

LEADERS IN SQUASH EXPORT: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW CASH CROP IN TONGA

Paul van der Grijp

Centre for Pacific Studies, Nijmegen

Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur l'Océanie, Marseille

As in many small Pacific Island countries, agriculture is the main economic activity in the Kingdom of Tonga. Squash (pumpkin) became Tonga's number one cash crop beginning in 1991, becoming more successful in economic terms than any other Tongan cash crop, such as coconuts, bananas, or vanilla. All Tongan squash is exported to Japan. Small countries supplying large countries with a basic food item is no novelty, but the impact of squash is unprecedented in Tonga's economy. This article deals with the Tongan squash business, with a clear emphasis on the role of the exporters, who are local Tongan entrepreneurs. Their very existence marks the deep penetration of Tongan society by the capitalist system. However, Tonga is still a Polynesian society with many of its typical features. Theoretically this study underlines the importance of the factors of the MIRAB model advanced by Bertram and Watters, without, however, agreeing on the supposed determining character of these factors.

AMONG SCHOLARS OF THE PACIFIC, there is a tendency to marginalize the local economies of the Pacific Islands. These economies are considered to be determined by outside forces and to exist in a kind of frozen state. This theoretical tendency was set in motion by dominant currents in development theory, such as the Modernization School and the World System School (So 1990), and was reinforced by the introduction of the MIRAB model in the mid-1980s. MIRAB is an acronym for migrant societies (MI), remittance incomes (R), aid dependency (A), and bureaucratic organization (B). According to R. Watters, who was the first to introduce the MIRAB model, remittances and aid are the basis of incomes in the islands. This explains the low

motivation to invest in market production and, as he claimed, the “virtual absence of an indigenous private sector” (Watters 1984:221).

Usual approaches to development presuppose that migration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy are part of the development process. G. Bertram and R. Watters (1985), however, ascribed the--epistemological--status of determination to these factors in contemporary South Pacific island economies: “the combined effect of migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy. . . now *determines* the evolution of the system” (1985:497; their emphasis).¹ In their second coauthored article on the subject, Bertram and Watters stated that the MIRAB factors “do not merely supplement onshore commodity production in the Islands but . . . have increasingly and decisively dominated the respective island economies and largely determined their evolution” (1986:47). Note here again the concept of determination.²

Bertram and Watters based their generalizations in the first instance on the situation in the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu, and Kiribati. However, they also extended the application of the MIRAB model to other South Pacific island nations such as Tahiti, Western Samoa, and Tonga. They referred, for example, to B. Finney’s study on Tahiti (1964). Finney observed that “‘fast money’ in the town was more appealing than ‘slow money’ earned from productive activity in the ‘countryside.’” According to Bertram and Watters, “Finney’s analysis clearly captures a ‘MIRAB’ transition” (1986:48). G. Marcus’s observation (1981) of the widespread diaspora of Tongans, another example, “makes nonsense of the traditional European concept of a unitary nation-state” (Bertram and Watters 1986:49) and would thus indicate the existence of a MIRAB transition. I would be the last person to deny the importance of the four factors advanced by Bertram and Watters.³ Nevertheless, I have strong doubts that these factors would *determine* local economies in all the Pacific Island nations. My case will be the Kingdom of Tonga and the precise context of the Tongan squash industry as well as the related development of local entrepreneurship.

As in many other small Pacific Island countries, agriculture is the main economic activity in the Kingdom of Tonga.⁴ Squash (pumpkin) became Tonga’s number one cash crop only beginning in 1991. No other Tongan cash crop--such as coconuts, bananas, or vanilla--has had such success in economic terms as squash. All Tongan squash is exported to Japan. Although not a novelty for small countries to supply large countries with a basic food item, the impact of squash is unprecedented in the Tongan economy.⁵ Squash is a regular staple food in Japanese households with low budgets. They consume a total of about 200,000 tonnes of squash per annum (Grynberg 1993; Fakafanua 1995:3). During the Japanese squash season, Hokkaido and southern Japan dominate the market with their product.⁶ The Japanese

off-season for squash is between November and May. This is when New Zealand, Mexico, the United States, and, now also, Tonga enter the scene. All squash is exported to Japan via the Kobe and Osaka auction markets. Tongan exporters are especially successful in November and December. Since its very beginning in 1987, the Tongan squash export trade has increased steadily.

This article is concerned with the Tongan squash business, with a clear emphasis on the role of the exporters. These exporters are local Tongan entrepreneurs. Their very existence marks the deep penetration of Tongan society by the capitalist system. However, Tonga is still a Polynesian society with many of its typical features. A relevant feature of the Tongan version of Polynesian identity is a chieftainship transformed in the second half of the nineteenth century into a royal house with accompanying landholding nobility (see Campbell 1992b; Marcus 1980).⁷ Recent decades, however, show the rise of a new middle class, consisting of Tongans with salaries and higher education (a growing civil service, schoolteachers, and so forth) as well as Tongan entrepreneurs (see Benguigui 1989). The rise of a new economic middle class finds its political translation in an urgent call for more democracy: according to some the absolute dominance of royalty and nobility in the governmental elite should be broken (see Hau'ofa 1994; James '1994; Lawson 1996). Entrepreneurs are fighting in particular for what they see as their liberal rights: a free market, that is, free for their entrepreneurial endeavors. In the case of squash export this could mean stopping government control. The entrepreneurs involved in the squash industry express, as we will see, differing and conflicting ideas on this point. However, the rise of entrepreneurship in Tonga is a matter not only of the middle class, but also of members of the royal family, the "traditional" Tongan upper class.

This exploration of the Tongan squash exporters and their trade is largely based on interviews with several of these exporters as well as archival research in the *Tonga Chronicle* and other Tongan journals. The state-owned national *Tonga Chronicle (TC)* is of particular interest since it serves as both an important source of contemporary Tongan squash-production history as well as a mirror of the government point of view. In the first part of this article, a chronicle of the Tongan squash boom, I deal with the initial years of the Tongan squash industry, government intervention, and problems and prospects of the squash industry. In the second part, on the development of Tongan entrepreneurship, I look at business initiatives by members of the royal family, present professional profiles and ideas of the leading exporters, and seek an answer to the underlying question: what kind of entrepreneurship is developing in contemporary Tonga?⁸ All this may serve to demonstrate that the Tongan economy is not determined by MIRAB factors only.

Chronicle of the Tongan Squash Boom

Initial Years of the Squash Industry

In 1987 a Tongan-New Zealand businessman named Joshua Tu'iono Liava'a paid a visit to Tonga. Liava'a was a representative of Group Trade Limited of Dargaville in New Zealand, a marketing company that deals with Japan. By then, New Zealand had already been exporting squash to Japan for seven years, Liava'a presented the idea of growing squash as an export product at the Tongan Ministry of Agriculture's experimental farm in Vaini. New Zealand was drawing an economic fence around Tonga by virtue of its quarantine requirements for bananas and other food crops, and from 1985 until 1989 banned Tongan agricultural products due to the discovery of fruit flies on them. New Zealand used to be Tonga's primary export market for fruit and vegetables. Against this background, Liava'a argued, squash could provide an important opportunity for Tonga. Liava'a also discussed the matter with Prince Mailefihi Tuku'aho, who actually adopted the idea and started to organize the first Tongan growers. At this point, Liava'a went back to New Zealand.

Prior to 1987, Prince Mailefihi had tried producing bananas and coconuts but had encountered problems with the New Zealand ban on Tongan produce, as had other Tongan exporters. In 1987 Mailefihi organized the first group of forty squash growers on Tongatapu in the Tonga Growers Association. The explicit aim of the association was "to assist in exporting agricultural produce with profits going directly to the growers and not to the association" (*TC* 1987). Two New Zealand representatives from Group Trade came to Tonga to assist the growers in determining the exact harvesting dates, to build the bins for consignment, and to ensure shipping to Japan. In 1988 the Tonga Growers Association consisted of sixty-four members. They harvested and transported the squash in bins to Poutaha, the packing center close to Tongatapu's harbor. Group Trade representatives supervised the grading at Poutaha and took care of the transportation to Japan and the marketing (Speijer, Holo, and Takau 1989:4). In 1988 the growers made good money by local standards. The New Zealand company was less fortunate. In 1987 and 1988 Group Trade broke even and covered its costs. In 1989, however, the company had a disastrous experience with kiwi fruits in New Zealand, its primary crop--the squash industry in Tonga being only a supplementary activity. Group Trade faded from the Tongan picture.

Squash shipments in 1989 were the first direct sales to Japan organized by the Tonga Growers Association, and were supposed to be "of much better quality" than the shipments exported through Group Trade in the previous

years (*TC* 1990a, 1989). According to one of the new growers, 1989 was not a good year for squash “as government had to step in and subsidised prices to growers by a grant of T\$500,000” (pers. com., 1995). This view is much more pessimistic than the one that comes to the fore in the *Tonga Chronicle*: “Earnings in 1989 have boosted the number of growers” (1990b:l). In 1990 the grower just mentioned founded an alternative export organization, which subsequently became the Squash Export Company Limited. In the same year, Prince Mailefihi changed the name of the Tonga Growers Association to the Tonga Growers Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society. The two export companies received loans from the Tonga Development Bank for production costs of T\$650 per acre for fertilizer, seeds, chemicals, machinery, transport, and labor (*TC* 1990b:3).⁹ In 1990, the Multi-Purpose Co-operative exported 2,900 tonnes and Squash Export 2,600 tonnes (ibid.).

