

# PACIFIC STUDIES

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a journal devoted to the study of the Pacific--  
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## **REALITY AND FANTASY: THE FOSTER CHILD IN HAWAIIAN MYTHS AND CUSTOMS**

Katharine Luomala  
University of Hawaii

Hawaiians, like other Pacific islanders, narrate prose sagas that incorporate motifs of the quest of a character, almost always male, to learn the identity of and then to locate his biological father.<sup>1</sup> As the father is either a great chief or a god, the youth expects to receive the privileges and rights that he believes are his birthright. Nine Hawaiian characters--eight male, one female (patterned after the male)--ask their female caretaker, "Who is my father?" Although the query is expressed in two tale-types also present elsewhere in the Pacific, no other archipelago has as many different semihistorical, mythical, and fictitious heroes who ask about their unknown father as the Hawaiian Islands.<sup>2</sup>

The principal tale-type as developed in Hawaii begins with a roving chief or sky god having a romantic encounter with a woman usually of lower rank than himself. Before going home he gives her tokens of his rank and a name for their anticipated son. She rears the child alone or, more commonly, with her brother or husband, who punishes the child for behaving as if he were a chief. The unhappy child, feeling himself a misfit in this environment, asks his mother: "Who is my father?" Evasive at first, she finally tells him the truth and advises him how to find his father. When he has located him he proves, often with difficulty at first, that he is indeed his son and entitled to his birthright. The saga often portrays him next as a usurping chief who displaces his elder half-brother or a god to gain great power. He may also marry his royal half-

sister to have offspring of higher rank than himself. But it is the early events in the hero's career that are the major focus of interest here.

The hero of the second tale-type is always named Laka. When his playmates make him aware that unlike them he has no father, he asks his mother, "Who is my father?" He learns that his father was murdered on another island while seeking a birth gift for him. Laka determines to build a canoe and go off to gain revenge and bring home his father's bones. After forest spirits restore a tree each time he has irreverently chopped it down for a canoe, his mother or grandmother tells him how to placate them. Once the spirits are appeased, they make his canoe and he leaves with supernatural companions to successfully avenge his father's death and bring home his bones.<sup>3</sup> Getting the bones is important for otherwise enemies might dishonor them by making them into fishhooks or other artifacts.

Psychoanalysts, psychologists, social workers, and others have observed in both normal and neurotic children and adults, male and female, what they call the "foster-child fantasy," according to which an individual believes that he is not the child of the ordinary couple who are rearing him but is the offspring of renowned, albeit unknown, parents. The motif of a male foster child who is reared without knowing that his natural parents are great personages occurs in many Old World and Near Eastern myths that Freud and his followers, particularly Otto Rank, have interpreted in terms of their psychoanalytical theories. Because in the Hawaiian sagas only the father's identity is unknown to the child, it is of interest to analyze them in relation to the psychoanalysts' theories--which are based on a different culture--and as a reflection of traditional Hawaiian social customs with regard to parentage, rank, adoption, and fosterage. First, I will present a selection of relevant theories of Western psychoanalysts and psychologists based on Euroamerican and Near Eastern culture.

### **Psychoanalytical Theories of the Foster-Child Fantasy**

Otto Rank, while recognizing the importance of cultural variability and diffusion in narratives about the quest for the unknown father, emphasized that their ultimate origin is in the human psyche.<sup>4</sup> The myth-maker, he wrote, created the myth from retrograde infantile fantasies and credited the hero with his own personal infantile history. Rank discerned a pattern, despite differences in expression, in accounts of the lives of fifteen mythic or semimythic Old World heroes. The noble parents have some difficulty with conception, such as prolonged barren-

ness, continence, or taboos on intercourse. When the hero is born they have him exposed, frequently to a watery death, because before or during the pregnancy a prophetic dream or an oracle has cautioned against his birth, usually because of danger that will befall his father. Saved and reared by lowly foster parents or animals until grown, the youth then leaves and after unusual adventures finds his true parents. Although they may acknowledge him as their son he may nevertheless take revenge, especially against his father, for having abandoned him. He may later win honors and fame but his life may end in tragedy. Of the many variations of the pattern, the best known is the Oedipus myth, in which the hero unwittingly slays his father and marries his mother.

The hero, according to Rank, represents Ego acting out in narrative form the Freudian "family romance" of real life. The young child at first idealizes and overvalues his parents as all-powerful and wonderful. However, as he grows more independent he becomes disillusioned by their ordinariness, real or imagined neglect, discrimination, or unsympathetic treatment. He then fancies, sometimes under the influence of romantic stories, that he is not their child but that of exalted persons. The latter represent the idealized parents he once thought his true parents were. As his sexual awareness develops, his strong sentimental attachment to his mother leads him to alter his fantasies so that he now wishes to eliminate competition for her affections. He therefore rebels against his father with the subconscious intent of displacing him. Nevertheless, he usually conceals his forbidden erotic wishes by trying to free himself from parental authority, develop a mature, integrated personality, and achieve his goals. As he grows older he consciously but ambivalently criticizes his fantasy while subconsciously clinging to it. Even as a normal adult he may revert to it in dreams. The male's Oedipus complex thus described has its counterpart in the female's Electra complex.

Fantasies of foster parentage and noble lineage led some of Philip R. Lehrman's patients to delusions of grandeur of being a crown prince or princess deprived of a rightful heritage.<sup>5</sup> Among milder expressions of their fantasy, these individuals evinced great interest in their genealogy, were estranged from their family, denied their nationality, changed their name, joined secret societies, or either sought or bestowed titles and degrees. An individual's fantasy might be released by a national upheaval or a major shift of residence. An immigrant, for instance, might revise his personal history in order to claim that he had high social position and estates in his homeland. On the other hand, the fantasies of a normal individual generally became the basis of constructive plans and actions, not of deception as an imposter or poseur.

To test the theory that all or most children have the foster-child fantasy during the development of the "family romance" and are influenced by it, Edmund S. Conklin in 1920 issued a questionnaire to 904 male and female students of late high school and early college age.<sup>6</sup> In the sample 28.5 percent had voluntary immediate recall of the fantasy, mainly in an incipient, unclear stage as a belief, daydream, or casual thought. More than half had it between the ages of eight to twelve. Slightly more girls than boys recalled it. The fantasy lasted either a brief time or as long as two years, with an occasional respondent still clinging to it. Almost as many who at first believed themselves of inferior as opposed to superior origin revised that fantasy to include greatness as they became more independent and lost the feeling of helplessness that had made them believe themselves orphans or foundlings.

Some respondents believed that their "real" parents were wealthy, noble, famous, or royal, or were supernatural beings. There were also those who thought that they were of status similar to that of the assumed foster parents. Many gave additional reasons for their fantasy that were not on Rank's list of real or imagined parental mistreatment and neglect, lack of affection, and suggestions from stories. These additional reasons included philosophizing (especially by boys) and knowing or hearing of actual cases of adoption and fosterage. Other reasons were dissatisfaction with economic limitations (usually by those with the fantasy of highborn parentage), absence of mental and physical family resemblance (especially by girls), encounters with famous people, and peculiar family circumstances (stepparent, family quarrels, marital infidelity, and parents' prolonged absences). Some individuals, having conceived the idea, sought proof, but others became depressed, ran away, and engaged in alienating behavior. Still others tried to behave better through gratitude to their assumed foster parents.

Since the psychoanalysts and psychologists have formulated and illustrated the foster-child fantasy almost entirely on the basis of Euroamerican and Near Eastern society and literature, it is of interest to see how both fantasy and reality are expressed in the narratives, beliefs, and customs of a different society, namely the Hawaiian, in which paternity was frequently actually in doubt.

### **Nine Hawaiian Father-Seekers**

Of the nine Hawaiian characters asking "Who is my father?" because they do not believe that their male caretaker is their biological father, only the demigods Māui and Laka are known outside the Hawaiian

Islands, and only Laka's father is dead.<sup>7</sup> The Hawaiian Māui is the only Hawaiian father-seeker born in nonhuman form. His mother, Hina-of-the-fire, bore him as an egg, which hatched into a crowing cock that then became a male child.

Three heroes who actually lived in the Hawaiian Islands around the fifteenth or sixteenth century A.D. are 'Umi-a-Liloa, son of Liloa, the sacred paramount chief of northwestern Hawaii, and a very low-ranking chiefess; 'Umi's future brother-in-law Kiha-a-Pi'ilani, son of Pi'ilani, the ruling chief of eastern Maui, and his highborn queen; and Pāka'a, son of a commoner named Kūanu'uanu, King Keawe-a-'Umi's chief steward, navigator, and councilor. Kūanu'uanu named his expected son by a minor chief's daughter for Keawe's scaly and wrinkled (*pāka'a*) skin caused by his excessive indulgence in kava, a chief's privilege. Both Kiha and 'Umi became great kings and conquerors while both Pāka'a and his son served Keawe, as did Kūanu'uanu. In genealogies Māui, 'Umi, and Kiha are listed among the ancestors of Kings Kamehameha I and Kalākaua. There appears to be no genealogy for Pāka'a, perhaps because his low rank did not permit him to keep one, which only chiefs could do. A high chief might give a valuable commoner a nominal title of chief as Keawe did to Pāka'a and his father, but such titles were outside the category of inherited rank as a chief.

Three heroes and a heroine are completely fictitious and no one claims descent from them in royal genealogies. Unlike the matter-of-fact narrative style of the sagas about 'Umi, Kiha, and Pāka'a, the sagas about the four fictitious characters are florid in style, the incidents fantastic, and supernatural characters much in evidence. Each of the four has a highborn father and a mother who is usually a commoner. One hero's mother, however, is exceptional in being the supernatural queen of a floating island where she has a romance with an earthly ruling chief. Their son's name, Na-ku'e-maka-pau-i-ke-ahi (Eyebrows burnt off in the fire), commemorates the chief's accident while trying to teach the queen to make fire and cook food, which were not known on her island. Like several other romantic and precocious heroes, Naku'emaka is born three years after his father's departure, walks on the second day, talks on the third, and plays darts on the sixth day with big boys who taunt him for being fatherless.

Another fictitious hero is Kalani-manui'a (High Chief Manui'a), whose name reflects his father's pride in his own rank and that of his anticipated son despite the mother being a commoner. How Nī'au-e-po'o, a cloudland king's son, got his name and what it means is uncertain.<sup>8</sup> If it were Nī'au-'e-'e-po'o (Coconut leaf midrib climbing to the

summit) it would refer to the boy's journey to his sky father on a stretching coconut tree (a familiar narrative device).<sup>9</sup> Actually Nī'au just sat on the tree as it rose, he did not climb it, but he is not the only hero or heroine to do that in a story. The fourth fictitious character is a female named Lau-kia-manu-i-Kahiki (Bird trapping leaf in Kahiki), her cloudland father's name for his anticipated daughter by a commoner.

I have located thirteen published narratives in which each of the nine father-seekers asks directly or indirectly about the father's identity. Three versions with the query relate to 'Umi; two each to Laka and Pāka'a; and one each to Māui, Kiha, Kalanimanui'a, Nī'au, Laukia-manu, and Naku'emaka.<sup>10</sup>

Although only three narrators have 'Umi ask about his father, none of the numerous other references to him express any doubt of his being the son of Liloa's misalliance with a low-ranking woman. Perhaps the other narrators regarded 'Umi's query as superfluous since, like the three storytellers who include it, they have 'Umi's mother protest to her husband that the boy he is beating is not his son but King Liloa's. The mother's protest naming the natural father is sufficient for 'Umi to seek out King Liloa.

All narrators agree that Kiha, the younger son of the ruling chief of eastern Maui and his highborn wife of an important Oahu family, was reared by his royal mother and her kin at the court of Queen Kūkani-loko on Oahu. However, only one narrator describes Kiha's boyhood and states that when the boy's maternal uncle scolded him for wasting food he asked his mother about his absent father. It seems unlikely that the son of two such prominent persons would never have heard at the Oahu court that his father was Chief Pi'ilani of Maui. This narrator, like the three who have 'Umi ask about his father's identity, is trying to adapt another famous legendary chief to the popular hero pattern. He has used stock incidents to fill a gap in knowledge about the boy Kiha's relationships with his mother and other caretakers.

Obscurities in those variants with the child's query can be illuminated by those without it. The demigod Māui's query, for instance, occurs only in an ambiguous name chant that is a cryptic biography of his life from birth to death, listing his struggles to gain power and usurp the privileges of gods. The chant is part of the *Kumulipo*, a genealogical creation chant compiled in its present form perhaps around A.D. 1700. Hina is puzzled because although she has slept with neither a fowl nor a man she has given birth to an egg that hatched into a cock and became a male child, called Māui-of-the-malo. A malo is a frequent symbol for sexual intercourse, and the cock, of a usurping chief. After defying his

maternal uncles and the gods Kane and Kanaloa, Māui asks his mother who his father is. She denies that he has a father, saying that the loin-cloth of Akalana (Kalana) is his father. The fact that she sends him to his *makua kāne*, male parent, for a fishhook called Mānai-a-ka-lani (Needle of the sky) hints that his father is a sky god. The difficulty in this context is that *makua kāne* may designate the father, uncle, or male cousin of either the mother's or the father's generation.

However, a fragmentary prose narrative that lacks the query identifies the father with the sky, for he is Makali'i (Pleiades), to whom Māui travels on a stretching coconut tree. The latter is his transformed maternal uncle who earlier took the shape of a canoe to transport Hina to her dream lover, Makali'i, then on Kauai. The two had eight children, including Māui, before they separated.<sup>11</sup>

A different myth without the query about the father also throws light on the name chant. In one of its two variants, Kane and Kanaloa magically impregnate Hina when, while bathing, she puts on the malo of Chief Kalana-mahiki of Hilo. In this fragment the egg Hina bears becomes Māui, whom she sends, when he has grown up, to live with his father, Kalana-mahiki, and his half-brothers. The two tokens--the chief's malo and his staff--that she now gives him were not mentioned earlier.<sup>12</sup> There the story ends. The other variant, while fuller, lacks the tokens, the egg, and the malo owner's name. The owner, however, is obviously a chief because the malo is red, the color of chiefs. And when Hina tells her husband, Akalana, about the red malo he says, "We shall have a lord."<sup>13</sup>

These two variants suggest that Akalana (Kalana) is Hina's nominal husband but not Māui's real father. Narratives about Māui, like those about 'Umi and Kiha, have assimilated him to the hero pattern to give him a more distinguished father than his mother's less impressive husband. The process in which Māui asks who his father is was already well under way by A.D. 1700.

Two heroes whose careers resemble those of the nine characters and have been based on the traditional hero pattern have not been included in this study. This is because they do not need to ask "Who is my father?"<sup>14</sup> They have always known his identity. Each, taking his father's tokens with him, leaves his mother and stepfather or foster father to join his natural father in the sky. The father of one of the two heroes asks the mother to use the name Ke-au-nini-'ula-o-ka-lani (The restless red current of heaven) if their anticipated child is a boy. Keaunini does not ask his mother who his father is but only how to reach him. When he meets his father they fight and Keaunini kills him

because the father did not give him a chance to display the tokens and prove his relationship. The other hero, Na-maka-o-ka-pāo'o (The eyes of the goby), presumably was also named by his father but the narrator does not say so. The storyteller, obviously beginning to create a new saga from old materials, neither integrated nor completed his story. How the boy learned his father's name and whereabouts is not divulged nor even how he reached his cloudland father.

The following outline gives the principal elements of those parts of the sagas that concern the parentage, childhood, and meeting with the father of each of the nine characters. Excluded are both the father's numerous adventures that led to his meeting the mother and the hero's later career. Laka, son of Wahieloa and Hina, and Kiha, son of Pi'ilani and Lā'ielohelohe, are absent from Part I of the outline because unlike the other characters they were not conceived at a clandestine meeting; they were born to parents who were already married to each other.

### *Part I. The Parents' Meeting and Separation*

A roving chief ("king") of Hawaii, Oahu, or a cloudland has an affair with a woman at her bathing place. When she becomes pregnant he leaves her with a name for the expected child and tokens of rank by which it can later prove its paternity. The father may also instruct the mother about how the child should present itself to him in order to be recognized. On returning to his domain he may prepare amenities for the child's expected arrival. (The child's name is given below in parentheses.)

#### **The Couple**

- *Father.* An earthly chief or king: Liloa ('Umi); Kaewaeoho (Naku'emaka); Kū (Kalanimanui'a); Akalana or Kalana-mahiki (Māui, variants). A commoner: Kūanu'uanu (Pāka'a). A supernatural sky god or king: Kane and Kanaloa or Makali'i (Māui, variants); Kūalaka'i (Nī'au); Maki'ioeoe (Laukiamanu).
- *Mother.* A commoner: Kauno'a (Kalanimanui'a); Hina (Nī'au); Hina (Laukiamanu). A minor chiefess: Lā'amaomao (Pāka'a); Akāhikuleana ('Umi). A supernatural being: Hina-of-the-fire (Māui); Kaanaelike (Naku'emaka).<sup>15</sup>

#### Father's Instructions

- *Child's Name.* Formula: "If a boy, name it (father's choice), if a girl, name it for your side." Exception: "If a girl, name it Laukiamanukahiki, if a boy, Maki'ioeoe."
- *Orders for Child's Recognition.* Child is to present tokens to its father. Exceptions: No tokens left for Pāka'a, Naku'emaka, and

Māui (except in one variant). Child must also arrive in a red canoe with red sails, red crew, and red gear (Nī'au, Laukiamanu).

- *Tokens.* Malo, warclub, whale-tooth necklace ('Umi); malo, spear (Kalanimanui'a); red feather helmet, cape, canoe (Nī'au); feather cloak, whale-tooth necklace, bracelet (Laukiamanu); chief's malo and staff (Māui, variant).
- *Father's Preparations.* Taboos his royal wife's daughter for expected son's wife (Nī'au); taboos bathing pool and other amenities for expected child (Nī'au, Laukiamanu).

### *Part II. The Child's Upbringing*

The child, reared by the mother and her kin, feels a misfit. Its uncle or stepfather mistreats it, or if reared only by the mother it notices that other children have a father. The child may have more than one reason for asking the mother who its father is. Sometimes evasive at first, she identifies the father, produces the tokens (if any), and advises the child about the journey and how to behave toward its father.

#### **Caretakers**

- *Primary caretaker.* Mother ('Umi, Kiha, Pāka'a, Naku'emaka, Kalanimanui'a, Nī'au, Laukiamanu, Māui, and Laka in one variant); grandmother (Laka, in another variant).
- *Secondary caretakers.* Stepfather ('Umi, Laukiamanu, Kalanimanui'a, Māui). Maternal kin: grandparents, ancestor (Nī'au); grandmother, grandaunt (Laukiamanu); uncle ('Umi, Kiha, Pāka'a); uncles (Māui, one variant); mother or grandmother (Laka, variants).

#### **Child's Queries to Mother about Father**

- *Age.* Six days old (Naku'emaka); four years old (Pāka'a); "not yet grown up" (Laka); pre-adolescent or adolescent (implied for others).
- *Reasons for Queries.* Observes playmates have a father (Laka, Nī'au, implied for Naku'emaka); reflects, wonders, reasons about father ('Umi, Pāka'a, Māui); wants more power after defeating uncles and gods (Māui); hears mother tell stepfather ('Umi, Kalanimanui'a); feels real father would be kinder (Kiha, Laukiamanu, implied for 'Umi); unhappy because male caretaker punishes him for generosity with food to playmates ('Umi, Kalanimanui'a, Laukiamanu), eating before him ('Umi), eating too much ('Umi, Kiha), destroying plants (Kiha), all characteristics of a chief.
- *Number of Queries before Learning Truth.* One ('Umi, Kiha); two (Naku'emaka, Māui, Laka); asks for ten days (Kalanimanui'a); asks persistently (Pāka'a, Nī'au, Laukiamanu).

- *Form of Query.* ‘Umi: “Have I not a different father?” Or, “Have I no other father but this one?” “Is he my only *makua*?” Or, “Is this indeed my father?” Kiha: “Where is my father? This is not my father. He is a man who gets angry with me.” Pāka‘a, after rejecting statement that his maternal uncle, a small boy, is his father: “Who is my father and where is he?” Or, he “began to wonder where his father was.” Kalanimanui‘a: “Who then is my father?” Naku‘emaka, after playing with boys who have a father and saying that he knew he had a father because he knew the reason for his name, asks, “Where is my father?” Nī‘au “asked where his own father might be.” Māui “reflected, asked who was his father.” Laka: “How is it that I have no father while other children have one?” Or, his long-lost father “is asked about by Laka.” Laukiamanu “began questioning who her own father was until the mother could stand it no longer.”

**Mother’s Initial Reply if Evasive.** To Kalanimanui‘a: “You have no father, this (her husband) is your father.” To Nī‘au: “Alas! He is dead, only we two are left.” To Laukiamanu: “The cliff is your father” (cliff denies this); “the bamboo is your father” (bamboo denies this, names the father); the mother confirms this. To Naku‘emaka: “You have no father.” To Pāka‘a: “Mailou (her young brother) is your father.” To Māui, “You have no father.” To Laka: “Ask your grandmother.”

#### **Mother’s Aid in Finding Father**

- *Gives Material Objects.* Father’s tokens (‘Umi, Kalanimanui‘a, Māui, variant; Nī‘au forgets to take them); calabash of winds and bundle with white malo, fine grass cape, fan (Pāka‘a); red canoe and escort on her rolling island (Naku‘emaka); canoe and food (Kiha).
- *Gives Other Help.* Sends her young brother ‘Ōma‘okamau as attendant to carry warclub (‘Umi); explains route, proper behavior to be acknowledged by father--namely, sit on his lap (permitted only to his own children), tell name, show tokens if any (‘Umi, Kiha, Pāka‘a), but Kiha as younger son is to sit on father’s left knee, take food and drink from his left hand, as the right side belongs to older son; sends child to her elders for help (Nī‘au, Laukiamanu, Laka); advises how to placate forest spirits (Laka, variant).
- *Mother’s Helpful Elders.* Her parents give direction-finding bow and arrow (Nī‘au); shape-shifting ancestor or uncle takes child to sky (Nī‘au, Māui in one variant); child’s blind, banana-cooking grandmother and grandaunt provide stretching bamboo to sky

(Laukiamanu); grandmother advises how to placate forest spirits to get canoe and four supernatural men become his crew (Laka, variants).

- *Mother's Lack of Help.* Neither mentions nor gives tokens to daughter (Laukiamanu).

### *Part III. Journey and Arrival at Father's Court*

On the journey to an earthly or sky father, the child's adventures, if any, may be pleasant or hazardous. No child is immediately accepted by its father. It may even be killed and later magically restored to life when priests identify its spirit. Ceremonies and marriage may follow but may be marred by the mother's revenge against the father for initially rejecting their son. There is no information on Māui's reception.

**Events Enroute.** Mother recites protective spells as stretching tree raises frightened boy to sky (Nī'au); child wins games with boys in sky (Nī'au); acquires friend of same sex in sky (Nī'au, Laukiamanu); adopts one or more boys as sons and companions ('Umi); joins crew of sight-seeing king to reach Hawaii (Pāka'a).

#### **Arrival at Court**

- *Father's Initial Rejection.* Has guards seize or try to seize apparent taboo-breaker ('Umi, Pāka'a, Laukiamanu, Naku'emaka); drops child from lap ('Umi), or tries but fails to drop child from lap (Pāka'a); surprised at younger son sitting on his right knee and taking food from his right hand (Kiha); has child killed (Kalanimanui'a's body thrown in ocean; bodies of Nī'au and friend to become burnt sacrifices; Laukiamanu thrown in pigpen, to be killed and baked later); no information (Māui); encounters witch guarding his dead father's bones (Laka).
- *Reasons.* Child has no tokens or red canoe (refused to go in one); uses tabooed amenities (Nī'au, Laukiamanu); marries tabooed half-sister (Nī'au); gets no chance to show tokens or tell name (Kalanimanui'a); is unrecognized on lap ('Umi, Kiha, Pāka'a, Naku'emaka).

**Father's Acknowledgment.** Sees his necklace on child ('Umi); hears son's name (Kiha, Pāka'a); recognizes son when he shifts to his right knee (Pāka'a); priest identifies child (Naku'emaka); when priests say the slain child's spirit rises from sea each night, father has it netted (Nī'au, Kalanimanui'a); ancestor Niu-ola-hiki (Life extending coconut tree), who raised child to sky, now takes eel form to have sea gods resuscitate Nī'au and turn friend into a red fish; priests partially restore and resuscitate slain child's body (Kalani-

manui'a); grandaunt in owl form brings tokens, chants parentage (Laukiamanu); no information on means of identification (Māui).

#### Some Subsequent Events

- *Ceremonies*. Symbolic navel-cutting ceremony to confirm son's identity ('Umi); feast of celebration (Naku'emaka); faulty rites to appease Niuolahiki, a factor in father's death (Nī'au); beauty contest, magically judged, selects completely restored son as winner (Kalanimanui'a).
- *Revenge*. Father orders guards killed and baked for not recognizing child (Naku'emaka, Laukiamanu); mother angry over father's initial rejection kills him, he becomes a fish (Nī'au); mother would have killed father but son helps him with wife-identification contest (Naku'emaka);<sup>16</sup> Laka and his crew kill the guardian of his father's bones and take them home.
- *Trouble with Siblings*. Elder half-brother angry at child usurping his privileges and rights; to escape death when brother becomes king, hero hides incognito in exile; priests recognize him, help him kill and depose half-brother and become king ('Umi, Kiha); brothers' broken taboo causes magically hooked islands to scatter (Māui).
- *Marriage*. Hero weds half-sister ('Umi, Nī'au, Kalanimanui'a); weds half-brother (Laukiamanu).

### Psychological Factors in the Sagas

Each Hawaiian male character's puzzlement about his true father recalls the foster-child fantasies of Conklin's American respondents and Freud's and Ranks theories, based on Old World and Near Eastern myths, that narrators project into each character's life their own childhood fantasies based on the "family romance." Of Conklin's respondents, more girls than boys reported having the fantasy, but in traditional narratives in Hawaii and other parts of the Pacific males are almost always the father-seekers. In Polynesian narratives, in fact, I have come across only three examples of a female quest for the unknown father; each example, whether from Hawaii, New Zealand, or the Tokelaus, is differently developed.<sup>17</sup> The saga about the Hawaiian girl, Laukiamanu, was, I suggest, adapted from those about male father-seekers, most specifically that about Nī'au; the Nī'au saga, in turn, may have been inspired by that about Kalanimanui'a. The three sagas constitute a unit with numerous detailed similarities beyond those they share with the other sagas.

