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John Charlot purports to have written a "critical review" of my book *Kingship and Sacrifice: Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii.* Critical it is, but a review of my book it is not.

It is not a review of my book because Charlot does not do what a reviewer should do: summarize the whole argument of a book before evaluating it. It is also not a review of my book because, by sheer power of misunderstanding, gross manipulation, and outright misquoting, Charlot has managed to create a travesty that has little recognizable relation to my book. He has thus accomplished the rare feat of seeing neither the forest nor the trees. Since he is mostly concerned with the trees, my rejoinder will have to follow him on his elective ground; however, I will repeatedly have to refer to the forest in order to indicate the true location of certain trees, or sometimes blades of grass that he mistakes for trees.

Before addressing Charlot's arguments I cannot avoid mentioning a rather unpleasant fact. Charlot seems to have been much disturbed by my criticism of one of his pet theories. As I shall show later at the end of this rejoinder, he has given me no reason to retract my criticism, but I find his accusation of having indulged in "name-calling" in the course of my criticism (Charlot 138) quite unacceptable. Far from being rude to him, in the acknowledgments I say, "I warmly thank him for his help" (Valeri xv). Since Char-lot seems unable to recognize polite language, I have decided to be much less careful with my words in this rejoinder and to attempt to match, as far as I am able, the unpleasant tone of his prose. I may be allowed to observe that this false accusation is only the most offensive example of his systematic distortion or even falsification of my statements throughout his piece.

Charlot begins by saying that there are many "inaccurate references" in my book and gives a number of examples that, presumably, he finds particularly blatant. Let me examine each of these examples in the order in which they are discussed by Charlot.

1. My statement (V. 149) that "divine ali'i . . . are obliged--men and women--to remain virgin until marriage" is not, says Charlot, supported by the source that I quote at that page. He claims this because the source in question states that "girls were required to be virgin until the first planned union to conceive a child" and does not mention that the same rule was valid for men. However, Charlot must admit (characteristically in a footnote--C. 140 n. 3--which is then not taken into

consideration in his negative evaluation of my argument) that other sources that I quote on the following page (V. 150) "arguably support the virginity of the male" (C. 140 n. 3).[1] In other words, my statement is correct and my only fault consists in not having quoted all the evidence on page 149. Charlot also claims that the general statement that opens my discussion of this and related practices, namely that they are meant to preserve the purity of the ali'i, is not supported by the source that I quote on page 149 (a text from Pukui, Haertig, and Lee, whose volumes I will henceforth quote as NK 1 or NK 2) nor by any other source. In his opinion, "virginity was maintained . . . for purely practical genealogical reasons, not for the maintenance of ritual purity" (C. 108). There are two points here: one is my alleged use of Pukui, Haertig, and Lee to support the thesis of a connection between virginity and ritual purity; the other is the validity of this thesis as such.

Concerning the first point, had Charlot quoted me in full, it would have been evident that my reference to Pukui, Haertig, and Lee was not meant to support my interpretation of virginity as a sign of ritual purity, but to document two specific facts: the taboo on intercourse between sacred ali'i and women of lower rank and the chiefly taboo on having sexual relations before the first marriage. Indeed, I write (V. 149): "The purity of sacred ali'i is preserved not only by the behavior of their inferiors or rivals, but also by their own comportment. For example, divine ali'i are forbidden to have sexual relations with women of lower rank, and they are obliged--men and women--to remain virgin until marriage (NK, 2:88-89)." NK 2 is mentioned as a source for the custom of premarital virginity, not in support of its connection with ritual purity. If anyone makes this source say what it does not say, it is Charlot, who writes: "the authors go on to say that the emphasis on virginity in some Hawaiian legends is a result of missionary influence" (C. 108). What the authors actually say is as follows: "In Hawai'i's stories, missionary influenced writers-translators who first put them in written form may have injected their own bias for chaste heroines" (NK, 2:89). Thus Charlot transforms a "may" (that is, a hypothesis for which, incidentally, no evidence is given) into an "is."[2] This is an example of what he accuses me of doing: transforming a simple hypothesis into a proven fact!

I now address the second point, that is, the connection between virginity and purity. Charlot claims "this virginity was maintained . . . for purely practical genealogical reasons, not for the maintenance of ritual purity" (C. 108). His basis for this important interpretive claim is Pukui, Haertig, and Lee, a modern text useful as a compilation of

sources, but one whose interpretations should be used with caution.[3] In my book I have repeatedly attacked the very Western-modern view that Hawaiian rank was a "practical" or purely "political" matter and attempted to show that it is very much connected with ritual. I will not repeat these arguments here, but simply focus on the connection between virginity and ritual purity. In a footnote to my general discussion of pollution (V. 361 n. 12), I referred to a passage from the nineteenth-century novel *Laieikawai* by Hale'ole, which supports the view that loss of virginity involves loss of purity (Beckwith 1919, 510-512). Charlot objects (C. 110) that this view is not traditional on the grounds that the heroine of that novel "receives in many ways a Victorian idealization." Charlot forgets that Hale'ole was one of the great experts of Hawaiian tradition (see V. xxv). His statement on virginity is at any rate confirmed by two texts that display no Victorian idealization.

One text is the story of a chiefly woman who has lost her virginity and is therefore banished by her father. She is met by emissaries looking for a new wife for their king. This king has a virgin daughter who lives on top of an extremely taboo terrace (*ka 'anu'u kapu loa,* Fornander 1916-1920, 4:545). This virgin daughter invites the heroine to sit by her on the platform, which, disliking the fact of her lost virginity, magically makes her slip. Later, the king's daughter brings the heroine to a bathing pool "which was also a very sacred place, those having lost their virginity, or who were defiled, were not allowed to bathe in it" (*" 'a'ole e 'au'au ka po'e i nahā, a me ka po'e haumia,"* ibid.). When the girl attempts to climb the bank of the pond she is again mystically pushed back because she is not a virgin. Had a priest not discovered that she was of higher rank than the king himself, and therefore taboo to him, the girl would have been put to death for having defiled the sacred platform and pool (ibid.).

The story demonstrates that loss of virginity implies loss of ritual purity, since it makes pure places mystically react against the deflowered woman. Furthermore, the text explicitly establishes a parallel between "deflowered persons" *(po'e i nahā)* and "polluted persons" *(po'e haumia).* It seems to me, therefore, that far from being evidence "against" my thesis, as Charlot incongruously states (n. 3), this text proves that my thesis is correct.

Another text illustrates the connection between virginity and ritual purity for a male. This is the story of Uweuwelekehau, a young man who "was always accompanied by his two gods, Kane and Kanaloa. His bringing up was surrounded by many restrictions; his house was sacred, people not being allowed to pass near it upon pain of certain death"

(Fornander 1916-1920, 5:194). The gods do not allow the man to have sexual intercourse with the woman he falls in love with, because he is "bound" by their mana (*"ua pa'a i ka mana o Kāne a me Kanaloa,"* ibid., 197). This text indicates that there is an incompatibility between the presence of divine mana (a ritual state) in the man and sexual intercourse, and therefore vindicates my position against Charlot's criticism. On the other hand, he is right in saying that my sources do not prove that chastity belts were used to preserve virginity before marriage: they only prove that chastity belts preserved fidelity within marriage.

2. Charlot questions the validity of three examples that I give to illustrate my point that mythical ali'i "are readily placed at the origin of certain species, especially foods" (V. 146). He acknowledges that my third example "fits" but claims that my first example "could better be understood as a story of the gods; and the second . . . does not state that the persons involved are chiefs" (C. 109). Had Charlot departed from his usual practice (at least in this "review") of reading texts out of context, he would have discovered that his claim concerning the second example is false. Indeed the text to which I refer is but the continuation of another one, where it is explicitly said that the person (not persons!) involved--that is, Maikohā—who metamorphoses into the *wauke* (*Broussonetia papyriphera* plant), is the son of the ali'i Konikonia (Fornander 1916-1920, 5:269). As for my first example, I fail to see how it "could better be understood as a story of the gods," since in the text to which I refer Hinaaimalama and her siblings--from whom various species originate--descend from grandparents who are alternatively called ali'i (chiefs) and *akua* (gods) (ibid., 267). If anything, this myth proves my most general point--rejected by Charlot--that chiefs and gods are treated as interchangeable in many contexts.

My next sentence in the book is also the target of Charlot's criticism. He claims that the chants in which chiefs are called various animals "cannot be used to demonstrate that the chiefs in question actually assumed the bodies named" (C. 109). My views are actually more subtle than Charlot represents, as is demonstrated by my statement: "It is as a shark, or by mystically controlling sharks, that the king often punishes transgressors and rebels" (V. 151). The statement that the king "is a shark" is further qualified on the same page--in the sentence quoted by Charlot--where I say that he is a shark, only in the sense that he can act through it and has a substantial relation to it, and so on. Charlot is wrong in interpreting this sentence as a claim that there is "an *identity* of the chief with the shark" (C. 109-110). But whatever the specific nature of the connection postulated between certain chiefs and certain

animals, my basic point is that it is not conceived as a simple "metaphor," but as a true "affinity" (V. 151). This is supported by the evidence, as Charlot must acknowledge. On the other hand, I find it hard to believe that he could seriously put forward the following argument against the view that ali‘i can assume nonhuman bodies: "the chiefs honored in the chants are historic figures: Kalani‘ōpu‘u and Kamehameha. Had they been able to assume nonhuman bodies, it would have been mentioned in the many historical accounts we have of them" (C. 109). I thought that we were discussing beliefs in chiefly powers, not actual chiefly powers. But it seems that Charlot is prepared to believe in anything, even in the kind of objection that he is able to devise!

3. Charlot finds fault with my statement that "sexual intercourse with inferiors is also polluting to superiors" (V. 91; see also 149). He expresses his surprise that I say this, since I have myself shown on page 150 (and p. 372 n. 56) that such intercourse was extremely frequent. On the page to which he refers, I say that the rules concerning the sexuality of the ali‘i reflect two contradictory requirements of chiefly rule: the preservation of the rank's purity by avoiding admixture with lower ranks, and the necessity of spreading life and of increasing the number of the chief's followers. I have also indicated, following Malo, that there is a partial solution to this contradiction: until an heir of the proper rank is born, sexual relations are restricted; after that, they become free. Charlot's criticism simply reflects his inability to see a statement as part of an argument: he sees two trees, but does not see that they are part of a wood.

Charlot's attempts to disprove that two texts which I use support the thesis that sexual intercourse with inferiors is polluting for sacred ali‘i are also misguided. The first one (Malo 1951, 70-71), he says, concerns "definitely a special case," since it refers to the ban on intercourse with "the *kauwā* or pariah class." I would not call it a "special case," but an "extreme case" since the *kauwā* are the extreme opposite of the ali‘i from the point of view of rank. Charlot's claim that marriage with *kauwā* is presented as "bad for genealogical reasons--that is, one becomes déclassé--rather than for ones of pollution" is typical of his superposition of modern Western ideas about "class" on the Hawaiian ideology of rank. As I have made abundantly clear, Hawaiian rank is measured by the degree of closeness to the gods from whom the ali‘i descend. Those who are close to the gods are said to be pure, while the impure are separated from them. In Kamakau's words, "all those who were polluted were kept separated because the god desired only those who were clean and pure" (1964:64). This implies that in Hawaii, as

elsewhere in Polynesia, the higher the rank, the greater the purity, and that loss of rank is loss of purity. Indeed I have quoted cases in which sacred ali‘i, because they were polluted by their enemies, were reduced IO very low status. It is because they are impure that the *kauwā* are low in status and therefore avoided as marriage partners by those who are higher. “Genealogical reason” is derivative, as is also shown by the fact that nonsexual forms of intercourse with the *kauwā* are sufficient to produce a loss in rank: “The houses of the slaves [*kauwā*] were *tapu.* No one not a slave could go there. If any one not a slave was seen there he became like an eating sore, a disgrace to his descendants” (Kepelino 1932: 144). No mésalliance is involved here.

To uphold his point that the taboo of intercourse with *kauwā* had nothing to do with pollution, Charlot (n. 4) is forced to do away with Malo’s statement that genealogists try to *ho‘oma‘ema‘e* or “cleanse” ali‘i lines of connections with *kauwā.* Charlot claims that since *ho‘oma-‘ema‘e* is not a “technical term” it need not have the sense of “cleansing” in such a context. What other sense, then? At any rate Charlot is in error in saying that *ho‘oma‘ema‘e* is not used as a technical term: it is used by Malo, for instance, to refer to the purification of a woman after delivery (Malo 1951, 138-139), as I have noted on page 86 of my book. More importantly, Charlot forgets that Kamakau makes the same statement as Malo about cleansing ali‘i rank, using the more common, and stronger (“technical,” if he wills) term *huikala,* “purify,” “cleanse”: “By mixing here, mixing there, the blood of lords has become mixed with the blood of *kauwa,* and there is nothing that can cleanse it *(‘a‘ole mea nana* i *huikala)”* (Kamakau 1964:9).

Charlot also betrays an utter lack of understanding of the notion of “pollution” (n. 4). He says that the sentence “the *kauwa* class were regarded as a defilement and a stench” (Malo 1951: 71) is mistranslated. The original Hawaiian reads *“ua kapa ia ka poe kauwa he palani, he hohono ke ano,”* which literally means *“kauwā* were called *palani* fish, a type that has a bad odor.” Now to compare the *kauwā* to something that has bad odor is simply to call them “impure,” “polluting.” Indeed “impurity” and “pollution” are themselves physical metaphors of social states, as every anthropologist knows (Douglas 1966) and as I have myself noted (V. 85). Emerson’s translation is therefore inaccurate but not conceptually misleading, as is confirmed by other texts. Thus Kamakau writes: “They [the *kauwā*]] continued to hide their shameful blemish *(‘alina hilahila),* but they could not wash out their tainted blood” (Kamakau 1964:9). And Kepelino writes that *kauwā* were called *hawahawa,* a reduplication of *hawa,* which Pukui and Elbert’s

dictionary glosses as "defiled, unclean, filthy, daubed with excrement" (PE, 58). If this is not "pollution" what is it? (For these references and others, see V. 85, 164,360 n. 4.)

The second text discussed (Kamakau 1961, 128) says that the ali'i Kahahana became "degraded" and lost the "tabu of fire *(Ahi),* heat *(Wela)* and extra-ordinary heat *(Hahana)*" because he made love to "lesser chiefesses." The connection between high status and purity is clearly stated in this text (V. 149); Charlot, however, says that "*kapu* often have particular rules, and one cannot generalize from one example." To this I will answer that my views on rank and its preservation by avoiding mixed unions do not rest on this single example and are not expressed in the single sentence of my book that Charlot quotes. If my critic wishes to demonstrate that Kahahana's case is exceptional, he should do so by proving (1) that the state of *kapu* is not for the high chiefs a religious state, that is, a state that involves a connection with the pure gods; and (2) that sexual relations, particularly with inferiors, are not usually conceived as inimical to a *kapu* state.

I think that my entire book is an argument against the first point; as for the second, it is sufficient to remind the reader that all those who participated in temple rites--and were therefore in a state of *kapu*--were required to abstain from sexual relations on pain of death (Malo 1951, 164). Sexual abstinence was also prescribed when planting, which involved contact with the gods (NK, 1:201). This shows that the incompatibility between sexual relations and closeness to the gods (which implies a state of *kapu*) is such a general principle that the example of Kahahana cannot be considered exceptional. Therefore, Charlot's comparison of the rule against sexual intercourse with inferiors attached to Kahahana's *kapu* with one *kapu's* peculiar requirement to shield the "head from the sun's rays" is totally specious.

4. Next, Charlot declares that "generalizations can be made only with caution from individual authors or works of literature" (C. 110). Example: the "extreme aspects of identification" between chiefs and their lands that I supposedly postulate can only be found in the chant of Ke'āulumoku "who, however important, represents a very personal, uncommon viewpoint" (C. 110). Whatever reason Charlot has to believe this, he does not share with us. Personally, I think that the viewpoint of an official bard at the court of two kings, and the half-brother of the wife of one of them (Fornander 1878-1880, 2:67, 157, 210) cannot be as idiosyncratic as Charlot claims. At any rate, any reader will see that I simply write "his [the king's] kingdom is assimilated with his body" (V. 146) and "the body of an ali'i is ritually interchangeable with

his land" (V. 152). Both statements imply (as is also made clear by my analysis of the *luakini* temple ritual) a relationship of symbolic equivalence or substitution, not "extreme aspects of identification," which only exist in Charlot's imagination.

5. Charlot's final example is an example only of his inability to read a sentence as part of an argument. I am accused of having referred to Kahiolo and Elbert to support my view that chiefs "are characterized by immobility and inactivity"--a view which, in Charlot's opinion, would only be supported by "a pejorative remark by a foreigner, amply refuted by contemporary literature" (C. 111). (Actually I also refer to a plethora of texts, which mention that very high ranking ali'i do not walk but must be carried and are therefore in a prescribed state of inactivity [V. 147]; but Charlot conveniently forgets this fact.) His partial style of quotation hides the fact that I am referring to Kahiolo and Elbert only as sources for the mythical motive of the hero's inaction (Kahiolo 1978; Elbert 1956-1957). But, had Charlot taken the trouble of reading through my argument, he would have discovered that I completely agree with Elbert in the view that this is only a provisional state of inaction, which inevitably turns into a state of action. Indeed, I write: "In mythology as in reality (cf. Beckwith 1940, 412-413) a time comes when passivity turns into an explosion of activity and the king reveals himself to be king precisely because he produces and acts" (V. 149). The two parts of the argument are separated because of a more general expository choice. I am arguing that ali'i are depicted as having apparently contradictory behaviors. Thus I first discuss one series of behaviors (inactivity, rank endogamy, invisibility, etc.), then the contradictory series (action, sexual intercourse with inferiors, visibility, etc.).

In this case, as previously, Charlot, astonishingly, is not aware of the structure of my argument and is therefore under the impression that I am making erroneous or contradictory statements. Although I should have referred to Elbert in the second part of the argument too, no major fault is involved in quoting a source only for part of the information that it contains, unless this partial use has the purpose of making false accusations against the author, in the manner of Charlot.