In 1991 other new export groups, such as the already-established Tonga Commodities Board and the recently founded Tai Agency Services Company, entered the squash market (*TC* 1991a). The Tonga Commodities Board was the state-owned organization that used to have the monopoly on, for example, the export of copra. In the case of squash, however, the Tonga Commodities Board was only one of the many competing export companies.¹⁰ In 1991 Tai Agency, sponsored by the Japanese firm Misuzu Shoji Company Limited, sent five Tongan representatives to Japan to explore the market. A spokesperson of Misuzu Shoji confirmed that there would be a market for any amount of Tongan squash of good quality (that is, grade A), even during the Japanese squash-growing season (*MT* 1991). In November 1991 eight vessels with squash left from Tonga for Japan.¹¹ At the same time, a new problem arose for the first time: “More than 600 tonnes of (squash) pumpkins had begun rotting. . . at the Queen Salote Wharf customs shed, due to poor ventilation in the storage area and the delay in the arrival of a transport vessel” (*TC* 1991e). However, this seemed only an incidental regression in the general success of the industry.

The Tongan Quota System for Squash

In 1991, for the first time, the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries imposed a quota system for the export of squash. According to the minister the exporters themselves had asked for such a system: “In 1991, exporters sought Government intervention to control the industry.” The minister also gave the reason for this: “In 1991 the quota was set before the high price was offered by Japan. The high price was set due to the quota” (Fakafanua 1995). Early in the year, the ministry allocated 10,000 tonnes to three export groups: Tonga Multi-Purpose Co-operative,¹² Squash Export, and Tonga

Commodities Board.¹³ Later in 1991, the ministry also granted export licenses to newly registered companies such as Tai Agency, the Ha‘amo Growers Association, and the Tauteoli International (Tonga) Company Limited. Because of this, the original three export groups expressed their fears “that the market towards the end of the year will be flooded” (*TC* 1991b). Altogether, in 1991 the Tongan government issued a total of nine export licenses.¹⁴

Even in the very first year of its existence, the quota system produced conflicts. Limited allocations led the three largest exporters to turn away many growers.¹⁵ “Controversy and ill feelings” were noted to have arisen between the exporting groups due to what certain groups labeled “unfair distribution of export quotas” (*MT* 1991). The first quota system was established based on quantity, not quality. The director of the Tonga Commodities Board, Lisiate ‘Akolo, complained about this: “[Squash] pumpkin exporters are facing heavy claims from the Japanese buyers because of undersized, discoloured, and rotting fruit, broken bins, and a flooded market” (*TC* 1991g).¹⁶ According to ‘Akolo, exporters should have emphasized quality rather than quantity. Since there were too many exporters, some of which had shipped out undersized squash, he had requested the government to limit export licenses. “Free-market concepts will not work for Tonga in this industry because, to the detriment of the Kingdom’s fledgling industry, the Japanese importers could easily contract with any other country that has growing conditions similar to those here,” said ‘Akolo (*ibid.*).¹⁷

As a consequence the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries imposed a lengthy set of criteria for the approval of export licenses in 1992. These varied from “sound financial standing and business repute” to “assurance that all squash has been purchased directly from the growers and transported directly to the packing and storing facility.” The list contained thirteen criteria, all aimed at guaranteeing quality (see *TC* 1992b). The applications had to be submitted to the ministry. Only seven companies obtained export licenses. Prince Mailefihi, who chaired a meeting of these seven, declared that “there is a strong solidarity among the seven companies, and we are privileged to have been picked from among the 22 applicants” (*TC* 1992d). The total allowance set for 1992 was 10,000 tonnes. The Tonga Development Bank warned that exporting more than this amount “could result in huge losses for growers.” Japan was still the lone market. To export more would mean lower prices. According to the bank it would also complicate quality control (*TC* 1992e).

In 1993, the total export allowance set for the whole of Tonga was 13,000 tonnes. According to one of the exporters. (pers. com., 1994), the government had overestimated the Hokkaido production of squash. In fact more than 18,000 tonnes were exported from Tonga (see Table 1). The govern-

TABLE 1. Tongan Squash Export Quotas and Actual Exports

Year	Quota (tonnes)	Exports (tonnes)	Exports (millions of TS)
1987		400	?
1988		971	0.4
1989		3,031	2.0
1990		6,245	4.8
1991	> 10,000	21,858	12.4
1992	10,000	9,935	8.6
1993	13,000	> 18,000	15.0
1994	17,000	16,988	13.0
1995	15,000	8,400	8.9

Sources: Exports in tonnes, 1987, estimation by Tevita Holo, pers. com., 1993; 1988, Speijer, Holo, and Takau 1989:4 and *TC* 1988:l; 1989, *TC* 1990b:l; 1990, *TC* 1991d; 1991, *TC* 1992f; 1992 and 1993, *TC* 1993a; 1994, Fakafanua 1995:3; 1995, *TC* 1995j and 1995k. Exports in dollars, 1988, Speijer, Holo, and Takau 1989:4 and *TC* 1988:l; 1989, Tongan Government 1993:53 (TS\$2.4 million in *TC* 1990b:l); 1990-1992, Tongan Government 1993:53 and *TC* 1993a, with an estimation of the net gain in 1991 at TS\$7.6 million in *TC* 1992f; 1993, *TC* 1993a; 1994, *TC* 1995f; 1995, *TC* 1996d.

ment did not retaliate against the exporters for exceeding the allowance, though, since there was no legal basis to do so. Only in November 1993 was a new law passed that made it possible to prevent exporters from exporting more than the quota.

In 1994, with the new law in force, the quota was defined as an “absolute maximum” of 17,000 tonnes, of which 2,000 tonnes would be kept “as a reserve as a provision against excess production” (*TC* 1994b). The remainder was allotted among thirteen licensed exporting agencies. One of the several new license holders in 1994 was PAKO (Organic Squash).¹⁸ In 1994 almost exactly 17,000 tonnes were exported, and at least six ships with squash left Tonga for Japan.

In 1995 another set of criteria for the approval of export licenses was published. Although not completely new, the list, numbering five criteria, was much shorter than that of 1992.¹⁹ In 1995 eleven agencies were licensed to export a total of 15,000 tonnes (see Table 2).²⁰

Several companies that had an export allocation in 1994 no longer had one in 1995 (see Table 2). The Lini Company, for example, did not perform well in 1994 and failed to pay its growers. The company was run by an entrepreneur from Vava'u, who stayed in Tonga's capital, Nuku'alofa. Although his 1994 allocation was for Vava'u only, most of the squash purchased by him was planted on Tongatapu. The ministry penalized him by not granting a new allocation for 1995. Tai Agency, another example, had financial prob-

TABLE 2. Export Quotas for 1993, 1994, and 1995 (in Tonnes)

	Island(s) ^a	1993	1994	1995b
Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing Ltd.	TT	3,300	3,550	3,350
Squash Export Co.	TT	2,500	2,250	2,100
Primary Produce Export	TT	2,000	2,150	2,150
Island Produce Co.	TT	1,000	1,300	1,600
Touliki Enterprises	TT	1,000	1,250	1,200
Ha'amo Growers	TT	1,000	800	850
Tai Agency	TT ^c	1,000	700	-
Friendly Is. Marketing	TT	-	500	950
AMACO ^d	TT	-	300	500
Malt (Organic Squash)	TT	Text	-	200
Primary Produce Export	VV	1,000	1,000	1,150
Lini Co.	VV	-	300	-
Vava'u Squash Export	VV	-	300	450
Ha'amo Growers	EU	200	200	400
Island Produce Co. ^e	EU	-	200	-
Mahe Taloa	HP	-	100	-
PAKO (Organic Squash)	HP	-	100	150

Sources: 1993, Hopoate Moengangongo, pers. com., 1994; 1994, *TC* 1994b and *Lali Magazine* 1994a; 1995, *TC* 1995c.

^aTT = Tongatapu; W = Vava'u; EU = 'Eua; HP = Ha'apai.

^bTotals 15,050 tonnes, not 15,000.

^cIn 1993, also includes exports from Vava'u.

^dAmanaki Marketing Co. Ltd.

^eFormerly Edwards Co.

lems in the form of debts to persons outside the squash business. The company also failed to pay its growers in 1994 and became involved in court cases with them. Tai Agency too was penalized by not receiving a new export license for 1995. In the words of the minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries, "exporters whose performance has been deemed unsatisfactory in the past have been withdrawn from consideration for export licenses" (Fakafanua 1995:4).

The share each company had in the total export allowance shifted year to year. In 1995 the quota for Squash Export was cut slightly to 2,100 tonnes. This might have been related to an order by the Supreme Court in Nuku'alofa for the company to pay a total of T\$14,060 to five of its former growers because of "sums that . . . had been wrongfully deducted from earnings due" during the 1991 season (*TC* 1993b). However, any connection is not obvious, since other companies such as Marketing, Blending and Manu-

facturing Limited and Touliki Enterprises also saw their allocations reduced in 1995 without any relation to court cases, while Primary Produce Export Limited, Ha'amo Growers, and Friendly Islands Marketing saw their allocations increased.

Until now, we have been dealing with the November-December niche market, that is, the time of year in which Tonga has dominated the squash market in Japan since 1991. Since 1994, a new niche market seemed to open up for Tonga. Sometime in May the New Zealand and Mexican producers stopped selling their squash and in June the Japanese producers commenced. In-between was a new niche, the so-called May season, which Tongan exporters sought to exploit for the first time in 1994. For this new niche market the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries allocated a quota of 2,000 tonnes for the whole of Tonga: Manufacturing, Blending and Marketing received an allowance of 1,500 tonnes for Vava'u and Ha'amo Growers 500 tonnes for 'Eua. However, neither on 'Eua nor in Vava'u was the May season a success. 'Eua produced 200 tonnes, but the shipment was canceled "because of lack of quality" (*TC* 1994e:3). Vava'u produced 1,000 tonnes, of which only 250 tonnes were found to be "of export quality" (*TC* 1994c).²¹ This was too small for shipment, so in May 1994 no squash at all was exported (*TC* 1995c).