When the child asks the decisive question, "Who is my father?" that

will change his life, he is, except for very precocious youngsters like Naku'emaka and Pāka'a, at a pre-adolescent or adolescent stage like Conklin's respondents. The child's uncertainty about his natural father, some storytellers suggest, originated earlier and then crystallized. The same applies to Conklin's respondents except that they thought they had been reared by two adoptive parents, not by a surrogate father and a natural mother.

Like Conklin's respondents, the Hawaiian characters had other reasons for asking the question besides their tendency to reflect and feel unhappy and alienated. Like the Old World and Near Eastern heroes, the Hawaiians were reared under humble or unusual circumstances, but the Hawaiian reasons usually developed from the child being punished by the surrogate father for chieflike behavior relating to food when, presumably, he was a commoner (except for Kiha). A chief always had plenty of food to eat but had the responsibility to distribute some to his dependents in return for their having produced it and having otherwise served him. The child ate too much, wasted food, destroyed plants, distributed family food generously to his playmates, or, feeling superior to his surrogate father, ate before he did. Chieflike qualities were also evident in his skill in surfing and other sports. Except for a child like Laka reared in a one-parent home, the father-seekers appear to have been well-liked by their peers, doubtless because of their generosity. In the one-parent home without a male authority the child's chieflike quality was exhibited by his success in games, which led his playmates to taunt him as fatherless.

Most Hawaiian father-seekers had a substitute male parent who was either the mother's husband or one of her brothers. The substitute is a commoner or, like Kiha's uncle, of lower rank than the natural father. The image of the surrogate father is negative, and perhaps to further degrade him few narrators bother to give his name. He and the child, whether male or female, are mutually hostile, with food as the most frequent source of overt dispute. Psychologically, he displaces the real father as the object of the growing child's rebellion and disillusionment. Nonetheless, after assuming his rightful rank, the child rarely takes revenge for earlier mistreatment. After all, the man had mistakenly assumed (except in the case of Kiha and perhaps Māui) that the child was his and must be taught behavior appropriate to the humble way of life he would always lead. He and the child are not only hostile to each other but probably jealous, for there is a very close and loving bond between mother and son. The substitute father's role highlights the child's supernatural or chieflike qualities, provides a contrast with the

natural father who represents the ideal, and motivates the son to ask if he has no other father but this man. The answer to the query propels him out into the world to achieve his destiny.

Each father-seeker, male or female, is either the mother's only child or narrators have obscured the presence of half-brothers and half-sisters who would compete for the mother's affection. Māui, known to have brothers, is an exception., but the *Kumulipo*, after naming them, completely ignores them. In prose narratives, however, they function importantly as Māui's foils and marplots. Sibling rivalry is most developed as a theme after the son has been accepted at his natural father's court. He must then contend with mistrust, jealousy, and physical danger not only from his half-brother, his father's chosen heir and his first-born son by a high-ranking chiefess, but from court attendants. The father himself, once he is certain that the newcomer is his son, performs the role of the ideal father in all but one important respect. He does not choose him, instead of his half-brother, as his heir and successor.

Unlike the Old World and Near Eastern myths, the Hawaiian narratives omit the warning against the child's birth, the child's abandonment, and its later revenge for the abandonment. In most Old World sagas, the hero is reared by neither of his natural parents; in the Hawaiian, the child's natural mother always rears her child and lives with him among her kinfolk who assist in rearing him.

Hawaiian narrators do not treat the natural father's absence as abandonment since he left a name for the expected child and, in most cases, tokens of his rank to confirm the child's paternity. Narrators justify his absence as due to homesickness, the call of official duties, the need to prepare for the child's eventual arrival in his kingdom, and the search for a birth gift. Abandonment is thus glossed over. The child, on learning who his natural father is, does not feel he was abandoned; instead, he is happy and eager to join him.

Although the child questions who his natural father is, he never doubts that the woman rearing him is his real mother. The girl Laukiamanu, although seemingly hostile to her mother as well as to her mother's husband, takes for granted that she is living with her natural mother. The male father-seeker has a very protective mother who plays a large role in his life from the time of his birth until his departure. While he detaches himself from her by leaving, she may reappear in his life later. 'Umi's mother is a model. She rears him carefully, protests her husband's mistreatment of him, identifies his father, gives him the tokens, and tells him how to reach the court. She also gives him her younger brother, about 'Umi's age, as his squire. After King Liloa's

death when 'Umi has to escape with his life from his hostile half-brother, now the king, he regresses and returns for shelter to her. However, she warns him he is not safe with her but should seek safety in exile outside his half-brother's kingdom. After he becomes king, 'Umi's bond with his mother remains strong. He invites her to live at the court with her husband and her children born since his departure from home.

A father-seeker's mother can also be extremely vindictive on his behalf. Naku'emaka and Nī'au each have a mother who enables them to journey to their father and who later takes revenge against the father for having initially rejected their son. Naku'emaka remains loyal to his father, who escapes death only through his assistance, but Nī'au's father is slain and transformed into a fish.

Each mother at first evades telling her son of his father's identity, perhaps through reluctance to have him leave her, grow up, and face the dangers inherent in his ambition to claim his heritage. Each mother is determined--and is sometimes supported by her parents, grandparents, and ancestors--that his natural father shall acknowledge him and grant him the status they feel is due him. The son's journey is both a psychological and a physical transition. It marks the death of his childhood and the start of his adult life. It removes him from his mother's side and her limited social environment to a larger arena and great danger.

The case of the girl Laukiamanu presents a problem. Her mother appears hostile to her, but this may be due to the narrator forgetting to mention the father's tokens--both when he leaves and when the girl departs to find him. The mother never mentions the tokens and Laukiamanu leaves without them. The mother earlier seems reluctant to admit that the girl's father is the king that Bamboo told her about. She does tell the girl of her father's requirements as to the canoe and its gear that will identify her on her arrival. The headstrong and impatient girl will not listen, although the mother warns that she will suffer "untold agony." She then sends the girl to her own older relatives for transportation on a stretching bamboo to the king's cloudland. The tokens are mentioned for the first time when the grandmother flies in with them and saves the girl's life. At last she is accepted by her father. The apparent ambiguity of the mother may have resulted from jealousy of her daughter becoming the pampered chiefess in her former lover's court.

The Hawaiian introduction of the conventional "Who is my father?" query into narratives about real kings like 'Umi and Kiha recalls Thomas Mann's statement that not only does the biographer seek to assimilate his subject's life to a conventionalized form but that the subject may

also see his life as the reanimation of myth, not, however, as "I am like--" but as "I am--."<sup>18</sup> The outline of these nine sagas illustrates the application of the pattern not only to semihistorical kings but to demigods and fictitious characters. Fantasy and reality have shaped the pattern. The many Hawaiian social customs relating to fosterage, adoption, parenthood, and rank have inspired children and even adults to believe that the fantasies in the sagas could become realities in their own life. These social customs are discussed next.

### **A Basis for Fantasy in Social Reality**

Hawaiians surpassed other island peoples in the number of stories of mythic, semihistorical, and fictitious characters inquiring about their biological father's identity; they probably also surpassed them in elaborating a set of customs of adoption and fosterage not only of children but of adults. If, as Robert H. Lowie stated, "Oceania as a whole represents a main center for adoption carried to unusual lengths,"<sup>19</sup> then Hawaii may well be the heart of that center.

Following is a summary of the pattern of adoption and fosterage of which there were (and still are) many variations and exceptions--enough to excite a young person's imagination to develop a latent fantasy of having very distinguished parents. In Hawaiian fantasies these ideal parents would be even more distinguished than the known natural or adoptive parents, for many, if not most, children, whether born of chiefs or commoners, were reared by other than their natural parents. Adoption followed class lines with commoners adopting children of commoners and chiefs those of chiefly rank. The natural parents either retained primary rights or surrendered them temporarily to surrogate parents. To prevent supernatural punishment with the child as the victim, the natural parents had to fully approve the transfer, agree with the substitute parents as to whether the transfer was temporary or permanent, not quarrel with them over the child, and if the transfer was supposed to be permanent, not take back the child unless the adoptive parents died. As the two sets of parents were usually kinfolk, members of the same extended family (*'ohana*) or close friends who usually lived near each other, the child was not cut off from its biological parents or extended family and was not kept ignorant of its origin. The adoption of the child was intended to reinforce existing alliances and create new ones beneficial to all concerned.<sup>20</sup>

The grandparents' claim to grandchildren took precedence over that of the natural parents, who had to get their consent to keep a child to

rear for themselves. The firstborn, if a boy, customarily went to the paternal grandparents; a girl went to the maternal grandparents. According to Mary Kawena Pukui, “The whole feeling was that the first grandchild *belonged* [her italics] to the grandparents. The natural mother had the baby on a kind of ‘loan’ basis.” Children born later might be adopted by the grandparents’ siblings and lateral relatives and then by the parents’ siblings and lateral relatives and friends. Adoptive parents reared and educated the child in a way appropriate to its birth order, social class, sex, and future career. An adopted child, particularly if firstborn, often became an indulged favorite but was responsible for becoming the family specialist in its traditional knowledge, supervising and caring for younger siblings, and eventually serving as family leader and counselor.<sup>21</sup>

English translators of Hawaiian texts often use the English terms “adoption” and “fosterage” interchangeably, and the line between them in Hawaiian custom sometimes appears to waver. But whether this is the result of different regional usage in the past or of modern Hawaiian interpretations is not clear. Two major Hawaiian terms relevant to the matter are *ho’okama* (to be discussed later) and *hānai*. According to Pukui and Elbert, *hānai* as a noun refers to an adopted or foster child.<sup>22</sup> As an adjective it describes either the nurtured or the nurturing person. The child in question is *keiki hānai* or *he hānai*. As a verb *hānai* means to feed, rear, nourish, and sustain. I find that the adoptive parent, if a commoner, is called *makua hānai*, but if of chiefly rank, more properly, *kahu hānai*. Pukui, emphasizing the permanency of the *hānai* relationship, has stated that a child “is the *hānai* of his permanent, adoptive parents” and the relationship is as permanent as that in modern legal adoption (*ho’ohiki*).<sup>23</sup> The difference is that in modern legal adoption outside the family the child severs all ties with natural parents and other kin, whereas in *hānai* he retains contact with his natural parents and ‘ohana. How generally Pukui’s interpretation of *hānai* as a permanent relationship would have been accepted in earlier times is uncertain. According to Pukui, a child cared for temporarily or part-time by foster parents was called *luhi*, and its natural parents had the right to reclaim it when they wished. Today some individuals reared for a long time by other than their natural parents either do not understand or remember whether they were *luhi* or *hānai* of a relative, the foster child or the adopted child.<sup>24</sup> They also confuse the relationship with modern legal adoption and may seek legally to get a share of the adoptive parents’ property.

References to ‘Umi’s boyhood demonstrate the varied traditional uses

of the term *hānai*. When 'Umi, who had been carefully brought up (*hānai*) by his natural mother, Akāhiakuleana, asked her if the man who beat him was his only *makua kāne* (literally, male parent) and if he had a different one, he either hoped or suspected that the man was not his *luau'i makua kāne* ("true" or natural father) but either his *makua kāne hānai* ("feeding" or adoptive father) or *makua kāne kōlea* (stepfather) and that he was his keiki *hānai* ("feeding" or adopted son). 'Umi, listeners know, is not contemplating merely moving to a nearby relative's or friend's house following the custom of commoners' children who, whether ill treated or not, roamed at will from one household to another. Because 'Umi already knew that he had another *makua kāne*—his mother's younger brother 'Ōma'okamau—it is clear that he is asking about a more mature *makua kāne*. The term designates either the natural father or the uncles and male cousins of both parents' generation.

David Malo called 'Umi's stepfather *makua kōlea* (literally, plover parent), a metaphor likening a stepfather to the migratory Pacific Golden Plover, which does not breed in Hawaii but winters there before flying back to the Arctic to nest and raise its young. Although N. B. Emerson commented that the metaphor is "used rightly without a laugh," one still hears it said jokingly, Emerson considered *makua kōlea* "a very significant phrase" because "of the uncertainty of the parentage on the male side," as expressed in the proverb "One can be sure of the mother but not of the father."<sup>25</sup>

Proof of the identity of both parents was important to chiefs in traditional culture, for chiefs constituted a caste-like class apart from commoners. Long genealogies of both parents supported claims of a chief to a certain rank, within their own class.<sup>26</sup> If it was not definitely known which of two chiefs was a child's father, presumably either the one with the higher rank or the one more generally accepted was used in the formal genealogy. The highest ranking chiefs and chiefesses were regarded as the earthly representatives of their divine ancestors, and great care was taken that there be no doubt as to who the father of a firstborn child was.

According to Abraham Fornander, a chief's rank, being determined by birth, did not decline if he lost possessions or influence, nor could it be raised by wealth and power. He might, however, through alliances by marriage and adoption "raise the rank of his children higher than his own, such as by marriage with a chiefess of higher rank than his own, marrying with a sister, or by their adoption into a family of higher rank than the father."<sup>27</sup> Ruling chiefs married several chiefesses for political reasons and to have high-ranking children. Kamehameha the Great is

an example. Both the mother and the maternal aunt of his sacred wife Ke'ōpūolani, who bore Kamehameha II and III, considered Kamehameha, like all chiefs from the island of Hawaii, of inferior rank; his military successes could not alter the fact in their minds.

Paternity was often in doubt as there was much sexual freedom, even for sacred chiefs and chiefesses once they had produced an heir. Nineteenth-century historians cite many examples of uncertain paternity among chiefs and chiefesses. The most famous example is 'Umi's descendant Kamehameha the Great, who had always thought that Chief Keoua of the island of Hawaii was his natural father until a few years after he conquered all the islands but Kauai. In S. M. Kamakau's account, Kamehameha, on hearing that Chief Kame'eiamoku was dying at Lahaina, Maui, went to him. Kame'eiamoku had attended Kamehameha since his boyhood and was one of his four great counselors who had engineered his rise to power and made him king. Kame'eiamoku kissed Kamehameha and said, "I have something to tell you: Ka-hekili was your father, you were not Keoua's son. Here are the tokens that you are the son of Ka-hekili." What the tokens were is not stated. Kamehameha commented that it was strange that his lifelong friend told him this now; had he told him earlier his "brothers" (Maui kinsmen) need not have died, for the rule could have been divided with them. His counselor explained that it was better to have conquered the islands because with one ruler over them there would be peace.<sup>28</sup> Kahekili, whom Fornander called "the reputed, if not the acknowledged father of Kamehameha I," was a very high chief who before his death in 1794 ruled Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Oahu.<sup>29</sup> Kamehameha had fought against him in invasions of Maui led by Keoua's half-brother Kalani'ōpu'u and later by himself.

The old counselor's dying revelation sheds light on why Kahekili, on hearing of Kamehameha's birth on Hawaii, had sent his half-brothers, the twins Kame'eiamoku and Kamanawa, to serve the child as honored attendants (*kahu*), a role they faithfully played even against their relatives until their death. Kamakau commented that it was an ancient custom "for the chief of one island to give a child to the chief of another island. This is the reason why Ka-hekili has often been called the father of Kamehameha, for chiefs of Hawaii and Maui were closely related, and this is why the twins Ka-me'e-ia-moku and Ka-manawa, who were the children of Ke-kau-like, ruling chief of Maui, were made tabu to live on Hawaii as associates for the child of Ka-hekili."<sup>30</sup>

The revelation, it is said, led Kamehameha to consider himself an *ali'i po'olua* (double-headed chief), but Kamakau's account does not support

an implication by E. S. C. Handy and Mary K. Pukui that Kamehameha and other Hawaiians thought that he had two biological sires, a phenomenon that they claimed was "believed to occur among *ali'i*." <sup>31</sup> Among other examples of double-headed chiefs is one of Kamehameha's wives, Kaheiheimālie, who was said to be the daughter of either Ke'eaumoku (another of Kamehameha's great counselors) or perhaps Kanekoa. <sup>32</sup> Sometimes a chiefess was already pregnant by one husband when she became the wife of another in whose household her *po'olua* child was born. One such child was Ke'elikōlani (Princess Ruth), Kamehameha's great-granddaughter, born in 1826. Her mother, it seems, was pregnant by Chief Kahalai'a when she became the wife of Chief Kekūanaō'a who is listed as the father of the child, said to be *po'olua*, "that is, a child of two fathers, which was considered a great honor by chiefs of that period." <sup>33</sup> Malo, explaining the term *po'olua* differently, stated that when a chiefess with a high chief as father but a lower-ranking chiefess as mother gave her child by her husband to another chief for adoption the child was called *ali'i po'olua*. <sup>34</sup> Sometimes a *po'olua* child resulted from deliberate planning, but whether only among commoners or also among chiefs is unclear. If a woman bore only stillbirths or no children her husband might approve of her having relations with another man because, it was believed, if she had a child by him then she and her husband would have children of their own after that. If a woman was uncertain which of two men had fathered her child both men might jointly accept it as theirs. The double-headed child then had more sets of relatives to care for it and the relatives had at the same time extended their alliances.

According to Malo, "Women very often gave their children to men with whom they had illicit relations," and a chief who had children by secret amours might recognize some of the children, some not. One who was told of his chiefly ancestry, although the public might not always know of it, was called "a chief with an ancestry" because he knew and could prove his pedigree. A child who merely knew but could not prove his chiefly bond was a "clothes-rack chief" because he put on airs such as not permitting anyone to put their clothes on his shelf. <sup>35</sup> Malo did not state the rank, if any, of the women he referred to but presumably they were chiefesses but of lower rank than the chief. Usually if mates were of different rank their offspring became lesser chiefs in the ruler's court. <sup>36</sup>

Although the social classes were theoretically endogamous and caste-like, casual mating occurred across class lines, providing children of commoners with a social basis for nourishing the fantasy of being the

offspring of a great chief. The mating might have been during a paramount chief's circuit of his domain with his retinue, or like 'Umi's royal father Liloa after his return from a journey to dedicate a heiau. Sometimes a chief or a chiefess either at court or in the country took a fancy to an attractive commoner. Neither the commoner nor the commoner's spouse dared object although the ranking lover's spouse might. To prevent any offspring born from such liaisons claiming rank through a blood tie, chiefly families had them killed in infancy. It was particularly important that a king's children resulting from such liaisons be killed, either at the order of the king or his council of high chiefs, to forestall any claims to rank or, more importantly, rulership.

King Liloa, it would seem, acted most irregularly in leaving tokens of his rank for a son by a woman of lowly birth, perhaps not even a member of the chiefly class. Customarily, the offspring of such a mating would have been sought out and killed to prevent what did happen--'Umi's arrival at court with the tokens, his acceptance by Liloa, and when Liloa died, his transformation into a dangerous competitor of his royal half-brother for power.

If the liaison was unwittingly or deliberately with an attractive *kauwā* (member of a segregated, polluting caste), families made every effort to separate the couple, and if a child were born "it would be dashed to death against a rock," according to Malo. If a woman knew neither the name nor the lineage of her child's father, the child was called, according to Handy and Pukui, *keiki a ka pueo* (child of an owl), the term for one begotten by the roadside by an unidentified man.<sup>37</sup>

Kamakau has stated, "There is no country person who did not have a chiefly ancestor. The *kauwa* too had a few born of them [chiefs] who concealed their relationship on the side of the slave."<sup>38</sup> Sexual freedom was such that an ambitious boy living as a commoner had abundant cause to fantasize being related to a chief, and to dream of someday having his rank recognized and chiefly privileges accorded him. A chief from whom many claimed descent was Keawe, one of 'Umi's sons and successors, and, it will be recalled, the ruling chief that Paka'a served. Keawe, who had five (some say seven) aristocratic official wives, also had, according to Fornander, "numerous amours with women of low degree and with the daughters of the common people." As a result some genealogists "greatly blamed [him for] thereby impairing the purity of the aristocratic blood and giving rise to pretensions that in after ages . . . became difficult to disprove." Nonetheless, Fornander "found . . . no name or family claiming descent from him and setting up pretensions accordingly, unless they were actually and historically descend-

ed from one of his five wives. . . .”<sup>39</sup> He was writing no doubt of members of the chiefly class, not of commoners who would talk among themselves of his amours.

Nevertheless, legendary and historical accounts tell of chiefs engaging in battle for supremacy and fighting not only with weapons but with ritualized boasts of high birth and taunts about the other’s low ancestry. After describing young Kamehameha’s battles on Hawaii against a rival chief, Kamakau added:

The strife between the chiefs took the form of denying each other’s pure descent from a line of high chiefs. Each was well-versed in genealogical lines, oratory, and minute details in the histories of chiefs, their birthplaces, rules of government, and the signs and omens that revealed their rank as chiefs. Both sides also had composers of meles who chanted the names of ancestors, the high and godlike rank of their own chief, and the mean ancestry of the other. This form of controversy between two chiefs is well-known today and will be remembered for all time.<sup>40</sup>

A malicious person could start a rumor questioning an opponent’s reputed paternity, or a commoner might claim high birth through his father with the hope of rising in the world. Beckwith wrote:

But for genealogical purposes a wife’s children were generally accepted as his own by the nominal husband unless the actual parent was in a position of advantage in rank and power which made him worth cultivating by an ambitious offspring. The journey of a first-born child of his mother to seek recognition of a highborn father in a distant land is hence a favorite theme of Hawaiian sagas and romances.

The effect of such loose matrimonial relations in a land where inherited blood counted above all things in establishing the perquisites of rank is to be seen in the dual pattern of court genealogies, where an unbroken line of descent often depends upon the female when a male parent fails. The Keawe line from ‘Umi is twice so preserved on the ‘Ulu genealogy. Both genealogies for the Kalakaua family derive finally through the mother.<sup>41</sup>

Even if a youth proved that his natural father was an important chief or king and was accepted at court, he was handicapped by his mother’s

lowly birth. To belong to the highest echelon of chiefs and chiefesses, a person had to have not only a high-ranking father but a high-ranking mother. Traditionally a king chose his successor on the basis of his first-born son's mother's rank being superior to that of the king's other wives. However, he consulted other high chiefs to get their support for his decision. If several chiefesses were of equally high rank, a king took all of them as wives to prevent their taking husbands whose children would compete on the basis of rank for power after his death. For the same reason his marriage to his sister or half-sister was desirable to insure the purity of the line and produce a child higher in rank than both parents. If the most eligible son was considered incapable by the ruler and his council he was passed over for a better qualified younger son or someone outside the immediate family. If the sons were all by women of inferior chiefly rank, the daughter of the highest ranking wife would be the king's successor, but only two such cases are known.<sup>42</sup>

When 'Umi's foster-child fantasy became reality and his royal father acknowledged him, his mother's humble status, whether that of commoner or very low-ranking chiefess, was debated by friends and enemies. To jealous Hākau, 'Umi's royal half-brother and their father's heir, 'Umi's mother was even lower than a commoner. After calling her a *wahine kauwā* ("slave" or outcast woman), he told Liloa that he had a *kauwā* for a son, a shocking insult to Liloa because ordinarily neither chief nor commoner would sleep with an untouchable. 'Umi's defenders claimed that his mother and Liloa were cousins through a common highborn ancestor, a relationship that Liloa himself had ascertained at their romantic meeting by asking "Who is your father?" Also, when he met 'Umi he asked kindly after his mother and sent presents to her and her husband. According to Kamakau, 'Umi's mother's genealogy "shows that they [her kin] had fallen very low."<sup>43</sup>

'Umi's enemies called him *noanoa* (commoner), *keiki kapa ali'i* (part chief), as well as *kūkae pōpolo*, *keiki lepo pōpolo*, and *lepolepo*, which metaphorically refer to a chief whose mother was said to be a commoner but literally refers to excrement from eating *pōpolo* greens.<sup>44</sup> These terms, said Kamakau, "might have been right or perhaps they were not, but he was victorious and ruled the kingdom."<sup>45</sup> Nonetheless, whatever power and glory a chief achieved through courage and ambition could not, as Fornander pointed out, raise his rank, although he could raise that of his children.

When 'Umi became king, a priest named Kaleioku (or Ka'oleioku), who had adopted him when he was in exile and was responsible for his deposing Hākau, advised him how to rule and whom to marry to have high-ranking children in order to dampen the criticism of the high

chiefs that his mother's lowly birth did not warrant his becoming king. Thereupon, 'Umi took several blue-blooded chiefesses as his official wives, most importantly his half-sister Kapukini-a-Liloa, who bore two of his successors (although she thought 'Umi's rank slight). One of the sons was Keawe the Great. 'Umi may also have married Pinea, Hākau's daughter named for her mother. More is known about his wife Pi'ikea, daughter of King Pi'ilani and Queen Lā'ielohelohe of Maui and sister of Pi'ilani's chosen successor and firstborn named Lono-a-Pi'i and of Kiha-a-Pi'ilani. The latter, with 'Umi's military support, was to depose and kill Lono to become king. 'Umi also mated with country women by whom he had numerous children; it is said that if any commoner on the island of Hawaii declared that 'Umi-a-Liloa was not his ancestor it was through ignorance of his ancestry.<sup>46</sup> This recalls Fornander's remark that anyone who did not claim descent from Keawe did not want to do so.

King Pi'ilani, it should be added, had been called *kūkae pōpolo* and *kūkae paoa* (stinking excrement) for the same reason as 'Umi. His mother's pedigree was not even remembered or perhaps conveniently forgotten, but Fornander charitably thought that she "was probably some Maui chiefess."<sup>47</sup> To have children of higher rank than himself, Pi'ilani married his paternal cousin, highborn Lā'ielohelohe of the important Kalona family on Oahu where she preferred to live and where she reared Kiha.

Events relating to 'Umi's and Kiha's overcoming the handicap of being a king's younger son illustrate another type of adoption besides that of children. A young adult might be adopted as a protege by a person older than himself, who would take him into his household to feed, protect, train, and counsel so that the careers of both the adopted ward and the adoptive parent would be advanced. 'Umi and Kiha each became a protégé of an older man, when, after their royal father's death, they had to flee and live incognito in exile as commoners to escape death at the hands of the new king, their abusive and insulting older brother, who had always resented having his prerogatives threatened or actually usurped.

Chroniclers differ about exactly how 'Umi and Kiha eventually became king, but what follows provides a notion of the events and their adoptive father's role in them.