The remark by a foreigner that Charlot defines as "pejorative" is: "The highest point of etiquette among illustrious Hawaiians was, *not to move*" (cited in V. 147). As the reader can see, nothing pejorative is meant here. I have used this remark because it is confirmed by many other such observations on Polynesian chiefs. Much of Polynesian (and Hawaiian) aristocratic etiquette is concerned with bodily control as an outward symbol of form and plenitude, which are chiefly and divine

attributes. I have often commented on the symbolic value of immobility, both in the book and in papers (Valeri 1982, 1985), and I do not have to repeat myself here. But Charlot has a mysterious comment: "that Valeri takes immobility literally can be seen from 272, 336." I don't understand what he means by "literal" immobility. But let me make clear once again that for me physical immobility is a sign of a spiritual or ritual state, as both passages of my book to which Charlot refers (V. 272, 336) demonstrate. The first reads: "This natural complex of relationships is perpetuated in a transformed state at the cultural level. The tree, immobile and attractive, appears as the complete, encompassing element. Thus it is transformed into the image of Kūnuiākea, 'Kū of wide expanse,' the supreme form of Ku" (V. 272). The second reference says: "as soon as the victim is captured, he is immobilized and set apart--a sign of his consecration" (V. 336).

These are, then, the best examples that Charlot can find of inaccurate references in a book of more than four hundred pages! And I have indeed shown that if there is a person guilty of inaccurate and selective use of reference, both to my text and to many Hawaiian texts, it is Charlot himself. No doubt any serious user of my book (as of any book) will want to check my references; but he will want even more to check Charlot's references. Readers will also want to reflect on this strange fact: All the above examples of "inaccurate" references come from a few pages of a chapter in which I criticize a thesis put forward by Charlot and attempt to prove the contrary thesis.[4]

The next section of Charlot's critique addresses the question of interpretation. Unfortunately, we are faced once again with the myopic and atomistic style of criticism with which Charlot has acquainted us. I am immediately accused of announcing my interpretation of a text instead of offering arguments in support of it. The first example given is once again an example only of Charlot's inability to keep focus on the reality of what I have written. He claims that my interpretation of a whole chant is based on one line only. But anyone can see that I do not claim to interpret the chant (V. 55). I am simply commenting on *one* of the metaphors used in its *third* part. Likewise, my reference to the gods coming from Kahiki is limited to that specific context. Interpreting this reference as a claim "that the gods must come from Kahiki every time they are invoked" (C. 111) is a truly herculean feat of distortion. As Charlot himself is forced to acknowledge, I have often mentioned other abodes of the gods.

Next, Charlot questions my interpretation of the story of the origin of the Kānehekili cult. He writes: "Two problems for Valeri's interpretation are that the story is about the priest, not the god, and that he dies, rather than being sacrificed" (C. 111). Charlot is apparently questioning as unproven the equivalence of the god and his priest. Their equivalence, however, is suggested by the fact that they have the same name (Kānehekili) and even more by a statement at the end of the myth: "Those who had the head [of the priest], they worshipped it; and also his eyes, or his mouth; they were called the eye of the god, or mouth of the god, and so on" (Thrum 1909, 48-49, cited in V. 132). Through the priest's body, then, the god becomes accessible for worship. This fact also demonstrates that the priest's body has the *same value* as a sacrificial victim's body; this is all I implied by saying that the priest (i.e., by definition, a sacrificer) is equated with a victim. I did not imply that the *manner of his death* was identical to that of an ordinary victim. Indeed, I have repeatedly shown in my book that the manner of death is far less important in Hawaiian sacrifice than the act of consecration, that is, of giving an object, animal, or person the status of mediator between god and worshipper. This is precisely what happens with the priest Kānehekili, since the pieces of his body mediate between the god Kānehekili and his worshippers. I may add now, however, that the mysterious and sudden death of the priest in the god's temple suggests that the god has killed him in order to make the spreading of his cult possible by distributing pieces of the priest's body. The alternative proposed by Charlot ("the body of the priest could be efficacious without being considered a sacrifice" C. 111) is inacceptable because he does not tell us what would make it efficacious. I spare the reader my comments on Charlot's other "hypothesis," contained in his words "and so on." I will simply say that this example shows that Charlot has understood nothing of my interpretation of Hawaiian sacrifice.

Let us now turn to the accusation that I can dismiss texts that do not fit my views. Two examples are given. The first concerns a cryptic reference by Kamakau to "mana" as "property" of baits (V. 100). This reference does not in the least contradict my basic definition of the term mana, which is "potency, to be potent," "efficacy, to be efficacious," "success, to be successful"--properties that baits should have (V. 98). Kamakau's text, however, is an instance of the occasional extension of the term mana outside the properly religious and ritual context. It is for this reason that I say that in this case mana is "banalized" (that is "made commonplace"), not because I want to dismiss Kamakau's text as irrele-

vant. On the contrary, I mention it because it is relevant to my thesis that in Hawaii the notion of mana has a greater range of applications than in some other Polynesian cultures (cf. V. 100-101).

The second example given by Charlot is puzzling. I have used certain lines of a chant for a limited purpose, more corroborative than demonstrative of an interpretation of mine. Charlot asserts but does not demonstrate that the rest of the chant contradicts my interpretation. Since he gives no reason to believe otherwise, I continue to consider the chant as "somewhat anomalous" because it contains lines that are not found in any other account of the rite in which it was chanted. At any rate I don't see anything in these lines that contradicts my interpretation of the rite.

Charlot then addresses a methodological question that seems at first interesting: too few senses of a word versus too many senses. Unfortunately we are disappointed again. My interpretation of lines 613-614 of the *Kumulipo* chant is questioned on the grounds that I select only one meaning for *kāne* ("human male") and only one meaning for *ki'i* ("image of a god"). According to Chariot, other meanings of the terms *kāne* and *ki'i* should be considered: hence it would be impossible to claim, as I do, that the god (Kāne) is called after the man, and the man (Ki'i) is called after the god (V. 6). But I will stick to my interpretation because the context rules out any of the other meanings for *kāne* suggested by Charlot. "The word can be used for the human male, but for any other male as well: animal, vegetable, mineral, or god" (C. 112). The god *Kāne* is represented as neither mineral nor animal in the context of the *Kumulipo,* but as human, in fact all too human, since he is jealous of his wife and angry at Ki'i for his secret union with her (a union which, incidentally, means taking the god's place) :

> She slept with Ki'i
> Kane suspected the first-born, became jealous
> suspected Ki'i and La'ila'i of a secret union [?]
> They pelted Kane with stones
> hurled a spear; he shouted aloud
> "This is fallen to my lot, for the younger [line]"[?]
> Kane was angry and jealous because he slept last with her
> his descendants would hence belong to the younger line
> the children of the elder would be lord (Beckwith 1951:106, lines 696-704).

So much for animal, vegetable, and mineral! As for *ki'i,* Charlot tells us: "A glance at the dictionary will show that Valeri is selecting only one

sense of *ki‘i*” (C. 112). Let us glance at the dictionary to establish whether my choice is justified. *Ki‘i* receives five groups of glosses in the dictionary of Pukui and Elbert:

1. Image, statue, picture, doll, petroglyph; features, as of a face; plans, as for a house; carved, as end of an *‘auamo* pole . . .
2. To fetch, procure, send for, go after, attack; to seek for sexual ends.
3. Hula step . . .
4. Same as *alani,* a tree.
5. Gesture, as in hula. (PE, 136-137) . . .

Glosses in groups 1, 3, and 5 are probably related, but they are obviously unrelated to groups 2 and 4, which are unrelated to each other. The signifier *ki‘i,* therefore, does not constitute one single polysemous word, but at least three different homophonous words. To suggest that all these meanings should be involved in the translation of the proper name Ki‘i is to incur in the error denounced by Charlot himself of “using too many senses of a word” (C. 112). In fact, it would be a worse error: it would imply treating several homophonous words as one polysemous word! It seems to me that only a meaning in group 1 can be a candidate for translating Ki‘i as used in this context of the *Kumulipo.* And among those meanings only the main one, “image” (that is, “image of a god,” V. 6), makes contextual sense. As I have mentioned (V. 7), this translation receives further support from another episode related in the *Kumulipo,* where Wākea, the apical ancestor of all Hawaiians, conceals himself in the image of a god *(ki‘i)* to seduce a divine woman. Here Wākea is like Ki‘i relative to La‘ila‘i: hence it makes sense to say that the name Ki‘i refers to a divine image in lines 696-698 (Beckwith 1951, 123, cf. 102-103 and the analogous myths in Valeri 1981). My translations of the names Ki‘i and Kāne in those lines are thus the most likely; Charlot cannot suggest any credible alternative, only a fan of dictionary meanings among which he does not choose.

The next case is one of “too many senses.” Charlot finds fault with my suggestion that the word *lau* is used in a magical formula for weakening the god Kamapua‘a because of a deliberate word play on two significata: “numerous” and “seine.” He comments: “A pig in a seine is an unusual image” (C. 112). Charlot is too literal-minded, which is not conducive to understanding the metaphors of a magical spell. The same literal-mindedness makes it impossible for him to understand my suggestion that the belt around the waist of the main temple image--called

piko, "navel"--probably also evokes the two other references for *piko:* genitals and crown of the head (fontanel). Charlot objects: "A child can be circumcised, but how could the crown or fontanel be cut?" (ibid.). I never suggested that the symbolic "cutting of the *piko*" of the image was also a cutting of the fontanel. As a material act, the rite is only a cutting of the umbilical cord of the god, who is represented as a newborn child. But as a symbolic act, it probably constitutes the three *piko* that define every human: a connection with his consanguines (through the navel), a connection with his ancestors (through the fontanel), and a connection with his affines and descendants (through the genitals). Indeed the latter two connections are made possible by the first, that is by birth. The fact that the rite is symbolically overdetermined and that his various meanings are not reducible to the materiality of an act escapes Charlot who, as we shall see again and again, doesn't seem to understand the properties of symbolic thought.

Next Charlot questions the connection that I tentatively suggest in a note between the two meanings of *lele:* "altar" and "messenger." But the two significata do have a common ground: their mediating role. Charlot gives no argument whatsoever against this connection.

I am also accused of combining Kahiki as a place name with Kahiki as various cosmic points. But all these meanings constitute one single grouping in Pukui and Elbert's dictionary. I am simply attempting to make sense of a connection that clearly existed in the Hawaiian mind, as testified, for instance, by the text of Kamakau to which I refer in my book (V. 9). One passage of this text reads: "Here are some terms for the *kukulu o ka lani,* 'the borders of the sky,' or *kukulu o Kahiki,* 'borders of Kahiki.' These are what *ka poʻe kahiko* called all lands beyond the Hawaiian archipelago--the lands beyond the circles of Kahiki-moe [the horizon] and Kahiki-ku [defined as "the (first) band of the firmament where it ascends upward" on p. 5]. These lands were called the lands of *kukulu o Kahiki* [*kukulu* is another word for "horizon," p. 5] or of *kukulu o ka lani or of na paia ku a lani,* the standing walls of heaven or of *kumu lani*" (Kamakau 1976, 6). Moreover, since Kamakau connects Kahiki with all lands beyond the horizon and the lowest zone of the celestial dome, we must conclude that these lands are indeed considered invisible from Hawaii. Indeed, contrary to Charlot's statement that I introduce in my discussion "the word 'invisible,' which does not appear in these texts" (C. 112), the word "invisible" appears in Kamakau's text, which speaks of the "invisible horizon" whose "only boundary is where it adjoins the solid walls of the sky" (Kamakau 1976, 5), where he situates the "lands of Kahiki-ku" (ibid., 6). Charlot completely misun-

derstands my definition of Kahiki as "invisible transcendent place." My references to the above texts should have made clear to him that I do not conceive of the lands of Kahiki as invisible in an absolute sense; they are invisible from Hawaii. Indeed I am well aware (since I have mentioned the fact several times) that mythical travelers sailed to Kahiki and set foot on land! This is another case where Charlot confuses his misconceptions with what I actually say. He also demonstrates that he is not a careful reader of the Hawaiian texts to which I refer, since he claims something completely untrue about at least one of them.

Charlot also accuses me of dividing "words into parts to get more meanings" (C. 113). He can produce only one example for this: I am supposed to assert that "*kauila* wood" is to be interpreted as *ka uila,* "the lightning" (ibid.). I say nothing of the sort. I am referring to *kauila* as the name of a rite, and saying that this name may be "a metonymy for the feather gods, which are supported by a handle or pole made from *kauila* wood" and could also be associated "with lightning *(ka uila),* that is, a manifestation of the divine power in its luminous but violent (as befits the *akua hulu manu* [feather gods]) form" (V. 269).

Charlot often claims that I formulate the correct methodology, but then do not follow it in practice. The problem is that he understands neither my methodological points nor what I do in practice. Two examples of this double misunderstanding can be found on page 113 of his text. Charlot notes that I caution against "the temptation to arbitrarily construct a single account of the rites patched together from different sources" but on page 8 combine two texts to "connect Pō and Kahiki" and, on page 331, different versions of a story. Charlot is confusing two different things. My methodological statement concerns patching together different descriptions of whole rituals to construct a single *descriptive* statement; it does not concern, as should be obvious, the establishment of structural relations and equivalences at the level of interpretation. At any rate, nowhere on page 8 do I say that Pō and Kahiki are connected. I say that they are two metaphors of "divine origins" that differ in that Kahiki, contrary to Pō, is one of "more concrete metaphors . . . with primarily spatial connotations" (V. 8). On the next page I state: "Pō and to a certain extent Kahiki are metaphors for the undifferentiated state of the divine power, which is placed at the origin of the living universe" (V. 9). If there is a connection between Kahiki and Pō it is the connection between two different metaphors. With regard to page 331 of my book, I do not put together different versions of a story to produce an artificially constructed version. I am simply trying to uncover a system of relations common to all versions.

Clearly, Charlot has no idea of the structural method, as is demonstrated by remarks found throughout his paper. For instance, he seems to believe that structuralism is a method based on finding "the raw and the cooked" everywhere. He even enlists me against Lévi-Strauss, by misquoting one of my sentences: "Valeri states that 'the disjunction between the raw offering and the cooked offering' cannot be found in Hawaii (123)." What I actually say is: "It does not seem that the disjunction between the raw offering and the cooked offering exists in the everyday appropriation of taro (cf. Kamakau 1976, 36-37); however, it exists during the celebration of the New Year and on other occasions when cultivators place their offerings of raw taro on the altar of their district" (V. 123). I hope that in his essays Charlot does not quote his Hawaiian sources in the way that he quotes my book! Note also that on pages 57-58 I show that offerings are differentiated into raw, roasted, broiled, and cremated.

On pages 113-114 Charlot illustrates two of his claims: "Valeri's arguments from texts are often tenuous"; "Valeri's arguments are often very short." My arguments are tenuous and short only in Charlot's distorted rendering. The first of the two examples of "tenuousness" concerns my hypothesis that a correspondence exists between the state of the audience in a certain rite, a state described as *'olu'olu* by K. Kamakau (in V. 289), and the state--also described as *'olu'olu--induced* in the god according to Malo (ibid.). Charlot objects that I translate *'olu'olu* only as "affable," while the word has many glosses. I have already explained that only the context allows us to decide how to translate a word. K. Kamakau is describing the mood of the participants: this can hardly be described by such glosses as "refreshing," "soft," or "comfortable," to which Charlot contrasts my gloss "affable." The latter seems to me a good general term summarizing all glosses that are relevant in this context: "cool," "pleasant," "polite," "courteous." Moreover, it is not true that I translate *'olu'olu* by "affable" only: I also give it the meaning "cool" and "to soften" (V. 289). Thus I use all the relevant meanings of this word, while Charlot adds other meanings that are either redundant or irrelevant.

Not happy with just distorting what I say, Charlot adds a strange argument: " *'Olu'olu* is a common word, so it would be difficult to make the correspondence argument even if it were appearing in the same text" (C. 113). *'Olu'olu* may be a common word, but it is not common in the narratives of the *luakini* temple ritual. Hence the use of the same word to describe the state of both god and worshippers may be significant indeed, even if each state is described by a different source.

Furthermore, to object that the two states refer to "different points of the account of the ceremony" is to miss the point, which is, precisely, that one state results from the other, and is therefore preceded by it (V. 307). Because I use the word "results," Charlot claims that I view the relationship between the two states as causal. Charlot could have spared himself this false claim if he had considered my statement (V. 307-308) in the light of what I have said about the relationship between god and worshippers throughout my book: that it is dialectical and reciprocal, not causal. But I have also said that this reciprocal relation is often weighted toward the worshippers, as is made clear in several contexts discussed in my book (V. 101-104, for instance), including the one misrepresented by Charlot (V. 307-308). It is because of this weighting that I say there that the state of the god "results" from that of the worshipper.

Another example given by Charlot is even worse. He claims that I give no reference for my various statements concerning the effect that (lancing has on the development of the fetus of an ali'i. In reality I give several references to texts describing facts that lend themselves to my interpretation, particularly K. Kamakau (1919-1920, 2-4; because of an unfortunate typo, the printed text has "24" instead of "2-4"). K. Kamakau says that the ali'i commands the people to dance in honor of his soon-to-be-born child and to compose and sing songs in his praise. These actions are said to have the power to ward off the negative effects of sorcerers and angry gods on the fetus (ibid., 2). Does not this justify my interpretation that "dance is necessary to help develop the fetus of an ali'i and to ease his birth" and therefore "help engender" it? What other interpretation does Charlot propose? As for my statement that "dance contributes to affirming the reality of the ali'i's mana" I would claim that, given the common association between mana and growth (cf. V. 96-97, 330-331), it is indirectly supported by K. Kamakau's text. It is, at any rate, supported by the facts mentioned on page 384, note 56.

Charlot connects the above statements of mine and a hypothetical one derived from them (V. 219) with two other sentences in order to prove that I transform hypotheses into "confirmed facts" (C. 114). This "proof" is achieved by distorting what I say. The first sentence ("the engendering of Lonomakua, like that of any god" V. 219) has no connection with the hypothetical statement (also on V. 219) quoted by Charlot on the relationship between dancing and the engendering of the god Lonomakua. That no connection exists is made clear by the rest of the sentence, which Charlot omits: ". . . is represented as the growth of a human." This continuation indicates that the sentence refers, not to

the engendering of the god through the dance, but to the fact that the process of construction and consecration of the god's image is represented in ritual as the growth of a human (cutting the navel cord, girdling with loincloth).

Charlot has no more justification in using the next sentence that he quotes, since there the expression "is born of the feasting" is a purely metaphoric expression and one that implies a relationship between the production of the god and the feast as a whole, not with the dancing alone, contrary to what Charlot attempts to suggest. I also fail to see how Charlot can say that hypothesis on page 99 becomes a confirmed fact on page 101 when he leaves both unspecified. Such an allusive style of reference and criticism, which is abundantly used by Charlot, especially in his footnotes, hardly corresponds to the conventional rules of scholarly debate.