In 1995 Tongan exporters tried once more to enter the May niche market in Japan. Again 2,000 tonnes were allocated, but only to Tongatapu (*TC* 1995c). However, early reports indicated that the Tongan exporters were "unlikely to attain 300 tonnes" (*TC* 1995g). Finally, only 128 tonnes were exported in the 1995 May season (*TC* 1996e:2). One exporter criticized the so-called May season as "the wrong time of the year to grow this kind of vegetables in Tonga. It is too hot and too wet" (pers. com., 1995).²²

Problems and Prospects of the Tongan Squash Industry

R. Brown and J. Connell commented that the rapid growth of Tongan squash exports "enabled the economy to emerge from recession in the early 1990s, and by 1991 squash exports were valued at between one and one-and-a-half times the combined total of Tonga's other exports" (1993a:8). This observation corresponds with T. Fairbairn's view that "over the last decade, economic growth in the Kingdom of Tonga has been moderate" and that "Tonga's real GDP at market prices . . . has grown moderately in recent years" (1992:ix, 2). Since Fairbairn wrote those words, economic growth has accelerated rapidly due to the squash industry. However, the sociocultural and ecological impacts of the squash boom on Tongan society as a whole are not strictly positive. For example, K. James warns, "The growth of the squash

industry in Tonga over the last five years illustrates many current ills of commercial farming practices: the large-scale commercial venture gains money, but at considerable cost to both the social fabric and the environment" (1993a:234-235).

In 1994 Tonga was the third largest exporter of squash to Japan by volume, New Zealand and Mexico occupying first and second place respectively. Of course, Fair-bairn was right when he suggested that "in the case of squash, possibilities for developing new markets, other than Japan, should be explored" (1992:21). But the question remains: which other markets? Tongan squash exporters are mainly active in the so-called November-December niche market. Although Tonga has become the dominant supplier during this particular niche (New Zealand does not export squash during these months), other exporting countries are competing for the same market, as shown in Table 3.

Until recently there was no real competition with other Pacific countries for the same niche market. Elsewhere in the Pacific, climatic circumstances were not supposed to allow for good squash productivity. Farmers in Fiji tried to grow squash for this niche several years ago without success, which may be due to the hot climate. The only strong competitors for this niche market were Mexico and Hokkaido. But if Hokkaido was struck by a hurricane or another disaster, Japan would be in short supply. Or if, for example, the Mexican squash was damaged by disease, Tonga would have no competition and the price would be high. Since 1993, however, Vanuatu and New Caledonia have produced small but increasing quantities: New Caledonia is at about the same degree of latitude as Tonga. According to one exporter who has interests in those countries, Vanuatu and New Caledonia might become strong competitors in the near future (pers. com., 1995).

TABLE 3. Countries Producing Squash for the Japanese Market in November-December 1994

Country	Tonnes
Tonga	16,988
Japan (Hokkaido)	10,000
Mexico	10,000
United States	6,000
Vanuatu	2,088
New Caledonia	1,394
Total	46,470

Source: Fakafanua 1995:3.

For the minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries the figures shown in Table 3 served as a warning against overproduction: "Japan's demand for imported (squash) pumpkin relies heavily on both its own production and economic conditions, . . . variables which Tonga cannot predict" (Fakafanua 1995:3).²³ Overproduction would also have a negative effect in that the wharf, packing houses, and quarantine services "would be pushed beyond their limits, and quality could be sacrificed" (ibid.).²⁴ These statements legitimize the quota system, but they also seem to be an illustration of the apparently prophetic words by a team of agronomists that "the degree of influence that planners can have over what happens in (Tongan) agriculture is often overestimated" (Hardaker, Delforce, Fleming, and Sefanaia 1988:77).

In 1995, for instance, due to dry weather "Tongan exporters would be lucky if they are able to make a total shipment of 10,000 tonnes to Japan" (TC 1995g). At the beginning of November 1995 only 6,000 of the 17,000-tonne quota had been harvested (TC 1995h, 1995i) and two weeks later a total of 8,400 tonnes (TC 1995j). One of the consequences of this sudden fall in production was an unprecedented price war among the Tongan exporters. In offering the highest price to growers, including to those who had a contract with other export companies, exporters tried to complete their own allocation.

By the end of 1995, a report of the Tonga Development Bank urged once more that the quota system be retained. It recommended a 10,000-tonne quota for 1996. The bank claimed that an open market would affect the financial returns of growers as well as exporters, and that growers' debts at the bank would increase (TC 1995k). The cabinet, however, decided to lift the quota system for 1996 (TC 1996a).

Development of Tongan Entrepreneurship

Business Initiatives by the Royal Family

In Tonga, there are several examples where members of the royal family have opened up new economic outlets, Prince Mailefihi, who organized the first squash growers in Tonga, is the son of Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, the king's younger brother. In this section I will look at other recent examples.

His Majesty Taufa'ahau Tupou IV, the present king of Tonga, owns a vanilla plantation of 40 hectares in Holonga, Vava'u (TC 1992c). In 1992 the manager of this plantation, 'Okusi Hoeft, anticipated producing 12 tonnes of green vanilla beans, the equivalent of 3 tonnes of dried export beans (see van der Grijp 1997). Since 1989 the royal company South Pacific Sea, Land and Air Limited had invested more than T\$60,000 in the vanilla plantation.

In 1991 the net earnings were 1.5 tonnes of export beans, or T\$125,000. These figures were public information in the national newspaper.²⁵ The king is also engaged in vanilla culture on Pangaimotu and in Tefisi. His wife, Queen Halaevalu Mata'aho, moreover, is a shareholder in the vanilla company in Vava'u known as the South Pacific Processing and Development Company, founded in 1991. By the end of October 1992 this company, with a plant at the Vava'u Small Industries Centre, had already exported 14 tonnes of dried vanilla beans. In that year grade A beans sold for T\$10 per kilo, which amounted to a total sum of T\$140,000. Prospects for the immediate future were considered good: "Tonnage might be doubled next year" (*TC* 1991b).²⁶ Furthermore, in 1995 the *Tonga Chronicle* pictured an agricultural officer inspecting squash on acreage said to belong to the queen (1995d). Thus, Prince Mailefihi is no longer the only member of the royal family dealing in squash.

There are other examples. In 1993 Tupouto'a, the king's eldest son and as such the crown prince of Tonga, introduced a branch of the Malayan Development Bank as the third commercial bank in Tonga.²⁷ Prince Tupouto'a holds 25 percent of the shares in this new bank (*MT* 1994a). Asked whether he thought there was anything wrong with members of the royal family becoming involved in business, Tupouto'a answered that "I think the Royal Family should be encouraged to get into business, everybody should go into business" (Fonua 1993: 12).²⁸

Tupouto'a's sister, Princess Salote Mafile'o Pilolevu Tuita, is involved in the satellite business. For a number of years Tonga has been a member of the International Telecommunication Union, which assigned it seven orbital slots. These cover three-quarters of the world's people, reaching both Pacific Rim countries and the Far and Middle East. Princess Pilolevu is the chairwoman and major shareholder of a private company called Tongasat, with 60 percent of the shares, the two other shareholders holding 20 percent each (*TC* 1995b). Princess Pilolevu is also the patron of the recently founded committee Ha'apai Growers, aimed at encouraging farmers to upgrade agricultural development in Ha'apai (*TC* 1995e).

Members of the royal family are highly regarded by Tongan business people. To mention a political example, the first woman elected as a people's representative to the Tongan parliament was Princess Mele Siu'ilikutapu, daughter of Prince Tu'ipelehake, the younger brother of King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV.²⁹ Generally speaking, in Tonga members of the royal family provide a role model for other Tongans. In writing about the squash industry, James pointed toward a business elite consisting of "a few commoners and nobles": "The people who stand to gain most belong to a wealthy business elite, made up of a few commoners and nobles, who have the influence, contacts, and capital for profitable investment in expansionist agricultural pro-

duction. Directors and most members of the controlling boards of major squash export companies are drawn from this social category and are able to get the best deals, profits, and quotas” (1993a:235). If this is the case (James does not give any example to support her statement), what then are the socioeconomic profiles of the leading squash exporters?

Profiles of Export Leaders

I will restrict my answer here to five exporters about whom I have firsthand information.³⁰

Feleti Sevele, Squash Export Company Limited. Sevele’s professional background is that of a mathematician/geographer turned businessman. In 1973 he received his Ph.D. from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand and joined the Tonga Commodities Board (the government agency for marketing copra, bananas, and vegetables) as secretary. In 1974 he became the boards director/chief executive at age twenty-nine, “one of the youngest-ever Government department directors” (*TC* 1974:1). From 1978 until 1984 he worked as chief economist for the South Pacific Commission in Noumea, New Caledonia (*TC* 1978). When he returned to Tonga, he decided to set up his own commercial farm with a piggery and bananas. In 1989 he joined the squash industry. He is a shareholder and chairman of the board of directors of Squash Export and a consultant to Touliki Enterprises. Squash Export has eight shareholders, Touliki Enterprises only two. The two companies are now working closely together. Over the years, these two companies together have acquired an important share of the total Tongan squash export trade.