Each chief had the good fortune to be recognized by one or more wily and ambitious priests who, hoping later to be rewarded, adopted the exiled youth in order to depose the hated new king and replace him with his junior. Kaleioku, a priest and lower in rank than 'Umi, made 'Umi

his *haku* (lord, master) and *ali'i* (chief) and made himself 'Umi's *kahu hānai* (adoptive father). He took 'Umi, his commoner wife, and their children into his household to care (*hānai*) for them. He also began to *hānai* (feed, support) 'Umi's loyal companions and others to build an army against Hākau. The proverb *Hānai kanaka, hiki ke ho'ōūnauna*, meaning "Feed human beings, for they can be sent on errands," refers to the benefits of treating an adopted child well.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps Kaleioku had the proverb in mind. Reciprocally, the army in serving Kaleioku and 'Umi could be said to *hānai* them. When 'Umi became king he rewarded Kaleioku with lands and the position of high priest and chief counselor, and brought his mother and her younger children to live at court. Nothing is said of his two children by his commoner wife or of their ever trying to claim 'Umi as father and benefit from the relationship.

In exile on Maui with his highborn wife, Kumaka, Kiha was adopted by Chief Kahu'akole, who advised him to put aside Kumaka and marry the Hana chief's favorite daughter Kōleamoku in order to get her father, Chief Ho'olae-makua, to support him against Lono-a-Pi'i.<sup>49</sup> Ho'olae disowned Kōlea, saying that she should have first married Lono to whom she was tabooed and that after that she could have taken another husband. When the couple's son Kauhiokalani was born, Kiha sent Kōlea with the child to ask Ho'olae for certain lands. This request for strategic lands made Ho'olae realize that his hated son-in-law was not a commoner but Chief Kiha who was planning to rebel against King Lono-a-Pi'i, to whom he was loyal. He refused the request but kept the firstborn son of Kōlea and Kiha to *hānai*. Kahu'akole then sent Kiha to his brother-in-law 'Umi for help. Urged by Pi'ikea and approved by Kaleioku, 'Umi invaded and conquered Maui. Among the dead were Lono-a-Pi'i and Ho'olae, but Kiha ordered that Kōlea and Kauhiokalani be spared. One assumes that Kiha then took his son to rear, but he is not mentioned again until after Kiha's death when he reappears serving his half-brother King Kamalālāwalu, son of Kiha and Kumaka (whom Kiha had taken back).<sup>50</sup> After 'Umi and Kiha had apportioned the conquered lands, 'Umi returned to Hawaii, but sent Kiha one of his and Pi'ikea's two sons. Kiha, however, despised his sister's children because of their father 'Umi's humble origin on his mother's side. (Yet 'Umi had just made him king!) Kiha treated the *hānai* with contempt, and when he killed the youth's favorite attendant (*kahu*), the youth died of grief.<sup>51</sup>

'Umi had other problems arising from his wife Pi'ikea's family. Her mother, Lā'ielohelohe, apparently did not scorn Pi'ikea's and 'Umi's children, as it is said that she asked for the firstborn and 'Umi promised

it. He broke that promise, but promised the next, and so on without ever intending to honor his promise. He made these false promises, according to one chronicler, because he had once vowed that, contrary to custom, he would not permit someone else to rear any child of his. Finally, when Pi'ikea was pregnant again, Lā'ie sent her supernatural ancestresses, "grandmothers," to Hawaii once more. This time they had the gods strike 'Umi's people dead at night. When he heard of the deaths, he foolishly went out to fight the gods. Meanwhile the grandmothers, acting as midwives, obtained the newborn and carried it to Oahu. Thus, says a chronicler, it came into Lā'ie's possession, that is, was adopted by her.<sup>52</sup>

According to Kamakau, "It was regarded as a great honor for a chief to be reared by his grandparents, and for the chiefs to rear their children's children. This made the chiefs beloved."<sup>53</sup> A grandchild, particularly if it was the mother's firstborn, was much indulged. Kekāuluohi, daughter and firstborn of Kaheiheimālie and Kala'i-mamahu (Kamehameha's younger half-brother), was reared by her maternal grandparents, Namahana and Ke'eaumoku, who "fondled her as if she were a feather lei from the precious *mamo* bird." She was "a favorite above all the other grandchildren," and was also the favorite of the uncles and cousins of her aunt Ka'ahumanu, her mother's older sister and one of Kamehameha's wives. Kekāuluohi was looked on as the family head, and her father's own trusted *kahu* and the latter's kin were her caretakers.

When Kamehameha took Kaheiheimālie from his half-brother to be one of his wives, the child probably remained with her maternal grandparents because Kaheiheimālie had refused to let Kamehameha adopt her at her birth because she loved Kala'i-mamahu and wanted to rear their child. Kekāuluohi later became Kamehameha's youngest wife, co-wife (*punalua*) with her mother, her mother's sister, and other high-ranking chiefesses. After Kamehameha's death his son Liholiho (Kamehameha II) took her as one of his wives but later gave her to his friend Kana'ina. By Kana'ina she had a son Lunalilo who succeeded Kamehameha V as king. She and Kana'ina were the adoptive parents (*kahu hānai*) not only of Kalama, who became the wife of Kauikeaoūli (Kamehameha III), but of the royal couple's second son.<sup>54</sup>

At the time that her aunt Ka'ahumanu was caring for Princess Ruth, Kekāuluohi helped her rear Ka'ahumanu's grandnephew and her own nephew, David Kamehameha, firstborn of Kīna'u and Kekuānaō'a. Kīna'u was Kekāuluohi's half-sister and like her had been one of Liholiho's wives. David's birth had helped reconcile Ka'ahumanu to Kīna'u's

refusal to marry Kauikeaouli (Kamehameha III) in accord with the wish of Kamehameha the Great that Kīna‘u and Kamāmalu, his daughters by Kaheiheimālie, marry his sons by Ke‘ōpūolani, his sacred wife, to continue his line.<sup>55</sup> Kamamalu, also one of the wives of Liholiho (Kamehameha II), had died with him in London.

Kekāuluohi’s adoption by her grandparents and her subsequent adoption of others is only one of many examples concerning the highest nobility and royalty. With rare exceptions, a royal or other highborn child was given by its parents at birth or soon after to another high chief or chiefess, usually related in some way, who became its *kahu hānai*. The term *kahu*, with or without a descriptive adjective, refers only to the guardian or attendant of a child (or adult) of status, not to that of a commoner. A ruling chief with no children of his own might have his *hānai* child succeed him if the child was old enough. People praised a wealthy chief or chiefess who reared a poor chief’s child. More than one wealthy *kahu hānai* made his adopted child his heir.<sup>56</sup> A minor chief who reared a high-ranking chief’s child benefitted socially and politically, as did his children. For the same reason a high chief might rear a child of a chief only a degree higher than himself. Royalty also found it politically advantageous to rear their relatives’ children and grandchildren and to have relatives rear theirs.

Each of Kamehameha’s two sons by his sacred wife Ke‘ōpūolani (his niece who outranked him) was given to a *kahu hānai*. However, in 1797 the firstborn, Liholiho, was taken from his original caretaker after his maternal grandmother reported that the infant (then about six months old) was not getting the right diet and the wet nurses were careless.<sup>57</sup> A chiefly child had several chiefesses as wet nurses because of numerous taboos relating to their duties that if violated would supernaturally harm and pollute the sacred child.<sup>58</sup> Kamehameha then gave Liholiho to Ka‘ahumanu, his favorite wife and cousin, to rear, and thereby had this son with him much more than was customary.

Chiefs jockeyed for the honor of being a highborn child’s *kahu hānai*, and the chosen chief was present at the birth, ready with wet nurses who were chiefesses in his family. After several chiefs had begged Ke‘ōpūolani for her next child, she promised it to her *kahu*, Kuakini, brother of Ka‘ahumanu and Kaheiheimālie. When the child was born in 1814 (the date is uncertain), Kuakini, thinking it stillborn, rejected it. Kaikio‘ewa, one of the king’s cousins and brothers-in-law, arrived in time for his accompanying high priest Kapihe to get the newborn to breathe and was made Kauikeaouli’s *kahu hānai*. When Kaikio‘ewa was appointed governor of Kauai to replace Kahalai‘a, the latter was

appointed the boy's *kahu hānai* to console him for being removed as governor. When Kauikeaouli became King Kamehameha III in 1825, succeeding Liholiho, he was only ten or eleven years old. He had a succession of guardians with various responsibilities, but Kaikio'ewa continued as a major *kahu* until his death in 1839, and would stop at nothing, even at the risk of his life, to further the well-being of the king and the kingdom.<sup>59</sup> Kaikio'ewa was also the adoptive father of Moses Kekuaiwa Kamehameha, second son of Kīna'u and Kekūanaō'a, and made him his heir.

A *kahu hānai* who reared his *hānai* child from infancy was responsible for its personal care and upbringing and supervised other *kahu*, his relatives, who assisted in caring for it. As usual the natural parents maintained close contact with the adoptive parents and the child, but where royal children were concerned the situation of a *kahu hānai* differed. He obviously did not have primary rights to a child who was in the line of succession, and he could be relieved of his position or have it modified as the natural parents and other advisors of the king and queen decided. Kamehameha the Great, before his death in 1819, appointed a *kahu-nui* (or *kahu ali'i*), a supreme *kahu*, who was over all *kahu hānai* and other *kahu* associated with the royal family. Kamehameha appointed the chief he most trusted, Ulumaheihei Hoapili, Kame'eiamoku's son, as the sacred family's chief guardian. He also entrusted to him the hiding of his bones after death. Further, he gave him Ke'ōpūolani as his wife (after her death in 1823, Hoapili married Kaheiheimālie). Until his death in 1840, Hoapili, who had great authority, was constantly consulted by members of the royal family and by other chiefs and chiefesses in matters relating to the royal family, upon whom the welfare of the kingdom depended. It was to him, for instance, that Kīna'u and Kekāuluohi, the young king's "foster mothers," went with others to discuss the errant behavior of Kauikeaouli after Ka'ahumanu's death.<sup>60</sup>

'Umi's refusal to give his mother-in-law his children to rear shows that Hawaiian parents did not always give up their children readily to others to rear. The experiences of Ke'ōpūolani and Kīna'u further illustrate the point. Ke'ōpūolani "wept when they [her two sons] were taken front her to be brought up by other chiefs and chiefesses. The mother yielded until it came to the last child and this one's rearing she would not give: to another." The child was Princess Nāhi'ena'ena, born in 1815.<sup>61</sup>

Each of Kīna'u's and Kekūanaō'a's four sons had been adopted--David by Ka'ahumanu, Moses by Kaikio'ewa, Lot (later Kamehameha

V) by Nāhi'ena'ena, and Alexander (later Kamehameha IV) by Kauikeaoūli, who made him his heir. When Kīna'u's last child, Victoria Kamāmalu, was born in 1838, she refused her maternal uncle Kuakini's request to take the child to the island of Hawaii to rear. Defying custom, she herself nursed it and her adopted daughter Pauahi, but made John Papa I'i and his wife Sarai her child's kahu. Their covenant, as I'i put it, was that he and Sarai would be the ones to carry the child, soothe it, and hold it on their laps.<sup>62</sup> Kīna'u at the time was Premier of the kingdom, and I'i, a chief with important relatives and associated with the royal court since boyhood, had served both Liholiho and Kauikeaoūli and was now Kīna'u's secretary and adviser. When Kīna'u died the following year, I'i and Sarai became Kamāmalu's foster 'parents under Kekūanaō'a's supervision.

A *kahu hānai* was sometimes called an 'ūhā (lap), which expresses the intimacy of guardian and ward. The term 'ūhā was also used in other contexts. Some chiefesses were said to have tabooed laps. They were unable to rear either their own or adopted children because their aumakua, or personal god, would make the children waste away or become crippled. The children thrived if adopted by others. The devoted aumakua, people said, did not want the chiefess soiled by a baby. If she could rear daughters but not sons it was because her aumakua was male and, like a husband, jealous of sons. If a child accidentally wet a sacred chief's lap, he might have it killed or take it as a foster child. The parents, who would be the chief's personal attendants, would not be responsible if the chief himself picked up the baby and got wet; however, he could still keep the child. Usually only a royal child had the right to sit on its royal parent's lap. 'Umi, in asserting his claim to King Liloa as his father, escaped the king's guards to sit on his lap.<sup>63</sup>

Despite its many guardians, a chiefly child was subject to hazards, which could inspire a lowborn child with fantasies of exalted lineage. Chiefs sometimes hid in the country with their children and lived incognito as commoners because of the abundance of food there, a desire to obscure the family's history as captives, weariness of observing their own taboos, and fear of the ruling chief who was perhaps a usurper.<sup>64</sup> For example, after his power as a ruling chief on Hawaii was seized by Kamai'ole, Kanipahu hid his two sons (half-brothers) Kalāpana and Kalahuimoku with trusted friends in secluded Waimanu Valley, Hamakua district, where Kamai'ole would not find and kill them. Kalāpana's mother and perhaps Kalahuimoku's remained with the boys. Years later when Kanipahu, who had been living as a commoner on Molokai, was asked to overthrow Kamai'ole he refused because he was ashamed of the

calloused humps on his neck from carrying heavy burdens. He sent the messenger on to Kalāpana, his chosen successor. Kalāpana fought and killed Kama'ole to become the ruling chief. His descendants included Liloa, 'Umi, and Kamehameha; 'Umi's mother was one of Kalāpana's half-brother's descendants.<sup>65</sup>

Other hazards to children of rank came not only from shifting political conditions but from kidnapping, abduction, murder, abandonment, substitution, and mysterious disappearance. Kamehameha, a valuable political pawn, was kidnapped at birth and an attempt was made to abduct him when he was probably in his teens. Pregnant Keku'iapoiwa, a high-ranking chiefess and wife of Keoua, one of the war chiefs of Alapa'i-nui, a ruling chief on Hawaii, was in an expedition led by Alapa'i (Keoua's adoptive father) against the ruler of Maui. One cold and stormy night while the fleet was still at harbor before leaving for Maui, Keku'iapoiwa gave birth to Kamehameha unattended while her guards and the chiefs slept. To be alone was most unusual because in any crisis of illness, death, or birth, kinfolk and others gathered to give psychological and practical assistance. In the case of a highborn chiefess protection was necessary to prevent a substitution or kidnapping. Nae'ole, a Kohala chief who wanted to be the kahu of Keku'iapoiwa's child and was waiting for the birth, made a hole in the thatch, snatched the newborn, and escaped with it. After its whereabouts were discovered some time later, the kidnapper and his younger sister were permitted, strange to say, to keep the child for about five years.<sup>66</sup> Then Alapa'i-nui took him for his favorite wife, Keaka, to rear. Kamehameha became very fond of his foster mother and her male cousin (an older relative of John Papa I'i) who helped to rear him.

Earlier, Alapa'i had adopted Kamehameha's father Keoua and his half-brother Kalani'ōpu'u, and had taken their very high-ranking mother, his cousin, as a wife. Both natural fathers were dead; Kalani'ōpu'u's father had been slain by his half-brother, Keoua's father, and the latter had died in battle against Alapa'i. Historians ask, Did Alapa'i adopt the fatherless youths through kindness, or "to prevent them from hatching treason and revolt in the provinces," or both? The half-brothers, after becoming Alapa'i's war chiefs, distrusted him, feeling that he had no real regard for them. When Keoua died after a lingering illness, it was rumored that Alapa'i's sorcery had killed him. Fornander has rejected this black view of Alapa'i and considered Kalani'ōpu'u's next action ill-advised.<sup>67</sup>

According to I'i, Kalani'ōpu'u was mindful of Keoua's request that he look after Kamehameha, "who would have no other father to care for

him.” Fornander and Kamakau describe how he later risked his life attempting to abduct Kamehameha. He failed, and indecisive warfare against Alapa‘i erupted.<sup>68</sup> Anticipating another attempt at abduction and control of Kamehameha, Alapa‘i before his death warned Keawe‘ōpala, his son by Keaka, not to let Kalani‘ōpu‘u take Kamehameha away. When Kamehameha was about twenty and both Alapa‘i and Kamehameha’s natural mother were dead, Kalani‘ōpu‘u became his guardian and killed Keawe‘ōpala in battle to become the ruling chief with Kamehameha at his side.

There is a famous example of an adoptive father’s treachery against his adopted son. Kahahana, an Oahu taboo chief, was adopted by King Kahekili of Maui as an infant. In 1773 when a council of Oahu chiefs selected Kahahana as their new king, crafty Kahekili, eager to capture Oahu for himself, used various stratagems. The first included asking Kahahana to give him certain strategic Oahu lands as a reward for bringing him up. The Oahu council of chiefs refused the request. Although the faithful but gullible Kahahana fought with Kahekili against Kalani‘ōpu‘u, the Maui king continued to plot and finally created a situation that in 1783 enabled him to invade and conquer Oahu. Kahahana, who was captured after about two years in hiding, was murdered and sacrificed by his adoptive father at a heiau in Waikiki.<sup>69</sup>

Perhaps Kamehameha’s mother’s experience in having her newborn kidnapped led Ke‘ōpūolani to warn Kuakini, selected as her next child’s *kahu hānai*, to be present at the birth to prevent someone else gaining possession of it. Substitution of one newborn for another was also a possibility. Ke‘ōpūolani herself was almost replaced by another, although not at birth. She was so sacred that when she was with her wet nurse (*kahu hānai waiū*), anyone who dared approach or touch her would be burned to death. Yet her guardians, thinking her homely and puny, decided to substitute their own healthy daughter for her. They were thwarted, it is said, by a dog which entered where the daughter was sleeping and bit off the fingers of one hand. Kamakau commented, “The servant might have been the chiefess had not God willed it otherwise.”<sup>70</sup>

Another instance of the unreliability of some caretakers concerns the taboo chiefess Kapi‘olani, Kame‘eiamoku’s granddaughter and Ulumaiheihei Hoapili’s niece. When she was probably about five years old she was abandoned and almost died. Because Kamehameha was fighting the chiefs of Hilo where Kapi‘olani lived, her caretakers (*kahu mālama*) fled with her into the forest, but “tossed her into a clump of ferns . . .

because her weight retarded them when danger was near." A man named Ho'omi'i, hearing the child's wailing, investigated, recognized Kapi'olani, and "picked her up and ran with sorrow for her in his heart . . . she might have died. If an enemy had found her, then she would have been killed."<sup>71</sup> Ironically, among the meanings of *mālama* are fidelity and loyalty.

According to Kamakau, "Some chiefs hid their children in the backwoods, and brought them up as commoners, and some children ran away into the back country and became countrymen."<sup>72</sup> How, why, and when Kai-ehu, Kame'eiamoku's son by an unidentified mother, disappeared has not been recorded. He was "born at the time of the battle of 'Iao Valley" (1790) and vanished. Kame'eiamoku had his son Ulumaheihē Hoapili search for his younger brother, "but no one knew where he was staying." Hoapili did not locate him until 1834 (if Kamakau's date is correct), and by that time Kame'eiamoku had been dead more than thirty years, Hoapili was nearly sixty, and the missing son was forty-four. Kaiehu "had been brought up in the country under the name of Ka-puni-'ai," and when he was found he was "peddling fish at Ka'anapali for some back countrymen who had no idea whose child he was." Unfortunately, nothing more is said about Kaiehu. Of the child's disappearance, Kamakau laconically remarked, "This is why the chiefs appointed a number of kahu to watch over a chiefs child." One wonders if Kaiehu ever wondered if he were a chiefs child and if his case led some Maui commoners to imagine that they too might be the long-lost sons of high chiefs.

Kaiehu presumably had become a waif and like some waifs who survived had perhaps been adopted and reared as a servant to the adoptive family. A waifs treatment differed from that of a child adopted from a relative or friend, who might become such a pet that food would be dribbled into its mouth to prevent its choking on lumps, and who might be beautified to be exhibited in a rural beauty contest.<sup>73</sup>

A Ka'ū family's ancestress is said to have been adopted as a child by her older maternal aunt who so neglected her that she ran away. She was found by an elderly couple who lovingly cared for her. Her natural parents knew nothing of her whereabouts until a prophetic dream led to a reunion just as the girl was about to be married. The bride at this time decreed that hereafter in her family only a younger sibling, not an older one, would be permitted to adopt a niece or nephew.<sup>74</sup>

Besides biological relationships, Hawaiians, as Handy and Pukui point out, have "three secondary categories of relationship whose basis is social rather than biological." They are *hānai* (the "feeding" relation-

ship), marriage, and *ho'okama*. The latter, however, is only one of several structured and recognized types of friendship that constitute informal adoption. *Ho'okama* means literally “to ‘make’ a child,” and figuratively, “to adopt a child in friendship.” The adopted and adopter are not biologically related or, at least, not close enough to be a consideration. The *ho'okama* relationship, which is “quite different from the ‘feeding’ relationship,” may be between persons of the same or opposite sex and of different ages. An adult may adopt a child, an elderly adult may adopt a younger adult. The relationship is based on “mutual affection and agreement, at first tacit, then unobtrusively discussed, between the child and the older person,” and involves “love, respect, and courtesy, but not necessarily responsibility of any sort, and rarely a change of residence.” The adopted individual is regarded as a member of the adoptive parent’s family. If one party is indifferent to a tentative *ho'okama* or the parents strongly object, the matter is dropped. The adoptive parent, the one who initiated the relationship, is called *makua ho'okama* (parent making-child); an adopted son is *keiki ho'okama*; an adopted daughter is *kaikamahine ho'okama*. The relationship is somewhat comparable to that between a godparent and a godchild.<sup>75</sup> In its broadest traditional sense, *keiki ho'okama* is how a chief in his role of *makua ho'okama* regards all those who are dependent on him.

Variations of *ho'okama* are evident in an example from the ‘Umi saga with regard to the rapidity of the development of the relationship, the change of residence, the deep responsibility between the adopter and the adoptee for each other, and the junior status of the adoptee in relation to the adopter.

Ten-year-old ‘Umi, en route to his royal father, adopted three boys as his *keiki ho'okama*. For two of them, Pi‘imaiwa‘a and Ko‘i, he first asked their own and their parents’ permission, and they also asked their parents’ permission. According to Kamakau, Pi‘imaiwa‘a’s parents, recognizing ‘Umi as a chief because of the royal tokens, gave him their son “to live or to die in his service.” Pi‘imaiwa‘a joked that ‘Umi had a son now who had grown up for him in one day. Versions differ as to the third boy, ‘Ōma‘okamau. According to Fornander, the boy was ‘Umi’s maternal uncle (*makua kāne*), but the narrator later refers to him as a *keiki ho'okama*. In Kamakau’s version, ‘Umi and the boy were not biologically related and ‘Umi had made him his *keiki ho'okama* long before leaving home with him; the adoption had been one more cause of ‘Umi’s stepfather’s anger toward him.<sup>76</sup>

Thomas Thrum states, “*Keiki hookama*, lit. adopted child, in this case is more that of a sworn boon companion, as they were lads together

and in no sense as father and son. It illustrates a custom of companionship in expectation of sharing in the honors and good things of life. A close attendant, not a menial servant."<sup>77</sup> When 'Umi became king he did reward his loyal companions and he chose Ko'i to hide his bones when he died. Although the boys were contemporaries and boon companions, 'Umi, who outranked them, was their lord (*haku*) as well as *makua ho'okama*.

Only 'Umi among the father-seekers of the sagas had *keiki ho'okama*, but Nī'au and Laukiamanu had each acquired an intimate friend (*aikāne*) of the same sex in the royal father's cloudland before the father recognized his offspring. In each case the father-seeker outranked the *aikāne*. In Nī'au's case, a boy named Uhu'ula (Red parrot fish) who admired Nī'au's skill in games asked to become his *aikāne*, to which he agreed. Whether it was Laukiamanu or her unnamed friend who first suggested that they become *aikāne* is not stated. When the king's guards burned both Nī'au and Uhu'ula to death, Nī'au's ancestors restored him to life but transformed his friend into a red parrot fish. When Laukiamanu was thrown into a pigpen, she refused her friend's request to join her because she needed her to bring food. Later, when Laukiamanu, recognized by her father, was set free, she made her *aikāne* a high chiefess and had her live with her. In each case a strong bond of affection and loyalty existed between the two *aikāne*, with the junior friend dying or willing to die if necessary. Only Laukiamanu's friend survived to be rewarded.

The *aikāne* relationship as described here is that of an intimate (but not homosexual) friendship between two members of the same sex, never between members of the opposite sex. The relationship is also called *hale aikāne* (house friend) because of the mutual hospitality of the friends and their families. To each friend the other's relatives of the parental generation are *inoa makua* (parents-in-name), who care for their offspring's friend as they would blood kin. Descendants of two *aikāne* sometimes continue to feel the link.<sup>78</sup> The relationship of the two friends is comparable to Old World blood brotherhood (and sisterhood), but no accompanying ritual has been reported for the Hawaiian relationship.

That the *aikāne* relationship is a kind of informal adoption is explicitly stated by Fornander:

Among the members of the *Aha-Alii* [Congregation of Chiefs, descended on either the Ulu or Nanaulu line] it was not unusual that two young men adopted each other in weal or woe at all

hazards, even that of life itself; and if in after life these two found themselves, in war time, in opposing ranks, and one was taken prisoner, his life was invariably spared if he could find means to make himself known to his foster-brother on the opposite side, who was bound to obtain it from the captor or the commanding chief. And there is no instance on record in all the legends and traditions that this singular friendship ever made default.<sup>79</sup>

Another custom is that described by Handy and Pukui of “making” a spouse. This is an adoptive platonic marital relationship, a kind of honorary marriage, and, like *ho’okama* and *aikāne*, it is a structured and recognized friendship. According to Handy and Pukui,

A boy or man may take a great fancy to a girl or woman, married or unmarried. He tells her or his parents that he wants her as his “adoptive wife” or *wahine ho’owahine* [woman made-wife]. This does not imply having the sexual husband-wife relationship, but a sort of brother-sister relationship. . . . Sometimes a girl suggests that a certain man or boy become her *kāne ho’okane* [man made-husband].<sup>80</sup>

The girl or boy chosen may be a mere child while the proposed partner is a mature adult. Once the agreement has been made, the family and relatives of the individual who first suggested the relationship may cement it with a feast, for which a small pig is roasted. That any such feast formally concludes a *ho’okama* or *aikāne* agreement has not been reported.