Charlot misreads my statement on page 273. It is not the statue made from the Haku ʻōhiʻa tree, but the tree itself that "is inseparable from the birds." Indeed in the section to which this sentence belongs, the name Haku ʻōhiʻa ("Lord *ʻōhiʻa* tree") refers to the tree or to the god in tree form, as is made clear by this passage: "In his 'wild' state the god is called by the name of the tree, Haku ʻōhiʻa" (V. 271). The immediate context of the sentence quoted by Charlot, in which I write that "the Haku ʻōhiʻa is fetched" (V. 273) from the forest, should leave no doubt of the fact that there Haku ʻōhiʻa refers to the god in tree form.

As for the criticism of my allegedly "short" arguments, it can be disposed of in a very short time. I say that the relatives of the king are his "doubles" because they replicate his rank (V. 161, par. 3). Indeed the whole discussion in this chapter concerns the role of sacrifice in "reestablishing differentiation in a hierarchical system that, paradoxically, produces a certain coefficient of undifferentiation because of the overlap of different principles" (V. 168). The statement on the identification of the transgressor with the king whose taboos he transgresses (V. 165) is not a "short argument," but simply the repetition of a thesis that has been previously argued in full (V. 92, 94). The statement on Atea (V. 169), a Marquesan god, is a purely incidental remark, which is nevertheless supported by my references (Tregear 1891; Williamson 1933). Charlot does not give any reason to believe that they are wrong. As for the statement on Kahōāliʻi (325), Charlot forgets that it begins with the expression, "It will be recalled that," which refers to a demonstration given on pages 260-262. I don't know who, apart from Charlot, would be in need of longer demonstrations for the next two statements of mine that he quotes.

Charlot also claims that Hawaiian pigs were smaller than modern Western ones (C. 114). This fact would make a speculation of mine concerning the age of a pig being sacrificed unlikely or at least unnecessary. European explorers, however, were impressed by the size of many Hawaiian pigs (Beaglehole 1967, 511 n. 1, 522, 1157, 1188). Samwell, for instance, notes that on the island of Hawai‘i “there are great plenty of large hogs” (ibid., 1188).

I leave to the reader to judge the value of Charlot’s claim (C. 114) that I “eschew argument” because I use various stylistical conventions to link sentences or to announce hypotheses or speculations. It is Charlot himself--it seems to me--who eschews argument by quoting these expressions out of context and by failing to demonstrate that they are substitutes for argument. Such methods of criticism create much of the impression of the “review.” Nor is this impression dispelled by the method (partial quotation and no argument) by which Charlot attempts to prove his view that I tend to use hypothetical points as if they were confirmed. I don’t see how my statement--“This classification of the fish species is in large part hypothetical. It does in any case confirm the theory advanced , . .” (V. 26)--can be given by Charlot as an example of my supposed tendency. Anybody reading the rest of the sentence quoted by Charlot can see that “the theory advanced” concerns not the fish species, but “the principal *‘aumakua* species” (V. 26). The latter is well supported by the evidence offered by the principal *‘aumakua* species, and only receives further confirmation by the fact that it can be applied, hypothetically but not unreasonably, to the fish *aumakua*.[5] Sadly, Charlot has misunderstood my argument.

The supposed slippage from the hypothetical to the confirmed in the case of Kūkā‘ilimoku (V. 222) exists only in Charlot’s imagination. Must I repeat constantly “or some other equivalent god” after Kūkā‘ilimoku? I have made abundantly clear that the latter name is only that of the main feather god in the island of Hawai‘i, but that the differently named feather gods of other islands and dynasties are *functionally* equivalent to Kūkā‘ilimoku (V. 247). In my use, therefore, this name is just a shorthand for the entire type of these gods. As a result of such methods, Charlot’s criticism often seems nothing more than strings of partial quotations, each treated as a valid argument.

The results are no better when Charlot tries his hand at logic. He says that my entire book is based on a circular argument: my theory will be confirmed by the analysis of the ritual, but that analysis depends on my theory (C. 115). Charlot is probably under the impression that the hermeneutical circle is the same thing as a “circular argument,” but even

so, it is somewhat surprising that he can believe that I have first formulated my theory, and then simply proceeded to apply it to the ritual without making any change in the theory as a result of the analysis. The fact is that he is confusing an expository device (I first summarize the argument in schematic form, then proceed to illustrate and enrich it by the analysis of a concrete ritual action) with the actual steps of my research! Moreover it is surprising that he does not see that indeed my preliminary statements about gods, sacrifices, ali‘i, and so on, are much enriched and made more complex the further I advance in the analysis, particularly in the analysis of the *luakini* temple ritual.

As for the supposed “example” given by Charlot of this circularity, namely the relationship between the model of the hierarchy of the gods and the model of the hierarchy of the temples (C. 115), I will simply observe that

1. Charlot does not take into consideration my statement that the first model is confirmed by the analysis of ritual, not only by that of the temple hierarchy;

2. The evidence that I have offered on the temple hierarchy does not “cast the very idea of such a hierarchy in doubt”; it simply shows that several details of my model of this hierarchy are open to discussion. No discussion, however, is offered by Charlot: only a dogmatic statement. Others better qualified to judge the case than he have found my ideas interesting and worth incorporating (Kirch 1985, 258, 260, 262);

3. It seems that Charlot is an extreme positivist: no conjectural model and no argument from coherence (cf. Dumézil 1948, 18) are admitted in his epistemological universe. Charlot himself hardly follows such strictures in his theses; no wonder, because otherwise he would not be able to formulate them.

My “attitude toward [my] evidence” (C. 116), writes Charlot, is shown by my discussion of mana. I claim that we should not make too much of the rare occurrence of this word in the descriptions of the temple ritual by K. Kamakau and Malo. My claim is based on the following chain of arguments: All occurrences in K. Kamakau’s text are found in prayers, which suggests that mana was mostly used in prayers; but only very few of the many prayers that were uttered in the temple ritual are given by K. Kamakau and Malo; hence the rare occurrence of the word mana may only be due to the rare occurrence of prayers in these sources. Charlot objects that there are too few examples of prayers to be able to hypothesize, as I do, that the word mana “must have been included rather often” in prayers (V. 98). To this I will answer that even if the recorded prayers are few, they do establish a significant contrast

between "presence of mana" in prayers and absence of mana in prose descriptions. It is this contrast, and not the absolute number of available prayers, that is the basis of my hypothesis which, incidentally, plays a marginal role in my discussion of mana. The main role is played by another argument: ritual action itself is the best evidence on mana, since a key source (not simply "another source" as Charlot defines it), the *Mooolelo Hawaii,* says that the whole ritual is about the transmission of mana (V. 98). Charlot cannot deny this point. Nevertheless he continues to believe, without argument, that since "verbal expressions" are the fundamental evidence, my "views are not supported by the texts." Must one assume, then, that for him the texts describing the *luakini* temple ritual and related rituals are not texts?

Next Charlot argues: "Valeri's main thesis can fairly be said to depend on his interpretation of one section of the main temple ceremony" (C. 117). He refers to the section that, in Malo's description, identifies the cutting of the navel cord and the girdling of the loincloth around the main temple image, with the image's transformation into an *akua maoli,* "true god"--that is to say, a true embodiment of the god (V. 314-315). Charlot immediately distorts my argument by leaving out the reference to the girdling with a loincloth from his quotation of my thesis (C. 117). The sentence excised by Charlot is: "This birth rite and the rite for putting the loincloth on the god that follows it are identical to those performed for any male child to transform him fully into a social being." Only after having said this do I say that "the transformation of the god into the perfect type of the human male is thus completed." It is clear, therefore, that both rites, the cutting of the navel cord and girdling the statue with a loincloth, are involved in the transformation. Charlot, however, gives the impression that my thesis is based only on the navel-cutting rite.

Against my view that the navel-cutting rite for the god symbolizes his "birth,"[6] Charlot uses a strange argument. He says that both Malo's and Kelou Kamakau's descriptions of the similar rite performed for male infants of the ali'i rank show "that that ceremony could be separated from the birth" (C. 117) because it was performed in the temple, not in the house where the child was born. It seems that for Charlot this is in itself proof that the rite could have nothing to do with birth. This argument can only be sustained by reducing birth to a mere biological fact, that is, the expulsion of the fetus. But this modern Western definition of birth was certainly not shared by Hawaiians. Indeed, I see nothing in Malo and Kelou Kamakau suggesting that the navel-cutting rite is not considered part of the process of bringing the child to life: they only

imply that, in the case of male infants, this process cannot be left to women alone, but must be concluded by a ritual act performed by men in the presence of the gods. The small spatial and temporal hiatus between the parturition and the navel cutting cannot therefore be seriously used as an argument against my interpretation.

Nor does the use of the navel-cutting rite as an image "to express the beginning of something" (C. 118) prove anything against my interpretation[7] either, since the rite can function as an image of beginning precisely because it evokes birth, which is the most compelling image of beginning. However metaphoric, then, the cutting of the navel cord of the god evokes the idea of birth; contrary to what Charlot claims, I do not go beyond the evidence in claiming this. Moreover, one should consider the navel-cutting rite in its syntagmatic context. This context shows that the images of gestation and birth permeate the ritual. The statue of the god is often treated as a fetus or as a baby in the rites preceding the cutting of its "navel cord." Furthermore, the rite is followed by the girdling of the loincloth on the statue. This sequence does suggest a passage from birth to social adulthood: therefore the cutting of the navel cord cannot be considered as a mere beginning; it is a much more concrete image. Once again, we see that Charlot commits the capital methodological sin of interpreting a fact out of context.

Charlot also states that "the primary object of the ceremony under discussion is the statue, and some discussion is necessary on which ceremonial points apply to it and which to the god, however one conceives of the relation between the two" (C. 118). On the basis of Malo's (1951, 171) statement that when the sequence of rites concerning the image is concluded, the image becomes an *akua maoli,* "a real god," I would say that Charlot's query is meaningless, since obviously the statement implies that by acting on the image one acts on the god, that to the visible process of the ritual corresponds the invisible process of the god. The idea of such correspondence is well known from other parts of Polynesia as well (cf. Firth 1970).

Charlot's argument that I go "beyond the evidence in describing the section of the ceremony as the birth of the god" can fairly be said to have been disposed of. But what about his other claim: "His [Valeri's] characterization of that god as a man is derived wholly from his theory and has no basis whatsoever in the text" (C. 118)? Reading this sentence, I wonder what qualifies as textual evidence with Charlot. From all his arguments it appears that only explicit statements qualify as such. If one can find in a text a sentence that supports an interpretation by explicitly saying that a thing is indeed as the interpretation claims it

to be, the text can be said to support the interpretation; if not, it does not. Obviously, Charlot confuses one level of the text, and one mode in which it provides evidence, with the notions of text and textual evidence in general.

If he means that my "characterization of that god as a man" is not supported by the text because the text does not contain the sentence "that god is a man," I agree with him. Indeed, it would be surprising if such statement existed. As a matter of fact, its existence would contradict my theory, which is based on the assumption that the human character of the god is recognized only in mystified form by Hawaiian consciousness (otherwise it would not be religious, V. 345-346). I therefore expect to find only clues to that identification in the textual material. But these clues are quite clear. If a god is represented in ritual--however metaphorically--as being generated, born, and given a loincloth, am I wrong to say that he is represented as human? If, moreover, the statue representing the god is the icon of a perfectly developed man, both physically and socially (in that he recalls the highest ranking ali'i), can I not say with some justification that he is "the perfect type of the human male"? Charlot is blinded by his literalism. He disregards the fact that a text is a complex entity that communicates in different forms and at different levels, not only at the propositional one. I would maintain, therefore, that he misses a whole dimension of the meaning of the Hawaiian texts to which we both refer.

Finally, Charlot addresses "one further difficulty for Valeri's theory": only Malo describes the "birth" rite. Charlot comments: "That is, what should be the most important ceremony of the whole sequence is replaced by a different one in two of the three sources" (C. 118). This objection disregards the fact that I do not give the same importance to all sources, but consider Malo as the most valuable. More importantly, it reflects Charlot's initial distortion of my position. As I have indicated above, the final transformation of the god, and therefore the most important ceremony of the whole sequence, is produced in Malo's account not simply by the "birth" rite, but by the sequence "birth" rite and girdling of the image with a loincloth. Indeed, it is the latter rite that is the fundamental one, since it marks the god's accession to full "manhood," the accomplishment of his development. Now this rite is also mentioned by the second most important source, K. Kamakau.[8]

Another unacceptable claim made by Charlot is that my thesis (V. 315-317) on the paradigmatical relation between the *maki'i lohelohe* rite in K. Kamakau's account and the "birth" rite in Malo's account is invalidated by the lack of "any hint of birth" in the first rite. But the

"paradigmatic relation" between the rites only implies that they are substitutable in the same context--not that they have the element of birth in common. The fact that this element is not mentioned in K. Kamakau's text does not invalidate my thesis, which is based on the entire sequence describing the development of the god, a sequence common, with minor variations, to all the sources.

But my analysis also makes clear that the birth rite in Malo and the *maki'i lohelohe* rite in K. Kamakau have one important element in common: the presence of "cords" that can all be considered as "navel cords" of sorts (and therefore metaphoric extensions of the birth image). In the birth rite, the image has a "navel cord"; in the *maki'i lohelohe* rite, the tower which, like the statue, is a device for rendering the god present, has four cords that are placed each at one of its corners. That these cords are like navel cords is a hypothesis, but one that makes sense (V. 316). The connection between the two rites illustrates my point that the texts describing the *luakini* ritual describe different practices, but at the same time share certain sense relationships (V. 317). Charlot's criticism reflects the arbitrary belief that material differences necessarily imply differences of meaning. Finally, let me say that it is simply by willfully ignoring the scrupulously maintained difference between the sections where I summarize the evidence and those where I give my interpretations, that Charlot can attempt to apply to my statements the criticism that I level against the statements of those who do not make this distinction: "It is not clear whether they are produced by the informants or by the authors" (V. 51).

After all the belaboring of details, for the most part without much importance, it is a relief to turn to what seems to be a more serious discussion: that of my "theoretical orientation" (C. 119). Unfortunately, we are quickly disappointed. Charlot begins by piecing together a few statements from my book that refer to some sources of my theoretical inspiration: Hegel, Feuerbach, and Durkheim. He immediately displays his talent for misunderstanding and distortion. For instance, he says that I take from Feuerbach the idea that Hawaiian religion is anthropomorphic. That Feuerbach wrote about Hawaiian religion is news to me. Nor have I made the mistake of associating the age-old theory that religion is anthropomorphic with Feuerbach alone. Charlot is confusing this theory with Feuerbach's thesis that man's consciousness of himself as species-being is reflected in his gods. He is misquoting from my page xi, where I say that "my argument has a certain Feuerbachian ring." Certainly, it is not the extremely common thesis of the anthropo-

morphic character of religious representations that has a Feuerbachian ring! I am also accused of having taken from Feuerbach the idea "that the state is a projection, so to speak, of human nature or essence" (C. 119). However, I do not speak of "state" anywhere in my text.

Quite novel, and indeed unprecedented in the annals of scholarship, is the method Charlot uses to "demonstrate" that a "central idea" for my interpretation of Hawaiian ritual and sculpture is inspired by a Brahmanical saying. The method consists in leaving unmentioned the fact that I quote the saying in a passing remark (V. 358 n. 65) on the sacrificial gift in general, not on Hawaiian sacrifice specifically. Although he must acknowledge at one point that I myself often stress the differences between Brahmanical ideas and Hawaiian ones, Charlot claims that I have derived my interpretations from Indian conceptions. His "proofs" for such statements remind me of the "proofs" adduced by an anonymous writer of about the year 200 to "demonstrate" that Homer borrowed from Moses: "Among his many 'proofs' were the 'borrowing' of the opening of Genesis for one bit of the description of the shield of Achilles in the *Iliad,* the portrayal of the Garden of Eden in the guise of the garden of King Alcinous in Book VII of the *Odyssey;* and Homer's referring to the corpse of Hector as 'senseless clay,' copied from 'Dust thou art and to dust thou shalt return' " (Finley 1977, 167).

Other statements by Charlot remind me more of the art of collage than of the rules of serious scholarly argument. An example of this art (perhaps in its surrealist form) is his list of "terms from Western philosophy and religion" that he says I frequently use in my book "without explicit justification." The justification, when it is needed, is given by the analysis itself. For instance, "particular" and "universal" are used (V. 270) to describe the passage of the temple image from a "particular" (that is, an individual phenomenon) to a "universal" (a term applying to all individual phenomena included in it). What concrete objection does Charlot have to the use of such terms? Does he wish to claim that Hawaiians do not think in terms of particulars and universals, like all other humans? Don't they make a distinction between, say, "a man" and "man"? Note also that a majority of the terms mentioned by Charlot are used by me in quotation marks, to signify either that they are taken in a special sense or that they are used by default, because no better term is available. Such is the case, for instance, of "supernatural," which I use only in a couple of cases, contrary to what Char-lot implies (see below, p. 188).

Charlot is not averse to stating plain falsehoods either, as when he claims that I use "substantialist" to "translate Hawaiian." What I write

is "I would give the word *la'a* a [the indefinite article was omitted because of a typo] more 'substantialist' meaning" (V. 363 n. 3). I am afraid that such a style of criticism reflects more on the critic than on the person criticized.

Other terms to which Charlot objects without argument are "sacred," "profane," and "substance," which are extremely common in anthropological discourse, where they do not have the philosophical or religious connotations that Charlot attaches to them. Analogously, in my (rare) use, the term "creation" is only a generic term referring to the multiple modes of the gods' productive activity (see below, p. 196). Note also that some of the terms whose use Charlot criticizes are in fact glosses taken from translations of Hawaiian texts or from dictionaries. For instance, he gives the impression that I use the word "miracles" frequently and as a matter of course. In fact, I used it only as a gloss given by Pukui and Elbert (PE, 53) of the expression *hana mana* (V. 324 n. 26).

More importantly, Charlot ignores the fact that anthropological interpretation is first and foremost translation; we cannot escape translating the ideological terms of another language into our own ideological terms. Charlot does not escape this predicament either. In fact, as I have already indicated, he is prone to borrowing the tritest terms from the arsenal of Western common sense. We have already encountered "practical," "class," "déclassé"; we shall soon encounter "religion and natural science," and many others.

