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READING THE LEAVES: THE ROLE OF TONGAN WOMEN'S TRADITIONAL WEALTH AND OTHER "CONTRAFLOWS" IN THE PROCESSES OF MODERN MIGRATION AND REMITTANCE

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A recent Pacific migration study has covered in detail the economic implications of remittances but has dismissed the transfers of huge "contraflows" of goods that are sent from the island states to migrant communities overseas as being "merely symbolic." In the Tongan case, the exchange of mats and bark-cloth, traditional wealth items produced by women, is pivotal to the remittance process. It reinforces sets of hierarchical kinship relations that are so dominant within the Tongan community that they function internally as relations of production in the modem remittance economy. In overseas communities, the increasingly numerous and abundant exchanges of such items signal migrant families' ability to prosper. They may be used to secure or improve economic class position and social status for givers. Thus, the contraflows of goods can reveal the nature of relationships that promote the current high rate of remittances.

Migration and Remittance

THE LATE 1960s saw the beginning of a wave of Tongan overseas migration. Before then, small numbers of comparatively privileged Tongans had left the country, in pursuit of education and training overseas. By the early 1970s, however, many thousands of ordinary commoners had set out for Pacific Rim countries in search of waged work in order to improve the living conditions of family members left in Tonga. The migrants gradually established sizable communities, mainly in Auckland, Sydney, Honolulu, and towns and cities on the mainland U.S. West Coast.

It is difficult to determine precisely the number of expatriate Tongans.' Estimates of migrants based on official statistics provided by the sending

and receiving countries and estimates of "illegals," who enter the host country without permission or overstay their visas, vary from between forty and fifty thousand (see Ahlburg 1991:15). Local studies in selected urban areas in Tonga, however, have shown that over 60 percent of the adult population were presently overseas or had returned from being overseas (Gailey 1992:52).

Marcus has made a much higher estimate, based on observations of migrant communities. He suggests that almost one hundred thousand Tongans, a number that exceeds the current population of Tonga, now live temporarily or permanently overseas (Marcus 1993:27). Since he last investigated the situation in 1978, the figure may have increased, especially if the children born overseas to Tongan parents were to be included, despite the overseas nationality or residency status they might have. The figures suggest considerable diaspora and that there is a Tongan nation of perhaps two hundred thousand people, less than half of whom are resident at any one time in the Tongan state.

A considerable proportion of the people overseas remit money and goods to close relatives in Tonga. The most generous remitters are people who were born in Tonga and have retained close ties with people there. They send money through banks, in transactions that are recorded officially as transfers, or hand carry cash, the amount of which can only be estimated. Much of the money remitted will be given by the recipients to the church, particularly in the highly socially visible annual free-gifting by families to the Free Wesleyan Church, the premier or "state" church in Tonga, to which 40 percent of the population nominally belongs. Migrants also send goods, such as clothing, food, cosmetics, vehicles, kitchenware, mechanical tools, and agricultural equipment, for use or resale.

The flow of foreign exchange to Tonga provided by personal remittances has balanced Tonga's payment of trade over the last decade or more and, in local terms, provided people with money to buy goods in domestic and overseas markets. The crucial question that arises is how long this vital but uncertain process can or will continue: what factors can sustain remittance and under what circumstances is the focus of family networks' activities likely to transfer from Tonga overseas?

The relevant factors in the case of neighboring Western Samoa, which has similarly high rates of migration and remittance, have been well canvased by Macpherson (1992, 1994). Tonga, however, differs significantly from Western Samoa in at least one important aspect: it lacks the formal local organization provided in Samoa by the village and *matai* systems. Possibly as a result of overseas Tongans' greater "use of kinship and genealogical categories to locate themselves culturally in space and time," informal family

networks rather than village-oriented organizations have become the main conduits of goods and people between home and overseas (Marcus 1993: 33). Tongans are more individuated or "atomized" (Morton 1987), by virtue of the land-tenure system of individual allotments, and promote the status of their family rather than a village.

Remittances flow to Tonga, and the Tonga-based relatives send in return root crops, seafoods and other local delicacies, kava, and the items of traditional wealth (finely woven mats of pandanus leaf and decorated painted bark-cloth) that are made exclusively by women. The items sent have both economic and social value for the people who remit. The contraflows of goods continually remind migrants of their economic and social obligations toward the home-based members of family networks.

There is evidence that goods from Tonga obtained as part of a mutually understood labor "investment" contract between relatives (see Ahlburg 1991:5-7), are used increasingly because of their cultural significance to forge personal, quasi-kinship relations within the migrant population. The newer relations include patronage and requests for favors, which accompany gifts. Presentations of Tongan valuables to distant kin or nonkinsfolk frequently represent attempts to bind them in webs of personal obligation that may widen the migrants' support network and employment opportunities and help to secure their financial status in the foreign country. A diverse set of social relations is required to meet migrants' needs in a highly competitive, economically insecure, and culturally alien environment. The contraflows of Tongan goods have received less attention in migration literature, however, than remittance flows into the country, although they are an integral part of the whole migration-remittance complex and embody the kinship relations that underpin the remittances.

The Migration and Remittance Debate

The literature on Pacific Islander migration and remittance is important because it meshes with more general questions and ongoing debates related to Pacific Island development and the world economy. It addresses the apparent lack of economic self-sufficiency and the increasing dependence of island nations on remittances to bolster their foreign-exchange reserves, service their balance-of-trade deficits, and materially raise standards of living. It also provides data on remittances' possible contributions to domestic savings, investment, and overall economic development (Ahlburg 1991; Brown and Foster 1994).

Pacific Island migration has also become part of the study of international population movements and has produced findings comparable with

migrant-worker studies reported from other parts of the world (Ahlburg 1991; Bedford 1985, 1987; Bedford and Gibson 1986; Bedford and Lamer 1992; Connell 1980, 1988; Chapman 1991; Bertram and Watters 1985, 1986; Pitt and Macpherson 1974). Migration issues have increasingly become a focus for Pacific research centers and international conferences (McCall and Connell 1993).

The studies have become more sharply focused and more detailed, and include local studies as well as more general, abstract formulations of the issues. These developments are shown to advantage in the volume recently edited by Brown and Connell (1995). The editors' own contributions make considerable use of three brief surveys they conducted in 1993 and 1994--among Tongan flea-market vendors in Nuku'alofa, Tongan and Western Samoan migrant households in Brisbane, and households receiving remittances in Tonga and Western Samoa. The volume includes a study of Fijian remittance from Sydney (Stanwix and Connell 1995) and two studies by Tongan social scientists, one of which examines Tongan remittance from Auckland (Vete 1995) and the other, the impact of remittances in four Tongan villages (Faeamani 1995).

The volume is a significant and welcome contribution to the literature. Its focus on the economic aspects of remittances, however, neglects other vital areas of inquiry, notably, the large "contraflows" of goods, which are noted but whose significance is not understood. Connell and Brown write, "The extent to which remittances in kind from the Pacific island states are merely symbolic transfers, are stimuli for further remittances, or are part of an import-export system is variable and largely unknown" (1995:23).

This openly acknowledged lack of understanding points up the desirability of cooperation between economists and anthropologists to achieve a more rounded analysis. Economists produce good data on the patterns and volumes of remittance over time and, as Ahlburg has done (1991), postulate the most probable social factors underlying the patterns. Anthropologists can provide insights into the sociocultural forces that underpin, drive, and shape the remittance flows but are, by their nature, not amenable to economic analysis. Both kinds of data are needed by the agencies that seek to contribute to development in the Pacific.[1]

The discussion that follows attempts to open up the current theoretical debate. It supports the contract theory of remittance argued by Ahlburg (1991:5-6), among others, for the Pacific, as opposed to a primary motivation of altruism. It shows that hierarchical family and church ideologies prevailing in Tongan culture morally enforce the obligation to remit. Alterations in the exchange of gifts, especially the goods handcrafted by women, would very likely indicate a change in the nature of the kinship that stimulates most remittances.

The transfers of traditional Tongan goods, far from being "merely symbolic," provide a key to understanding the whole dynamic of remittance behavior. To neglect them analytically distorts the views of the migration experience presented in the volume by islanders and only marginalizes further the role of the remittance receivers, making them appear more passive and "dependent" on hand-outs from people overseas than they appear to themselves.

The goods referred to generally as "handicrafts" bear historical and cultural meaning that enables them to play a special role in Pacific Island societies and among migrants. Certain types of mats and decorated bark-cloth, made exclusively by women, are know as *koloa fakatonga* (Tongan wealth). The formal presentation and exchange of these items is instrumental in the creation of relationships that link people and *ngaahi kāinga* (extended family groupings), and direct the flow of goods and services between them. The role of the exchange of these articles in the reproduction of Tongan society is directly comparable to the production of children, who also are known as the *koloa* (wealth) of their family and nation (James 1988:34). Gifts of traditional ceremonial wealth to people overseas promote cohesion between migrants and the members of their families at home in ways that have rarely been noted in migration literature.

The Social Context of Remittance

Brown and Connell are mostly concerned with the implications on development of the monetary value of remittances. Their focus, though important, tends to isolate the economic implications of remittances from the wider social configuration in which they occur. For example, the "massive social significance" of remittances, which they acknowledge, is scarcely illuminated by its division into parts; and the claim that their study is the first to examine "the specific rationale" (Connell and Brown 1995:13) of remittance is supported by little more than a list of the intended or actual *uses* of remittances.

Indeed, judging from what Pacific Islanders themselves say, the use of remittances may not be at all the "rationale" for sending them. Islanders stress repeatedly that the rationale for sending remittances is to "help the family." It matters less to them how the remittances are used than that they have fulfilled their family duty. Fulfillment of this obligation represents a far more important social investment than any economically productive investment could be (Vete 1995167; see also Stanwix and Connell 1995:79). Thus, the monetary or use value and the social meaning and value of remittances are "thoroughly intertwined" (Vete 199566; see also Fuka 198590; Tongamoa 1987; Vete 1995:55; Faeamani 1995:142; Stanwix and Connell 1995:73,

74). Remittances *are* increasingly used for monetary savings and investments (James 1991:3; Walker and Brown 1995; Faeamani 1995); but a functionalist view of the uses of remittances, such as that provided by survey techniques, will neither explain their occurrence nor provide clues to the likelihood of their continuance.

In Connell and Brown's list, the "social uses" of remittance are mentioned last; but 79 percent of Tongan households and 63 percent of Western Samoan households surveyed mentioned them as the *main* use of remittances, although such uses account for only about 10 percent of the remittances received (1995:24). In addition, the authors see "social uses" solely in terms of expenditures on education, weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies in the homeland. Their overly Eurocentric and economistic analysis conflates the specific forms of "social expenditure" with the otherwise neglected issue of "their massive social significance," and the matter is put aside (ibid.:23).

In at least two instances, Connell and Brown's list of uses has led them into misleading inferences. For example, they note from their recent surveys, "The second substantial category of remittances was for church donations" and that "approximately half the Tongan remitters in Auckland and 76 percent in Sydney sent remittances to be used for church donations" (ibid.: 13). This finding is not surprising, but the inference drawn from it, that "both the religious use and the significance of institutional remittances are unusual" for the Pacific (ibid.:16; Brown 1995:51), needs elaboration and clarification in order to reflect the social facts. Indeed, in much remittance literature the discussion of what remittances do has become so close to reification that one could be forgiven for thinking that remittances themselves have become the principal agents of change instead of the people who send and receive them.

Remittance for Church Donations

In the first instance, the term "institutional" appears to refer to the church. However, Brown elaborates in a later chapter: "It is well known that a significant part of remittances in the South Pacific are sent directly to churches and other institutions, community organizations, sports clubs, cyclone relief funds, and so on. These amounts represent . . . 18 percent and 41 percent of the remittances sent to Tongan and Western Samoan households," respectively (1995:51). The conclusion that large amounts of money are sent by migrants directly to church institutions and other organizations is, however, quite misleading in the case of Tonga.

Proportionally, only very little money overall goes directly to such organizations. Usually, it is sent to family members to enable them to make a

good showing in their annual donation to the church. Increasingly, also, church ministers go on fund-raising tours overseas to gather donations for churches and schools, not all of which find their way to church funds. At the Free Wesleyan Church conference in 1996, HRH Princess Pilolevu, the king's only daughter, asked that ministers time their visits with more consideration for the people overseas, because several fund-raising tours following closely upon one another often left the migrant families in a state of severe want. When money is remitted directly to church funds, the amounts are not usually large.

Large amounts of money might be sent to the church and other village-based organizations in Western Samoa (see Macpherson 1994:106). The high proportion of remittances reported in the surveys as traveling to Samoan households for these combined purposes suggests, however, that they were sent in response to appeals following the recent serious impact of cyclones Val and Ofa on that country rather than as regular remittances.

Remittances of many hundreds of dollars are most certainly used *for* church donations in Tonga and are specifically requested or sent for that purpose. But most of the gifts for the church are sent to parents or close relatives to be given to the church in the annual, highly competitive "free-gifting" ceremony, the *misinale.* Brown and Connell do not mention the *misinale* as being the vital link in the process or the importance of the local status it confers. The amount of the donation is announced in church and the whole family derives prestige (or, alternatively, some measure of notoriety and shame) from its extremely visible public presentation (James 1991: 5; Faeamani 1995: 149- 150).

Similarly, contributions that are reportedly sent to sports organizations, youth clubs, women's development groups, or schools are also usually sent to family members "for" the institution (see Brown 1995:51). The intervening step of first sending the money to the family, particularly to one's parents, followed by its public presentation is not an insignificant point, because the aim of the exercise is primarily to give the family status in the community as being pious, generous, prosperous, and properly Tongan, and only secondarily to support the institution or group. If these well-established, publicly recognized patterns of behavior were to alter, the flow of remittances might be expected also to alter in some way.

The Recipients of Remittances

A further issue revolves around the identity of the remittance receivers. Connell and Brown report that their survey data show that migrants support "family," "kin," and "relatives" within the "transnational corporation of kin" (1995:15, 27). The range of people that these terms denote, however, is

extremely wide. It is possible to be more specific about the relatives who are most likely to be sent remittances and to dispel any lingering impression that remittance offers diffuse support for a large number of largely undefined relatives.

Most remittances occur, in fact, between a narrow range of family members. They are given, first and foremost, to the remitter's parents and, second, to brothers and sisters (Tongamoa 1987:97-99; James 1991:3, 13; Vete 1995:66). The ideology of sacrifice and service due to parents is buttressed both by the traditional hierarchical emphasis in Tongan culture and by Christian church teaching (Vete 1995:62; cf. Macpherson 1994:103). Gailey adds that women are also likely to remit to their adult daughters, in addition to their parents, and to remit more to their sisters than to their brothers (1992:63).

In Tongan classificatory kinship terms, a woman's sister is a "mother" to her children. When parents migrate, the mother's sister may help the grandparents to look after dependent children left behind. Much of the money sent is specifically for the provision of such children or to thank and honor the caregivers, who may also include migrants' brothers and their families. Remittances sent "for the children's sake" help to explain the continuing high receipts that, in 1994, were estimated at around T$51 million ('A. Taufe'ulungaki, pers. com., 1994; James 1995:167).[2]

Current remittances do not represent diffuse benevolence to an undefined set of people; they are very specific. Thus, correlations of the stagnation of remittance flows with the income the migrant earns overseas or the length of time the migrant stays away should also consider that remittances may decline markedly or cease after remitters' parents emigrate or die (see Macpherson 1994:104). To whom then would remitters remit? In this context, note that second-generation remitters may not remit simply "because they have no-one special at home to remit to" (Fuka 1985:42).

Gendered Remittance Behavior

Gender differentials in remittance appear also to have been overlooked in the surveys of Tongan and Western Samoan households published in 1995. Yet, in 1985, Vete (Fuka and Vete are the same person) observed that Tongan women tend to be better remitters than Tongan men and Gailey has claimed women remit more to women than to men (Gailey 1992:62-63). Tongan women in Auckland showed a higher propensity to remit, a greater sensitivity toward the domesticneeds of the households and individuals to whom they remitted, and, frequently, sent a higher proportion of their (usually lower) wages home than did Tongan men (Fuka 1985; Vete 1995:59-61).

Women seem to have a warmer and stronger, more affectionate and sentimental, commitment to their parents than do men, because the traditional upbringing largely confines girls to the house and prizes docility and obedience as feminine virtues (Vete 1995:66). The ancient belief in the passage of "blood-rank" through the mother may also create a sense that females are closer to female forebears than males are to either females or males. Men in their old age tend to look to their daughters rather than their sons for affectionate care (James 1983:240).

This is not to say that women are more active in or take greater responsibility than men for Tongan kinship transactions, although this claim has been made by others (Gailey 1992:67; see also Small 1995:255 n. 32). Men simply play a different role. Similarly, migration and remittance are gendered processes in which men and women have roles that are both central and different. Men produce, prepare, and send traditional food items and kava to migrant kin and friends, and male migrants probably remit a greater sum in cash than do women (James 1991:3, 15; see also Stanwix and Connell 1995: 73). Additionally, men's wages often maintain the migrant household as part of their duty as the primary providers for the family, enabling women, especially single women, to remit a greater part of their wages home.

In the survey of remittance senders in Brisbane, however, it is not apparent whether women were interviewed separately, or at all, although their remittance behavior was likely to have been significantly different from that of migrant men. The sample, we are told, "included families in which the head of household was born in Tonga or Western Samoa" (Brown 1995:38). Perhaps only the head of the household was interviewed. In any event, gender does not emerge as an analytical factor in the findings, although evidence has been available for at least a decade that "gender is a primary influence on remittance" (Vete 1995:59; see also Fuka 1985; James 1991:3, 8).

The Unity of Thought and Action in Tongan Remittance Behavior

Connell and Brown have attempted to extract the economic aspects of remittances from the social context in which they are embedded in a way that Tongans do not. The "epistemological break" they have made between cultural, social, and economic functions, which is required by Western forms of inquiry (Godelier 1978:765), is not perfectly adhered to even within capitalist social formations. This inconsistency has become clear in several contexts, perhaps the most critical of which is the highlighting of the role of women and unpaid domestic labor in the reproduction of the workforce. Similarly, the informal patterns of aid among the women of poor, unemployed, or working-class households have enabled them to survive in situations in which the individual household income derived from wages has

been insufficient to sustain, let alone reproduce, the labor force (see Bott 1957; Sacks 1993). The editors' imposition on their survey data of categories stemming from the separate and distinct institutions that dominate capitalism obscures the fundamental unity of thought and action expressed by most Pacific Islander remittance behavior that relates to a worldview not yet dominated by market relations.

Kinship As a Relation of Production

In its crudest and most materialist versions, Marxian theory postulates that economic factors are the most basic. Accordingly, the social "base" comprises the relations of production, which I take to mean the sets of social relations that must be entered into in order to gain access to the means of production, that is, the natural elements and the techniques and tools that are used to exploit them. According to this view, the symbolic, political, and kinship systems form part of the "superstructure," whose form varies according to the base on which it depends.

In a cogent argument, Godelier has concluded that, in certain societies, relations of kinship, politics, and religion may be so dominant as to function internally as relations of production (1978:765). In such cases, "base" and "superstructure" are fused into one, and there is no opposition between them as has commonly been posed in Marxist thought. He further distinguishes base and superstructure as distinct functions, rather than "layers" or "levels" of action in society. Thus, kinship may play its role in the organization of marriage and descent, and function simultaneously as a relation of production (ibid. : 763).

Godelier's revisionist linking of base and superstructure illuminates the Tongan materials. Indeed, the insight had already been comprehended in Halapua's study in the mid-1970s of small-scale village-based Tongan fishermen. He concluded that financial investment in improved technology alone would not increase the catch, because it was constrained not only by technological factors but, more important, by the social relations between crew members. The obligations of reciprocity between them had to be fulfilled before each gained access to the means of production: a place in the boat, the use of the fishing gear, and part of the distribution of the catch (Halapua 1982:77). The catch was limited by the demand perceived by the fishermen, which included cultural sanctions against "greediness." In this case, the kin- and village-based social relationships, or "superstructure," in the "traditional enterprise" were not subjugated to the demands of the marketplace.[3] Instead, they functioned internally as the "base," the relations of production, that controlled access to the means of production and limited the catch.

The specificity of most Tongan remittances, from children to parents, is sufficiently pervasive to suggest that these kinship relations constitute relations of production (see also van der Grijp 1993:10).[4] The tie between Tongan parents and children is such that adult children will put aside their own interests and those of their children in order to provide material support for their parents and siblings. As Helen Morton, who has made the Tongan parent-child relationship her particular subject of study, puts it, "The high value of children is . . . the contribution they can make to the household through their labor and, as they get older, their financial, material, and emotional support of their parents" (1996:44).[5]

The notion of labor-debt provides theoretical underpinning for the obligation of parental support from Tongan children. Godelier has observed that kinship will likely operate as a relation of production in societies in which the "*living* labour force counts for more than labour accumulated in the form of tools, domesticated resources, etc.," and where there is "some *relation* between living' (present) labour and 'dead' (past) labour" (1978:766). In Tonga, there is a specific labor-debt relation between the younger and older generations. The debt consists of the parents' sacrificial effort to raise and educate the children and, perhaps, to leave them an inheritance; the children's repayment consists of the material care of the parents and contributions on behalf of the family at feasts, church, and other ceremonies (Morton 1996:86). The duty of migrant children, in words they repeat, is "to repay my parents for all the work they did in bringing me up."

Relations of Hierarchy in Tongan Kinship

Tongan kinship remains strongly hierarchical and political, in the sense that no two *kainga* (extended family) members have the same status: each is simultaneously inferior *(tu'a)* to some people and superior *('eiki)* to others. The senior man in a household, the father of a family, has considerable authority over his wife and children, and a sanctity attaches to his person and personal belongings (Lātūkefu 1975:7). The senior male as "father" or *'eiki* (chief) of the family has the duty of providing its food, and senior women are obliged to provide mats and barkcloth for household use and *koloa* (wealth) for gift exchange. Family relationships must be honored in appropriate ways, which involve the material demonstration of the bond with contributions of labor and goods (see also Lātūkefu 19758).

The unity of Tongan thought, emotions, and action is shown in the lavishing of time, energy, money, and goods on the categories of people to whom respect and obedience are due. The "chiefs" in the most immediate relationship of affection, duty, and blood are parents, or people who stand in the

same relation, who control the distribution of the wealth they receive. The money that has been sent for house improvements may be spent on a funeral, an amount sent for a younger sibling's school fees may be spent on another child, and so on. Migrant children do not seriously question such decisions. Obedience is regarded as great a duty as love.

Fatongia, the term now used generally for duty, including familial duty, formerly described the enforced labor of commoners for chiefs (Latukefu 1974:173). Tongans in Auckland in the mid-1980s justified their efforts by saying, *"Kuo lava atu hoko fatongia"* (I have made my tribute, done my duty) (Vete 199567). Their *kavenga* (burden, responsibility) is to get together the money for siblings' school fees, the family's church donations, or other requests their parents might make of them, such as providing dresses for a wedding, first birthday, or funeral; and their *fatongia* is to give it. In other words, they present their "living" labor in exchange for their parents' past "dead" labor (Godelier 1978:766). Ideally, *fatongia* is reciprocal, so that the parents should also uphold the relationship of material and emotional interdependence with their children. This reciprocity lends warmth to the otherwise "unchallengeable authority and unquestioning subservience" that characterize hierarchical status relations (Morton 1996:92).

The items of traditional wealth produced exclusively by women occupy a special place in these intergenerational relations. Originally associated with deities and high-ranking godlike chiefs, the items themselves took on spiritual and aristocratic properties that are still associated with the oldest and most valuable of them, which are in the Palace Collection. It is a logical step to see mats and tapa as standing in for people, as do fine mats *('ie toga)* in Samoa (see Weiner 1989:38) or whale's teeth *(tabua)* in Fijian culture (James 1992:91). Women were seen as the guardians of the mystical heritage, looking after the gods by weaving for them (Taufe'ulungaki 1992). Following constitutional reforms of the late-nineteenth century, ordinary commoners assumed many customs that belonged formerly to the chiefs, among them being the presentation of *koloa* (wealth items) at family occasions. Mats and barkcloth are believed still to possess life-enhancing and life-protecting qualities, and married women feel great shame if they have not a mat and a length of tapa ready in their home for a life crisis. Wives of bureaucrats and professional women must all have these items; if too busy to make them, they must either buy them or barter to obtain them.

The shame and the gossip elicited by a failure to meet one's social obligations is so great that people go into debt to acquire Tongan valuables. In 1996, the Tonga Development Bank's personal loan portfolio was overrun by, people seeking loans for family ceremonies. Nothing actually "happens" to people who fail to meet social expectations, but the feeling of shame is in-

tensely painful; the status of the family is diminished, which might, just conceivably, prevent another family from marrying into the disgraced family or persuade a respectable school, business, or the government not to hire an employee from that family.

Weiner has observed of Samoan cloth that its cosmological connection "reveals a person's right to claim the prerogatives and powers evoked by the conjunction of past and present" (1989:36, 62). It embodies both the "cosmological referents" of the political world and the "economic necessities" embedded in kinship and gender relations (ibid.:36). In the context of modern Tongan migration, Weiner's influential argument applies, albeit in a modified form, to the exchange of mats and barkcloth that undoubtedly embody the hierarchical relations and economic contracts embedded in kinship and gender relations. Weiner was speaking primarily of the symbolic power of ancient Samoan fine mats to transcend the decay over time of the glory and power of Samoan chiefly titles and to render them "timeless," together with the events they commemorate and the people they celebrate. Nowadays, the popularization of an ancient aristocratic tradition among ordinary commoner Tongans sees *koloa* produced and exchanged to confirm the continuity of their hierarchical family relationships not only over generations, but also over vast geographical distances.

Widely Shared Values

Kinship relations, embodied in the exchange of *koloa,* are able to dominate Tongan belief, attitudes, and behavior and function as relations of production because their basic meanings are widely *shared* (see Godelier 1978: 767). To be Tongan is to respect social superiors and to care for one's parents. Socialization practices, which can involve harsh discipline and the insistence upon instant, unquestioning obedience on the part of children, ensure that these ideas remain dominant for the present generation. In an equation of the exercise of parental authority with love and care, a wife once cited to me the scars on her husbands body from his father's frequent beatings as proof of the deep love his parents had borne him. The hierarchical state structure reinforces these ideas, as does the hierarchical organization of the major churches. Quite humble people, should they acquire a particularly fine piece of *koloa,* will seek to present it to a person of high status in order "to get their face known" to one who can dispense favors. High-ranking people who accept the gifts without making any return are, in a sense, profiteering from traditional patterns of respect and *fatongia*. People will occasionally name nobles and people of high aristocratic blood whom they believe to be behaving badly in this respect.

Many people still believe that generous gifts to church ministers, as Gods representatives on earth, and to the annual *misinale* will induce God to give material blessings and long life in return. A senior government bureaucrat told me, "The uneducated people believe the minister has the power to pronounce a blessing or a curse. This is reinforced because he is the one to provide a personal reference for a visa application!" The goods sent as remittance contraflows from Tonga to relatives overseas are, similarly, Tongan thought in action: a life-enhancing blessing and part of the *fatongia* to mark a relationship from which certain material returns are expected.

The Flow of *Koloa* Overseas

In Tonga, women familiar with the handicraft markets estimate that a greater amount of *koloa* than previously is being sent overseas. This increase is due to the greater absolute number of people in migrant communities but also because there is a higher demand from them for *koloa.*[6] The goods have considerable economic value. In 1991, an exporter estimated that the annual handicraft turnover was probably about T$2 million, of which only T$200,000 was officially recorded as exports. The rest of the trade consisted of barter and gift-giving with relatives and others living overseas. It may be assumed that this market has grown and that women's handicraft production now returns between T$3 million and T$4 million annually in value (James 1993: 145, 146).[7]

Most of the *koloa* sent overseas is not destined for the tourist market but for use and exchange within Tongan migrant communities. Some women in Tonga have curtailed their production of tourist items in order to make traditional wealth for sale, exchange, and gifts to relatives and friends overseas (Small 1995246). Women's work groups *(kautaha)* take out development bank loans to purchase raw materials for the production of *koloa.* Only a few Tongan women, however, regularly sell *koloa,* and when they do, it is rarely in order to repay the bank loans. They may sell for special purchases, such as an airfare or to pay school fees. Clearly, the items can be traded as commodities, because a small number of women in Nuku'alofa have begun to speculate. Women who have ready cash buy cheaply from women who need money quickly but have been unable to sell the articles in the Tongan market. They hold the items for sale when the demand goes up, for example, on the occasion of a church conference or university graduation day or when there are people wishing to take a gift overseas. A few women are themselves flying overseas with bundles of *koloa* for the express purpose of selling or exchanging them for Western goods and money.

The wealth items accompany dance troupes, church and school concert

and band tours, the Tongan canoe-rowing teams on their visits to Samoa and New Zealand, and groups visiting relatives who, frequently, give thousands of dollars in money and hospitality and receive mats and barkcloth in exchange (Koenig 1993). Rotumans (Rensel 1993) and Fijians (Stanwix and Connell 1995:79) go on "fund-raiser" trips overseas; and Samoans also make *malaga* (traveling visits), taking kava, mats, and food delicacies to relatives overseas for weddings, funerals, or the dedication of church buildings (Franco 1985; Yamamoto 1993).

Barter and Exchange

To acquire *koloa,* women overseas are prepared to go to the considerable expense and trouble of arranging exchanges with women at home. In return for money and Western goods, women in Tonga give mats and barkcloth. In 1995, I observed a weeklong *katoanga* (festive exchange) on a small island off the main island, in Vava'u, Tonga's main northern group of islands. A young married woman from the island, who had moved to San Francisco some years previously, asked her mother to organize an exchange. Ten women participated from each side. The Tongans living in the United States brought generous quantities of household goods to give as presents together with US$1,500 each, sufficient for six good-quality mats.

The daughter brought her mother a ship's container full of housewares and kitchenware, which included a large gas stove and gas cylinder. The island women all belonged to the mother's *kautaha;* some were her maternal relatives, and others were her immediate neighbors. The local women, in fact, had trouble meeting the demand of the U.S.-based women; many could not offer six mats of their own, but combined with others to make up the number. One household that participated through the combined efforts of a mother, her sister, and her daughter received US$2,000 as well as clothing and gifts of other goods. Dances, informal concerts, feasts, boat trips, and picnics were prepared for the visit by the participants' male and female relatives who lived on the island.

The degree of commoditization was masked as gift exchange. Both parties were able to perceive the transactions of goods and money as gifts stemming from affection *(me'a 'ofa).* The relationship between the makers and the receivers as well as the situations in which they are presented remain vital to the meaning and value of the particular mats exchanged. Nevertheless, the value of the goods is carefully reckoned on a scale: four mats (one of ten feet, one of twelve feet, and two of fifteen feet) are equal in trade, or barter to one *launima* of barkcloth, a length of about seventy-five feet, calculated as fifty *langanga* pieces, of which each is a handspan and a half, or

about eighteen inches in length, and of a standard width. In 1996, each side of this equation of mats and cloth was worth approximately T$1,000 in Tonga and US$l,000 overseas, the amount varying slightly according to the demand and the quality of detailed workmanship. A businesswoman in Neiafu with whom I discussed the exchange boasted that she could have gotten more money for the island women's mats had she taken them to Nuku'alofa for sale to overseas groups or people shortly going overseas. My friend on the outer island remarked that was all very well, but the island women could not afford the fare or the time away from their families and chores to travel to Nuku'alofa to barter, and, in any case, the businesswoman would have kept the profit for herself for her trouble. My friend was looking forward to Christmastime, when she was to exchange four mats of the dimensions already given for US$2,000 with Tongan women in Pago Pago through a contact made for her by her husbands niece, who was working in the fish cannery there. The money she expected for her mats was above the scale, but, as in the case of the exchange on the island, the extra given constituted the migrant women's affection for their relatives and their desire to help the cash-poor women at home.

In the mid-1980s Small documented the extensive exchanges of *kautaha* located on the eastern seaboard of Tongatapu (1987). In the past, she noted, most exchanges had taken place between kinswomen, but, increasingly, they were taking place with groups from overseas and between groups of unrelated women or, as in the case I described, between home-based and overseas groups in which the kin relationship between only one or two members provided the connecting link. Thus, Gailey's assertion that migrant women must purchase mats and barkcloth overseas remains only partly true, and it further loses credence when it is combined with her strong implication that overseas women are somehow prevented from buying *koloa* because men have greater access to cash owing to a gendered capitalist labor market (1992: 61). Women can be sent *koloa* as gifts or barter Western goods to obtain it. In any case, the implication that they cannot obtain money from their husbands and families overseas is immediately contradicted by Gailey's observation that mothers are the most adept at "managing family finances" (1992:62). Women overseas often work for wages and may also be able to count on their husbands' wages for support of the overseas households. In any event, Tongan women living overseas have poured thousands of dollars back into Tonga in the purchase and barter-exchange of *koloa.*

The Use of *Koloa* Overseas

The use of mats and barkcloth in the home and the *ta'ovala* (waist mat) as part of formal dress is a mark of national identity and a statement of fellow-

ship with other Tongans. Church and local migrant communities reinforce and elaborate the traditions. In the United States, for example, Tongans now exchange *koloa* to mark both school and college graduations, as well as births and sixteenth birthdays, which are not usually celebrated in Tonga. Also, more categories of people than is usual in Tonga are given *koloa*. In Honolulu, at a girl's sixteenth birthday, for example, her schoolteacher, her best friend, the person who sewed her dress, the person who made the birthday cake, and several others received *koloa,* in addition to the church minister and her father's sister, who are traditionally due this form of respect.

Traditional Show and Display

Many Tongans have remarked that the conspicuous amounts of wealth items that are presented at ceremonies overseas are far in excess of those in ceremonies at home, even among noble households. They attribute this discrepancy to three major factors: First, the people overseas have to pay money for these items, so that huge presentations represent their wealth within the migrant communities. "It is all part of the near fatal Tongan trait of 'show and display,' to look better than others and than you really are!" I was told. Second, the people overseas might be insecure in their position in the new country but publicly make the claim that they are successful by brave shows of traditional goods. Third, they use the goods to reaffirm their identity and solidarity with Tongan communities everywhere.

Tongan church leaders overseas are among those who play upon the competitive element between individuals and congregations. Not infrequently, they direct the wealth items toward their own churches, schools, and personal ministries to a degree that is rarely exhibited, or quickly checked, in Tonga (see also Faeamani 1995:145; Koenig 1993). As the Tu'i Tonga makes an annual presentation to his deity of the "first fruits" of the land, many people pass their first pay packet to their father or to the "chief" of the family--who, perhaps, is the father's sister--or to the church minister as an act of respect. The relations between Tongans and their social superiors, whether titled chiefs, government and church leaders, or members of the family, are neither purely secular nor matters of temporal power but have, ultimately, a spiritual component (Tamahori 1963:133). The locus and form of the remittance economy reveal the simultaneous function of relations of kinship and of religion as relations of production (Godelier 1978:764).

Forging New Relations

Essential as these wealth items are for family ceremonial, the sheer quantity of *koloa* being exported, the proliferation of ceremonies, and the amount of

koloa being presented overseas suggest that something else is also occurring. Women in Sydney, for example, hold periodic shows of different kinds of koloa for the benefit of other Tongans and the general public; and, in 1995, a Tonga Development Bank officer, exploring the possibilities of the trade export of koloa to Auckland, reported that up to fifteen pieces of barkcloth at a time were being offered as prizes in a lottery. She was amazed to see that the articles were in great demand even among second-generation Tongans. "I thought they would be leaving the Tongan things," she said, "but not at all; instead, they are going for the best ones, the special ta'ovala and so on." This observation suggests that, among some sections of the migrant population, a market for koloa is developing along the lines of the Western market for valuable antiques or collector's items.