Each partner has, in effect, a life-long friend of the opposite sex, an honorary spouse who is recognized as such by their families and friends. They are loyal, devoted, affectionate, and companionable without any sexual or economic involvement, but they exchange gifts. A poor but industrious man, unable to support a wife because of family obligations, may become a girl’s *ho’okāne*. From then on he brings whatever presents he can to her and if she marries to her husband as well. He and her husband treat each other as brothers and her husband regards him as a *punalua*, here used to refer to a sister’s husband. The *punalua* will be as fond of his honorary spouse’s children as if they were his own.<sup>81</sup>

Another form of platonic relationship is the reverse of that just described in that established sexual partners temporarily or permanently adopt each other as brother and sister and use appropriate

kinship terms to each other. *Ho'okaikuahine* refers to a man "making" a sister of his wife, who then calls him *kaikunāne* (brother) and he calls her *kaikuahine* (sister). Kiha and Chiefess Kumaka, who had fled into exile together to escape from King Lono-a-Pi'i, had this relationship temporarily. Kumaka, according to Thrum, had been Kiha's "companion in his trials and tribulations, even in those that might mean death. He made a sister of his wife." And called her sister. This was because his adoptive father, Kahu'akole, believed that if Kiha put aside Kumaka and married Kōleamoku, the latter's powerful father would side with Kiha in his plot to depose Lono-a-Pi'i. Apparently Kahu'akole thought it more effective politically to keep Kiha's identity as a chief secret and not have Kōleamoku and Kumaka live together as *punalua*, here meaning two wives sharing a husband. Because the plan failed, Kahu'akole told Kiha to leave Kōleamoku and go back to Kumaka. When Kiha became king, Kumaka bore Kamalālāwalu, who, when Kiha died, became king.<sup>82</sup>

The general features of the Hawaiian foster-child fantasy, as expressed in the hero sagas, resemble those elements of Near Eastern and European sagas that psychoanalysts have described as part of a male or female child's normal psychological development toward maturity. (Such sagas, it should be noted, occur in other parts of the world besides those noted here.) Hawaiian social conditions under which a latent foster-child fantasy could emerge and flourish differed, however, from those in the Near East and Euramerica. As this survey has shown, the concepts of adoption and inherited rank were among the dominant features of Hawaiian social customs and hero sagas.

Hawaiians carried the concept of adoption to exceptional lengths as a means to establish and formalize new social relationships between members of the same social class, whether of commoners or of chiefs, in order to increase the number of individuals and families who looked to each other for emotional support and, in the most common form of adoption, economic support as well. For chiefs there was the further advantage of political and military support. The concept of adoption was used even to formalize close bonds of affection between two unrelated and economically independent individuals. Two women might adopt each other as sisters, two men take each other as brothers, and a husband and wife become brother and sister. Further, a man or woman, boy or girl, regardless of age, might become the honorary, nonsexual spouse of a member of the opposite sex; or they might assume a role comparable to that of godparent or godchild to a member of the same or opposite sex.

Additionally, an individual might adopt one or more of his contemporaries as his "children," or an adult might become the adoptive parent of a younger adult; in each case, however, the adoptive parent trained and supported the adopted child and in turn was served by it. The concept of adoption was also carried into government, for a chief was metaphorically the adoptive father of dependents on his lands and they were under his control. In various ways, then, fictive kinship bonds were created that were phrased in terms of adoption.

The most prevalent pattern of adoption was that which under certain conditions could give both form and stimulus to a latent foster-child fantasy. This pattern involved parents giving up their children (male or female), albeit reluctantly at times, to be reared and economically supported by their relatives or close friends of the same social class as themselves, while they, in turn, adopted the children of others to rear. With rare exceptions, adopted children were not cut off from their natural parents, for the two sets of parents and their kin were in frequent contact with each other and the children. A royal child's adoptive parents who had charge of its personal and intimate daily care were supervised by the child's senior relatives to insure that the child was protected and trained for its future role. A child, male or female, who was a member of the chiefly class was taught both parents' genealogies and everything else such a child should know. A commoner's child learned about its relatives as well as the taboos and guardian gods it had inherited.

Such in theory and usual practice was the pattern of adoption followed in adopting children at birth or soon thereafter. That a child knew the identity of both his adoptive and natural parents would not preclude his development in terms of the "family romance." In fact, a male would have two fathers to rebel against and two mothers whose affection he wished to reserve for himself. And there would still be the longing for the ideal father who was superior to both the natural and the adoptive one.

Certain social conditions provided fertile ground in which a foster-child fantasy could grow. As has often been pointed out, the natural father's identity, unlike the mother's, was often uncertain. Some children were of double-headed paternity. Some children did not know the identity of their natural parents. This might happen if their adoptive parents took them to a distant locality or another island, where they lost contact with their natural parents and if neglected or mistreated ran away to become perhaps waifs adopted by strangers. Warfare, political intrigue, and ambition particularly endangered highborn children regardless of the care their adoptive parents and caretakers gave them.

Records tell of such children being kidnapped, abducted, abandoned, possibly substituted for another, or completely lost from sight.

And despite the attention the chiefly class gave to arranging marriages to maintain a pure line, misalliances and casual affairs cut across classes. Efforts to destroy the offspring at birth did not always succeed, especially if the mother was a commoner whose name the chief did not know. A survivor might or might not be able to prove his genealogical claim to rank and win his chiefly father's acceptance. The mother of a child "begotten by the roadside" would not know the father's identity or lineage.

These social conditions indicate why in the Hawaiian sagas attention centers on only the father being unknown until he proves to be a ruling chief, a god, or important court retainer with the nominal title of chief. That the father-seeker is male except in one saga expresses the psychic superiority of men over women, who were regarded as inferior and polluting, regardless of rank. Nevertheless, that one saga suggests that the foster-child fantasy was also present among girls and women.

What is known about the Hawaiian foster-child fantasy must be inferred from the sagas since there is no study of the fantasy among living Hawaiians. It is interesting, however, how frequently one hears an individual claiming, and perhaps with proof, to be a descendant of a renowned chief of the nineteenth century or even of three centuries earlier. Other chiefs besides Keawe and 'Umi scattered their favors so widely that the fantasy of exalted ancestry if not of parentage survives in modern society. What form the present fantasy of distinguished parentage takes remains to be learned.

## NOTES

1. Luomala 1940, 1961b.
2. Kirtley 1971:364, H1381.2.2, H1381.2.2.1, H1381.2.2.1.1.
3. Kirtley 1971:202, D1602.2; 160, C939.3; Luomala 1955:161-178; Beckwith 1940: 259-275; Beckwith 1930.
4. Rank 1914:82.
5. Lehrman 1927.
6. This study took place in Oregon (U.S.). See Conklin 1920; Conklin 1935:140ff.
7. See Luomala 1949, a monograph on Māui, and Luomala 1955:85-98 on Māui; Luomala 1955: 161-178 on Rata (cognate of Laka).

8. Beckwith (1940:483) was surely thinking of *nī'auipi'o*, a term for rank, when she wrote: "The name Niauēpo'o is a class title in Hawaii for chiefs of the highest rank, born from the marriage of close relatives among high chiefs." She spells the term for rank correctly later (1951:13-14). *Nī'auipi'o*, literally, "bent coconut rib, i.e., of the same stock," identifies the "offspring of the marriage of a brother and sister, or half-brother and half-sister" (Pukui and Elbert 1957:245). Examples occur in the father-seeking narratives.

9. See Beckwith (1940:478-488) on the stretching-tree shape-shifter and symbolism.

10. Only versions with the father-seeker's query are listed below; each narrator tends to tell his version differently. Fornander (1880, vol. 2) has discussed 'Umi, Kiha, and Paka'a in their historical context.

*'Umi*. Fornander 1917, vol. 4:178-235 (said to combine Malo's and Kamakau's accounts); Malo 1951:257-265; Pogue 1978:147-153; Kamakau 1961:1-21 (lacks the query, but a footnote, p. 1, cites other versions); Beckwith 1919:649-650; Beckwith 1940:389-391, abstracts.

*Kiha*. Thrum 1923:77-86, from *The Polynesian* 1 (1840); Thrum 1923:73-76, from *Kuokoa*, 18 Nov. 1865 (part of a version, no query); Beckwith 1919:650; Beckwith 1940:387-389, abstracts; Kamakau 1961:22-33 (no query but a footnote, p. 22, cites other versions).

*Pāka'a*. Thrum 1923:53-67; Rice 1923:69-89; Beckwith 1919:650-651; Beckwith 1940:86-87, abstracts.

*Māui*. Beckwith 1951:135-136, Beckwith translation; Beckwith 1940:227-229, from Ho'olapa; Luomala 1949: 111-112, from Lili'uokalani.

*Laka*. Thrum 1907: 111-112; Beckwith 1930; Beckwith 1940:263-264, abstracts.

*Naku'emakapauikeahi*. Rice 1923:19-31.

*Kalanimanui'a*. Fornander 1917, vol. 4:540-553; Beckwith 1919:657; Beckwith 1940:479-480, abstracts. Kamakau (1961:3169) mentions a place named Kalanimanui'a in 'Ewa, Oahu, where a great battle was fought in 1794.

*Nī'auēpo'o*. Pukui 1933:179-185; Beckwith 1940:279, abstract.

*Laukiamanuikahiki*. Fornander 1917, vol. 4:596-609; Beckwith 1919:655; Beckwith 1940:513-514. abstracts.

11. Dickey 1917:16-18; Beckwith 1940:231-232, abstract.

12. Bastian 1883:278; brief reference, 232.

13. Luomala 1961a:155; Beckwith 1940:229.

14. The two heroes are:

*Keaunini*. Beckwith 1940:506-513, abstracts; Westervelt 1915:163-223; Thrum 1923: 220-227; Fornander 1880, vol. 2:49, 56-57; Fornander 1919, vol. 6:345; M. K. Pukui, unpublished version.

*Namakaokapāo'o*. Fornander 1919, vol. 5:274-283; Beckwith 1940:480-481, abstract.

15. Ku and Hina--with or without descriptive epithets relating to fertility of people, land, and sea--are a parental pair in religion, myth, and romance. Kū-waho-ilo (Maggot-mouthed Kū) is Kaanaelike's grandfather; she climbed to him on a stretching coconut tree and returned on his long tongue. His long tongue also scooped up the remains of 'Umi's half-brother, whom he sacrificed to the gods. On Ku and Hina, see Beckwith 1940:12-30; on floating islands and cloudlands, see *ibid.*, 67-80.

16. A narrative without Naku'emaka concerns Anelike (Kaanaelike) and her earthly husband, a fisherman; after a separation she has him distinguish her from her eleven sisters (Green 1926:115-118).
17. Burrows 1923:143-173, Fakafo, Tokelaus; Smith 1913, vol. 1:146ff., one of several Maori (New Zealand) versions.
18. Mann 1937.
19. Lowie 1930:460.
20. Handy and Pukui 1958:71-72; Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, vol. 2:36. See Howard et al. (1970) for a survey of traditional and modern customs of adoption and fosterage.
21. Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, vol. 1:49, 51-53; Kamakau 1964:26-27.
22. Pukui and Elbert 1957:52.
23. Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, vol. 1:131-132. A legally adopted child is called *keiki hānai ho'ohiki* (Pukui and Elbert 1957:64). On *luhi*, see Beckwith 1919:595.
24. Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, vol. 1:131-132.
25. Malo 1951:260, 265 n.4 by Emerson; Handy and Pukui 1958:68-69. Namakaoka-pāo'ō's father was also called *mukua kāne kōlea* (Fornander 1919, vol. 5:277).
26. Malo 1951:54-56, 60, 63 n.17; Fornander 1880, vol. 2:28-30; Kamakau 1964:4-6; Beckwith 1951:11-14.
27. Fornander 1880, vol. 2:27-29. As Fornander said, "Once a chief always a chief," and no crime he committed could alter that fact for him and his children. On Kamehameha, see Kamakau 1961:208, 260; Fornander 1880, vol. 2:320.
28. Kamakau 1961:188-189.
29. Fornander 1880, vol. 2:260.
30. Kamakau 1961:68. Kahekili was Kekaulike's son but the twins' father was said to have been Keawe-poepoe (Kamakau 1961:31; Fornander 1880, vol. 2:154 n. 4).
31. Handy and Pukui 1958:54.
32. Kamakau 1961:385. Kamakau points out the advantages of Kaheiheimālie's double-headed paternity and the kin she shared with Kamehameha.
33. Ibid.:347. Fornander 1880, vol. 2:108, does not mention the double-headed paternity.
34. Malo 1951:56.
35. Ibid.
36. Handy and Pukui 1958:79.
37. Malo 1951:70; Handy and Pukui 1958:196. 'Umi, Liloa's favorite, was, Liloa said, "the boy that will make my bones live, this child of an owl" (Kamakau 1961:9). Liloa, calling him "owl's child," perhaps one of his heir Hākau's insults about 'Umi's mother's origin, seems to mean that nonetheless 'Umi would one day do him more honor than highborn Hākau who was a pleasure-seeker, woman-chaser, and cruel to commoners. The

expression “the bones live” also is used by elders about a considerate and kind child (Handy and Pukui 1958:179).

38. Kamakau 1961:4. On *kauwā*, see Malo 1951:68-72; Handy and Pukui 1958:79, 204-205; Kamakau 1964:8-9.

39. Fornander 1880, vol. 2:112-113.

40. Kamakau 1961:152-153.

41. Beckwith 1951:30. See Fornander (1880, vol. 2:139, n. 1) for an example of such a controversy between Kamehameha’s supporters and his opponents.

42. Wilkes 1856, vol. 4:31. Kamehameha’s children by Ke’ōpūolani superseded his older children by wives of lesser rank.

43. Kamakau 1961:4.

44. Pukui and Elbert 1957:162; Malo 1951:55; Kamakau 1961:1, 3, 15, 242; Kamakau 1964:4,6; Fornander 1917, vol. 4:238 n.2.

45. Kamakau 1961:3.

46. Ibid.:19.

47. Fornander 1917, vol. 4:238, chant and n.2; on Pi’ilani’s mother, see Fornander 1880, vol. 2:83.

48. Handy and Pukui 1958:168.

49. Kamakau 1961:25-32; Thrum 1923:73-76. Accounts vary, but according to Fornander (1880, vol. 2:206), Kumaka was Kahu’akole’s sister.

50. Kamakau 1961:56.

51. Ibid.:32. The unfortunate youth’s name was Aihakoko. According to Fornander (1880, vol. 2:103-104), Aihakoko was ‘Umi’s daughter, not son, but met a “tragical end” on Maui. Thrum (1923:85-86) states that Kiha’s counselors had him let ‘Umi’s two sons rule instead of himself during ‘Umi’s lifetime.

52. Kamakau 1961:20; Fornander 1917, vol. 4:230-232 (from Kamakau).

53. Kamakau 1961:347.

54. Ibid.:391, 393, 394 (Kekāuluohi’s birth); 253, 341, 394, 395 (her mother Kaheiheimālie and Kamehameha I); 279-280 (Kekāuluohi’s marriages, adopted children).

55. Kamakau 1961:279-280, 290; Ii 1959:152. Kīna’u herself had been reared by her maternal aunt, Peleuli, one of the wives of Kamehameha I (Kamakau 1961:346).

56. Kamakau 1961:347.

57. Ii 1959:15.

58. Beckwith 1932:126, 163 n. 55; Kamakau 1961:259.

59. Kamakau 1961:263-265, 269, 337-339; 348 (on Moses).

60. Beckwith 1932:122, 123 (*kahu ali’i* and *kahu hānai*); Kamakau 1961:288, 304, 336-337 (Hoapili as guardian); 212, 215 (Hoapili as caretaker of Kamehameha’s bones); 261,

263, 352, 393 (Hoapili as husband of Ke'ōpūolani and Kaheiheimālie). Hoapili also helped rear Lot Kapuaiwa, later Kamehameha V.

61. Kamakau 1961:260. Kaheiheimālie, it will be recalled, refused to let Kamehameha I adopt Kekāuluohi.

62. Ii 1959:161, 163, 164, 166, 167. Both Dr. G. P. Judd and Ii advised Kīna'u not to take the infant to Kuakini on Hawaii. Kamehameha III later appointed Ii *kahu* of the royal and other highborn children, some from the outer islands, attending the missionary Royal School in Honolulu. Ii devotes most of chapter 12 (161-177) to his ward Victoria Kamāmalu (1838-1866).

63. Handy and Pukui 1958:48-49; Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, vol. 1: 192, 202-203.

64. Kamakau 1961:347; Kamakau 1964:6, 10.

65. Malo 1951:247-251; Fornander 1880, vol. 2:40-41, 74; Kamakau 1961:4.

66. Fornander 1880, vol. 2:135-136; Kamakau 1961:67-69; Ii 1959:3, 6.

67. Fornander 1880, vol. 2:134, 142-143; Ii 1959:3; Kamakau 1961:75.

68. Ii 1959:3; Fornander 1880, vol. 2:143-144; Kamakau 1961:75-76.

69. Fornander 1880, vol. 2:217-226; Kamakau 1961:128-138.

70. Kamakau 1961:259.

71. Ibid.:379-380.

72. Ibid.:347-348.

73. Kamakau 1964:26-27; Handy and Pukui 1958:71,101-102.

74. Green 1926:71-79.

75. Handy and Pukui 1958:44, 71-72 (quotations); see also Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, vol. 1:167; Pukui and Elbert 1957:115. Kenn (1939:48) differs from Handy and Pukui on *ho'okama*, saying that if a childless chief took a relative's child to rear with the intent of passing on his title, privileges, and possessions to it and the parents surrendered their rights, the process was called *ho'okama*, a term also used, he said, for modern legal adoption. *Hānai* to him implies a less complete transfer of parental rights.

76. Kamakau 1961:6. For accounts of the adoption, see Fornander 1917, vol. 4:201, 203, 221); Kamakau 1961:5-7.

77. Fornander 1917, vol. 4:182 n. 2 by Thomas Thrum.

78. Handy and Pukui 1958:73. They also discuss other categories of friendship.

79. Fornander 1917, vol. 4:29-30.

80. Handy and Pukui 1958:55.

81. Handy and Pukui 1958:54-56, 57, 73; Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, vol. 1:167; Pukui and Elbert 1957:327.

82. Thrum 1923:73; Kamakau 1961:25; Pukui and Elbert 1957:108.

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## THE ATOMIZATION OF TONGAN SOCIETY

Keith L. Morton  
*California State University, Northridge*

In 1951 Douglas Oliver wrote of Tonga:

From the decks of a copra steamer pulling in to Nukualofa, this capital of the Kingdom of Tonga looks more like Cape Cod than South Seas. The illusion remains even after stepping ashore, because Tongans learned long ago that the easiest way to remain Tongan is to appear Western. (1961:179)

Oliver's observation rings with considerable truth even today, since Tonga and Tongans project a strong impression of conservatism and traditionalism. Despite Tonga's apparent continuity in life-style, the structure of Tongan society has been profoundly transformed by the processes of state formation, particularly the centralization and institutionalization of power and authority. George Marcus (1978) has described the consolidation of political power and the movement from traditional chieftaincy to constitutional monarchy. These changes, at the societal level, have also transformed local organization by restructuring the social relations of production.

Ethnographers working in Tonga during the last few decades have noted several features of Tongan local organization that suggest a strong trend toward social relations that are individualized, optative, and emphasize horizontal rather than vertical social relations. These observations, presented as absences of expected patterns, have contrasted

with what ethnographers understood to be traditional social relations. As early as the 1940s it was apparent that lineage or ramage organization was of little significance at the local level. The Beagleholes wrote that "there are no strong lineage-feelings among the villagers, nor any strong lineage-groupings. None of them had any association with, nor any interest in, the classic lineages of Tonga" (1941:71). Twenty-five years later, Aoyagi found a similar situation in another village: "an internal stratified system as the result of ramification . . . cannot be possibly found in this village" (1966: 175). Kaeppler (1971) and Morton (1972) found that commoners were only weakly and occasionally affiliated with titled persons and saw whatever association they had with nobles as a consequence of residence, rather than consanguinity.

Perhaps the most detailed description of Tongan local organization is Decktor-Korn's dissertation, "To Please Oneself: Local Organization in the Tonga Islands" (1977). The author relies on the concept of "loose structure" to help depict the flexible and optative nature of local organization. Decktor-Korn's material suggests that local organization consists of an amorphous association of households and larger, kindred-based residence units that are weakly defined, highly flexible with respect to both structure and membership, and function with a minimum of vertical integration. Beyond kinship are a number of voluntary associations and church-affiliated groups that exhibit even greater structural flexibility and less continuity in membership than do kin-based social groups. Decktor-Korn also notes that the village itself is not an important social unit, but rather an administrative unit within a highly centralized and somewhat remote governmental structure.

A Tongan scholar, 'Eveli Hau'ofa, observes and laments the extent of social change in Tonga. He describes the kinship system as "coming under heavy pressure . . . from overpopulation, increased monetization, and pressure on resources." According to Hau'ofa, the results are a movement toward nuclear family units rather than extended families and less interest in the affairs of kin beyond the household. His general conclusion is that Tonga is currently "in an era of uncertainty and confusion" (1978:16).

There is, then, substantial agreement among ethnographers regarding the general features of modern local organization. These features include the weakened, if not absent, vertical social relations among social strata that were historically present (see Gifford 1929; Goldman 1970; Sahlins 1958). Kin groups larger than nuclear-family households are weakly defined in both structure and function. Local organization is household centered and social relations beyond the household tend to be

optative, temporary, and ad hoc. These characteristics are the emerging form of social relations at the local level and constitute a trend toward atomization. Rubel and Kupferer defined an atomistic society as “a society in which the nuclear family represents the major structural unit and indeed, almost the only formalized social entity.” Also included in Rubel’s and Kupferer’s conception of the atomistic society are several antisocial psychological characteristics: “contentiousness,” “suspiciousness,” and “invidiousness” (1968: 189). These psychological traits are not generally characteristic of Tongan peasants, and the use here of the term “atomistic” is limited to its structural aspect.

Atomization is a widespread, if not a worldwide, phenomenon that has usually been associated with industrialization. Weber (1950:111) suggested that both the size of the family and its cohesiveness were reduced by industrialization. Goode (1963:6) also notes that the nuclear family usually becomes independent of more inclusive social groups as industrialization expands. At the most general level, the atomization process in Tonga is possibly due to the incorporation and institutionalization of many aspects of Western culture, including Christianity, a Western educational system, and a political system that has greatly reduced the privileges of the traditional elite (Marcus 1978). Despite the potential influence of the variety of Western institutions that have been incorporated into Tongan society, I argue in this paper that the primary cause of atomization is the change in the social relations of production—specifically, the adoption of individualized land tenure. Individualized land tenure has established the economic conditions necessary for independent, nuclear-family households by functionally replacing traditional social relations in the production process.

The social implications of Tonga’s individualized land-tenure system have been variously portrayed by authors dealing with the subject. Nayacakalou (1959) noted the predominance of nuclear-family households, but did not connect this phenomenon with individualized land tenure. Instead, he interpreted modern land-tenure arrangements to be only a regularized and codified version of traditional land tenure. However, this view can only be sustained by limiting the evidence to the immediate relationship between the commoner and the land; that is, in both traditional and modern circumstances individuals were ultimately assigned to work one piece of land. In a later study of land tenure, Maude noted the breakdown of the extended family and the role of modern economic circumstances in causing that process: “The main factors in this change in household form have been the change in the system of land tenure, the development of cash production, and a

weakening in the ties which formerly bound the members of the extended family together" (1965:50).

Joining the influence of the land-tenure system are population growth and internal migration, which result in village populations largely consisting of households with relatively few kin ties to one another. Villages themselves are relatively new features of Tongan social life and were originally established as fortresses in the first half of the nineteenth century, a period of internecine warfare. With the cessation of warfare after 1852, fortifications were no longer necessary, but the population remained clustered in villages (Kennedy 1958:163-165). Because villages were not part of traditional social organization and have few functions as social units in modern Tonga, their internal characteristics vary markedly in accord with local histories.

In a previous article (Morton 1978) I described Tonga's economy as monetized but not commercialized. The limited development of a commercial economy is a significant constraint on the potential for economically independent households and on the atomization process. Without the expectation of consistent or adequate income from participation in a commercial economy, Tongan peasant households rely on their social ties with other households to ameliorate temporary or long-term shortages of subsistence goods. More generally, household interdependence results from the impossibility of long-term household survival by exclusive reliance on its own resources. Together, these conditions constrain and contradict the process of atomization by forcing interdependence and integration of households at the level of exchange. It is this phenomenon that I previously referred to as the communal economy (Morton 1978).

Tongan local organization, thus, consists of households that are potentially independent at the level of production but necessarily linked at the level of exchange by the impossibility of long-term economic independence. Furthermore, the social relations relied upon as links between households are not the social relations of traditional Tongan society, but social relations that conform to the modern circumstance of individualized production. The following analysis of production, kinship, and exchange is intended as further elucidation of this view of Tongan local organization.

### **Tradition and Transformation**

The political transformation of Tonga began in the first half of the nineteenth century with the ascendancy of Taufa'ahau to the position of Tu'i

Kanokupolu, the most politically powerful of ancient Tu'i lines. By 1875, with the aid of Wesleyan missionaries, Taufa'ahau was able to fully consolidate his political power, and in that year he became Tonga's first constitutional monarch. Taufa'ahau deprived most traditional chiefs of their power over commoners and sharply limited the power of those he retained as a hereditary nobility. After 1875 the nobility was economically dependent on the Crown rather than on their traditional authority over commoners, and commoners were emancipated from their traditional duties to chiefs. Marcus (1978) fully describes the nineteenth-century events that led, in the twentieth century, to the restructuring of Tongan society.

Prior to the political events of 1826-1875, Tongan society exhibited the general characteristics of Polynesian society: ranked social strata with genealogical position rationalizing differential access to political, economic, and religious power. While there is some ambiguity and disagreement concerning exact numbers of strata and the nature of rank within strata, the general structure of precontact Tongan society is reasonably evident and has been described by Gifford (1929), Goldman (1970), Sahlins (1958), and Mariner (Martin 1817). Uppermost in honor and sanctity was a line of paramounts, *tu'i*; a second stratum consisted of chiefs, *'eiki*; and a third elite stratum, *matāpule*, acted as chiefs' assistants and attendants. The fourth major stratum, *tu'a*, or commoners, made up the bulk of the population. Gifford (1929) and Goldman (1970) give detailed accounts of the relationship among the elite strata. Here, it need only be said that Tonga's history from about 1450 to the modern postcontact period reveals a pattern of competition for power manifested in warfare, political assassination, and apparent manipulation of genealogical traditions in order to capture and consolidate political hegemony. The trend in this four-hundred-year period was a gradual reduction in the number of elite, titled lineages and the absorption of the power and property of weaker lines by more successful ones.