Ironically, Charlot does not hesitate to accuse me of reading "classic Western views" into Hawaiian thinking. The list of such "readings" is simply ludicrous. I am supposed to think that in Hawaiian thought humans are "separate from nature," although I say just the contrary. Evidently Charlot has not read my interpretation of firstfruits sacrifices (V. 76-78), where I claim that since no difference is felt to exist by itself between humans and nature, nature could not be appropriated by man if ritual did not create some difference, although pretending all the time to *reaffirm the absence of any difference* (cf. V. 34, 359 n. 75). Furthermore, all my interpretation of Hawaiian ritual is based on the principle that in various aspects of nature Hawaiians found aspects of themselves and of their social and mental life, that in Hawaii nature is naturalized man (Lévi-Strauss' "l'homme naturalisé") and man is humanized nature. Hence, saying that I claim that humans are "separate from nature" is tantamount to showing that one has not even understood the most basic thesis of my book.

Even more ludicrous is Charlot's thesis that I separate "religion from

natural science," a statement he supports by referring to page 35 of my book. The reader who takes the trouble to read the page will discover that there I simply criticize Horton's "intellectualist" theory, which postulates strong similarities between "primitive religion" and modern science (n.b. "science," not knowledge). I suggest that this theory does not apply to Hawaiian religion. Charlot understands this as reading into Hawaiian thinking a Western distinction between "religion" and "natural science"! I shall discuss below other supposed instances of Western-influenced interpretations mentioned by Charlot.

My criticism of Horton's intellectualist theory of religion should show Charlot's statement that I am an extreme intellectualist to be simplistic at best. But it is simply absurd to view my various statements on symbolic identity or "substitutability" as proofs of my supposed "extreme intellectualism." Symbolic substitution and its correlate, symbolic identity, have nothing to do with "identity" in the sense that this term has in formal logic, contrary to what Charlot believes (C. 120). As I have made abundantly clear, the idea of substitution--in sacrifice, for example--postulates the symbolic identity between a thing or person that stands for another, *at the same time that it presupposes their actual difference.*[9] It is precisely on this combination of postulated identity and actual difference that the efficacy of ritual, and more generally of symbolism (cf. Valeri 1981), rests. The identity of the king and his adversary or transgressor of his taboo is not an absolute identity: it is identity relative to a certain quality that is highlighted--for instance identity relative to rank, *kapu*, powers, ambitions, and so on. What normally should be defined as a simple similarity becomes something more than that, however, because it is correlated with a symbolic and even psychological process of identification. In other words, the "other" becomes a "double" (cf. Girard 1972; Rank 1925; Vernant 1974 2:65-66). This seems to me to imply that a person and his double relate in a mode already oriented by the rules of ritual and more specifically of sacrifice. In other words, the transgressors or adversaries of the king are already seen as his sacrificial substitutes, for reasons that I explain in chapter 5.

In sum, it is because he denies the essentially ritual nature of the hierarchical system and wants to see it in exclusively Western, "practico-genealogical" terms, that Charlot completely misunderstands my use of the terms "identical" and "substitutable." To my use of such terms --motivated by a symbolic "logic" that eludes him--Charlot opposes his Western common sense, saying that such identities "would be *naturally* impossible" (C. 121, italics added).

Charlot also attacks my argument that twinship is logically related to

the idea of royalty with his usual argument that I "impose" my own terms on Hawaiian culture. He is unable, however, to demonstrate that my use of such terms is arbitrary, nor does he propose an alternative explanation that would demonstrably be closer to Hawaiian ideas. Such criticism is very easy but does not cut very deep. In a passage of my book I write that "circular things and things capable of circular movement are often considered divine, especially if they are powerful and distant, such as the stars or the moon" (V. 88-89). Charlot's objection to this--"many nonround objects were considered *akua*"--is surprising, to say the least. Where and when have I said that only round objects were considered *akua?* And what can we make of this "objection" to my point that the moon and the stars are used as metaphors of gods because, as circular objects capable of circular movements, they evoke autonomy and self-sufficiency: "A traditional expression for feminine beauty--. . . 'the face is like a moon'--does not evoke autonomy and self-sufficiency" (C. 121)? Evidently Charlot thinks that comparing the moon to the gods in one respect is incompatible with comparing it to feminine beauty in a completely different respect (shininess and roundness of face, etc.)!

His next observation on my supposed contradictions in the characterization of chiefs and gods is once more due to his failure to grasp the structure of my argument, as already indicated. Indeed, Charlot's constant repetition of the same misunderstanding is most tiresome. As for his claim that a chant that I mention (V. 371 n. 51) as an example of the ali'i's tendency to express themselves "metaphorically, poetically" on certain occasions "contains not a single metaphor" (C. 122), it is simply untrue. The chant contains one clear case of metaphor ("eaten by deep sorrow") and possibly others (for instance, "skies" and "mountains" may refer metaphorically to chiefs). At any rate, I mention the chant as an example of poetical expression in general, not simply as an example of that particular form of poetical expression which is metaphor (V. 148).

Nowhere do I say that only the poetic genre was used in communication among chiefs, nor that--most absurd of all--"Hawaiian chiefs and chiefesses had rank-related difficulty verbalizing" (C. 122). All I imply is that while, as Charlot says, "all classes of Hawaiian society used poetry," this use was much more important and elaborate among chiefs, as testified by 'Ī'ī, among others, in the passage to which I refer (V. 148). To say, as Charlot does, that there is no evidence for my statement that high-ranking nobles avoid situations of laughter is to ignore, for instance, that they cannot participate in crucial rites marked by laugh-

ter (V. 284). It is also to ignore a text that I mention (V. 276). On the other hand, Charlot gives no source for his claim that Kamehameha (a chief who, incidentally, did not have the highest rank and lived in a period of change) made his courtiers laugh. The few mentions of laughter that I have found in the narratives concerning the kings of the past refer to an anomalous king and to private or at any rate not ritually charged situations.

Finally, anyone who has taken the trouble to glance through the most elementary introductions to Buddhism will find it difficult to take seriously Charlot's accusation that I extrapolate an "*arhat* --like ideal" from the evidence on Hawaiian ali'i. How, indeed, can my account of Hawaiian ali'i be compared with "the arhat ideal, that of the human being who, by strenuous effort, acquires Enlightenment" (Humphreys 1985, 49)? Where have I suggested that Enlightenment was a religious concept of the Hawaiians? And how can Charlot dream of comparing the hereditary rank of the ali'i with a state reached individually "by strenuous effort"?

Charlot announces next that my idea that Hawaiian religion and society constitute a system is derived from Hegel. But it is not necessary to know anything about Hegel, just to read my book, both for its analytic practice and explicit methodological declarations, to realize that my notion of system derives from Structuralism and particularly from Saussure. Chariot seems to have read only bits and pieces of my book[10] and seems not to have read Hegel at all. He accuses me of believing that Hawaiian religious phenomena can be reduced to "a single, unified system" (C. 122-123) and of ignoring the "evidence of disunity." These accusations are strange, to say the least, since Charlot himself must acknowledge that I mention contradictions, conflicts, and differences from island to island.

Indeed, I have elicited information hitherto neglected that seems to prove that the hierarchy of the major gods on Kaua'i (and even on Maui) was different from that on the island of Hawai'i (V. 185, 335). Charlot also mentions my view that the systematization of Hawaiian religious beliefs and practices is due to priestly and chiefly influence, although he fails to add that I stress the constant tension between spontaneous, unsystematic creation from below and systematization from above (V. 36). This tension contributes to the historicity of the Hawaiian religious system, which I have never denied. I am all for considering Hawaiian religion historically. Indeed, I have written a special essay (Valeri 1982) based on an actually documented case of historical change, to which I have repeatedly referred in my book. But to pretend

to study the "historical development" of the priestly system in the absence of positive historical documents, as Charlot suggests that I should have done, is to confuse the writing of history with the writing of science fiction. Writing a synchronic study of Hawaiian religion at the end of the eighteenth century, as it is documented by the sources, means to be more historically minded than to indulge in the gratuitous pseudo-historical fantasies of Charlot (C. 123-124, C. n. 33 *in fine*). To construct arbitrary diachronic sequences does not make one a historian.

Charlot professes to be very surprised when, having given much evidence of conflict, diversity, and having warned that my analysis concerns the system of the island of Hawai'i (which is essentially the one documented in the sources), I claim: "I have attempted to give a coherent picture of the Hawaiian ideological system by considering all available information" (V. 191). But Charlot's surprise is due only to his misunderstanding of my use of the notion of system in this statement. I use "system" here in its structuralist sense: an abstract group of relations underlying a variety of concrete configurations, even conflicting ones. The system that I have attempted to reconstruct is neither the "priestly" system nor the "popular" system, nor is it the system of the island of Hawai'i alone; it is a set of relations underlying them all, and such that it does not deny, but makes intelligible their differences. This is precisely the structuralist notion of system. But having mistaken my use of this notion for the "Hegelian one," and having on top of that confused the latter with the crassest empiricist use of "system," Charlot claims that I contradict myself or that I want to reduce all religious views and practices to the priestly system of the island of Hawai'i pure and simple. I repeat that since most of our documents do indeed refer to that island, we have no choice but to use them; at the same time, we can abstract from the system of the island of Hawai'i more general principles that are not necessarily in conflict with whatever facts we know about other islands or other views. I have not claimed anything else. But not only does Charlot misunderstand my most general point, he also distorts and falsifies the evidence in a hopeless attempt to prove that I contradict it.

One example concerns his reading of some of my statements about priestesses, prophets, and sorcerers. He accuses me of calling these religious figures "marginal" because, he says, they do not fit my system (C. 123). He is simply disregarding the fact that this "marginality" is an indigenous evaluation. Malo, for instance, writes that the prophets *(kāula)* "were a very eccentric class of people. They lived apart in desert places, and did not associate with people or fraternize with any one" (Malo 1951, 114, cited in V. 138). "Marginal" means "to be at the mar-

gins." Are not asocial people who live apart in desert places marginal? Moreover Charlot confuses my structuralist use of the notion of "marginality" (derived from, among others, Victor Turner, Edmund Leach, and Mary Douglas), which is value-free and implies that what is marginal is powerful and therefore important, with his everyday use, which implies lack of value and importance.

It is unforgivable that Charlot quotes page 328 of my book as evidence for the alleged fact that priestesses and prophets "take part in the temple ritual" and cannot therefore be considered marginal. The sources that I quote there do not mention priestesses at all--only high-ranking female ali'i who do not officiate and who, therefore, have no priestly function. Furthermore, they participate in a rite that takes place outside the temple proper (V. 237) and at the conclusion of the main ritual (V. 327-328). It is, therefore, structurally marginal, especially since, as I have made clear, it marks the passage of men from the sacred world of the temple to the profane world of everyday life (V. 326). As for the prophets, they come on the scene even after the female ali'i, and they worship the goddesses (not the gods, who are the object of the temple worship), imploring them thus: "Make the ali'i treat us well when we are in their presence, and see to it that we are granted forgiveness *(kala)* when we ask for it" (V. 328). This prayer indicates that the prophets are not simply marginal relative to the chiefly-centered temple ritual,[11] but are actually in a state of tension and potential conflict with the ali'i, since they have to implore the goddess to intercede with the ali'i on their behalf. Indeed, goddesses mediate between the temple ritual and the religious practices of the prophets, but are not part of that ritual in a strict sense. By claiming the contrary (C. 126), Charlot makes an incorrect statement and has the gall to give as supporting reference a text of mine that denies it flatly.

Moreover, the sorcerers (more exactly, the black sorcerers) are not the "target" of my "polemic" (C. 123), but of that of most Hawaiian texts known to me. Kamakau, for instance, refers to black sorcery as "these evil ways of killing men" (Kamakau 1964, 137; cf. V. 138). Evidence of the sorcerers' categorical marginality is given by the texts that I quote on pages 138 and 370 (n. 31). Charlot refers to these pages but, surprisingly, he seems to ignore their content. Even more surprising are the other references (pp. 183, 185, 247-248, 380 n. 9) he uses as evidence that sorcerers are not marginal. At these pages I refer to the sorcery gods of the king, who form a very special category, including forms of the major gods Kū, Kāne, and probably Kanaloa as well. The king himself is the priest of many of these sorcery gods, who are meant to counteract

the practices of black sorcerers (cf. Valeri 1982). No ordinary sorcerers are involved in these rites, contrary to what Charlot implies.

Charlot's criticism of what he calls my notion of the pantheon is simply appalling. Each sentence contains so many errors and absurdities that to expose them all would require a separate rejoinder. I shall therefore concentrate on the essentials. "Valeri's discussion of the 'pantheon' shows that (1) he wants to make it all-encompassing for Hawaiian religion as a whole, and (2) that he wants it to be coherent" (C. 124). From this first sentence and what follows, it appears that Charlot identifies "pantheon" with the "system" of the four major gods and their particularizations. This is a very curious interpretation. Pantheon simply means "the assemblage of all the gods; the deities of a people collectively" (OED). It is with this meaning that I use this word, as other Polynesianists--for instance Firth (1970, 85) or Johansen (1954, 218)--have done before me. I do not limit its reference to the system of four gods and their particularizations, as should have been evident to Charlot had he read, at the very least, the subtitles of the section "The Pantheon" in my first chapter. These subtitles are: "The Major Gods and Their Particularizations," "Goddesses, *Akua Wahine,*" "The *Akuu 'Aumakua,* " "The *Akua 'Unihipili.*" In other words, "pantheon" simply means "all the gods"; whether or not these gods are systematically related is irrelevant to my use of this term. For this reason, the statement that I make the pantheon "all-encompassing for Hawaiian religion as a whole" is either tautologous (the set of all the gods includes all the gods!) or incorrect (since I do not refer to the four major gods by the word "pantheon").

Charlot also accuses me of basing my view that the "pantheon" is "coherent" "on systematizing nineteenth-century sources, especially Kamakau, and on the conventional idea of 'the four great gods of Polynesia' " (C. 125). This statement contains an error of fact and a grave misunderstanding. The grave misunderstanding consists in assimilating my hypothesis (this is indeed the status that it has in my book, cf. V. 110) that minor deities are encompassed by the major ones with Kamakau's thesis that "subordinate gods are produced by a 'segmentation' *(mahae'ana)* of the major gods" (V. 14). Kamakau's thesis does not correspond to my view, as should be evident even from the sentence quoted by Charlot to illustrate his claim (V. 36). There I refer to the already mentioned tension between the spontaneous proliferation of gods and the priestly attempts at systematizing them--a position that amounts to denying that Kamakau's segmentation model applies to all gods. While I consider Kamakau's model as one interesting conceptual-

ization of the relation between major and minor gods (cf. V. 14), my own view of this relation is more complex than his. Readers of my book will know that minor gods can be considered as encompassed by the major ones principally because their cults are hierarchically linked. For instance, I have given evidence proving that minor gods could not be worshipped until the worship of the major gods was completed in the royal temples (V. 187-188). Furthermore, the gods of the subordinates of a king or major ali‘i (even their *‘aumakua* or “family gods”) and those of their lands had to participate in the rites of the major gods where they were relegitimated and reconstituted (V. 263-270, 281-282, 290, etc.). In sum, my basic argument is that the hierarchy of the gods must be understood through the hierarchy of their rites and of the places and times of their performance.

Because Charlot refuses to face the fact that the relations between Hawaiian gods cannot be interpreted independently of their relations in ritual, he fails to understand my Dumontian (cf. V. xv) use of the notion of “encompassment” (Dumont 1966). The use of this notion does not imply the view that all minor gods are forms of the major ones (although many are), but that the major gods are presupposed by the minor ones,[12] at least in the priestly theory that is predominant in most traditional texts. On the other hand, that ritual is the most generalized and important expression of the encompassment of minor gods by the major ones does not exclude other more direct expressions, through descent, names, or shared predicates (V. 109-110). Another way of relating inferior gods to superior ones is through the predicate of purity (ibid. and passim). As I make clear, none of these models are generalized to include all gods (cf. V. 14); hence my case for encompassment rests more on what ritual shows than on the attempts at reflective conceptualization of Hawaiian priests and wise men. Indeed, I completely subscribe to Jane Harrison’s view: “What a people does in relation to its gods must always be one clue, and perhaps the safest, to what it thinks” (Harrison 1903, vii). Furthermore, I have repeatedly mentioned that certain gods are outside the official hierarchy of the cults: the *akua ‘unihipili* (V. 30), the *akua lele* (V. 351 n. 31), and at least some of the sorcery gods (V. 42, 138, 370 n. 32). (No doubt Charlot’s “wandering spirits” may also be included in the list.) I have also stressed that the goddesses “are not as hierarchized” as the gods (V. 113, cf. 19), a fact that has ritual correlates (V. 127). Indeed, I have not attempted to include the goddesses in my simplified summary of “the hierarchy of the gods and the hierarchy of men” (V. 109). But Charlot ignores all this and isolates a single sentence of that summary (the only sentence in my

book to appear so extreme), disregarding, too, that I qualify it by saying that it is "a simplified model" and that "the reality is more complex" (V. 110, cf. V. 36).

Let us now turn to the error (or rather errors) of fact made by Charlot. He claims that my statement, "there is no doubt that Kū, Lono, Kāne, and Kanaloa are the highest gods" (V. 109), derives from "the conventional idea of 'the four great gods of Polynesia' " and especially from Kamakau. First, I nowhere use the expression "the four great gods of Polynesia," which he gives as a quotation. Second, my statement derives neither from that "conventional idea" nor from Kamakau, but from the best available sources. One of the earliest Hawaiian sources, Malo himself, writes: "The names of the male deities worshipped by the Hawaiians, whether chiefs or common people, were Ku, Lono, Kane, and Kanaloa; and the various gods worshipped by the people and the ali'i were named after them" (V. 81). Note, incidentally, that the last sentence supports the view that minor gods were encompassed by the four major ones, an additional proof that Charlot is wrong in attributing this theory to "systematizing nineteenth-century sources." More importantly, Malo's statement is fully supported by many prayers uttered during the *luakini* ritual that invoke the four main gods together (V. 269-270, 281-283, 290, etc.). These prayers are given, again, by the oldest sources: Kelou Kamakau and Malo. Those given by 'Ī'ī, who witnessed the rituals, also confirm that the four gods were worshipped together in the *luakini* temple. This evidence undermines Charlot's curious thesis that "the association of four gods" is "an idea based on the Christian Trinity" (C. 125). Apart from all other differences with Christian Trinitarianism, I fail to see how a quaternity can be based on a trinity. Moreover, the fact that various quaternities are symbolically important in all Polynesian cultures is well known. Note also that Charlot attaches a different translation to the expression *ke kōko'ohā o ke akua* ("the quaternity of the god") from the one that I give ("the association of four gods," V. 13). No doubt Charlot wanted to suggest a connection with the "Trinity."