Hopoate Moengangongo, Primary Produce Export Limited. Moengangongo received his first university degree in Queensland, Australia, and his master’s from the University of Hawai‘i. He taught agriculture in Western Samoa at the Samoan branch of the University of the South Pacific from 1985 to 1990, lecturing on agricultural engineering subjects such as machinery, irrigation, agricultural waste management, and soil conservation. Moengangongo first became involved in squash production in 1991, when he was asked by Prince Mailefihi to advise on pesticide management to improve the squash yield of Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing. Mailefihi was a personal friend; they had attended school together. At the end of the 1991 season, Moengangongo left Mailefihi’s company. Early in 1992 he became general manager of Primary Produce, a subsidiary of Tonga Investment Limited (formerly the Tonga Commodities Board). Moengangongo is very much involved in production aspects such as upgrading quality. Primary

Produce, which used to be the Produce Division of the Tonga Commodities Board, markets not only squash but also vanilla, coconuts, yams, and taro. On the main island, Tongatapu, the company has sections for vanilla, squash, and sundry produce including coconuts and taro; it also has offices on the islands of Vava'u and 'Eua. Primary Produce has its own board of directors. The fact that this company is still 100 percent owned by the Tongan state differentiates it from the other companies, which are all private. Moengongongo, however, considers Primary Produce a private company too; and he himself, being the general manager of this state-owned company, is not considered a civil servant by the board of directors.³¹

Siotame Tomu Nakao, Ha'amo Growers. When Nakao returned from university, in 1956, he took over his father's retail business and involvement in the copra trade. In 1958 Nakao began work for the government with the Construction Company, a subsidiary of the Tonga Commodities Board, and later became the manager. Besides his other work, he has always been involved in commercial agriculture. After retiring from government, he started a wire factory and a paper factory in the Small Industries Centre in Ma'ufanga. In 1991 he began exporting squash under the company name of Ha'amo Growers. Like Sevele, Nakao not only headed his own export company but was himself a large squash grower. In 1993 Ha'amo Growers had seventeen shareholders and a board of directors with five shareholder members. Nakao himself was the general manager. All shareholders were also growers. In October 1993 Nakao became ill but continued working full time. His health grew worse and in May 1994 he was unable to continue working and went to New Zealand for an operation. The medical treatment was successful, but for Nakao the episode was reason to retire from the areas he had been working in before, to hand over all his functions in J. H. Nakao Holdings to his sons in October 1994, and to concentrate thereafter on the development of new entrepreneurial activities.³² When one of the five board directors died in 1995, he was replaced by Nakao's eldest son. The youngest son, "Junior," who was already on the board, is now the operating manager. The eldest son, George, is manager of Seastar Fishing Company and is also a squash grower and the chairman of directors for the whole company, J. H. Nakao Holdings.³³

Siope 'Amanaki, Amanaki Marketing Company Limited. 'Amanaki's educational background consists of eight years in Fiji, first in a secondary school for agriculture, then in an agricultural college. In 1971 he went to the United States and obtained a B.Sc. degree in agriculture. Then he worked for eleven years as a chief extension officer in the Ministry of Agriculture,

after which he switched to the Tonga Commodities Board, the government organization dealing with the marketing of agricultural produce. He had been working a total of twenty-two years in government before retiring on his fifty-fifth birthday to concentrate on private farming. He started growing squash in 1989, after hearing that there was a good market in Japan. He discussed the matter with Prince Mailefihi, who convinced him to enter the industry and invited him to become a committee member of the Tonga Growers Association. In 1990 'Amanaki cofounded the Squash Export Company with Feleti Sevele. In 1991 'Amanaki distanced himself from Squash Export and started exporting through Tai Agency. He tried to obtain an export license beginning in 1991, but his application was continually turned down by the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry. "Their idea is that too many cooks may spoil the broth. There are already seven export companies in existence which they consider is enough," said 'Amanaki in 1993. In 1994, however, under the name Amanaki Marketing Company (AMACO) he finally obtained his own export license.³⁴ AMACO has a board of directors with five members, of whom two are nongrowers. Three directors are closely related: Siope 'Amanaki, his wife, and his nephew (his father's brother's son). 'Amanaki's wife and nephew do not grow squash themselves. His nephew has a degree in civil engineering. 'Amanaki invited him on to the board because he would like to set up a cluster of companies with different activities such as marketing, architecture, and building, in which he wants to engage him in the future.³⁵

Fe'ao Talivakaola, Vava'u Squash Export Limited. Talivakaola received his tertiary education in Papua New Guinea in 1972-1974, after which he returned to Tonga. During 1982-1986 he managed a Mormon school estate of 32 acres of vanilla at Tefisi in the western district of Vava'u. During 1988-1991 Talivakaola was a large producer of root crops. When the New Zealand market for root crops failed, he decided to move to the squash business. In the northern Tongan island group of Vava'u the squash industry only commenced in 1991. Talivakaola was one of the executives of the Vava'u Squash Company under the Tai Agency, which was then the exporter. In 1992 and 1993 Talivakaola and his business partner applied for an export license but failed. In 1994 they were successful and formed a company with the name Vava'u Squash Export Limited.³⁶ At the beginning of 1995, Talivakaola's business partner took full-time employment in New Zealand and decided not to continue the squash business in Vava'u. To be able to go into the squash business again, Talivakaola formed a new company, Vava'u Produce and Marketing Limited, with three directors who are also the only shareholders.³⁷ Compared to the others Talivakaola exemplifies a small exporter.

Conceiving Entrepreneurship in Tonga

In these profiles of Tongan squash exporters we can discern the aristocratic and educated elements of entrepreneurial activity. In this respect one may ask whether there is some truth in James's statement on the Tongan squash industry, cited earlier, that the "people who stand to gain most belong to a wealthy business elite, made up of a few commoners and nobles" and that "directors and most members of the controlling boards of major squash export companies are drawn from this social category."

I asked several of the leading exporters, who are indeed directors of the controlling boards, whether they are noble (*nopele*) or have noble kinship ties. Sevele answered that he has "no direct noble family members." 'Amanaki replied similarly. Moengangongo mentioned he has "noble blood from his father's side" but does "not want to emphasize this." Talivakaola has "no noble family connection"; neither did his two business partners in 1995 nor his former business partner. Nakao, however, is part of the noble Ma'afu family. His mother was the only sister of the Ma'afu titleholder. This family connection is how Nakao received a large coconut plantation that he later used for other cash crops, such as squash.³⁸ In his own words Nakao emphasizes his family link with the noble Ma'afu family through his mother.³⁹ Nakao's father, however, is Japanese, born in Japan, who only came to Tonga in later life. This fact may be of crucial importance in understanding his success in business, especially now with the squash export trade to Japan.

Although Nakao and Moengangongo are of noble blood and Nakao took advantage of this by accumulating much land, none of the leading squash exporters holds a title. What about Prince Mailefihi, the son of the present king's younger brother? Many members of the royal family hold titles, some of them even have more than one with accompanying landed properties, but Mailefihi has none. Taking this into account, James's statement that the Tongan squash business is dominated by "a wealthy business elite, made up of a few commoners and nobles," seems right only up to a point. It makes sense insofar as one considers as "noble" all those who have a kinship relation with an aristocratic family. In Tongan parlance the word *nopele*, however, does not apply. In Tonga, *nopele* are specific persons holding a noble title with its corresponding noble estate (*tofi'a*). The leading exporters are indeed wealthy by local standards, but not noble in the latter sense. The minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries, the Hon. Kinikinilau Tutoatasi Fakafanua, is a noble. He controls--or, to be more exact, limits--the squash business because he is responsible for the quota system, but he is not in the squash business himself.

How then, may we characterize the leading exporters? Most of them hold

an overseas university degree. Fairbairn had already remarked that “entrepreneurial attitudes and initiatives are well developed among Tongans, partly as a result of education and experience gained from migration” (1992: 33). What is striking is the number of leading exporters (Sevele, Nakao, ‘Amanaki, Moengangongo) who commenced or pursued their professional careers with the former Tonga Commodities Board. Having first worked in government, they all became private entrepreneurs. Only Moengangongo, who is the general manager of a state-owned company but is not considered a civil servant, is an exception in the sense that he is not a private entrepreneur.

Moengangongo, however, fully supports the privatization of the state-owned Primary Produce company for which he works. When he assumed the post of general manager, in 1992, the board of directors had announced plans to privatize within two years. “We are looking ahead to completely privatize our company, to free it from government ties. That was one of the objectives when we changed it from the Tonga Commodities Board. This means that any profits will not go to the government but to the shareholders. I am very much in favor of it,” he said in 1994. By 1995 Primary Produce was still not yet privatized: “The privatisation is pushed back another two years, because the board of directors wants to slow down the process,” Moengangongo stated. “Now ‘they changed their minds.” He claims not to know the motives behind this.

With the exception of Moengangongo and, occasionally, Talivakaola, all the interviewed exporters have large (by local criteria) squash plantations of their own. Moengangongo, who travels between Tongatapu and Vava‘u every fortnight during the squash season, says he does not have enough time to grow his own squash (pers. com., 1995). Talivakaola, the exporter from Vava‘u, was running a large squash plantation on ‘Uta Vava‘u in a joint project with his business partner in 1994, but, after the departure of this business partner to New Zealand, he ceased growing in 1995. One of Talivakaola’s two new codirectors, however, has a large plantation in Vava‘u.

Thus, we can conclude that the common characteristics of the leading squash exporters in Tonga are (1) superior education, (2) personal experience overseas, (3) working experience in government, (4) entrepreneurial spirit, and (5) having a large squash plantation of one’s own.⁴⁰ We may deduce from their professional experience in high government or related positions that the leading exporters are sufficiently qualified to gain access to the national banking system to borrow working capital. The same experience is also useful in negotiating export quotas with the government. Their background, however, does not mean that exporters always get what they want from government, as we can see in the recent history of the quota system.