Observations from other overseas migrant communities suggest that, in some cases, valuables are being exchanged to create personal ties that may secure migrants' economic and social survival and upward mobility through mutual aid. Tongan migrants living in the more expensive cities of the mainland U.S. West Coast, for example, require assistance to find jobs, visas, accommodation, and friends in their new surroundings (Small 1995: 246). According to Small, the solidarity among Tongan migrants is not due solely to their commitment to Tongan culture and tradition. It is also a function of capitalism and "the U.S. class structure, racism, ethnocentricism, and language barriers that, for many Tongan immigrants, have resulted in their limited mobility, strained relationships with non-Tongans, and cultural misunderstandings that invite social distance from other Californian residents" (ibid.).

These features are characteristic of other immigrant "underclasses" composed mostly of unskilled or semiskilled workers, whose mutual aid enables them to live at a less-than-living wage in enclaves in capitalist societies. Thus, Tongan migrants claim solidarity with one another as part of a strategy of economic survival, as other Pacific Islanders do (Pitt and Macpherson 1974; Franco 1985; Macpherson 1992:119), as rural migrants have done in ethnically diverse cities in other parts of the world (Little 1957, 1962; Meillassoux 1968), and as women in urban working-class communities do to enable their families to survive when men are out of work (Bott 1957; Sacks 1993). As newcomers in alien social settings, for generations Tongans have commonly forged links with members of other family networks--through gifts of food and valuables, children given in fosterage and adoption, and people exchanged in marriage--as a way of creating fictive kinship, which brings the unfamiliar into a recognizable pattern of hierarchical relations that are at once more amenable to habitual adjustment and manipulation.

The exchange of wealth items forges or strengthens social relations that enable some families and individuals to gain advantages over others in the

job market. The control and distribution of precious *koloa* at Tongan ceremonial occasions enables successful "big-men" families, who have achieved a higher standing overseas than their families warrant in Tonga, to confirm their ethnic identity and claim a legitimacy for their patronage or employment of less well-off Tongans (cf. Peace 1979:29). Adroit women can exploit the opportunities for status advancement with mats and barkcloth, the status markers that are their special province (see also James 1979).

The exchanges that are made among migrants to ensure their productivity and make it possible for them to remit may involve adjustments of family and jobs within and between communities, metropolitan centers, and countries. The complex movements of people and goods that take place overseas are parts of the migration-remittance process that, like the role of women's production and exchange of traditional Tongan valuables, are rarely noted in the migration literature (James 1993:143-144; Macpherson 1994:100). The use of traditional wealth is apt in the alien modem processes, because its cultural associations lend it a value "that is greater than the owners themselves" (Weiner 1989:36). *Koloa* has value and meaning that comprehends both the semisubsistence sphere and the capitalist sphere. It conjures up the past--it is the essence of tradition--and has thoroughly modem applications. Its social currency is worth money and is still far greater than money. While the moral community that exists among core groups of migrants endures, gifts of mats and barkcloth will continue to have profound meaning and serve preeminently in "caring for" *(takanga'i)* relationships and creating new ones.

The role of women in the production of traditional items used primarily in ceremony is usually relegated to "the economy of affection," which, nevertheless, has been shown to be an important component of small business enterprise and other commercial transactions in modem private-sector development (Rutz 1987; Ritterbush 1988; Hooper 1993). Migration, employment opportunities for those at home and overseas, and improved living standards made possible by flows of goods and cash remitted by overseas migrants have opened a new range of roles and functions in the development process for women and their production of *koloa*. Nowadays, women's material culture, an aspect of their traditional power and social status, is being used to integrate aspects of Tonga's culture, modem development economy, and kinship with the cohesion of a population that is widely spread throughout the world as a result of the process of migration.

Future Directions

Contraflows of goods from the islands to migrant populations overseas are not "merely symbolic" (Connell and Brown 1995:11) or expressive spin-offs

from economic realities; nor should they be marginalized and neglected in analyses of the migration-remittance process. Survey techniques alone will not reveal their "massive social significance." This article has shown that contraflows of goods are integral to the duties implied in the hierarchical relationships between parents and children, between social superiors *('eiki)* and inferiors *(tu'a).* The ideas are so dominant and widely shared among migrants that kinship functions as a relation of production in the remittance economy. It stimulates the pursuit of wage labor and the return of money and goods to Tonga. In parallel, the sending of money to parents for the church is seen as a *fatongia* (duty) to parents and to God. In the latter case, religion buttresses kinship's functions as internal relations of production within the migrant communities.

Hierarchical Relations under Threat

The possibility always exists that people who consent to perform a service will withdraw their consent or that the internal contradictions within a system will transform or destroy it. Western modes of thought and action have become increasingly intrusive in Tonga and in overseas migrant communities. Many of the hierarchical relations of kinship are becoming increasingly problematic among members of the younger generation and, more particularly, among second-generation Tongans living overseas.

In Tonga, most young people who have acquired Western education accept the fact that its goals and orientation conflict with the Tongan way *(angafakatonga)* in more ways than are commonly acknowledged. A young, unmarried Ph.D. who had spent some years in Brisbane recently explained,

> Parents overseas push the children to fulfil the cultural roles but they do not find it meaningful. They have *koloa,* but the mother values it differently from the daughter. People who were born here and went to school here send remittances. People born there? No way! Even helping their own parents is going; they spend their money on makeup, fashionable clothes and to go to entertainment; they are very Australian in their ways. But for us it is our main goal; we give to parents to help with food, obligations to the church, feasting, to lift [i.e., help] the younger brothers and sisters. That is how we are brought up here, to look after one another. Even though I need the money for myself, my family takes priority, that is why people send remittances to the parents. (Pers. com., Nuku'alofa, 28 April 1996)

A general feeling of *fetokoni'aki* (helping one another and particularly relatives) remains integral to Tongan identity in overseas communities (see also Fuka 1985; Vete 1995). To the extent that it does, there may still be said to exist a moral community overseas. *Koloa* represents the established social claims of those at home and will continue to do so as long as family and *kainga* relationships mean the same in Tongan migrant experience as they do in Tonga.

To secure the loyalty and obedience of the next generation, other measures are sought. The children of migrants may be returned to Tonga to live with their grandparents or other relatives (James 1991:2, 17-18). This arrangement enables the migrant parents each to engage in two or three jobs overseas, which they need to support themselves and send money back for the children and parents. It may also enable the children to grow up in healthier conditions than their parents can afford overseas.

An additional reason, however, is increasingly given, namely, "to give them Tongan relatives" or "so they will grow up to have relatives in Tonga." Over the years, I have known of many women who traveled overseas to attend a daughter's childbed and bring the baby back, at the tender age of one or two weeks, to be raised by the grandmother or other relatives in Tonga. Is this an attempt to ensure that "second-generation migrants" will have "someone special to remit to" when they grow up (Fuka 1985:42)? If so, does it work?

Among the data lacking from studies of Tongans overseas is an estimation of the degree of loyalty to people in Tonga that exists among second-generation migrants who have lived in Tonga for a time. The probable answer is that it all depends on personal circumstances, particularly the nature of the families involved. This answer is likely to prove unsatisfactory to those who seek to predict remittance flows and plan national development. Some migrant parents manage to instill conservative traditional family values into their children, and others manifestly do not.[8] Nowadays, the relations of hierarchy implicit in Tongan kinship have become more problematic, particularly among second-generation migrants in overseas communities. At the same time, the reaffirmation of Tongan identity and *kainga* ties has assumed additional functions that are instrumental in the pursuit and consolidation of economic and social position essential to survival in capitalist economic structures. An increased demand for the traditional valuables suggests that they are taking on wider functions in migrant communities in the assertion of fellowship among a broader social spectrum. As the first-generation primary ties gradually pass away, remittances may dwindle. In their stead, however, Tongan women may find an export market in traditional wealth, as long as the valuables continue to bear aristocratic, family, and "Tongan" associa-

tions and these meanings continue to have value overseas in nontraditional contexts.

In sum, the goods that were formerly presented to ancient gods in an effort to ensure fertility and prosperity for land and people now, through the transformation of a cultural process, tap the economic forces that, like the gods of old, lie beyond the horizon--in Pacific Rim countries--but, this time, through the intermediaries of successful entrepreneurial migrants and other "high priests" of capitalism. Long associated with forms of Tongan social stratification based primarily on rank, *koloa* has found a new role in securing economic class position in the capitalist labor market of more developed countries. With greater hindsight, the role of women and their wealth in the last thirty years or so in Tongan migration and remittance behavior may appear only as a brief moment in Tonga's long and varied migration history. For the moment, however, as a parallel to the biblical parable of the fig tree, a careful reading of the flows of woven pandanus leaves and beaten and painted mulberry bark from Tonga to migrants overseas could well provide a sign of change in the relationships that presently sustain the current high level of remittances to Tonga. Such change may instead introduce an increasing market for the goods that are now sent as gifts.

NOTES

I would like to thank Antony Hooper and two anonymous reviewers, whose comments and ideas have sharpened and improved the arguments presented here.

1. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for the counterpoise of the two analytical contributions.

2. At the time, the Tongan currency was almost on a par with the U.S. dollar.

3. The concept of the "traditional enterprise" will be introduced in a forthcoming paper, "The Social Dynamics of Aid to Private Sector Development in Pacific Island Economies," by A. Hooper and K. James.

4. Van der Grijp, drawing on the same inspiration in M. Godelier, has emphasized the dominance of kinship in Tongan modes of production (van der Grijp 1993: esp. Introduction). He has not, however, applied the argument to the transfers of *koloa* within the remittance process, as I am attempting to do.

5. Morton notes that Howard has observed a similar "association of affection with material giving" for Rotuma (Morton 1996: 86). Howard suggests that the generosity of parents establishes a social debt that enables them to control and influence their children's lives (1970:33). Macpherson has also observed that Western Samoans are bound to serve the family because of the biblical injunction to care for parents and the Samoan belief that one is obliged to those "whose sweat one has eaten" (1994:92).

6. Folau Vaea, director of the Handicraft Section, Friendly Island Marketing Cooperative, pers. com., March 1996.

7. In July 1996 the Tongan dollar was worth US$0.97.

8. The studies of Tongan migrants conducted by C. A. Small in San Francisco (1997) and H. Morton in Melbourne may help provide answers to these questions.

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LEADERS IN SQUASH EXPORT: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW CASH CROP IN TONGA

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As in many small Pacific Island countries, agriculture is the main economic activity in the Kingdom of Tonga. Squash (pumpkin) became Tonga's number one cash crop beginning in 1991, becoming more successful in economic terms than any other Tongan cash crop, such as coconuts, bananas, or vanilla. All Tongan squash is exported to Japan. Small countries supplying large countries with a basic food item is no novelty, but the impact of squash is unprecedented in Tonga's economy. This article deals with the Tongan squash business, with a clear emphasis on the role of the exporters, who are local Tongan entrepreneurs. Their very existence marks the deep penetration of Tongan society by the capitalist system. However, Tonga is still a Polynesian society with many of its typical features. Theoretically this study underlines the importance of the factors of the MIRAB model advanced by Bertram and Watters, without, however, agreeing on the supposed determining character of these factors.

AMONG SCHOLARS OF THE PACIFIC, there is a tendency to marginalize the local economies of the Pacific Islands. These economies are considered to be determined by outside forces and to exist in a kind of frozen state. This theoretical tendency was set in motion by dominant currents in development theory, such as the Modernization School and the World System School (So 1990), and was reinforced by the introduction of the MIRAB model in the mid-1980s. MIRAB is an acronym for migrant societies (MI), remittance incomes (R), aid dependency (A), and bureaucratic organization (B). According to R. Watters, who was the first to introduce the MIRAB model, remittances and aid are the basis of incomes in the islands. This explains the low

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motivation to invest in market production and, as he claimed, the "virtual absence of an indigenous private sector" (Watters 1984221).

Usual approaches to development presuppose that migration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy are part of the development process. G. Bertram and R. Watters (1985), however, ascribed the--epistemological--status of determination to these factors in contemporary South Pacific island economies: "the combined effect of migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy. . . now *determines* the evolution of the system" (1985497; their emphasis).[1] In their second coauthored article on the subject, Bertram and Watters stated that the MIRAB factors "do not merely supplement onshore commodity production in the Islands but . . . have increasingly and decisively dominated the respective island economies and largely determined their evolution" (1986: 47). Note here again the concept of determination.[2]

Bertram and Watters based their generalizations in the first instance on the situation in the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu, and Kiribati. However, they also extended the application of the MIRAB model to other South Pacific island nations such as Tahiti, Western Samoa, and Tonga. They referred, for example, to B. Finney's study on Tahiti (1964). Finney observed that " 'fast money' in the town was more appealing than 'slow money' earned from productive activity in the 'countryside."' According to Bertram and Watters, "Finney's analysis clearly captures a 'MIRAB' transition" (1986:48). G. Marcus's observation (1981) of the widespread diaspora of Tongans, another example, "makes nonsense of the traditional European concept of a unitary nation-state" (Bertram and Watters 1986:49) and would thus indicate the existence of a MIRAB transition. I would be the last person to deny the importance of the four factors advanced by Bertram and Watters.[3] Nevertheless, I have strong doubts that these factors would *determine* local economies in all the Pacific Island nations. My case will be the Kingdom of Tonga and the precise context of the Tongan squash industry as well as the related development of local entrepreneurship.

As in many other small Pacific Island countries, agriculture is the main economic activity in the Kingdom of Tonga.[4] Squash (pumpkin) became Tonga's number one cash crop only beginning in 1991. No other Tongan cash crop--such as coconuts, bananas, or vanilla--has had such success in economic terms as squash. All Tongan squash is exported to Japan. Although not a novelty for small countries to supply large countries with a basic food item, the impact of squash is unprecedented in the Tongan economy.[5] Squash is a regular staple food in Japanese households with low budgets. They consume a total of about 200,000 tonnes of squash per annum (Grynberg 1993; Fakafanua 19953). During the Japanese squash season, Hokkaido and southern Japan dominate the market with their product.[6] The Japanese

off-season for squash is between November and May. This is when New Zealand, Mexico, the United States, and, now also, Tonga enter the scene. All squash is exported to Japan via the Kobe and Osaka auction markets. Tongan exporters are especially successful in November and December. Since its very beginning in 1987, the Tongan squash export trade has increased steadily.

This article is concerned with the Tongan squash business, with a clear emphasis on the role of the exporters. These exporters are local Tongan entrepreneurs. Their very existence marks the deep penetration of Tongan society by the capitalist system. However, Tonga is still a Polynesian society with many of its typical features. A relevant feature of the Tongan version of Polynesian identity is a chieftainship transformed in the second half of the nineteenth century into a royal house with accompanying landholding nobility (see Campbell 1992b; Marcus 1980).[7] Recent decades, however, show the rise of a new middle class, consisting of Tongans with salaries and higher education (a growing civil service, schoolteachers, and so forth) as well as Tongan entrepreneurs (see Benguigui 1989). The rise of a new economic middle class finds its political translation in an urgent call for more democracy: according to some the absolute dominance of royalty and nobility in the governmental elite should be broken (see Hau‘ofa 1994; James ‘1994; Lawson 1996). Entrepreneurs are fighting in particular for what they see as their liberal rights: a free market, that is, free for their entrepreneurial endeavors. In the case of squash export this could mean stopping government control. The entrepreneurs involved in the squash industry express, as we will see, differing and conflicting ideas on this point. However, the rise of entrepreneurship in Tonga is a matter not only of the middle class, but also of members of the royal family, the “traditional” Tongan upper class.

This exploration of the Tongan squash exporters and their trade is largely based on interviews with several of these exporters as well as archival research in the *Tonga Chronicle* and other Tongan journals. The state-owned national *Tonga Chronicle (TC)* is of particular interest since it serves as both an important source of contemporary Tongan squash-production history as well as a mirror of the government point of view. In the first part of this article, a chronicle of the Tongan squash boom, I deal with the initial years of the Tongan squash industry, government intervention, and problems and prospects of the squash industry. In the second part, on the development of Tongan entrepreneurship, I look at business initiatives by members of the royal family, present professional profiles and ideas of the leading exporters, and seek an answer to the underlying question: what kind of entrepreneurship is developing in contemporary Tonga?[8] All this may serve to demonstrate that the Tongan economy is not determined by MIRAB factors only.

Chronicle of the Tongan Squash Boom

*Initial Years **of** the Squash Industry*

In 1987 a Tongan-New Zealand businessman named Joshua Tu'iono Liava'a paid a visit to Tonga. Liava'a was a representative of Group Trade Limited of Dargaville in New Zealand, a marketing company that deals with Japan. By then, New Zealand had already been exporting squash to Japan for seven years, Liava'a presented the idea of growing squash as an export product at the Tongan Ministry of Agriculture's experimental farm in Vaini. New Zealand was drawing an economic fence around Tonga by virtue of its quarantine requirements for bananas and other food crops, and from 1985 until 1989 banned Tongan agricultural products due to the discovery of fruit flies on them. New Zealand used to be Tonga's primary export market for fruit and vegetables. Against this background, Liava'a argued, squash could provide an important opportunity for Tonga. Liava'a also discussed the matter with Prince Mailefihi Tuku'aho, who actually adopted the idea and. started to organize the first Tongan growers. At this point, Liava'a went back to New Zealand.

Prior to 1987, Prince Mailefihi had tried producing bananas and coconuts but had encountered problems with the New Zealand ban on Tongan produce, as had other Tongan exporters. In 1987 Mailefihi organized the first group of forty squash growers on Tongatapu in the Tonga Growers Association. The explicit aim of the association was "to assist in exporting agricultural produce with profits going directly to the growers and not to the association" *(TC* 1987). Two New Zealand representatives from Group Trade came to Tonga to assist the growers in determining the exact harvesting dates, to build the bins for consignment, and to ensure shipping to Japan. In 1988 the Tonga Growers Association consisted of sixty-four members. They harvested and transported the squash in bins to Poutaha, the packing center close to Tongatapu's harbor. Group Trade representatives supervised the grading at Poutaha and took care of the transportation to Japan and the marketing (Speijer, Holo, and Takau 1989:4). In 1988 the growers made good money by local standards. The New Zealand company was less fortunate. In 1987 and 1988 Group Trade broke even and covered its costs. In 1989, however, the company had a disastrous experience with kiwi fruits in New Zealand, its primary crop--the squash industry in Tonga being only a supplementary activity. Group Trade faded from the Tongan picture.

Squash shipments in 1989 were the first direct sales to Japan organized by the Tonga Growers Association, and were supposed to be "of much better quality" than the shipments exported through Group Trade in the previous

years *(TC* 1990a, 1989). According to one of the new growers, 1989 was not a good year for squash "as government had to step in and subsidised prices to growers by a grant of T$500,000" (pers. com., 1995). This view is much more pessimistic than the one that comes to the fore in the *Tonga Chronicle:* "Earnings in 1989 have boosted the number of growers" (1990b:l). In 1990 the grower just mentioned founded an alternative export organization, which subsequently became the Squash Export Company Limited. In the same year, Prince Mailefihi changed the name of the Tonga Growers Association to the Tonga Growers Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society. The two export companies received loans from the Tonga Development Bank for production costs of T$650 per acre for fertilizer, seeds, chemicals, machinery, transport, and labor *(TC* 1990b:3).[9] In 1990, the Multi-Purpose Co-operative exported 2,900 tonnes and Squash Export 2,600 tonnes (ibid.).

In 1991 other new export groups, such as the already-established Tonga Commodities Board and the recently founded Tai Agency Services Company, entered the squash market *(TC* 1991a). The Tonga Commodities Board was the state-owned organization that used to have the monopoly on, for example, the export of copra. In the case of squash, however, the Tonga Commodities Board was only one of the many competing export companies.[10] In 1991 Tai Agency, sponsored by the Japanese firm Misuzu Shoji Company Limited, sent five Tongan representatives to Japan to explore the market. A spokesperson of Misuzu Shoji confirmed that there would be a market for any amount of Tongan squash of good quality (that is, grade A), even during the Japanese squash-growing season *(MT* 1991). In November 1991 eight vessels with squash left from Tonga for Japan.[11] At the same time, a new problem arose for the first time: "More than 600 tonnes of (squash) pumpkins had begun rotting. . . at the Queen Salote Wharf customs shed, due to poor ventilation in the storage area and the delay in the arrival of a transport vessel" *(TC* 1991e). However, this seemed only an incidental regression in the general success of the industry.

The Tongan Quota System for Squash

In 1991, for the first time, the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries imposed a quota system for the export of squash. According to the minister the exporters themselves had asked for such a system: "In 1991, exporters sought Government intervention to control the industry." The minister also gave the reason for this: "In 1991 the quota was set before the high price was offered by Japan. The high price was set due to the quota" (Fakafanua 1995). Early in the year, the ministry allocated 10,000 tonnes to three export groups: Tonga Multi-Purpose Co-operative,[12] Squash Export, and Tonga

Commodities Board.[13] Later in 1991, the ministry also granted export licenses to newly registered companies such as Tai Agency, the Ha'amo Growers Association, and the Tauteoli International (Tonga) Company Limited. Because of this, the original three export groups expressed their fears "that the market towards the end of the year will be flooded" *(TC* 1991b). Altogether, in 1991 the Tongan government issued a total of nine export licenses.[14]

Even in the very first year of its existence, the quota system produced conflicts. Limited allocations led the three largest exporters to turn away many growers.[15] "Controversy and ill feelings" were noted to have arisen between the exporting groups due to what certain groups labeled "unfair distribution of export quotas" *(MT* 1991). The first quota system was established based on quantity, not quality. The director of the Tonga Commodities Board, Lisiate 'Akolo, complained about this: "[Squash] pumpkin exporters are facing heavy claims from the Japanese buyers because of undersized, discoloured, and rotting fruit, broken bins, and a flooded market" *(TC* 1991g).[16] According to 'Akolo, exporters should have emphasized quality rather than quantity. Since there were too many exporters, some of which had shipped out undersized squash, he had requested the government to limit export licenses. "Free-market concepts will not work for Tonga in this industry because, to the detriment of the Kingdom's fledgling industry, the Japanese importers could easily contract with any other country that has growing conditions similar to those here," said 'Akolo (ibid.).[17]

As a consequence the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries imposed a lengthy set of criteria for the approval of export licenses in 1992. These varied from "sound financial standing and business repute" to "assurance that all squash has been purchased directly from the growers and transported directly to the packing and storing facility." The list contained thirteen criteria, all aimed at guaranteeing quality (see *TC* 1992b). The applications had to be submitted to the ministry. Only seven companies obtained export licenses. Prince Mailefihi, who chaired a meeting of these seven, declared that "there is a strong solidarity among the seven companies, and we are privileged to have been picked from among the 22 applicants" *(TC* 1992d). The total allowance set for 1992 was 10,000 tonnes. The Tonga Development Bank warned that exporting more than this amount "could result in huge losses for growers." Japan was still the lone market. To export more would mean lower prices. According to the bank it would also complicate quality control *(TC* 1992e).

In 1993, the total export allowance set for the whole of Tonga was 13,000 tonnes. According to one of the exporters. (pers. com., 1994), the government had overestimated the Hokkaido production of squash. In fact more than 18,000 tonnes were exported from Tonga (see Table 1). The govern-

TABLE 1. Tongan Squash Export Quotas and Actual Exports

Year	Quota (tonnes)	Exports (tonnes)	Exports (millions of T$)
1987		400	?
1988		971	0.4
1989		3,031	2.0
1990		6,245	4.8
1991	> 10,000	21,858	12.4
1992	10,000	9,935	8.6
1993	13,000	> 18,000	15.0
1994	17,000	16,988	13.0
1995	15,000	8,400	8.9

Sources: Exports in tonnes, 1987, estimation by Tevita Holo, pers. com., 1993; 1988, Speijer, Holo, and Takau 1989:4 and *TC* 1988:l; 1989, *TC* 1990b:l; 1990, *TC* 1991d; 1991, *TC* 1992f; 1992 and 1993, *TC* 1993a; 1994, Fakafanua 19953; 1995, *TC* 1995j and 1995k. Exports in dollars, 1988, Speijer, Holo, and Takau 1989:4 and *TC* 1988:l; 1989, Tongan Government 1993:53 (T$2.4 million in *TC* 1990b:l); 1990-1992, Tongan Government 1993:53 and *TC* 1993a, with an estimation of the net gain in 1991 at T$7.6 million in *TC* 1992f; 1993, *TC* 1993a; 1994, *TC* 1995f; 1995, *TC* 1996d.

ment did not retaliate against the exporters for exceeding the allowance, though, since there was no legal basis to do so. Only in November 1993 was a new law passed that made it possible to prevent exporters from exporting more than the quota.

In 1994, with the new law in force, the quota was defined as an "absolute maximum" of 17,000 tonnes, of which 2,000 tonnes would be kept "as a reserve as a provision against excess production" *(TC* 1994b). The remainder was allotted among thirteen licensed exporting agencies. One of the several new license holders in 1994 was PAKO (Organic Squash).[18] In 1994 almost exactly 17,000 tonnes were exported, and at least six ships with squash left Tonga for Japan.

In 1995 another set of criteria for the approval of export licenses was published. Although not completely new, the list, numbering five criteria, was much shorter than that of 1992.[19] In 1995 eleven agencies were licensed to export a total of 15,000 tonnes (see Table 2).[20]

Several companies that had an export allocation in 1994 no longer had one in 1995 (see Table 2). The Lini Company, for example, did not perform well in 1994 and failed to pay its growers. The company was run by an entrepreneur from Vava'u, who stayed in Tonga's capital, Nuku'alofa. Although his 1994 allocation was for Vava'u only, most of the squash purchased by him was planted on Tongatapu. The ministry penalized him by not granting a new allocation for 1995. Tai Agency, another example, had financial prob-

TABLE 2. **Export Quotas for 1993, 1994, and 1995 (in Tonnes)**

	Island(s)[a]	1993	1994	1995b
Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing Ltd.	TT	3,300	3,550	3,350
Squash Export Co.	TT	2,500	2,250	2,100
Primary Produce Export	TT	2,000	2,150	2,150
Island Produce Co.	TT	1,000	1,300	1,600
Touliki Enterprises	TT	1,000	1,250	1,200
Ha'amo Growers	TT	1,000	800	850
Tai Agency	TT[c]	1,000	700	-
Friendly Is. Marketing	TT	-	500	950
AMACO[d]	TT	-	300	500
Malt (Organic Squash)	TT	Text	-	200
Primary Produce Export	VV	1,000	1,000	1,150
Lini Co.	VV	-	300	-
Vava'u Squash Export	VV	-	300	450
Ha'amo Growers	EU	200	200	400
Island Produce Co.[e]	EU	-	200	-
Mahe Taloa	HP	-	100	-
PAKO (Organic Squash)	HP	-	100	150

Sources: 1993, Hopoate Moengangongo, pers. com., 1994; 1994, *TC* 1994b and *Lali Magazine* 1994a; 1995, *TC* 1995c.

[a]TT = Tongatapu; W = Vava'u; EU = 'Eua; HP = Ha'apai.

[b]Totals 15,050 tonnes, not 15,000.

[c] In 1993, also includes exports from Vava'u.

[d] Amanaki Marketing Co. Ltd.

[e] Formerly Edwards Co.

lems in the form of debts to persons outside the squash business. The company also failed to pay its growers in 1994 and became involved in court cases with them. Tai Agency too was penalized by not receiving a new export license for 1995. In the words of the minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries, "exporters whose performance has been deemed unsatisfactory in the past have been withdrawn from consideration for export licenses" (Fakafanua 1995:4).

The share each company had in the total export allowance shifted year to year. In 1995 the quota for Squash Export was cut slightly to 2,100 tonnes. This might have been related to an order by the Supreme Court in Nuku'alofa for the company to pay a total of T$14,060 to five of its former growers because of "sums that . . . had been wrongfully deducted from earnings due" during the 1991 season *(TC* 1993b). However, any connection is not obvious, since other companies such as Marketing, Blending and Manu-

facturing Limited and Touliki Enterprises also saw their allocations reduced in 1995 without any relation to court cases, while Primary Produce Export Limited, Ha‘amo Growers, and Friendly Islands Marketing saw their allocations increased.

Until now, we have been dealing with the November-December niche market, that is, the time of year in which Tonga has dominated the squash market in Japan since 1991. Since 1994, a new niche market seemed to open up for Tonga. Sometime in May the New Zealand and Mexican producers stopped selling their squash and in June the Japanese producers commenced. In-between was a new niche, the so-called May season, which Tongan exporters sought to exploit for the first time in 1994. For this new niche market the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries allocated a quota of 2,000 tonnes for the whole of Tonga: Manufacturing, Blending and Marketing received an allowance of 1,500 tonnes for Vava‘u and Ha‘amo Growers 500 tonnes for ‘Eua. However, neither on ‘Eua nor in Vava‘u was the May season a success. ‘Eua produced 200 tonnes, but the shipment was canceled “because of lack of quality” *(TC* 1994e:3). Vava‘u produced 1,000 tonnes, of which only 250 tonnes were found to be “of export quality” *(TC* 1994c).[21] This was too small for shipment, so in May 1994 no squash at all was exported *(TC* 1995c).

In 1995 Tongan exporters tried once more to enter the May niche market in Japan. Again 2,000 tonnes were allocated, but only to Tongatapu *(TC* 1995c). However, early reports indicated that the Tongan exporters were “unlikely to attain 300 tonnes” *(TC* 1995g). Finally, only 128 tonnes were exported in the 1995 May season *(TC* 1996e:2). One exporter criticized the so-called May season as “the wrong time of the year to grow this kind of vegetables in Tonga. It is too hot and too wet” (pers. com., 1995).[22]

Problems and Prospects of the Tongan Squash Industry

R. Brown and J. Connell commented that the rapid growth of Tongan squash exports “enabled the economy to emerge from recession in the early 1990s, and by 1991 squash exports were valued at between one and one-and-a-half times the combined total of Tonga’s other exports” (1993a:8). This observation corresponds with T. Fairbairn’s view that “over the last decade, economic growth in the Kingdom of Tonga has been moderate” and that “Tonga’s real GDP at market prices . . . has grown moderately in recent years” (1992:ix, 2). Since Fairbairn wrote those words, economic growth has accelerated rapidly due to the squash industry. However, the sociocultural and ecological impacts of the squash boom on Tongan society as a whole are not strictly positive. For example, K. James warns, “The growth of the squash

industry in Tonga over the last five years illustrates many current ills of commercial farming practices: the large-scale commercial venture gains money, but at considerable cost to both the social fabric and the environment" (1993a:234-235).

In 1994 Tonga was the third largest exporter of squash to Japan by volume, New Zealand and Mexico occupying first and second place respectively. Of course, Fair-bairn was right when he suggested that "in the case of squash, possibilities for developing new markets, other than Japan, should be explored" (1992:21). But the question remains: which other markets? Tongan squash exporters are mainly active in the so-called November-December niche market. Although Tonga has become the dominant supplier during this particular niche (New Zealand does not export squash during these months), other exporting countries are competing for the same market, as shown in Table 3.

Until recently there was no real competition with other Pacific countries for the same niche market. Elsewhere in the Pacific, climatic circumstances were not supposed to allow for good squash productivity. Farmers in Fiji tried to grow squash for this niche several years ago without success, which may be due to the hot climate. The only strong competitors for this niche market were Mexico and Hokkaido. But if Hokkaido was struck by a hurricane or another disaster, Japan would be in short supply. Or if, for example, the Mexican squash was damaged by disease, Tonga would have no competition and the price would be high. Since 1993, however, Vanuatu and New Caledonia have produced small but increasing quantities: New Caledonia is at about the same degree of latitude as Tonga. According to one exporter who has interests in those countries, Vanuatu and New Caledonia might become strong competitors in the near future (pers. com., 1995).

TABLE 3. Countries Producing Squash for the Japanese Market in November-December 1994

Country	Tonnes
Tonga	16,988
Japan (Hokkaido)	10,000
Mexico	10,000
United States	6,000
Vanuatu	2,088
New Caledonia	1,394
Total	46,470

Source: Fakafanua 1995:3.

For the minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries the figures shown in Table 3 served as a warning against overproduction: "Japan's demand for imported (squash) pumpkin relies heavily on both its own production and economic conditions, . . . variables which Tonga cannot predict" (Fakafanua 1995:3).[23] Overproduction would also have a negative effect in that the wharf, packing houses, and quarantine services "would be pushed beyond their limits, and quality could be sacrificed" (ibid.).[24] These statements legitimize the quota system, but they also seem to be an illustration of the apparently prophetic words by a team of agronomists that "the degree of influence that planners can have over what happens in (Tongan) agriculture is often overestimated' (Hardaker, Delforce, Fleming, and Sefanaia 1988:77).

In 1995, for instance, due to dry weather "Tongan exporters would be lucky if they are able to make a total shipment of 10,000 tonnes to Japan" *(TC* 1995g). At the beginning of November 1995 only 6,000 of the 17,000-tonne quota had been harvested *(TC* 1995h, 1995i) and two weeks later a total of 8,400 tonnes *(TC* 1995j). One of the consequences of this sudden fall in production was an unprecedented price war among the Tongan exporters. In offering the highest price to growers, including to those who had a contract with other export companies, exporters tried to complete their own allocation.

By the end of 1995, a report of the Tonga Development Bank urged once more that the quota system be retained. It recommended a 10,000-tonne quota for 1996. The bank claimed that an open market would affect the financial returns of growers as well as exporters, and that growers' debts at the bank would increase *(TC* 1995k). The cabinet, however, decided to lift the quota system for 1996 *(TC* 1996a).

Development of Tongan Entrepreneurship

Business Initiatives by the Royal Family

In Tonga, there are several examples where members of the royal family have opened up new economic outlets, Prince Mailefihi, who organized the first squash growers in Tonga, is the son of Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, the king's younger brother. In this section I will look at other recent examples.

His Majesty Taufa'ahau Tupou IV, the present king of Tonga, owns a vanilla plantation of 40 hectares in Holonga, Vava'u *(TC* 1992c). In 1992 the manager of this plantation, 'Okusi Hoeft, anticipated producing 12 tonnes of green vanilla beans, the equivalent of 3 tonnes of dried export beans (see van der Grijp 1997). Since 1989 the royal company South Pacific Sea, Land and Air Limited had invested more than T$60,000 in the vanilla plantation.

In 1991 the net earnings were 1.5 tonnes of export beans, or T$125,000. These figures were public information in the national newspaper.[25] The king is also engaged in vanilla culture on Pangaimotu and in Tefisi. His wife, Queen Halaevalu Mataʻaho, moreover, is a shareholder in the vanilla company in Vavaʻu known as the South Pacific Processing and Development Company, founded in 1991. By the end of October 1992 this company, with a plant at the Vavaʻu Small Industries Centre, had already exported 14 tonnes of dried vanilla beans. In that year grade A beans sold for T$10 per kilo, which amounted to a total sum of T$140,000. Prospects for the immediate future were considered good: "Tonnage might be doubled next year" *(TC* 1991b).[26] Furthermore, in 1995 the *Tonga Chronicle* pictured an agricultural officer inspecting squash on acreage said to belong to the queen (1995d). Thus, Prince Mailefihi is no longer the only member of the royal family dealing in squash.