The great division in Tongan society was between commoners and all chiefly strata. Every major aspect of Tongan culture manifested this division in qualitative and absolute terms. In religious thought the souls of all elite persons were immortal, leaving the body at death and existing forever in *Pulotu*, the place of the dead. Commoners were thought to possess only a life force that deteriorated with the body after death (Mariner, in Martin 1817:100). Politics and warfare were strictly the prerogative of titled persons, with commoners acting as soldiers of the lowest rank. Materially, commoners were probably reasonably well-off, but they could not hold rights in objects of wealth and held no rights in

resources beyond those assigned or allowed by chiefs. In the social sphere, commoners were not people of little honor, they were people of no honor. Commoners served chiefs as laborers and warriors, and lived as tenants on land controlled by their more socially esteemed and politically powerful kin.

Power flowed down the line of hierarchy, and in principle each superior down to head of household had great powers over the life and property of his subordinates. In practice, it was the commoner who was the universal subject of all powers, and it was the upper ranks who had the forcefulness to evade subordination. In the system which had established the crude pattern of master and victim as a relationship akin to that between awesome god and a human being, the commoner was the victim. (Goldman 1970:303).

Drawing on the work of Rousseau (1978), Gailey (1981) has applied the concept of estate to Tongan stratification. "If the Tongan kin groups were stratified, but the strata were determined through kinship relations common to both strata, they were not classes" (Gailey 1981:40). Estate systems are "a form of social stratification in which the strata are jurally defined, and where strata present a significant homology with the system of relations of production. The ideology of the system legitimizes inequality" (Rousseau 1978:87). The concept of estate predates the idea of class and is associated with an organic rather than a layered model of society (Fallers 1973:9). While separated by cultural differences and hereditary status, estates are vertically integrated through shared rather than opposing ideologies. In Tonga, kinship provided the social linkage between estates and a shared ideology that supported status differences.

At the local level, traditional Tongan society consisted of homesteads, *'api*, dispersed on the lands of a chief. Homesteads may have been occupied by patrilineally extended families (Maude 1965:50). Or, according to Lātūkefu (1967:3), the homestead consisted of a more loosely constructed association of close kin, linked generationally through either patrilineal or matrilineal ties. In either case the social relations within the homestead and among closely related homesteads were structured by three principles of rank. Ego's patrilineal kin were *'eiki* to him, that is, they outranked him and he owed them social respect. Matrilineal kin were of lower rank than ego and from them he could expect respect and material support. Within the sibling group, sisters outranked their

brothers, and brothers owed both respect and material assistance to their sisters. Finally, there was a principle of seniority that ranked siblings of the same sex. These relations are described in greater detail by Lātūkefu (1967:4-7).

I am more concerned here with the economic implications of ranking. Homesteads were under the authority of the *'ulu*, head, who controlled labor within the homestead and oversaw the organization of production at the lowest level. Besides overseeing production on his homestead, the *'ulu* was the social link between the homestead and the next higher level of organization, the *fa'ahinga* or *matakali*. The *fa'ahinga* consisted of a number of neighboring homesteads connected through common kinship. According to Lātūkefu (1967:8), "this was a named, exogamous group embracing several *'api* headed by the *'ulumotu'a*." The *'ulumotu'a*, principal head, was probably from the chiefly estate and had to be at least of *matāpule* status. Like the *'ulu*, the *'ulumotu'a* controlled production by distributing land among his homesteads, overseeing cultivation, and organizing labor. The *'ulumotu'a* was either a close kinsman of a major chief, or the assistant, *matāpule*, of a major chief. In turn several *fa'ahinga*, through common descent from the original title-holder, formed the *kainga* and were under the authority of the current title-holder, *'eiki*. The *kainga* was the largest social unit associated with a discrete territory and the largest unit of local organization. It was the *'eiki* of the *kainga* who received a grant of land from the Tu'i Tonga; an individual *'eiki* might lose control of his land through the misfortunes of war or politics. Like the *'ulumotu'a* and *'ulu* below him, the *'eiki* took a direct interest in production, but at a more distant administrative level. For commoners, access to land depended on kinship links between the *'ulu* at the lowest organizational level and the *'ulumotu'a* and *'eiki* at higher levels.

While most of this construction is borrowed from Lātūkefu, I question his opinion that residence rather than kinship bound commoners to chiefs (1967: 11). It is quite probable that most commoners did not know their genealogical connection to chiefs, but they did know their connection to their *'ulu* and their *'ulumotu'a*. In a system of hierarchical relations, it is only necessary for the participants to be aware of their relations with those immediately above and immediately below them. Since the commoner was at the bottom of the genealogical scale, specific kin connections beyond the homestead and the *fa'ahinga* were not relevant to him. However, this lack of relevance for the commoner, participating at the lowest level of the society, does not imply that kinship did not provide the overall structure of social relations.

Production, distribution, and consumption were all organized by the ramage-like structure of traditional social relations. The territorial equivalent of the sociopolitical hierarchy was what Sahlins (1958:6-7) termed "overlapping stewardship." All land was first vested in the Tu'i Tonga, who granted *tofia*, estates, to principal chiefs, and they in turn granted use rights to their 'ulumotu'a; final allocation was made to heads of 'api by the 'ulumotu'a. The tenure rights of commoners were minimal since they could be evicted without recourse. In return for allowing access to his land, the chief demanded both goods and services from his tenants. A variety of goods were reserved exclusively for chiefly consumption, including certain types of yams, fish, turtles, and shellfish. First fruits from all harvests were also for the use of chiefs. Goods produced at the local level moved up the hierarchy of statuses and supported public works, warfare, craft production, and the lavish life-style of the chiefly estates. Labor for public works and for warfare was organized by the 'ulumotu'a and chiefs and either used locally or contributed for use at higher levels.

The 'ulumotu'a exerted considerable influence over what crops were produced and what quantities were necessary for tribute and ceremonial offerings. Due to the abundance of resources and the general ease of production, it is doubtful that the material demands of the chiefs ever threatened the basic welfare of commoners. But commoners could not possess the prestige goods associated with chiefly status. Wealth was distinguished from subsistence goods and consisted of *ngatu* (tapa cloth), fine mats, canoes, items of personal adornment, special architecture, and some food items, for example, pigs and certain yam varieties. Gailey (1981) maintains that *kaloa*, wealth, was produced exclusively by women, but this is doubtful since a variety of goods produced by male labor were also prestige goods, for example, yams, whales teeth, canoes, and houses. There was an emphasis on the circulation of goods as it relates to status and power, that is, status was manifest in the power to give and to demand goods. Thus the commoner was stigmatized both in his role as provider and as receiver (Goldman 1970:301-302).

Historically, Tonga's political economy was structured and dominated by the asymmetrical relationship between commoner and chiefly estates. Kinship served both to connect the estates materially and ideologically and to socially rationalize differential access to economic and political power.

Of all the social and political changes that occurred in the establishment of Tonga's monarchy, the adoption of individualized land tenure

was most significant in shaping modern local organization. As Marcus states, "It was the land arrangements, envisioned by the constitution, which were to give real substance to other clauses concerning individual rights and emancipation" (1978:516). Subsequent to 1875, land laws were enacted that granted usufruct directly to individual males, so that under the present land system every Tongan male, age sixteen and over, is entitled to  $8\frac{1}{4}$  acres of agricultural land, plus a small lot,  $\frac{2}{5}$  of an acre, on which to live within a village or town. This system is not completely instituted and cannot be because of land scarcity (Maude 1973:171-172).

Besides materially freeing commoners from their dependency on chiefs for access to land, the land laws have several significant social consequences. The modern land-tenure system not only frees the commoner from the chief but also from the entire social hierarchy that previously linked commoner and chief and defined social groups at the local level. The *'ulumotu'a* no longer directs production, and a high proportion of households do not recognize any association with an *'ulumotu'a* or a broader residence group. By emphasizing inheritance of land through primogeniture and allocating land only to males, the law undermines the traditional claim of women, as sisters, on the labor and resources of their brothers. It also depreciates the value of female links in establishing claims to land. Consequently, the land-tenure system exerts pressure on traditional forms of kin relations to transform themselves into something approximating a Western model of kin relations, that is, households consisting of independent nuclear families dominated by males as husbands and fathers.

Tonga's adopted land-use policy has also transformed social relations by clustering the population into villages. Prior to the modern period Tonga's population was dispersed in homesteads. It was only during periods of intense warfare in the nineteenth century that fortified villages were temporarily established for protection. During the twentieth century villages became administrative units that could be overseen by a town officer, an elected official responsible to the central government. Internal migration and rapid population growth have created village communities in which kinship cannot function as the single, or even the dominant, mode of interaction. Mutual aid, cooperation, and other interactions generally are based as much on coresidence.

Taken together, all aspects of Tonga's land-tenure system constitute an attempt to establish self-sufficient households, each with its own access to the means of production and each responsible for its own material welfare. This arrangement of the means of production and labor

would, if achieved, approximate what Marshall Sahlins has termed the domestic mode of production, the D. M. P. However, the D. M. P. is only a logical possibility, an underlying structure; it cannot, in fact, be achieved.

Clearly the domestic mode of production can only be a disarray lurking in the background, always present and never happening. It never really happens that the household by itself manages the economy, for by itself the domestic stranglehold on production could only arrange for the expiration of society. Almost every family living solely by its own means, sooner or later, discovers it has no means to live. (Sahlins 1972: 101)

The long-term fragility of the D.M.P. constitutes a major constraint on the full development of economically independent households. In the case of Tonga there are other important constraints on the development of independent households. The lack of sufficient land to fully institute the system means that many households must rely on informal and extralegal methods to gain access to land.

Tonga's marginal participation in the market economy also influences the nature of local organization and forces reliance on noncommercial forms of distribution and exchange. Several linked conditions have prevented the rapid development of a commercial economy in Tonga. Perhaps most significant is that land has not been commoditized; it cannot be legally transferred by sale. The nonexistent land market, combined with other government policies that discourage or prevent the intrusion of foreign capital, have largely prevented the establishment of large-scale enterprises. Commercial development has been limited to the service sector, retailing, and, to an even more limited extent, commercial farming.

During the period of this study (1970-1971), about 90 percent of Tonga's export income was derived from the sale of coconut products and bananas; the remainder was from the sale of other agricultural products and handicrafts. The 1966 census also reveals the predominance of agricultural production in Tonga's economy. Sixty-seven percent of all adult males were engaged in agriculture while less than 3 percent worked in manufacturing and processing; services ranked as the second largest category of employment at just under 10 percent (Fiefla 1968:28). Total exports for 1970 averaged about T\$33<sup>1</sup> per person. These data reveal a commercial economy of small proportions dominated by agricultural production with minimal participation in com-

mercial exchange. Obviously, Tongans do not rely on the production of cash crops or on the availability of wage labor to meet most of their material needs. Reproduction of the system at every level depends on subsistence needs being met through local production and distribution.

Thus, as argued here, local organization in modern Tonga is more the result of accommodations to modern political and economic circumstances than to conservation of traditional social relations. Maintenance of traditional social relations was not a viable twentieth-century alternative because of changes in the political structure, particularly the reduction in chiefly authority. A more complete transition to a market economy and Western social relations was also not an option in the face of government policy that largely prevented investment by foreign capital and limited development of commodity production within Tonga. The result has been a reformulation of local organization in terms of subsistence-oriented production carried on by household units disassociated from traditional social relations.

### **Local Organization and Production**

Despite their lack of easily discernible structure or function, Tongan villages provide a pragmatic reference point to describe local organization. The village I selected for study, Matolu,<sup>2</sup> is located on the main island of Tongatapu. Matolu is distinctive in that the noble holding the estate on which the village is located resides in the village. All families in Matolu were members of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in the village. In most villages, religious affiliation is diverse and changes rapidly (Decktor-Korn 1977: 170-195).

Because of its proximity to Nuku'alofa and the fact that land is still available, Matolu has experienced very rapid population growth. Between 1956 and 1971 the population grew from 91 to 261, an increase of 287 percent. Mean household size grew from 4.8 to 6.2, and the number of households increased from 19 to 42. This rate of growth is atypical since Tonga's overall population grew by approximately 40 percent during the same period (Fiefia 1968:6). Only 7 of the 42 household heads were born in Matolu; 18 were born in other villages on Tongatapu, and the other 17 were born in villages located in other island groups. All of these men explained their change in residence by the availability of land and Matolu's proximity to schools and medical services. With the exception of one household, all of the "immigrant" families have some attachment to earlier residents of the village, either through kinship or marriage. However, there was no pattern to the type

of relationship utilized to establish residence by the immigrants. The one exception is the church steward, who is assigned to his position by the church administration.

Matolu's rapid growth and the influx of immigrants resulted in some political and social tension. "Native" residents who can trace a long family association with the village are known as the "real Matolu people." More recent arrivals, even though they may have resided in the village for twenty years or more, are considered newcomers. This division is represented symbolically by the separation of the two groups in different graveyards. The division also appears in some local jokes, but there is no discernible effect on the quality of relationships between individuals or households, or on the organization of the village itself.

The availability of agricultural land is the main material concern of all families. First, they are concerned with immediate availability: Will they have land to use for subsistence gardening? Second is a long-term concern: Is land available for legal allotment? Other considerations are whether there are opportunities for wage labor, and whether there is ready access to health care and educational services. Because of the complexity of the decision-making process, it is difficult to classify residence choices. With that in mind, 57 percent of the households were residing virilocally, 29 percent were neolocal, and 14 percent were uxorilocal. On the surface this distribution might be understood as consistent with traditional residence patterns. However, the primary concern is with access to land, and since transfer of land under the current land-tenure system gives strong preference to inheritance through primogeniture, eldest sons would prefer to remain in close association with their father.

After considering the origin of household heads, their residence choices, and their stated motives for selecting a particular village, it is apparent that kinship is playing only a limited role in determining village composition. Instead, access to land--which may be obtained in several ways, including use of kin relationships--is the primary concern in selecting the postmarital residence. All household heads in Matolu have access to gardening land, but only 13 hold legally registered allotments; 14 hold plots pending final approval by the noble, and 15 have temporary access to land through a kinsman or friend. Like most nobles, the noble holding the Matolu estate has been very slow to approve final allotment of land. Reluctance in this matter provides the noble with some control over peasant families vying for legal access to land. This manipulation by the noble is extralegal, but it is grudgingly accepted as his traditional right.

Villagers express a preference for living in nuclear-family households, and of the 42 households in Matolu, 41 consist of nuclear families. Eight of these households include an adult, unmarried relative of either the household head or his wife. One household includes three conjugal pairs, but two of the couples are only recently married and, although intending to establish separate households, have not yet done so.

All households engage in some cash-producing activities. These activities vary over time within the same household and between households. Cash-crop production, mostly coconuts and bananas, fishing, production of handicrafts, and wage labor are the main sources of income. No households engage in any of these activities continuously; income-producing activities are always linked to specific targets of a nonsubsistence nature. Decktor-Korn (1977) found the same orientation to production for exchange. This pattern of intermittent involvement in the market economy can be explained by the small amount of income generated relative to time input plus the intermittent nature of income sources themselves: wage-labor jobs are likely to be temporary and the markets for agricultural products are sporadic.

Of the 42 household heads in Matolu, 25 identified themselves as farmers, 6 as wage laborers, and 5 as fishermen; 2 others were working in New Zealand as wage laborers. The remaining 4 household heads consisted of minor church and government officials. This information suggests more specialization than actually exists, since all household heads, with the exception of the two absent from the village, gardened and relied on gardening to meet household subsistence needs. Strict occupational specialization in the market economy is impractical for most because most income sources are temporary; this is true of both wage-labor jobs and the production of cash crops.

Production is carried out by households operating independently of one another. Household heads make their own decisions on such matters as the use of horticultural land, crop selection and rotation, and whether to plant cash or subsistence crops. Their decisions are not subject to review or control by any higher social or political authority. For farmers who do not have their own allotments and rely on kin or nobles for access to land, this statement must be modified. These farmers are less likely to grow cash crops or to invest as much labor in the land as farmers working their own allotments, because their rights to the land are temporary.

Labor is largely supplied by the household head working alone, occasionally assisted by other males in his household--sons or visiting kinsmen. More rarely, wives will assist their husbands. Labor is often

pooled for tasks that require large labor input in short periods, or for tasks that are extensive and considered boring. Most formally, labor pooling is organized as a *kautaha toungāue*, an association in which the participants agree to work for one another, as a group, in rotation. One individual is selected as timekeeper to help enforce the principle of equal contribution. During 1971 Matolu had two such groups, one having a membership of ten and the other a membership of seven. The tasks undertaken as a group were planting and hoeing. On the days the association was to work, each member had one hour in the morning to work on his own garden plot; the remainder of the day the entire membership worked on the garden of one member. The order of rotation was established by the proximity of each garden to the village, group work beginning at the closest garden and ending at the most distant.

Kinship was not a criterion for membership; instead the groups were formed on the basis of residence. All members of one group resided in the northern half of the village, and the members of the other group resided in the southern half. It is also important to note that these groups functioned without a leader. The timekeeper was selected because he was thought to be honest and sufficiently literate to keep records. Less than half the men chose to belong to a formal gardening association. However, there are less formal, smaller groups of friends and neighbors that work together. In these cases, the labor input of each should balance out but is not strictly accounted since companionship is the dominant concern.

In contrast to traditional circumstances, kin groups, or even dyadic relationships with kin outside the households, play virtually no role in organizing production. The only kin group larger than the household is the *matakali*, and it is both corporately weak and structurally ambiguous. In the village of Matolu there are four recognized *matakali*. Of the 42 households in the village, only 21 claim affiliation with a *matakali*. In each household claiming affiliation, either the household head or his wife is a consanguine of the 'ulumotu'a. The position of the 'ulumotu'a is not strictly determined by kinship or descent. Instead, the position seems to result from the merging of a consideration of village history and current political realities. Recognized 'ulumotu'a claim relatively long ancestral associations with the village and have some claim to status through seniority, title, or control of some official position such as town officer. These men tend to be the foci of status rivalry within the village, not because they are 'ulumotu'a, but by virtue of holding other political or social positions. Economically, they are sometimes significant in mobilizing goods and labor for ceremonial occasions and/or

feasting, but they do not have the authority or personal power to do more than request contributions and cooperation.

Historically both the *matakali* and the *'ulumotu'a* were more socially significant and were apparently critical in organizing production at the local level. Lātūkefu (1967:8) states that in the past only titled persons could hold the position of *'ulumotu'a*; this suggests that historically *matakali* were segments of ramage, *ha'a*. The *'ulumotu'a* of precontact Tonga were quite powerful since they held the final rights to land in the system of overlapping stewardship. Under that system, the land of the *matakali* was distributed and cultivated under the supervision of the *'ulumotu'a*.

The modern system of land tenure has altered the chain of stewardship so that the *'ulumotu'a* no longer receives land to administer and no longer supervises production. The modern *matakali*, to the extent that it exists, has weakened and changed in both structure and function. Gifford (1929) and Lātūkefu (1967) both describe *matakali* as segments of larger lineal units, *ha'a*. Today the *matakali* are not segments of larger units, nor do they function directly in the production process. Also, the power of the *'ulumotu'a* over members of the *matakali* has been significantly reduced, since they no longer rely on the *'ulumotu'a* for access to land.

In modern Tonga kinship has a limited and peripheral role in organizing production, particularly in organizing labor and allocating access to land, the primary means of production. Consequently, its role in establishing and defining local organization has also been significantly reduced. Kinship groups larger than the nuclear family and the household are poorly defined and functionally ambiguous. Villages themselves lack structure related to kinship. None of the foregoing is meant to claim that kinship is not an important aspect of modern Tongan social life; it clearly is. However, in removing traditional kin relations from production their material constraints on the community and the individual have been altered.

### **Local Organization and Exchange**

Tongan local organization roughly approximates the household type of peasant political-economy described by Halperin (1977:291). In this type of peasant system, households are relatively autonomous at the local level, political power is a function of the traditional sociocultural system, and the local elite exert economic controls through taxation and authority over the distributive system. In the two other types of peasant

systems defined by Halperin, administered community and commercial plantations, elites exert much more direct control over production itself. More significantly for this analysis, in a household-type peasant economy the reproduction of the local community is left to the local community. This is the case in Tonga where the state provides little economic protection. Tongan households are left to their own social devices to protect themselves from short-term or long-term economic difficulties. The disadvantages of household independence are apparent to Tongan peasants. Illness, family discord, separation, and/or old age may seriously disrupt production and threaten the ability of the family to provision itself. Besides obvious material circumstances that slow or stop household production, there are a variety of social activities and religious duties that also disrupt production for varying amounts of time.

The long-term unreliability of the domestic mode of production, combined with the limited development of a commercial economy, necessitates and produces the communal economy. The communal economy is not a total economy; it does not have its own form of production. Goods that enter the communal economy are goods produced for use by households; they are not produced specifically for exchange. The communal economy is a sphere of exchange in which goods move from household to household through the social linkages of kinship, friendship, and neighborliness.

The ideology of the communal economy contrasts with the individualistic nature of production. Its widest principle is *fetakoni'aki*, the spirit and reality of cooperation. More specifically, this ideology prevails upon individuals to materially assist kin, neighbors, and friends, particularly those who need assistance. It also calls upon the able individual to assist others who are socially close before using resources in other ways--for example, sharing food surpluses with neighbors rather than selling them. Tongan attitudes toward food are perhaps the best example of this ideology. Tongans view food as almost a free good. No one should be deprived of food; "come and eat" is probably the most frequent greeting in Tonga and is extended to strangers as well as close kin and friends. There is also a pervasive attitude that the selling of food is a breach in custom and borders on immorality.

To determine the characteristics of Tonga's communal economy, I collected data on 604 transactions. The data were obtained from 40 households in Matolu over a ten-week period. The sampling procedure was to visit each household at two-week intervals and elicit information on the last four transactions in which the household had been involved. Dupli-

cate reports of the same transaction were removed from the sample. Collecting information from both principals involved in a transaction provided an opportunity to evaluate the validity of the data. The few discrepancies I found were minor and were probably due to honest differences of opinion or memory. There was some difficulty in collecting this information since Tongans considered it uninteresting to discuss the details of everyday exchange. Their interest focused on those transactions they considered socially significant. It was easier for an informant to remember the details of his gift of a large pig for his brother's wedding feast several years earlier than the basket of taro he gave to his neighbor two days before. By focusing my informants' attention on one- and two-day periods preceding the interviews, I obtained a sample more closely reflecting the general characteristics of the communal economy. Reliance on informants' selection of transactions would undoubtedly have skewed the sample toward transactions involving prestige items in a ceremonial context. In this sample only 7 percent of the cases were associated with a ceremonial context. Social contexts that do require gifts are life-crisis events--births, certain birthdays, weddings, and funerals. Guests attending feasts also provide their hosts with gifts of prestige foods or traditional craft items, particularly tapa and mats. However, the emphasis here is on more mundane transactions and their role in the communal economy. The great preponderance of these transactions, 93 percent, occurred in the course of daily patterns of interaction rather than during extraordinary ceremonial events.

Virtually all of these transactions would be classified as generalized reciprocity (Sahlins 1965: 147). Their two-sided quality is not apparent in a single transaction. At the moment of transfer there is, of course, a giver and a receiver, but over time this distinction is dissolved. The community's expectation is that individuals will be involved in the communal economy as both givers and receivers. There is some prestige attached to being a giver, and individuals who seem to consistently be receiving without good reason, such as physical disability, are the subject of some gossip and may be subjected to mild public ridicule through joking.

Initiation of transactions is often subtle because "gifts" may be elicited by admiring a desired object or by mentioning a need. With this in mind, 26 percent of the transactions were initiated by a request and the remaining 74 percent were initiated by the giver.

The types of material exchanged further suggest the importance of the communal economy in the day-to-day provisioning of households. Foodstuffs are the largest category and constitute 63 percent of the sam-

ple. Nearly all of the foods exchanged were produced at the local level. Horticultural products made up 37 percent of the sample, fish and meat totaled 25 percent. Since there is no refrigeration in the village and no other preservation methods are used, meat and fish have to be consumed soon after they are obtained. Consequently, they are overrepresented in the sample relative to their actual frequency in the typical villager's diet. In many households meat and/or fish is only consumed once or twice a week.

The separation of the communal and commercial economies is manifest in the types of goods exchanged, the form of transactions, and their distinctiveness in social function. A variety of imported commodities have become necessities in household consumption patterns, for example kerosene, matches, salt, spices, cloth, and a variety of household utensils. These goods are treated differently than locally produced goods within the communal economy. Only 20 percent of the goods transferred were imported and, if tobacco products are excluded, only 10 percent of the goods exchanged originated in the commercial sector. These commodities are usually given in very small quantities and are intended to tide the receiver over until supplies can be replenished through purchase. Expensive commodities such as radios, bicycles, and fine dishware are loaned with considerable frequency, but are rarely given freely.

Money was exchanged in 11 percent of the transactions. These were small quantities, generally less than T\$1. A request for money was always accompanied with a statement regarding its intended use. While difficult to quantify, exchanges involving money seemed to be treated with more specificity regarding use and conditions of repayment than did transactions involving goods. However, no transactions by sale were observed between co-villagers except those that occurred at the one village store.

Production is organized and accomplished by households working independently. I argue here that this model of production as social policy and as a system for allocating the means of production--land--has an atomistic effect on Tongan social life. In particular, it has to a large extent dissolved the material basis for hierarchical social relations. However, the inherent impossibility of production and reproduction based strictly on autonomous households necessitates socioeconomic ties among households. This necessity is made more pronounced by the limited development of the commercial economy and the similarly limited development of social welfare policy and institutions at the society level. Reproduction of the community and the households themselves depends on a vigorous communal economy.

TABLE 1 Transactions according to Kinship and Geographic Distance

Geographic Proximity	Kin	Non- Kin	Total
Exchange parties reside in same village	150 (a)	236 (b)	386
Exchange parties reside in different villages	160 (c)	58 (d)	218
Total	310	294	604

*Note:*  $\lambda_a$  (kinship is dependent variable) = .29,  $\lambda_a$  (location is dependent variable) = .05,  $\lambda = .17$ , Chi-square = 66.48 ( $p < .001$ ).

Kinship and coresidence, together, are the social relations that structure the communal economy. Table 1 categorizes transactions as to whether the principals were kin and whether they were coresidents. Lambda a ( $\lambda_a$ ),<sup>3</sup> Guttman's coefficient of predictability (Freeman 1965:71-78), was used to examine the relationship between proximity and kinship. When  $\lambda_a$  is calculated with kinship as the dependent variable (i.e., kinship status is guessed with knowledge of residence), 29 percent of guessing errors are eliminated; when location is guessed with knowledge of kinship status,  $\lambda_a$  is only 5 percent. This implies that shared kinship overrides distance and that coresidence overrides lack of kinship (compare cells b and c). The low frequency in cell d, less than 10 percent of the sample, further confirms the significance of both coresidence and kinship as important determinants of exchange.