Government Regulation versus Free Market

Although a quota system was in place in 1993, as there had been in the two previous years, the actual export during the November-December season far exceeded the official maximum allowance. This was true for the whole of Tonga and also for the individual exporters. Primary Produce, for example, exceeded its allocation in 1993 by 548 tonnes; Ha'amo Growers was allocated only 200 tonnes for 'Eua but acquired 380 tonnes from there. In January 1994 during a meeting with government representatives, the seven 1993 exporters were asked about the tonnage they aimed at producing for the next main season, that is, November-December 1994. Their expectations added up to 25,000 tonnes. The Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries later imposed a quota of 17,000 tonnes for 1994. It was the first year in which the government became very strict about the quota system. As one of the exporters observed at the time:

We now have the problem that we will have to structure our organization to produce exactly the allocated amount. I see the good side of this. If we produce more than the quota, it opens up an avenue 'for local manufacturing of squash, turning squash into powder.⁴¹ Previously we were unable to take advantage of that. We could not really expect any surplus because one could always export excess production. (Pers. com., 1994)

Among the exporters, differences of opinion exist about the limitations to be imposed by government. Again, just after the 1994 meeting, another exporter commented about the limits on squash export:

If government tries to regulate business, it never works. It is against efficiency and it introduces corruption. They have some weird ideas in government. People who take the decisions there have never been in business and they do not know the problems. They have a civil servant's mentality. The government gets money out of charges on the wharf, out of sales tax and other taxes. They think that an unlimited export would reduce the prices. They have a policy of encouraging the private sector, but in the squash industry, they impose several limitations on its expansion. Let the exporters decide for themselves how much they export. Government policy should be economic development. But what they do with their limitation of export is against national interest. Let us decide. We, the exporters, are bringing the produce overseas. We are negotiating a

good price. The growers take their advantage from that. They get a good price for their product and they are happy. We as businessmen make our profit, and we are happy. We make sure that the quality of the product we sell to the Japanese is good, and thus they are happy. (Pers. com., 1994)

On 17 March 1994, six of the seven 1993 exporting companies made an official request to the government to eliminate the quota system. They suggested that

an open policy should allow [the exporters] to organize their growers and establish their own volume for the season and should require each agency to establish its own marketing arrangements for a predetermined quantity of pumpkin at a viable price. "These are business decisions which can only be decided upon by the grower and exporter." . . . Government [should] confine its involvement "to a clear mandate on quality" and on transport procedures to wharf-side. (*TC* 1994a)

Prince Mailefihi had not signed the request because he was away from Tonga, but according to the *Tonga Chronicle* he "had fully endorsed it in a telephone conversation" (*ibid.*). A follow-up letter from the companies Squash Export, Touliki, Ha'amo, and Tai Agency emphasized that "all developed countries and most developing ones are minimizing government involvement and moving to ever freer markets" (*ibid.*). According to the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries, however, the quota system should be continued "to maintain quality and satisfy the demands of Japanese importers" (*Lali Magazine* 1994a). After the government refused to abolish the quota system, Touliki and Squash Export instituted proceedings to obtain legal declarations that the Licenses Act, the Licenses Amendment Act 1993, the Order-in-Council of April 8, 1994 [known as the Licenses (Squash Export) Order 1994], and the 1994 quota allocation were "unlawful and invalid." After hearings in the Supreme Court, however, Puisne Judge John William Lewis refused all three of the plaintiffs' claims (*TC* 1995a).

The quota for 1994 was fixed at 17,000 tonnes. The actual export of 16,988 tonnes corresponded with the quota, leaving a surplus production of 4,000 tonnes (*MT* 1994c).⁴² Squash Export had an allocation of 2,250 and exported that amount, though the company could have exported much more. Said a disappointed director, "We had a ship leaving from Tonga with only 700 tonnes on board. It could have taken 3,200 tonnes, but government said no" (pers. com., 1995). Another exporter had a different point of view.

Tongan government has a good reason to put a limit to the export. This is something we exporters always have asked for. In the beginning of the season we always have a good price, which goes up during the season. Only in case of over-production or over-export, the price goes down during the season. But with a slightly lower price and a higher export, the total income for Tonga will be higher. Tonga is holding back, but other countries are increasing their export. That is why I think that the total Tongan export should increase slowly every year. The price in 1994 was the worst we ever had. But since government is not wavering any more with the export allowance, we expect the price this year to start off the same as last year, but then to rise. If we meet the quota, the price will still go up. (Pers. com., 1995)

A third exporter holds a similar opinion,

I worry much about the squash industry in Tonga, because there is a move in the Legislative Assembly to have a free trade in squash, to lift the quota system. I am against this. It is very clear that the time in which we can export to Japan is limited from October till December. In this period Japan only needs 20,000 tonnes a month. If we limit our export, we will get a fixed price. If we export more, we may get nothing at all on the Japanese auction. We have to stick to the quota system and let the Japanese know that we only produce the best quality squash. (Pers. com., 1995)

One exporter founded a consultancy company that exports squash expertise to other small Pacific Island countries, such as Vanuatu. "In the old days," he said, "Tonga used to send out missionaries to the neighbouring islands, now we are sending out squash experts" (*MT* 1994b). The other leading exporters, however, are not at all pleased with this initiative. One of them commented, "If it is just to help another country, then there is nothing wrong with it. But if it is only for his own profit, than it is a wrong attitude" (pers. com., 1995). Another colleague too has a negative opinion about the initiative: "It is very selfish of him. And even then, his own involvement in a foreign country is not going to be long. They want to make use of his advice, and as soon as possible they will have the same knowledge as we, because they are as wise as we are. And then they will discard him" (pers. com., 1995). Behind these negative opinions is, of course, a fear of competition from other countries. There have been some references to the consultancies abroad in local newspapers but no real public debate, since hardly any details

of the arrangements are known to others. The founder of the consultancy company said, "Of course, I have been criticized for my consultancies abroad, not officially by government, but by some of the civil servants." I asked him whether he does not see any contradiction in providing advice on squash to other countries that are competing for the same market. In his answer he referred to his difficulties with the quota system.

In 1994, I was told by government that I could only export half the amount I was able to. I have to satisfy my clients in Japan and maintain my relationships which are built up over the years. I was asked by the government of Vanuatu to assist, and to me, the market is there. The Tongan export is limited, but the other countries can still export. You see, I am a businessman and this is a period of multinationals. My presence in Vanuatu gives me some influence there, but it is also improving my position in Tonga. I am spreading my risks. (Pers. com., 1995)

Thus, this businessman compares his (future) enterprise with that of a multinational. What is a multinational? According to the economist G. Bertram, multinationals or transnational corporations have three special features: (1) they "conceal their true assets and income from tax-gathering and other supervisory authorities," (2) "the nominal prices at which goods and services are transferred from one part of the enterprise to another are not very informative to outside observers," and (3) "multinationals transfer cash from one country to another only when this is the most efficient way of financing planned expenditure in the receiving country" (1993:256). The main objective of multinationals is wealth maximization within the limits of maintaining cohesion.⁴³ The Tongan entrepreneur who compared his enterprise with a multinational intended to grow squash on land that he himself would lease in Vanuatu in 1996. "And," he added suggestively, "I have other business interests than just agriculture."

Conclusions

Generally speaking, capitalist entrepreneurs think of themselves as creative individuals who stimulate technological innovation and mobilize capital and labor within a commercial or industrial project in order to make a profit. This conception does not necessarily include accumulation of private property. Accumulation of private property--of the essential means of production--by the entrepreneur, however, strengthens his or her power position as top manager within the enterprise. Tongan squash exporters have in com-

mon a desire to earn as much money as possible by buying a product from their fellow countrymen, selling it overseas, and thus accumulating capital. The manner in which each goes about realizing a goal, however, is different. The very liberalistic exporter quoted above, with a strong international and "multinational" outlook and preparedness to take business risks, does not want government intervention in his relations with foreign customers. The two other exporters quoted rather emphasize Tonga's national interests and are ready to accept government control as a means of regulating production and securing profit margins. The general manager of Primary Produce supports privatization of the still state-owned company he is working for. These ideas and corresponding ideologies of the leading exporters also outline different currents in conceiving future Tongan entrepreneurship.

Within the Tongan context it is no mere accident that the initiative for an economic development, in this case the introduction of a new cash crop, was taken--or taken over--by a member of the royal family: Prince Mailefihi Tuku'aho. Mailefihi's father, Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake (the king's brother): was at that time still the prime minister of Tonga and had previously been minister of Agriculture. Liava'a, the very initiator of the squash industry in Tonga, already remarked, "I don't think the industry would have flourished if it 'were not for Mailefihi's influence and the support of his father" (*MT* 1993). A staff member of the governmental experimental farm in Vaini affirms that "Prince Mailefihi was his father's actual representative. He was the person who negotiated with Group Trade and organized the growers and distributed the seeds" (pers. com., 1995). In 1995 Mailefihi still obtained the highest export allocation but his colleagues did not consider him as the best performer in organizing the growers. As one of the other leading exporters expressed it, "The fact that he is royal does not make him a good businessman" (pers. com., 1995). In my opinion, however, the very fact that Mailefihi is of royal descent certainly played a part in the success of his business initiative within the Tongan context. This may be a typical aspect of the Tongan version of Polynesian identity in contemporary economic development. The question--in the interviews repeatedly put forward by his fellow-exporters--whether he is a skilled entrepreneur is another matter.