Charlot claims that my use of this expression is "faulty" because the expression "oh association of four of the god(s)" is followed, in a chant, by the line "oh association of five of the god(s)" (Fornander 1916-1920, 4:605). Thus, according to Charlot, "the chant is not referring to a single, overall supreme group, but to a number of groups" (C. 142 n. 27). This argument is strange. First, I have never suggested that other groups are not referred to in the chant, simply that the expression "oh association of four of the god(s)" refers to Kū, Kāne, Lono, and Kana-

loa. Second, Charlot forgets that, with the exception of the line he quotes, all other numerical groups in the chant are multiples of four: forty thousand, four hundred thousand. This shows that the chant reflects in part the usual formula, "the 40000 deities, the 400000 deities, the 4000 deities" (cf. V. 13), which expresses the postulated equivalence of the totality of the gods and the numerical index four--the one, precisely, which defines the group Kū, Lono, Kāne, Kanaloa. I don't know what the "group of five" gods stands for, although I have noted that five is connected by one source with the god Kū (V. 350 n. 15). It may thus stand for five forms (or, as I call them, "particularizations") of Kū.

Charlot's next statement that I adopt "the Trinitarian notions of other nineteenth-century Hawaiian writers, who degrade Kanaloa to a sort of demon" (C. 125) is completely false. Actually, my statement that "the quadripartition of the gods is a superficial phenomenon that conceals a tripartition at a deeper level" (V. 18), from which Charlot derives his extravagant interpretation, is the logical implication of the traditional pairing of Kāne and Kanaloa as two sides of the same whole--a pairing reflected by the *Kumulipo*, in which the two gods appear as twin brothers. Perhaps Charlot believes here, for once, that even the *Kumulipo* is inspired by "the Trinitarian notions" of nineteenth-century writers?

The statements on the preeminence of Kū, Lono, Kāne, and Kanaloa contained in the texts of Malo and Kelou Kamakau should be sufficient to demonstrate that the preeminence was real and traditional. Yet Charlot does not simply ignore that crucial evidence: He also falsely accuses me of leaving out "a good deal of evidence" that would prove that those four gods were not the highest. The first evidence that he mentions is a chant about the goddess Pele in which "those gods are mercilessly subordinated to her" (C. 125). But this chant dates from the late 1890s and was recorded in this century by Pukui (Pukui and Korn 1973, 52). It mentions a geographical name (Borabora) not known traditionally. Its reference to Pele as "ruler of the Menehune" (Pukui and Korn 1973, 55) in the context of a migration from Tahiti also betrays the fact that it is recent, since only in late nineteenth-century theories does one find mention of Menehune as migrants from the Society Islands to Hawaii (Barrère 1969, 41; cf. 36). Note also that only Kū and Lono, not Kāne and Kanaloa, are put in a position inferior to Pele in the chant. In sum, this late and nontraditional text cannot support Charlot's claim that the four major gods were "mercilessly" subordinated to Pele in ancient Hawaii.

More importantly, Charlot confuses different genres. The Pele litera-

ture, especially in its revised, nineteenth-century form, reflects an anti-hierarchical bias that is perfectly consonant with the dominant role that goddesses (whose antistructural role I have emphasized)[13] play in it. Furthermore, tales in which not only inferior gods, but even men, subordinate important gods and even ridicule them exist in Hawaii as elsewhere in Polynesia. But, as I have shown in a study of some of these, tales (Valeri 1981), such explicit reversals are limited either to contexts in which they were ritually permitted (such as the Makahiki festival. when the "Pele literature" was performed in the dances), or to playful narration. Charlot, as usual, lumps all texts together without attempting to establish beforehand their signification by an analysis of the genres and contexts in which they appear. He thus violates one of the basic rules of source criticism. No doubt the abolition in 1819 of the ritual system on which the hierarchy of gods was based changed the value of these playful reversals. By eliminating their very contrast with the serious contexts of temple ritual, it created a condition for transforming them into permanently valid charters of status for certain groups (particularly in Ka‘ū). Precisely because of this, Charlot's use of some Pele chant as evidence against the idea that Kū, Lono, Kāne, and Kanaloa were the highest gods is unsound both from a historical and a sociological point of view. Indeed, it is sufficient to remember that Pele is often considered as the daughter of Kūwahailo (Beckwith 1940, 30)--that is. Kū as introducer of human sacrifice (the very basis of temple ritual)--to put Charlot's claims in their true place. As a daughter of Kū, Pele can hardly be considered to dominate him, since she is genealogically encompassed by him.

Charlot's second piece of evidence, the myth of Lonoka‘eho's defeat by Kamapua‘a, does not prove his point any better than the first. Lonoka‘eho is considered an ali‘i, not a god, in the principal text of the Kamapua‘a legend (Fornander 1916-1920, 5:327). Even the Kahiolo text, the only one to which Charlot refers, does not say that he is a god. At any rate, I have found no reference anywhere to Lonoka‘eho as a god who is worshipped. More importantly, the Kamapua‘a legend belongs to a playful and comic genre in which the desire for a reversal of hierarchical relations is given an imaginary satisfaction. Even if Lonoka‘eho were in the class of Lono gods, then, the legend would not prove the existence of a *serious* and *ritually implemented* alternative to the view that Lono is one of the supreme gods.

As a further piece of evidence against the supremacy of the four gods. Charlot refers to a published work of his that I cannot find in any library to which I have access. I cannot therefore evaluate the examples he gives there.

Charlot also claims that since "it is impossible to absorb the female gods of Hawai'i into the four male gods" (C. 125), my view that inferior gods are encompassed by major ones is further invalidated. This is a strange argument, since I have explicitly said that goddesses form a class apart from the male gods and are themselves encompassed by Hina, who is paired with Kū. At the pinnacle of the Hawaiian pantheon, then, there is a male/female pair. Indeed I have written: "The structure of the pantheon--like that of the *Kumulipo*--reflects the primacy of the sexual principle" (V. 12). Hence Charlot's "deduction" that I "belittle" goddesses because I cannot reduce them to the major gods is totally wrong.

Charlot argues against my statement that "goddesses are few and have a marginal position in the Hawaiian pantheon" (C. 125), saying: "Goddesses are in fact numerous and important." As I have already explained, Charlot misunderstands my use of the anthropological notion of marginality, which does not imply lack of importance, but an antistructural power. In noting the preponderant role that goddesses have in sorcery I have underscored that their importance consists precisely in their power to transcend and threaten the official hierarchical system, not in the fact that they participate in it. Charlot, who naively equates "important" with "central," attempts instead to demonstrate that the goddess Pele and her priestesses "take part in the ritual" (of the *luakini* temple). The "demonstration" is effected by referring to pages of my book that, as I have already noted, demonstrate nothing of the sort. Pele is not worshipped in the *luakini* temple proper and appears only at the conclusion of the ritual. Furthermore, I find no mention of "priestesses of Pele" in the texts to which I refer. Only *po'e kāula* ("seers" or "prophets," sex unspecified) are mentioned, but none of them officiate in the rite. Charlot's statements are a product of his fantasy, and I find it particularly objectionable that he refers to my book as evidence to support them.[14]

Charlot also criticizes my statement that Pele and the other goddesses are "ultimately controlled by the King" on the grounds that it contradicts "the Pele chants mentioned above in which supremacy is claimed for her" (C. 126). I don't see how chants that allegedly claim the supremacy of Pele over other gods can prove anything about who ultimately controls the *cult* of the goddess. Charlot confuses mythology with ritual. That Pele and other goddesses are ultimately controlled by the king is demonstrated by the fact that the worship of these goddesses is initiated at the beginning of the ritual year by a sacrifice consecrated by the king in an annex to his main temple (V. 328-329).

As for Charlot's statement that the goddesses are "numerous and

important"--a statement for which he gives no evidence--I wonder what exactly he means. Given the immense number of Hawaiian deities, it is obvious that, in an absolute sense, goddesses are numerous. But when I say that "goddesses are few , . . in the Hawaiian pantheon" (V. 19), I use "few" in a comparative sense. Indeed, the number of male deities, at least in our sources, is overwhelmingly superior to the number of goddesses. As for the question of "importance," while, as I have said, some goddesses are important in an antistructural sense, a great many goddesses cannot be considered important in terms of Hawaiian values. This is because they are specifically defined as "patron deities" of certain groups of women involved in technical activities (such as beating and printing tapa cloth, see Malo 1951, 82) or even aesthetic ones (such as dancing, ibid.) that, however valued, do not have the same importance as the activities of war and production over which the great male gods preside.[15]

Finally, Charlot says that the idea that an individual's relation to the gods is mediated by the hierarchy is contradicted by numerous accounts of direct contact (C. 126). After reading this criticism, I began to doubt that Charlot had read my book in its entirety. Not only do I treat at length the kinds of direct contact to which he refers, and more, but I specifically state at different points that there are two rival modes of relating with the gods: one hierarchically mediated, the other direct (V. 19-20, 138-140).[16]

The important point to grasp, however, is that direct contact through means such as dreams, visions, and descent is not in itself evidence of the absence of hierarchical encompassment. For instance, many of the family gods *('aumakua)* result from the marriage of an important god (Charlot cites Kū) with a human woman (cf. NK, 1:36). The attributes of a local or familial god may be identical to some at least of the attributes of a more encompassing god and therefore provide a link between them. This link is often expressed in ritual subordination. Thus, as I have noted, the altars of local and familial fishing gods are reconsecrated yearly after the altar of the king's fishing god (a form of Kū) has been reconsecrated (V. 187, 378 n. 28). The same is true of the altars of local and familial agricultural gods, which can be reconsecrated only after the king's agricultural temples (centered on Lono) have been rebuilt or reinaugurated (V. 187). The linkage between family cults and the cults of the society as a whole (controlled by the king) is explained by the fact that they both have analogous aims, which they realize at different social levels: they promote agriculture, fishing, and human fertility, sanction moral laws, and so on. As "families" are

"nested" in the social hierarchy, so family gods are "nested" in the gods of the global society. Direct relationships with certain deities thus imply, logically and usually ritually as well, indirect relationships with more distant and encompassing deities.[17] As the family cult is inconceivable without the cult of the society as a whole, so the family gods are inconceivable without the gods of the society as a whole. The relationship of family x^1 with the fishing deity y^1 is "direct," but at the same time implicitly inscribed in its relationship with a larger social unit x^2, which corresponds to the fishing deity y^2.

In contrast to these relationships, many relationships with gods are *only* direct because they are individualistic or even antisocial (as in many cases of sorcery, V. 30, 33, 42, 138) or because they claim to transcend the social hierarchy (as in the case of many ***kāula***, "seers," "prophets," V. 138-140). Charlot is unable to see the significance of these different types of relations with the gods because, among other things, his view of Hawaiian religion is completely asociological. He ignores the fact that representations are connected with actions and are actions themselves. Their meaning is therefore inseparable from the context of action, which includes the system of social relations.

New peaks of misunderstanding are reached in Charlot's discussion of what he calls "the second major principle of Valeri's book," that is, my thesis that Hawaiian gods are essentially anthropomorphic. I leave out all the minor oddities[18] to concentrate on the basic point. Charlot makes an egregious error that completely vitiates his entire argumentation: He thinks that "anthropomorphic" simply means "having the physical form of man." He therefore claims that my point that Hawaiian gods are conceived anthropomorphically can only be proven if it can be proven "that all Hawaiian gods have human bodies" (C. 127). Since he himself believes that there are a "large number of gods that have only animal or elemental bodies" (ibid.), he concludes that my thesis is wrong. Charlot does not realize that, following anthropological and philosophical usage, I give "anthropomorphism" a much wider sense than the one that he gives to it. In Lalande's classic definition, for example, anthropomorphism "se dit de tout raisonnement ou de toute doctrine qui, pour expliquer ce qui n'est pas l'homme (par exemple Dieu, les phénomènes physiques, la vie biologique, la conduite des animaux, etc.) y applique de notions empruntées à la nature ou à la conduite humaine" (Lalande 1956, 63).

Another modern philosopher defines anthropomorphism as "that promiscuous mixing of our own intuitions of meaning, relevance, importance, with objective reality" (Taylor 1985, 1, 249). Thus if I

interpret the behavior of an animal in terms of human feelings, intentions, reasoning, I anthropomorphize it. In other words, I give animal feelings and thoughts the *form* of human feelings and thoughts. Thus anthropomorphism does not necessarily imply the projection of the bodily form of man on something nonhuman, as Charlot seems to believe.[19] Throughout my book, I have made abundantly clear that the anthropomorphic character of Hawaiian gods is to be found, first and foremost, at the level of the signified, not that of the signifier: not in the gods' material manifestations, but in the human and social attributes they symbolize by means more complex than the purely iconic one offered by the human body. Thus I have repeatedly pointed out that most of these human attributes are signified by the natural, nonhuman "bodies" of the gods.[20] Indeed this is one of the central theses of the book that Charlot has managed to misunderstand.

But Charlot is never happy with misunderstanding alone: he must also use objectionable means to achieve his aim. Thus he writes (C. 126): "His [Valeri's] one argument [for anthropomorphism] is that all Hawaiian gods have a human body in their *kino lau,* their system of multiple bodies (9-12, 21, 31, 35, 47):" and he quotes my page 11: *"the 'genus' of all species included in one god belongs not to the natural world but to the human, social world."* In this passage, Charlot gives the impression that the sentence he quotes from my book is equivalent to his own sentence, which precedes it. In other words, he is making me say that the genus of all species included in the god is the same thing as the human body that the god can assume. Charlot is confusing this statement, which is only due to him, with my thesis that the human body of a god is able to symbolize more clearly the genus *(human in the cultural sense)* that is also symbolized by the sum total of his natural bodies. At any rate the sentence that he quotes specifically refers not, as he says, to the human body of a god (who happens to be Kamapua'a), but to his *porcine body.* This shows, precisely, that the anthropomorphic character of Kamapua'a does not depend on his being able to assume the physical body of man, but on the fact that his pig body "represents human properties evoked by certain of the pig's qualities: virility, activity, bellicosity, and so on" (V. 11). This is enough to dismiss as irrelevant Charlot's elucubrations on whether it is the pig body or the human body of Kamapua'a that is the principal one and similar arguments about other gods. Charlot is simply fighting figments of his own imagination, since my idea of what constitutes the "anthropomorphic" character of the gods is quite different from the one that he attributes to me.

The same can be said of his statements on my supposed "presupposition of a separation of human beings from 'nature,' " which, with characteristic illogic, he thinks is at the basis of my "strong anthropomorphization of Hawaiian religion" (C. 127). As I have pointed out (V. 34), if there were such separation, there could be no anthropomorphization because natural phenomena could not signify human ones! Charlot attributes to me just the opposite of what I say. He then proceeds to defy decency when he defines the sentence where I have pointed out that no such separation exists as "the section in which Valeri admits that his theory cannot be found in the Hawaiian texts" (C. 128). The "theory" to which Charlot refers is Charlot's own theory of what my theory is.[21]

Let me repeat, then, once and for all, that my main thesis is that Hawaiian gods are anthropomorphic in the sense that their *natural bodies* are signs of *human properties.* But, as I just mentioned, I have also said that Hawaiian gods are usually anthropomorphic in another sense: they are able to manifest themselves in human form. However, I have made clear that the "human form" assumed by the gods must be conceived in its widest sense: not only as a human form spontaneously assumed when they appear in visions or dreams or even in physical presence, but also as the human form that men give to the gods when they ritually incorporate them into anthropomorphic images or into human mediums (cf. V. 9 and my reference there to Firth 1930-1931; V. 72, 345). Whatever the mode (spontaneous or contrived by man) and the quality (natural or artificial) of the gods' anthropomorphic manifestation, it has the effect of making more evident the fact that *all his nonhuman manifestations symbolize human predicates*. In this sense, the frequently documented presence of a human body among the multiple bodies of gods is not without importance for my thesis, although it is not necessary to it.

I readily admit that I cannot produce for all of the thousands of Hawaiian deities texts that state expressly that they have a human body as Charlot would like me to do. But such texts can be produced for a great many gods, and for all of the more important deities, male and female.[22] On the other hand, the few texts produced by Charlot as evidence of gods "with only animal bodies reported" either do not support or flatly contradict his point.[23]

Charlot asserts that "in accordance with his separation of human beings from nature and with his philosophical orientation, Valeri seeks to establish a nonnatural or 'supernatural,' invisible, immaterial realm or dimension" (C. 128). It is not clear how this supposed "dimension" could possibly be related to my supposed "separation of human beings

from nature" or to my monistic philosophical orientation (made clear by my references to Feuerbach and Hegel). The important facts, however, are as follows. As I have already indicated, I use the word "supernatural" only a couple of times and exclusively in quotation marks to indicate that I refer to another author's usage (as, precisely, in the sentence from V. 92 quoted on C. 128 as evidence), or that I am reluctant to use it. When I myself use it, I use it in its current anthropological sense, that is, as referring not to a nonnatural "dimension" of reality, but to a mode of operation that is different from the ordinary one and imputed to invisible divine action. It is in this sense that the term is used by anthropologically minded Polynesianists like Firth (1970).

That the being of the gods is not reducible to that of their empirical manifestations is not an idea derived from my theory, contrary to what Charlot claims, but from the facts. Indeed, I do not think that anyone before Charlot (with the exception of the missionaries who accused Polynesians of idolatry or brute-worship) has ever doubted this. Malo, for one, writes: "All these gods, whether worshipped by the common people or by the ali'i, were thought to reside in the heavens. Neither commoner nor chief had ever discerned their nature; their coming and their going was unseen; their breadth, their length and their dimensions were unknown" (Malo 1951, 83).