Obviously, close proximity is likely to promote relationships of cooperation and mutual assistance, and to a large extent villagers expect to rely on neighbors for material assistance. Interdependence of neighboring households is symbolically recognized in the distribution of Sunday feast foods. Food for Sunday is usually prepared the day before since cooking and other forms of work are illegal on Sundays. Households prepare large quantities of one or two dishes and then a child is sent to deliver portions to several neighboring households. At the practical level this allows each household to have a variety of foods without the extra effort of preparing several different dishes.

Fifty-one percent of the sample consisted of exchanges between kin, so in general it can safely be concluded that kinship is playing an active role in determining with whom one exchanges. The strongest tendency revealed in table 1 is that when exchange occurs between principals residing in different villages they are likely to be kin. Within the village

kinship plays a much stronger role than the data suggest because the non-kin to kin ratio is quite high. Village demographics are such that relatively few kin are available within the village.

The proportion of transactions that involve kin, however, only tell us that kinship is a significant feature in the communal economy and local organization. The exact kin relations involved and their relative proportions are much more revealing about the material role of kinship. Fifty percent of the exchanges occurring among kin are between parents and children or between siblings, that is, persons that once resided together in the same household and constituted a nuclear family. The frequency of exchange falls off dramatically with increasing degrees of consanguinity. Overall, the pattern of exchange among kin is one in which the household organized around nuclear families emerges as the socially significant unit. Exchange within the communal economy both contradicts and reaffirms the atomistic influence of the organization of production. While it links households together in recognition of the interdependency of households, it is itself organized in terms of households rather than more inclusive kin groups.

Tongans have a strong conscious model of exchange that for them should be both prescriptive and descriptive. The model is based on kinship rank within the bilateral kindred, *kainga*, and specifies the direction of the flow of goods, that is, goods should move from persons of lesser rank to persons of greater rank. Relative rank within the bilateral kindred is established by three criteria applied in the following order: agnates are of higher rank than ego and uterines are of lower rank; females occupying the same genealogical position as males are of higher rank than their male counterparts; and age outranks youth. So the eldest female in a sibling group outranks all of her siblings. In the parental generation father's sister is of particularly high rank because of her position as both agnate and female. Mother's brother, because of his position as both uterine and male, is the epitome of low rank within the kindred. Traditionally, the relationship between mother's brother and sister's son was known as the *fahu* relationship, meaning "above the law." In this relationship ego was allowed to exact unlimited goods and services from mother's brother.

This model of exchange is understood by virtually all adult Tongans and is thought to characterize exchange behavior. It is discussed by E. W. Gifford (1929:17-19) and by Ernest and Pearl Beaglehole (1941:76-78), and finally by Adrienne Kaeppler. After describing kinship rank, Kaeppler states, "The economic implications of status within the system of exchanges among the Kainga can be characterized as indi-

rect reciprocity, i.e. goods and services go from ego and his siblings to his patrilineal relatives, while he exacts goods and services from his matrilineal relatives" (1971: 179). Whether Kaeppler's statement is correct or not is not really at issue. It is certainly correct in that it represents the way Tongans themselves view exchange between kin. However, the actual pattern of transactions in my sample contradicts this view because, first, exchange with kin outside the first degree of collaterality is relatively infrequent and, second, because there is not a one-way flow of goods within kin dyads involving differences in rank. The actual direction in which goods moved only conformed to the ideology of kin ranking in 37 percent of the transactions. Clearly, kinship rank is not significantly influencing the direction in which goods move within the communal economy.

The ideology of kin rank is, of course, associated with traditional relations of production in which access to the means of production was defined by kinship status. Under modern circumstances it contradicts the actual organization of production and the atomistic character of local organization. Its survival and Tongans' belief in its efficacy possibly lies in its ideological-political function rather than its economic role. Tonga's modern government, although quite different from the traditional political system, is largely rationalized in terms of traditional kin ranking and the associated system of stratification. "Former relations of production and other social relations do not disappear suddenly from history, but they are changed; they influence the *forms* and *places* which will assume and manifest the effects of the new conditions in material life, within the former social structure" (Godelier 1977:5).

The shift in the economic functions of kinship are critical to understanding the direction of social change in Tonga. All forms of kin relations, beyond those within the nuclear family, have been disassociated from production, and it is this disassociation that produces the atomistic character of local organization. To a large extent kinship maintains its integrative function by facilitating mutual assistance between economically interdependent households, but this is, at base, the limited kinship of the nuclear family. The social character of exchange within the communal economy disguises significant structural change in local organization.

### **Conclusions**

That traditional forms of social relations are transformed by the intrusion of Western social models and a capitalist market economy is already

well established in social science. The goal of this paper has been to more closely examine the dynamic relations among production, social organization, and exchange in the reorganization of Tongan local organization. At the broadest level it can be concluded that local organization little resembles its historic and traditional counterpart. By individualizing production, Tonga's modern land-tenure system has been central in weakening and dissolving not only relations between traditional strata, but all relations that previously linked individuals into hierarchically organized, corporate, kin groups. Internal migration, stimulated by the search for land under the modern system, plus population growth, have also contributed as atomizing influences.

Completion of the atomizing process has been forestalled by the economic impossibility of a domestic mode of production and by the limited development of the commercial economy. The presence and vigor of a communal economy attests to the economic interdependence of households and provides data that demonstrate the importance of social relations based on coresidence and kinship defined in terms of nuclear families. Because exchange within the communal economy is facilitated by social relations rather than by commercial motives, it appears as a traditional feature of local organization. However, these are not the same social relations that traditionally organized production and exchange.

Local organization in Tonga is the result of the specific way in which Tongan society responded to its domination by Western culture and capitalist economic relations. In Tonga's case indigenous political control was maintained, but only by adopting Western social and political models. Most relevant to the argument advanced here is the adoption of the concept of a freeholding peasantry tied directly to a centralized state bureaucracy. As proposed by Lingenfelter (1977:114), "The superordinate variable in change is the domination of the colonial power which restructures the indigenous societies to extract from them a surplus, which is politically defined, and idiosyncratic to each historical time and place." Despite the enigmatic character of colonialism, an examination of the way in which colonialism reorganized indigenous labor and consequently the way in which it impinged on traditional social relations provides some comparison. In Tonga labor was removed from the control of traditional social relations by providing individual males with legal rights in the means of production through the authority of a state. Despite the continued emphasis on production for use instead of production for exchange, traditional social relations have largely been dissolved.

Finney's analysis of socioeconomic change in Tahiti (1973) suggests that local organization in Tahiti and Tonga are broadly similar in the weakening or destruction of traditional social relations and their atomistic character in the modern period. In his examination of food exchange in Tahiti, Finney found that 80 percent of these exchanges occurred between siblings or between parents and children. In Tonga, the comparable figure is 50 percent. Social change in Tahiti has, of course, been more dramatic and thorough than in Tonga, but this general state of affairs does not account directly for the atomistic character of Tahitian local organization. Tahitians have experienced a more direct intrusion of capitalism than Tongans by the thorough commercialization of their internal economy. Finney's Tahitian peasants are oriented primarily to the production of cash crops and have attempted to individualize production themselves since the rewards of commercial production are distributed in terms of individual effort. Tahitian proletarians have lost their rights in the means of production and sell their labor directly in the labor market. Permanent social relations beyond the nuclear family become materially irrelevant where the commercial rewards for labor are continuous and meet subsistence needs. Unlike Tonga, Tahitian social organization is atomized by direct participation in a commercial economy, that is, subsistence needs are met by selling products or labor.

Samoa, in contrast to both Tonga and Tahiti, is known for its cultural conservatism and social stability. Holmes (1971:101-104) notes a trend toward individualized land use. Increasingly, untitled men are allowed to use sections of family-held lands, move inland beyond the control of *matai*, and rely on wage labor. *Matai* are also finding it increasingly difficult to control family lands. Despite these trends, 98 percent of the land in American Samoa, and 86 percent in Western Samoa, remains under the control of the *matai* (ibid.:99). As concluded by Holmes (ibid.:103), "land and social organization remain closely linked." Thus, in Samoa traditional social relations have remained central to production and continue to dominate local organization.

The strength of traditional social relations in Samoa and their weakness in Tonga lends support to the hypothesis that the social relations of production, whether stable as in Samoa, or transformed as in Tonga, are central to the process of social atomization. Samoa has experienced more commercialization and industrialization than Tonga. It has also been exposed to the influences of Christianity, Western education, and tourism, yet has experienced less change at the level of local organization. The contrast between Samoan and Tongan local organization is

starkly revealed in a comparison of extra-household local organization and its role in production. In Samoa, kin groups, 'ainga, rather than individuals hold land, and control of production is vested first in the matai of the 'ainga and finally in the village fono that establishes production goals for the matai(s). Further, the matai directly organizes labor within his 'ainga (Lockwood 1971:32-33). In Samoa, the village is a significant, if not central, level of organization in the production process. Through its hierarchy of kin relations the Samoan village organizes production by allocating land and labor and monitoring consumption. The Tongan village lacks any function directly related to production and, other than its passive role in establishing association through proximity, contributes nothing to the organization of labor.

Tongan local organization is not a chaotic mixture of traditional and Western culture nor is it the result of Tongan attempts to remain traditional; rather it is a result of the specific way in which Tonga has responded to its peripheral status in broader political and economic systems.

## NOTES

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1. The basic unit of Tongan currency is the *pa'anga*, dollar, which was valued at T\$1.00 = U.S.\$1.14 during this study.
2. Matolu is a pseudonym for a village located on Tongatapu.
3. Lambda a ( $\lambda a$ ) is a measure of accuracy in guessing the value of one variable from knowledge of the value of another variable. Thus  $\lambda a$  reflects asymmetrical associations. Lambda ( $\lambda$ ) reflects symmetrical associations, that is, the result of guessing both ways.

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
**THE LIVES AND TIMES OF RESIDENT TRADERS IN TUVALU:  
AN EXERCISE IN HISTORY FROM BELOW**

Doug Munro

*Darling Downs Institute of Advanced Education  
Toowoomba, Queensland*

Seaborne trade in the Pacific last century depended on shipping, capital, connections, and markets. So crucial were these impersonal forces that they encourage an economic determinism by diverting attention from the human dimension of the business. In particular it is easy to overlook those who assumed the roles, so to speak, of hewers of wood and drawers of water. Seaborne trade, in short, was more than a matter of “prices, percentages, competitors and navigation” (Firth 1978: 130); it was equally a matter of deckhands afloat, copra cutters ashore, and resident traders scattered throughout the archipelagoes. To put it another way, the interarchipelago trade in copra, bêche-de-mer, and pearlshell could never have been an economic proposition unless the trading vessels involved had been manned by “native” crews who were cheap to maintain and feed; or had not thousands of Islanders throughout the Pacific cut the copra that those vessels carried away to distant markets. Nor could the copra trade have been conducted in the absence of the underrated yet ubiquitous European resident trader, sometimes trading on his own account but more commonly in company employment, for whom the Pacific became “home.”

This breed of men has been pushed to the farthest margins of Pacific historiography. They seldom penned their memoirs<sup>1</sup> and have never received preferential treatment from historians. Furthermore, their marginal *status* within the European trading system has obscured, then



Map by Department of Geography, University of Auckland, from *Tuvalu: A History*, copyright 1983. Reprinted courtesy Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva.

and now, their crucial *role* within it. While other aspects of trading have become better understood in recent years, our knowledge of the resident outstation traders remains much as it was two decades ago when Harry Maude and Alastair Couper first drew attention to them (Maude 1968:270-273; Couper 1967). The only significant advance has come from Francis Hezel, who gives resident traders prominence in his history of the precolonial Caroline and Marshall Islands (Hezel 1983). Hezel, however, views the typical trader's life more optimistically than I am able. Given these circumstances, a deeper study on this social group needs little justification; what follows is a move in that direction. Rather than being a series of individual biographies, this paper brings together the fragmentary evidence in an attempt to construct a social profile, or group biography, of those traders who took up residence in the tiny island world of Tuvalu.<sup>2</sup>

### **Wider Background**

The nine coral atolls and reef islands of the Tuvalu group have always been peripheral to European interests. Small in size and modest in resources, they offered no scope for large-scale European settlement or plantation economies.<sup>3</sup> Trading contacts between Tuvaluans and Europeans initially occurred in 1821 when Captain George Barrett of the *Independence II*, the first whaling ship to enter Tuvaluan waters, sent parties ashore at Nukulaelae to obtain provisions for sick members of his crew (Stackpole 1953:279-280). Over the next forty years the most common sail on the horizon was that of the broad-beamed whaler, overwhelmingly from Massachusetts. Although Tuvalu was located on the western edge of the On-the-Line whaling ground, whaling captains tended to avoid this badly charted, low-lying archipelago where the winds and currents were tricky, where local resources offered little scope for repairs and reprovisioning, and where whales were not particularly abundant. Tuvalu, in other words, was more a thoroughfare than a whalers' resort, with many captains passing through and avoiding all chances of contacts with shore. Instead, Tuvaluans took the initiative, coming out in their canoes to exchange coconuts and mats for metal fishhooks, knives, glass bottles, and beads. Despite the intermittent nature of these encounters, trading between Europeans and Tuvaluans, as far as the latter were concerned, had begun in earnest, thus paving the way for less transient types of commercial contacts.

By the 1860s the whalers' day in Tuvalu was all but over. The depletion of sperm whales combined with developments in the United States

(civil war, gold rushes, and the substitution of whale products) resulted in whalers largely abandoning tropical latitudes. Their replacement was already on hand; during the previous decade the itinerant whaler had gradually been replaced by another breed of merchant--the seaborne trader.

The first "traders proper" to enter Tuvaluan waters were freelance skippers in search of speculative cargoes. An early example involved the California vessel *Rodolph* on a Pacific cruise to gather produce for the San Francisco market (Kemble 1966: 140-147). Trading contacts gradually became more durable with the entry of the Sydney firms of Robert Towns and Company, J. C. Malcolm and Company, and Macdonald, Smith and Company, who pioneered the coconut-oil trade in the group. Initially their involvement in coconut oil was of a speculative nature, with their vessels dealing directly with Islanders and gathering cargoes wherever they could on an ad hoc basis. But they operated on a far larger scale than the independent freelance skippers: Tuvalu formed only one small part of their overall operations. Towns, for example, regarded the group as no more than an offshoot of his activities in Kiribati which, in turn, were but a sideline to his involvement in sandalwood trading in Vanuatu. Periodically one of Towns' vessels was diverted from Vanuatu to pick up the coconut oil collected by his agents stationed in these remote archipelagoes (Maude 1968:263-267; Shineberg 1967: 108-118). Malcolm too had been active in Vanuatu, but had terminated this interest in about 1860 and redirected the Pacific side of his affairs to coconut oil. His ships plied Rotuma, Kiribati, and Futuna as well as Tuvalu, and he established a head station at Rotuma and posted a resident agent at Maiana in northern Kiribati (Macdonald 1982:27; Maude 1981:81). Thus, from the onset Tuvalu was of little importance in trading company calculations and assumed significance only as part of an extended network of trading stations involving other archipelagoes as well.

In order for the Island trade to function on such a scale, the trading companies had to rationalize their procedures. This was accomplished in two stages. First, the itinerant trading contacts between ship and shore that characterized the whalers and earliest traders gave way to the establishment of the island base, such as Malcolm's at Rotuma, from which company ships could strike out for neighboring archipelagoes. From there it was a short step toward developing networks of outstations, each manned by a resident company agent (Couper 1967:51-52).

This became the organizational form for trading throughout the Pacific. It was a conscious response to economy and efficiency and was

geared to minimize the difficulties of conducting seaborne trade in an extremely dispersed geographic setting. Resident traders served to stimulate local production by being on hand to barter goods for oil, which they would store until it was collected by the company ship. They also made possible the optimum utilization of ships' time, which was crucial to the fortunes of trading companies. This was more efficient than itinerant trading for speculative cargoes, where the vessel would lie idly at each point of loading while the crew went ashore for a cargo, quite possibly offending local sensibilities in the process. Not only was a ship's time, in a sense, irreplaceable, but ships themselves were costly items of capital equipment that depreciated rapidly and operated at high cost. Hence the need for their continual utilization and, in consequence, the rationale for resident traders.

### **The Earliest Traders**

The first resident traders in Tuvalu arrived sometime during the 1850s as agents of Robert Towns (Maude 1968:265n). They were followed by others, such as Jack O'Brien at Funafuti, Charlie Douglas at Niutao, Peter Laban at Nukulaelae, and, perhaps, the two unnamed white men who went out to greet the New Bedford whaler *Elizabeth* at Nui in 1861.<sup>4</sup> It is sometimes uncertain whether these individuals actually arrived as traders or whether they were deserters from whaling ships who sooner or later engaged as shore-based company agents or as independents gathering consignments of coconut oil for passing trading vessels. Jack O'Brien, reputedly the son of a New South Wales convict, and Charlie Douglas came to the Pacific as whalers, made the transition to beachcombing, and soon after turned to trade (Dana 1935:246-248; Restieaux MSA). Then there is the case of John Daly, one of Towns' trading captains, who was separated from his vessel by extraordinary misadventure at Niutao in 1868: when towing twelve empty hogsheads ashore he drifted over the horizon, unnoticed by his crew, and drifted to Nanumea. He was rescued eight months later by a passing vessel.<sup>5</sup> But whatever their reason for being in Tuvalu, resident Europeans who engaged in trade were advantaged by their linguistic monopoly: only a handful of Tuvaluans had ever enlisted on whaling vessels and few, if any, could speak English with sufficient fluency to act as middlemen in the passing trade in coconut oil (Munro 1985).

The remarkable feature of these earliest traders was not their commercial significance but their religious impact in that they paved the way for the missionaries who followed (Brady 1975:143n). Their

motives were varied. There were the self-styled missionary traders, men such as Tom Rose at Nukulaelae and Robert Waters at Nui, who actively proselytized. Rose held rudimentary services on Sundays in response to the peoples' desire to know more about Christianity (Mrs. Chalmers 1872:147-148). So did Waters, but with an eye to economic advantage: capitalizing on the temporal power that accompanied his assumed missionary role, he instituted a system of fines payable only in coconut oil (Murray 1876:391-392, 409-410). Other traders were openly contemptuous of the pagan system. Charlie Douglas at Niutao and another trader at Vaitupu, known in oral tradition as "Titi,"<sup>6</sup> set fire to all the religious structures (Alefaio 1979; Dana 1935:247-248). In dramatic fashion Jack O'Brien did the same at Funafuti, "not from any religious purpose, but because the ancient religion took up much of the time which he thought, rightly or wrongly, should be given to collecting copra [should be coconut oil] for him" (Sollas 1897:354-355). The fact that such actions failed to attract divine retribution was probably one factor in the eventual eclipse of the pagan religion. Even those traders who had no intention of eroding the foundations of the pagan religion usually had the effect of doing so (in the southern islands at least) for they came not as an isolated force but as part of an overall alien culture that the Tuvaluans perceived as being more powerful than their own. The Tuvaluans observed the worldly wealth, the impressive technology, and the literacy of these sporadic earliest Europeans, whether ashore or afloat; they could scarcely afford to ignore a god who so endowed his adherents.<sup>7</sup> Even such reprehensible actions as those of Tom Rose and Jack O'Brien in assisting the Peruvian slavers at Nukulaelae and Funafuti respectively in 1863 (Graeffe 1867:1162-63) had the unexpected short-term effect of strengthening the appeal of Christianity. The survivors turned to the powerful new religion to restructure their communities from the ruins of the immediate past (Maude 1981: 174-175).

By the mid-1860s most, perhaps all, the Tuvalu islands had played host to a resident trader. That decade was one of transition in the group. The trade in coconut oil was being phased out in preference for the more profitable copra. The London Missionary Society (LMS) also began stationing Samoan pastors throughout Tuvalu, and by degrees the group became a Protestant stronghold. Once established, the LMS entered the local trading relationship. Annual donations were solicited, thus diverting some of each island's resources away from the trader. At the same time, however, the LMS stimulated trade by creating a vigorous local demand for clothing, stationery, and building materials for churches. In this way the established two-way trading pattern between

traders and Tuvaluans was transformed into an interrelated three cornered relationship involving the LMS as well (Munro 1982:207-209, 220-229).

An additional change resulted from the “emergence of a new economic milieu in the archipelagoes” of the Pacific (Couper 1967:73), dominated by large, diversified, heavily capitalized companies quite different in character and objectives than their smaller rivals, whom they eclipsed, and better able to make money out of the dispersed island trade. In the forefront was the Hamburg firm of J. C. Godeffroy und Sohn, which exercised a near monopoly over copra trading in Tuvalu during the 1870s. The company placed traders on most islands of the group, including such individuals as Harry Nitz at Vaitupu and Martin Kleis at Nui. These men remained the rest of their lives on their respective islands, marrying into the community and raising large families. By the following decade, however, Godeffroys’ successor, the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Südsee-Inseln zu Hamburg (DHPG), encountered severe competition from H. M. Ruge and Company, another German firm, and from Henderson and Mcfarlane of Auckland. By this time the trader’s house, store, and copra shed in Tuvalu were as common a sight as the church, the *maneapa* (public meetinghouse), and the adjacent village green.

Despite their diversity of social backgrounds, the overwhelming impression is that traders were a group of men, dissatisfied and often unsuccessful in other walks of life, who found a refuge on the margins of the Island trade. They were social casualties by and large. Most went into trading in the first place as a last resort after drifting in and out of various occupations--and sometimes in and out of trouble as well--in various parts of the world, ranging from goldmining in New Zealand, bushranging in Australia, fighting in a South American revolution, or service in the Hong Kong police force or the Royal Navy. Typically unmarried, but sometimes turning their backs on an unhappy marriage, they also leave the retrospective impression of weariness with the uncertainties of a wandering existence. In this gradual process of an unsettled disposition giving way to the desire for a more stable existence they drifted, often unexpectedly, into the Island trade, sometimes first as seamen but finally as company agents ashore. There is the suggestion too that one attraction of the trade was the absence of constant and direct supervision. Although more settled in their occupation than before, traders still tended to be men on the move, wearying of one island (sometimes driven away by the inhabitants) and moving on to the next with their dreams of sudden wealth receding ever further. Thus,

most of the copra traders who came to Tuvalu were already identities on other archipelagoes and known by name at least throughout the Island trade.

The number of traders in Tuvalu probably exceeded seventy. I have been able to document the presence of sixty-two individuals, but there would have been others, particularly during the period before 1865, who are not mentioned in the sources.<sup>8</sup> The number of traders fluctuated, with some islands receiving more than others. On the drier reef islands of Niutao and Nanumanga, whose commercial potential is meager even by Tuvalu standards, there was seldom more than a solitary trader, and indeed Nanumanga went for long periods without a trader at all. The atolls, by contrast, experienced almost continuous occupancy, often two or more traders at any given time, but there is no set pattern. The number of traders within the group also varied over time. At any given moment there could be as few as two or as many as fourteen, but usually there were between five and ten. The actual number reflected the overall activities of the trading companies involved. During the 1870s there was an annual average of eight traders; most were employed by Godeffroys, who dominated the commerce of the wider region. During the 1880s, with increasing competition from other firms, the figure rose to ten but dwindled during the following decade to an average of five as one company after another terminated its interest in Tuvalu. Other companies filled the void, but the number of traders in the group continued to decline because companies now preferred to deal directly with Tuvaluans; and by 1909 the remaining two Europeans in the group had long since abandoned their vocation to become "relics . . . of a vanished class" (Mahaffy 1909; see also Wallin 1910).

### **Relations with Other People**

#### *Traders and Tuvaluans*

Whatever their initial diversity in social background, outlook, and temperament, traders in Tuvalu were soon forced into a common mold by the inescapable circumstances of their vocation, the atoll environment, and the people with whom they shared an island. At first sight it might appear that Tuvaluans were the arbiters of the trading relationship in that it revolved around their demand for trade goods and was dependent on the amount of copra they were prepared to produce in exchange. In point of fact the overall European trading system was not one in which Tuvaluans, or other Pacific Islanders, could participate

except at the bottom of a hierarchy of dependence. This limitation stemmed in part from cultural restraints imposed by kinship obligations, community solidarity, and ethics of reciprocity that run counter to profit making and economic individualism. These same social obligations mitigated against the success of indigenous commercial ventures based on the spirit of private enterprise. "In effect," as Couper explains, "a trading system based on cash tended to become inextricably entwined with another based on kinship" (1967:125). Tuvaluans, moreover, lacked the necessary capital and connections and faced the hostility of entrenched European interests whenever they chose to break into the new system of maritime commerce on its own terms. Thus, Tuvaluans and other Pacific Islanders were admitted only in a restricted fashion, providing they submitted to the trade's unilateral interests and pressures. They were the toilers--the copra cutters and deckhands--whose rewards were largely subject to external authorities and controls (see Couper 1968; Couper 1973).

Resident traders were the point of contact between trading companies and Tuvaluans, and the latter could exert telling pressure on the traders to get a better deal for themselves. The inherent conflict of interest between the two parties led to constant haggling over the price of goods and the value of copra. Boycotting the resident traders was a common enough occurrence on any given island as a means to raise the buying price of copra. Such embargoes on trade were invariably of short duration since the Tuvaluans in the meanwhile deprived themselves of their only access to clothing, stationery, and other needed items from the trader's store, as well as cash for their missionary contributions. Traders knew this and were wont to hit back by imposing trade embargoes of their own. Thus the missionary Nisbet discovered during the LMS's annual visit of inspection in 1875 that "The people [of Vaitupu] had fallen far short of their usual liberality in regard to the teacher's salary. He accounted for this by the fact that the stores had been closed, as the traders refused to comply with the demand of the people for an increase in the price of dried nuts" (Nisbet 1875:7-8).

Another such incident occurred at Nanumanga five years later when Louis Becke closed his store following a dispute with a high-ranking Nanumangan. Being the only trader on the island Becke was in a strong position to set his own terms and conditions. It was not a situation where Islanders could play off rival traders against one another: all they could do in the circumstances was to wait for trading vessels to call and conduct business with them. But no vessels came and finally the Nanumangans were reduced to pleading with Becke to resume normal trad-

ing operations--or such at least is Becke's version of events (Becke 1880). Disagreements over the quality or suitability of the nuts could also force trade to a standstill. When the traders at Niutao refused to purchase green nuts, which are useless for copra, the *kaupule* (council of elders) was "much aggrieved" and banned trade altogether on the grounds that the traders were acting "arbitrarily and unfairly" (Maxwell 1881:5-6).