At the beginning of this article I underlined the social and economic importance of the factors put to the fore in the MIRAB model of Bertram and Watters, without agreeing, however, on the supposed *determining* character of these factors. I concluded my discussion on "Conceiving Entrepreneurship" by defining five common characteristics of the leading squash exporters in Tonga: (1) superior education; (2) personal experience overseas, (3) working experience in government, (4) entrepreneurial spirit, and (5) having a large squash plantation of one's own. We may now translate some of these common characteristics of squash exporters in terms of the factors of

the MIRAB model. Superior (and often overseas) education as well as personal experience overseas may be translated as “migration,” while working experience in government may be translated in terms of “bureaucracy.”⁴⁴ The idea of growing squash as a cash crop in Tonga was introduced by the Tongan-New Zealand businessman Tu‘iono Liava’a, who by migration formed a business development link.⁴⁵ The assistance given the first Tongan squash growers by Liava’a’s New Zealand company, Group Trade, might be interpreted as “aid”--although this was certainly not without commercial self-interest since Group Trade was a private company. In the first part of this article we have seen the crucial--but also contested--role of the government (“bureaucracy”) in supporting and promoting as well as guiding and restricting the Tongan squash boom.

Does this mean that MIRAB factors such as migration, aid, and bureaucracy **determined** the rise of the Tongan squash industry? I do not think so.⁴⁶ The occurrence of the recent squash boom and the related development of local entrepreneurship in Tonga actually contradict the assumptions of the MIRAB model of a “stagnating or declining agriculture” and “virtual absence of an indigenous private sector” in South Pacific island economies. Moreover, besides the ordinary logic of capitalism there are also typical Tongan aspects, such as initiatives by members of the royal family, that help to explain this kind of local economic development.

NOTES

I would like to thank all the interviewed Tongan entrepreneurs mentioned or, in several cases, not mentioned in the text. I am also indebted to Futa Helu, Françoise Douaire-Marsaudon, Jan Pouwer, and the three anonymous *Pacific Studies* reviewers for their critical and constructive suggestions, and to Angèle Dorfman for her meticulous corrections of my English.

1. Methodologically Bertram and Watters focus, as they say, on “aggregate economic indicators rather than detailed field work, but obtaining results which we believe to be consistent with the field-research record, and helpful in interpreting it” (1985:497). Note here the concept of *belief* (“we believe”) in the middle of a methodological statement.

2. In 1993 Bertram specified that “the microeconomies of the Pacific . . . are liberal, deregulated open economies with cautious and prudent fiscal policies, and strong balance-of-payments positions over the medium term” (1993:253). According to Bertram, “the ‘gaps’ which have opened up over the long run between exports and imports, and between government expenditure and local revenue, are the *ex-post* consequence of the fact that these economies are driven not by productive factor incomes from domestic industries, but by the flows of rent income to which they hold inherited and negotiated entitlements in the world of the 1980s and 1990s” (ibid.). This, of course, once more would justify the MIRAB model.

3. See van der Grijp 1993b. For assessments of the impact of MIRAB factors on the Tongan economy, see also Ahlburg 1991, Brown and Connell 1993a and 1993b, Brown and Foster 1995, Campbell 1992a, James 1991, Marcus 1993, and Perminow 1993; and for their impact on some other South Pacific economies, see Hooper 1993, Hooper and James 1993, James 1993b, and Munro 1990.

4. For agronomic studies on Tonga, see Hardaker 1975, Thaman 1975, Seminar für landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung 1983, Rathey 1984, and Wiemer 1985; for anthropological studies that place agricultural developments in their cultural context, see Beaglehole and Beaglehole 1941, Koch 1955, Rogers 1975, Hau'ofa 1979, Morgan 1985, and van der Grijp 1993b.

5. We should remember that Tonga has less than 100,000 inhabitants and Japan more than 100 million. According to the last census, held on 28 November 1986, 94,649 people were living in Tonga (Tongan Government 1991:vii); the Statistics Department estimated the population on 31 December 1992 at 98,161 (Tongan Government 1993:l).

6. All year round, Hokkaido and southern Japan absorb more than 50 percent of the Japanese market. Other parts of Japan and other countries supply the rest (MT 1991). In 1993 squash imports were estimated at about 40 percent of the total Japanese consumption (Grynberg 1993).

7. Other main features of Tongan Polynesian identity are (1) the *tu'a-'eiki* dichotomy, a system of asymmetrical ideology about the "right" place of individuals and groups within the society as a whole; (2) the dominant role of kinship in the social relations of production, in particular (but not only) in the subsistence-and-gift economy; and (3) a particular form of land property (van der Grijp 1993a). For comparable distinctions in Samoa, see Macpherson 1988, O'Meara 1990, and Tiffany 1975.

8. The answer to this question may also throw light on the more general anthropological problem of the unique Tongan mixture of Polynesian identity and capitalism. In my monograph *Islanders of the South* (van der Grijp 1993b), I made an effort to treat this general problem in its rich variety of implications. This also includes a chapter on "Tongans as Western-style Entrepreneurs," but the Tongan squash boom is only treated briefly. In two other papers I focus on the actual production of squash and the sociocultural impact of the squash boom, respectively (van der Grijp 1994 and 1996). The present article is, as far as I know, the first more elaborate publication on the recent phenomenon of the Tongan squash industry.

9. In the national newspaper their proceedings were reported: "The first shipment . . . for the season [of 1990] is scheduled to leave for Japan on November 15. The shipment includes 1,900 tonnes arranged by the [already existent] Tonga Growers Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society and 1,000 tonnes arranged by the [new] Squash Export Company Limited. . . . Three or more shipments were expected for 1990" (*TC* 1990c).

10. In March 1992, in view of privatization, the Tonga Commodities Board was restructured and its name changed to Tonga Investment Limited. By 1995 this privatization was still not realized.

11. Seven export firms had shipped the following tonnage: Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing Limited, 9,237; Squash Export Limited, 2,700; Tonga Commodities Board, 2,059; Tai Agency Services, 2,313; Touliki Enterprises, 1,607; Ha'amo Growers, 600; Edwards Company, 50. By this time, the total tonnage for the season was expected to be above 20,000, tonnes (TC 1991f).

12. This was Mailefihī's company, which only later in 1991 he renamed Marketing, Blending and Manufacturing Limited.

13. The Tonga Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society obtained an allocation of 6,000 tonnes; Squash Export, 2,500; and Tonga Commodities Board, 1,500.

14. According to *Matangi Tonga* two of them, Tauteoli International and Sione Latu, never used their licenses (MT 1992). According to one of the other exporters, however, Tauteoli bought squash from growers on Vava'u in 1991 (pers. com., 1994).

15. The journal *Matangi Tonga* claimed that they turned away "thousands of growers" (MT 1991). However, this figure seems exaggerated since in 1991, to quote Prime Minister Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, "there are only about 1,000 squash growers" (Fonua 1991:19). The *Tonga Chronicle* mentioned a figure of 1,550 growers for 1991 (TC 1992f).

16. 'Akolo continued: "The claims could result in payments to growers [of] 8-10 *seniti* per kilo below negotiated prices. . . . Before the current season's start, buyers expected imports of 12,000-15,000 tonnes, . . . but 22,000 tonnes have arrived in Japan, with another shipload on the way" (TC 1991g).

17. A 1991 Tongan government delegation to Japan reported that about 15 percent or 3,285 tonnes of a total of 21,858 tonnes of Tongan squash arrived in Japan undersized, rotten, or both. According to this delegation, the Tongan squash industry "may be impeded or destroyed through poor-quality exports" (TC 1992a). The industry's biggest problem was identified in terms of the exportation of undersized, blemished, decayed, or otherwise inferior squash, "at least 15% of the total export" (TC 1992f).

18. This was the Fanga Falikipako group directed by Siaoosi Puloka. The 1994 allocation was under his personal name.

19. Criteria for the approval of export licenses in 1995 were: (1) a financial statement from the previous year; (2) proof of ability to finance or raise finance to meet commitments; (3) a proposal of how to accomplish a shipping program under which squash would arrive in Japan every seven to ten days; (4) a copy of a letter of credit (or irrevocable letter of credit) from their buyer, contracting a price and method of payment; and (5) any other information that would be helpful to the ministry in deciding suitability to export squash (Fakafanua 1995). The lengthy list for 1996 was subdivided into criteria of financial status, management and marketing experience, and quality standards (Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries 1996).

20. The total allowance did not include a "reserve of 2,500 metric tonnes which may be allocated during the season if export prices so warrant" (TC 1995c).

21. In *Lali Magazine* a lower figure is mentioned for Vava'u: "only 178 tonnes had been shipped from Neiafu" (1994b).

22. In the May season of 1996 an export of 300 tonnes was expected (*TC* 1996e:2).

23. The minister specified that "average Japanese [squash] pumpkin consumption for two months is 34,000 metric tonnes. The market supply [in 1994] exceeded demand by 12,470 metric tonnes." Then followed the rhetorical question, "Can Tonga afford to send more pumpkin to Japan?" (*Fakafanua* 1995:3).

24. In 1994 Tonga had, according to the minister, an "excess production of 13.3%, in 1995 maybe 16.7% (= provision)" (*Fakafanua* 1995:3).

25. Hoef, the manager of the royal enterprise, planned to establish a new royal vanilla plantation of 50 hectares in Foa, Ha'apai (*TC* 1992c).

26. Besides the queen, the two other shareholders are the businessmen Mike Kneubuhl and Jack Riechelmann.

27. Within a year this Malaysian bank changed its name three times. In 1993 it opened as the MBf Royal Bank of Tonga, soon afterwards changed to MBf Bank (Tonga) Limited, then in 1994 became the MBf Bank Limited. The first commercial bank in the country was the Bank of Tonga, and the second was the Australia New Zealand Bank (ANZ). The two new banks (MBf and ANZ) are not yet involved in squash but may be in the future. The arrival of the two new banks in Tonga is perhaps related to the success of squash, but not directly. As one exporter said, "Among economists there has always been the feeling that a couple of commercial banks may be able to survive in Tonga. Now the time may have been appropriate for them to enter Tonga" (*pers. com.*, 1994).