I do not think that these views have been influenced by Christian ideas;[24] on the contrary, comparative evidence from the Tikopia, a Polynesian people whose religion appears to have been uninfluenced by Christianity at the time they were studied by Firth, fully confirms its genuinely traditional character. Firth writes that "only in specific contexts did the Tikopia attribute definite form to [the gods]. Linked with this view was the conception of *atua* as for the most part invisible to men. Hence the question of their 'proper' shape did not readily arise. Indeed, the absence of shape might be stressed--'we do not see them: how do we know what they look like?' " (Firth 1970, 67; cf. 117-118). Moreover, Tikopia belief (cf. Firth 1967, 207) confirms my claim (and Malo's) that the gods "cannot be confused with those among their instantiations . . . that are supposed to empirically manifest the god's properties" (V. 32) .[25]

Comparative evidence thus further belies Charlot's claim that Hawaiians did not distinguish between the invisible reality of the gods and their visible manifestations (a thesis he needs in order to uphold his denial of the fundamentally anthropomorphic character of the gods). As I have myself pointed out, the two were strongly connected, particularly in ritual, but this is no justification for claiming that no distinction existed and therefore for maintaining that Hawaiian culture was char-

acterized by "its understanding of everything in physical terms" (C. 136). Indeed, the latter claim shows to what an extent Charlot can project typically Western views (here the physicalist monism of modern science) onto Hawaiian ideas.

Moreover, Charlot's thesis has the effect of attributing to Hawaiians his own illogic. Indeed, if the god were not something more than, say, an animal in which he manifests himself, then there would be no difference between a mere animal and a god! Charlot mistakes the view that the god is only accessible through some empirical phenomenon for the view that the god only has empirical reality (cf. C. 129). By doing so he does serious injustice to the "considerable powers of abstraction" (Firth 1970, 109) indicated by the Hawaiian, as by the Tikopia, notion of "god ."

Having established to his satisfaction that the Hawaiians were at his intellectual level, Charlot proceeds by attacking my use of the word "divine" in a section where I draw some preliminary conclusions. He claims that I introduce there a non-Hawaiian idea, because the word *akua* "is never . . . used as an abstraction, 'the divine' " (C. 129). But with one single (and partial) exception--to which I shall return and which is not the text quoted by Charlot--have never used "the divine" as a translation of *akua,* only as a descriptive term that refers to an abstraction: the quality of "divinity" common to all gods,[26] that is, the quality that makes it possible to define them as "gods."[27] Although the existence of such a quality is clearly implied by the notion of *akua,* Charlot claims that it is a "non-Hawaiian idea" simply because it is not signified by a specific linguistic form. This is a very naive and incorrect view of the relationship between language and ideas.

Not happy with formulating a disingenuous criticism alone, Charlot proceeds to misinterpret a sentence (V. 288) that refers to the transformative relation existing betwen different gods or states of the same god in the *luakini* temple ritual. This transformative relation, I hypothesize, has the effect of suggesting to the audience a category of divine power more abstract than the individual gods. There is nothing particularly strange about this hypothesis. Anthropologists have noted that in polytheistic religions one often finds, expressed in ritual form, extremely general ideas of divine power. This is the case, for instance, in the Chihamba ritual of the Ndembu (Turner 1962), or in the *ida* ritual of the Umeda of which it has been said: "By studying the sequence of *ida* as a whole one arrives rapidly at the idea that there are not many ritual figures, but basically one such figure in process of transformation" (Gell 1975, 296).

Analogously, the sentence of my book quoted and criticized by

Charlot (C. 130) refers to an implied category of divine power made apparent by ritual transformations, not, as he believes, to a cosmogonic argument in which "the gods emerge from an undifferentiated divine and merge back into it." Indeed, I refer there to a synchronic hierarchy of categories: In my view the category of divine power in the *luakini* ritual presupposes the different gods and is not separable from them. The idea of a "pulsation" back and forth from an "undifferentiated divine" cannot be found in my interpretation of the *luakini* ritual. On the contrary, I make it clear that the different stages of the process of transformation are always "frozen into personalities" (V. 288). Indeed, the transformation is summarized in my interpretation by the contrast between the gods Kū and Lono, not by the contrast between the undifferentiated and differentiated divine, which applies to the cosmogonic process.

When I do claim that there is an analogy (but never an identity) between the ritual process and the cosmogonic process it is at a much higher level: that of the yearly ritual cycle. This is because the beginning of the year seems to be conceived as a return to the beginning of the world (V. 215). Since the god connected with the beginning of the year is Lono--whom a text (by K. Kamakau in V. 206) explicitly associates, in that particular temporal context, with a variety of attributes normally associated with other gods; indeed, it associates it with the entire cosmos--I have hypothesized that the god represents at that moment the divine in general. I have also argued that, to some extent, the same is true of Kū in the *luakini* ritual, because this god often stands there for the other three major gods, whom it constantly implies, and for other reasons mentioned in my book. But the analogy between Lono or Kū and Pō ("Night") as the most general metaphor of the divine is limited to what they refer to, since, as I have made abundantly clear, Pō is not individualized, let alone personalized like Kū and Lono. Furthermore, none of these gods have the generality that the Pō image has. I stand by this argument, against which Charlot offers no concrete criticism and which indeed he completely ignores.

Having thus shown my actual views on the relationships between individual gods and a more generic category of divine power that has a variety of analogous (but by no means identical) ritual and cosmogonic expressions, let me turn to the basic point of contention between me and Charlot. This is my identification of the "undifferentiated divine"--that is, in my interpretation, the divine in its most generic form--with the Pō ("Night") image. First let me note that Charlot is falsely giving the impression that my discussion of the age of Pō has a great deal of

importance in my argumentation. This is not so. I say at the outset that I only give a "brief look at the genesis of the cosmos according to Hawaiian mythology" (V. 3). Indeed, my discussion of the *Kumulipo* only takes up four pages at the beginning of my book. On pages 35-36 I venture the hypothesis, which is presented as such, that Pō is "the closest approximation to a supreme divine principle found in Hawaii" (V. 35), as it is perhaps in Maori cosmogony (Shortland 1882, 10). But whatever the merits of such a hypothesis, my interpretations of the Hawaiian religious system do not depend on it, contrary to what Charlot seeks to suggest by totally invalid or captious arguments, as I shall now demonstrate.

Charlot's criticism of my association of Pō with the "undifferentiated divine" is based on his usual error: he misconstrues a relative term as an absolute one. Although brief, my discussion of Pō in the *Kumulipo* (V. 7) shows that I view it as "the undifferentiated divine" only in a relative sense. It is "undifferentiated," first and foremost, relative to the myriad of individualized, personalized deities that appear in the age of Ao, "Light," which follows the age of Pō, "Night," or "Darkness." Indeed, as I have pointed out (V. 30), it is believed that deities or ancestors who cease to be worshipped, or who leave the concrete form in which they can be approached, return to Pō and dissolve in it (this "dissolution" of course is such only from the point of view of human perception, for which the world of Pō is the "Unseen" [gloss of Handy and Pukui 1972, 131]). This dissolution is clearly mentioned in the text to which I refer (V. 30): "When the kahu or keeper felt it was unwise or even dangerous to keep the *'unihipili* as a household presence, he could release the spirit and let it merge into the more tranquil eternity of Pō" (NK, 1:196). Analogously, the spirits of the dead plunge from the *leina* (cliffs or seacoast promontories) into Pō, which Pukui defines as "measureless expanse of all space . . . timelessness of all time . . . eternity" (NK, 1:35; cf. 40, 137). Pō also stands for the generic divine in common expressions such as *he hō'ike na ka pō*, "a revelation of the night," which Pukui explains as "a revelation from the gods in dreams, visions and omens" (Pukui 1983, 68). Since Pō stands here for the gods in general, it can be called "undifferentiated [i.e., generic] divine" as I do in my book. In the expression *mai ka pō mai*, translated as "from the gods, of divine origin" (PE, 307) or "out of the unseen" (Handy and Pukui 1972, 131), Pō has the same meaning of generic divine that it has in the previously quoted expression. It indicates that something that is not individually identified belongs to the realm of the divine. Charlot nevertheless claims that this expression does not support my view.[28] This is only

because he understands neither the meaning of the expression nor my view.

That I view the "undifferentiated divine" as undifferentiated only relative to its differentiation into individualized gods becomes perfectly clear once the passage of my book criticized by Charlot (C. 130) is put in its context:

> Until this point, the divine coincided first with the undifferentiated principle Pō and then with its impersonal specifications presiding over the great divisions of nature. This identification of the undifferentiated divine with Pō is made evident by the refrain that characterizes the age of Pō: "the divine enters, man cannot enter. . . ." Being entirely divine, nature entirely excludes man. By producing the first man, however, the divine brings about its own transformation. From now on it will be constituted by personal, anthropomorphic gods such as Kāne and Kanaloa. Moreover, as I shall demonstrate, these personal gods regroup the natural species on the basis of a human "moral" logic that takes the place of or modifies the "natural" classificatory logic that the *Kumulipo* identifies with the state of the divine until man appears on the scene. (V. 7)

Charlot's selective style of quotation covers not only the fact that Pō is called "undifferentiated divine" relative to the personal gods of the age of Ao, but also that I do not consider it internally undifferentiated. Indeed, in the passage just quoted I refer to the fact that Pō includes its impersonal specifications presiding over the great divisions of nature. Before that I give them in detail and show that they are sexually paired couples in which Pō divides itself and which generate the biological cosmos (V. 4-5). Charlot's objections to my view of Pō betray his total misunderstanding of it, since they seem to imply that I identify Pō only with its absolutely initial state, prior to its differentiation into the above mentioned paired forms.

Thus he criticizes my use of the refrain *o ke akua ke komo, ʻaʻoe komo kanaka*--which I translate as "the god [or the divine] enters, man cannot enter" (V. 4)--to prove the "identification of the undifferentiated divine with Pō," by the strange argument that it cannot be applied to Pō because, says Charlot, "when first used (line 39), that line is twenty-five lines away from the last mention of *pō̄* (line 14)" (C. 130). Charlot's argument is erroneous with regard both to the *Kumulipo* and to the text of my book. The reason is that the refrain is a refrain, which means that it returns several times in the section of the chant describing the age of

Pō. Therefore it refers to that age as a whole, not to a single mention of Pō in a single line. This is precisely why I use the line as evidence for the fact that "the Pō period is . . . entirely divine" (V. 4; cf. 7, 216, 222), not simply, as Charlot seems to believe, for the fact that Pō as mentioned for the first time in line 14 of the *Kumulipo* is divine.

In sum, when I speak of Pō as "undifferentiated divine" I refer principally to the age of Pō as a whole, in contrast to the age of Ao when personal gods are differentiated; only secondarily do I refer to Pō before it differentiates itself internally in its "impersonal specifications presiding over the great divisions of nature" (V. 7). The basic point missed by Charlot is that the *Kumulipo* transforms a relationship of logical inclusion (which implies that Pō is viewed as "the realm of the gods," "pertaining to or of the gods" [PE, 307]; in sum as a metaphor for the generic divine) into a genetic relation (which implies that Pō is viewed as the undifferentiated origin of the individual gods who become distinct in the age of Ao, "Light" [V. 6-7], and therefore vision, distinct knowledge).[29] Analogously, the relationship between Pō and its paired sexual specifications (symbolizing the great realms of animal life) is represented both as one of logical inclusion (as is made clear by their names, which all consist of the morpheme Pō plus a specifying suffix, V. 4-5) and one of genetic differentiation.

Pō is thus both past as generative principle and present as the most encompassing category of the divine. This is precisely why I have written that Pō is "the undifferentiated creative origin of the cosmos, which continues to exist in transcendence [i.e., in the "unseen," another meaning of Pō] as its perennial source" (V. 35). Saying, as Charlot does, that this is an idea similar to "the Thomist description of God as creator and sustainer of the universe" is betraying a total misunderstanding of my argument and a profound ignorance of Thomist philosophy, for which God (a perfect and intelligent substance endowed with free will) creates and sustains the universe providentially, that is, in view of an end that coincides with him (Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 1). None of these characterizations are implied in my account of Pō.

Let me now turn to some criticism of particular points. Charlot attacks me for translating the already mentioned expression *ʻo ke akua ke komo, ʻaʻoe komo kanaka* (quoted on V. 4, 7, 216, 222) as "the divine enters, man cannot enter." Strictly speaking, this criticism applies to only one case (V. 7). Charlot fails to mention that I also translate the expression as "the god enters, man cannot enter" (V. 216, 222). These two translations are considered equally possible in my first quotation of the line (V. 4), although the translation "the god" is given preeminence

("the god [or the divine] enters, man cannot enter"). The reason I use "the divine" as an alternative to "the god" in this expression is as follows: *Ke akua* cannot refer to an individual, personal god (such as, say, Kāne) when it occurs in an expression qualifying the age of Pō, from which personal gods seem to be absent. Indeed, they are said to appear only at the beginning of the age of Ao, together with man (V. 6-7). It seems to me, therefore, that the expression *ke akua* is used in Hawaiian exactly like in Greek ὁ θεός, where it means "the god," but in two senses: in the sense of an individual, named god, and in the sense of the power common to all gods. "Les diverses puissances surnaturelles dont la collection forme la société divine dans son ensemble peuvent elles-mêmes être appréhendées sous la forme du singulier, ὁ θεός, *la* puissance divine, *le* dieu, sans qu'il s'agisse pour autant de monothéisme" (Vernant 1974, 2:87). What Vernant says of the Greek ὁ θεός applies perfectly well to the Hawaiian case. The abstract idea of divine potency is referred to by an individualizing expression that means "the god." But "the god," in this usage, refers neither to an individually named god, nor to a supreme god; it is just the generic idea of divine power. This is why I find it legitimate to translate *ke akua* as "the divine" in one context.

Charlot also objects: "Far from referring to a single, all-encompassing, undifferentiated principle, pō is being constantly paired--with *ao* in the structure of the whole chant, with *lipo* in lines 7-8, and with *lā*, 'day,' in line 10" (C. 131). Let us look into these claims.

1. It is not clear what Charlot means by saying that pō is paired "with *ao* in the structure of the whole chant." My understanding, however, is that the age of Pō is paired with the age of Ao only in the sense that the former precedes the latter and indeed generates it (V. 6). This confirms that Pō is conceived as the encompassing generative principle relative to Ao. If there is "pairing" here, it is certainly not one that belies the all-encompassing status of Pō.

2. "Pairing" is a vague term: there can be pairing of opposites (such as "male" and "female," "dark" and "clear") or pairing of equivalents. Lines 7-8 simply use the device of poetic parallelism to enumerate a series of equivalents of Pō, which are in a relationship of redundancy to it, not of complementary opposition:

> From the source in the dark *(lipo)* was the earth formed
> from the source in the night *(pō)* was darkness formed.
>
> (Johnson 1981,3)

3. The pairing of *lā*, "day," with *pō* in line 10 demonstrates precisely the opposite of what Charlot claims, since it neutralizes their opposition: *'o ka lipo o ka lā*, *'o ka lipo o ka pō*, "darkness of day, darkness of

night." In other words, the day is as dark as the night; there is no contrast of night and day-darkness reigns supreme. Indeed the next line states: *pō wale ho'i,* which Johnson (ibid.) translates "of night alone" and Beckwith (1951, 58) "nothing but night." Thus Pō is the true encompassing principle at this point, contrary to what Charlot claims; the very evidence that he gives to disprove my point proves it.

Let me consider now Charlot's argument for denying my view of Pō as "creative origin of the cosmos" (V. 35). The argument is that since "the word *pō* appears first in line 5--after a description of the turning of the earth and sky and the sun being in shadow to illuminate the moon" (C. 131), Pō cannot be considered the primal principle. Heaven and Earth, who are husband and wife, are this principle; hence--argues Charlot--"the mating of the earth and sky" is the "origin of the universe" (C. 131). Charlot's argument is unconvincing for several reasons:

1. That the word *pō* ("darkness") is mentioned a few lines after Heaven and Earth is not in itself proof that darkness appears after the "mating of the earth and sky." On the contrary, the first lines imply that darkness is present from the beginning because "At the time when the earth became hot/ At the time when the heavens turned about" *(Kumulipo,* lines 1-2, Beckwith's trans., p. 58) the sun was darkened and the moon shone, as at night. Thus Pō, darkness, is indicated as truly primordial.[30]

2. The *Kumulipo* does not describe the "origin of the universe" as a whole, as Charlot implies, but only of the biological universe, the "living universe," as I call it (V. 9). The inorganic universe is taken for granted.

3. In contrast to the explicit mention of the mating of the paired forms of Pō to produce the biological cosmos, there is no *explicit* mention in the *Kumulipo* that the life-forms derive from the mating of Heaven and Earth (which is itself only implicit). This couple, therefore, has an unclear status in the chant; it is more a generic image of generativity (cf. V. 215) than a true ancestral couple.

In sum, in treating Pō as the ultimate source of the cosmos, I am in agreement with what the *Kumulipo* (like many similar Polynesian cosmogonies) states. But stressing that Pō is the initial source does not in the least imply asserting that sex and procreation have no role in the generation of the universe, since Pō includes its sexually paired forms. Indeed, Charlot's statement--"Because Valeri is replacing this two-source origin [the mating of earth and sky] with a single-source one [Pō], he cannot use sex and procreation. He must use 'creation' or 'production' " (C. 131)--ranks as perhaps the falsest in his "critique."

Although I describe the cosmogonic process in the *Kumulipo* as gene-

alogical and sexual, and I quote approvingly Beckwith's view that this process is "actuated by desire, which is represented by the duality of sex generation" (1919, 300, V. 5), Charlot has the gall to retort to my supposedly "creationist" interpretation of the *Kumulipo* that "the *Kumulipo* is, however, a chant of the procreation, not the creation, of the universe. There is nothing other than late, biblically influenced Hawaiian texts to compare with the extended creationistic systems of Sāmoa and the Society Islands" (C. 131-132). That the *Kumulipo* chant describes "the sexual production of the cosmos" (V. 89) is precisely what I have argued in the book; moreover, in a subsequent paper I have myself drawn the contrast between the *Kumulipo* and the later Hawaiian biblically influenced texts or the Central Polynesian cosmogonies (Valeri 1986). Charlot does not see (or does not want to see) that our only real disagreement on what the *Kumulipo* says concerns the stage at which procreation first appears. I claim that this happens as soon as Pō, "Night, Darkness," divides itself in female and male forms (V. 4); he claims that it is with the "mating of the earth and sky" (C. 131). Since the two events are practically contemporary, there is very little difference between our positions. On the other hand, I strongly disagree with Charlot's reductionist extension of the "procreational" model of the *Kumulipo* to the relation between the personal gods and their manifestations and to the rituals that I analyze in my book.