Two separate issues were involved in the imposition of trade embargoes by Tuvaluans. They were used both as a device to strengthen their commercial bargaining power and as a disciplinary measure against infractions of the local code. Captain Maxwell, who patched up several such disagreements during the cruise of HMS *Emerald* through Tuvalu in 1881, remarked that "the taboo is their only defence against any dishonest trader, and their only means of enforcing good behaviour upon people towards whom they are not permitted to use force. Still there is no doubt that it may be, and sometimes is arbitrarily and vexatiously applied" (Maxwell 1881:5). Jack O'Brien's confrontations with the *kaupule* at Niutao, where he had gone to trade during the 1880s provides a case in point. He may well have been the sort of Irishman who felt "a sort of divine commission to fight against Kings and other rulers," but the *kaupule* were also dispensing justice rather too partially and "making laws having special reference to the poor Irishman whose irascible temper seems to have annoyed them" (Marriott 1883:17; Newell 1885:21).

In other cases too the rights and wrongs of the matter were ill defined. When Thompson of Nui was fined for squabbling with his wife, he paid the fine but refused to appear before the chiefs for a mandatory scolding and instead remained inside his house behind locked doors. After the third summons the door was broken down, Thompson dragged bodily to the council house, and his residence robbed during his absence. Maxwell arbitrated and was told by another trader on the island that "the same thing would have been done to any native on the island; that the Kaipuli [sic] always enforced obedience to their demands according to the law; that Mr. Thompson was made aware of their laws when he first came . . ." (Maxwell 1881:3). In the end Thompson was quite amenable to reason: he wanted nothing more said about the stolen sixteen dollars, only an apology for being manhandled. Maxwell then suggested repayment of the stolen money and that Thompson's door be repaired, and finally Thompson and the "King" shook hands expressing their hope to "be better friends in future" (Maxwell 1881:4).

The relationship between traders and local leaders embraced a range of situations and was fraught with tension. Even when disagreement with a trader was at an interpersonal or an interfamily level, it would ultimately have had to be resolved by the local leadership, since a trader's activities involved the island at large. Because each party was dependent on the other, it was mutually inconvenient for trading operations to be suspended indefinitely, and disagreements were nearly always resolved sooner or later. In late 1885, for example, the council of Nanumea told George Winchcombe and Frank Jackson to leave the atoll the next time their firms' vessels called on the grounds that the two traders were "not good for the people." Jackson departed at the first opportunity, but Winchcombe stayed on and nothing more was said because, on sober reflection, the Nanumeans realized that they could ill afford to be without a trader on the island (Winchcombe 1881-1887:2).

#### *Traders and Missionaries*

Several other factors intervened to varying degrees to complicate traders' daily lives. The Samoan pastors of the LMS frequently deployed their considerable local influence to damage the interests of a trader they happened to dislike, to the extent sometimes of instigating embargoes against that trader. The visiting European missionaries received numerous complaints from traders that the pastors were interfering in trade or acting despotically, but almost invariably these charges were dismissed as being "trivial," "unfounded," or springing from jealousy of the pastors' local influence (Powell 1871:20; Davies 1880:6-7; Phillips 1884:17; Winchcombe 1881-1887:31). Not prepared to be dictated to and loath to divert their busy schedules for the sake of aggrieved traders, the visiting missionaries were also concerned to uphold the authority and standing of their outstation pastors. The European missionaries' also tended to regard traders as "trashy whites" of godless deportment (although occasional friendships or regard for individual traders were also sometimes the case), and this likewise served to prejudice the reception of even genuine complaints. Accordingly, the visiting LMS missionaries perceived themselves not as the protectors of traders but quite the reverse: "The 'John Williams' has been a grand check on the doings of unscrupulous Traders," wrote one (Wilson 1886:14), while another reported that "as in other voyages so also in this one the evil example and influence of the traders scattered throughout these islands gives the Deputation no small amount of trouble" (Newel 1885:46). Traders' experience of Samoan pastor and European missionary alike largely

explains why they were anti-missionary rather than irreligious as such, and Louis Becke had a point when he said that some traders were indeed "very religious men, although they don't show it" (Becke 1905:149).

Some traders, however, did show their religious feeling but in their own way. Alfred Restieaux and George Westbrook on Funafuti so thoroughly detested the island's dictatorial pastor that they refused to attend his church services and held their own private devotions on Sundays (Phillips 1881:8). Restieaux even refused to have the pastor baptize his children; he waited instead for the arrival of a warship and asked its chaplain to perform the ceremony (Maxwell 1881:2; Bridge 1883:2). Some other traders were more forthright in their efforts to undermine the pastor's standing. In 1890 Edmund Duffy arrived at Nanumea from the Fakaofu in Tokelau, where he had been at the center of a schism in the local church (Claxton 1889:9). At Nanumea he showed himself to be public spirited and directed the building of the road, which to this day runs on the ocean side of the main village (A. Chambers 1984:87-88). He also sided with the high chief against the pastor in a dispute over each other's sphere of authority, and when the pastor threatened and belittled the chief, Duffy translated a letter of complaint from the chief to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.<sup>9</sup>

Rarely did friendships develop between resident traders and the Samoan pastors of the LMS. Louis Becke, who traded at Nanumanga in the early 1880s, was later to idolize pastor Ioane, but on the grounds that he was different from the common run of pastors. Pearson (1970:240-241) has termed this attitude a "qualified racism" or the "cult of the exceptional Polynesian." Becke criticized the harsh and petty theocracies over which Samoan pastors typically presided, and then went on to say:

But on this particular little island we had for our resident missionary a young stalwart Samoan, who did not forbid his flock to dance and sing, nor prohibit the young girls from wearing flowers in their dark locks. And he himself was a mighty fisherman and a great diver and swimmer, and smoked his pipe and laughed and sang with the people out of the fulness of his heart when they were merry, and prayed for and consoled them in their sorrow. So we all loved Ioane, the teacher, and Eline, his pretty young wife, and his two jolly little muddy brown infants; for there was no other native missionary like him in the wide Pacific. (Becke 1897:148-149)

Otherwise Becke so detested men of the cloth that he left Tuvalu in 1881 for the Carolines, which were “free from that curse of the islands the missionary element” (Becke 1880).

Most traders managed to maintain a reasonably polite relationship with visiting European missionaries, if only because they dealt with them so infrequently. The personalities of individual traders could also have a bearing on the outcome. Harry Nitz, the long-serving Godeffroy/DHPG trader on Vaitupu, helped in the construction of the island’s new church, which he then regularly attended in a manner befitting “a well conducted man” (Powell 1871:18; Davies 1873:4). Others, however, such as George Winchcombe, only served to confirm the missionary stereotype of the dissolute, worthless trader. As Louis Becke wrote of him:

four years on Niutao and cannot yet talk the language in fact had to interpret for him. such a man to talk, my ears are actually tingling now, I don’t know how much more I would have suffered if it had not been for a case of gin I produced and by liquoring him up freely I got a little respite. he is a fair sample of too many island traders fond of liquor and never happy without some grievance against the natives, these are the men that give the missionaries such a pull over all traders-- (Becke 1880)

The irony is that Winchcombe “professed to be a cut above the ordinary trader.” His airs and graces, his ostentatious use of long words, and an extreme possessiveness toward his wife resulted in Winchcombe being the butt of many unkind remarks (Dana 1935:254-256). At the same time he proved to be a sore trial to all he encountered. Fellow traders could not abide his selfishness: he was never prepared to reciprocate past kindnesses (Restieaux MSc). Nor did the chiefs on the various islands where he traded appreciate his litigious nature: he constantly appealed for their arbitration in his quarrels and then dissented from decisions that did not go his way. It is little wonder when he left Nukufetau that the people had no wish to accept another trader in their midst (Rooke 1886: 10).

#### *Traders versus Traders*

As well as being at odds with representatives of the LMS, traders also had problems with each other and the companies to whom they were tied. Traders on the same island often provided each other with com-

panionship, even if in different circumstances those men may not have been associates. But they were also certain to provide one another with competition and this could strain a friendship or even prevent one from developing, especially in the 1880s when falling world copra prices and increasing competition left many traders heavily in debt to their companies. This competitive situation could result in price wars breaking out, and relations between traders on the same island then hit a very sour note. When Louis Becke arrived for a brief stay at Nukufetau in 1881, the only other trader on the atoll was George Winchcombe, whom he already disliked. Becke promptly raised the buying price of copra and lowered the selling price of his trade goods to the native producers, thus bringing Winchcombe's business to a halt (Maxwell 1881:3).

The trading companies, moreover, did not always act in strict fairness toward their outstation traders, whom they considered to be insufficiently honest, industrious, or sober. Feeling the pinch of hard times, Henderson and Macfarlane started charging their traders for shrinkage and debiting their accounts if, in response to competition, they raised the purchasing price of copra above a stipulated amount. (Restieaux MSb: 12). In 1882 and 1883 this same firm was experiencing difficulty in keeping its far-flung and probably overextended trading network serviced, with the result that many of its traders, including those in Tuvalu, became

completely destitute for stores, and even the necessaries of life, the vessels that should have supplied them being many months overdue. . . . One result of their being left in this distress is sometimes, that they are obliged to part with the produce they have collected for their own firm, in order to procure the necessary supplies, thereby gaining a character for fraudulent practices which is not always deserved. (Le Hunte 1883: 10-11)

Yet "bondage" to an established trading company was, on the whole, a more secure arrangement than the earlier ad hoc procedure of collecting produce for free-lance trading-captains who might go out of business the next day and whose treatment often left much to be desired. A case in point is the treatment meted out to Winchcombe by the notorious Bully Hayes. Hayes landed Winchcombe at Nukufetau in 1872 but without provisions or suitable trade. Returning four months later Hayes invited Winchcombe and his Tuvaluan wife on board his ship, where he put a bottle of gin at the trader's disposal. The day ended with the hopelessly drunk Winchcombe being tarred by the crew while Hayes was in his cabin with Winchcombe's wife where he "downed her on the sofa &

so forth”; finally, the two were dumped ashore and abandoned (Res-tieux MSc:4-5, 7-10).

### *Traders and Naval Captains*

In 1872, HMS *Basilisk* (Captain John Moresby) passed through Tuvalu and called at most islands. At Niutao Moresby warned that warship action would result “should they ever be unfriendly to white people.” Two days later at Nanumea he heard that the local trader had been threatened, so a couple of shells were fired into the bush as a warning (K. Chambers 1984:110-111; Moresby 1876:79-80). Moresby’s action was exceptional; never again did a British warship in Tuvalu waters fire a shot in anger. Traders eventually came to realize that they could not depend on naval protection. The first to do so was W. B. Thompson, who was fined and boycotted, and even occasionally assaulted, by the people of Funafuti during the mid-1870s for arrogantly persisting with the notion that his Funafutian wife’s family lands should be made over to him. Thompson regarded the matter as a test case and called for “powerful and vigorous action” to demonstrate once and for all that Islanders could not “with impunity insult, rob and committ [sic] Brutal Outrage upon a British subject.”<sup>10</sup>

Although he was largely the maker of his own misfortunes, Thompson did have some valid complaints, though these were pointedly ignored by officers of both the Royal Navy Australian Station and the Western Pacific High Commission. Thompson’s position as trader on Funafuti thus became quite untenable, and he had no option but to leave the atoll. Finally he took passage in 1878 on Henderson and Macfarlane’s schooner *Belle Brandon* commanded by Captain Frederick Ohlsen. It so happened that Ohlsen was embroiled in a separate trading dispute at Vaitupu where he had been menaced by a group of armed Islanders acting under instructions from the local Samoan pastor. When they eventually reached Fiji, Ohlsen and Thompson took their complaints to the acting High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, who dismissed them out of hand in abusive letters of reply.<sup>11</sup>

His verdict was predictable. The acting high commissioner was expressing what any other British colonial official would have said in the circumstances, if more vehemently. Similar sentiments were penned by a touring judicial magistrate who had

not the least doubt in my mind that . . . if Englishmen choose to settle in these spots--take native wives,--and identify themselves with the natives, they must be satisfied to accommodate

themselves to the rules and customs of the country, and not call for the interference of the captain of a man-of-war because they may be inconvenienced either in business or private matters by laws of general application to the whole people. . . . nothing to my mind can be worse than . . . sending Queen's ships to take up traders' squabbles, impose fines on whole communities, and, if necessary, enforce their payment by actual force, because--(in nineteen cases out of twenty)--some seedy loafer has, through his own acts, incurred the hatred of the islanders on whom he has been thrust, and who in enmity annoy him in order to drive him away. (Le Hunte n.d. : 14)

In short, British official attitudes were little different from those of the LMS missionaries in that they disliked traders in general and resented being dictated to by them. Also at issue was the humanitarian principle that Islanders' rights were to be protected and upheld, and the practical consideration that imperial resources in the Western Pacific were patently insufficient to deal with more pressing matters, such as the regulation of the labor trade in Melanesia, without a warship being diverted every time a "trader's squabble" was reported. Another colonial official summed up the situation exactly when he said, "if traders went in with their eyes open to these places merely for their own gain, they did not deserve the protection of their Government, and that it was better for the Governemnt to say that they would not protect them rather than that they could not, which is in reality the case" (Romilly 1893:151). Indeed naval captains' hands were largely tied since they had no jurisdiction over Islanders or non-British nationals alike. In the absence of serious and unprovoked violence against British traders, the naval officers could not act against the Tuvaluans, and in any case none of them (apart from Captain Moresby in 1872) showed any inclination to do so. Nor did they regard themselves being obliged in any way to give active support to British traders in the group. Certainly Captain Maxwell was willing enough to listen to any grievances that British traders and island leaders may have had against each other, but he treated the two parties differently: the chiefs were generally given advice that was in no way binding while the trader was "cautioned . . . that he was a British subject and was amenable to British law for his acts, whatever they might be, whether he were the instrument of a German firm or any other" (Maxwell 1881:4-5; see also Macdonald 1982:64-67).

After the declaration of a British Protectorate in 1892, traders' activi-

ties came under the scrutiny, albeit irregular, of a resident commissioner. One early commissioner, William Telfer Campbell, despised traders and proceeded against them on the slightest provocation. He was prompted to intervene in 1896 when Richard Collins of Nukulaelae threatened to shoot Lapana, the chief, during a heated disagreement. Campbell was singularly unimpressed with Collins' explanations that Lapana was normally "my best friend," that he had only threatened to "shove" Lapana outside, not to shoot him, and that he had no ammunition for his revolver. Intent on ridding the Protectorate of Collins, Campbell had him conveyed to Funafuti and demanded two sureties of fifty pounds sterling each, in default of which Collins would be deported to Fiji. The high commissioner, while acknowledging that Collins was a "meddlesome" fellow, decided that Campbell's punishment was excessive because Lapana had offered provocation and also because Collins had really "been deported for matters outside the record." The deportation order was rescinded. Collins then "posed as a reformed character" before the visiting missionary from Samoa and got a free passage back to Nukulaelae with his family in the mission ship *John Williams* (Mrs. David 1899:284). Nevertheless Campbell got a measure of revenge by issuing a liquor prohibition order against Collins which helped to quieten him down.<sup>12</sup>

British traders were vastly dissatisfied with their treatment by officialdom and Louis Becke spoke for many when he remarked that "a man in the South Seas now might as well be a Chinaman as an Englishman--for all the protection he will receive" (Becke 1880). It is not surprising in the circumstances that traders of British nationality sometimes toyed with the idea of changing their citizenship.

The German navy, by contrast, was geared to the protection of German commerce in the Western Pacific and spent an estimated fifteen million marks doing so between 1875 and 1895 alone (Kennedy 1974: 106). As W. B. Thompson said, by way of reproach, "The German traders are always . . . taunting us about the action of our Ships of War as compared with theirs and it is a fact that natives will insult an Englishman when they will not dare insult a German or American."<sup>13</sup> Even so, German traders in Tuvalu were, in practice, no better placed than their British counterparts. Certainly the *Ariadne* called at Funafuti and Vaitupu in 1878 and Captain Werner imposed trade and friendship treaties giving Germany most-favored-nation treatment. He also warned the chiefs at both islands that disruptions to German trade and shipping would no longer be tolerated, and at Vaitupu he intervened on behalf of the local DHPG trader, Harry Nitz, in a dispute over a piece of

land (Werner 1889:320-330). But, as Captain Maxwell predicted, the Germans would never succeed in imposing their will on Tuvaluans in the absence of "strong and incessantly applied pressure" (Maxwell 18815). The necessary follow-up action was not forthcoming and the only subsequent German naval visit occurred in 1883 when the *Hyäne* called at Funafuti. In short, the Tuvalu archipelago was too unimportant both from a trading and labor-recruiting point of view to justify the regular oversight of the German navy, and without this coercive presence the treaties of trade and friendship fell away to nothing.

Maxwell, in 1881, was the first naval officer, either British or German, to visit most Tuvalu islands since Moresby's 1872 cruise in the *Basilisk*. Ample time had passed for trading disputes to accumulate and intensify; indeed, Maxwell was dispatched to the Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Marshall islands precisely because there were so many outstanding matters requiring official investigation.<sup>14</sup> Fair-minded though he was, Maxwell left no doubt that the Royal Naval vessels were scarcely at the beck and call of traders. Successive visiting naval officers adopted the same attitude. The balance of local power now tipped in favor of the Tuvaluans and the quality of race relations improved as traders made greater efforts to keep on good terms with Tuvaluans. More aware than before that their business depended on local goodwill, most traders soon accepted, if somewhat pragmatically, that the ground rules had changed and behaved accordingly.

Naval activity in Tuvalu, then, helped the individual island communities in maintaining a show of integrity in the face of pressures from traders on the spot. But the naval captains were only one element in these local dramas; they combined with Samoan pastors, European missionaries, and the competitive trading situation generally to strengthen the position of Tuvaluans in their dealings with their local company traders and, by extension, the wider European trading system itself.

### **The Routine of Daily Life**

As well as having seemingly every other man's hand turned against them, the resident traders also had to contend with the realities of an unamenable physical and social environment. There were, admittedly, some compensations. At least the mosquitoes were not malarial. Furthermore, Tuvalu was an uncommonly peaceful place, and the only traders to be physically harrassed were those who brought it upon themselves, like W. B. Thompson at Funafuti. But the limitations of the restricted atoll diet and the doubtful nutrition of the provisions from

company ships, if they came at all, made inroads into the traders' health, lowered their resistance to secondary illnesses, and sapped their vitality. When Robert Louis Stevenson and his entourage visited several islands of the group in 1890, every trader they met was in poor health, whether it be from food-related complaints such as anemia and boils or from other ailments such as elephantiasis. The two traders at Funafuti were described as "wretched looking objects," and Stevenson's wife, Fanny, was dismayed when the leprosy-inflicted trader at Niutao, whose "fingers were dropping off," shook hands with her (Mrs. Stevenson 1914:89-106). Moreover, Western medical facilities were nonexistent ashore and recurring illness was a fact of life among traders. On one occasion at least the timely arrival of the missionary barque *John Williams* probably saved the life of a sick trader (Powell 1879:3); and in 1896 Harry Nitz of Vaitupu sought treatment in Fiji for his skin complaints, said to be leprosy.<sup>15</sup>

Socially and intellectually traders were little better off. Theirs was an isolating vocation. Detached from the mental climate that had shaped their outlook and values, they were now transplanted in a markedly dissimilar social framework where the dull routine of village life combined with the sameness of the scenery and the infrequency of diversions served to depress the senses, impose a tedium on their lives, and encourage a pattern of heavy drinking. Nor was a trader's existence enlivened by the spartan simplicity of his dwelling, typically a wretchedly appointed native-style house largely bereft of creature comforts. As (George Westbrook pointed out after several years at the game in Funafuti during the 1880s:

If you would only bear in mind what a wretched life it is living on one of these sandbanks, no company, no amusements, no Theatres, no Bank Holidays, no beefsteak or fresh vegetables for 7 years, if sick no doctor, no news from home or friends, letters often lost or laid carelessly by, several times I have not received letters until long after written.<sup>16</sup>

Outside observers would not have been surprised at such regrets. "It is one of the saddest features of this . . . voyage [to Tuvalu, Tokelau, and Kiribati]," reported one LMS missionary more in pity than disgust, "to note the solitary and wasted lives [of traders] on almost every island, awaiting a lonely grave in this vast ocean solitude" (Claxton 1889:9). "Truly," observed another traveler, "the traders life on these islands must be fearfully monotonous. Some are unvisited for nine months or a year and the natives are far from cheerful company for an educated

man" (Woodford 1884:75). Actually most Tuvalu islands experienced a far higher frequency of shipping contacts by the 1880s as a direct result of increasing competition in the island trade. Passing ships sometimes left behind reading matter (Gill 1872:9; Le Hunte n.d.:15; Woodford 1884:16; Thurston 1893:10), and the arrival of a company vessel was usually an eagerly awaited event as it brought provisions, mail, news of the world, and fellowship (Dana 1935: 197-199). But the diversion was only momentary. Often before nightfall the ship had disappeared over the horizon, leaving the traders to resume their monotonous, unhealthy, and enervating existence.

Part of the problem was the ambivalent social identity that Tuvaluans accorded traders in their midst. Whether trading on their own account, or in the capacity of company agents, traders were never just individuals to be judged on their own merits. They were also seen as representatives of an alien trading system whose rationale violated a local reciprocity system based on generosity and sharing. The disjunction between the two was fundamental, and being associated with the former resulted in traders being part of, yet detached from, village life. Marrying into the community, as most traders did, helped ease these problems of allegiance and identity; but marriage could be a two-edged sword. It gave traders access to a domestic life and the support, more or less, of an extensive network of affines. But this wider social identity could also carry the penalty of the wife's relatives expecting preferential treatment in trading relations. Nevertheless, these marriages were usually lasting relationships from which some of the leading families in Tuvalu--the O'Briens, the Kleises, and the Restures (a corruption of Restieaux)--are descended.<sup>17</sup>

The harsh facts in a trader's life were the heat, tedium, and mosquitoes, the often claustrophobic social pressures of village life, and the inability to get away from one's problems. The pervasiveness of mission-inspired local laws and pastor domination were another bone of contention; often small in themselves, such irritations had a cumulative effect and intruded heavily on a trader's existence. Sometimes the sum total of frustrations and hardships became intolerable and, provoked once too often, traders could react dramatically. The Chinese trader at Niutao in 1878 reached the limit of his endurance when he was fined for killing a chicken on Sunday. In a fury "he killed it a second time!!" and when he was dragged off to the *maneapa* he used the "most filthy language towards the King and chiefs" (Turner 1878:56).

Given the frustrations of their lives and the basic conflict of interests between traders and Tuvaluans it is not surprising that an undercurrent of racial antipathy was often part of a trader's stock of attitudes, even

though most were married to a Tuvaluan. Much of the time such sentiments were well under control since their business operations in large part depended on local goodwill. But in the case of an open disagreement and particularly a boycott, these suppressed feelings of dislike and contempt were liable to come explicitly to the fore.<sup>18</sup>

The paradox is that station-trading became a way of life. Frank Thomas had been twenty-seven years in the business before he came to Vaitupu in 1882. Normally he was an independent but on that occasion he was in the employ of Henderson and Macfarlane (Bridge 1883:3; Dana 1935:201-207; Davis 1892:81-82). Another familiar figure in the Island trade was the “old man-of-war’s man” Charlie Douglas, who for over thirty years following his departure from Niutao was to be found on one or other of the Marshall Islands until his death in 1892 from a fall on board a visiting vessel (Young 1875-1877:26; Le Hunte 1883:44; Davis 1892:21, 92). Tom Day (or O’Day) was another permanent fixture. It was for his benefit that Captain Moresby bombarded Nanumea in 1872. He left the atoll soon after and at one stage was to be found at Nikunau in southern Kiribati. Described as “another of these pitiful old blackguards,” he returned to Tuvalu in 1893 as Henderson and Macfarlane’s trader at Nanumanga and died the following year at Nanumea.<sup>19</sup>

There were a number of reasons why traders remained traders. Trading life was usually no worse and often a great deal better than anything available elsewhere. Many, it will be recalled, were traders to begin with because they could not make a success of anything else. Those who attempted to break out of the system were usually forced back into it again. As time went on their options contracted and their life chances diminished. Often no richer than the day they started trading and in far worse physical shape, they had little prospect of gaining a livelihood back in Europe or Australia, however much they yearned to go back and settle down with their “own people” (Dana 1935:260-267). Ideas of return were doubly remote for traders who had married across racial lines and who knew that their wives and children would have difficulty adjusting and would never be socially acceptable outside the Pacific. A certain ambivalence may also be detected because the Island world and the European world each had their attractions and drawbacks. In the end it was a choice between either one or the other, and circumstances usually forced a return to the Islands, where at least the trader was his own master in the limited sense that his work was not subject to constant oversight. Jack Buckland, who traded at Niutao and Nanumea during the 1890s, made the most of his situation. In singular fashion he “spent a short period each year in Sydney playing spendthrift on the

accumulations of a small funded income and the rest of the year vegetating penniless as a petty trader out in the islands."<sup>20</sup>

Once they had accepted the reality of their situation, traders often then made a virtue out of necessity and developed an ethos and mystique of their own in which they became the sturdy and self-reliant knights of commerce. The reality was that traders were uncommonly dependent--on their company vessels for provisions, reading matter, and news of the outside world; on warships for all these things in lesser measure and for protection; and on Tuvaluans for copra. Station-trading, moreover, was a dead end and so became a way of life by default. It was exceptional for a trader to find another livelihood. Louis Becke got out and eventually used his literary skills to make a living; even then he wrote mostly about the "world of traders, supercargoes and their native contacts" of which he was once part (Maude 1967:225). Otherwise, traders moved to port towns like Apia where their domestic arrangements were within the pale of civic respectability.

Here we return to the wider question of resident traders' self-perceptions and attitudes. On the subject of Louis Becke, Pearson (1984:81) makes the observation that Becke's writings show "a notable lack of criticism or even of the desire for any other kind of world than . . . one free from the restraints of home society, free from the operation of conscience." This statement indirectly points to the dilemma and the ambivalence of the traders' situation. They were disparaged by missionaries, distrusted by their employers, discriminated against by naval authorities, hounded by resident commissioners, regarded as "seedy loafers" by a British judicial commissioner (Le Hunte n.d.:14), and condemned by a high commissioner for introducing their "rotten, pestilential civilisation" (Thurston 1893). In consequence, traders increasingly became estranged from their own society and developed something of a siege mentality. Left to fend for themselves, or so it seemed, they in turn saw no obligation to uphold the values of their own societies. Many therefore left the impression, often justified, of being profligate, godless, hostile toward constituted authority, and devoid of enduring values. Traders thus acquired an equivocal social identity. On the one hand they were regarded by other Europeans as an outgroup. Yet they were more or less unsuccessful in integrating into village life and so they remained tied, if tenuously, to the moorings of the European world.