28. To the question whether a member of the royal family "is able to gain special favours from government," Tupouto'a, according to the interviewer, "did not wish his response to this question to be on record" (*Fonua* 1993:12).

29. The second woman elected a people's representative, Papiloa Foliaki, remarked about Princess Mele Siu'ilikutapu's being a member of the royal family and still being a people's representative: "The fact that she had a seat in parliament was important because, generally speaking, through her aristocratic background and connections she gave women in parliament prestige. In this way she has opened the door for other women" (*van der Grijp* 1993b:23 n. 19).

30. Interviews with Feleti Sevele, 11 January 1994 and 3 July 1995, Nuku'alofa; Hopoate Moengangongo, 13 January 1994 and 22 August 1995, Haveluloto; Siotame Tomu Nakao, 11 January 1994, Nuku'alofa, and 3 July 1995, Ma'ufanga; Siope 'Amanaki, 15 December 1993 and 5 July 1995, Ma'ufanga; Fe'ao Talivakaola, 12 August 1995, Neiafu.

31. In 1974 there were three subdivisions of the Tonga Commodities Board. In the present structure there are no subdivisions, only separate companies, subsidiaries under a parent or umbrella company called Tonga Investment. There are currently four companies: (1) Primary Produce Export Limited; (2) FRISCO Limited, for building materials;

(3) Home Case Limited, which involves distribution of LPG gas for domestic use; and (4) Building Quarry Limited, for construction material such as coral blocks and cement. The general director of Tonga Investment is a New Zealander.

32. A recent example is the opening of a Tongan agency of the multinational money-transfer company Western Union, managed by Nakao's daughter.

33. The Nakao family has a majority on the board because the family holds a majority of the shares. Although there are seventeen shareholders, the Nakao family, under the name J. H. Nakao Holdings, has 55 percent of the authorized capital, which is about 80 percent of the paid-up capital.

34. In that year AMACO had a maximum allowance of 340 tonnes. The same amount was exported. This included 300 tonnes basic allowance plus 10 percent extra.

35. 'Amanaki's wife is a shareholder but his nephew is not, nor are the two other directors. 'Amanaki owns 99 percent of the shares and his wife 1 percent. According to him there is no special legal reason for this construction.

36. In 1994 Vava'u Squash Export obtained an allocation of 300 tonnes but by the end of the year was able to ship only 200 tonnes.

37. Talivakaola holds 40 percent, another Vava'u businessman 40 percent, and an accountant 20 percent. The former Vava'u Squash Export had two director/shareholders: Talivakaola and his former business partner, each holding half of the shares.

38. Nakao's first cousin (his mother's brother's son) is now the *nopela* Ma'afu. The first Ma'afu, Nakao's great-grandfather, was the younger brother of Siasia Taufa'ahau Tupou I, the first king of Tonga. According to oral tradition the first Ma'afu moved from the island of Fakakakai in Ha'apai to Tongatapu when the leading chiefs of Tongatapu asked him to become the head of their Ha'a Havea clan (Nakao, pers. com.). Nakao's great-grandfather had three sons. The eldest was Siotetame, Nakao's grandfather. He married three times and had two daughters. The daughter of his last marriage became the heir. She was Nakao's mother.

39. Nakao's emphasis on noble descent through the female line corresponds with traditional Tongan practice (see Douaire-Marsaudon 1993:506-507, 709, 716).

40. Only Moengangongo is an exception to point 5. Regarding the entrepreneurial spirit in other Tongan contexts, see Ritterbush 1988, Ramanlal 1990, Sturton 1992, and van der Grijp 1993b: chap. 6.

41. Not until 1996 did a Japanese business delegation visit Tonga to determine the viability of establishing facilities in Tonga to process squash into powder for export (TC 1996b).

42. An editorial in *Matangi Tonga* observed that 1994 "will be remembered as the year of the Squash Crisis, when more than 4,000 tonnes of unwanted squash pumpkin littered the farms and rotted at the dump" (MT 1994d).

43. Multinationals would share these features with what Bertram and Watters have coined "transnational corporations of kin" (1985, 1986).

44. Hooper and James criticize the concept of bureaucracy since "government positions typically both provide prestige and security as well as money, but the individuals who hold them are not, in Pacific societies, divorced from 'traditional' concerns" (1993:4).

45. What happened to Liava'a? In 1993, when the squash business had been a success for some years, Liava'a visited Tonga again and was, of course, impressed by the impact of his initiative on Tonga's economy. He wanted a share in the success too. "I am talking to government for my fair share of the squash exports to Japan, and I am confident that I will be rewarded for my effort" (*MT* 1993). Unfortunately, there is no information available as to whether Liava'a actually received his reward.

46. A. Hooper, who conducted anthropological fieldwork on the island of Fakaofu in Tokelau, acknowledges that Tokelau today has been "very largely *determined*" by the MIRAB factors (my emphasis). Bertram and Watters suggested that MIRAB transformations were "smooth, incremental and generally adaptive." According to Hooper, however, "this was not the case on Fakaofu," where the process generated "many protracted and divisive conflicts," nor were the outcomes of the process "generally adaptive" (1993:242). Tokelau was one of the five initial cases of the MIRAB model.

REFERENCES

Ahlburg, D.

1991 *Remittances and Their Impact: A Study of Tonga and Western Samoa*. Pacific Policy Papers, no. 7. Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies. Australian National University.

Beaglehole, Ernest, and Pearl Beaglehole

1941 *Pangai: Village in Tonga*. Memoir 18. Wellington: Polynesian Society.

Benguigui, Georges

1989 The Middle Classes in Tonga. *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 98:451-463.

Bertram, Geoffrey

1993 Sustainability, Aid, and Material Welfare in Small South Pacific Island Economies, 1900-90. *World Development* 21:247-258.

Bertram, I. G., and R. F. Watters

1985 The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates. *Pacific Viewpoint* 26:497-519.

1986 The MIRAB Process: Earlier Analyses in Context. *Pacific Viewpoint* 27:47-59.

Brown, Richard P. C., and John Connell

1993a *Entrepreneurs in the Emergent Economy: Migration, Remittances, and Informal Markets in the Kingdom of Tonga*. Canberra: Economics Division, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

1993b The Global Flea-Market: Migration, Remittances, and the Informal Economy in Tonga. *Development and Change* 24:611-647.

Brown, Richard P. C., and John Foster

1995 Some Common Fallacies about Migrants' Remittances in the South Pacific: Lessons from Tongan and Western Samoan Research. *Pacific Viewpoint* 36: 29-45.

Campbell, Ian C.

1992a A Historical Perspective on Aid and Dependency: The Example of Tonga. *Pacific Studies* 15 (3): 59-75.

1992b *Island Kingdom: Tonga Ancient and Modern*. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press.

Douaire-Marsaudon, Françoise

1993 Les premiers fruits: Parenté identité sexuelle et pouvoirs en Polynésie occidentale (Tonga, Wallis, Futuna). 2 vols. Ph.D. thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

Fairbairn, Te'o Ian

1992 *The Tongan Economy: Setting the Stage for Accelerated Growth*. Canberra: Australian International Development Assistance Bureau.

Fakafanua, Tutoatasi

1995 The Past and Future of Pumpkin Exports. *The Tonga Chronicle*, 6 April, 3-4.

Finney, Ben R.

1964 Polynesian Peasants and Proletarians: Socio-economic Change in the Society Islands. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University. Revised and updated publication in 1973, Cambridge: Schenkman.

Fonua, Pesi

1991 Prime Minister Prince Fatafehi Tu'i-pelehake Retires. *Matangi Tonga* 6 (4): 18-19.

1993 HRH Crown Prince Tupouto'a Speaks for the Monarchy. *Matangi Tonga* 8 (1): 8-13.

Grijp, Paul van der

1993a After the Vanilla Harvest: Stains in the Tongan Land Tenure System. *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 102:233-253.

1993b *Islanders of the South: Production, Kinship, and Ideology in the Polynesian Kingdom of Tonga*. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. 154. Leiden: KITLV Press.

1994 Agriculture Became Very Popular: Socio-Cultural Impact of the Tongan Squash Boom. Paper presented at the biannual conference of the European Society for Oceanists, 15-17 December, Basel.

1996 Tongan Culture, Agriculture, and the Failure of a Development Model. Pa&r presented at the biannual conference of the European Society for Oceanists, 13-15 December, Copenhagen.

- 1997 Brown Gold: Official Expectations and Local Assessment of the Tongan Vanilla Production. *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* 104:93-103.

Grynberg, Roman

- 1993 Squash Success: Why Tonga Has Been Able to Get Top Prices in Japan. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, November, 12.

Hardaker, Brian

- 1975 Agriculture and Development in the Kingdom of Tonga. Ph.D. thesis, University of New England, Armidale.

Hardaker, Brian, Julie Delforce, Euan Fleming, and S. Safanaia

- 1988 *Smallholder Agriculture in Tonga: Report of the South Pacific Smallholder Project in Tonga*. Armidale: South Pacific Smallholder Project, University of New England.

Hau'ofa, Epeli

- 1979 *Corned Beef and Tapioca: A Report on the Food Distribution Systems in Tonga*. Development Studies Centre, Monograph 19. Canberra: Australian National University.
- 1994 Thy Kingdom Come: The Democratization of Aristocratic Tonga. *The Contemporary Pacific* 6:414-428.

Hooper, Antony

- 1993 The MIRAB Transition in Fakaofu, Tokelau. *Pacific Viewpoint* 34:241-264.