The evidence indicates that he is in error: the relationship of personal, individualized gods with nature (more generally, with the "phenomenal" world) cannot be reduced simply to a "procreational," "genealogical" relationship of gods with the phenomenal world. Indeed, in Hawaii, as in every other Polynesian culture, the relationship of the gods with the world takes a great variety of forms (cf. Firth 1970, 98-99). It is precisely because I recognize this fact, not because I rule out procreation when it exists, that I use the term "production" or even "creation."[31] I do not contrast these terms to "procreation" (for instance in a passage quoted above I speak of "sexual production" V. 5), and they are not in a relationship of logical exclusion with it, contrary to what Charlot asserts without demonstration. They are simply more generic terms covering the totality of the relations between the gods and what they bring about, by sexual and asexual means.

In my book, I have referred to many cases of nonprocreational production of species by gods, for instance by transformation of parts of their bodies (e.g., V. 359 n. 74).[32] Moreover, nonprocreational accounts are often used as alternatives to procreational ones. Malo, for instance, writes: "In the genealogy of Wakea it is said that Papa [Wākea's wife]

gave birth to these islands. Another account has it that this group of islands were not begotten, but really made by the hands of Wakea himself" (Malo 1951, 3). The "labor model" testified by this text seems to be used particularly to account for the god's way to bring about the growth of food plants. Thus the lands where "the best time to plant was during the winter rains" were called "the lands cultivated by Kanepua'a [a god]" (Kamakau 1976, 25). Some of the works of the gods to which the prayers refer are digging "the earth to soften and pulverize it," watering the plants, and shading them against excessive sun (ibid., 27-29). This work is the god's share in producing the fruits of the earth; no mention of the gods mating with goddesses to make the plants grow exists in these prayers (even if goddesses are mentioned in one--Kamakau 1976, 30). Other sources confirm the absence of mating. For instance, Malo (1951, 206-207) says that any of the four major gods could be worshipped by the farmers to obtain crops, but he does not mention that any goddess was paired with them. This is not what we would expect if Charlot's "pan-procreational" thesis was correct. On the other hand, I have noted, although not enough for Charlot's taste, that the Makahiki ritual indicates that the god's action on plant growth has a sexual component (V. 214, 222, 224). Thus I do not deny this component; I simply claim that it is arbitrary to reduce to it all the forms taken by the god's productive action. Charlot forgets that not even the *Kumulipo* accounts for everything with a procreational-genealogical model. As I have already noted, all of inorganic nature is not so derived.

More importantly, Charlot's attempt to reduce all facets of Hawaiian religious ideology to the *Kumulipo* model is flawed because his failure to consider the chant's purpose keeps him from correctly assessing the significance of its genealogical idiom. As I have shown elsewhere (Valeri 1986), the *Kumulipo* must be viewed as an incantatory formula (cf. Beckwith 1951, 36, 38), whose purpose is to establish the absolute legitimacy of the ali'i for whom it was composed. His legitimacy is made unassailable by "naturalizing" the historical process that brought him to his exalted position. Such "naturalization" is obtained by two convergent means: by reducing the process of succession to mere genealogy, that is, to mere procreation, without taking into account all properly political, action-based events; and by connecting human genealogies to a genealogy of natural species. Thus the complex process of human history (partly documented in narratives) is reduced to genealogy, which is then projected onto the entire cosmos. This results in making the ali'i for whose birth the chant was composed into the outcome and the summary of the entire biological universe, that is, absolutely unquestionable

(Valeri 1986).[33] Accordingly, the genealogical idiom by which the *Kumulipo* links the divine world to the phenomenal one should not be taken too literally. Indeed, one can apply to this chant what has recently been said of an Indonesian cosmogonic tradition also dominated by genealogy: "genealogical images sound more like figurative expressions for relations of world creation rather than literal genealogical truths" (Hefner 1985,202).

While Charlot's exclusive focusing on the procreative model may be explained by a peculiar obsession, no amount of obsession can justify his absurd claim that "Valeri has managed to depict the pinnacle of Hawaiian religion as a masculine creator-god" (C. 132). The only "proof" advanced for this claim is my description of goddesses as "marginal." I have already shown that Charlot misunderstands this. But even this misunderstanding does not explain how he can put forward such a claim when I have explicitly stated: "The structure of the pantheon--like that of the *Kumulipo*--reflects the primacy of the sexual principle. The duality of the sexes is in effect divinized in the couple Kū (male)/ Hina (female)" (V. 12). This statement stands true for me even when I recognize, in agreement with the evidence, the hierarchical asymmetry of male and female in Hawaiian culture. That no contradiction is involved here is shown, for instance, by what a modern Hawaiian scholar has to say about the pervasiveness of both gender dualism and gender asymmetry in the *Kumulipo:* "The dichotomous style of balanced opposition of the opening chant of the *Kumulipo* is a brilliant reduction of the theme and metaphysics of dualism within a compressed poetic context. In philosophically reducing all organic and abstract form to dualistic categorization and opposition, however, the ancients were inevitably to grant greater respect to the masculine component of the universe and human life and to diminish the importance of the feminine" (Johnson 1981, 29).

Ignoring all this, and the even stronger evidence of gender asymmetry provided by ritual, Char-lot claims that I downgrade "Hawaiian goddesses and women, imposing on them an old-fashioned Western image" (C. 132).[34] He tries to deny the fact that Hawaiians considered women as ritually impure and excluded them from temple ritual, but he has no documentary basis to do so. His claim that in reiterating this well-known fact I appear "to argue against [my] sources, imposing a one-source picture upon the considerable evidence for a two-source, sexual ritual (e.g., 206, 217, 219-220, 282, 288; cf. 302-303)" (C. 132-133), simply displays what I am forced to call his considerable lack of honesty. None of the pages of my book that he mentions provide evi-

dence for his claim. On pages 206, 217, and 219, I refer to the Makahiki festival which, as a ritual transgression of the ordinary system of worship, suspends the separation of the sexes associated with that system and has sexual components, as I have myself emphasized. Indeed, on page 206 I mention the fact that all temple sacrifices were taboo during this period. Charlot's other references presumably are to the dangling penis of the man-god Kahōāli'i (V. 282) and the "dangling penis" of the temple image before it was covered with a loincloth (V. 288). I fail to see how this is evidence for a "sexual ritual"[35]; as I have shown, it is not sexuality but nudity, as symbol of the divine in its "untamed" state, which is significant in those contexts. Here again, Charlot sees too much sex in Hawaiian symbolism, perhaps due to his own Western bias. Hawaiians, however, do not seem to have believed that sexual intercourse was possible with a dangling penis! Charlot's reference to pages 302-303 presumably concerns my discussion of the symbolism of the Hawaiian house; again, this does not constitute evidence that the *luakini* ritual is a "sexual ritual."[36]

In his discussion on the alleged participation of "priestesses" in the purification rites preceding the entrance of men into the *luakini* temple, Charlot fails to mention that no Hawaiian source refers to it, and that it is only alluded to by Emerson (a source that Charlot disparages) in a footnote to Malo's text. At any rate, the rite occurs before the main ritua1, from which women are notoriously excluded on pain of death. Furthermore, my comment on Emerson's dubious piece of information in no way reflects a "negative view of women." I am also at a loss to discover what speculation on page 277 reflects this supposed negative view. Such veiled remarks are hardly acceptable in scholarly argument.

Charlot's final criticism is that I use a "death-rebirth idea" (C. 133) borrowed from Frazer and Sahlins to interpret Hawaiian sacrificial ritual. He uses my discussion of the *kāli'i* rite as an example. In fact, I do say that the *kāli'i* is a symbolic death, but I do not say that it represents "rebirth." Charlot misunderstands my interpretation, which is based on my more general idea that ritual avoids the occurrence of what it represents (here the death of the king) by producing it fictitiously. The rite does not have to emphasize this result by representing it as a "rebirth," especially here where the effect sought is the "taming" of the king's violence. Indeed, in the *kāli'i* "to strike the king" (one translation of *kāli'i*) is immediately equated to "to make the king" (another translation of *kāli'i*). Charlot suggests that simple "surrender" to the king may be involved in the rite, but his interpretation does not stand up to the evidence, which shows that the alleged "surrender" is in fact an attack in

which the king can be killed (V. 211). Moreover, if it were a surrender, why would it be followed by a sham battle between the king's party and the opposing party?[37]

While there is no trace of the so-called "death-rebirth" model in my analysis of the *kāliʻi* rite, I do use this model to interpret certain rites of the *luakini* temple. Although my interpretation is presented as conjectural, I find it justified for reasons that I have already stated in my book and which I will not repeat here. More generally, I will say that, in Hawaii as elsewhere (cf. Turner 1977), sacrifice employs an implicit death-rebirth idiom. For, as I have demonstrated at length with arguments Charlot does not counter, Hawaiian sacrifice is based on the principle of substitution. To kill a victim who stands for the sacrifier implies that the latter dies symbolically. But since this death is fictitious, and its only purpose is to transform the state of the sacrifier, its outcome can be (although is not necessarily, as I have mentioned) represented as a rebirth in a new state.

The argument implicit in sacrifice (a rite that has no place in Charlot's romanticized view of Hawaiian religion) finds its way into verbal utterances, contrary to Charlot's claims. Thus many sacrificial prayers associate the death of the victim who stands for the sacrifier with obtaining *ola,* "life," for him. Consider, for instance, these lines, a motto for one of my chapters:

> A *hiki a ola*
> *no nei make ia oe e Lono*
>
> Life is obtained
> by this death by you, o Lono (V. 200)

This text confirms what anybody who is not deaf can hear cried out by all sacrificial ritual: that life and death are dialectically connected, not radically separated, contrary to Charlot's opinion.[38] I find it peculiar, to say the least, that he uses the reaction of a modern Hawaiian audience as evidence for this alleged separation in ancient Hawaii. What contemporary Hawaiians say is no evidence for what their ancestors thought two hundred years ago. Furthermore, their suspect overreaction to the suggestion that the two senses of the word *make* ("desire" and "death") are connected cannot be taken, without further argument, as evidence that no such connection exists. It could legitimately be taken as evidence of the contrary, unless, of course, one decides that Hawaiians have no unconscious. But I, for one, do not subscribe to the paternalistic Western idea that Polynesians are Arcadian nature children, without dark

undersides. To say with Charlot that ancient Hawaiians, who used human sacrifice and other violent rituals to obtain *ola*, "life," saw "life as health and vigor and joyous sexuality, and death as the opposite" (C. 135), that they did not "see death in life and life in death," is to confuse them disrespectfully with modern California hippies. That some modern Hawaiian youths are closer to their California counterparts than to their ancestors, I would not deny, but to use their views as evidence on traditional values seems to me particularly unacceptable.

I will now briefly discuss the content of Charlot's appendix, which concerns my criticism of his essay, "The Use of *Akua* for Living Chiefs." I have never implied that Charlot's thesis also referred to dead ali'i. It is not clear, for that matter, how this supposed misunderstanding of his position "misdirects Valeri's discussion," since the note where Charlot presumably illustrates his claim only refers to a discussion of the divinization of living ali'i (V. 145) and to our disagreement on the proper translation of the word *akua* in the sentence *he akua na ali'i o Kona* (V. 370 n. 37). In neither case do I imply that Charlot denies the well-known fact that dead ali'i were divinized.

It is not really necessary to spend much time on Charlot's rebuttal of my criticism of his thesis that the use of the term *akua* to refer to living ali'i is an innovation due to Kamehameha and "used in the post-Kamehameha period." The reason is very simple. Charlot does not even answer my basic and decisive criticism: How could Hawaiians begin addressing ali'i as *akua* precisely "when traditional religious concepts were undergoing a crisis (cf. Choris 1822, 123; von Chamisso 1864, 4:133-140) and the ali'i were losing their sanctity in the eyes of the people" (V. 145)? "Charlot attributes no motivation to this supposed innovation and no cause for its alleged success in the proto-missionary period" (ibid.). In particular, how could the usage of addressing the ali'i as *akua* have spread precisely when the Hawaiian aristocracy had ceased to believe in the gods and had abolished their cult? Charlot should know that explanation of human action requires the reconstruction of motives. But, as I have already noted, his way of writing history is most unhistorical: it consists in creating unmotivated sequences of events. Yet every historian knows that it is not sequencing in time, but motivation or "causation" that constitutes historical explanation.

To these arguments I would now add one more. Charlot's thesis rests on a devaluation of the texts of Malo and Kamakau, where one finds explicit reference to the fact that high-ranking ali'i could be addressed or referred to as *akua*. Charlot argues that these texts have no documen-

tary value because they "could easily have been influenced by the post-Kamehameha practice" (C. 137). But with regard to Malo, at least, this argument holds no water: Malo was born in 1795 and thus had every chance to become aware of such an important innovation as that of giving the title *akua* to living ali'i. He would have mentioned this innovation by Kamehameha. The same argument is valid, a fortiori, for the compilers of the *Mooolelo Hawaii* (1838).

Finally, Charlot has nothing to say against another of my basic claims, that whatever one wants to say about the texts where ali'i are explicitly called *akua*, "one cannot hope to solve the question of the 'divinity' of the ali'i by considering some texts independently of the global ideology that has produced them. Notions are not expressed only in words" (V. 145). It is precisely because of this that I rest my case that the highest ali'i were considered *akua* on the abundant evidence demonstrating that the attributes and prerogatives of the ali'i were similar or identical to those of the gods (V. 145-153). Although Charlot's muteness in the face of the above arguments makes a detailed response to his reiterations unnecessary, I cannot leave unchallenged some of the erroneous statements or fallacies in which he indulges.

He claims that I try to prove that ali'i "were called gods during their lifetimes" because they were descended from the gods. What I actually claim is that descent from the gods establishes that high-ranking ali'i have qualities considered divine (V. 144). To my argument that ali'i who were given the proper names of their gods must have been considered divine, Charlot retorts that one thing does not follow from the other, as demonstrated by the fact that "Hispanics . . . call sons Jesus" without implying that they are divine. The objection would be valid if the Spanish usage were comparable to the Hawaiian one. But it is not: the name Jesus may be given to any Spaniard irrespective of rank and is therefore totally unmarked, but the names of an ali'i's gods could only be given to him, as far as I know (see sources quoted in V. 145). Furthermore, I do not claim that the usage of calling ali'i "by their god's proper name" (V. 145) necessarily indicates that they also receive the common name *akua;* rather, I say: "In my opinion the custom of naming kings after their gods attests to the belief that the king is a manifestation of his gods and is therefore himself a god relative to all other men" (V. 145). As I have made abundantly clear, my discussion of whether or not Hawaiian ali'i were called *akua* is secondary in my eyes because it is only part of the wider discussion of whether or not they were considered "gods" in the sense that they had divine qualities not available to inferior men.

This brings me to another false statement by Charlot, who writes of "Valeri's purpose of demonstrating an absolute, not a qualified, applica-

tion of the word *akua* to a living chief" (C. 139). Charlot displays here an insufferable disregard for what I actually say, which is as follows: "Generally speaking, the opposition *akua/kanaka,* 'god'/'man,' seems to be relative when applied to ali'i" (V. 143); "some kings, at least, are called *akua,* 'gods.' This is because no sharp distinction is made between the gods and their closest manifestations among humans. Indeed, it seems that the opposition *akua/kanaka* is a relative one and that certain men may be called the gods of others" (V. 144). It is precisely for not having understood the relative character of the appellation *akua* that I have taken Charlot to task in my book (V. 144)!

Finally, two small points:

1. Charlot objects to my interpretation of line 734 of *Haui ka lani,* which I take from note 1 to the Fornander text. The issue is whether or not the word *akua* in that line is a veiled reference to the ali'i of Hilo. Charlot claims that "the line makes perfect sense when taken literally," that is, when translated "blinded are the eyes of the gods with salt" (C. 139). I fail to see how this literal translation can make "perfect sense": Who has ever heard that the eyes of Hawaiian gods were blinded with salt? In contrast, vanquished ali'i were often blinded. I trust the interpretation contained in the footnote of Fornander's collection because that interpretation is due to a respectable Hawaiian source, "J. P. Kuluwaimaka, a famed chanter" (Fornander 1916-1920,6:368).

2. Charlot complains that I do not take account of his objections to the chant of Kūali'i as a document of the traditional use of the term *akua* to refer to living ali'i. The reason for my neglect of his objections is that I do not find them convincing, particularly because he fails to give a motive to Kamakau's alleged interpolation of references to King Kūali'i as *akua* in the text of the chant (lines 593-594).

In his conclusion, Charlot says that "Hawaiian religion can be seen as itself only if looked at closely and carefully, that is, following scholarly rules of interpretation and argument" (C. 137). This is the only statement of his with which I wholeheartedly agree. But I have shown that Charlot has rarely followed scholarly rules in his "review" of my book. His implicit suggestion that "Pacific studies" follow his own example would be its end as a serious intellectual enterprise.

NOTES

1. Another source that implies this and not simply the virginity of the female (as Charlot, n. 3, claims) is Fornander 1916-1920, 4:540.

2. Incidentally, Charlot does not even refer to this source properly. He quotes it as Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:88-89. In fact, the passage is from the second, not the first volume of the book, which was published in 1979, not in 1978. Nor was the first volume published in 1978; it appeared in 1972.

3. However, Mary Pukui is quoted there as saying: "Hawaiians placed very high value on virginity when a girl was reserved for the ali'i. Ali'i were considered to be under the keeping of the gods" (NK, 1:201). Pukui seems here to establish a connection between a religious fact (the ali'i are "under the keeping of the gods") and the requirement that their spouses be virgins, although later she speaks of virginity as a means of insuring legitimacy. The two views are not incompatible.

4. Even a couple of examples quoted from another chapter are in fact repeated in the chapter where I criticize Charlot.

5. Some Hawaiian words (such as *'aumakua*) have a special form in the plural. In conformity with common practice concerning the use of foreign words in English sentences, here as in my book, I have treated those words as invariable and therefore used them in their singular form only. In the same vein, English and Americans always write "twenty *lira,"* using the singular form instead of the plural form of the Italian word.

6. Charlot (C. 117)observes that in the passage that he quotes, as in others (e.g., V. 306, 330), I put "is born" in quotation marks. He objects to this because "the Hawaiian equivalents do not appear in the Hawaiian text." Charlot seems to be ignorant of the fact that quotation marks (or inverted commas) may be used to indicate a nonliteral statement. Obviously, the god is not born in a literal, ordinary sense, and this is why I use the expression with quotation marks. Analogously, when I say that 'Umi is " 'reborn' as a noble" (V. 278), I imply that he is "reborn" in a metaphoric sense only. Charlot thinks instead, quite gratuitously, that the inverted commas imply that I claim to be quoting from my sources.