There are other examples. In 1993 Tupoutoʻa, the king's eldest son and as such the crown prince of Tonga, introduced a branch of the Malayan Development Bank as the third commercial bank in Tonga.[27] Prince Tupoutoʻa holds 25 percent of the shares in this new bank *(MT* 1994a). Asked whether he thought there was anything wrong with members of the royal family becoming involved in business, Tupoutoʻa answered that "I think the Royal Family should be encouraged to get into business, everybody should go into business" (Fonua 1993: 12).[28]

Tupoutoʻa's sister, Princess Salote Mafileʻo Pilolevu Tuita, is involved in the satellite business. For a number of years Tonga has been a member of the International Telecommunication Union, which assigned it seven orbital slots. These cover three-quarters of the worlds people, reaching both Pacific Rim countries and the Far and Middle East. Princess Pilolevu is the chairwoman and major shareholder of a private company called Tongasat, with 60 percent of the shares, the two other shareholders holding 20 percent each *(TC* 1995b). Princess Pilolevu is also the patron of the recently founded committee Ha'apai Growers, aimed at encouraging farmers to upgrade agricultural development in Haʻapai *(TC* 1995e).

Members of the royal family are highly regarded by Tongan business people. To mention a political example, the first woman elected as a people's representative to the Tongan parliament was Princess Mele Siuʻilikutapu, daughter of Prince Tuʻipelehake, the younger brother of King Taufaʻahau Tupou IV.[29] Generally speaking, in Tonga members of the royal family provide a role model for other Tongans, In writing about the squash industry, James pointed toward a business elite consisting of "a few commoners and nobles": "The people who stand to gain most belong to a wealthy business elite, made up of a few commoners and nobles, who have the influence, contacts, and capital for profitable investment in expansionist agricultural pro-

duction. Directors and most members of the controlling boards of major squash export companies are drawn from this social category and are able to get the best deals, profits, and quotas" (1993a:235). If this is the case (James does not give any example to support her statement), what then are the socioeconomic profiles of the leading squash exporters?

Profiles of Export Leaders

I will restrict my answer here to five exporters about whom I have firsthand information.[30]

Feleti Sevele, Squash Export Company Limited. Sevele's professional background is that of a mathematician/geographer turned businessman. In 1973 he received his Ph.D. from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand and joined the Tonga Commodities Board (the government agency for marketing copra, bananas, and vegetables) as secretary. In 1974 he became the boards director/chief executive at age twenty-nine, "one of the youngest-ever Government department directors" *(TC* 1974:l). From 1978 until 1984 he worked as chief economist for the South Pacific Commission in Noumea, New Caledonia *(TC* 1978). When he returned to Tonga, he decided to set up his own commercial farm with a piggery and bananas. In 1989 he joined the squash industry. He is a shareholder and chairman of the board of directors of Squash Export and a consultant to Touliki Enterprises. Squash Export has eight shareholders, Touliki Enterprises only two. The two companies are now working closely together. Over the years, these two companies together have acquired an important share of the total Tongan squash export trade.

Hopoate Moengangongo, Primary Produce Export Limited. Moengangongo received his first university degree in Queensland, Australia, and his master's from the University of Hawai'i. He taught agriculture in Western Samoa at the Samoan branch of the University of the South Pacific from 1985 to 1990, lecturing on agricultural engineering subjects such as machinery, irrigation, agricultural waste management, and soil conservation. Moengangongo first became involved in squash production in 1991, when he was asked by Prince Mailefihi to advise on pesticide management to improve the squash yield of Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing. Mailefihi was a personal friend; they had attended school together. At the end of the 1991 season, Moengangongo left Mailefihi's company Early in 1992 he became general manager of Primary Produce, a subsidiary of Tonga Investment Limited (formerly the Tonga Commodities Board). Moengangongo is very much involved in production aspects such as upgrading quality. Primary

Produce, which used to be the Produce Division of the Tonga Commodities Board, markets not only squash but also vanilla, coconuts, yams, and taro. On the main island, Tongatapu, the company has sections for vanilla, squash, and sundry produce including coconuts and taro; it also has offices on the islands of Vava'u and 'Eua. Primary Produce has its own board of directors. The fact that this company is still 100 percent owned by the Tongan state differentiates it from the other companies, which are all private. Moenga-ngongo, however, considers Primary Produce a private company too; and he himself, being the general manager of this state-owned company, is not considered a civil servant by the board of directors.[31]

Siotame Tomu Nakao, Ha'amo Growers. When Nakao returned from university, in 1956, he took over his father's retail business and involvement in the copra trade. In 1958 Nakao began work for the government with the Construction Company, a subsidiary of the Tonga Commodities Board, and later became the manager. Besides his other work, he has always been involved in commercial agriculture. After retiring from government, he started a wire factory and a paper factory in the Small Industries Centre in Ma'ufanga. In 1991 he began exporting squash under the company name of Ha'amo Growers. Like Sevele, Nakao not only headed his own export company but was himself a large squash grower. In 1993 Ha'amo Growers had seventeen shareholders and a board of directors with five shareholder members. Nakao himself was the general manager. All shareholders were also growers. In October 1993 Nakao became ill but continued working full time. His health grew worse and in May 1994 he was unable to continue working and went to New Zealand for an operation. The medical treatment was successful, but for Nakao the episode was reason to retire from the areas he had been working in before, to hand over all his functions in J. H. Nakao Holdings to his sons in October 1994, and to concentrate thereafter on the development of new entrepreneurial activities.[32] When one of the five board directors died in 1995, he was replaced by Nakao's eldest son. The youngest son, "Junior," who was already on the board, is now the operating manager. The eldest son, George, is manager of Seastar Fishing Company and is also a squash grower and the chairman of directors for the whole company, J. H. Nakao Holdings.[33]

Siope 'Amanaki, Amanaki Marketing Company Limited. 'Amanaki's educational background consists of eight years in Fiji, first in a secondary school for agriculture, then in an agricultural college. In 1971 he went to the United States and obtained a B.Sc. degree in agriculture. Then he worked for eleven years as a chief extension officer in the Ministry of Agriculture,

after which he switched to the Tonga Commodities Board, the government organization dealing with the marketing of agricultural produce. He had been working a total of twenty-two years in government before retiring on his fifty-fifth birthday to concentrate on private farming. He started growing squash in 1989, after hearing that there was a good market in Japan. He discussed the matter with Prince Mailefihi, who convinced him to enter the industry and invited him to become a committee member of the Tonga Growers Association. In 1990 ‘Amanaki cofounded the Squash Export Company with Feleti Sevele. In 1991 ‘Amanaki distanced himself from Squash Export and started exporting through Tai Agency. He tried to obtain an export license beginning in 1991, but his application was continually turned down by the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry. “Their idea is that too many cooks may spoil the broth. There are already seven export companies in existence which they consider is enough,” said ‘Amanaki in 1993. In 1994, however, under the name Amanaki Marketing Company (AMACO) he finally obtained his own export license.[34] AMACO has a board of directors with five members, of whom two are nongrowers. Three directors are closely related: Siope ‘Amanaki, his wife, and his nephew (his father’s brother’s son). ‘Amanaki’s wife and nephew do not grow squash themselves. His nephew has a degree in civil engineering. ‘Amanaki invited him on to the board because he would like to set up a cluster of companies with different activities such as marketing, architecture, and building, in which he wants to engage him in the future.[35]

Fe‘ao Talivakaola, Vava’u Squash Export Limited. Talivakaola received his tertiary education in Papua New Guinea in 1972-1974, after which he returned to Tonga. During 1982-1986 he managed a Mormon school estate of 32 acres of vanilla at Tefisi in the western district of Vava’u. During 1988-1991 Talivakaola was a large producer of root crops. When the New Zealand market for root crops failed, he decided to move to the squash business. In the northern Tongan island group of Vava’u the squash industry only commenced in 1991. Talivakaola was one of the executives of the Vava‘u Squash Company under the Tai Agency, which was then the exporter. In 1992 and 1993 Talivakaola and his business partner applied for an export license but failed. In 1994 they were successful and formed a company with the name Vava‘u Squash Export Limited.[36] At the beginning of 1995, Talivakaola’s business partner took full-time employment in New Zealand and decided not to continue the squash business in Vava‘u. To be able to go into the squash business again, Talivakaola formed a new company, Vava‘u Produce and Marketing Limited, with three directors who are also the only shareholders.[37] Compared to the others Talivakaola exemplifies a small exporter.

In these profiles of Tongan squash exporters we can discern the aristocratic and educated elements of entrepreneurial activity. In this respect one may ask whether there is some truth in James's statement on the Tongan squash industry, cited earlier, that the "people who stand to gain most belong to a wealthy business elite, made up of a few commoners and nobles" and that "directors and most members of the controlling boards of major squash export companies are drawn from this social category."

I asked several of the leading exporters, who are indeed directors of the controlling boards, whether they are noble *(nopele)* or have noble kinship ties. Sevele answered that he has "no direct noble family members." 'Amanaki replied similarly. Moengangongo mentioned he has "noble blood from his father's side" but does "not want to emphasize this." Talivakaola has "no noble family connection"; neither did his two business partners in 1995 nor his former business partner. Nakao, however, is part of the noble Ma'afu family. His mother was the only sister of the Ma'afu titleholder. This family connection is how Nakao received a large coconut plantation that he later used for other cash crops, such as squash.[38] In his own words Nakao emphasizes his family link with the noble Ma'afu family through his mother.[39] Nakao's father, however, is Japanese, born in Japan, who only came to Tonga in later life. This fact may be of crucial importance in understanding his success in business, especially now with the squash export trade to Japan.

Although Nakao and Moengangongo are of noble blood and Nakao took advantage of this by accumulating much land, none of the leading squash exporters holds a title. What about Prince Mailefihi, the son of the present king's younger brother? Many members of the royal family hold titles, some of them even have more than one with accompanying landed properties, but Mailefihi has none. Taking this into account, James's statement that the Tongan squash business is dominated by "a wealthy business elite, made up of a few commoners and nobles," seems right only up to a point. It makes sense insofar as one considers as "noble" all those who have a kinship relation with an aristocratic family. In Tongan parlance the word *nopele,* however, does not apply. In Tonga, *nopele* are specific persons holding a noble title with its corresponding noble estate *(tofi'a).* The leading exporters are indeed wealthy by local standards, but not noble in the latter sense. The minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries, the Hon. Kinikinilau Tutoatasi Fakafanua, is a noble. He controls--or, to be more exact, limits--the squash business because he is responsible for the quota system, but he is not in the squash business himself.

How then, may we characterize the leading exporters? Most of them hold

an overseas university degree. Fairbairn had already remarked that "entrepreneurial attitudes and initiatives are well developed among Tongans, partly as a result of education and experience gained from migration" (1992: 33). What is striking is the number of leading exporters (Sevele, Nakao, 'Amanaki, Moengangongo) who commenced or pursued their professional careers with the former Tonga Commodities Board. Having first worked in government, they all became private entrepreneurs. Only Moengangongo, who is the general manager of a state-owned company but is not considered a civil servant, is an exception in the sense that he is not a private entrepreneur.

Moengangongo, however, fully supports the privatization of the state-owned Primary Produce company for which lie works. When he assumed the post of general manager, in 1992, the board of directors had announced plans to privatize within two years. "We are looking ahead to completely privatize our company, to free it from government ties. That was one of the objectives when we changed it from the Tonga Commodities Board. This means that any profits will not go to the government but to the shareholders. I am very much in favor of it," he said in 1994. By 1995 Primary Produce was still not yet privatized: "The privatisation is pushed back another two years, because the board of directors wants to slow down the process,': Moengangongo stated. "Now 'they changed their minds." He claims not to know the motives behind this.

With the exception of Moengangongo and, occasionally, Talivakaola, all the interviewed exporters have large (by local criteria) squash plantations of their own. Moengangongo, who travels between Tongatapu and Vava'u every fortnight during the squash season, says he does not have enough time to grow his own squash (pers. com., 1995). Talivakaola, the exporter from Vava'u, was running a large squash plantation on 'Uta Vava'u in a joint project with his business partner in 1994, but, after the departure of this business partner to New Zealand, he ceased growing in 1995. One of Talivakaola's two new codirectors, however, has a large plantation in Vava'u.

Thus, we can conclude that the common characteristics of the leading squash exporters in Tonga are (1) superior education, (2) personal experience overseas, (3) working experience in government, (4) entrepreneurial spirit, and (5) having a large squash plantation of one's own.[40] We may deduce from their professional experience in high government or related positions that the leading exporters are sufficiently qualified to gain access to the national banking system to borrow working capital. The same experience is also useful in negotiating export quotas with the government. Their background, however, does not mean that exporters always get what they want from government, as we can see in the recent history of the quota system.

Government Regulation versus Free Market

Although a quota system was in place in 1993, as there had been in the two previous years, the actual export during the November-December season far exceeded the official maximum allowance. This was true for the whole of Tonga and also for the individual exporters. Primary Produce, for example, exceeded its allocation in 1993 by 548 tonnes; Haʻamo Growers was allocated only 200 tonnes for ʻEua but acquired 380 tonnes from there. In January 1994 during a meeting with government representatives, the seven 1993 exporters were asked about the tonnage they aimed at producing for the next main season, that is, November-December 1994. Their expectations added up to 25,000 tonnes. The Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries later imposed a quota of 17,000 tonnes for 1994. It was the first year in which the government became very strict about the quota system. As one of the exporters observed at the time:

> We now have the problem that we will have to structure our organization to produce exactly the allocated amount. I see the good side of this. If we produce more than the quota, it opens up an avenue ʻfor local manufacturing of squash, turning squash into powder.[41] Previously we were unable to take advantage of that. We could not really expect any surplus because one could always export excess production. (Pers. com., 1994)

Among the exporters, differences of opinion exist about the limitations to be imposed by government. Again, just after the 1994 meeting, another exporter commented about the limits on squash export:

> If government tries to regulate business, it never works. It is against efficiency and it introduces corruption. They have some weird ideas in government. People who take the decisions there have never been in business and they do not know the problems. They have a civil servant's mentality. The government gets money out of charges on the wharf, out of sales tax and other taxes. They think that an unlimited export would reduce the prices. They have a policy of encouraging the private sector, but in the squash industry, they impose several limitations on its expansion. Let the exporters decide for themselves how much they export. Government policy should be economic development. But what they do with their limitation of export is against national interest. Let us decide. We, the exporters, are bringing the produce overseas. We are negotiating a

> good price. The growers take their advantage from that. They get a good price for their product and they are happy. We as businessmen make our profit, and we are happy. We make sure that the quality of the product we sell to the Japanese is good, and thus they are happy. (Pers. com., 1994)

On 17 March 1994, six of the seven 1993 exporting companies made an official request to the government to eliminate the quota system. They suggested that

> an open policy should allow [the exporters] to organize their growers and establish their own volume for the season and should require each agency to establish its own marketing arrangements for a predetermined quantity of pumpkin at a viable price. "These are business decisions which can only be decided upon by the grower and exporter." . . . Government [should] confine its involvement "to a clear mandate on quality" and on transport procedures to wharfside. *(TC* 1994a)

Prince Mailefihi had not signed the request because he was away from Tonga, but according to the *Tonga Chronicle* he "had fully endorsed it in a telephone conversation" (ibid.). A follow-up letter from the companies Squash Export, Touliki, Ha'amo, and Tai Agency emphasized that "all developed countries and most developing ones are minimizing government involvement and moving to ever freer markets" (ibid.). According to the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries, however, the quota system should be continued "to maintain quality and satisfy the demands of Japanese importers" *(Lali Magazine* 1994a). After the government refused to abolish the quota system, Touliki and Squash Export instituted proceedings to obtain legal declarations that the Licenses Act, the Licenses Amendment Act 1993, the Order-in-Council of April 8, 1994 [known as the Licenses (Squash Export) Order 1994], and the 1994 quota allocation were "unlawful and invalid." After hearings in the Supreme Court, however, Puisne Judge John William Lewis refused all three of the plaintiffs' claims *(TC* 1995a).

The quota for 1994 was fixed at 17,000 tonnes. The actual export of 16,988 tonnes corresponded with the quota, leaving a surplus production of 4,000 tonnes *(MT* 1994c).[42] Squash Export had an allocation of 2,250 and exported that amount, though the company could have exported much more. Said a disappointed director, 'We had a ship leaving from Tonga with only 700 tonnes on board. It could have taken 3,200 tonnes, but government said no" (pers. com., 1995). Another exporter had a different point of view.

> Tongan government has a good reason to put a limit to the export. This is something we exporters always have asked for. In the beginning of the season we always have a good price, which goes up during the season. Only in case of over-production or over-export, the price goes down during the season. But with a slightly lower price and a higher export, the total income for Tonga will be higher. Tonga is holding back, but other countries are increasing their export. That is why I think that the total Tongan export should increase slowly every year. The price in 1994 was the worst we ever had. But since government is not wavering any more with the export allowance, we expect the price this year to start off the same as last year, but then to rise. If we meet the quota, the price will still go up. (Pers. com., 1995)

A third exporter holds a similar opinion,

> I worry much about the squash industry in Tonga, because there is a move in the Legislative Assembly to have a free trade in squash, to lift the quota system. I am against this. It is very clear that the time in which we can export to Japan is limited from October till December. In this period Japan only needs 20,000 tonnes a month. If we limit our export, we will get a fixed price. If we export more, we may get nothing at all on the Japanese auction. We have to stick to the quota system and let the Japanese know that we only produce the best quality squash. (Pers. com., 1995)

One exporter founded a consultancy company that exports squash expertise to other small Pacific Island countries, such as Vanuatu. "In the old days," he said, "Tonga used to send out missionaries to the neighbouring islands, now we are sending out squash experts" *(MT* 1994b). The other leading exporters, however, are not at all pleased with this initiative. One of them commented, "If it is just to help another country, then there is nothing wrong with it. But if it is only for his own profit, than it is a wrong attitude" (pers. com., 1995). Another colleague too has a negative opinion about the initiative: "It is very selfish of him. And even then, his own involvement in a foreign country is not going to be long. They want to make use of his advice, and as soon as possible they will have the same knowledge as we, because they are as wise as we are. And then they will discard him" (pers. com., 1995). Behind these negative opinions is, of course, a fear of competition from other countries. There have been some references to the consultancies abroad in local newspapers but no real public debate, since hardly any details

of the arrangements are known to others. The founder of the consultancy company said, "Of course, I have been criticized for my consultancies abroad, not officially by government, but by some of the civil servants." I asked him whether he does not see any contradiction in providing advice on squash to other countries that are competing for the same market. In his answer he referred to his difficulties with the quota system.

> In 1994, I was told by government that I could only export half the amount I was able to. I have to satisfy my clients in Japan and maintain my relationships which are built up over the years. I was asked by the government of Vanuatu to assist, and to me, the market is there. The Tongan export is limited, but the other countries can still export. You see, I am a businessman and this is a period of multinationals. My presence in Vanuatu gives me some influence there, but it is also improving my position in Tonga. I am spreading my risks. (Pers. com., 1995)

Thus, this businessman compares his (future) enterprise with that of a multinational. What is a multinational? According to the economist G. Bertram, multinationals or transnational corporations have three special features: (1) they "conceal their true assets and income from tax-gathering and other supervisory authorities," (2) "the nominal prices at which goods and services are transferred from one part of the enterprise to another are not very informative to outside observers," and (3) "multinationals transfer cash from one country to another only when this is the most efficient way of financing planned expenditure in the receiving country" (1993:256). The main objective of multinationals is wealth maximization within the limits of maintaining cohesion.[43] The Tongan entrepreneur who compared his enterprise with a multinational intended to grow squash on land that he himself would lease in Vanuatu in 1996. "And," he added suggestively, "I have other business interests than just agriculture."

Conclusions

Generally speaking, capitalist entrepreneurs think of themselves as creative individuals who stimulate technological innovation and mobilize capital and labor within a commercial or industrial project in order to make a profit. This conception does not necessarily include accumulation of private property. Accumulation of private property--of the essential means of production--by the entrepreneur, however, strengthens his or her power position as top manager within the enterprise. Tongan squash exporters have in com-

mon a desire to earn as much money as possible by buying a product from their fellow countrymen, selling it overseas, and thus accumulating capital. The manner in which each goes about realizing a goal, however, is different. The very liberalistic exporter quoted above, with a strong international and "multinational" outlook and preparedness to take business risks, does not want government intervention in his relations with foreign customers. The two other exporters quoted rather emphasize Tonga's national interests and are ready to accept government control as a means of regulating production and securing profit margins. The general manager of Primary Produce supports privatization of the still state-owned company he is working for. These ideas and corresponding ideologies of the leading exporters also outline different currents in conceiving future Tongan entrepreneurship.

Within the Tongan context it is no mere accident that the initiative for an economic development, in this case the introduction of a new cash crop, was taken--or taken over--by a member of the royal family: Prince Mailefihi Tuku'aho. Mailefihi's father, Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake (the king's brother): was at that time still the prime minister of Tonga and had previously been minister of Agriculture. Liava'a, the very initiator of the squash industry in Tonga, already remarked, "I don't think the industry would have flourished if it 'were not for Mailefihi's influence and the support of his father" *(MT* 1993). A staff member of the governmental experimental farm in Vaini affirms that "Prince Mailefihi was his father's actual representative. He was the person who negotiated with Group Trade and organized the growers and distributed the seeds" (pers. com., 1995). In 1995 Mailefihi still obtained the highest export allocation but his colleagues did not consider him as the best performer in organizing the growers. As one of the other leading exporters expressed it, "The fact that he is royal does not make him a good businessman" (pers. com., 1995). In my opinion, however, the very fact that Mailefihi is of royal descent certainly played a part in the success of his business initiative within the Tongan context, This may be a typical aspect of the Tongan version of Polynesian identity in contemporary economic development. The question--in the interviews repeatedly put forward by his fellow-exporters--whether he is a skilled entrepreneur is another matter.

At the beginning of this article I underlined the social and economic importance of the factors put to the fore in the MIRAB model of Bertram and Watters, without agreeing, however, on the supposed *determining* character of these factors. I concluded my discussion on "Conceiving Entrepreneurship" by defining five common characteristics of the leading squash exporters in Tonga: (1) superior education; (2) personal experience overseas, (3) working experience in government, (4) entrepreneurial spirit, and (5) having a large squash plantation of one's own. We may now translate some of these common characteristics of squash exporters in terms of the factors of

the MIRAB model. Superior (and often overseas) education as well as personal experience overseas may be translated as "migration," while working experience in government may be translated in terms of "bureaucracy."[44] The idea of growing squash as a cash crop in Tonga was introduced by the Tongan-New Zealand businessman Tu'iono Liava'a, who by migration formed a business development link.[45] The assistance given the first Tongan squash growers by Liava'a's New Zealand company, Group Trade, might be interpreted as "aid''--although this was certainly not without commercial self-interest since Group Trade was a private company. In the first part of this article we have seen the crucial--but also contested--role of the government ("bureaucracy") in supporting and promoting as well as guiding and restricting the Tongan squash boom.

Does this mean that MIRAB factors such as migration, aid, and bureaucracy ***determined*** the rise of the Tongan squash industry? I do not think so.[46] The occurrence of the recent squash boom and the related development of local entrepreneurship in Tonga actually contradict the assumptions of the MIRAB model of a "stagnating or declining agriculture" and "virtual absence of an indigenous private sector" in South Pacific island economies. Moreover, besides the ordinary logic of capitalism there are also typical Tongan aspects, such as initiatives by members of the royal family, that help to explain this kind of local economic development.

NOTES

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1. Methodologically Bertram and Watters focus, as they say, on "aggregate economic indicators rather than detailed field work, but obtaining results which we believe to be consistent with the field-research record, and helpful in interpreting it" (1985:497). Note here the concept of *belief* ("we believe") in the middle of a methodological statement.

2. In 1993 Bertram specified that "the microeconomies of the Pacific . . . are liberal, deregulated open economies with cautious and prudent fiscal policies, and strong balance-of-payments positions over the medium term" (1993:253). According to Bertram, "the 'gaps' which have opened up over the long run between exports and imports, and between government expenditure and local revenue, are the *ex-post* consequence of the fact that these economies are driven not by productive factor incomes from domestic industries, but by the flows of rent income to which they hold inherited and negotiated entitlements in the world of the 1980s and 1990s" (ibid.). This, of course, once more would justify the MIRAB model.

3. See van der Grijp 1993b. For assessments of the impact of MIRAB factors on the Tongan economy, see also Ahlburg 1991, Brown and Connell 1993a and 1993b, Brown and Foster 1995, Campbell 1992a, James 1991, Marcus 1993, and Perminow 1993; and for their impact on some other South Pacific economies, see Hooper 1993, Hooper and James 1993, James 1993b, and Munro 1990.

4. For agronomic studies on Tonga, see Hardaker 1975, Thaman 1975, Seminar für landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung 1983, Rathey 1984, and Wiemer 1985; for anthropological studies that place agricultural developments in their cultural context, see Beaglehole and Beaglehole 1941, Koch 1955, Rogers 1975, Hau'ofa 1979, Morgan 1985, and van der Grijp 1993b.

5. We should remember that Tonga has less than 100,000 inhabitants and Japan more than 100 million. According to the last census, held on 28 November 1986, 94,649 people were living in Tonga (Tongan Government 1991:vii); the Statistics Department estimated the population on 31 December 1992 at 98,161 (Tongan Government 1993:l).

6. All year round, Hokkaido and southern Japan absorb more than 50 percent of the Japanese market. Other parts of Japan and other countries supply the rest (MT 1991). In 1993 squash imports were estimated at about 40 percent of the total Japanese consumption (Grynberg 1993).

7. Other main features of Tongan Polynesian identity are (1) the *tu'a-'eiki* dichotomy, a system of asymmetrical ideology about the "right" place of individuals and groups within the society as a whole; (2) the dominant role of kinship in the social relations of production, in particular (but not only) in the subsistence-and-gift economy; and (3) a particular form of land property (van der Grijp 1993a). For comparable distinctions in Samoa, see Macpherson 1988, O'Meara 1990, and Tiffany 1975.

8. The answer to this question may also throw light on the more general anthropological problem of the unique Tongan mixture of Polynesian identity and capitalism. In my monograph *Islanders of the South* (van der Grijp 1993b), I made an effort to treat this general problem in its rich variety of implications. This also includes a chapter on "Tongans as Western-style Entrepreneurs," but the Tongan squash boom is only treated briefly. In two other papers I focus on the actual production of squash and the sociocultural impact of the squash boom, respectively (van der Grijp 1994 and 1996). The present article is, as far as I know, the first more elaborate publication on the recent phenomenon of the Tongan squash industry.

9. In the national newspaper their proceedings were reported: "The first shipment . . . for the season [of 1990] is scheduled to leave for Japan on November 15. The shipment includes 1,900 tonnes arranged by the [already existent] Tonga Growers Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society and 1,000 tonnes arranged by the [new] Squash Export Company Limited. . . . Three or more shipments were expected for 1990" *(TC* 1990c).

10. In March 1992, in view of privatization, the Tonga Commodities Board was restructured and its name changed to Tonga Investment Limited. By 1995 this privatization was still not realized.

11. Seven export firms had shipped the following tonnage: Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing Limited, 9,237; Squash Export Limited, 2,700; Tonga Commodities Board, 2,059; Tai Agency Services, 2,313; Touliki Enterprises, 1,607; Ha'amo Growers, 600; Edwards Company, 50. By this time, the total tonnage for the season was expected to be above 20,000, tonnes *(TC* 1991f).

12. This was Mailefihi's company, which only later in 1991 he renamed Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing Limited.

13. The Tonga Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society obtained an allocation of 6,000 tonnes; Squash Export, 2,500; and Tonga Commodities Board, 1,500.

14. According to *Matangi Tonga* two of them, Tauteoli International and Sione Latu, never used their licenses *(MT* 1992). According to one of the other exporters, however, Tauteoli bought squash from growers on Vava'u in 1991 (pers. com., 1994).

15. The journal *Matangi Tonga* claimed that they turned away "thousands of growers" *(MT* 1991). However, this figure seems exaggerated since in 1991, to quote Prime Minister Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, "there are only about 1,000 squash growers" (Fonua 1991:19). The *Tonga Chronicle* mentioned a figure of 1,550 growers for 1991 *(TC* 1992f).

16. 'Akolo continued: "The claims could result in payments to growers [of] 8-10 *seniti* per kilo below negotiated prices. . . . Before the current season's start, buyers expected imports of 12,000-15,000 tonnes, . . . but 22,000 tonnes have arrived in Japan, with another shipload on the way" *(TC* 1991g).

17. A 1991 Tongan government delegation to Japan reported that about 15 percent or 3,285 tonnes of a total of 21,858 tonnes of Tongan squash arrived in Japan undersized, rotten, or both. According to this delegation, the Tongan squash industry "may be impeded or destroyed through poor-quality exports" *(TC* 1992a). The industry's biggest problem was identified in terms of the exportation of undersized, blemished, decayed, or otherwise inferior squash, "at least 15% of the total export" *(TC* 1992f).

18. This was the Fanga Falikipako group directed by Siaosi Puloka. The 1994 allocation was under his personal name.

19. Criteria for the approval of export licenses in 1995 were: (1) a financial statement from the previous year; (2) proof of ability to finance or raise finance to meet commitments; (3) a proposal of how to accomplish a shipping program under which squash would arrive in Japan every seven to ten days; (4) a copy of a letter of credit (or irrevocable letter of credit) from their buyer, contracting a price and method of payment; and (5) any other information that would be helpful to the ministry in deciding suitability to export squash (Fakafanua 1995). The lengthy list for 1996 was subdivided into criteria of financial status, management and marketing experience, and quality standards (Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries 1996).

20. The total allowance did not include a "reserve of 2,500 metric tonnes which may be allocated during the season if export prices so warrant" *(TC* 1995c).

21. In *Lali Magazine* a lower figure is mentioned for Vava'u: "only 178 tonnes had been shipped from Neiafu" (1994b).

22. In the May season of 1996 an export of 300 tonnes was expected *(TC* 1996e:2).

23. The minister specified that "average Japanese [squash] pumpkin consumption for two months is 34,000 metric tonnes. The market supply [in 1994] exceeded demand by 12,470 metric tonnes." Then followed the rhetorical question, "Can Tonga afford to send more pumpkin to Japan?" (Fakafanua 1995:3).

24. In 1994 Tonga had, according to the minister, an "excess production of 13.3%, in 1995 maybe 16.7% (= provision)" (Fakafanua 1995:3).

25. Hoeft, the manager of the royal enterprise, planned to establish a new royal vanilla plantation of 50 hectares in Foa, Haʻapai *(TC* 1992c).

26. Besides the queen, the two other shareholders are the businessmen Mike Kneubuhl and Jack Riechelmann.

27. Within a year this Malaysian bank changed its name three times. In 1993 it opened as the MBf Royal Bank of Tonga, soon afterwards changed to MBf Bank (Tonga) Limited, then in 1994 became the MBf Bank Limited. The first commercial bank in the country was the Bank of Tonga, and the second was the Australia New Zealand Bank (ANZ). The two new banks (MBf and ANZ) are not yet involved in squash but may be in the future. The arrival of the two new banks in Tonga is perhaps related to the success of squash, but not directly. As one exporter said, "Among economists there has always been the feeling that a couple of commercial banks may be able to survive in Tonga. Now the time may have been appropriate for them to enter Tonga" (pers. com., 1994).

28. To the question whether a member of the royal family "is able to gain special favours from government," Tupouto'a, according to the interviewer, "did not wish his response to this question to be on record" (Fonua 1993:12).

29. The second woman elected a people's representative, Papiloa Foliaki, remarked about Princess Mele Siuʻilikutapu's being a member of the royal family and still being a people's representative: "The fact that she had a seat in parliament was important because, generally speaking, through her aristocratic background and connections she gave women in parliament prestige. In this way she has opened the door for other women" (van der Grijp 1993b:23 n. 19).

30. Interviews with Feleti Sevele, 11 January 1994 and 3 July 1995, Nukuʻalofa; Hopoate Moengangongo, 13 January 1994 and 22 August 1995, Haveluloto; Siotame Tomu Nakao, 11 January 1994, Nukuʻalofa, and 3 July 1995, Maʻufanga; Siope ʻAmanaki, 15 December 1993 and 5 July 1995, Maʻufanga; Feʻao Talivakaola, 12 August 1995, Neiafu.

31. In 1974 there were three subdivisions of the Tonga Commodities Board. In the present structure there are no subdivisions, only separate companies, subsidiaries under a parent or umbrella company called Tonga Investment. There are currently four companies: (1) Primary Produce Export Limited; (2) FRISCO Limited, for building materials;

(3) Home Case Limited, which involves distribution of LPG gas for domestic use; and (4) Building Quarry Limited, for construction material such as coral blocks and cement. The general director of Tonga Investment is a New Zealander.

32. A recent example is the opening of a Tongan agency of the multinational money-transfer company Western Union, managed by Nakao's daughter.

33. The Nakao family has a majority on the board because the family holds a majority of the shares. Although there are seventeen shareholders, the Nakao family, under the name J. H. Nakao Holdings, has 55 percent of the authorized capital, which is about 80 percent of the paid-up capital.

34. In that year AMACO had a maximum allowance of 340 tonnes. The same amount was exported. This included 300 tonnes basic allowance plus 10 percent extra.

35. 'Amanaki's wife is a shareholder but his nephew is not, nor are the two other directors. 'Amanaki owns 99 percent of the shares and his wife 1 percent. According to him there is no special legal reason for this construction.

36. In 1994 Vava'u Squash Export obtained an allocation of 300 tonnes but by the end of the year was able to ship only 200 tonnes.

37. Talivakaola holds 40 percent, another Vava'u businessman 40 percent, and an accountant 20 percent. The former Vava'u Squash Export had two director/shareholders: Talivakaola and his former business partner, each holding half of the shares.

38. Nakao's first cousin (his mother's brother's son) is now the *nopele* Ma'afu. The first Ma'afu, Nakao's great-grandfather, was the younger brother of Siaosi Taufa'ahau Tupou I, the first king of Tonga. According to oral tradition the first Ma'afu moved from the island of Fakakakai in Ha'apai to Tongatapu when the leading chiefs of Tongatapu asked him to become the head of their Ha'a Havea clan (Nakao, pers. corn.). Nakao's great-grandfather had three sons. The eldest was Siotetame, Nakao's grandfather. He married three times and had two daughters. The daughter of his last marriage became the heir. She was Nakao's mother.

39. Nakao's emphasis on noble descent through the female line corresponds with traditional Tongan practice (see Douaire-Marsaudon 1993:506-507, 709, 716).

40. Only Moengangongo is an exception to point 5. Regarding the entrepreneurial spirit in other Tongan contexts, see Ritterbush 1988, Ramanlal 1990, Sturton 1992, and van der Grijp 1993b: chap. 6.

41. Not until 1996 did a Japanese business delegation visit Tonga to determine the viability of establishing facilities in Tonga to process squash into powder for export *(TC* 1996b).

42. An editorial in *Matangi Tonga* observed that 1994 "will be remembered as the year of the Squash Crisis, when more than 4,000 tonnes of unwanted squash pumpkin littered the farms and rotted at the dump" *(MT* 1994d).

43. Multinationals would share these features with what Bertram and Watters have coined "transnational corporations of kin" (1985, 1986).

44. Hooper and James criticize the concept of bureaucracy since "government positions typically both provide prestige and security as well as money, but the individuals who hold them are not, in Pacific societies, divorced from 'traditional' concerns" (1993:4).

45. What happened to Liava'a? In 1993, when the squash business had been a success for some years, Liava'a visited Tonga again and was, of course, impressed by the impact of his initiative on Tonga's economy. He wanted a share in the success too. "I am talking to government for my fair share of the squash exports to Japan, and I am confident that I will be rewarded for my effort" *(MT* 1993). Unfortunately, there is no information available as to whether Liava'a actually received his reward.

46. A. Hooper, who conducted anthropological fieldwork on the island of Fakaofo in Tokelau, acknowledges that Tokelau today has been "very largely *determined"* by the MIRAB factors (my emphasis). Bertram and Watters suggested that MIRAB transformations were "smooth, incremental and generally adaptive." According to Hooper, however, "this was not the case on Fakaofo," where the process generated "many protracted and divisive conflicts," nor were the outcomes of the process "generally adaptive" (1993:242). Tokelau was one of the five initial cases of the MIRAB model.