Hooper, Antony, and Kerry James

- 1993 *Sustainability and Pacific Cultures*. Paper presented at the Fourth Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders, 24-26 June, Tahiti. Published Honolulu: East-West Center, Pacific Islands Development Program, 1994.

James, Kerry

- 1991 Migration and Remittances: A Tongan Village Perspective. *Pacific Viewpoint* 32:1-23.
- 1993a Cutting the Ground from Under Them? Commercialization, Cultivation, and Conservation in Tonga. *The Contemporary Pacific* 5 (2): 215-242.
- 1993b The Rhetoric and Reality of Change and Development in Small Pacific Communities. *Pacific Viewpoint* 34:135-152.
- 1994 The Prodemocracy Movement in Tonga. *Pacific Affairs* 67:242-263.

Koch, Gerd

- 1955 *Südsee-gestern und heute: Der Kulturwandel bei den Tonganern und der Versuch einer Deutung dieser Entwicklung*. Kulturgeschichtliche Forschungen. Braunschweig: Albert Limbach Verlag.

Lali Magazine

- 1994a Seeds of Discontent among Tonga's Pumpkin Exporters. May, 28.
- 1994b Vava'u Beanfeast. June, 19.

Lawson, Stephanie

- 1996 *Tradition versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Macpherson, Cluny

- 1988 The Road to Power Is a Chainsaw: Villages and Innovation in Western Samoa. *Pacific Studies* 11 (2): 1-24.

Marcus, George E.

- 1980 *The Nobility and the Chiefly Tradition in the Modern Kingdom of Tonga*. Memoir 42. Wellington: Polynesian Society.
- 1981 Power on the Extreme Periphery: The Perspective of Tongan Elites in the Modern World Systems. *Pacific Viewpoint* 22:48-64.
- 1993 Tonga's Contemporary Globalizing Strategies: Trading on Sovereignty amidst International Migration. In *Contemporary Pacific Societies*, ed. V. Lockwood, T. Harding, and B. Wallace, 21-33. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industries

- 1996 Criteria for Assessing: Pumpkin Exporters' Performance for Now and the Future. *The Tonga Chronicle*, 24 January, 2.

Morgan, Christopher

- 1985 Competing Circuits in the Vava'u Social Economy. Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.

MT [Matangi Tonga]

- 1991 Squash Exports: No Need to Turn Thousands of Growers Away. 6 (4): 32.
- 1992 Development Bank Lent \$5.2 M to Squash Growers. 7 (1): 19.
- 1993 Businessman: Josh Thought of Squash. 8 (4): 38.
- 1994a Third Name Change for Bank. 9 (3): 6.
- 1994b Vanuatu: Tonga's New Squash Experts in Demand. 9 (2): 22.
- 1994c Huge Surplus Crop Goes to Waste. 9 (5): 4.
- 1994d The Squash Crisis. 9 (5): 7.

Munro, D.

- 1990 Transnational Corporations of Kin and the MIRAB System: The Case of Tuvalu. *Pacific Viewpoint* 31:63-66.

O'Meara, Tim

- 1990 *Samoan Planters: Tradition and Economic Development in Polynesia*. Fort Worth: Holt, Reinhart and Winston.

Perminow, Arne Aleksej

- 1993 Between the Forest and the Big Lagoon: The Microeconomy of Kotu Island in the Kingdom of Tonga. *Pacific Viewpoint* 34:179-192.

Ramanlal, Soane

- 1990 *Private Sector Development in the Kingdom of Tonga*. Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development Program, East-West Center.

Rathey, Rainer

- 1984 *Agriculture in the Economy of the Kingdom of Tonga: Final Report of the Agricultural Economist*. Tongan-German Plant Protection Project. Nuku'alofa: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry.

Ritterbush, S. Deacon

- 1988 Entrepreneurship in Tonga. In *Island Entrepreneurs: Problems and Performances in the Pacific*, ed. Te'o Ian Fairbairn, 137-164. Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development Program, East-West Center.

Rogers, Garth

- 1975 Kai and Kava in Niuatoputapu: Social Relations, Ideologies, and Contexts in a Rural Tongan Community. Ph.D. thesis, University of Auckland.

Seminar für landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung

- 1983 *Investigation on Current Yield Potentials on Tax Allotments on the Islands of Ha'apai and Vava'u, Kingdom of Tonga*. Studien IV, 38. Berlin: Fachbereich Internationale Agrarentwicklung der Technische Universität.

So, Alvin Y.

- 1990 *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.

Speijer, P. R., T. F. Holo, and I. Takau

- 1989 *Pumpkin Production for Export in Tonga*. Technical Bulletin, no. 9. Nuku'alofa: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forests and the Tongan-German Plant Protection Project.

Sturton, Mark

- 1992 *Tonga: Development through Agricultural Exports*. Pacific Islands Development Program Economic Report, no. 4. Honolulu: East-West Center.

Thaman, Randolph

- 1975 The Tongan Agricultural System. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles.

Tiffany, Sharon

- 1975 Entrepreneurship and Political Participation in Western Samoa: A Case Study. *Oceania* 46:85-106.

TC [*The Tonga Chronicle*]

- 1974 Commodities Board Gets New Director. 31 October, 1, 8.
 1978 Dr Sevele Resigns: New Post at SPC. 28 July, 8.
 1987 Two to Aid Pumpkin Exports. 30 October, 1.
 1988 12,000+ Tonnes of Local Pumpkin for Japan. 28 October, 1, 8.
 1989 1,141 Tonnes of Pumpkin Bound for Japan. 17 November, 1.
 1990a Local Pumpkin Growers Will Share T\$666,000. 2 February, 6.
 1990b Pumpkin Growers Seek to Double Exports to Japan. 17 August, 1, 3.

- 1990c Pumpkin Exports Off to Japan Next Week. 9 November, 2.
- 1991a Commodities Board to Join in Pumpkin Exports. 31 January, 5.
- 1991b Market-Flooding Fears of Pumpkin Growers Unfounded. 6 June, 1.
- 1991c House Discuss Vanilla Industry. 22 August, 2.
- 1991d Pumpkin Exports to Japan Set Record for Private Produce Shipments. 7 November, 3.
- 1991e Stored Pumpkins Found Rotting. 21 November, 2.
- 1991f Pumpkin Exports Expected to Earn More Than All '90 Exports. 28 November, 1.
- 1991g Pumpkin Industry Facing Quality, Flooded Market Problems. 19 December, 1.
- 1992a Cabinet Receives Pumpkin Export Report from Delegation That Visited Japan. 16 January, 2.
- 1992b Pumpkin Export Limit, Licensing Criteria Established. 13 February, 1.
- 1992c Royal Vanilla Harvest Anticipated. 5 March, 4.
- 1992d Pumpkin Exporters Make Allocations, Agree to Co-operate. 12 March, 1.
- 1992e Bank Warning: Danger Lies in Too Many Pumpkins for Export. 9 April, 3.
- 1992f Squash Export Allotments, Requirements Stressed. 10 September, 3.
- 1993a Pumpkin Exports Reach 18,000 Tonnes, Value T\$15m+. 2 December, 2.
- 1993b Pumpkin Exporter Ordered to Pay 1991 Growers. 9 December, 3.
- 1994a Free Market System Considered for Pumpkin Exports. 24 March, 1.
- 1994b Pumpkin Exports Set at "Absolute Maximum" of 17,000 Tonnes. 14 April, 1.
- 1994c Pumpkin Harvest Far Below Quota in Vava'u. 26 May, 5.
- 1994d Will N.Z. Squash Over-Supply Impact on Growers Here? 2 June, 2.
- 1994e Squash Quality Must Improve. 22 December, 1, 3.
- 1995a Applications to Overturn Export Regulations of Pumpkin Industry Refused by Court. 2 March, 1.
- 1995b Princess Defends Self, Tongasat in Radio Interview. 2 March, 5, 7.
- 1995c 11 Licensed to Export Pumpkin. 27 April, 1.
- 1995d Organically Grown Pumpkins. 21 September, 3.
- 1995e Growers Promote Agriculture. 5 October, 4.
- 1995f Pumpkin Production Shortfall Anticipated. 5 October, 4.
- 1995g Disappointing Pumpkin Harvest Opens Way to Sell Small Fruits, May Start Price War. 19 October, 2.
- 1995h Pumpkin Prices to Growers Hit 73 Seniti. 2 November, 3.
- 1995i Pumpkin Prices Rise Again as Season Draws Near Close. 9 November, 1.
- 1995j Pumpkin Export Tonnage Continues to Fall Behind. 16 November, 3.
- 1995k Pumpkin Report Urges Retention of Export Quotas. 21 December, 1.
- 1996a Pumpkin Restrictions Dropped. 24 January, 1.
- 1996b Japanese Studying Pumpkin Processing Viability. 22 February, 2.
- 1996c More Pumpkin Tonnage, Exporters Ahead. 14 March, 1.
- 1996d '95 Trade Deficit Stands at T\$79.4m. 21 March, 2.
- 1996e Special Pumpkin Harvest Under Way. 9 May, 2.

Tongan Government

- 1991 *Population Census 1986*. Nuku'alofa: Statistics Department.
- 1993 *Statistical Abstract 1993*. Nuku'alofa: Statistics Department.

van der Grijp. See Grijp, Paul van der

Watters, Ray

1984 The Village Mode of Production in MIRAB Societies. *Pacific Viewpoint* 25: 218-223.

Wiemer, Hans-Jürgen

1985 *Agrarstruktur in Tonga: Eine Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeographische Analyse der Relation von Landrecht und Landnutzung im Kontext wachsender Markt-orientierung am Beispiel eines Inselstaates im Südpazifik*. Sozialökonomische Schriften zur Ruralen Entwicklung, Band 61. Göttingen: Edition Herodot.