7. Let me remark in passing that Charlot attempts to support his interpretation with a reference to Ke'āulumoku's chant, which is precisely the kind of evidence that, when I use it, he finds objectionable because it "represents a very personal, uncommon viewpoint" (C. 110).

8. The rite is not mentioned in the third source (Wilkes 1845), but this is an extremely abbreviated (less than three pages) description of the *luakini* temple ritual.

9. "Thus for the sacrifice to be efficacious, it is necessary for the victim to be at once identified with and distinct from the sacrifier" (V. 48).

10. Also a result of his inattentive reading is the statement that my final (and ironic!) sentence refers to the logic of the entire system. It simply refers to the relationship between material and ideal conditions of the system, the discussion of which takes less than a page in my book.

11. This marginality is also indicated by the fact that the prophets leave before the king consecrates the offerings of chicken (in part at least contributed by them) and dogs to the goddesses (V. 329). Technically, then, they do not participate in the sacrifice proper.

12. The presuppositional nature of the notion of encompassment implies that it can even take the form of "encompassment of the contrary," Dumont's very definition of hierarchy

(Dumont 1966). In other words, even gods in stark contrast with the major ones may be viewed as encompassed by them.

13. The antistructural role of Pele and the goddesses associated with her is also manifested by their role as *akua noho* (gods of possession), which is emphasized by Malo (1951, 116).

14. Charlot (C. 126) also seems to suggest that I claim that only the four main gods participate in the *luakini* temple ritual; but since he himself refers to my book as evidence for the worship of other gods as well, he cannot be serious.

15. I may be allowed, in this context, to react to another author's criticism. In an otherwise perceptive review (for which I am very thankful), Jocelyn Linnekin takes issue with my use of a quotation from Malo: "The majority of women . . . had no deity and just worshipped nothing" (Malo 1951, 82). Linnekin writes that this statement is inconsistent with the "long list of female deities" (Linnekin 1985, 789) that precedes it. But she disregards the fact that Malo says that most of the female deities he enumerates were worshipped by certain women only--in most cases women who were involved in specialized activities (medicine, sorcery, dancing, tapa-printing). Therefore his general statement does not contradict his list of female deities.

16. It is ironic that Charlot accuse me of ignoring the direct relationship with "family gods," since my extensive analysis of these gods (V. 19-30) is preceded by a statement in which a "sharp contrast" is noted between the relation with the "great gods" and the relation with the family gods *('aumakua)*. Of the former relation I say that it may or it may not be hierarchically mediated (V. 19), but that it always "presupposes the social totality, precisely because everybody may invoke them" (V. 19-20). In other words, the four main gods are gods of all Hawaiians and therefore index the maximal level of Hawaiian society. In contrast, the *akua 'aumakua* are gods of kinship groups (or even individuals) only, and are directly related to them. My treatment of *akua 'unihipili* and more generally of sorcery should leave no doubt about the importance I give to direct relations with the gods. The cases of dreams, visions, and marriage of gods with humans mentioned by Charlot are treated in my book (V. 20-21).

17. As is noted by Pukui et al., an *'aumakua* can be " 'a spiritual go between,' passing on prayers to the akua" (NK, 1:35). Thus they mention "praying to the *aumakua* as link to the *akua"* (36), another indication of the encompassment of *'aumakua* by the *akua,* often represented by descent (ibid.).

18. I found the following statement rather entertaining: "Valeri's exclusive equation of 'subject' with 'human' is unusual. Some worldviews recognize nonhuman subjects, such as angels and leprechauns" (C. 126). I naively thought that angels and leprechauns were imaginary creatures in which the human subject projected himself!

19. My view of anthropomorphism is also the view that Raymond Firth found adequate to Tikopia religion: "*Atua* generally seem to have been thought of by the Tikopia as anthropomorphic in the sense that they were endowed with human characteristics in most contexts of discussion" (Firth 1970, 67); yet "when they wished to manifest themselves they might assume alternative forms: they might inhabit an inanimate object . . . or they might enter an animate body, as a bird or a human being" (V. 109). In other words, the anthropomorphic character is present even when the gods manifest themselves in natural objects *(fakatino,* a cognate of the Hawaiian *kino):* "It is not held that the object reveals

the actual shape of the god; he is spoken of and treated as if he were anthropomorphic" (Firth 1967, 207).

20. See for instance this sentence: "the *kino lau* of gods are constituted by the projection of human predicates and their subjects (individual or collective) on the species and other phenomena of the natural world that evoke them" (V. 11).

21. Analogously, the contradiction that Charlot attributes to me in his note 32 is of his own making.

22. I believe, moreover, that most *'aumakua* gods could manifest themselves in human mediums, thereby assuming human shape. As ancestors, furthermore, they must have been able to appear in human form in dreams and visions.

23. Let me consider these texts in the order in which they are given by Charlot:

1. "Fornander 1918-1919, 366 (shark)." This text mentions a king (ali'i) of the sharks, not a god. His brother is said to be "a famous shark deity," not by the text but by its editor, Thrum. There is no reference anywhere that this supposed shark deity was not able to assume the physical form of man, contrary to what Charlot claims.

2. "Green 1923, 16-17 (bird)." This text is simply an animal tale and does not say that the two birds it mentions are gods.

3. "Green 1923, 44-45 (caterpillars)." Possibly Charlot's idea that the caterpillar mentioned in this text is a god is based on the arbitrary analysis of the name of its species, *kuawehi,* into *kua (=akua)* and *wehi.* This analysis is an example of Charlot's category "too many meanings" and is therefore erroneous by his own standards. Pukui and Elbert do not analyze the word at all, but define it as "dark caterpillar resembling *poko,* cutworm" (PE, 158).

4. "Green 1923, 46 (squid)." This text does not say the squid is a god.

5. "Green 1926, 66-69 (rat and owl)." In this animal tale, Rat and Owl (capitalized in the text as proper names) are said to be *kupua,* "demigods" (PE, 171). The editor of the tale explains what this means: "the animals are represented as *kupua,* or beings who can take either animal or human form at will." This flatly contradicts Charlot's claim that the tale is evidence of gods who can only take animal form. Note, moreover, that the talc refers to Owl as "*he kanaka mahia'i,*" "a man who farms," and to Rat as "*he kanaka palaualeo,*" "a lazy man." The use of *kanaka,* "human being" (PE, 118), leaves no doubt of the fact that these two *kupua* are conceived more anthropomorphically than theriomorphically, and that it is dangerous to infer animal character from an animal proper name.

6. "Green and Pukui 1936, 174-175 (squid); 176-177 (fish)." I don't have access to this text.

With the possible exception of the last, none of the sources cited by Charlot as evidence prove his point. Moreover, they have little value as evidence, since they were collected in the twentieth century. Rut Charlot is not afraid of anachronism, since he also cites "many contemporary Hawaiian religious experiences" as proofs of his point. It is on this faulty or anachronistic evidence that he bases his theory that "anthropomorphism is a later element in Hawaiian religion that was applied secondarily to the older theriomorphic gods" (C. n. 33).

Charlot also mentions "a useful list of categories . . . in Fornander 1919-1920, 6:52-55" (ibid.). It is not clear what he means by "categories." The text--a mere fragment--lists various natural phenomena and claims, quite erroneously, that they are worshipped as such. It does not say that these phenomena are manifestations of deities, let alone that they are their only manifestations. Charlot's cavalier use of evidence and quotation is

again verv much apparent here and in his other claim that I neglect the "gods who emerge with animal species in the *Kumulipo* before the birth of anthropomorphic gods and human beings (e.g., Kīwaʻa, line 366)." Where does the *Kumulipo* say that the bird *kiwaʻa* or any other such species is a god, I pray? And what exactly are these "gods who emerge with animal species"?

24. Indeed, they are confirmed by a statement of Hewahewa, the last high priest, in conversation with Judd: "In conversation with Hewahewa today, he said they always thought that God lived in heaven, that they made the idol and presented offerings hoping the spirit would descend and take possession of the idol and give answer to their enquiries as to the *pono* and the *hewa.* The old people said God had done so formerly" (J. P. Judd, Notes on his tour of Oahu, beginning 27 March 1834, Hawaiian Mission Children's Society Library, Judd Papers). (This reference was kindly provided by Marshall Sahlins.)

25. Incidentally, I nowhere "admit" that my view "cannot be found in the Hawaiian texts".

Charlot's accusation that my language is "very irregular" when speaking of "invisible" because I apply this term not only to the gods, but also to the aliʻi or to Kahiki, is in fact directed against the English language, where "invisible" means both "that cannot be seen; that by its nature is not an object of sight" and "not in sight; not to be seen at a particular place or time, or by a particular person" (OED). More importantly, I make clear that the nonvisibility of aliʻi from commoners and of Kahiki from Hawaii is used as an experiential analogue of the invisibility of the gods that Kahiki and aliʻi are ultimately meant to evoke. Thus I call Kahiki a spatial "metaphor" of the divine origins (V. 8), and I define the prostration taboo *(kapu moe)* of the aliʻi as "a means of making these sacred beings invisible by acting not on their persons, but on their beholders" (V. 147). For other methods of creating experiential analogues of invisibility, see pages 148, 268-269, 300-301, 323-325. Note also that I speak of "relative invisibility. . . . of high-ranking aliʻi" (V. 147), not of absolute invisibility.

Even on this question, Charlot does not fail to offer us an amusing example of his tendency to contradict himself from one sentence to another. Just after having written that "Kahiki is called 'invisible' [by Valeri] apparently because it can't be seen from Hawaiʻi (8-9)," he continues: "Kahiki must be so treated [by Valeri]--must be placed in a transcendental dimension rather than be accepted as a distant land within this universe . . ."

Note also that I nowhere say "that Hawaiians had the concept of immateriality" (C. 129). The origin of this extraordinary statement may be in Charlot's misunderstanding of a general statement of mine about the use of perfume in ritual in general: "Note also that, like music, speech, or color, perfume has the property, precious from a ritual standpoint, of evoking immateriality in materiality, abstraction and generality in the concrete and individual (cf. Lewis 1980, 69)" (V. 268). In the analysis of the Hawaiian fact, which immediately follows this general statement, I do not use the term "immaterial" at all. On the contrary, I say that the gods "exist in experience thanks to a contrast between 'absence from sight' and 'presence in smell' " (V. 268-269).

26. See, for instance, V. 153, where the sentence "the predicates of the divine" means: the predicates that characterize all the gods.

27. Note also that I use the expression "the divine" very seldom and not "widely" as Charlot claims. Moreover, two out of five references given by Charlot for this use are bogus. Thus "the divine" is not mentioned on page 88: on page 90, as the reference to

Dumont makes clear, it is used as an abbreviation of the expression "divine sphere," which is contrasted to the expression "human sphere."

28. Charlot also manages to distort what I say about this expression, by failing to mention that I quote it with Pukui's translation "out of the unseen." This translation evokes, precisely, cognitive undifferentiation: what remains unseen cannot be differentiated. Only insofar as the gods have emerged from the "unseen" (Pō) can they be identified and therefore differentiated one from another.

29. Note that the *Kumolipo*--exactly like some Maori cosmogonies (cf. Taylor 1855, 14-16)--is not simply a cosmogony. It is also a gnoseology; it accounts for the possibility of knowing the divine.

30. I now consider erroneous my statement that the Earth's slime is the *kumu* "source" of Pō (V. 4). This interpretation was suggested to me by Beckwith's (1951) translation of lines 6-7 of the *Kumulipo* and by her rather confusing comments on pages 44-45, which made me think that the slime was produced by the union of Sky and Earth. The new translation by Johnson (1981), which unfortunately I read only after my book was in press, unequivocally shows that Pō is its own source:

> From the source in the slime was the earth formed
> from the source in the dark was darkness formed
> from the source in the night (pō) was night (pō) formed. (Johnson 1981, 3)

Thus Pō is not generated sexually by the "marriage" of Sky and Earth, but generates itself, asexually, as the last line clearly states.

31. Note, however, that in none of the pages quoted by Charlot (V. 156, 7, 75) to support his statement that I "must use 'creation' or 'production' " (C. 131) do I use the word "creation." With a characteristic non sequitur Charlot, after having assimilated my use of the word "creation" to that of a certain "Western scholar," claims (n. 42): "Valeri's text is a good example of the power of distortion of such use. [In fact my use is different.] Valeri's emphasis on creation--rather than procreation--entails his elevation of *sight and intelligence' to 'what is most human.' " I fail to see the logical connection between Charlot's two claims. While the intestinal regions were indeed involved in intellectual processes, the privileged connection between "sight and intelligence" is demonstrated by the word *'ike,* which means: "To see, know, feel, greet, recognize, understand . . . to receive revelations from the gods; knowledge, understanding, recognition, comprehension and hence learning; sense, as hearing or sight; vision" (PE, 90). The superiority of seeing (and hearing. which is associated with it in *'ike*) in humans is explicitly claimed by at least one Polynesian text and cannot therefore be dismissed as a "typically Western" view: "The eyes and ears of man govern the muscles and head. If the eyes sleep, the ears are closed also; but if the ears hear a voice or sound, the eyes open. They are thus the guardians of the body, and see or hear things nigh or distant by which the body may be injured" (White 1887-1890. 1:163).

32. The transformation of bodily parts of a god and other modes of nonprocreational production found in Hawaii are also common elsewhere in Polynesia, for instance in Tikopia (Firth 1970, 87; 66). Note that in Tikopia the most generalized idiom to account for the production of food plants by the gods is not procreational but defecational, if one may say so. In effect, these plants are considered to be the gods' excrements (Firth 1970, 66; Firth 1967, 159-160).

33. This shows, incidentally, that the *Kumulipo* is more anthropocentric and sociocentric than Charlot would have it.

34. His evidence for this alleged imposition of an (unspecified) old-fashioned Western image is a string of quotations, given out of context, which he thinks he can refute by writing: "In fact, all the activities mentioned above, except childbearing, were performed by men as well" (C. 132). Charlot's quotations from my book do not say otherwise, since they refer to women's "predominant role" in dancing, to their "privileged relationship with the female deities of sorcery," and to "properly feminine activities." None of these expressions implies that these activities are exclusively feminine. At any rate, it is not clear how Charlot's statement "proves" that my picture of Hawaiian women is based on Western views of women. Furthermore, I object to his constant mode of argumentation: if there is some similarity, however vague, between an account of Hawaiian views and Western views, then the description is false. Such argument is unacceptable because it denies a priori, and without demonstration, that points of similarity may exist between Hawaiian views and Western views.

35. How can the *luakini* temple ritual be considered a "two-source, sexual ritual" when any participant who is caught having sexual intercourse with a woman is put to death? Such prohibition indicates the explicitly nonsexual character of the ritual.

36. I dismiss as dubious Kamakau's statement that the temple images to the left of the altar were female, because he is the only author to claim so and because his account of whatever concerns the *luakini* temple and its ritual is often untrustworthy (cf. V. 335-336; 382 n. 32). Furthermore, the earliest source (Samwell 1967, 1177-1178) does not support the view that images on the left side of the altar were in any way contrasted to those on the right side; the iconography confirms this, since it does not show that the left-side images had female traits. To my claim that "all surviving images are anthropomorphic," Charlot objects that "a number of nonanthropomorphic, undeterminable, and unshaped stone gods can be seen at the Bishop Museum" (C. n. 36). But if these stones are shapeless and undeterminable, how can Charlot determine that they are images of gods? Simply because it is said so by curatorial tradition? At any rate, a former curator, Brigham, seems to have had a different opinion on this matter. He noted that he never saw any carved image of animals (let alone of theriomorphic gods), with the single exception of fish (Brigham 1902, 92-94). The existence of these few fish images, however, does not prove that there were purely theriomorphic gods. Indeed, fish-gods are explicitly given both human and fish form in myth (V. 76-79). Shark-gods, in particular, seem to have often been given this double nature (Beckwith 1940, 129-130, 138-139, 140-143, etc.). With the exception of a couple of fish images in the Bishop Museum, then, my statement that "all surviving images are anthropomorphic" (V. 9) remains correct. Note, moreover, that my statement is followed by the qualification that "sometimes nonanthropomorphic components are included." It is implied that these components may have motivated Malo's claim that there were cases of theriomorphism. The essential point, however, is that anthropomorphic images played an absolutely dominant role in Hawaiian ritual, particularly in the temple ritual (cf. Brigham 1902, 93). This fact supports my view that ritual is fully efficacious only when the god is made present anthropomorphically. But I have never denied that the gods were made present indexically as Charlot claims with his Laka example (which I myself give, V. 396 n. 177). On the contrary, I have mentioned a variety of purely indexical signs of the gods in ritual (V. 267-269, 270, 272, 281, 300, 308)--only I do not call them "images," since, precisely, they are not icons!

37. Charlot again displays his literal-mindedness in his objection that disassembling the image of Lonomakua cannot imply that this god is killed. First, let me note that no act occurring in the context of ritual can be considered as a purely material, technological act. The ritual disassembling of a god's image is not the same thing as the dismantling of something without symbolic signification: the image represents the god and even embodies him. Second, the dismantling cannot be evaluated independently of its syntagmatic context. Since it follows the king's violent termination of the Makahiki, the undoing of the image of the god who functions as Lord of Misrule appears as much more than a material undoing. Contrary to what Charlot suggests, this hypothesis is not in the least contradicted by the fact that Lono returns to Kahiki, since this return is effected by the god's neutralization through his symbolic death (again, without rebirth).

38. Charlot admits that Hawaiians were "acquainted" with the "death-rebirth theory" (C. 134), but claims that they made "sparing use" of it. His pseudo-ecological hypothesis to explain this alleged sparingness ("lack of winter and spring, planting obviously living taro-tops rather than dead-looking seeds") cannot be taken seriously. A great number of cultures, even in the Pacific and Indonesia, employ the death-rebirth metaphor although they lack winter and spring and cultivate tuberous plants instead of seeds (why these should look dead is a mystery: rice seeds, for instance, are often conceived as alive in Southeast Asia). Charlot's other hypothesis--that "strong and consequent dualism" in Hawaii rules out the death-rebirth model because it excludes any dialectical connection of life and death--is also contradicted by comparative evidence. No wonder, since I cannot think of a deeper misunderstanding of the relationship between opposites in a dualistic system! It remains to be demonstrated, moreover, that Hawaiian thought is as dualistic as Charlot makes it. Dualism is certainly not the only mode of Hawaiian culture.

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NK. See Pukui, Haertig, and Lee.

PE. See Pukui and Elbert.

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