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THE OPEN DOOR IN PARADISE? UNITED STATES STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, 1945-1947

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Between 1945 and 1947, the United States set out on an imperial course to guarantee its future security in the Pacific Basin vis-à-vis potential aggressor nations in East Asia. Ensuring U.S. strategic control of the area meant wielding physical control over the economic resources of the Pacific islands conquered from Japan, especially the Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline groups composing Micronesia. By coupling these indigenous economies to that of the United States, American officials, particularly military officers, hoped to develop a local economy that could subsidize an American administration. Some even suggested creating a market economy in the islands that could buttress long-term U.S. control of the area by "Americanizing" the Pacific Islanders through the introduction of mainstream American consumer goods and social services. Historians have much to learn from this neglected episode of early Cold War history, since the economic administration of the Pacific islands conquered from Japan provided an exception to U.S. postwar protestations of "open doorism." Scholars of international relations will note the broad manner in which U.S. officials defined "strategic" security for the Pacific Basin. Finally, students of American "exceptionalism" will find interest in American officials' narrow, even legalistic, definitions of "imperialism," used to deflect international criticism that the United States was retreating from its wartime support for the decolonization of empires.

BETWEEN 1945 AND 1947, the United States sought to guarantee its security in the postwar Pacific by taking direct control over several island groups conquered from Japan. American policymakers, planners, and strategic

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thinkers were convinced by the perceived failure of the Washington Treaty System, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the costly island-hopping campaign in the central and western Pacific, and rising tensions with the Soviet Union that future American security in East Asia could only be ensured by consolidating control over the Pacific Islands and turning the Pacific Basin into an "American lake." U.S. consolidation included a significant economic dimension, since economic control over the region was seen as one strand of a broad, multidimensional policy to ensure American national security in the region. Three aspects of this economic dimension to American Pacific policy are important for historians who are attempting to decipher U.S. actions in this part of the world during the early Cold War.

First, American economic policy in the postwar Pacific Islands was an exception to postwar American protestations of free trade and "open doorism." The Pacific Basin represented one area of the world in which the United States did not attempt even a rhetorical free-trade approach to postwar reconstruction. While some State Department personnel argued for open areas of trade in Micronesia and the Philippines, most American policymakers and planners had no intention of leaving the Pacific Islands "open" to foreign merchants of any nationality because of the perception that foreign economic penetration could be a forerunner to the subversion of an American administration.

Second, the economic dimension of U.S. policy illustrates that Americans defined strategic security in the Pacific Basin in a broad sense. To policymakers and planners, physical military control over these strategic islands meant the economic penetration of the region and control over its resources, harbors, and airfields, as well as tactical military control. Even military officers, strategic thinkers, and members of Congress who believed the islands held potential for exploitation recognized that policymakers sought to penetrate the regional economy primarily for reasons of physical control and security, not for economic gain.

Third, American efforts at physical economic control over the islands reveals an intriguing phenomenon of self-denial by U.S. officials about American imperialism. Policymakers and planners defined the word "imperialism" along very narrow lines to repel charges by other nations that the United States was indulging in "territorial aggrandizement." These individuals hoped to deflect international charges of great power imperialism by claiming that the United States wanted control of the islands in order to guarantee international stability and security in the Pacific region, not to close the area to other nations because of national insecurity resulting from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

American Exceptionalism and the Postwar Pacific

The American assumption of complete economic control over Micronesia in 1944-1945 and the repatriation of all East Asians by the end of 1947 was taken as a logical step toward ensuring U.S. strategic security in the region. Given the degree of control that the Japanese had exercised over the Micronesian economy,[1] economic control and repatriation were seen as necessary measures to eradicate Japanese influence from the islands. Commander Dorothy Richard cites the repatriation order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as evidence that security, not exploitation, was paramount in American priorities. By removing all Japanese, Taiwanese, Ryukuans, and Koreans from the islands, the United States Navy effectively removed the professional and skilled classes of interwar Japanese Micronesia,[2] making it impossible to recreate the "artificial, capitalistic type of prewar economy" after 1946.[3]

The idea that American motivation was based on military security and not on economic exploitation, in fact, became the main argument of American policymakers and planners who asserted that the U.S. sphere in the postwar Pacific was inherently different from the European and Japanese imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century or the Soviet imperialism of the mid-twentieth century. However, U.S. acquisition of the islands made charges of "territorial aggrandizement" by other nations likely. This possibility prompted officials to seek to justify American control. Their justifications reveal distinct attitudes toward the definition of imperialism, the role of economic exploitation in that phenomenon, and the recurring idea of American exceptionalism in international relations. There was a widespread attitude among American officials that since the islands had a small population, were sparse in resources, and were commercially "primitive," U.S. control did not constitute "imperialism" in the traditional European sense of the term, because the economic exploitation of a significant indigenous population was not taking place. This mindset was enunciated by officials at many levels of the policymaking bureaucracy.

For example, as early as June 1944 Admiral Harry Yarnell, head of the Chief of Naval Operations, Special Planning Office for Postwar Demobilization, argued that the American acquisition of the Japanese Mandated Islands should not be considered a violation of the August 1941 Atlantic Charter and should not set a precedent for unilaterial territorial annexations by other nations, since the islands "have little commercial value and their maintenance would be a continuous source of expense."[4] The idea that the United States was not indulging in traditional imperialism because of a lack of apparent economic motive in Micronesia was asserted more clearly by Secre-

tary of War Henry Stimson in January 1945. Stimson added to Yarnell's argument by claiming that U.S. actions were not self-serving but were meant to provide stability and security for all nations in the Pacific Basin. Arguing to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Stimson stated that the islands should not be regarded as colonies but rather as "defense posts" necessary to the nation responsible for security in the area. Stimson then suggested that the United States was merely keeping the islands "in trust" for the world and not for any national advantage.[5]

Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal again used this narrow notion of imperialism to argue to President Harry Truman in April 1945 that U.S. actions in Micronesia would not consititute imperialism by any standard of measurement. Like Yarnell, both men stated that the islands held no commercial value and would be a burden on the United States treasury. Both men also used this argument to conclude that there was a "fundamental difference" between the American strategic trusteeship in Micronesia and the trusteeships being established in other nations' colonies throughout the world. The secretaries subsequently suggested to Truman that this difference should be emphasized to the United Nations as a way to lobby for comprehensive American control over the region.[6] Later, during the 'House hearings on Navy appropriations for fiscal year 1946, Forrestal expounded on the idea that imperialism required economic motives and that American control over Micronesia did not constitute that type of situation. He claimed that the islands were nothing but "sandspits in the Pacific," that they represented no great economic asset, and that they were therefore "quite different from the acquisition of territory in the old imperial sense."'

In August 1946, Forrestal even convinced Truman to keep the United States Commercial Company (USCC) under Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) auspices, rather than Navy control, in order to repel charges of economic aggrandizement. Charles Henderson, chairman of the board of the RFC, had wanted the United States Commercial Company transferred back to the Navy Department. Henderson's reasoning was that the United States Commercial Company, the postwar heir to the Foreign Economic Administration and the agency with primary responsibility for the postwar economic welfare and rehabilitation of the islands, had originally been created, supplied, and administered by the Navy. Henderson therefore argued that RFC personnel and administration created an additional layer of bureaucracy at a time of fiscal retrenchment and that the Navy had the means to carry on the economic administration of the islands itself. Forrestal countered that keeping Micronesian economic administration in the hands of a federal civilian agency would prevent the economic administration of Micronesia from appearing to the world to be military or eco-

nomic exploitation for the benefit of the United States. Truman concurred and, though reluctant to turn the political administration of the islands over to civilians in the Interior Department in 1946, kept the United States Commercial Company in charge of Micronesia's economic administration until 1947.[8]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and its subordinate Joint Strategic Survey Committee continued the line of thought that the acquisition of territory without apparent economic motive dispelled the notion of imperialism. Writing in January 1946, the two bodies stated that the United States had historically been an "anti-imperialistic" nation and that the acquisition of territory with no commercial value "is not believed a substantial departure from this position."[9] The Joint Chiefs even used the sparse population of Micronesia and its "low state of political and economic development" to justify arguing for annexation of the islands because of concern about the efficacy of U.N. trusteeship arrangements.[10] In addition, it tried to use the same arguments about population, resources, and an "underdeveloped" central government to deflect Soviet proposals to have "independence," rather than "self government," established as the eventual political goal of the Micronesian trusteeship."

Individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also separately subscribed to the view that branding a nation as imperialistic required some degree of economic motive or exploitative intent. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, chief of naval operations, reiterated before Congress the lack of economic advantage for the United States in Micronesia and stated that the United States sought security, not "riches," in the Pacific. Nimitz then used this justification to argue that trusteeship should not be applied to the American administration over Micronesia, because the islands did not represent a "colonial problem."[12] Similarly, General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, Army chief of staff, denied any economic motive on the part of the United States during July 1947 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and placed American motives strictly in terms of military security.[13]

Cabinet officers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and high-level planners did perceive an economic dimension to American national security policy for the postwar Pacific, but they consistently denied that this dimension entailed traditional imperialism. Seeing economic penetration strictly in terms of physical military control, officials linked inter-war and wartime events to the concept of American exceptionalism and asserted that territorial control for strictly military purposes was not imperialism as long as the economic exploitation of a large indigenous population was not taking place. Officials who were opposed to the idea of strategic trusteeship even linked this narrow interpretation of great power imperialism to the concept of American excep-

tionalism in order to assert that the United States was justified in annexing the Pacific Islands, since its motives were allegedly so pure.[14]

Critics might argue that these officials were too knowledgeable about world affairs to believe this interpretation of imperialism and were merely demonstrating their cynicism about the entire matter. Obviously, some sort of explanation had to be produced to justify to the American public and to the world the wide gulf existing between wartime rhetoric about dispensing with territorial gain and the postwar reality of control over the Pacific Islands. Yet as numerous historians of U.S. international relations have demonstrated, American exceptionalism has been a widespread and sincerely believed concept in American history, however hypocritical it may have appeared to contemporary foreign nationals or later generations of historians.[15] The tone of the reports and diary entries and the repeated concerns of these officials have convinced me that the officials believed they were administering the Pacific "in trust" for other nations and the Pacific Islanders. The officials cited genuinely believed that postwar international security and stability were dependent on sacrifices by the United States, whose modus operandi as a great power was characterized by American exceptionalism rather than the rapacious exploitation of traditional imperialism.

Economic Security and the Postwar Pacific

Regardless of their denials of U.S. economic aggrandizement, military officials were apprehensive about foreign economic activity in the islands. To these individuals, any economic activity by a foreign national could potentially support espionage activities by foreign governments, something the United States had been concerned about during the inter-war period.[16] This concern manifested itself in a disagreement between the State and Navy Departments over the transit and trade rights that foreign nationals were to have in postwar Micronesia. The disagreement was part and parcel of a rift between the two departments over the efficacy of unilateral annexation versus strategic trusteeship as the best form of American administration in the postwar Pacific. More important, however, the conflict suggests the degree to which the American planners from both departments perceived economic control as merely another form of physical security.

In September 1946, as the United States was negotiating in the United Nations the establishment and conditions of international trusteeships in former colonial areas, the Navy and State Departments found themselves in disagreement about the inclusion of a "most-favored-nation" clause in the United States' proposed Draft Trusteeship Agreement. Apparently, the State Department believed most-favored-nation status should apply to all nationals

of all U.N. member nations. State Department officials argued that any limitations on economic status would bring about an "unfavorable" reaction against American citizens in other nations' trusteeships if those nations' citizens were not allowed full economic rights in Micronesia. To State Department officials, "full economic rights" for foreign nationals meant the same freedom of transit rights by land, air, and sea that American citizens in Micronesia were to enjoy.[17]

The Navy Department's attitudes toward comprehensive security in the islands came out quite clearly in their response to the State Department's position. Navy officials argued that the sparseness of the population and resources made provisions for "free-for-all" social, economic, and commercial exploitation unnecessary and that allegedly "subversive" activities could be undertaken under the guise of commercial development, inter-island traffic, and "welfare" activities. Accordingly, the Navy wanted a special status for American citizens in the islands that would clearly set them apart from nationals of other U.N. member nations. This security-conscious attitude on the part of the Navy was made clear to John Foster Dulles as he negotiated the U.N. trusteeship agreements in 1946-1947. In late October 1946, Dulles informed the U.S. delegation to the United Nations that the Navy wanted a trade monopoly over Micronesia to prevent any foreign nationals from photographing the islands or the American bases being constructed there.[18] Apparently the Navy got its way, since the U.S. Draft Trusteeship Agreement, submitted to the United Nations the next month, in-eluded special economic and transit rights for American citizens in the trust territory.[19]

The Navy-State rift over Micronesia was similar to disagreements between the State and Interior Departments over the economic future of the Philippines. The State Department wanted that newly independent nation to have an economy that was integrated into a global free-trade system, while Interior Department officials wanted a political economy that was essentially an American adjunct so that the United States could prevent the archipelago from "collapsing" in a turbulent postwar world. Like the Navy in Micronesia, the Interior Department won the dispute over the Philippines, as evidenced by the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, which gave American citizens special economic status in the new republic, provided the U.S. president with veto power over Philippine monetary policy, and established a preferential trading system for the United States in the islands. Still, State Department resistance to Navy unilateralism needs to be put into context. While the State Department put up a fight in 1945 and 1946 over adherence to a free-trade doctrine in the Philippines and Micronesia, department officers never seriously questioned the policy of treating at least the northern Pacific

Basin as a strategic area under comprehensive U.S. control. In 1945, department officers had even assisted the Interior Department in creating the strategic trusteeship concept as a way to provide the United States with a secure buffer zone in the Pacific Basin while maintaining the U.S. facade in the United Nations as an anticolonial power.[20] In short, while the State Department may have opposed certain unilateralist tactics between 1945 and 1947, it never seriously questioned the goal of creating an "American lake" in the postwar Pacific or denied that economic security was a significant part of that process.

In addition to its role in postwar U.S. physical security in the region, the economic administration of Micronesia was linked at various times with other strategic goals. For example, in October 1946 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, ordered Lieutenant General John Hull, commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific, to provide assistance to fisheries experts from the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service who were carrying out an economic survey of Micronesia requested by the Navy in 1946.[21] The report by the Interior Department supposedly emphasized Micronesian marine production for "Asiatic" markets; and MacArthur was interested-in having his subordinate commander assist the United States Commercial Company in the survey, since he believed it was possible that the Caroline Islands could export dried bones and shells for sale in Japan and Korea. MacArthur apparently believed this kind of economic interaction would assist in the "ultimate economic rehabilitation" of both Japan and Micronesia.[22]

Navy Secretary Forrestal succinctly placed the economic control of the Pacific in an even more general strategic context, however, in February 1947, when he argued in support of the U.S. Draft Trusteeship Agreement. In a speech supposedly delivered to foster support for the concept of trusteeship itself, he instead concentrated on the provisions of the agreement that were designed to guarantee unilateral American strategic control over the region. By concentrating on these provisions, he also enunciated Navy Department fears over foreign penetration of the region.[23] Fearing foreign economic activity of any kind, Forrestal conceded that the Draft Agreement provided for significant participation of the islands in the international economy, but he spelled out that this participation had to be fully consistent with the "requirements of security." To Forrestal, these requirements meant fairly wide-ranging "restrictions on the commerical and other activities of foreigners," since the United States "could not allow a national of a potential aggressor to set up even a peanut stand in the shadow of an American base."[24]

Forrestal's attitude was entirely consistent with immediate postwar knowledge of pre-1941 Japanese expansionism. It was common knowledge by 1945

that Japanese economic penetration of Micronesia had begun long before Japan took military control of the islands from Germany in 1914. Moreover, it was known by this time that Japan had had a significant economic stake in East Asia before attempting to gain physical control over that region.[25] Thus, Forrestal's concern about foreign economic ventures in Micronesia was consistent with fears that American control over the Pacific Basin might be less than complete in later years and that incomplete control might "pave the way" for foreign penetration, subversion, control of the islands by another nation, and international aggression similar to the events of 1941-1942.[26] The best solution to Forrestal as well as to most high-level policymakers was to ensure that other nationals did not gain any kind of political, economic, or cultural inroad to island life.[27]

An Open Door in the Postwar Pacific?

At the same time, some important officials in Washington and the Pacific hinted at a more substantial economic role for the Pacific Islands, especially Micronesia, than just as a postwar buttress of U.S. physical control. In addition, there were people in semiofficial and unofficial capacities who seemed to have an "economic vision" for Micronesia and, to some extent, the entire Pacific Basin. These people were mostly, though not exclusively, members of the House Naval Affairs Committee or professional naval officers. Although the accuracy of their ideas about the economic potential of the region is questionable, these individuals saw American economic development of the Pacific Islands as a way not only to eradicate foreign influence from the area, but also to subsidize American administrative costs in the region. Some naval officers and members of Congress even suggested that Micronesia and other areas of the Pacific could be made into a profitable source of raw materials and a market for American capital and manufactures in the 1940s.

William Roger Louis and Elliot Converse have both shown that President Franklin Roosevelt at times believed that military and commercial air routes could be combined at various locations throughout the Pacific Basin to support American economic links to the fabled markets of Asia. Roosevelt felt so strongly about using the Pacific Islands as monopolized commercial transit points to East Asia for U.S. civil airlines and shipping companies that he sent Rear Admiral Richard Byrd and a team of area specialists on a tour of the South Pacific in the fall of 1943 to stake out postwar sites.[28] Byrd waxed enthusiastic about the potential development of joint military and commercial aviation assets in the postwar Pacific. Although Byrd's report is suspect because of his apparent desire to score points with Roosevelt, it is

apparent that Roosevelt saw a strategic interdependence between base development in the postwar Pacific, commercial transit routes to East Asia, the American exploitation of that potential market, and a healthy postwar American political economy.[29]

The goal of achieving administrative and fiscal self-sufficiency in order to subsidize costs was the major focus of at least one congressional report. An August 1945 report by the House Committee on Naval Affairs, Subcommittee on Pacific Bases, titled *Study of Pacific Bases,* offers some insights into American economic ambitions in the Pacific Islands. The subcommittee's ideas revolved around the notion of reducing costs first and then creating profitable opportunities wherever those opportunities presented themselves.[30] The subcommittee was primarily concerned with developing the islands' economies toward "maximum self-sufficiency." It called for research and development of island resources, especially in the area of vegetables, fish, minerals, "native" handicraft, and the development of commercial air and shipping centers.[31] In fact, the subcommittee took the time and trouble to offer fairly detailed analyses of each major island group in Micronesia, focusing on what it believed was each atoll's specific economic potential.

The members were particularly impressed by what they believed was Japan's "proven" ability to make the Marianas self-sufficient in food production and even to create a "two to one" ratio of economic output to administrative costs. The subcommittee felt that because of this economic past, the indigenous population should be able to maintain self-sufficiency in the future, raise their own standard of living, and avoid being forced onto the "dole" by the United States.[32] Additionally, the subcommittee suggested that there was room for productive ventures in the Marianas when it discussed rudimentary industries such as copra production, indigenous crafts, fishing, and even merchant vessel production, the last with a significant amount of assistance from the U.S. government and private American capital. Members envisioned Saipan, for example, being developed into some sort of vegetable, tropical fruit, and dairy production center.[33] Even when the subcommittee estimated areas such as the Marshall and Palau (now Belau) Islands to be of minimal economic potential, it nevertheless explored possibilities for development, such as agriculture, fishing, handicraft industries, and commercial shipping, so that these areas could also become self-sufficient and subsidize American administration to the extent possible.[34]

Self-sufficiency as an economic objective was also suggested by Admiral Raymond Spruance in early 1945. As U.S. Fifth Fleet commander during the war, Spruance had become familiar with the islands. As early as February 1945, he stated that the larger islands of Micronesia, such as Ponape and Kusaie (now Pohnpei and Kosrae), would need to develop some sort of

commercial activity, "if only to take care of the population."% In December 1945, as commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and commander in chief/ military governor of the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), Spruance ordered the islands closed to all private enterprise, American and foreign, as part of a policy to promote "native" ownership, industry, and economic self-sufficiency. Spruance believed it was the responsibility of the United States to ensure that the Micronesians attained the "the highest possible level of economic independence" as soon as possible, but he wanted to avoid "indiscriminate exploitation" of the islands' natural resources and of the islanders themselves as cheap labor for American or foreign investment ventures.[36] If providing an economic windfall to American commercial interests had been official policy, Spruance's order to close the islands to private enterprise was the wrong way to go about operations. Most likely, closing the islands to all private enterprise was a military security measure and promoting "native" self-sufficiency was an attempt at reducing administrative costs.[37]

In 1946 the idea of neatly blending postwar American military and economic goals in the Pacific was again enunciated, this time by Army Air Force Lieutenant General Ennis Whitehead. As commanding general of the Pacific Air Command, United States Army, and General MacArthur's senior air commander in the postwar Pacific Basin, Whitehead offered means by which the United States could employ private American firms to assist in carrying out strategic goals in the Korean Peninsula, while at the same time assisting the Truman Administration in its military demobilization and inculcating the southern Koreans with notions of American "know-how." Specifically, Whitehead suggested to MacArthur that the United States award an American commercial airline a contract to provide internal civil air transportation in occupied southern Korea. Whitehead also asserted that the Army could supply the airline with surplus military aircraft to make the contract more attractive and could accommodate the airline with routes that used existing military airdromes.[38]

Whitehead argued that the southern Koreans did not have an adequate infrastructure of trained crews, maintenance personnel, management skills, or radio communications to service the Korean market. Citing precedents in Latin American where the United States had used private individuals or firms to carry out public functions in support of American foreign-policy goals, Whitehead thought it perfectly reasonable for the United States to employ this practice in East Asia. Whitehead, in other words, wanted the United States to employ what Emily Rosenberg calls "chosen instruments," private citizens and corporations, to help implement official U.S. policy in a timely and, presumably, cheaper fashion.[39]

In spite of Roosevelt's, Byrd's, and Whitehead's enthusiasm for the Pacific

as a commercial gateway to East Asia, self-sufficiency and the reduction of administrative costs, rather than outright commercial exploitation, was the foremost objective for the majority of concerned officials once physical control over the region was assured. Between 1945 and 1947, the Navy's budgetary appropriations dropped from over $31 billion in fiscal year 1945 to $24 billion in fiscal year 1946 and then again to $5 billion in fiscal year 1947. Of that last amount, Captain William Jennings, assistant chief of naval operations for island governments, told the Senate Appropriations Committee that the Navy spent $5 million on civil and public administration in the Pacific Islands in 1947, not including the cost of constructing or maintaining base facilities in Micronesia.[40] Given Jennings's figures, island administration was about one percent of the Navy's budget. Though this may not seem to have been a significant amount, any costs that could have been subsidized by Pacific Basin economic activity probably would have been welcomed by the Navy Department.[41] After all, the more the Navy trimmed from its island governments budget, the more funds it would be able to divert to the construction and improvement of Pacific base facilities and the maintenance of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Secretary Forrestal reiterated the need for self-sufficiency in a letter to President Truman in August 1946. Forrestal, arguing for retention of the United States Commercial Company under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, also outlined the USCC's plans to set up agricultural training stations on major islands such as Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Truk (now Chuuk), and Ponape (Pohnpei). With strong support from the Navy, the USCC stations could teach the Micronesians to be "modem" agriculturalists using "sound" (i.e., American) methods of agriculture, animal husbandry, marketing, and product exportation. To Forrestal, the "average native" lacked "the initiative, self-confidence and business acumen to carry on an enterprise wholly on his own" and therefore needed the guidance of the Navy and the United States Commercial Company to avoid exploitation by continental American and foreign enterprises. Forrestal's ultimate goal, however, was to develop the Micronesian economy to the point that the Micronesians could "contribute an ever increasing share toward the costs of their own govemment."[42]

Articles published in professional and scholarly journals also described the economic potential in Micronesia, but their authors went one step farther than the officers on the spot and the officials in Washington in their suggestions that a profit could be turned in the islands. In a February 1945 article in the United States Naval Institute's Proceedings, the Navy's semi-official forum for debate, Marine Corps Reserve Major Guy Richards argued that the Micronesians would be easily attracted to American suzer-

ainty because of the allegedly superior technological and economic prowess of the United States, which had been demonstrated during the war.[43] Richards supported adding an economic element to the American strategic role in Micronesia, suggesting that a preponderance of U.S. consumer goods would not only socialize the Micronesians to American control but also provide a market for American manufactures. Although Richards perceived Micronesia as an outlet for the American economy, he saw economic exploitation as a means, not an end, to ensuring U.S. strategic control over the area.[44]

Rear Admiral Gilbert Rowcliff was more immediately concerned with the economic problems that the continental United States would experience after the war. Rowcliff summarized these economic problems as diminished natural resources, unemployment, high tariffs, a search for markets, and large public debts. To Rowcliff, the postwar United States would need "trade and commerce" to alleviate these problems, and he proceeded to explain how American trade with the "lucrative western Pacific" would help the conversion to a postwar U.S. economy as American manufactured goods were exchanged for raw materials such as copra, vegetables, rubber, oil, and silk.[45] Rowcliff believed that economic development in the western Pacific would illustrate to the world that the United States "can do something else besides wage war." He believed that markets could be built in the western Pacific, because they had been "well primed with American equipment, public works, and development" and "subsidized with American dollars and fertilized by American flesh and blood." His ideas were reflective of a prevailing attitude that the United States had the right to enjoy any benefits that accrued from administering the region because it had paid for the islands in "blood and treasure."[46]

Navy Captain K. C. McIntosh went one step farther by suggesting the construction of some sort of economic satrapy in Micronesia. Convinced that the islands were needed for national security, he advised the United States to advance loans to the islands as well as to construct public works and develop markets for salable goods in order to establish self-supporting economies. McIntosh thought salable goods were represented by products like copra, sugar, coffee, and peppers, products that he claimed could be easily cultivated in Micronesia. He also argued that it would be more cost-effective for the United States to provide funds to the Micronesians for the development of self-supporting market economies than to continue to subsidize the islanders with annual appropriations.[47]

McIntosh's ideas are interesting from another perspective. Using Japan's economic exploitation of Taiwan as an example of how the United States should not treat Micronesia, McIntosh urged that the U.S. island govern-

ments should not be exploitative but must develop the island economies in a "benign" way toward self-sufficiency and an American form of capitalism. Not surprisingly, McIntosh did not perceive imposing an American form of capitalism on the Micronesians as imperialism or exploitation. Instead, he saw it merely as assisting the islanders in taking on their "proper" role in the American sphere. Emily Rosenberg asserts that Americans simply assumed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that their particular brand of capitalism and their general lifestyle were valued by people all around the globe. McIntosh's view reinforces that thesis.[48]

The assumption that all foreigners desired a replication of American society in their own countries was also enunciated by Yale Professor of Government Rupert Emerson. Emerson, writing about American policy toward its Pacific "dependencies," saw one American goal as securing a more "adequate" standard of living for the indigenous population. However, he also perceived economic advantages for the United States. Emerson believed that the islands could be made into productive centers of cheap raw materials for the United States as well as markets to absorb partially a postwar American domestic surplus.[49] For these reasons, he favored a closed and centrally managed economy in the islands to prevent other nations from partaking in. these alleged benefits.[50] Similar to Rosenberg's discoveries about American cultural and economic expansion in the first half of the twentieth century, Emerson's ideas reflected an attitude held by many Americans that U.S. expansion into other areas of the world could solve domestic problems, "uplift" foreigners, and be benign all at the same time.[51]

Finally, a fascinating insight into attitudes about the economic exploitation of the Pacific Basin is available in an unofficial document titled "The American Plan for Veterans," authored by Michael J. Brennan of New York City. Brennan's past is unclear from the correspondence, but he submitted his work to Truman's office in June 1946. There is no evidence that his ideas ever became policy, but they are nevertheless a concrete example of Americans assuming that their national interests harmonized with larger global interests.

Virulently anti-British, Brennan's tract reads like an American newspaper editorial during one of the many nineteenth-century Anglo-American diplomatic crises. Brennan began by arguing that "civilization," which was supposedly European and Christian, had been moving inevitably westward for some time, epitomized by the U.S. westward expansion in North America.[52] Brennan went on to discuss the fountain of America's newfound global power, which he saw emanating from its republican principles and domestic political institutions, as well as from its wartime military and economic power. Comparing the exceptional American nation to the "empires" of

Europe and Asia, Brennan then began to explain how providing for America's veterans was central to the nation's honor and postwar economic health.[53]

Brennan asserted that the national debt and the "onerous" wartime taxes levied by the government might continue after the war, since the United States needed to maintain a global military base system and forces in readiness to deter future aggression and to "bounce" the European imperialists out of their colonial territories. Given the growing unemployment problem in the United States resulting from demobilization, Brennan feared large numbers of Americans, especially veterans, might become destitute and the nation might sink back into a depressed state similar to the condition it had experienced between 1929 and 1941.[54]

Fully subscribing to American exceptionalism in American foreign policy, Brennan explained America's "colonial experiment" in the Pacific in terms of "justice," asserting that the United States should work out a regional security arrangement with Pacific nations such as Indonesia and set up a board of trustees headed by General MacArthur to administer the regional agreement. Though this board would contain Indonesians, other peoples from the Pacific territories, and representatives of the Allied Powers, Brennan would have had Americans dominate the body as the nation that had the "highest" number of forces engaged and losses incurred against the Japanese in the Pacific War.[55]

Finding that the interests of unemployed American veterans and newly liberated Pacific peoples were somehow interwoven, Brennan then argued that the newly developing nations would need supervisory and technical advisers to develop their "virgin" territories. American veterans would supposedly make the perfect advisers because of their wartime technical skills. Moreover, their overseas employment would ease the competition for jobs in the United States, get veterans off the "dole," ease domestic taxation by decreasing government expeditures, and "certainly" benefit the Pacific Islanders, who would be the object of American benevolence and guidance. In addition, both the United States and the Pacific nations would supposedly benefit from the inevitable exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods that would follow the injection of American advisers into the territories and the development of the Pacific Basin as part of a postwar American economic sphere.[56]

It is difficult to arrive at a conclusion about the efficacy of these arguments for economic development. Clearly, the individuals cited could have been discussing Pacific Basin economic development in grandiose and profitable terms as a clever marketing tactic to sway doubtful members of the Truman Administration, Congress, or the public about the advantages of annexing or integrating the islands into American domestic life. It is impos-

sible to know their exact motivations for the arguments. Nor is analysis made easier by the fact that historians of the region differ about the area's economic potential.

Mark Peattie, for instance, has demonstrated that, although Japanese economic development of the islands did pay for administrative costs in Micronesia and even created a financial surplus by the late 1930s, total production never surpassed one-half of one percent of production throughout the entire prewar Japanese Empire. Whatever the economic stakes in Micronesia might have been, they were not very substantial in Peattie's view.[57] Still, Dirk Ballendorf argues that the Japanese period illustrated to American policymakers and planners that Micronesia could be self-sufficient in agriculture and could export raw materials such as phosphate, cash crops such as copra, and consumer goods such as shells on a profitable basis. Certainly, the scale of such activities could not have been large, but to officials trying to trim budgets in the middle to late 1940s, any development would have been welcomed, encouraged, and possibly exaggerated.[58]

Nor were ideas about economic development in the postwar Pacific limited to Micronesia. Nick Cullather has shown that Interior Department officials; charged with planning for the Philippines' postwar independence, sought to create an American-oriented economy in the archipelago that would develop from American capital, supply raw materials to the United States, and provide markets for American industry.[59] Although the Philippines was of a completely different character from Micronesia in terms of population, land area, and economic development, ideas and plans for both areas appear with hindsight to be overly ambitious. Neither the majority of Filipinos nor the majority of Micronesians had the financial wherewithal to represent any significant return on American investment for some time to come, if ever. While Department of the Interior plans to substitute annual appropriations to the Philippines with private capital investment were as unsound as the Department of the Navy suggestions for Micronesia, both appeared to originate in a strong but unrealistic faith in the reconstructive and rejuvenating powers of private American capital and business expertise.[60] I find little evidence that officials' beliefs in the almost magical quality of mixing private American capital with good intentions were anything but sincere.

Historians such as Rosenberg and Robert Pollard have thoroughly demonstrated that American subscriptions to the international problem-solving potential of free trade, open doorism, and American-style liberal capitalism were widely believed myths in American society during the 1940s. Although

the protected economy proposed for the Pacific Islands was not liberal capitalism or free trade, there was little that was inconsistent about the beliefs enunciated in the articles concerning Micronesia or the plans concerning the Philippines. Both sets of works were intellectually grounded in assumptions of superior American economic performance and the same postulations on which postwar free-trade doctrine was based, even though the proposed economic administration of the Pacific was far from free trade.[61]

There is some evidence that the Navy sought economic advantages in Micronesia, which suggests thoughts of exploitation beyond self-sufficiency and the subsidization of administrative costs. The trade monopoly that Dulles discussed in the fall of 1946 was definitely an aspect of American security in the Pacific. Yet the references to excluding foreign nationals and the provisions for privileged status for American citizens that were incorporated into the Draft Trusteeship Agreement denotes something beyond basic security measures.[62]

Although the United States Commercial Company was primarily a subsistence welfare agency that was not meant to create a profit in the islands, it was meant, as Forrestal's letter to Truman indicates, to engender an "enterprising" ethos in the Micronesians. It was followed in 1947 by the establish-. ment of the Island Trading Company, which took control of the export-import trade in Micronesia following the establishment of the U.N. trusteeship in July 1947 and was even more specifically geared toward instilling a capitalistic, profit-oriented ethos in the Micronesians. In addition, the final trusteeship agreement with the United Nations, which was largely derived from the Draft Trusteeship Agreement of November 1946, granted the United States special trade privileges such as most-favored-nation status and the right to integrate the islands into a customs zone with the United States.[63] Significantly, the United States was the only administering authority of a trusteeship to receive such sweeping powers.[64] The granting of this authority could have simply been testimony to American influence in the United Nations, strong convictions and lobbying on the part of American policymakers for comprehensive strategic control of the islands, and a willingness to maintain that control by any means necessary. Yet the possibility of economic exploitation cannot be completely ruled out.

In May 1947, for instance, Admiral Louis Denfield, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command, and commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, suggested to Rear Admiral Charles Pownall, commander, Naval Forces, Marianas, and naval governor of Guam, that the United States retain for its own benefit any economic advantages resulting from commerce and industry in Micronesia. While Denfield failed to elaborate in detail what those

advantages might be, he specifically recommended prohibiting the importation to Micronesia of any commodity mined, manufactured, or produced in "foreign areas" that the Micronesians could acquire from the United States.[65]

The idea that Micronesia might be able to yield something in economic terms was even hinted at by Admiral Nimitz as he testified before the July 1947 Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on the U.N. trusteeship agreement. Though Secretary Forrestal continued to assert that economic benefits from the agreement would be "nil" and that there was nothing to exploit in the islands, Nimitz seemed to contradict him when he told the committee that there was potential for the islands as transit points for American commercial aviation routes to East Asia. Nimitz, however, could very well have been telling the senators what he believed they wanted to hear, since in October 1946 he had told the same committee that American interest in the islands was strictly military.[66]

In the end, however, American ideas for the economic development of Micronesia seem to be disingenuous. The ideas enunciated by civilian officials, military officers, and members of the House Subcommittee on Pacific Bases about turning the islands into sources of raw materials and production centers of light industrial goods are flawed, particularly when the June 1947 "Report by the Joint Marianas Board on the Military Development of the Marianas" is taken into account. The idea that the islands could be agriculturally or industrially developed seems ridiculous in light of the report, since its accompanying maps indicate that the U.S. military was planning to take control of huge tracts of land on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian.[67]

For example, so many American military units and personnel were stationed on Guam that anti-aircraft practice firing had to be conducted seaward to avoid interfering with aircraft approaches. Moreover, while board members made repeated references to the need to accommodate the Micronesians on the best arable land and to minimize the economic damage done to them by the U.S. strategic presence, and while they were also sensitive to charges by Congress and the press of "land grabbing," the board was still determined to acquire over seventy thousand acres of land on Guam alone, and it was not willing to subordinate military interests to economic development of the island.[68] Given the quantity of land the military wanted on the major islands of the Marianas, the only significant economic development of the islands that might have benefited the future development of the continental American political economy would have entailed transforming the Micronesian economy into a service-based economy in support of the huge American military establishment, a pattern 'that was seen in the Ryukyus after 1945.[69]

Conclusion

To defend American control over Micronesia against charges of imperialism from foreign nations, policymakers enunciated fascinating ideas about the allegedly exceptional character of U.S. actions. These views directly support assertions made by historian Emily Rosenberg that Americans did not see themselves as imperialistic in the 1940s and that US. economic expansion was assumed to be a positive phenomenon for anyone experiencing it.

In spite of this consistent denial of imperialism, suggestions for an economic development policy toward the Pacific Islands depended upon to whom one was talking at any given time. The opinions of cabinet officers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officers on the spot, members of Congress, and individual strategic thinkers ranged widely from denying any economic plan for the islands to arguing that the economic development of Micronesia could be a great boon for the United States. None of the evidence cited, however, dispels the fact that American policy toward the islands represented an anomaly to global U.S. free-trade policy in the late 1940s, since none of the individuals or organizations cited, with the exception of some State Department officials in the fall of 1946, argued for anything but an economic zone that was entirely closed to foreign trade.

Cabinet officials, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their subordinate planning bodies were the strongest subscribers to the theory that economic penetration was an element of strategic control, not economic exploitation or commercial gain. Although members of these organs did at times hint at the economic exploitation of the islands, the tone of their reports and statements suggests they were tailoring their arguments to gamer support from the president, Congress, and the American public rather than to express sincerely held beliefs about economic development.

Officers on the spot, such as MacArthur and Denfield, some members of Congress, and unofficial writers were more willing to discuss the economic development of the islands than policymakers and planners in Washington. While it can easily be argued that these politicians and officers were also creating arguments to gamer political support from various constituencies, the continued American belief in the efficacy of the China Market and the open door in the 1940s leads to the conclusion that their arguments were profoundly held, but flawed and unrealistic.

Still, while opinions differed widely over the tactics of self-sufficiency versus aggressive economic development, all of these individuals were writing in the context of a closed system created to support American strategic goals of postwar reconstruction in the Pacific and East Asia. Even the most ardent advocate of economic exploitation in the islands does not seem to

have lost sight of the fact that the economic administration of the Pacific Islands was ultimately not for making money or creating a global showcase for American-style free trade. The economic administration of the Pacific Islands was intended to ensure postwar American strategic security in the Pacific Basin.

NOTES

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1. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Mark Peattie, *Nan'yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1988), 118-152.

2. See Dorothy Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,* 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957-1963), 2:406; see also Dirk Ballendorf, "The Japanese and the Americans: Contrasting Historical Periods of Economic and Social Development in Palau," *Journal of the Pacific Society,* October 1988: 11; and idem, "An Historical Perspective on Economic Development in Micronesia, 1783 to 1945," *Asian Culture (Asian-Pacific Culture) Quarterly* 19 (Summer 1991): 54.

3. See Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* 2:406.

4. See Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, "Memorandum on Post-War Far Eastern Situation," 16 June 1944, file "Intelligence, A8," box 195, Strategic Plans Division Records, Navy Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

5. See Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* 2:62; and "Trusteeships," 30 March 1945, in *The Forrestal Diaries,* ed. Walter Millis and Eugene Duffield (New York: Viking Press, 1951).

6. See "Memorandum for the President," 13 April 1945, in *The Forrestal Diaries, 1944-1948* (Washington, D.C.: NPPSO, Naval District Washington, Microfilm Section, 1973-1979). Truman may have been convinced by these arguments, since he stated in July 1945 that the United States was not fighting for territory or anything of a "monetary nature." While he refused to countenance the idea of annexing Micronesia in the end, he nevertheless supported the idea of retaining the islands on a "sovereign" basis until the United Nations was "fully established." In addition, he completely supported the idea of strategic trusteeship, which was virtually annexation in all but name. See Tom Ireland, 'Will We Claim Pacific Islands?" file 48-l-24, box 90, Record Group 80, Records of the Office of

the Secretary of the Navy, General Records of the Department of the Navy, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as RG 80, NA); "The President-Bases," 30 September 1945, in *The Forrestal Diaries, 1944-1949* (microfilm); and Lester Foltos, "The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-1947," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Summer 1989): 317-342.

7. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1946: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations,* 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 25.

8. See Henderson to Truman, 18 August 1946, file OF 210-B, "United States Commercial Company," box 798, White House Official Files, Harry S Truman Library (HSTL), Independence, MO. See also Forrestal to Truman, 28 August 1946, ibid.

9. See "Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee," part of "Trusteeships for Japanese Mandated Islands," Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 570/48, 17 January 1946, file 12-9-42 sec. 13, JCS Central Decimal File, 1946-1947, Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS) 360, Records of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as RG 218, NA).

10. See Annex to Appendix "A," part of "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific," JCS 1619/l, 24 May 1946, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 59, Papers of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Records of the Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees, Record Group 353, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

11. See "United States Position on Soviet Proposals for Amendment of Draft Trusteeship Agreement," JCS 1619/20, 3 March 1947, file 12-9-42 sec. 29, CCS 360, RG 218, NA.

12. See "Trusteeships," 22 October 1946, in *The Forrestal Diaries, 1944-1949* (microfilm); and Nimitz, "The Future Employment of Naval Forces," in Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* 3: 170.

13. See U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,* 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 18.

14. See Perry Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 75-83; and Elliot Converse, "United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1984), 261.

15. See, for example, Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), passim; Thomas Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 173-214; and Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 229-234.

16. See Dirk Ballendorf, "Secrets without Substance: U.S. Intelligence in the Japanese Mandates, 1915-1945," *Journal of Pacific History* 19 (April 1984): 83-99.

17. See "Memorandum by the Ad Hoc Committee to SWNCC," part of "Draft Trusteeship Agreement," 10 September 1946, SWNCC 59/4, SWNCC Papers, file 12-9-42 sec. 27, CCS 360, RG 218, NA.

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19. See Press Release 142, 25 February 1947, file 2-l-7, box 14, RG 80, NA.

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21. See MacArthur to Hull, 5 October 1946, AFMIDPAC series, Record Group 9: Collections of Messages (Radiograms), 1945-1951, Bureau of Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Va.

22. Ibid.

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24. Ibid.

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26. See Forrestal, "United States' Role in the Trusteeship System."

27. Ibid.

28. See Louis, *Imperialism at Bay,* 269-271; and Converse, "Postwar Overseas Military Base System," 24-25, 50, 101-102.

29. See Louis, *Imperialism at Bay,* 269-271.

30. See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, *Study of Pacific Bases,* 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), passim.

31. Ibid., 1012.

32. Ibid., 1020, 1022.

33. Ibid., 1022-1023.

34. Ibid., 1107, 1110-1111, 1115, 1116, 1118, 1123.

35. Spruance to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), 14 February 1945, as found in Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* 2:78.

36. For Spruance's order, see CINCPOA letter, 15 December 1945, as found in Richard, ibid., 408. For the official economic policy of the United States Naval Military government in Micronesia, see "Pacific Charter," 12 December 1945, part of CINCPOA letter 52855, as found in ibid., 406. See also Ballendorf, "The Japanese and the Americans," 8; and idem, "An Historical Perspective," 37.

37. See CINCPOA letter, 15 December 1945, as found in Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* 2:408.

38. See Whitehead to MacArthur, subj: Korean Airlines, 12 June 1946, Records of the Pacific Air Command, United States Army, 720.963-2, Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Agency (AFSHRC), Montgomery, Ala.

39. Ibid. For the idea of "chosen instruments," see Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream, 59-62.*

40. See Jennings to the Senate Appropriations Committee, U.S. Senate, *Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1948: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations,* 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 119-120.

41. Ibid.

42. See Forrestal to Truman, 28 August 1946, file OF 210-B, "United States Commercial Company," box 798, White House Official Files, HSTL.

43. See Major Guy Richards, U.S.M.C.R., "Pacific Briefing," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (hereafter cited as *USNIP)* 71 (February 1945): 170.

44. Ibid.

45. See Rear Admiral Gilbert Rowcliff, U.S.N., "Guam," *USNIP* 71 (July 1945): 793. See also Cullather, "Limits of Multilateralism," 78, 84.

46. Rowcliff, "Guam," passim.

47. See Captain K. C. McIntosh, "The Road Ahead," *USNIP* 71 (November 1945): 1285. See also Cullather, "Limits of Multilateralism," 82, 84.

48. See McIntosh, "The Road Ahead," 1285. See also Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream,* 229-234. For a view of American attempts to impose a form of U.S. political economy on postwar western Europe, see Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1-26, 427-445.

49. See Rupert Emerson, "American Policy toward Pacific Dependencies," *Pacific Affairs* 20 (September 1947): 270; and Cullather, "Limits of Multilateralism," 70-89.

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51. Ibid., passim; and Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream.*

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53. See Brennan, "The American Plan for Veterans," 11-23.

54. Ibid., 24-38.

55. Ibid., 39-43.

56. Ibid., 45-48.

57. See Peattie, *Nan'yo,* 150, 152.

58. See Ballendorf, "The Japanese and the Americans," 7-13.

59. See Cullather, "Limits of Multilateralism," 70-89.

60. Ibid., 77-78, 84.

61. See Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream,* 3-13, 229-234; see also Robert Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 1-9, 243-253.

62. See Dulles, "Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations," 25 October 1946, *FRUS* 1946, 1:661.

63. See Roger Gale, *The Americanization of Micronesia: A Story of the Consolidation of U.S. Rule in the Pacific* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), 63-64. See also Ballendorf, "The Japanese and the Americans," 12; and idem, "An Historical Perspective," 54.

64. See Gale, *Americanization of Micronesia,* 63-64.

65. See Denfield, 8 May 1947, serial 3209 to Pownall, 15 May 1947, serial 12172, as found in Richard, *United States Naval Administration,* 2:414.

66. See Nimitz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory* of *the Pacific Islands,* 20. See also Nimitz to Forrestal, "Trusteeship," 22 October 1946, in *The Forrestal Diaries, 1944-1949* (microfilm).

67. See "The Report of the Joint Marianas Board on the Military Development of the Marianas," 1 June 1947, 178.2917-l, AFSHRC. The maps can be found in Tabs A-4, B-l, B-2, C-l, C-2, C-3, F-4, I-l, I-2, O-l, O-2, O-3, P-2, P-4, Q-l, Q-2, and Q-3 of the cited report.

68. Ibid., 10, 22-23, 32, 34, 75, 76.

69. See Arnold Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950* (Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center for Military History, 1988), 122-152.

THE ADOPTION OF CHRISTIAN PRAYER IN NATIVE HAWAIIAN *PULE*

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Many outward, physical manifestations of Hawaiian language and culture have changed radically among Hawaiians since the first arrival of foreigners to Hawai'i in 1778. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the inner, psychological and emotional, character of Hawaiians has changed more slowly. Certain traditional cultural and linguistic elements have been retained in acculturated forms. An example of such retention is the adoption of Christian prayer in spontaneously composed *pule*, a form of prayer and the sole genre of formal Hawaiian oratory retained in uninterrupted continuity from the early nineteenth century to the present. This article describes the importance Hawaiians traditionally placed upon language, comments on several major historical events that led to the decline of Hawaiian language and culture, and shows that in spite of this marked decline many elders who speak Hawaiian as their first language retain a distinctly Hawaiian form of Christian prayer, which originated soon after Hawaiian conversion to Christianity. The several traditional elements of prayer language, poetic devices, and vocal styles of presentation retained in this form reflect the creative adaptation of Christian prayer to suit Hawaiian values and sensibilities.

GIVEN A KNOWLEDGE of the major cultural, political, and sociological changes that have taken place in Hawai'i since foreigners (British explorer Captain James Cook and crew) first arrived in 1778, one might assume that little of traditional Hawaiian language and culture survives today--that Hawaiians have all but completely embraced the English language and Western culture. Certainly, and in spite of the growing strength of Hawaiian language and culture since the late 1960s evidence of the pervasiveness of

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Western influences seems compelling: most Hawaiians speak English and not Hawaiian as their first language, receive an English-medium education, live in Western-style homes, and wear Western clothing, to name but a few influences.

Without question, many outward, physical manifestations of culture have changed radically among Hawaiians, especially in the past hundred years since the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchial government by American businessmen. Despite these outward manifestations, however, evidence suggests that the inner, psychological and emotional, character of Hawaiians has changed more slowly. Although some traditional cultural and linguistic elements have been irretrievably lost, other traditional elements have been retained in acculturated forms. With regard to the process of sociocultural change, Robert L. Bee writes, "The stimuli for sociocultural change are constantly operating to alter the preexisting elements in the system; but insofar as the system, the general pattern of life, is considered worthy by its members, they will (consciously or unconsciously) take action aimed at insuring that change does not suddenly obliterate all or even most of the stabilizing links with the past" (197413). An example of the retention of traditional elements in an acculturated form and the focus of this article is the adoption of Christian prayer in spontaneously composed ***pule,*** a Hawaiian form of prayer and the sole genre of formal Hawaiian oratory retained in uninterrupted continuity from the nineteenth century to the present. I make a distinction here between spontaneously composed and pre-composed Christian *pule*. The latter are usually translations from English and contain fewer traditional Hawaiian elements than the former.[1] Spontaneously composed Christian ***pule*** (hereafter referred to as Christian ***pule)*** may still be heard in Hawaiian Christian churches and in the opening and closing prayers of meetings and parties, among other contexts.[2]

In this essay, I describe the importance Hawaiians traditionally placed upon language and comment on several major historical events that led to the decline of Hawaiian language and culture. Further, I show that, despite a marked linguistic and cultural decline, many elders who speak Hawaiian as their first language retain a distinctly Hawaiian form of Christian prayer that originated soon after Hawaiian conversion to Christianity early in the nineteenth century.

Since the late 1960s a widespread renewed interest in Hawaiian language and culture has occurred in Hawai‘i, but more among younger than older Hawaiians. Older Hawaiians tend to retain a negative view of Hawaiian language and culture shaped during their youth, mainly by a strongly Euro-American-based school system that greatly suppressed the language and

culture. Although a few young people involved in Hawaiian language revitalization have shown an interest in learning about Christian *pule,* most Hawaiians show little interest, apparently assuming that it contains little that is traditionally Hawaiian. In some cases, the lack of interest also results from the perceived association between *haole* (Anglo-American) colonialist oppression of Hawaiians and Christianity. Thus, the elders' retention and use of this acculturated prayer form are not in response to the current renewed interest in Hawaiian language and culture; rather, the form reflects an unselfconscious expression of the elders' worldview.[3] Although some elders express surprise and puzzlement upon learning that several elements of their Christian *pule* originate in pre-Christian Hawaiian sources, none with whom I have spoken would deny that these very elements contribute to the unique power and beauty of this prayer form.

In traditional Hawaiian society, the proper use of language was of great importance. The elevated language of poetry was considered to be the most appropriate for use in prayers, which were an important means to address the deities. Indeed, traditional prayers were frequently referred to as *mele pule*--chanted prayer-poems. Proverbial sayings about the power of language reflect the great value placed upon proper language use. Sayings like *"I ka 'olelo no ke ola; i ka 'olelo no ka make"* (In language rests life; in language rests death) and *" 'O 'oe ka luaahi o kau mele"* (You bear both the good and the bad consequences of the language used in your poetry) underscore the traditional Hawaiian belief that language--especially as used in chanted prayers and poetry--is imbued with *mana,* power originating from a spiritual source. According to this belief, the desired outcome of activities in various phases of life is, to a great extent, predicated upon the skillful manipulation of the *mana* inherent in language. Indeed, at one time or another, every Hawaiian expressed, affirmed, and influenced the course of his or her life through the *mana* of language, which was given focus and direction by chanting (Silva 1989:86).

Although changes due to foreign influences began with the arrival of the first foreigners in 1778, Hawaiian language and culture have suffered a great and continuous decline since 1820, when New England Calvinist missionaries began actively converting Hawaiians to Christianity. The Hawaiian language continued to be spoken by most Hawai'i residents--both Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian alike--until the end of the nineteenth century, when political developments led to the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893. Three years later a law was passed by the Republic of Hawai'i that made illegal the use of Hawaiian as a language of instruction in the schools (Territory of Hawaii 1905156). As English then became the sole legal language of instruction and the only language permitted on school grounds, children on all

islands, with the exception of Niʻihau, were forced to abandon Hawaiian.[4] Two years later, in 1898, the annexation of Hawaiʻi by the United States effectively took away all opportunities for Hawaiian political self-determination and reaffirmed the prevailing status of English. In 1900, Hawaiʻi became a U.S. territory; in 1959, the fiftieth state in the Union. These dramatic political, social, and linguistic changes, combined with the influence of immigrant sugar and pineapple plantation laborers from countries such as China, Japan, and the Philippines, resulted in the decline of Hawaiian language use and gave rise to Hawaiʻi Creole English, commonly known as "pidgin English" in Hawaiʻi today.[5]

After the turn of the century, the decline in the number of Hawaiians who were knowledgeable in traditional language and culture was matched by a concomitant rise in those who embraced the English language and Euro-American culture. Although all of the estimated 40,000 Hawaiians at the turn of the century spoke Hawaiian, of the 220,000 Hawaiians today, only some 800 are native speakers.[6] Chanted prayers and poetry, because of their inextricable association with the Hawaiian language and cultural contexts, were severely and adversely affected. Increased Westernization brought about the adaptation of many new and different values, which resulted in the decrease of traditional chant contexts and the loss of many chanted texts from the active repertoire. For example, as Hawaiians became Christianized, many traditional *pule* to the numerous Hawaiian deities came to be looked upon as pagan (and thus unacceptable) and were deliberately put aside and forgotten (Silva 1989:87).

Christian *pule* to Jehovah largely replaced traditional *pule* to the Hawaiian deities and, in less than a generation after missionaries first arrived in Hawaiʻi, some Hawaiians had learned so quickly about Christianity that they became missionaries themselves and began proselytizing other Hawaiians (Thurston 1833). By this time, the language and vocal presentation style of Christian *pule* probably had already begun to reflect Hawaiian adaptations, which undoubtedly enhanced the relevance, meaning, and power of what was once a foreign prayer form.

A comparison of the language used in a traditional and in a Christian *pule* follows (see the Hawaiian texts with English translation below--the first translation by Mary Kawena Pūkuʻi as adapted by this writer, the second by this writer). The *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale* was given to me by my chant teacher, Kaʻupena Wong, who received it from his teacher, Pukuʻi (for Pukuʻi's Hawaiian version of this *pule,* see Handy and Pukui 1972:113-114). The Christian *Pule Hoʻokuʻu* was tape recorded and transcribed as spontaneously composed and presented by Martha Mānoanoa Lum Ho at the close of a community meeting held at the University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo in 1985.[7]

Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale
Traditional House Dedication Prayer

Ua ku ka hale, ua paʻa ka hale,
The house now stands, it is completed,
He hale ku i ka ʻeleua, i ka ʻeleao,
A house that resists the rains and the stormy elements,
He hale noho hoʻi no ke kanaka.
A house for man to dwell in.
E Lono e, eia ka hale lā,
O Lono, behold the house,
Ua ku i Mauliola.
A house in the presence of the Giver-of-Life [the deity Mauliola].
E ola i ka noho hale,
Let it have life through those who dwell therein,
E ola i ke kanaka kipa mai,
Let it have life through the visitors that come,
E ola i ka haku ʻaina,
Let it have life through the landlord,
E ola i na aliʻi.
Let it have life through the chiefs.
ʻO ia ke ola o kauhale, e Mauliola.
That is how this dwelling shall have life, o Giver-of-Life.
Ola a kolo pupu a haumakaʻiole,
Life until one creeps and is weak-eyed with age,
A pala lau hala,
Until one sprawls like a withered *hala* leaf,
A kaʻi koko,
Until one must be carried about in a hammock,
A kau i ka puaaneane.
Until one reaches the extremity of life.
ʻO ia ke ola āu, e ke akua.
That is the life that you provide, o god.
E Ku, e Kane, e Lono,
O Kū, o Kane, o Lono [three major Hawaiian deities],
Kuʼua mai i ke ola,
Let down the gift of life,
I na pomaikaʻi
And all of the blessings with it
A *ea ka lani, ka honua,*
Till the heavens and earth be heaped.

Ea ia Kaneikawaiola.
Let them be raised up by Kane-of-the-Living-Waters [the deity Kaneikawaiola].
E ola mai kahi pae a kahi pae,
May there be life from one boundary to the other,
E ola mai luna a lalo,
From above to below,
Mai kaupoku a ke kahua.
From roof to foundation.
E ola a ola loa no!
Let there be life--everlasting life!
ʻAmama, ua noa.
The prayer is complete, all sacred prohibitions have been lifted.

Several poetic devices typical of traditional *pule* are used in the *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale.* These devices provide the means through which the Hawaiian value placed upon wholeness and thoroughness is expressed, thereby increasing the *mana* of the language used and, ultimately, ensuring the efficacy of the prayer.

In traditional *pule,* important themes and ideas are typically restated several times. In the *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale,* the word *ola* (life) occurs fifteen times. In traditional *pule,* deities, people, places, positive attributes, and desirable outcomes are typically listed, one after another, with each deity, person, place, attribute, or outcome placed within an identical syntactical structure. In the *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale,* such listing occurs frequently and is found in lines 6-9: "Let it have life through those who dwell therein / Let it have life through the visitors that come / Let it have life through the landlord / Let it have life through the chiefs"; in lines 11-14: "Life until one creeps and is weak-eyed with age / Until one sprawls like a *hala* leaf / Until one must be carried about on a hammock / Until one reaches the extremity of life"; and in line 16: "O Ku, o Kane, o Lono." Further, in traditional *pule,* words of opposite meaning and that delineate space or time are typically paired. In the *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale,* such pairing occurs in line 19: "Till the heavens and earth be heaped." In lines 21-23, two poetic devices are combined--paired words of opposite meaning are listed within an identical syntactical structure: "May there be life from one boundary to the other / From above to below / From roof to foundation." In addition to providing a means through which the potency of the prayer may be intensified, each of the foregoing devices--separately and in combination--renders the language used aesthetically pleasing to the Hawaiian ear.

Related to the use of poetic devices, the overall tone of the language used in this *pule* also deserves comment. Aware of the interdependent nature of

his relationship with the deities and having successfully fulfilled all requirements of ritual and worship, the composer believed he was entitled to call respectfully yet forcefully upon the deities now to do their part by providing the outcomes sought through prayer. Describing this traditional relationship between Hawaiians and the deities, George Kanahele writes, "Simply put, gods and people are interdependent: for better of worse, they need each other. It is not a relationship in which one functions as the slave of the other, or takes from the other without returning benefit or hurt. Rather, it is the perfect symbiotic relationship, in which both parties mutually benefit from living and working together" (1986:80).

The Christian supplicant praying in English typically places himself in a vastly inferior position beneath God, using, for example, language like, "We, Thy humble servants, beseech Thee, Almighty God, . . ." In contrast, the tone of the language used in the *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale*--typical in traditional *pule*--reflects the composer's confidence in his right to benefit from the *mana* his prayer will generate to create the life *(ola)* and blessings *(pomaika'i)* he seeks.

Pule Hoʻokuʻu
Closing Christian Prayer
by Martha Manoanoa Lum Ho

Pule kākou.
Let us pray.
E ke akua, ka mukua lani,
O God, Heavenly Father,
Ke hoʻomaikaʻi aku nei makou ia ʻoe.
We praise and thank you.
ʻOiai ua pau nā hana i keia ahiahi,
As our work this evening has been completed,
ʻO ʻoe ka mea nāna e kokua kiaʻi i na makua, na keiki
You will assist and watch over the parents and the children
I ko lakou alahele e hoʻi ana i ko lakou home.
On their way back to their homes.
ʻO ʻoe pu kekahi me lakou:
You will be with them:
ʻO ʻoe ma mua, ʻo ʻoe ma hope, ʻo ʻoe ma loko, ʻo ʻoe ma waho.
You will be in front, you will be in back, you will be inside, you will be outside.
Nau e kia'i kokua ia lakou a hiki i ko lakou home,
You will watch over and assist them until they reach their homes,

10 *A ʻo na mea pono ʻole, nau no ʻoki hoʻokaʻawale aku.*
And you will sever and separate from them all misfortune.
A ua aʻo mai ʻoe ia makou i ka pule ʻana: "E ko makou makua i loko o ka lani . . ."
And you taught us to pray: "Our Father, who art in heaven . . ."
ʻAmene.
Amen.

Although Lum Ho's Christian *pule* is comparatively short, it contains several of the same poetic devices through which the value placed upon wholeness and thoroughness in traditional Hawaiian *pule* (and noted in the *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale* above) is expressed. For example, she states not just once, but twice, in line 5 and again in line 9, that God will assist and watch over the parents and children who are about to leave the meeting. In line 8, she combines the use of two poetic devices in the delineation of where God will be found by pairing opposite locations listed within an identical syntactical structure: "You will be in front, you will be in back, you will be inside, you will be outside" (in other words, God will be everywhere providing protection).

Further expressing her Hawaiian worldview, Lum Ho inserts traditional prayer language in line 10: "And you will sever and separate from them all misfortune." Her inclusion of the term *ʻoki* (sever) reflects the traditional Hawaiian religious practice explained by Pukui, Haertig, and Lee:

> In the human-with-human, human-with-gods relationship of old Hawaii, nearly every destructive or negative psychological-emotional force had its more positive, hopeful offsetting force. . . . In this psychic balancing act, *ʻoki* played a star's role. Traditionally, *ʻoki* could remove a name *(inoa)* that harmed its bearer, or merely separate harmful influences from the name so it could be kept. *ʻOki* could release the living from the clinging spirit of the dead. It could remove curse or *kapu* (taboo), or prevent or lessen misfortune forecast in a dream or vision. In these important remedial functions, *ʻoki* was accomplished by prayer, often coupled with a statement that severence was now being done. (1972: 172-178)

Lum Ho strengthens her use of *ʻoki* by adding the term *hoʻokaʻawale* (separate) after it so that misfortune will not only be severed, but will also be isolated and set apart from everyone involved. Finally, and related to the use of this kind of emphatic traditional prayer language, the overall tone of Lum Ho's prayer, like that of the *Pule Hoʻolaʻa Hale,* is respectful yet forceful and fully confident that God will, indeed, provide what is being sought--protection over those leaving the meeting to return home.

In addition to retaining the use of several elements of traditional prayer language, some Hawaiian-speaking elders--Lum Ho among them--also retain in the vocal presentation of their *pule* either of two traditional chanting styles called *kepakepa* and *kawele.*[8] Despite showing a definite preference for one style over the other, most elders do not associate their manner of praying with pre-Christian chanting styles nor do they appear to know much about them. This is not surprising since, as mentioned above, most elders also do not associate the language of their Christian *pule* with pre-Christian Hawaiian sources. While growing up, Hawaiians like Lum Ho learned to pray by imitating their elders, but they did not also learn the terms for the associated vocal styles because chant contexts and use were breaking down and in a general state of decline at the time.

In former times, *kepakepa* was the most ubiquitous of the several different chanting styles, perhaps because it is speechlike and requires little formal vocal training. *Kepakepa* could be used when chanting nearly every kind of poetry--both formal and informal, pre-composed and spontaneous. For example, it was used when chanting *mele moʻokuʻauhau* (genealogical poems), *mele inoa* (name poems), *mele hula* (dance poems), and *mele paʻani* (game poems). Notably, in the context of this discussion, *kepakepa* was also used when chanting *mele pule* (Tatar 1982:111).

Initially, the use of *kepakepa* in Christian *pule* may seem quite perplexing, given the style's traditional use in prayers addressed to native Hawaiian deities--the pagan deities the Christian missionaries vehemently condemned at every opportunity. However, as the cadences of everyday speech were unsuitable in the presentation of the formal poetic language used to generate the *mana* desired in prayer, to newly converted Hawaiian Christians the familiar *kepakepa* undoubtedly appeared to be the vocal style of choice--precisely, perhaps, because of its association with traditional *pule.* Adrienne Kaeppler writes that, during the first years of their conversion to Christianity, Hawaiians did not immediately cast aside the old religion and in fact continued to worship some Hawaiian deities (1993:2). Thus, it appears likely that as Hawaiians began worshipping Jehovah among several other deities, the use of *kepakepa* in Christian *pule* provided the continuity of vocal presentation that seemed logical and appropriate.

Although several substyles of *kepakepa* exist, the most common in former times and the one that continues to be heard today in the praying of some Hawaiian elders is a rapid, rhythmic, spoken form in which phrases of descending contour and decreasing loudness are punctuated with quick and deliberate pauses for breath. In the 1985 tape recording of her Christian *pule,* Lum Ho prays using the *kepakepa* style.

Kawele is another, less frequently heard chant style also used by some elderly Hawaiians while praying. Although rhythmic like *kepakepa, kāwele* is

slower and features longer, sustained phrases that follow a level rather than a descending contour. As a result, *kawele* sounds more chantlike than does *kepakepa* and lies on a vocal continuum between speech and chant.

Despite strong Euro-American influences in Hawai‘i since the early nineteenth century, the development and the retention of the spontaneously composed Christian *pule* indicate that, even while embracing Christianity, Hawaiians have, in this acculturated prayer form, clung to several elements of traditional language and culture. Far from slavishly adhering to Western models, Hawaiians have creatively adapted Christian *pule* to suit Hawaiian values and sensibilities, infusing its language and vocal style with traditional elements that give the form relevance, meaning, and power.

NOTES

1. The pre-composed Christian *pule* most widely known today is probably *Ka Pule a ka Haku* (The Lords Prayer).

2. The growing vitality of Hawaiian language and culture since the late 1960s is reflected today in the increased public use of Christian *pule* in various contexts.

3. With exceptions, the expression of this worldview is generally lacking in the language used in Christian *pule* by young people who are not native speakers of Hawaiian.

4. Unlike most Hawaiians elsewhere, Ni‘ihau residents continue to speak Hawaiian as their first language, partly because of the long-standing efforts of the islands owners, the Robinson family, to support the residents’ comparatively traditional lifestyle and partly because of the independence of the people themselves, described in the traditional saying, *“Ni‘ihau i ke kiku”* (literally, Ni‘ihau leans back firmly; that is, Ni‘ihau people are independent [Pukui 1983:252]).

5. For detailed discussions of Hawai‘i Creole English, see Bickerton and Odo 1976 and Carr 1972.

6. This is my current estimate based on Emily Hawkins’s 1979 estimate of 2,000 native speakers and considering that most were elderly at the time of her estimate.

7. Lum Ho was born in Wala‘ōhi‘a, Puna, Hawai‘i, in 1904 and died in Hilo, Hawai‘i, in 1987.

8. For a detailed discussion of *kepakepa* and *kāwele,* see Tatar 1982.

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EDITOR'S FORUM

EMPLOYMENT STATUS, ETHNICITY, AND ALCOHOL USE IN GUAM

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This research note reports the results of tests designed to assess the relative effects of employment status versus ethnicity on alcohol use in Guam's Asian-Pacific community. Guam's cultural diversity has grown sharply since 1986; one result of recent increases in migrants to Guam is the stereotypical view that all Micronesians abuse alcohol. In this brief study I argue that employment status is more important than ethnicity for understanding alcohol use in Guam. Drawing from an extensive literature describing the effects of social integration on health risk behaviors, I hypothesize that unemployed persons will consume significantly more alcohol than employed persons, and that being unemployed will account for ethnic differences in alcohol use. The results of regression analyses of Behavioral Risk Factor Survey data support these hypotheses. Whereas being Micronesian, male, and having a low income predict greater alcohol use, unemployment accounts for the significantly greater use of alcohol reported by Micronesian respondents. The implications of these findings for theory and future research are also discussed.

THIS RESEARCH NOTE explores the relative effects of employment status versus ethnicity as factors affecting alcohol use in Guam. Alcohol use in Guam and Micronesia is pervasive (Marshall 1993, 1991; Pinhey, Workman, and Borja 1992), associated with mental health problems (Hezel and Wylie 1992), various forms of physical violence (Hoff 1992; Marshall 1979; Nero

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1990), suicide (Rubinstein 1992), and with injuries resulting from automobile accidents. Alcohol use is also a leading risk factor for a number of physical health problems, including cirrhosis of the liver, which is among the leading causes of death in Guam (Vital Statistics 1991). Alcohol use is primarily a male activity (Catalano et al. 1993; Marshall 1987, 1979; Nero 1990). In U.S. mainland populations, higher incomes are associated with the *use* of beverage alcohol, whereas lower incomes correlate strongly with *severe* alcohol problems (see Greenburg and Grunberg 1995 for a review). The literature also supports the argument that social ties--employment, marriage, parenthood--reduce significantly the use of alcohol and other pharmacological substances (see Pinhey, Workman, and Borja 1992; Umberson 1987 for reviews). The loss of these ties--job loss, divorce, children leaving home--may increase alcohol and substance abuse (see Catalano et al. 1993; Horwitz and Davies 1994 for reviews).

In the present analysis I assess the effects of employment status and ethnicity on alcohol use for Guam's Asian-Pacific population. The 1986 implementation of a Compact of Free Association between the United States and the newly formed Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands led to a "flood" of Micronesian migrants to Guam (Rubinstein and Levin 1992). This influx of immigrants has been met with a degree of negative ethnic stereotyping. One such stereotypical view is that all Micronesians abuse alcohol. I argue that alcohol abuse in Guam is more strongly related to unemployment than to Micronesian ethnicity.

Theory

A firmly established sociological literature describes the effects of social ties on health behaviors, reaching back to Emile Durkheim's seminal study of social integration and suicide ([1897] 1951). Drawing on this literature, I hypothesize that social ties resulting from employment reduce alcohol use, whereas the loss of these social ties through unemployment results in greater alcohol consumption (Catalano et al. 1993; Catalano 1991; Crawford et al. 1987; Layne and Lowe 1979). This hypothesis reflects Durkheim's classic view of social integration wherein the existence of relationships is seen as affecting an individual's social environment. As Umberson argues (1987: 309), social ties involve elements of obligation and constraint and provide a sense of meaning and purpose for individuals' lives (Gove 1973). In this way employment relationships affect mental well-being and health behaviors by shaping a person's social environment and lifestyle (House, Landis, and Umberson 1988).

A basic premise of this explanation is that the social integrative effects of

employment diminish an individuals inclination to engage in behaviors that may adversely affect his or her health, and that the sense of meaning and the obligations that arise from employment inhibit behaviors that risk health and promote those that are positive.[1] From this perspective, excessive drinking on the job may be defined as deviant by employers and fellow employees, and is thus sanctioned (Parsons 1951). Sanctions may result either in an end to excessive drinking on the job or to unemployment. The alternate hypothesis is that drinking on the job is an accepted or normal behavior that does not result in sanctions (Ames 1996), thus suggesting that levels of alcohol consumption are not related to employment status. I test this hypothesis using a probability sample of Guam's Asian-Pacific population and anticipate that unemployment is related significantly to greater alcohol use, whereas employment is related to significantly lower levels of consumption. Drawing from previous research (Catalano et al. 1993; Marshall 1987; Nero 1990; Umberson 1987), I also predict that men will report using significantly more alcohol than will women, and that greater alcohol abuse is related to lower income levels. Based on popular descriptions (Kluge 1991), previous research (Marshall 1993, 1991, 1987, 1979; Nero 1990), and local stereotypes, I anticipate that Micronesian respondents will report consuming more alcohol than respondents from other ethnic groups, and that their greater alcohol use will diminish to insignificance when the effect of unemployment is simultaneously considered. A review of the literature on substance use in Guam and Micronesia reveals no studies directly examining the relative influence of employment status and ethnicity for alcohol use.[2]

Methods

The data for this study come from a Behavioral Risk Factor Survey (BRFS) conducted in Guam between the middle of March and the end of May 1991. The BRFS used a two-stage proportional cluster design to generate a random sample of Guam households. The sampling frame consisted of a list of the 35,277 households on the island. The relative proportion of households for each of Guam's nineteen villages to the total pool of households was calculated from the sampling frame, and a starting point within housing clusters was chosen at random. Interviews were completed with either the head of household or spouse, or with the eldest dependent (18 years of age or older). If all three were present, one was chosen at random for inclusion in the study. These methods yielded a total of 398 completed interviews, for a response rate of 80.4 percent.

The dependent variable for this study is alcohol use. This variable was measured using the following item: "A drink is 1 bottle of beer, 1 glass of

wine, 1 can or bottle of wine cooler, 1 cocktail, or 1 shot of liquor. On the days when you drank (this month) about how many drinks did you drink on average?" A total of 132 respondents (33.2 percent) reported using alcohol. The mean for alcohol use is 4.3 drinks per episode with a standard deviation of 4.4 drinks.

To evaluate the independent effects of employment status on alcohol use, I constructed three binary variables: (1) currently working (working = 1, others = 0); (2) currently unemployed (unemployed = 1, others = 0); and (3) not in the labor force (not in the labor force = 1, others = 0). Using ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis, the models also assess the effects of self-reported ethnicity on alcohol use. Final binary ethnic categories include Chamorro, Filipino, Asian (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), Micronesian (Chuukese, Yapese, Kosraean, Pohnpeian, and Palauan), and Caucasian respondents (the excluded comparison category in the OLS regression models that follow).[3] The OLS regression models control for age (actual years), sex (males = 1, females = 0), marital status (married = 1, others = 0), parenthood (parent = 1, others = 0), total family income (a seven-point ordinal scale ranging from less than US$10,000 to $50,000 and greater), and education (an ordinal eight-point scale ranging from eight grade or less to postgraduate degree). Although not shown here, I calculated zero-order correlations among all the independent variables described above. None correlated above .37; I therefore concluded that multicollinearity is unlikely to be problematic in the multivariate models that follow.

I estimate the effects of employment status on alcohol consumption using three equations. The first equation (1) contains the binary measure for being employed, the second equation (2) for being unemployed, and the third equation (3) for those respondents who are not in the labor force (that is, homemaker, retired, in school). As discussed above, I anticipate that respondents who are employed will consume significantly less alcohol, and that unemployed respondents and males with lower incomes will report using significantly more alcohol. I also anticipate that being unemployed is relatively more important than is being Micronesian for predicting alcohol use in Guam.

Results

Descriptive results indicate that Micronesian respondents have higher mean drinking scores (8.7) per drinking occasion than Chamorro (4.9), Caucasian (3.5), Filipino (2.8), and Asian (2.3) respondents. As may be seen in Table 1, however, employed respondents report consuming significantly less alcohol than others, while greater alcohol use is related significantly with being Micro-

TABLE 1. Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients for Alcohol Use with Employment Status and Control Variables (*n* = 132)

	(1) Employed		(2) Unemployed		(3) Not in Labor Force	
Variable	*B*	*SE*	*B*	*SE*	*B*	*SE*
Chamorro	0.813	1.275	0.570	1.242	0.897	1.292
Filipino	-1.017	1.385	-1.119	1.345	-1.112	1.405
Asian	-0.959	1.602	-1.089	1.555	-1.080	1.625
Micronesian	4.350**	2.092	3.050	2.046	4.066*	2.149
Age	-0.028	0.032	-0.009	0.030	-0.018	0.033
Male	3.408****	0.784	3.007****	0.753	3.200****	0.804
Married	0.214	0.902	0.109	0.876	0.144	0.915
Parent	1.070	0.749	1.022	0.721	0.879	0.757
Income	-0.322	0.209	-0.456**	0.199	-0.395*	0.215
Education	0.135	0.190	0.103	0.180	0.058	0.192
Works	-1.673*	0.905				
Unemployed			5.343***	1.628		
Not in labor force					0.142	1.021
Constant	4.039		3.100		3.289	
R^2	.256		.298		.235	
Adjusted R^2	.188		.234		.165	

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

nesian and being male (equations 1 and 3). Unemployed respondents report using significantly more alcohol, are significantly more likely to be male, and report lower income levels (equation 2). As predicted, being unemployed accounts for the statistically significantly greater alcohol use reported by Micronesian respondents (equation 2). Nonparticipation in the labor force is not related to greater alcohol use (equation 3).[4]

I considered next the possibility that greater alcohol use was related to higher levels of frustration, unhappiness, or distress resulting from unemployment.[5] In separate analyses (not shown here), I estimated the effects of unemployment on psychological distress, personal happiness, and frustration (see Turner 1995 for a review). Unemployment was not related significantly to these variables. Further explorations revealed that these variables were not related significantly to reports of greater alcohol use either.

Discussion and Conclusions

The recession of the early 1990s has renewed scholarly interest in the behavioral effects of job loss (e.g., Catalano et al. 1993; Catalano 1991). Among

these effects are the suspected connection between unemployment and alcohol use. Drawing from an extensive literature describing the effects of social integration on health behaviors, the present study explored the relationship between employment status, ethnicity, and alcohol use in Guam. I hypothesized that employed persons would consume significantly less alcohol, and that unemployed persons and males with lower incomes would consume significantly more alcohol. I also predicted that being unemployed is more important than being Micronesian for understanding alcohol use in Guam. The results of my tests support these predictions and the conjecture that relationships and obligations resulting from the social integration of employment reduce alcohol use, whereas the loss of social ties because of unemployment is associated significantly with greater alcohol use. Another way of gaining insight into the importance of employment status for understanding alcohol use is to reconsider the meaning of the unstandardized regression coefficients presented in Table 1. Employment reduces alcohol use by almost two drinks per episode *(B* = -1.673), while unemployment increases alcohol use by roughly five drinks per episode *(B* = 5.343). Since acute drinking is defined as being five or more drinks per drinking occasion, unemployment can be seen as contributing significantly to alcohol abuse.. Thus, another particularly important finding is that unemployment accounts for the significantly greater alcohol use reported by Micronesian respondents, indicating that unemployment rather than being Micronesian may be of greater importance for predicting increases in alcohol consumption for Guam's multiethnic population.

What are the implications of these findings for theory and future research? First, the results of the present study clearly indicate that unemployment contributes significantly to greater risk for alcohol abuse, particularly among males with lower incomes. Second, since alcohol abuse is associated with spousal abuse (Hoff 1992; Nero 1990), it is possible that unemployment due to a contracting economy results in greater alcohol consumption, resulting in increased levels of domestic violence. The linkages between economic conditions, substance abuse, and domestic violence have yet to be fully explored for Guam or Micronesia. Future researchers may wish to examine these relationships.[6] Third, because unemployment accounts for Micronesians' significantly greater use of alcohol, it is possible that job training, placement programs, and a robust economy may reduce levels of alcohol abuse in Guam.

Finally, the potential limitations of this brief study deserve mention as they relate to interpretations of the results. Specifically, a principal weakness of cross-sectional analyses comparing alcohol use among the unemployed with others is the problem of "reverse causation"--the possibility that prob-

lem drinking causes unemployment rather than vice versa (see Catalano et al. 1993:215). Time-series or panel studies provide a solution to this methodological difficulty. As well, the sample for the present study is relatively small and a larger sample may have produced stronger or different patterns. These potential limitations aside, the results of the analysis reveal strong and significant associations between employment status and alcohol use that are consistent with predictions derived from the social integration hypothesis, thus contributing to our knowledge of alcohol use in Guam. Systematic time-series studies linking economic conditions with substance abuse and violent behavior are clearly indicated, as are educational and intervention programs for the unemployed.

NOTES

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1. As one anonymous referee was quick to point out, examples of obligations resulting from the social integrative effects of employment that would reduce drinking behavior among working Micronesians include having to get up early to begin work and being afraid of being dismissed for absenteeism or for poor performance resulting from a bad hangover.

2. Details concerning Guam's social context and history are easily accessible elsewhere (Pinhey and Ellison 1997; Rogers 1995), and are not discussed in this research note to conserve space.

3. The relatively small size of the BRFS sample necessitates collapsing Asian and Micronesian respondents into the two larger "Asian" and "Micronesian" ethnic categories. Although it is likely that alcohol use varies among the ethnic groups that comprise these categories (see Zane and Kim 1994), the stereotype that *all* Micronesians abuse alcohol is actually better tested using this classification. Nevertheless, following Rubinstein and Levin (1992:350), I note that to speak of migrants from the Federated States of Micronesia as a single ethnic category is misleading. Micronesian migrants to Guam speak as many as fifteen different languages; each separate ethnic group shares ties to a home island and tends to maintain cultural distinctiveness through the maintenance of language and endogamy, all of which are probably reinforced by the continuing influx of new migrants from home communities.

4. I also recalculated the OLS regressions using various measures of employment status as the excluded comparison category while including two employment categories in the OLS regression equations. The results of these reanalyses indicate that for every combination of employment status, being unemployed is associated significantly with greater alcohol consumption, and that the significantly greater alcohol use associated with being Micronesian is reduced to insignificance when unemployment is considered simultaneously with the other control variables.

5. In Palau, drinking is an accepted outlet for frustration (Nero 1990:86), which may result from job loss and unemployment. Whereas economic change in Palau may result in stress, frustration, and greater alcohol consumption (ibid.:80), the link between unemployment and these variables for Guam's population is unclear.

6. For time-series association studies between macroeconomic indicators and variables related to alcohol use see Brenner 1975, 1977; Catalano, Dooley, and Jackson 1983; and Thomas and Kramer 1978. Brenner's early study found that increases in the national unemployment rate were associated with subsequent increases in sales of alcohol, admissions to mental health facilities for alcohol disorders, deaths resulting from cirrhosis of the liver, and arrests for alcohol-related offenses.

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PSYCHOSOCIAL FACTORS DIFFERENTIATING MARIJUANA USERS FROM NONUSERS IN GUAM

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Research results suggest that younger, single employed males in Guam are at greater risk than others for marijuana use, and that self-reported marijuana users are significantly more likely than nonusers to indicate higher levels of psychological distress and physical complaints. Prevalence estimates for marijuana use in Guam indicate that between 8 and 14 percent of the adult population has tried marijuana. An unanticipated finding is that parents with young school children are significantly more likely than others to report ever having used marijuana. The implications of these results for future research are also discussed.

THIS RESEARCH NOTE explores the relationship between emotional well-being and self-reported marijuana use in Guam's extensive Asian-Pacific community. As Marshall, Sexton, and Insko (1994) note, previous studies focusing on pharmacologically active substances in Oceania have examined either the use of betel nut or kava, the two main precontact substances of the region (Brunton 1989; Burton-Bradley 1978; Lebot, Merlin, and Lindstrom 1992; Lindstrom 1987; Pinhey, Workman, and Borja 1992), or the use of alcohol and tobacco, the two major introduced substances in the region (Black 1984; Brott 1981; Carucci 1987; Haddon 1947; Marshall 1982, 1979; Pinhey, Workman, and Borja 1992). However, the literature reveals relatively few studies that focus on the use of illicit substances in Oceania or Micronesia, and the few studies that are available focus on marijuana use in Chuuk (Larson 1987; Marshall, Sexton, and Insko 1994; Marshall 1991, 1990)

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and in Papua New Guinea (Sterly 1979). Although concern is growing over the potential mental health effects of illegal drug use for various communities in the region (e.g., Hezel and Wylie 1992:343; Marshall, Sexton, and Insko 1994:24), there are virtually no current studies available that examine directly the potential mental health consequences of illicit substance abuse in the Western Pacific.[1] The present study addresses this issue by exploring the potential psychosocial factors that may differentiate self-reported marijuana users from nonusers in Guam. The specific goals of this brief analysis are (1) to identify the social groups in Guam that are at risk for marijuana use, (2) to determine the various psychosocial characteristics that may differentiate marijuana users from nonusers in Guam, and (3) to estimate the prevalence of marijuana use in Guam.

Background

Marijuana is the world's most widely used illegal substance, and about one in four Americans currently report having tried marijuana (National Institute on Drug Abuse 1990; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988). Marijuana use is most frequent among those between 18 and 25 years of age, and is more popular among males than females (Robbins 1989; National Institute on Drug Abuse 1990; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988). Some researchers argue that marijuana was introduced to the Western Pacific by Peace Corps volunteers (see Lindstrom 1987), while others note that over the past twenty-five years substance abuse in the region has grown as transportation networks improved, tourism increased, and more islanders traveled to other countries, thus gaining exposure to different lifestyles and substances (e.g., Marshall, Sexton, and Insko 1994:23). Following a decade-long decline (Bachman et al. 1988), rates of teenage marijuana use in the mainland United States have risen sharply in the past five years. More than 41 percent of last year's high-school seniors reported having tried marijuana or hashish, the highest rate since 1989 (Leland 1996). At this time, prevalence rates for marijuana use in Guam are not known.

It is generally agreed that the effects of marijuana use are not particularly dramatic: an increase in heart rate, a reddening of the eyes, a dryness in the mouth, and a disruption of short-term memory. Although the health hazards of marijuana use continue to be the subject of an emotional debate, marijuana is clearly less dangerous than alcohol, tobacco, cocaine, and most other widely used recreational drugs (Ray 1983). However, recent studies suggest that marijuana use among adolescents may contribute to subsequent psychological impairments (Hansell and White 1991), especially among those individuals characterized as being "highly introspective" (see Zablocki et al. 1991).

Research describing marijuana use in Guam's extensive Asian-Pacific community is nonexistent. However, anecdotal accounts and direct observation suggest that marijuana use in Guam is common, a conjecture that gains considerable support from the frequent newspaper accounts of attempts to smuggle marijuana onto the island from Palau and Chuuk, and from discussions with local marijuana users wherein specific kinds of marijuana (e.g., "Rota bud") are frequently mentioned. Since the present analysis is the first of its kind for Guam, it is impossible to provide a systematic assessment of the attitudes or meanings that may be associated with the use of marijuana on the island. Indeed, a secondary goal of the present study is to stimulate future research on community perspectives of substance abuse.

Methods

The primary data for this study are from the Behavioral Risk Factor Survey (BRFS) conducted in Guam between the middle of March and the end of May 1991. The BRFS used a two-stage proportional cluster design to generate a random sample of households. The sampling frame consisted of a list of the 35,277 households on the island. The relative proportion of households for each of Guam's nineteen villages to the total pool of households was calculated from the sampling frame, and a starting point within housing clusters was chosen at random. After pre-tests of questionnaire items were completed to insure agreement on the meaning of interview questions, personal interviews were conducted with either the head of household or spouse, or with the eldest dependent (18 years of age or older). If all three were present, one was chosen at random for inclusion in the study. These methods yielded a total of 398 completed interviews, for a response rate of 80.4 percent. Although the sample is relatively small, it is representative of Guam's noninstitutionalized, civilian adult residents.

Four measures are used to assess the psychosocial health characteristics of respondents. ***Psychological distress*** is a six-item short version of Langner's twenty-two-item Mental Illness Index (1962), the validity of which has been established in a number of previous studies (see Johnson and Meile 1981 for a review). High scores for this measure indicate greater psychological distress. Respondents were asked, how frequently they (1) feel worthless? (2) feel hopeless? (3) feel lonely when you are with others? (4) feel blocked? (5) have trouble remembering things? (6) feel restless? Response codes range from 0 ***(not at all)*** to 4 ***(extremely).*** Possible scores range from 0 to 24. 'The sample mean for this measure is 2.8 with a standard deviation of 3.4. An exploratory maximum likelihood factor analysis produced a single factor with

loadings of .60 or greater. The psychological distress scale shows high reliability ***(alpha =*** .819).

Personal happiness is a single item asking respondents how often they felt happy. Response codes for this item range from 0 ***(never)*** to 5 *(always).* The sample mean for personal happiness is 3.69 with a standard deviation of 1.16. Personal happiness is a frequently used measure of emotional well-being (e.g., Ellison 1991).

Somatization is an eight-item summated scale that approximates similar measures reported elsewhere (see, e.g., Conger et al. 1993). Respondents were asked how frequently they (1) had problems sleeping, (2) felt chest pains, (3) felt their mind went blank, (4) had a poor appetite, (5) felt nauseous, (6) had trouble breathing, (7) felt numbness, (8) felt weak. Response codes range from 0 ***(not at all)*** to 4 ***(extremely).*** Possible scores range from 0 to 32. An exploratory maximum likelihood factor analysis produced a single factor with loadings of .50 or greater. The somatization scale shows high reliability ***(alpha =*** ,807). The sample mean for the somatization scale is 3.3 with a standard deviation of 3.4.

Life satisfaction is a single item asking respondents to rate their overall life satisfaction with response codes ranging from 1 ***(very dissatisfied)*** to 5 ***(very satisfied).*** The sample mean for life satisfaction is 3.28 with a standard deviation of 0.76. Life satisfaction is a frequently used measure of emotional well-being (see, e.g., Ellison 1991).

Marijuana users and nonusers are distinguished with a question asking respondents to indicate whether they had ever used marijuana. Slightly more than 11 percent of the sample said they had. This item approximates measures used in similar studies (e.g., Marshall, Sexton, and Insko 1994; Zablocki et al. 1991); and, within reasonable limits, self-reports of marijuana use have come to be accepted as reliable and valid indicators of substance use (e.g., Radosevich et al. 1980). Nevertheless, self-reports of marijuana use are subject to the limitations inherent in all retrospective accounts.

Ethnicity is self-reported. Binary ethnic categories include Chamorro, Filipino, Asian (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), Micronesian (Chuukese, Yapese, Kosraean, Pohnpeian, and Palauan), and Caucasian respondents. Additional binary variables used to assess the sociodemographic characteristics of marijuana users versus nonusers include education (those not completing high school = 1, all others = 0), total family income (those earning less than US$15,000 per year = 1, all others = 0), employment status (works full-time or part-time = 1, others = 0), marital status (married = 1, all others 0), parenthood (has young child in school = 1, others = 0), and gender females = 1, males = 0).

Following the strategy described by Zhang, Markides, and Lee (1991),

analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to compute means for the psychosocial measures and respondents' age. Computation of binary variables (e.g., ethnicity) is performed with the same procedure, which is similar to using dummy variables in ordinary least squares regression analysis (Feldstein 1966). ***F*** tests are used to assess statistical significance.

In addition to the survey methodology described above, direct observation and informal interviews were also employed to establish a context within which to better interpret the results of the BRFS. This methodology included participation in social events where the use of marijuana was common and accepted. The use of multiple methods is often suggested when topics have previously gone unstudied, when research is exploratory, and when researchers wish to validate findings (see Denzin and Lincoln 1994).

Results

The first goal of this analysis is to identify the social characteristics of persons in Guam who are at greater risk for marijuana use than others. As shown in Table 1, individuals who report ever having used marijuana are sig-

TABLE 1. **Arithmetic Means *(x)* for Sociodemographic Characteristics of Self-Reported Marijuana Users versus Nonusers in Guam**

	Used Marijuana *(N* = 44)		Has Not Used Marijuana *(N*= 354)	
	x or %	*SD*	*x* or %	*SD*
Chamorro (%)	61.4	0.49	52.3	0.50
Filipino (%)	11.4**	0.32	31.1	0.46
Asian (%)	5.0	0.21	6.2	0.24
Micronesian (%)	11.4	0.32	6.0	0.23
White (%)	11.4	0.32	5.0	0.21
Mean age	28.9***	8.60	42.8	14.50
Female (%)	25.0***	0.44	62.1	0.48
Married (%)	41.9***	0.49	69.4	0.46
Parent (%)	45.5	0.50	38.8	0.49
$15,000 income or less (%)	26.3	0.44	39.3	0.47
Did not graduate high school (%)	20.4	0.40	24.0	0.42
Employed (%)	77.3*	0.42	59.4	0.49

Note: Readers are reminded that the arithmetic mean for binary variables may also be interpreted as the percentage of cases in non-zero categories.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ *(F* test)

TABLE 2. Arithmetic Means *(x)* for Psychosocial Health Characteristics of Self-Reported Marijuana Users versus Nonusers in Guam

	Used Marijuana		Not Used Marijuana	
	x	*SD*	*x*	*SD*
Mean happiness	3.64	1.05	3.70	1.17
Mean distress	4.11**	3.49	2.63	3.32
Mean somatization	5.09*	4.31	3.52	3.86
Mean life satisfaction	3.16	0.71	3.30	0.76

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$ *(F* test)

nificantly less likely to be Filipino, a finding that essentially mirrors the results of studies describing U.S. mainland Asian-Pacific populations (e.g., Zane and Kim 1994). Also in keeping with the results of earlier studies (Umberson 1987) is the finding that marijuana users are less likely to report that they are married. Marijuana users also appear to be younger persons, males, and significantly more likely to report being employed. Again, these findings are in keeping with the results of earlier studies conducted on U.S. mainland populations (e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988) and are supported by direct observation.

Table 2 contains the results of analyses (ANOVA) examining the psychosocial characteristics of marijuana users and nonusers. As may be seen, respondents who report ever having used marijuana are significantly more likely than others to report higher levels of both psychological distress and somatization. The possibility that these bivariate associations might not retain their statistical significance when control variables were simultaneously present in the equation was also considered. In separate analyses (not shown here), logistic regression was used to reassess the relationship of the four psychosocial measures to self-reported marijuana use. Controlling for ethnicity, age, gender, marital status, parenthood, income, education, and employment status, psychological distress and somatization retained their significant associations with self-reported marijuana use. In keeping with the results presented in Table 1, the logistic regressions confirmed that younger males were significantly more likely than others to report ever having used marijuana. The logistic regression analysis also confirmed that Filipino respondents were significantly less likely than members of other ethnic groups to report marijuana use. An unanticipated finding was that respondents who reported having young children in school were significantly more likely than others to say they had used marijuana.

Finally, 11.1 percent of BRFS respondents reported ever having used marijuana. A 95 percent confidence interval (CI) was calculated to estimate Guam's rate for marijuana use (95% CI = 11.1 ± 3.1). From these figures, one can roughly estimate that somewhere between 8 and 14 percent of Guam's adult population has used marijuana.

Discussion and Conclusion

This research note makes a modest contribution to an emerging literature that describes the social distribution of mental health concerns and substance use in Guam (see Pinhey 1996; Pinhey and Ellison 1997; Pinhey, Rubinstein, and Colfax 1997). The results of analyses of BRFS data and direct observation each reveal that younger, single males are at greater risk than others for marijuana use, whereas women and Filipino respondents appear less likely than others to use the substance. In keeping with the results of earlier analyses (Umberson 1987), marriage appears to constrain marijuana use in Guam.

Marijuana users appear also to suffer greater psychological distress than nonusers and to report significantly more physical complaints. Whether or not marijuana is used by respondents to cope with psychological distress and physical symptoms cannot be discerned from the cross-sectional data analyzed in the present study. The results of more-extensive longitudinal analyses, however, indicate that marijuana use contributes to subsequent psychological impairment and physical symptoms among younger persons (see Hansell and White 1991), thus suggesting that the findings reported here may reflect the negative outcomes of previous marijuana use. Drug education programs in local high schools that are designed to reduce substance abuse may therefore also contribute to a reduction in future levels of psychological distress.

The prevalence of marijuana use in Guam is not known. However, the present study suggests that marijuana use in Guam may be significantly less than rates reported for U.S. mainland populations. Whereas approximately 25 percent of mainland U.S. residents report having used marijuana, only 11.1 percent of the BRFS respondents did so. Because the BRFS focused on adults and excluded persons under 18 years of age, the actual rate of marijuana use in Guam is probably much higher than indicated here. The validity of the present estimate is further confounded by findings showing that, whereas younger people are more likely than others to report using marijuana, the use of marijuana drops off sharply when persons reach age 35 (e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988). Separate analyses (not shown here) substantiate this general pattern for Guam. In sum, almost 29 percent of

BRFS respondents between the ages of 18 and 25 report having used marijuana, dropping to 13 percent of those aged 26 to 35 and only 5 percent of those over 35 years old. Future researchers in Guam may wish to design studies addressing substance abuse among adults and adolescents to gain more precise prevalence estimates.

The finding from the logistic regression analysis showing that parents of school-aged children were more likely than others to use marijuana is difficult to explain, and is in direct contrast with results from similar studies conducted in the U.S. mainland. For example, Umberson found that parents with young children were significantly less likely than others to report using marijuana, to have drinking problems, or to drive after drinking (1987). One possible explanation may be that the parenthood measure used in the present study (having a young child in school) actually indicates the younger age of respondents who report being parents. The significant association between having a young child in school and self-reports of marijuana use found in the present analysis deserves additional study.

The potential limitations of the present analysis should be mentioned. First, the BRFS sample is relatively small. Larger samples may produce results different from those presented here. Second, the BRFS measure for marijuana use is for those who have *ever* used the substance. Measures assessing the frequency of marijuana use, the length of time that individuals have regularly used marijuana, current use of marijuana, and other similar measures may provide the means for more accurate and extensive analyses. Finally, the BRFS is cross-sectional, and thus does not allow for analyses addressing the question of which came first, marijuana use or psychological distress. The answer to this question for Guam awaits the generation of longitudinal data. These potential limitations aside, the present analysis extends our understanding of the psychosocial health profile of marijuana users in Guam, and contributes to our knowledge of a major health concern for Guam's rapidly growing and little-studied population. Future researchers are strongly urged to more thoroughly examine the relationship of substance abuse to mental health in Guam and Micronesia (e.g., Hezel and Wylie 1992), and to participate in the development of community-based substance-abuse prevention programs.

NOTE

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1. Other researchers note that concern with marijuana use is particularly evident in Guam, where "ice" and heroin are also problematic (Marshall, Sexton, and Insko 1994: 24). Moreover, drug-related issues in Guam are not restricted to mental health problems alone: among other concerns are the various criminal activities associated with drug smuggling and with other crimes committed by drug users themselves. These authors also discuss the acknowledgement of drug-related problems in Micronesia by the World Health Organization's Regional Office for the Western Pacific. The office has funded several short-term consultancies and convened two conferences focusing on drug-related problems in the region, one held in Palau (June 1989) and the other in Pohnpei (August 1993). The direct involvement of the Federated States of Micronesia government in the Pohnpei conference is described by Marshall and colleagues as a "significant marker of growing concern" in the region over substance abuse (ibid.).

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BOOK REVIEW FORUM

Nicholas Thomas, ***Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government.*** Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xi, 238, illust., bib., index. US$17.95 paperback.

Review: **PATRICIA GRIMSHAW**
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Women, Gender, Sexuality, and Colonialism's Culture

IN *COLONIALISM'S CULTURE,* Nicholas Thomas has made an outstanding contribution to the increasingly significant and complex area of colonial and postcolonial studies. His entry into key debates is innovative and nuanced, drawing upon an extremely impressive range of research and reading. The book places this already widely respected historian firmly in the front ranks of scholars of colonialism and its aftermath, and incidentally thereby promotes the theater of Thomas's central concerns, the Pacific, onto the broader stage of Western discussion and analysis. ***Colonialism's Culture*** has immediately found an interested readership internationally, and deservedly so. Thomas writes with admirable clarity, economy, and accessibility. Nicholas Thomas should be congratulated for this very considerable achievement.

One reason for my sense of the importance of this book is that it opens pathways for feminist scholarship to flourish. Thomas did not himself pursue issues of women, gender, and sexuality to any depth. Readers could well argue, given the relative brevity of the book--fewer than two hundred pages --and the breadth of its concerns, that if what Thomas accomplished was considerable, one could scarcely ask for more. Nevertheless, the issues raised

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by feminist scholars, whether at the theoretical level or through the implications of specific focused studies, have decided implications for the transformation of the debates. This is an appropriate time, given the considerable body of feminist scholarship that now exists, to address the state of play, and how Thomas's work assists its impact.

Thomas shows here an undoubted appreciation of the significance of the current literature on gender and colonialism. But what is more, his constuctive attempt to turn around the current direction of colonial discourse theory will in the future allow feminist revisions to take their place more centrally in the area. Thomas's is by no means a study that politely gestures in the direction of feminist insights only to proceed unheeded on its way. On the contrary, his allusions to feminist scholarship recognize the nature of their challenge and are integral to his narrative. Thomas's revisionist position will prove a breakthrough for scholars who wish to bring women and gender into the mainstream. His central thesis is thus an enabling one for new feminist scholarship, both via his examination of colonial discourse theory and his pursuit of alternative models of historical analysis.

Thomas initially mounts a sharp critique of the work of such major scholars in the field of colonial discourse theory as Johannes Fabian, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, and Abdul JanMohamed for contributing to a totalizing and homogenizing depiction of imperialism and colonialism. These scholars, Thomas claims, have taken the key ideas of Edward Saïd's seminal work, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978), which should be read as a study of a particular time and place, and extended "orientalism" to serve as a conceptual framework applicable to enormously different sites of colonialism. While these practitioners have repeatedly called for recognition of plurality, disjuncture, and difference, they have in effect produced a globalizing metanarrative. In the process, what is more, they have ignored indigenous peoples' own resistances to and evasions of colonial hegemony: the voice of the "colonized" has been all but silenced. Failing to ground their observations in the specificities of historical situations, with all their particular contestations and ambiguities, Thomas continues, colonial theorists have colluded in the creation of a story that disguises much that it purports to explain. A recent critic of postmodernism has suggested that "hermeneutics without history can scarcely escape either banality or reductionism."[1] It is a notion with which Thomas, clearly, would have some sympathy.

Thomas's assertion that colonialism was fractured, that its course took different directions according to time and place, that neither nations nor national actors can be collapsed into simplistic categories of behavior, and that the "colonized," while universally confronted with massive challenges, themselves responded in diverse ways to colonial penetration, might not seem

startling news to many historians. Yet it is not only within theoretical debate that these ideas are not as widely anticipated as one might expect. I am reminded of the response of one fine American historian, in a similar *Pacific Studies* book review forum in 1992, to my study of American missionary wives in Hawai‘i in the nineteenth century. *Paths of Duty* had described a group of Protestant women whose worldview was so bounded by the cultural expectations of the early American national period that years of exile, and multiple novel experiences, dented their sense of confident superiority not one jot. Their rigidity was stunning, and its description the main point of the book." This critic sought, quite properly, an interactive history, but more surprisingly, expressed the desire to know more of the ways in which Native Hawaiian women had influenced the missionaries, including the Americans' metaphysical beliefs and religious practices.[3] She had recently read Ramon Gutierrez's marvelous study of the seventeenth-century Franciscan mission to Pueblos in New Mexico--a mission of Spanish, male, Roman Catholic priests proselytizing among a Native American people--and had been impressed by the Franciscans' adaptation of some indigenous practices.[4] By analogy, the critic assumed a similar, overlooked parallel in Hawai‘i. Nothing could have been further from the case: the Spanish actors' intentions and cosmology in a far earlier period contrasted radically with the Hawaiian situation. Although I certainly wished subsequently that I had included more material, speculative though it would have been, on Native Hawaiians, it would have been a very different story from Gutierrez's. Nicholas Thomas demolishes such expectations of sameness in colonial histories, stressing fractures even within missions, as among other colonizing groups.

He does more. The great strength of Thomas's study is that he does not rest his case with his telling critique of colonial discourse theory, but illustrates a fresh approach through empirical analysis. Thomas is too theoretically engaged himself to suggest that endless empirical studies of colonial encounters, lacking the context of colonialism on a wider canvas or innocent of authorial self-reflexivity, can be an answer to the problems of metatheory. Drawing on Pierre Bordieu's delineation of the "project," with its emphasis on agency and practice, and influenced too by Michel Foucault's notion of the discursive nature of power, Thomas formulates a conceptual framework for examining colonialism that enables diversity to be acknowledged. Colonialism, he argues, must be historicized, and historicization implies more than just bringing the present to the past: on the contrary, the past must also be brought to the present, in a world where indigenous peoples are increasingly politicized. He proceeds to demonstrate the force of his ideas through a reconsideration of a number of colonial interchanges. Many of these focus on Thomas's main- research concerns in the Pacific, particularly Fiji. From

the margins of empire as the Pacific undoubtedly was, Thomas expresses the not unreasonable hope that the issues that emerge may throw into clearer relief tendencies that can be obscured on the denser canvases of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

What Thomas's revisionist ideas offer is the possibility for bringing women, gender, and sexuality to center stage to integrate feminist insights into colonial studies. If this is so, it is heartening to acknowledge the rapidly expanding nature of this area. There has been an exciting explosion of publication in the area of gender history, with a good deal of scholarship appearing even since he completed his manuscript. (In the introduction Thomas notes that he was able to refer to few studies published after 1991: at some stage any writer has to concentrate on the material at hand if he or she is ever to finish a project; books, also, have a lengthy lead time in the process of publication.) I was reminded of the burgeoning of this field when I noted Thomas J. Prasch's review article, "Orientalism's Other, Other Orientalisms: Women in the Scheme of Empire," in the Winter 1995 edition of the *Journal of Women's History.* Prasch addressed the ideas presented in no fewer than ten monographs and scholarly collections, most published around 1992 to 1994, the work of literary critics, anthropologists, cultural theorists, and historians. At least three subsequent, important interventions in the debate come to mind: Ann Laura Stoler's *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things,* Anne McLintock's *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context,* and Robert Young's *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race.*[5] Prasch notes in his article that the traditional literary representation of European imperialism has been overwhelmingly a masculine story, as have tales of indigenous resistance; "in such accounts European women were an absence, indigenous women a cipher; neither had status as autonomous subjects, neither had agency." Saïd's seminal work, he claims, while alluding "to the gendered vision of empire, did little to change the representation of women."[6] And, we might add, nor did most of the scholars whom Saïd inspired, apart from one important strand of Gayatri Spivak's work.

Much of the recent writing on women has focused on the very real presence of white women in sites of colonialism, and the part they played as agents of empire. In the Pacific area Margaret Jolly's and Martha Macintyre's edited collection *Family and Gender in the Pacific: Domestic Contradictions and the Colonial Impact,* along with studies by Claudia Knapman and Diane Langmore, constituted pathbreaking work, which joined a host of such studies elsewhere from the mid-eighties.[7] Some of this scholarship has discovered white women to be more sympathetic than men to injuries to colonized women and children, less harmful in interracial encounters because

less powerful, and more perceptive in their recordings of empire because more marginalized themselves. Other scholars have resisted what they consider an attempt to resurrect white women, only to exonerate them from a racism in which they were in reality deeply implicated.[8] Whichever view, many studies across the globe testify to white women's involvement in imperialism and colonialism, a shift in the area paralleled by a recovery of white men as gendered agents of colonialism. "Real Men Hunt Buffalo" runs the beginning of the title of an article in the latest edition of *Gender and History,* representative of the current rethinking of men, masculinity, and frontiers, particularly in the British Empire. To a far greater extent than previously, in addition, white men's sexual relations with indigenous women (more rarely, with indigenous men) have surfaced also in this revision of colonialism. If Prasch is correct in stating that the story of empire as "sexual opportunity" for men has a long genealogy, recent studies have given these relationships a fresh critical evaluation.[9]

It is perhaps in the area of white men's representations of indigenous women and gender relations that revisionists have demonstrated the capacity to engage centrally with critiques of colonialism at the theoretical level. Gayatri Spivak's original work on British colonial observations of Hindu women has been significant here,. followed by the writings of other Indian scholars such as Chandra Mohanty and Lata Mani.[10] In *Colonialism's Culture* Thomas pursues such insights in an important passage where he notes the ways in which, in the Pacific, "perceptions of women and women's 'status' encoded other forms of geographic and racial difference. The degradation of women was a measure for the degradation of a society." Further, "responses to the body were less important than the work of a gendered vision upon women and upon the relations of debasement or sexual equality that women's bodies exhibited" (p. 102). It is in such passages that Thomas points the way to an inclusive history for concerns of gender.

My own readings, with colleagues, of colonial writings about Maori women and southeastern Aboriginal women certainly affirm the centrality of observations of gender to constructions of the colonized. Explorers, travelers, colonial officials, and settlers in the early stages of white incursion first noted individual Maori or Aboriginal women's behavior and appearance, then were repeatedly drawn into rhetorical generalization on the "position of women." They commonly placed indigenous women's perceived social lives against a grid of European cultural expectations and often found the women--or Maori or Aboriginal men's treatment of women--sadly wanting. That these negative constructions echoed uneasily through discussions on public policies through the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and have played a part in shaping indigenous activist men's and women's responses within political

movements today, serve to reinforce Thomas's sense of the part the past continues to play in the present.[11]

Colonialism's Culture is a landmark work. It offers a paradigm for colonial studies grounded in specific historical circumstance and detail, reinforced by a context responsive but not subservient to colonial discourse analysis. Thomas recognizes and embraces plurality, dissonance, and difference. He sketches a framework energizing for all scholars anxious to restore the voices of many figures not previously the stuff of the stories of empires. We are in his debt.

NOTES

1. M. Bernstein, "An Eerie Absence," *Times Literary Supplement,* 23 February 1996, 13.

2. P. Grimshaw, *Paths of Duty: American Missionary Wives in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989).

3. N. Cott, "Book Review Forum," *Pacific Studies* 15, no. 3 (September 1992): 149-152.

4. R. Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

5. A. L. Staler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); A. McLintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); R. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

6. T. J. Prasch, "Orientalism's Other, Other Orientalisms: Women in the Scheme of Empire," *Journal of Women's History* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 174-188.

7. M. Jolly and M. Macintyre, eds., *Family and Gender in the Pacific: Domestic Contradictions and the Colonial Impact* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); C. Knapman, *White Women in Fiji, 1835-1930: The Ruin of Empire?* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986); D. Langmore, *Missionary Lives: Papua 1884-1914* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989).

8. See J. Haggis, "Gendering Colonialism or Colonising Gender: Recent Women's Studies Approaches to White Women and the History of British Colonialism," *Women's Studies International Forum,* no. 13 (1989): 105-115; Von Ware, *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism, and History* (London: Verso, 1992); N. Chaudhuri and M. Strobel, eds., *Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); M. di Leonardo, ed., *Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in a Postmodern Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

9. E. Vibert, "Real Men Hunt Buffalo: Masculinity, Race, and Class in British Fur Traders' Narratives," *Gender and History* 8, no. 1 (April 1996): 4-21; see relevant chapters in

M. Roper and J. Tosh, eds., *Manful Assertions: Masculinities in Britain since 1800* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); C. Hall, *White, Male, and Middle Class: Explorations in Feminism and History* (London and New York: Polity and Routledge, 1992); J. A. Mangan and J. Walvin, eds., *Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987).

10. G. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxisms and the Interpretation of Culture,* ed. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); C. Mohanty, "'Under Western Eyes': Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," *Feminist Review,* no. 30 (Autumn 1988): 61-88; L. Mani, "Multiple Mediations: Feminist Scholarship in the Age of Multinational Reception," *Feminist Review,* no. 35 (1991): 24-41.

11. P. Grimshaw and H. Morton, "Paradoxes of the Colonial Male Gaze: European Men and Maori Women," in *Work in Flux,* ed. E. Greenwood, K. Neumann, and A. Sartori (Melbourne: History Department, University of Melbourne, 1995), 144-158; P. Grimshaw and A. May, " 'Inducements to Strong to Be Cruel to the Weak': Authoritative White Colonial Male Voices and the Construction of Gender in Koori Society," in *Australian Women: Contemporary Feminist Thought,* ed. N. Grieve and A. Bums (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), 92-107.

Review: **ISABELLE MERLE**
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Nicholas Thomas's analysis of colonialism--a vast and difficult subject--is extremely stimulating, not only on account of its critique of certain theoretical texts but also as a result of the concrete examples that it explores. Before addressing the core issues, it is necessary to state that the books perspective is of particular interest for a French historian specializing in New Caledonia because it locates colonialism in a contemporary context. It is not only a matter of reflecting on the colonial past, but also of analyzing interpretations taken both from strictly academic contexts and from more popular works intended for the general public. By placing the primary focus on culture, Thomas goes beyond the classical analysis of neocolonialism, which is based on political or economic approaches. He addresses ideas conveyed through literature, film, art exhibitions, and even political militancy. His analysis explores the way that the formation of national identity and memory is being influenced by reevaluation of indigenous culture in North America and Australasia, citing, for example, the impact of films like *Dancing with Wolves* and movements such as New Age primitivism.

France has a different experience because of its past as a colonial center ruling its territories from a distance. Even though decolonization has put paid to a certain number of debates, in France colonialism should not be

considered as an object of study belonging entirely to the past. It is noteworthy that in recent years there has been a renewal of interest in the colonial past, reflected in a growth in university research and books and films intended for the general public, some of which reveal a strong sense of nostalgia. The effects of the economic recession, memories of lost grandeur, postcolonial disillusions concerning Third World countries--in light of all these, questions are asked about the causes of the renewal and the various rereadings of the past that have been presented. From the same perspective, there is value in reconsidering the events that erupted in New Caledonia in 1984, the violence they provoked locally, and the intensity and aggression they triggered within the French political scene. These recalled, overtly or otherwise, the memory of previous conflicts and in particular that of the Algerian war.

Thomas's analysis of the links between the past and present serves to underline the continuity of discourse on "the other," the roots of which he finds in *L'Histoire Naturelle* of Buffon and in the descriptions left by eighteenth-century explorers. Out of this emerged a new type of categorization that defined "the other" through focusing on his or her difference, specific traits and physical and behavioral qualities as well as a search for the essential nature of "the other." This essentialist conception has thoroughly permeated anthropology; Boas rejected evolutionism and swapped the notion of race for that of culture but retained this descriptive logic,, based on "the naturalization of the distinctive," a logic also found in Geertz and Dumont. This model of ethnological interpretation, which is questioned today by a number of anthropologists,[1] was opposed in every respect to the modes of understanding prevalent in premodern Europe. Referring to the interpretation of Johannes Fabian, Thomas recalls the assumptions of a religious representation of "the other" that relied not on the description of specific attributes but on comparisons that stressed the absence of European Christian values. The "heathen" were not characterized in anthropological terms but presented as incomplete and imperfect beings who had to be converted and transformed. Thomas thus shows the connection between such a perspective and the missionary discourse which, in infantilizing "the other," sought to discover in the "primitive" a supposedly pure being ready for conversion.

The example of the Protestant minister Maurice Leenhardt, who had a significant influence on New Caledonian ethnography, reveals another mode of thought: belief in a fundamentally mystical Kanak, who lived in a primitive state, ignorant of good and evil and predisposed by nature to receive Christ. More religious than the Christians, the Kanaks would at one time have known God but would have then forgotten him, and the role of

the missionary was to draw upon that original sense of the divine in order to reorient them toward the Christian religion.[2] Leenhardt's view was not the infantilism of the native, but a belief in a primitive and fundamentally mystical world that represented a fertile field for the growth of Christianity. Leenhardt saw Kanak culture as having intrinsic value but nonetheless in need of reform and transformation. He exemplified thereby an incorporative missionary discourse opposed to an essentialist anthropological model based on a reification of difference, a fixed conception of a society resistant to change and evolution.

In returning to the origins of scientific discourse, Thomas reiterates a critique already developed in his previous work *Out of Time* (Cambridge, 1989), in which he argues against an ahistorical and atemporal anthropology that is unable to account for social transformations, colonial confrontations, resistance and exchange, and the emergence of hybrid identities. Colonialism is used here by Thomas as a resource to question ethnographers and force them to rethink their categories. Colonialism was a global phenomenon that touched virtually all regions of the world, and anthropology cannot continue to represent societies as totalities, closed in upon themselves and independent of the context in which they found themselves and the historical development through which they passed.

As well as arguing that anthropology should reflect on the question of colonialism, Thomas also says colonial studies should give attention to an anthropological approach in studying societies. In referring to works concerned with colonial representation (Saïd), and more specifically with colonial discourse theory (Bhabha, JanMohamed), the author provides a critique of a certain globalizing vision, which conceives of colonialism as a system of *"gouvernementalité"* (as formulated by Foucault) that appears entirely coherent, efficient, and organized in terms of a structure of domination and repression. Such studies have the merit of examining in detail the domain of representations and in developing a new reading--from the angle of colonialism--of various artistic, literary, and scientific works. For Thomas, however, these works are less than adequate in that, first, they rely on a transhistorical approach that tends to decontextualize discourses and, second, because they reduce the heterogeneity and contradictions in the world of the colonizers while ignoring the practical effect of the colonial discourse on those colonized. As Thomas stresses, colonialism is far from being "a unitary project but a fractured one, riddled with contradictions and exhausted as much by its own internal debates as by the resistance of the colonized" (p. 51). Moreover, the "colonial discourses" often aimed to influence the general public in the metropole rather than the colonized themselves. "It needs to be acknowledged that the discourse may not have impinged upon indige-

nous consciousness at all, or was at best indirectly related to discourses that were expressed at the site of colonization: to presume imposition is to overstate the importance and effectiveness of imperialism, to forget that imperialists were often arguing with each other or speaking narcissistically to themselves" (pp. 57-58).

I wholeheartedly agree with this deconstruction of the globalizing vision of colonialism that emphasizes the internal contradictions, conflicts, and uncertainties of colonial objectives, having myself developed this type of analysis in my work on New Caledonia *(Expériences Coloniales: La Nouvelle-Calédonie, 1853-1920* [Paris: Belin, 19951). The colonial plans developed by the French state with respect to New Caledonia represented the product of intense discussions marked by multiple contradictions and disagreements (in France and in New Caledonia). The implementation of these plans revealed all the uncertainties, inconsistencies, and backtrackings of a colonial policy that evolved according to the events and interests of the moment. With respect to the Kanak world, colonial strategies followed a remarkably tortuous path, as they were contested within local representative bodies as well as at the highest level of the state by the colonial ministry. The Kanaks were damaged by the way they were characterized in a racist colonial discourse, which, contributed to a sense of shame about their own identity. They were able, however, to defend themselves by ignoring that alien discourse, choosing to retreat and to veil the complexity of their world just as they have been able, more recently, to rehabilitate Leenhardt's analysis when it was useful for their own purposes.

Thomas proposes to return to an approach that is localized, historicized, and contextualized with respect not only to colonialism but to colonialisms. In rejecting a globalist conception, which is based mainly on discourse analysis, he advocates, to a certain degree, an empiricist approach. For Thomas, this empiricism must avoid simplistic assertions. It must be based on an analysis that links a delicate interpretation of the complexity of *"logiques pratiques"* operating in the field with an interpretation of the colonial discourse that is developed for or in the metropole. Drawing on the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Thomas seeks to account for the dynamism of actors in the colonial context, their strategies for resisting or exercising power, and their capacity for cultural exchange or appropriation when caught up in projects of social transformation that are sometimes in competition, sometimes marked by internal contradictions, and sometimes subject to contestation or reformulation. Thomas's use of the term "project" has theoretical implications of major significance for the author: "It draws attention not towards a totality such as a culture, nor to a period that can be defined independently of people's perceptions and strategies, but rather to a socially transformative

endeavour that is localized, politicized and partial, yet also engendered by longer historical developments and ways of narrating them" (p. 105).

One can easily see the potential of such an approach. It revisits the colonial terrain in making the interpretation more complex by means of an anthropological analysis that considers the issues of colonial situations, the relations between colonizer and colonized, the diverse strategies of different groups, and the competition and complementarity between different colonial projects. The author insists in particular on the need to analyze in greater depth the world of the colonizer, which, as stressed by Ann Stoler, has never been of primary concern to anthropologists. In fact, the world of the colonizer merits greater attention precisely because it is culturally complex and extremely diverse. One point of major interest in Thomas's book is the way he pioneers new lines of analysis in a field that was too often divided into, on the one hand, the theoretical approach of "colonial discourse" studies (and more generally of cultural studies) or, on the other hand, a certain type of resolutely empiricist history that he groups rather vaguely under the heading of "conventional history." In light of this, I would like to address certain issues that arise from the book.

In contrasting an essentialist anthropology and policies of segregation with the evangelical project of incorporation, the author only makes passing reference to the question of assimilation. He refers to "the stereotypic French assimilationist approach," which is supposedly close to the missionary project because it combines the fundamental recognition of potential human equality with the total denial of indigenous culture (p. 134). In my view, this point requires a more thorough analysis of the specifics of both French and British colonial policy. French policies, in fact, were not always assimilationist, but quite often equivocated between the two poles of assimilation and segregation. British policies, as well, were not always exclusively segregationist and in some contexts conceived of the formation of indigenous elites and the transfer of the colonizer's values and ways of life to the indigenous population.

The example that the author gives of Fiji is particularly noteworthy on account of the way in which the British sought to maintain society in its traditional state (even though this particular notion of tradition was essentially a construct): they finally imposed a remarkably elaborate social health and welfare program inspired by those developed in Europe in the nineteenth century with the purpose of improving the living conditions of the working class. As the author emphasizes, it was a matter of "a modem and subtle project that proceeded through social engineering rather than violent repression, and appeared essentially as an operation of welfare rather than conquest" (p. 124). This welfare program, beyond questions of visibility and

order, forced Fijians to adopt behaviors that conformed to British values (p. 120). The example would seem to suggest that the author has not given sufficient attention to the ways that official policy in fact involved a complex interaction between segregationist and reformist objectives.

I do find convincing Thomas's analysis of the missionary discourse, which he shows to be based on a vision that stresses the absence of religious values and invokes a child's soul to illustrate the process of conversion. Nevertheless, missionaries were often the first linguists to translate the Bible into local languages and the first ethnographers to observe in detail the norms and customs of the people whom they intended to convert. Thus they participated in the construction of anthropological knowledge and sometimes even took up academic positions in newly established departments of anthropology --as was the case with Leenhardt. This is a paradox that merits further reflection. What would have been the influence of experiences in the field on the preestablished missionary conceptions that had been shaped by the official discourses of the religious authorities? Would not the concrete realities of missionary work have undermined, at some point, the certainties of priests and ministers as they were confronted with the persistence of traditional beliefs and the strength of local cultures? Would not this have given them some sense of their own lack of power?

One could, in fact, question why Thomas does not apply the program that he sets out when he turns to the analysis of concrete examples. His analysis of Fiji, which is particularly interesting, seems to rely strongly on Foucault in describing a particular form of *"gouvernementalité."* This analysis provides a subtle interpretation of a colonial project but leaves unclear the *"logiques pratiques"* and the actors themselves. One would like to know more about the precise context in which this type of project was set up and maintained over the long term. What was the role of London (if there was one) in determining this policy? What were the motivations of the first governor of Fiji, the discussions and debates that took place in local colonial institutions, the attitudes of successive governors toward traditional Fijian society and the welfare project put in place in 1896? One would like to know something about the reactions of the Fijians themselves, which Thomas refers to in passing, but also something about the reactions of the settlers and missionaries. In fact, one would like to see set out more thoroughly *"les structures et les logiques du champ"*--to use the terminology of Bourdieu.

In the case of the missionaries in the Solomons, local details are also left unclear. Who precisely were these missionaries? In what particular context did they work? What sort of resistance did they confront? What kinds of concrete action did they undertake? What were their relations with their ecclesiastical hierarchy? What was their relationship with the other white

settlers? Although Thomas provides a good description of the missionaries' strategy of building up the mission as a total social project, nevertheless his analysis remains at the level of discourse and does not explore the details of its practice. This is perhaps the result of a choice made as to analytical approach, but it is nevertheless impossible to discern how Thomas is applying the type of analysis that he himself proposes.

In conclusion, I would like to return to several points of debate that emerge from this work. I am still not clear about the place that Thomas accords to history as a discipline among those disciplines that address colonialism. It seems to me that the author tends to reduce history (which he refers to as "conventional history") to nonreflective empiricist practice, an accusation that seems somewhat unjust. Not only are there many works of quality on the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America, but many of these also show a real capacity for methodological reflection that connects with that of anthropology. (Examples are the works of G. Dening on the Pacific, S. Gruzinski and N. Wachtel on Latin America, and more broadly the historical reflection produced by Africanist historians either in English or French.)

As a consequence of focusing his discussion on anthropological perspectives and on studies of colonial representations, Thomas reduces colonialism, in my view, to the single question of "the other." The core of the text is the author's concern with indigenous society, an area that he describes. brilliantly with respect to Fiji and the Solomons, which he also addresses through the story of Prester John as well as through his examination of various contemporary questions. I feel this premise is limiting. The colonial process, of course, did not have as its primary concern the contemplation of "the other." By that, I mean that any examination of the culture of colonialism cannot leave out discussion of the social, economic, and political aspects of European society in expansion, without at least explaining why this narrower focus was taken. To take an example, one can return to the case of New Caledonia, which, as explained previously, became an experimental domain for colonial projects that followed a logic of "social" colonization. The main issue in New Caledonia involved the idea of settlement. This idea closely related to certain fundamental questions that haunted the French nineteenth century, including the threat of criminality and the condition of the "working class" or "dangerous class"--what was called "the social question." Following the model of its Australian neighbor, New Caledonia was destined to receive a mixed population of convicts and "respectable" migrants. At the heart of the project was the fundamental question of the land, which was to be offered to convicts and migrants to establish a "regenerated" society in the image of an idealized French countryside. In this context, the Kanaks represented a

blind spot that the official policy refused to acknowledge, as was the case with Aboriginals in Australia or Native Americans in the United States. The remarks that Thomas makes with respect to the uncertainties of the colonial projects, the discussions and disputes they engendered, the difficulties of putting them into operation, and the incoherence as well as the reformulation of the projects are eminently applicable to the dynamics of settlement in New Caledonia. These dynamics were the result of a policy both complex and remarkably vacillatory. Certainly, the Kanaks were eventually taken into account by the early ethnographies and local policies, but they were also marginalized with respect to a large portion of the colonial agenda. No analysis can afford to ignore the local colonial context or the connection with the metropole.

Another example involves other aspects of colonialism's culture, the question of "*espace*" (land/territory), the irrepressible desire to conquer the land, to transform it, to develop it. There was in nineteenth-century colonialism a feeling of omnipotence with respect to the entire world (which was not a reality, of course). This sense of omnipotence was directed to both the appropriation and the transformation of the land itself. The natural environment had to be changed, as rationality was denied to any indigenous modes of land use. Nature had to give way to European demands. The colonies were seen as empty space on the map in need of new boundaries, new topography, new roads, towns, villages, and landscaping. If the Europeans had been able, they would have changed the flow of the rivers. Such an effort to reshape the land fed off the growth of geographical knowledge that accompanied the emergence of geographical societies and the academic discipline itself.

Such examples show the continuing interest of colonial studies and especially the domain of "colonialism's culture" opened up by Thomas's work.

NOTES

1. Concerning French works, see the classic by G. Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique Noire* (Paris: PUF, 1955). Cf. M. Augé, *Symbole, fonction, histoire: Les interrogations de l'anthropologie* (Paris: Hachette, 1979); J.-L. Amselle and E. M'Bokolo, *Au coeur de l'ethnie: Ethnies, tribalisme et Etat en Afrique* (Paris: Edition la découverte, 1985); A. Bensa, "De la micro-histoire vers une anthropologie critique," in *Jeux d'échelles, la micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris: Gallimard Le Seuil, 1996). All but Bensa are available in English translations.

2. See A. Bensa, "Quand les Canaques prennent la parole: Entretien avec Pierre Bourdieu," in *Chroniques Kanaks: L'ethnologie en marche,* Ethnies 18-19 (Paris: 1996).

Review: **BRUCE KAPFERER**
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Contemporary anthropology is marked by intense self-conscious, occasionally self-serving, critique and a retreat from its vital aim of ethnographic analysis upon which is largely based the academic legitimacy of anthropology as a discipline worthwhile practicing. Nicholas Thomas's *Colonialism's Culture* exemplifies the trend away from ethnographic research and illustrates some of the dangers of this trend.

Thomas's thesis is simple. What he identifies as the culture of colonialism is not a homogeneous or unified phenomenon. How it manifests in diverse forms of discourse--in the traveler's tales of persons who variously lived or commented on colonial realities, novelists, tourists, administrators, anthropologists--is relative to time and place. This is a well-worn postmodernist point and unexceptionable. Thomas clearly aims to be more original so he distances himself critically from some of those (for example, Saïd and Fabian) whose approaches he, nonetheless, broadly endorses. The work may be generally understood as a sequel to Thomas's previous study, *Entangled Objects* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

A photograph in this text (that of 'a postcard of a small white girl holding the hands of two children of the colonized on each side) is now emblazoned on the cover of the more recent book. The analysis of photographs is an increasingly popular strategy of diverse postmodernist commentary. For Thomas, the photograph displays the infantilizing and racist possibilities of colonial discourse, a major theme of the book.

Thomas's interpretation of the 1910 postcard displays some of the analytical poverty of the book. Thomas describes the photograph as "remarkable." He acknowledges that it is difficult to argue from the position of the purchaser of such a postcard but, undeterred, he proceeds to excavate its meanings. He states that the postcard indicates a surface equivalence (all are equally innocent children) but it implies a more fundamental racism, hierarchy, and primitivism that are more evident in other photographs and texts. This strikes me as altogether a stronger possibility in the photograph itself than Thomas admits. The fully dressed white girl stands in a central position between the two loincloth-wearing black children. Her identity is fully expressed and this contrasts with the suppressed identities of the children whose hands she holds. The native children can be seen as even having their gender identity hidden. They are simply naked black kids. The girl is displayed with her feet authoritatively and stridently apart--a figure of firm, gentle, and guiding power? Such points, although relatively obvious, are not

clearly drawn by Thomas. I do not think it takes great analytical ability to do the kind of deconstruction that Thomas so often labors over in this book. His rhetorical strategy is one of appearing to pare away the subtle layers of meaning (the real and unconscious hegemonizing force of colonial discourses?). Obvious ones stand out--like power and the structuring of authority and domination in colonial regimes--but these are suppressed in this volume.

Thomas adopts a kind of Foucaultian strategy. His interest is not with the formal structures of power, the political economies of colonial and postcolonial regimes that have dominated modernist historical and sociological inquiry, but with apparently more innocent practices at the periphery of power: practices that appear disconnected from obvious systems of oppressive authority and hierarchy. The practices he concentrates upon appear as the "liberal" or progressive front of otherwise dominating and imprisoning power. Here, Thomas might have followed a Foucaultian line more adeptly, a line that he indicates from the word go.

Thus, the book opens with a scene set in the anthropologist's Canberra kitchen. While making breakfast Thomas overhears a radio talk where a present situation of racial tolerance is asserted against the intolerant difference of a racist past. The continuity of a colonially constructed racism into the discourses of the present is one of the strong implications of the book. But he seems, almost naively, blithely unaware of his own bourgeois positioning and the fact that he is speaking with an authorial voice centered in Australia's postcolonial capital, the heart of apparatuses of moral surveillance for the production of good citizens in Australia. Foucault and other deconstructionists have seen the complicity of scholarship and of science in the discourses integral to the formation of the modem state. Thomas's own criticisms of anthropologists and of other scholars with whom he is broadly aligned has the appearance of a Foucaultian radical stance. But to my mind his criticisms lack bite and this is especially so with regard to the continuing, often state-sanctioned, discriminatory disadvantaging and denial of the plight of aborigines. Thomas in his criticisms is often too ready to express state-sponsored progressivist moralisms of the very kind that scholars like Foucault would be suspicious.

The work does not merit Fabian's (a scholar who sees his own work of anthropological deconstruction as paralleling that of Foucault) accolade on the jacket. I for one would have liked to have seen a closer inspection of missionary texts and the discourses of colonial medicine in the Fijian context (where Thomas claims considerable authority) than Thomas provides.

Thomas does not identify connections and transmutations in the discourse of the texts that would indicate disjunctions and shifts in the forma-

tion of colonial and postcolonial state orders. In other words he does not carefully outline the forces that have shaped postcolonial realities and the reformation of the past in the present that is also a future. I stress that the exploration of colonial and postcolonial discourse is a wonderful field to investigate and especially so in the contexts of contemporary processes involving hitherto colonially oppressed minorities. Thomas's exercise is highly important for comprehending the diverse regimes of power that may characterize what is called "postcoloniality." Colonial political orders are to be seen as forerunners of the contemporary surveillance state. The methods whereby colonizers intervened within and transformed the life domains and practices of those they controlled is apparent in the details of missionary practice, health and medical administration, colonial descriptions of cultural and social customs and how they were to be protected or secured, colonial bureaucratic discourse, and so forth. In such details are the preliminary formations of so many, usually state-mediated, contemporary political worlds. But Thomas skims his materials too easily and reiterates tried and true observations--such as primitivism in the representation of indigenous peoples--that have been better argued by other scholars.

Thomas takes what by now are ritual swipes at major modernist anthropological scholars, Geertz and Dumont for example. Sometimes these are a little too shallow. There are, surprising as it may seem to some, arguments in both Geertz's and Dumont's work that prefigure approaches that would appear otherwise critical of them. While Dumont is undoubtedly a totalizing thinker, he is fascinated with the genealogies of contemporary discourse and how they are transmutations of earlier forms. The colonial context of India is a regime of power that displays some of the dynamics ushering in modernity. In Dumont's understanding, the individualism that took root in India under British colonial rule gave rise to new forms of oppression through an idiom of liberalism. This is not so far away from Foucault's perspective on the process of the emergence of post-Enlightenment and ostensibly liberating discursive formations relevant to new power regimes in Europe and exemplified in Foucault's studies, *The Birth of the Clinic* and *Discipline and Punish.* Dumont radically criticizes anthropological texts on India (largely those of the British social anthropological tradition) for being thoroughly concerned with the application of concepts founded in modem liberalism. Such texts, he argues, contribute to a false stereotypy of Indian village practices and a deeply prejudiced vision of India as a whole--indeed the kind of prejudice that enabled British colonial power to legitimate itself as a liberalizing force. Thus, India is invented by anthropology and other social scientists as an archetype of inequality that only modem reforms of the kind initiated in

Europe will overcome. Dumont attacks such perspectives and the kind of anthropology associated with them.

Dumont is eminently criticizable, but Thomas's failure to grasp the direction of his argument not only distorts Dumont but supports a kind of postmodem view of certain scholars that refuses major similarities in argument. This refusal is masked in a sham radicalism that covers up, as with Thomas when compared with Dumont, an altogether weaker position.

I started this comment on Thomas by stressing anthropology as an ethnographic discipline and concerned in diverse ways with the careful attention to practices. This emphasis has received a renewed focus in recent years, often under the influence of postmodern developments. Foucault and other priests of the movement have not just questioned how accounts of practice have been presented but have been acutely attentive to developing approaches to the investigation of practices that avoid the manifest distortions and oversystematization, for instance, of positivist empiricism. Thomas presents an interpretation of texts that I find far more superficial than the interpretive culturalism of a Geertz. Indeed, Thomas's expressed concern with the cultures of colonialism brings him close to a Geertzian strategy with its assumptions of local holism and deep-seated cultural codes waiting to be cracked.

I have chosen to discuss Thomas in the context of Foucault. The latter presents an approach highly influential for Thomas but has a far greater respect for empirical detail, for ethnography in fact. Anthropology began as an armchair discipline, and in the hands of anthropological scholars like Thomas it evinces a danger of returning to these roots, There is almost a Frazerian butterfly-collecting feel to Thomas's text. A couple of *Boy's Own* novelists here, the writings of odd missionaries and journalists there, an apparently randomly selected postcard or two, and so forth. There is no relentless interrogation of materials that marks the best of many deconstructionist and postmodernist analyses. Anthropologists have had great opportunities to investigate in depth the colonial practices within which the history of the peoples they studied were often so thoroughly embedded. They had access to the writings of local administrators and the chance to investigate the discursive formations of colonialism and postcoloniality that infused the everyday worlds in whose realities they participated. With some exceptions anthropologists largely avoided such important concerns. It took a new generation of scholars who were usually not anthropologists to expose the neglect. Thomas has seen the lack, but this study seems to be in nowhere land. It refuses the value of the anthropologist's insistence on ethnography and refuses the intense archaeological examination demanded by many deconstructionist and postmodem scholars.

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I appreciate the time that Patricia Grimshaw, Isabelle Merle, and Bruce Kapferer have taken to review *Colonialism's Culture.*

I am flattered by Patricia Grimshaw's praise for the book. She finds generously that while little is said directly about gender and sexuality in colonial cultures, the book opens pathways for feminist scholarship. When I wrote the book I felt that this area needed to be addressed more explicitly but somehow (over the course of several fairly tortuous revisions) never found a way of doing this. In restrospect, the gendering of racial types, nationalities, polities, and regions in colonial discourses perhaps seemed too obvious a theme to devote much space to. It would have been easy to harp on the feminization of oriental despots and the masculinized populations of headhunters, but these seemed static stereotypes of the kind I was concerned to get away from. Rather than further catalogue "images of the other," I sought to identify certain plots in narratives of colonial relations, which worked not only with particular constructions of indigenous and colonized peoples, but also with notions of past and future, progressions and destinies.

Certainly, the gender coding of populations and colonial relations is vital and energizing. What I attempted to show with the Methodist mission case study, however, was that the defining metaphors of this sort were not limited to a male/female complementary hierarchy but rather incorporated a larger field of familial relations. Native peoples were infantilized, with all the fraught combination of subordination, difference, kinship, paternalistic and maternalistic love, and generational replacement that that entailed. In examining the workings of gender in the field of colonizing cultures, it seemed useful to take sexual difference less as a term in itself than as one that was combined in different ways with ideas of race, relatedness, seniority, and so on. These ideas were not of interest merely for their complexity, but because they provided a lens through which the distinctiveness of colonizing projects became evident: the missionaries' familial tropes were not shared by other kinds of colonizers.

There is, of course, much more to a gender-conscious colonial history than this. There are studies of the activities of women in particular colonial situations, of the kind Grimshaw cites. The study of masculinity is no less important, and I expand upon the brief discussion in *Colonialism Culture* of failures of imperial masculinity in a forthcoming coauthored book.[1] But here it is perhaps most useful to make a connection that was not well developed in the book. I used Johann Reinhold Forster's comparative anthropology from the late eighteenth century to exemplify the fashion in which the

"status of women" became a key index of the advancement of a population as a whole. Forster was unusual among his contemporaries in the extent to which he focused upon this, not merely as an index but also more actively as a cause of what he saw as progress toward civilization: women, in effect, might feminize and refine society.[2] Forster's writing is of great interest for what it reveals of his own time and the complexities of the eighteenth-century responses to Oceania, which have not been much illuminated by recent writing on Cook. But in the context of *Colonialism's Culture,* it would have been more important to point out that although this mode of exploring human difference gave way to more-racialized perceptions, it retained a good deal of subsequent energy, most particularly in the cultures of Christian evangelism, economic development, human rights, and so on. The identification of certain modes of denigrating women (and children) that license intervention has surely been one of the most enduring features of Western engagements with other parts of the world since the end of the eighteenth century. If this theme has been discussed in the South Asian context by Spivak and others, its ethnographic ramifications substantially remain to be addressed.

Isabelle Merle raises a number of legitimate and suggestive points. Many of her remarks implicitly or explicitly contrast the cases I discussed with those of France and New Caledonia. I can only begin by conceding that of course my arguments were limited to primarily British Empire examples; though I alluded at points to contrasting national modes of colonizing, I was more concerned to engage with differences of epoch and project. Certainly I would acknowledge that the issue of official (as opposed to missionary) assimilationism is not sufficiently explored, and I would also be interested in considering how far Maurice Leenhardt fits and does not fit with the characterization of evangelical assimilationism put forward in my book. Leenhardt is all the more interesting because he exemplifies less the destructive missionary than the one who inaugurated serious ethnographic work and created resources that served a Kanak project of cultural renaissance toward independence.

Merle finds that the case studies (of Fiji and the Solomons) fall short of effectively applying the model of studying practical colonial projects that the book advocates. I can only acknowledge that these were intended as brief exemplifications rather than extensive case studies; though both in fact were drawn from longer articles that provided a good deal of the kind of information called for.[3]

I feel that I did not make my stance regarding disciplines clear, or at least that I do not disagree at all with Merle when she suggests that much fine work has been done within history that is not reducible to unreflective em-

piricism. I take it for granted that cultural history and historically minded anthropology substantially converge, and that these disciplines, as well as others, make vital contributions to the study of colonialism in the past and the present.

I do not quite agree that the book overemphasizes the question of "the other." Although "the other," unfortunately always evoked in the singular, has certainly been overemphasized in the critical study of colonial discourse, I would not want to forgo a "core" concern "'with indigenous society," or rather with the indigenous/colonial relation. That said, I appreciate that many colonial projects were primarily preoccupied with reforming metropolitan society, or more obviously with issues of trade and profit, more than that they were a response to indigenous culture. Even when particular texts, images, or discourses were primarily a response to indigenous people and culture, they did not necessarily take them as "others" to be juxtaposed with the self in any case. One of the points of the recent edition of Forster's *Observations* (1996) is, for instance, that his discussions of Maori cannibalism, Tahitian and Tongan political forms, and the status of women encoded British and European political debates: they were not meditations on "the exotic."[4] The interplay between home and elsewhere remains one of the most fertile areas for colonial studies:

The fact that Bruce Kapferer is an exponent or sometime exponent of the sort of Dumontian anthropology that *Colonialism's Culture* was marginally concerned to criticize may explain his antipathy to the book, but it does not excuse his distortion of its arguments. One correction may suffice. The missionary postcard captioned "A Study in Black and White" is not read in a "deconstructionist," "postmodernist," or Geertzian-despite-my-intentions fashion. The analysis of that particular image in fact proceeds from historical discussion of missionary practices and projects, and their ideological ramifications. So, far from being concerned to uncrack some deep-seated cultural code, I was explicitly concerned with missionary rhetoric, which happened to be revealingly exemplified through a set of propaganda photographs; most particularly, I was concerned to contrast that rhetoric with others in circulation at the time. What was basic to the analysis, in other words, was the strategic situation of a mission relative to indigenous people and other colonial forces, not the imputed semiotics of a single image. On this point my approach is grossly misread, and the observations that follow are correspondingly irrelevant to the merits or faults of the book.

Kapferer inadvertently raises an issue of some interest, which is implicit in Merle's question about history and anthropology We agree about the importance of ethnography; and Dening, among the other historians cited by Merle, is sometimes characterized as an "ethnographic" historian. This means

reflective, sensitive to cultural complexity, and above all localized. But are these attributes sufficient to describe an ethnographic orientation toward the past that proceeds in the absence of what anthropologists would understand as the basis of ethnography, namely fieldwork? What is the adequacy in knowledge that ethnographic history seeks to mimic, and how is it to be arrived at? Can it be arrived at through archival research, or are we introducing a series of metaphors, postulating fieldwork in the library, dialogue with one's sources, and so on, that are appealing but in the end mystifying? This is one of a number of larger methodological issues that will surely continue to trouble as well as animate research on the cultures of colonialism.

NOTES

1. Nicholas Thomas and Richard Eves, *Bad Colonists: The South Seas Letters of Vernon Lee Walker and Louis Becke.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, forthcoming.

2. Harriet Guest, "Looking at Women: Forster's Observations in the South Pacific," in Johann Reinhold Forster, *Observations Made during a Voyage Round the World,* ed. Nicholas Thomas, Harriet Guest, and Michael Dettelbach (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996 [orig. 17781).

3. Nicholas Thomas, "Sanitation and Seeing: The Creation of State Power in Early Colonial Fiji," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32 *(1990):* 149-170; "Colonial Conversions: Difference, Hierarchy, and History in Early Twentieth Century Evangelical Propaganda," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34 (1992): 366-389.

4. See note 2 above.

VISUAL MEDIA REVIEWS

NEGOTIATING THE *PŌ:* THE HAWAI'I INTERNATIONAL FILM FESTIVAL, 8-15 NOVEMBER 1996

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IS THERE A CURRENCY of human experience? Distinguished by the theme 'When Strangers Meet," the sixth Hawai'i International Film Festival presented films from around the Pacific, and many of the worlds other oceans, that negotiated precisely this question. While mainstream Australian, Japanese, and Korean works were the centerpieces of the festival, I found most poignant the productions of two groups of young filmmakers who responded to the challenges of self-representation, of artistic integrity, and of overcoming the problem of formulating locality in this century of moving images and shifting boundaries of identity. Compiled as *From Sand to Celluloid* (1996, Australia), a set of short features by Aboriginal Australians, and *Pacific Diaries,* shorts from American Pacific Islanders, these two series did not speak to the transcultural politics of highly dispersed and competitive Pacific Rim populations or the local commodification of art in the search for global recognition, as one might suggest many of the festival's films did. However, these films well characterized the quality, intensity, and affirmational spirit of cultural identity of the films at the festival. Furthermore, the relation of these films to the national cinemas showcased at the festival illuminated some of the character of our times.

It almost goes without saying that the history of filmmaking has roots as deeply entwined in human imaginations and communicative conventions as

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any art. Plato, a deeply postmodem philosopher and already writing in an epoch of frission, pastiche, and montage, seems to have well understood the character of filmic representation in his descriptions of the semiotic cave. In this limestone theater of images, a slave is positioned facing a wall onto which a flickering lantern-light's play of light and shadow is cast. Bound to his seat, the slave is fastened in such a way that he is unable to turn his head and thus cannot determine whether the projection results from the back-lighting of actual events occurring out of view or represents the illusory sleight of hand of some shadow puppeteer. Indeed, perhaps this is the relation of the individual to culture generally. As human beings awash in a sea of information, we are all bound to perceive the world through a cultural lens synchronized to our movements so as to prohibit any looking back through the glass. Now, on the cusp of the centenary of filmmaking in the Pacific--and almost a century after the first film festival in the region, held in the Auckland opera house in 1898, which was incidentally the same year Edison produced the first film in the Pacific with a short from Hawai'i--any glance or engagement with representations and images of Pacific Islanders and their cultures reveals precisely the limitations Plato described. Filmmakers and anthropologists, actors and audiences are all forced to struggle with communicating deeply subjective human experiences. As if this were not problematic enough, contemporary film production does not occur in a historical vacuum. Rather, new films may be seen as focal points for all that has passed in the same vein. For Pacific peoples, the juxtaposition of past and present is particularly troubled since, as anyone who has ever pondered *White Shadows of the South Seas* (1927), *South Pacific* (1957), or *Cannibal Tours* (1987) knows, so rarely has the camera allowed what we all, consciously or not, wish to believe--that the image on the screen is shadow and not illusion. Thus, the tension between these two elements has more to it than some film critic's debate over the ontogeny and communication of meaning in works of mechanical reproduction. The essence of Plato's cavern of images is both the anticipation of the epistemological quandary of an audience *and* the suggestion that a critical facet of the film experience is the matrix of power relations emplaced by such mediations.

An aspect of these relations is the circulation and distribution of films: the notice paid, the audiences entertained. In the film industry, metaphorically generalized to some single signifying process, festivals such as the Hawai'i International Film Festival are responsible for reinterpreting and reversing the cinematic illusions of culture and place created by the institutionalized centers of film and image production in Hollywood, London, and Paris. Perhaps more than any other festival, the HIFF creates a space in which nonindustrial and alternative voices may circulate uniquely local mean-

ings with the same aura of legitimacy, if only for a few weeks, as any Hollywood film. While works from the Middle East, mainland United States, and western Europe were screened, the festival clearly constructed a cinematic matrix of experience in which films from Pacific locales could be viewed within a framework of self-representation and local issues. As anyone with interest in filmmaking in the Pacific knows, a bare minimum of scholarly attention has been paid to the history and role of Pacific film in establishing contemporary relations between peoples and states.

The group of short Aboriginal Australian features titled *Sand to Celluloid* ask a great deal of their audience and of themselves. Indeed, they demand their audience take notice of the conjunction of cultural representations and social relations in national matrices of ethnic privilege and position, precisely the perspective so frequently overlooked. These six directors have found an answer to the question of how the perennial search for the cultural self is circumscribed by the representations of others and do not seem to have much liked what they found. Initiatives of the Australian Film Commission, *Black Man Down, Fly Peewee Fly!, No Way to Forget, Payback, Round-Up,* and *Two Bob Mermaid* captivate their audience in a cinematic dreamtime in which the truth of contemporary Australian society is clarified from the chaotic patterns, events, feelings, and uncertainties of daily life.

Each of these films forced me to sit back and take stock, and even if your concerns are somewhat different from mine, you'll find something in one of these shorts that speaks to your experience. My favorites included the humorous *Round-Up,* directed by Rima Tamou, which follows the fortunes of two stockmen (Australian cowboys) whose constant brawling winds them up in a big-city hospital sharing the same room. Released from the hospital at the same time and forced to survive in the harsh wilderness of metropolitan Australia, the two men--one a white Australian and the other an Aboriginal man--discover that they are not as different as the color of their skins had led them to believe. *No Way to Forget* might refer as well to the film itself as to director Richard Frankland's experiences as a field officer during the royal commission investigation into Aboriginal deaths in custody. An award winner at the 1996 Cannes Film Festival, *No Way* left me as haunted as the main character, Shawn, by his experiences during a long night drive between Swan Hill and Melbourne. The film ends when Shawn leaves us with the chilling rejoinder, "The deaths still occur, the mothers still cry, the children still ask me of their fathers, and the community still rings when a death in custody occurs." *Two Bob Mermaid* is a touching reminder that social identity is not black and white. The hero, Koorine, is a young Aboriginal girl who dreams of being a swimming star and who "passes for white" at the segregated swimming pool. Breathtakingly beauti-

ful cinematography captures the humor and pain of growing up between worlds.

The Pacific Islanders in Communication series *Pacific Diaries* also explores issues of identity that arise in periods of cultural transformation. The two films from the series shown at the festival, *Happy Birthday Tutu Ruth* and *The Samoan Heart* (both 1996, United States), brought empathetic tears to the eyes of more than one member of the audience. *Happy Birthday,* by Ann Kirk and Carlyn Tani, is a powerful portrait of a remarkable woman at the time of her ninetieth birthday. The film chronicles the hardships and pleasures of her life as a taro farmer, limpet picker, and great-great-grandmother. Tutu Ruth artfully blends wisdom, experience, and humor to share a brief glimpse of Hawai'i through her eyes. *The Samoan Heart,* directed by Ruth Tuiteleleapaga, documents the difficult path two Western-trained artists walk between innovation and custom in their art and daily lives. In American Samoa, where traditional culture, the *fa'a Samoa,* remains a vibrant practice increasingly in competition with American goods and values, the choice of these two artists to search for the heart of their identity in the heritage of their ancestors was like a shell carillon for an audience struggling with the same issues.

There was one other film showcased in the festival and directed by a filmmaker speaking from outside a national cinema. *O Tamaiti (The Children),* by the New Zealand filmmaker Sima Urale (1996), seemed to operate outside the boundaries of both culture and nation while remaining firmly located in both. *O Tamaiti* shows the world of adult relations, work, time, and space through the eyes of a young child. Eleven-year-old Tino reminds us of an existential freedom many of us, trapped by feelings of futility, may have forgotten. Much like the shorts in *Sand to Celluloid* and the short features in the *Pacific Diaries* series, *O Tamaiti* may well fit into a curriculum seeking to explore issues of local identity and culture in a world increasingly organized around national and transnational institutions.

Recent recognition of the role of film in the creation and maintenance of connections between self and other, between image and representation, between local and national cultures has led to the emergence of the international film festival as a forum in which occurs constructive discourse concerning the communicability of unique cultural elements as well as universal human conditions. Of these festivals, graded by breadth of cultural vision, surely the Hawai'i International Film Festival ranks as one of the world's finest. However, as much praise as I otherwise have for the festival, it is utterly clear that the position of indigenous filmmakers in relation to regional or larger national film industries found a perfect metaphor in the presentation of this festival itself. For instance, the underrepresentation of

Hawaiian-produced or -directed films at a festival that draws much of its attractiveness and *mana* from an implicit if appropriational association to the idea of "Hawai?" and the romanticized notion of its people and their culture was highlighted by the inclusion of glossy big-budget films like *Pilialoha* (1996, Japan) and *Hawai'i's Last Queen* (1996, United States) that may reflect the values and perspectives of their Japanese and New England, respectively, filmmakers more than the Hawaiians they represent. Indeed, given the economic reality that connects Japanese and Hawaiian peoples, *Pilialoha* might easily be read as plainly offensive. In this film a young Japanese boy is magically transported back in time, where he befriends a Hawaiian child of the same age. The two boys set out on a quest to find a magical herb that will cure the Hawaiian boy's dying mother. When the herb is finally found, only one challenge remains. Defying any sensible narrative convention, it is the Japanese boy, the heroic tourist, who secures the herb and saves the mother when the Hawaiian boy is too scared to go farther.

I cannot help considering the festival's theme again, 'When Strangers Meet." For those of us in large, ethnically diverse, and postcolonial nations, sometimes the strangest strangers are the ones in our own backyards. This may also have been the case at the Hawai'i International Film Festival and a stranger relation between the festival's intention and presentation, I cannot imagine.

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THE NOT SO PACIFIC: PACIFIC ISLANDER FILMS AT THE 1996 MARGARET MEAD FILM & VIDEO FESTIVAL, 8-14 NOVEMBER 1996

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"F--k Margaret Mead," said the Samoan gang member living in Los Angeles, "Long Beach: that's where you want to go if you want to make a movie."[1] While his was a pointed claim about the diasporic dimensions of Pacific Islander lives, it also signals a respatialized cultural geography for the meaningful contexts in which cultural identities are forged today. Pacific Islanders' struggles to assert and locate cultural identity, struggles that take place in a variety of culturally and spatially diverse contexts and that involve struggles against colonialism, neocolonialism, and the logics of racism that help authorize the two, connect most of the half-dozen films showcased in the three "Pacific Island Cultures" sessions held at the November 1996 Margaret Mead Film & Video Festival at the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. Despite the gang member's pithy advice to Margaret Mead, then, the films and videos shown in New York's annual visual homage to her more closely reflect this gang member's reconfiguration of the meaningful sites and expanded terms of cultural identity than the more bounded and isomorphic views of Margaret Mead.

In this essay I review several of the Pacific Islander films shown at the festival, including the one in which the gang member's words were memorialized, *My Crasy Life* (1992, United States and Samoa). The other Pacific Islands films screened include *Baba Kiueria* (1986, Australia), *Colonists for a Day* (1995, Papua New Guinea), *Islands on the Edge of Time* (1995, Palau), *Mask Dance (Singsing Tumbuan)* (1995, Papua New Guinea; not reviewed), and *Then There Were None* (1995, Hawai'i).

Baba Kiueria

Each year the Margaret Mead Festival highlights a particular theme, and in 1996 that was "Fake Documentary." In this genre of filmmaking the con-

ventions of traditional documentary are used to call into question, and subvert, what constitutes "truth" in telling stories about people's lives. Oftentimes humorous, pointed, and political, these films can reveal and untangle the absurdities embedded in some of our most naturalized assumptions and conventions. *Baba Kiueria,* a film made in 1986 by the Aboriginal Programs Unit in Australia, uses satire to protest the white-washed meanings of the Australian Bicentenary and exemplifies the power of fake documentary and humor as media for social critique (cf. Ginsburg 1995).

The film gains its title in the opening scene. On a serene lakeshore, a white, middle-class family is having a picnic: father barbecuing, mother setting the picnic table, children of various ages running around playing. From across the lake a small motorboat approaches, bearing a half-dozen uniformed men. The family, appearing concerned, gathers together on the shore to watch the boat's arrival. The boat docks and several Aboriginal men in military regalia approach the family, ceremonially carrying the Aboriginal movement's flag. In a send-up of the primal moment of the colonial encounter, one of the officers plants the flag and another, directing his words to the father, slowly asks, 'What. . . do . . . you . . . call . . . this . . . place?" The father looks around at his family and the area, a puzzled expression on his face. Turning back to the officer, he shrugs his shoulders: "It's a barbecue area," the father says. The Aboriginal officer nods: "Ah," he says approvingly, "Baba Kiueria--I like that."

Thus is the Aboriginal colony of Baba Kiueria named. The film reverses the categories of colonizer and colonized in Australia: in Baba Kiueria, it is Aboriginals who are the colonists and Whites who are colonized. Through reversing these terms, the film makes numerous critical interventions into discourses of primitivism, racism, cultural superiority, "development," and modernity. Viewers are guided through the film by an Aboriginal investigative reporter, who tells us she spent six months living with "a typical White family in a typical White ghetto." Voyeuristic scenes in the home of these ethnographic subjects have the reporter addressing to viewers her motivating questions ('What holds White society together?") and findings ("They are so different from the [media] images of Whites"), as family members move awkwardly in the background or respond in bitten-off words to the reporter's sudden questions about their status in this society: 'We're very happy. . . there's no problems." Cultural exoticization comes under critique in one memorable breakfast-table scene, where the lingering gaze of the camera makes a prominently displayed box of corn flakes into an indigenous cultural artifact: this is White culture.

On her quest to understand Whites' inability to succeed in this colonial society, the reporter locates Ahoriginals as the source of wisdom about the

colonized Whites, simultaneously calling attention to the pervasiveness of this practice in documentary productions. The reporter questions various professionals on what they think of Whites, including the minister of White Affairs, who generously responds, "They're a developing people, starting to take an interest in the world around them." Addressing the "problem" of White assimilation, a police inspector tells the reporter it would help if Whites would "smile a bit." Stereotypes from the mouths of Aboriginals are put to exquisite parodic use throughout the film: Whites are lazy because they would rather lie around in the sun at a swimming pool than work in a factory; White people's love of soccer confirms their natural affinity for violence; the annual Veterans' Day Parade is a ritual microcosm celebrating the foundations of White society--death and sacrifice.

Not only are the roles of colonizer and colonized reversed, but so too are the valences of the stereotyped cultural values of each. As the camera pans a busy eight-lane highway, the reporter tells us that the government has plans for "this barren wasteland." A bush scene of dry land and sparse trees replaces the highway at the reporter's announcement of the plans: to make "a useful park." When White protest groups claim that this plan will "interrupt important trade routes," the minister of White Affairs responds that White attempts to cast the plan as "a land rights issue" are "the actions of a minority." Examining cultural values, the reporter explains how White children go to school to learn "the ways of their people": in a classroom a child stands facing a chalkboard, putting the final touches on his drawing of a nuclear bomb exploding into a mushroom cloud.

The conventional questions and frameworks found in media and ethnographic representations of Aboriginals gain the full force of absurdity through the film's reversal of who occupies dominant and subordinate positions: who speaks and who is spoken about, who is subject and who is object. "Is it fair to try to develop White people?" the reporter asks: 'What shall we do about the problem of White people? Should we change or should they?" Exploring these questions throws racism into a particularly stark light: "Are White people intelligent? Tests say yes; the problem is in their insularity." The dexterity and poignancy of the parody that constitutes *Baba Kiueria* creates a most effective and dangerously revealing critique of the naturalized cultural exoticization and racism that structure representations of Aboriginal people.

Colonists for a Day

In contrast to the parodic social documentary of *Baba Kiueria* is the classically conventional social documentary film, *Colonists for a Day.* The filmic

strategies of authoritative voice-over, archival film footage and photographs, interviews, and naturalistic shots of pristine mountains and misty valleys combine to tell a particular version of the story of Australia's brief trusteeship over New Guinea. This apologia for Australian colonialism is an interesting visual document in the emerging field of the anthropology of colonialism; unfortunately, the film was not designed to contribute to that field, making viewers responsible both for recontextualizing the film and for reinterpreting the footage.

The story line depicts Australians as eminently obliging in their response to the United Nations' foisting on them of this trusteeship--in the 1940s a periodization that effectively erases the region's status as an Australian Mandate in the years following World War I. Although Australia's trusteeship is critiqued within the film, it comes under scrutiny primarily from the perspectives of the "*kiaps,*" Australian men who did the legwork of "pacifying" New Guinea. The film focuses on former *kiaps,* who are interviewed in the domestic settings of their homes and who are cast, both in their self-representations and in the supporting scenes and narratives included by filmmaker Alec Morgan, as good-hearted chaps driven by their desires to bring "civilization" to the savages: "They learned how to garden, the rudiments of hygiene, how to defecate in a toilet," one ex-*kiap* says, elaborating on what *kiaps* taught to Melanesians. The master narrative of the film, then, casts the *kiaps* as misunderstood do-gooders: "[We] were trying to create a Black Australia . . . the institutions . . . values [were Australian]," an ex-*kiap* explains.

The film's narrative and visual focus on the *kiaps* was likely meant to be balanced by the interspersed footage from recent interviews with Melanesians, who comment on their historical experiences with and understandings of the *kiaps:* 'We didn't know if they were human or not," a Melanesian man recalls of the first time he saw one. While the Melanesians interviewed are always named, the interviews take place in villages that are never located: individuals' links to and memberships in specific cultural groups receive no mention. This sidelining of the cultural and regional specificity of these Melanesians and, relatedly, of the cultural diversity of Papua New Guinea, reinforces the *kiaps'* cultural geography of the region: New Guinea consists, for them, of coastal areas that are safe and the "wild interior" that needed pacifying. Thus is the cultural space of Papua New Guinea consistently mapped in colonial terms, even in this 1995 production.

What is perhaps most valuable about the film, however, is the poignant contortions and confessions of the former *kiaps* when these are reinterpreted as indigenous ethnography: this is the anthropology of colonialism, with the colonists speaking about themselves. As an indigenous colonial pro-

duction, *Colonists for a Day* becomes a text revealing of the conflicting agendas of colonial agents and the multiple frameworks through which they make sense of their colonial projects. Throughout the film, former *kiaps* reflect on their years in New Guinea: what they thought they were doing, what Australia was trying to accomplish, what they now believe Melanesians thought of them, what they now think Australia accomplished. As the *kiaps* look back on their years in and prior plans for New Guinea, they exude a profound nostalgia for their own good intentions and for the interrelated promise of their civilizing and modernizing mission. At the same time, their nostalgia grates harshly against their retrospective recognitions of the paternalism and moral questionability of the colonial project in which they participated.

Islands on the Edge of Time

Islands on the Edge of Time and *Then There Were None* are both filmic political interventions into the problems spawned by neocolonialism and colonialism in Palau and Hawai‘i, respectively. The insights of these films, and of *Islands on the Edge of Time* in particular, constitute a much-needed visual media resource for introducing the knotted problems facing many Pacific societies today: the continuing struggles of indigenous peoples for independence from political trustees and/or colonial powers; the pitched conflicts over Euro-American strategic and military bases and interests in the Pacific; the meanings of political sovereignty in an age of multinational corporations, mobile capital, and foreign aid dependency; the growing problems of environmental degradation; and the possibilities for sustainable development.

Islands on the Edge of Time ranges broadly in its exploration of Palauan society today, and provides a useful introduction to the politics of Palauan political autonomy and economic dependency, in part through its treatment of the recent history of the Compact of Free Association between Palau and the United States. While the film makes clear the U.S. government’s relentless interventions into Palauan democratic processes to further its own interests in the compact, the details of the struggle over the compact and their complex refractions through local interests are not wholly amenable to such a filmic summary; ethnographies like Lynn Wilson’s *Speaking to Power* (1995) are useful and perhaps necessary supplements to this film, both for comprehending the intricacies of the compact and for contextualizing many of the cultural practices and values briefly introduced (and sometimes misrepresented) in this film. *Islands on the Edge of Time* won an award for its treatment of environmental issues, however, and one of the strong points of

the film is its educational approach to the value of preserving ecosystems and reconfiguring what counts as "development" so that it is both sustainable and congruent with local needs. The differences between short-term development and sustainable development are complexly treated in the film, making evident their links to political autonomy, to the need to redefine "economic need," and to local cultural values. One schoolteacher interviewed in the film, for example, advised caution in the project of developing tourism in Palau; otherwise, she said, "like Hawaiians, our culture will become just another showcase . . . a museum."

Then There Were None

The analogy to Hawai'i provides a segue to *Then There Were None.* Perhaps the most personal film reviewed here, *Then There Were None* tells a particular history of Hawai'i through the first-person narrative and partial autobiography of its part-Hawaiian filmmaker, Elizabeth Kapu'uwailani Lindsey. Using a range of media--archival photographs, promotional films from earlier in this century, family photographs, footage of recent Hawaiian land rights and sovereignty actions--the film begins with Captain Cooks eighteenth-century arrival in the islands, takes viewers up to the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by American business interests a century later, and treats the intensive commercialization of the islands over the course of the twentieth century. The filmmaker's own family biography moves to the center of the film in the commercial frenzy of the 1950s: "Selling Hawai'i has never been easier!" exclaims an ad man in one promotional film. Lindsey eloquently describes the pain and irony of having Hawaiian *aloha* turned into a marketing device while Hawaiians themselves were increasingly forced to live on the most marginal of lands and progressively decimated by the disease and anomie introduced to the islands by the once-welcomed foreigners. Lindsey's autobiographical segments are similarly rich in understated irony and poignancy as, for example, when she foreshadows her later reign as Miss Hawai'i and unsuccessful bid to become Miss America through a reference to an adolescence she and her friends spent trying to look like the models in *Seventeen Magazine*--and never succeeding. In its final section, *Then There Were None* focuses on Hawaiian challenges to American values and rule by highlighting protests organized by Hawaiians, including the land rights encampments at Makapu'u and Waimānalo in the 1980s. Footage from the 17 January 1993 march on 'Iolani Palace, a somber commemoration of the overthrow of Hawaiian Queen Lili'uokalani a hundred years before, closes the film, accompanied by Lindsey's narrative of promise: 'We are and will always be an unvanquished people."

Throughout *Then There Were None,* however, the effects on Hawaiians of the increasingly intrusive moves by American and other colonial powers are calibrated to stark white-lettered statistical summaries that appear on the periodically blacked-out screen. These statistical summaries enumerate the numbers of "pure Hawaiians" left in a particular year--"1821--210,000 pure Hawaiians"; "1922---22,000 pure Hawaiians"--and appear regularly throughout the film as it moves chronologically through Hawai'i's colonial history. Following Lindsey's hopeful closing note, we learn that by the year 2044 demographers predict there will not be one "pure Hawaiian" left. While these stark statistics constitute a powerful visual device for translating the effects of colonialism into real lives--and deaths--there is also something disturbing about the film's repeated references to and reliance on the concept of "pure Hawaiians." Here, instead of focusing on blood-quantum politics, a site of contention among many Hawaiian activists as well, I want to draw attention to the ways the privileging of blood as sign of cultural purity reasserts a problematic modernist romanticism, one that troubles both *Then There Were None* and the Palauan film *Islands on the Edge of Time.*

In *Then There Were None* blood purity stands in for a cultural authenticity in decline, in such a way as to reproduce the modernist yearning for "pure" peoples "uncontaminated" by modernity. In an analogous vein, *Islands on the Edge of Time* bends dangerously close to compromising its astute political analysis by clinging to a similarly modernist yearning for the kind of timeless islands referenced in the film's title: a romantic primitivism evoking a dehistoricized and isolated people who are only now being trammeled by the corruptions of an imperialistic modernity. In *Islands on the Edge of Time,* this modernist yearning enables some rather serious misrepresentations of Palauan society: Palauan social organization, for example, is depicted as egalitarian ("no one is better than anyone else here"), in sharp contrast to ethnographic studies that describe a society organized in ranked matriclans, whose corresponding etiquettes of respect behavior are prerequisite for social competence, and whose ranked order provides a vital cultural context for understanding local political conflicts, including the politics of the compact (see Wilson 1995).

My Crasy Life

My Crasy Life indirectly returns us to the 1996 Mead festival theme of fake documentary. More akin to ethno-fiction, the film is a scripted production, according to filmmaker Jean-Pierre Gorin; it is the product of collaboration between Gorin and the Sons of Samoa gang members who live in Long Beach, a part of Los Angeles, and are affiliated with the Crips, of Crips/Bloods infamy.

The film centers, at one level, on the foundational importance of gang life to the youths in the film. The film's title memorializes the extent to which everything in the film is filtered through gang life by spelling "crasy" with an *s,* not a *z:* this is "Gangster's spelling, not Webster's," Gorin states. Thus the film explores the violence of gang life, the rewards, costs, and meanings of gang membership. A relaxed daytime scene, for example, has many of the gang members sitting around the living room of someone's house. The camera focuses on one seated young man who is meticulously ironing a pair of slacks and, later, a signature blue Crips bandanna ("the flag of justice"). As if choreographed, the youths slow and steady ironing is punctuated by his periodic reaches down under his ironing table into a duffel bag: he withdraws a gun, cocks and uncocks it, smoothly passes it along to the gang member to his right, then returns to his ironing. The youth to whom he has passed the gun repeats the cocking ritual and, in turn, passes the gun along to another gang member. The first young man continues his slow and steady ironing, then reaches down for another gun, later yet another. Like familiar lovers, domesticity and warfare here dance in unspeakably comfortable intimacy.

At another level, *My Crasy Life* is about the Samoan diaspora in Los Angeles: how young Samoan men in the Sons of Samoa negotiate and signify the meanings of being Samoan relative to the other identities in which they invest in this non-Samoa location. This level is not, of course, separable from the specifics of gang life. In one film sequence, for example, gang members step in front of the camera and offer definitions for terms called out by someone behind the camera: "tat" is rendered "tattoo"; "shew," a gang member explains, means getting high off embalming fluid; given the word "Crip," one Samoan youth laughs and says it means "a nigger like me." This last youth's use of "nigger" as a term of self-description icon&es the complex identities these young men forge as they locate themselves in reference to Samoa ("Sons of Samoa" is, after all, the gang name) and to Los Angeles gang life of the early 1990s.

Nostalgia for Samoa and the search for meanings for Samoa are strongest in the second half of the film, which includes a journey by one gang member to American Samoa and interviews with two gang members who relocate to Honolulu, which has a large Samoan community. A group interview in which the young men reminisce about the stories they used to hear about "back in Samoa" juxtaposes their current lack of knowledge about Samoa with their desires to know more, with their nostalgia for the stories they used to hear: they are exuberant and proud as they sift through their memories for traces of Samoa and share recollections of growing up in a more Samoa-cognizant social context. The youth reminisce about going to church when they were children, for example, remembering how the church "kept

us in contact with Samoans." "But now," one young man says, "it's like a piece is taken out: no one knows what's going on back there now. . . I miss hearing about Samoa." Several of the youth speak of their desires to learn the Samoan language. One comments on his lack of knowledge "about the deep stuff. . . when my parents talked, that's when a big respect come."

Kinship is one of the more interesting sites of contradiction for these youth. The gang members consistently juxtapose "my homeys" to their "immediate family," yet references to the practice of "just being family" abound in the youths' everyday speech--and there the referent is the gang, not one's kin. In one especially compelling scene, a gang member cries as he talks about his love for his mother, describing how she cared for him while he was in jail: "she went through mountains to send me packages, worked overtime to send me money. . . she did a helluva lot for me," he says. The youth contrasts his mother's care during his jailing to that of his "homeys," who, he says, never even sent him letters. Yet at the end of this homage to his mother, when he is asked who he would choose if the choice were between his immediate family and his "street family," he responds, "My homeys *are* my family. . . my immediate family weren't there for me."

My Crasy Life won a Special Jury Award at the Sundance Film Festival, for "its intelligence and experimental play between documentary and fiction." Much of the film, including scenes that appear as straight interviews, were scripted in a collaborative process between Gorin and the youths. Gorin has described his filmic strategy as using the camera as both a mirror and a stage: the gang members are performing themselves as they see themselves, but also as they want to be seen. Stylistically, then, and given the collaborative philosophy of the film, *My Crasy Life* stands somewhere on the edges of cinema vérité in that genre, "the activity of filming becomes a reflexive and catalytic encounter among all involved" (Ginsburg 1995:66). I locate this film on the edges of this genre, however, because the process of collaboration that created *My Crasy Life* took place outside of the film itself and because the filmmaker is absent from both the mirror and the stage. Viewers, then, have no access to the film's collaborative yet backgrounded process of production and, importantly, no ground on which to evaluate the success of what the filmmaker states is the core commitment of the film, "to respect the voice of its 'subjects.' "

It is within the complexities of the film's merging of documentary and fiction that both the strengths and the challenges of *My Crasy Life* lie. The film's strengths include the ways it enables viewers to enter what is presented as the meaningful world of these gang members, to begin to comprehend that world through the terms the gang members have chosen for us. The challenges enter, first, in the absence of context&zing cultural

information and, second, in the problematic positioning of the filmmaker: if the film is a blend of documentary and fiction, at which junctures in the film do the collaborative segments end and the filmmakers own interpretations begin?

We never, to our knowledge, encounter the filmmaker in this film: instead he is hidden, somewhere behind the camera, behind the scenes, and far behind the gang members. The absent filmmaker syndrome is particularly troubling in *My Crasy Life* because the closest thing the viewer has to an authorial narrative voice is that of a cynical and mean-spirited computer --a computer that other reviewers have interpreted as the narrative voice of the filmmaker. "Talk Mode" (which I name after the flashing words that appear when the computer speaks from its dashboard screen in the patrol car) is partner to "Jerry," a sheriff who takes an active interest in these young men's well-being. Jerry goes, for example, to Honolulu to speak with the family of a recently jailed gang member and enlist their support in relocating the youth to Honolulu and away from Los Angeles gang life. Yet viewers learn of Jerry's plans to meet with the family by way of Talk Mode's cynical commentary: 'What's this? A flight itinerary--you've been holding out on me . . . it's your little friend again . . . you're going to visit his family, aren't you . . . why don't you give it up, just go to the beach." Viewers first encounter Talk Mode as Jerry is patrolling the Long Beach neighborhood of the Sons of Samoa in his sheriff's car: Talk Mode volunteers a weather report for the night, adding, "Chances are the gangsters will stay inside." In a subsequent scene, Talk Mode scolds Jerry for making a U-turn, then says, "Don't look away: I have some data for you." The "data" are sudden, full-screen, color stills of young men, presumably gang members, lying in pools of their own blood, murdered on the streets.

Near the end of the film, in the early dawn as Jerry is finishing a patrol shift, Talk Mode comments from the dashboard, "All the gangsters here . . . all those drive-bys and Raiders jackets filling my memory. . . a mystery. These gangsters, Jerry, do they hold as much mystery for you as they do for me?" The "mystery" of these youths is exacerbated in the film by the absence of the cultural information that would help to demystify the complexities of their lives: in particular, there are no aids within the film to help viewers understand the specifically Samoan dimensions of these young men's lives. The lack of cultural contextualization will pose particular challenges to viewers unfamiliar with Polynesian societies. When one young man talks about being stabbed, for example, he describes himself as having been "a warrior" until just before he was stabbed. Then, as soon as he was stabbed, he says, "the thoughts came to my head, and I was scared. . . thoughts came about my family. . . and I was just glad that I [lived]." Viewers

familiar with Polynesian societies will recognize the particularly Polynesian assumptions about personhood and epistemology embedded in this youth's depiction of thoughts coming to him (see Shore 1982). Most viewers, however, will not even notice the reference or, if they do, are likely to interpret it as idiosyncratic to the speaker, perhaps as another way in which this particular gang member refuses to take responsibility for himself: even his thoughts do not originate with him.

Similarly, the fact that the gang members are young men, aged fifteen to thirty, is cultural--not simply demographic--information. In many Polynesian societies, this period of life is named and attached to a particular set of meanings and expectations. In Samoa these young men would be *taulele'a* (Shore 1982:101, 231), while in the Society Islands of French Polynesia where I worked they would be *taure'are'a:* a recognized period in the life cycle (roughly spanning ages fifteen to thirty) characterized by freedom from responsibilities and a license to experiment with different jobs, intimate relationships, and living situations. It is a period of marked cultural indulgence: most adults expect *taure'are'a* men to get bored quickly with work and to quit easily, to move around, to have a series of lovers, and to spend much of their time hanging out with their friends and "doing nothing." In the Society Islands, however, while the cultural characteristics of the *taure'are'a* period frequently combine with certain political and economic currents to lead young men into nationalist (pro-independence) activism, they do not combine to lead young men into gangs. Place the same cultural characteristics of young male adulthood into the context of South Los Angeles and this life period suddenly becomes overdetermined by danger. In Samoa, these young men are likely doing no more nor less than what is expected of them; in Los Angeles, they are killing and dying.

NOTES

I thank Faye Ginsburg for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review

1. At the Editor's request, the gang member's actual statement, "Fuck Margaret Mead," has been rendered as "F--k Margaret Mead" in the opening sentence of the review.

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ERRATUM:
CAPTAIN COOK AS NAVIGATOR AND NARRATOR, A REAPPRAISAL

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My recent article charted some changes that accompanied the transformation of James Cook from a navigator into a polite author.[1] Though taciturn, Cook was not at first at a loss for words: on his first voyage, he coped with the challenge of describing flora and fauna by occasionally adapting the journal of Joseph Banks, an experienced naturalist. Though Cook did not acknowledge these borrowings, he modified them so that they unambiguously reflected his subjective perspective.

My description of subsequent changes in Cooks authorial practice contained two errors of fact, namely that Cook did not cite a borrowing from William Wales's journal, and that this occurred on his final voyage (Percy 1, 24). It was on his *second* voyage that Cook began explicitly to acknowledge such borrowings. When sickness confined him to the beach on Easter Island, he used and acknowledged the journals of others. But some more "literary" borrowings were not acknowledged. And more than once the antarctic landscape reduced the aspiring author to an uncharacteristic if fashionable speechlessness (Percy 22).[2]

Assuming the additional roles of author and naturalist, Cook the navigator struggles for an appropriate vocabulary. On his second voyage, he concludes a summary description of birds with the statement that "I am neither a botanist nor a Naturalist and have not Words to describe the productions of Nature either in the one Science or the other" (Cook 615). His final voyage journal shows his increasing confidence as a naturalist (Percy 22) and, in a passage explicitly adapted from Anderson's journal, his rejection of some seamen's terms like "Mother Careys goose." Yet Cook can supply no new

term to replace what is “known to Seamen [and even to Anderson] by the name of Elephant fish” (Percy 23-24). Such subtle shifts and gaps make the already silent seaman a particularly elusive subject.

NOTES

1. Carol E. Percy, “ ‘To Study Nature Rather Than Books’: Captain James Cook as Naturalist Observer and Literary Author,” *Pacific Studies* 19, no. 3 (September 1996), 1, 24 [hereafter cited as “Percy”].

2. James Cook, *The Voyage of the* Resolution *and* Adventure, 1772-75, vol. 2 of *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, ed. J. C. Beaglehole, Hakluyt Society extra series 35 (Cambridge: For the Hakluyt Society at the University Press, 1961), cxxi-cxii [hereafter cited as “Cook”].

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