### **The Decline of Trading Life**

In 1892 Britain declared a Protectorate over the then Ellice Islands. The move slightly postdated other changes that had gradually whittled

down the number of resident traders in the archipelago. This process of attrition began in 1888 with Ruge's bankruptcy and the final withdrawal of the DHPG a year and a half later, leaving Henderson and Macfarlane with the field to themselves (Munro 1982:198-205). Their monopoly was strengthened in 1893 by a mail subsidy for their vessel *SS Archer* to call at Fiji, Tuvalu, and Kiribati (Couper 1967:83). Capitalizing on this concession, Henderson and Macfarlane landed a handful of new traders in the group, namely Jack Buckland at Niutao, Tom Day at Nanumanga, Richard Collins at Nukulaelae, and Edmund Duffy at Nanumea.<sup>21</sup> But Henderson and Macfarlane's monopoly did not last. The Australian company Burns Philp entered the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorates in 1898 and consolidated its position in 1902 with the award of an Australian government mail subsidy to provide regular shipping to the Protectorates (Buckley and Klugman 1981:80-81). They in turn encountered competition from Levers Pacific Plantations in 1903,<sup>22</sup> and from Captain E. F. H. Allen of the Samoa Shipping and Trading Company in 1911.<sup>23</sup>

Several changes differentiated the new trading dispensation from the precolonial order. It was based largely on steamships rather than sailing vessels; Anglo-Australasian companies rather than German firms dominated the business; and the shore-based company agent gradually became redundant. Tuvaluans, now compelled to make quantities of copra for the Queen's Tax, had become so accustomed to the requirements of trading companies that they dealt directly with the trading steamers' supercargoes. Indeed at Funafuti in 1910 a native trading company was running in direct competition with the resident half-caste trader, who was probably a son of Jack O'Brien (Buckley and Klugman 1981:265; Macdonald 1982: 141). A further structural change to trading in Tuvalu occurred in 1914 when Captain Allen transferred his Apia headquarters to Funafuti.<sup>24</sup> From this atoll base he plied Tuvalu and neighboring archipelagoes much in the manner of the speculative owner-traders of the mid-nineteenth century, and serviced plantations on the uninhabited islands of Nassau, Niulakita, and in the Phoenix group (Allen n.d.). In other words the copra trade in Tuvalu reverted back to a predominantly ship-based operation in which the shore-based agent of old had no place.

Nevertheless, a handful of resident traders in the Protectorate remained on their islands, long-established identities who were so institutionalized that they stayed on to serve out their time if only in retirement. When Henry Nitz passed away at Vaitupu in 1906, and Martin Kleis at Nui in 1908, each had spent over thirty years on his respective island almost without break.<sup>25</sup> Jack O'Brien's death at Funafuti in 1899

(Waite 1899:540n) ended a turbulent career in the group that spanned four decades. He arrived in pagan times and stayed on to witness many transformations in the Tuvaluan way of life. In his twilight years at Funafuti he "constantly expatiated on the good old times when he first came to the island, when the people held feasts, public games, dances, and such-like pleasures, most of which have been put down by the missionaries. He said things were much more lively in those days" (Mrs. David 1899: 167). Ironically, he himself had helped prepare the way for the LMS by desecrating and then destroying many of the old religious structures forty years before.

The last of this group of stayers was Alfred Restieaux. He was typical of the trader who would die in the Islands, "perhaps cherishing to the last the fancy of a visit home" but "doomed . . . to remain indefinitely on one narrow atoll" (Farrell 1928:351; Stevenson 1900:2). Like O'Brien he said that only his Tuvaluan wife and children prevented his return to somewhere like Sydney (Mrs. David 1899:132; Mrs. Stevenson 1914:91). Both were probably rationalizing to a certain extent. Heavily in debt to the DHPG throughout the 1880s he was simply abandoned when they pulled out of Tuvalu. He never traded again but instead went to Nukufetau, his wife's home island, to live out his days in reduced circumstances. His health was not good and his eyesight progressively deteriorated. Although described by visiting naval captains as "doing nothing," Restieaux in fact wrote a series of reminiscences that have proved valuable to historians and other students of this period in Tuvalu. With his passing in 1911, an era in Tuvaluan commercial history drew to a close.<sup>26</sup>

Tuvalu was one of the first archipelagoes to experience the demise of its resident trader population.<sup>27</sup> By 1911 the rationale for trading companies placing agents on islands--namely to encourage production for barter and to reduce the turnaround time of the ship collecting the cargo--was no longer there. Production was now stimulated by a King's Tax, payable in copra, and the trading routine was so well established that Tuvaluans preferred to deal directly with the visiting super-cargoes. The middleman had been effectively cut out and in 1910 the two remaining traders in the group were the half-caste descendants of late traders (Wallin 1910).

Wider economic imperatives combined with local circumstance to preclude the return of resident traders to Tuvalu. Burns Philp established a headstation in Kiribati in 1913 that included Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands within its orbit. Although subsidized by regular renewals of its Australian government mail contract (Buckley and

Klugman 1983:25, 66, 99), the firm lost ground in Tuvalu and concentrated instead on the more lucrative Marshall and Kiribati archipelagoes. The matter of establishing trading stations throughout Tuvalu was often discussed. But the cost of erecting such facilities would have outweighed the benefits and it was recommended that the group could be better worked if another vessel was added to the Gilberts fleet. The tempo picked up during the early 1920s with company vessels making two or three trips to the group per year and a trading station being established at Nukufetau. However, as a result of diverting a vessel two or three times a year to service Tuvalu as well as the occasional call to Ocean Island, the seat of government of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Burns Philp's Gilberts fleet became overworked. The firm attempted to rationalize by withdrawing from the Marshalls and transferring *SS Murua* to the Tuvalu run, which resulted in the wreck of the vessel at Nanumea in April 1921.<sup>28</sup>

With his headquarters at Funafuti, Burns Philp's only competitor in Tuvalu, Captain Allen, was better placed to profit from the group. His advantage was increased by the success with which he tendered for the King's Tax, because he usually carried superior lines of trade goods (Couper 1967:103), and because his agreement with Burns Philp to sell trade goods at the same prices meant that he could not be undercut.<sup>29</sup> He also ran profitable sidelines by providing building materials for churches and conveying government personnel. But during the 1920s, with a combination of family problems and his ships being wrecked or condemned, Captain Allen's enterprises fell on hard times and were bought up by Burns Philp shortly after his death in 1924. The following year the Tuvalu portion of Burns Philp's Tarawa Branch was transferred to the firm's Apia Branch.<sup>30</sup>

These organizational changes to the Tuvalu copra trade effectively put an end to any possibility of a recrudescence of resident traders in the group. Essentially, then, they were a transitional social group that (existed over a fifty to sixty year period to meet the needs of a particular stage of the Island trade, dying out when that stage gave way to another. In their time they played an important part in the most momentous period of Tuvalu history, which saw the shift from an isolated, independent, self-sufficient, and pagan life-style to one that was Christian, literate, partially dependent on a range of imported goods, involved in a wider sphere of political activity, and largely accepting of missionary and colonial rule.

Yet the passing of this specialized social group was swift and almost unnoticed. In 1926, only fifteen years after Alfred Restieaux's death at

Nukufetau, Tuvalu's commercial environment took another change in direction, and with the establishment of the first cooperative trading society (Macdonald 1982:142) the group's economic climate was even further removed from the one that had enabled the existence of resident traders. Such was the pace of change that by 1926 most of Tuvalu's younger generation would never have laid eyes on a resident trader.

### ABBREVIATIONS

BP	Becke Papers, Mitchell Library, Sydney.
BPh	Records of Burns Philp Company Ltd., Rare Books and Special Collections Library, University of Sydney. (These records are presently being reboxed and to some extent re-sorted.)
CO 225	Records of the Colonial Office, Public Records Office, London. *
ML	Mitchell Library, Sydney.
PMB	Pacific Manuscript Bureau, Manuscript Series. Available on microfilm at member libraries of the Bureau. For details see any recent issue of <i>Pambu</i> , the Bureau's newsletter.
RNAS	Records of the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Navy Australia Station, National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington. *
RP	Restieaux Papers, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington (consulted on microfilm in the Department of Pacific & SE Asian History, Australian National University, Canberra).
SSJ	Records of the London Missionary Society, South Sea Journals. School of Oriental and African Studies, London. *
SSL	Records of the London Missionary Society, South Sea Letters. School of Oriental and African Studies, London. *
SSR	Records of the London Missionary Society, South Sea Records. School of Oriental and African Studies, London. *
TP	Towns Papers, Mitchell Library, Sydney.
WP	Westbrook Papers, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington.
WPHC 4	Records of the Western Pacific High Commission, Series 4, Inwards Correspondence--General. Public Records Office, London. *

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\*Consulted on microfilm at either the Mitchell Library, Sydney, or the National Library of Australia, Canberra.

## NOTES

This paper is drawn from a Ph.D. thesis presented to Macquarie University, Sydney, and supplemented by subsequent research. I am grateful to my supervisor, Stewart Firth, for his advice and encouragement.

Thanks are also due to Bruce Dawe for casting his eye over an earlier version. A later version benefited from the detailed comments of Michael Goldsmith and Keith Chambers. Hugh Laracy, Ken Buckley, and Kristine Klugman gave privileged access to materials that form the basis of their unpublished research. Burns Philp allowed me to consult their records and the staff of the Rare Books and Special Collections Library at the University of Sydney, the custodians of these records, facilitated my research among them. The Institute Research Services of the Darling Downs Institute of Advanced Education financed the post-thesis research.

Harry Maude has been unfailingly kind and supportive over the years. I dedicate this paper to him.

1. Pacific Island traders were like English agricultural laborers and Australian convicts in that they left few written remains. Only four of the seventy or so traders in Tuvalu between c. 1855 and 1909 left reminiscences or letters. George Westbrook's experiences at Funafuti and Niutao during the 1880s have been published as Dana 1935:169-258. Further material is in the Westbrook Papers housed in the Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington. The Westbrook Papers also contain a valuable set of manuscripts written by his fellow trader at Funafuti, Alfred Restieaux, available only on microfilm. They are not autobiographical but relate to the doings of other traders. The surviving letters and papers of Louis Becke are held by the Mitchell Library, Sydney. Becke also published a number of semi-fictional accounts, some of which have been utilized in the present article. Included among the Becke Papers is a useful diary kept by George Winchcombe, who traded on several of the Tuvalu islands. See the bibliography for details.

Despite being a small sample, the situations and experiences of these four men are sufficiently representative of traders in Tuvalu that I feel safe in making extensive use of their writings. Inevitably, however, I have had to rely for most of my information on the writings of people who were not traders.

2. Tuvalu is the present-day name for the former Ellice Islands. The other indigenized place-names used in this article are Kiribati (which includes the former Gilbert Islands) and Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides). Unlike Kiribati and Vanuatu, Tuvalu appears to have been the traditional name its inhabitants applied to their island group.

3. The single exception was the plantation at Nukulaelae operated by the Godeffroy/DHPP establishment from 1865 until 1890 (see Munro and Besnier 1985). Unreferenced statements in this section relating to the European trading system and Tuvalu's place in it have been drawn from Brookfield 1972: chs. 1-4; Couper 1967; Macdonald 1982: ch. 2; Munro 1982: chs. 2, 7, 8.

4. Restieaux MSa; Moresby 1872:163; Logbook of *Elizabeth*, 16 Sept. 1861, Old Dartmouth Historical Society and Whaling Museum, New Bedford, Mass. (PMB 290, frame 731).

5. Eury to Towns & Co., 10 Feb. 1868, TP, Uncat. MSS set 307, item 89; Eury to Towns & Co., 19 Feb. 1868, TP, Uncat. MSS set 307, item 91; *Sydney Mail*, 28 Aug. 1869, 12b. I owe these references to Harry Maude.

6. Titi's identity is uncertain. He may have been Robert Towns' agent Solomon Heather (Maude 1968:265n.); or he may equally have been a man named Marshall who was discharged from the New England whaling bark *Stafford* in 1861 (see Logbook of *Stafford*, 2 Nov. [1861], Old Dartmouth Historical Society and Whaling Museum, New Bedford, Mass. [PMB 957]). In 1874 a Mr. Marshall was trading at Vaitupu as Bully Hayes' agent (see *Samoanische Zeitung*, 11 Jan. 1914, 11b). This was probably the same person who was discharged from the *Stafford*, but there is no evidence that Marshall lived continuously on Vaitupu between these dates.

7. This interpretation is more fully argued in Munro 1982: ch. 4. On the subject of trader involvement in the destruction of the pagan religion, Michael Goldsmith (personal communication, 16 Aug. 1982) suggests that some of the "softening-up" they effected might have been because Tuvaluans did not regard missionaries and traders as belonging to discrete occupational categories. This is not to suggest that there were no differences between the two in the eyes of the Tuvaluans. Rather, the differences that the traders and missionaries considered important very likely did not match local criteria, with the result that traders were perhaps seen as "missionaries as well," just as the missionaries-proper who followed would have been perceived to some extent as "traders."

8. There is an annual island-by-island breakdown of traders in Tuvalu for the years 1865-1892 in table 7:3 of my thesis (Munro 1982:186-190). I will be happy to respond to readers who require further details.

9. Vaitoru to Thurston, 16 Nov. 1893, translated by E. A. Duffy, trader on Nanumea, WPHC 4, 76/1893. The background to this episode is detailed in Chambers 1984: 112-113, 151; *Munro* 1982:147, 147n.

10. Thompson to Gorrie, [n.d.], encl. in WPHC 4, 30/1878.

11. See encls. in CO 225/1/16498 and in RNAS 13/49; Turner 1878:11-21.

12. See encls. in WPHC 4, 69/1897; WPHC 4, 316/1897; WPHC 4, 456/1897; CO 225/52/10715; CO 225/52/10179; CO 225/52/18023.

13. Thompson to Gorrie, [n.d.], encl. in WPHC 4, 30/1878.

14. Gordon to Kimberley, 23 Apr. 1881, CO 225/7/9875; Maxwell to Gordon, 16 Apr. 1881, WPHC 4, 80/1881.

15. Campbell to Thurston, 5 Dec. 1896, WPHC 4, 68/1897.

16. Westbrook to the trustees of Henderson & Macfarlane's estate, 10 Jan. 1890, WP, folder 43.

17. At this point it is worth drawing attention to a comment by Niko Besnier (personal communication, 23 Jan. 1986). He suggests that

the adaptational difficulties faced by traders on Tuvaluan atolls can probably be explained by a combination of the extreme isolation of the atolls and of another factor, namely the very big difference in ethos between Tuvaluan and Western cultures. Margaret Mead ("Public Opinion Mechanisms among Primitive Peoples," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1 [1937]: 5-16) has suggested that cultures may be typologized in terms of the basis on which their ethos is channeled, recognizing "personal" (e.g., Arapesh), "positional" (e.g., the Iatmul), "traditional" (e.g., Bali), and "positional-traditional" (e.g., Samoa, the Zuni) categories (cf. also Felix and Mary Keesing, *Elite Communication in Samoa*, Stanford: Stan-

ford University Press, 1956, p. 258, for discussion on Samoa). Tuvaluan culture, where many of the individual's choices in life are made by the social system, is positional-traditional with a vengeance. This accounts for (i) the receptiveness of Tuvaluans to the laws established by the Samoan pastors (and later Grimble) dictating behavior in excruciating detail of everyday life; and (ii) the extreme difficulties outsiders may have dealing with such ethos (even today, as I am sure you know well!).

18. This aspect of life goes unmentioned in Becke's nostalgic published account of his eleven months' residence at Nanumanga (see Becke 1909:54-104). For Restieaux's opinion of Becke, see Restieaux MSd.

19. Hayter 1871-1873: entry for 21 July 1872; Mrs. Stevenson 1914:120-123; Thurston 1893:9-10; Swayne to Thurston, 18 Dec. 1893, WPHC 4, 21/1894; Swayne to Thurston, 17 Jan. 1895, WPHC 4, 42/1895.

20. Furnas 1951:365. There was an unhappy sequel, which Mrs. Stevenson (1914:175n.) relates: "Some years ago when Jack was at his station he received word that his trustee, who was in charge of his property, had levanted it all. Whereupon poor Jack put a pistol to his head and blew out what brains he possessed. He was a beautiful creature, terribly annoying at times, but with something childlike and appealing--I think he was close to what the Scotch call a natural--that made one forgive pranks in him that which would be unforgivable in others. He was very proud of being the original 'Tommy Hadden' in [R. L. Stevenson's book] the 'Wrecker,' and carried the book wherever he went."

21. Mrs. Stevenson 1914:106; Davis 1892:52; Swayne to Thurston, 18 Dec. 1893, WPHC 4, 21/1894. Even so not all islands had a resident trader; in 1897 the resident commissioner reported, "There is no trader on the island [of Nukufetau] but I believe one of Messrs Henderson and Macfarlane's traders will shortly commence trading. His arrival is anxiously looked forward to by the great majority of the natives who are suffering from a tobacco famine." See Campbell to Berkeley, 22 Sept. 1897, encl. in CO 225/52/25701.

22. *Samoanische Zeitung*, 4 Nov. 1905, 8c, 2 Dec. 1905, 8b, 8 Feb. 1908, 8c; Wallin 1910. Ken Buckley and Kris Klugman kindly gave me access to Wallin's report of 30 Jan. 1910. Wallin wrote several other reports that Dr. Buckley and Ms. Klugman have edited for publication as accompanying text for a photographic volume on Burns Philp's Pacific activities. The book, to be published by George Allen & Unwin Australia, is scheduled for release in early 1987.

23. Allen n.d. I am grateful to Hugh Laracy for making available a Xerox copy of this typescript. Dr. Laracy will be writing an essay on Captain Allen for a collection of biographical essays he is working on.

24. See encls. in WPHC 4, 616/1914; WPHC 4, 1133/1914; WPHC 4, 2376/1914.

25. These are the dates on their tombstones, which I observed during fieldwork in 1978. See also Newell 1906:17.

26. Dana 1935:189-196; Davis 1892:31; Mahaffy 1909:26; Thurston 1893:8; *Sumoanische Zeitung*, 6 Jan. 1912.

27. Mahaffy 1909:24-26. But on a regional scale the resident trader's day was not quite over. Louis Becke (1897:317-319) etched the last act of the drama before the curtain finally descended. In doing so he drew the apt comparison with the continuing retreat of

James Fenimore Cooper's "gaunt old trapper" Natty Bumppo from the advancing tide of civilization in the American West.

28. See the Tarawa Manager's Annual Reports for 1920 and 1921, BPh; Buckley and Klugman 1983:128; Couper 1967:87.

29. Joseph Mitchell, Notes on the Gilbert, Ellice and Marshall Trades, 22 Nov. 1916, BPh.

30. Tarawa Manager's Annual Report for 1925, BPh; Buckley and Klugman 1983: 137.

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## BOOK REVIEW FORUM

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Valerio Valeri, *Kingship and Sacrifice: Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii*. Translated from the French by Paula Wissing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. xxviii, 446, index. \$22.50 paper, \$55.00 cloth.

*Review:* JOHN CHARLOT  
EAST-WEST CENTER, HONOLULU

The publication by a prestigious university press of a major book on the little-studied subject of Hawaiian religion is an important event for the development of a scholarly field. Such a book deserves careful attention, especially from the small number of other students of the subject. My purpose in this article is to make a detailed examination of Valerio Valeri's methods and major conclusions in this book. In so doing, I am continuing a work of criticism I began some years ago on the French typescript of an earlier version of this work (xv).<sup>1</sup> A subject as large as Hawaiian religion can naturally support a wide variety of opinions, and frank and open discussion is necessary for the arduous process of developing consensus on points of substance and proper method.

Many aspects of Valeri's work can be commended. Such a comprehensive book can remind scholars of neglected aspects of the subject. Moreover, an impressive number of sources have been used in the book. Most important, Valeri, unlike too many scholars, works from the Hawaiian language and uses diacritical marks. He also works from Hawaiian manuscript materials, which are sometimes quite different from the translations made of them (e.g., Malo 1951). In using these materials, he often makes good points about proper method. In the lat-

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ter part of the book, he provides useful descriptions of Hawaiian ceremonies based on correlations of different sources.

These positive aspects and many others will be evident to readers of Valeri's book. I will now concentrate on some of the criticisms I feel must be made of it.

Valeri states that writing the book constituted for him an "interpretive experience" of the "dialectical relationship between theory and interpretation." The more he "understood the logic of Hawaiian thought, the clearer certain crucial anthropological problems became," and vice versa (x). His book is best understood, I would argue, through an examination of the relation of his theory to the evidence. This is, I realize, a pressing issue in anthropology. For instance, Alfonso Ortiz has demonstrated that the theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss cannot be applied to the Tewa.<sup>2</sup> After the publication of two major works on Hawai'i with a more empirical orientation (Linnekin 1985; Kirch 1985), it is instructive to study an exemplary model of another approach.

I start, therefore, not with Valeri's views but with his methods, especially his relation to his materials: historical documents, texts in Hawaiian and European languages. Valeri's book is interesting among other reasons as an example of a transition by some anthropologists from fieldwork to historical documentary research. The problems Valeri encounters are thus instructive and significant. Valeri makes valid theoretical points about method (xvii, xxiv, xxviii, 66, 96-97, 191-192), but criticisms can be made of his practice. (I will not discuss problems of translation).

A major problem of Valeri's book, in my opinion, is the quantity of inaccurate references. I give below a few examples and will add others in later sections of this article.

1. Valeri argues (149) that chiefs must maintain their purity partly "through their own comportment." He gives as an example: "divine ali'i . . . are obliged--men and women--to remain virgin until marriage." His source (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:88-89) refers, however, only to women: "Among ranking *ali'i*, girls were required to be virgin until the first planned union to conceive a child. This was a kind of precautionary virginity. Sexual adventure before this royal mating could well upset the genealogical appletart!" (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:89). This virginity was maintained, therefore, for purely practical genealogical reasons, not for the maintenance of ritual purity. Moreover, the authors go on to say that the emphasis on virginity in some Hawaiian legends is a result of missionary influence and that, in reality, practice was loose.<sup>3</sup>

After a semicolon, Valeri continues, “chastity belts are even used.” His first reference, which is to the same work (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:91), does not, however, discuss virginity before marriage, but fidelity within marriage. The example cited by the authors (Fornander 1916-1917, 4:172-173; see also 164-167) refers to the wife of an impotent and jealous husband. Moreover, the text belongs to the Mo‘ikeha stories, which are nontraditional in form and thus arguably nineteenth-century compositions. Valeri’s other example (Fornander 1916-1917, 4:112-114) is also a Mo‘ikeha story about a woman living with a man who is unfaithful to her; for revenge, she binds herself to prevent his having intercourse with her.

Not one of Valeri’s references supports his point. Indeed, the thrust of his first reference can be used against his view.

2. Valeri states that there was a Hawaiian “belief” that the ali‘i “just like the gods, have natural ‘bodies’ along with their human form. . . . this is particularly true of mythical ali‘i, who are readily placed at the origin of certain species, especially foods” (146). Of the three examples he gives, the first (Fornander 1918-1919, 5:266) could better be understood as a story of the gods; and the second (*ibid.*, 270, 272) does not state that the persons involved are chiefs. The third (*ibid.*, 279) fits, but one example does not demonstrate a regular “belief.”

Valeri then writes, “As for living ali‘i, it is believed that they often manifest themselves in powerful and sometimes terrible animals in order to punish or protect their subjects.” All of Valeri’s references are to chants in which a chief is called various animals, such as a shark, stingray, or frigate bird. Such metaphors are common in Hawaiian poetry and cannot be used to demonstrate that the chiefs in question actually assumed the bodies named. Moreover, the chiefs honored in the chants are historic figures: **Kalani‘ōpu‘u** and **Kamehameha**. Had they been able to assume nonhuman bodies, it would have been mentioned in the many historical accounts we have of them. (The final reference in Valeri’s note 40 is to one of the legends he referred to when discussing mythical chiefs.)

Valeri argues against taking such poetic statements as “simple metaphors” (151). The chiefs have a “true affinity” to natural phenomena: “Thus, the king is not only compared to the shark, he is the shark because he can act through this animal, because he has a substantial relation to it, because he is its descendant.” I myself have used such points to describe the Hawaiian view of the close relationship of all human beings to the other elements of the universe (Charlot 1983a: e.g., 35-44, 62), but these points do not prove an *identity* of the chief

with the shark or that he can assume a shark body. Valeri himself states higher on the same page, "the king is compared to a shark," and has himself insisted on the metaphorical character of chant (148).

3. Valeri states, "Sexual intercourse with inferiors is also polluting to superiors" (91; also 149). This is surprising because, as Valeri himself shows (150, 372 n. 56), such intercourse was extremely frequent, indeed, a stock theme of Hawaiian literature. The text from Malo that Valeri cites in support of his statement refers to marriage with the *kauwā* or pariah class, definitely a special case (Malo 1951, 70-71). Moreover, such a marriage is presented as bad for genealogical reasons--that is, one becomes *déclassé*--rather than for reasons of pollution.<sup>4</sup>

Valeri's second reference (Kamakau 1961, 128; used also on 149) describes Kahahana's losing certain Maui *kapu* privileges by having intercourse with "the lesser chiefesses." Chiefly *kapu* are, however, a complicated subject (Charlot 1985, 10-11, 37-40). *Kapu* often have particular rules, and one cannot generalize from one example. For instance, another Maui *kapu*, the *Po'oho'olewa i ka lā*, required its owner to shield her head from the sun's rays (Sterling and Summers 1978, 243). One could not argue from this one example that doing so was a general practice; it was simply the regulation of a particular *kapu*. Valeri's references do not, therefore, support his point.

In his related note (361 n. 12) Valeri states, "Note also that for a high-ranking woman the loss of virginity involves a loss of purity and mana." His one reference is to the nineteenth-century novel *Laielikawai* by S. N. Hale'ole. Despite its many qualities, the novel cannot be used as a reliable guide to classical Hawaiian culture, especially when dealing with sexuality and the novel's heroine, who receives in many ways a Victorian idealization.

4. Generalizations can be made only with caution from individual authors or works of literature. For instance, chiefs and their lands were often connected, but the extreme aspects of identification cited by Valeri (146, par. 2; see also 152) can be found only in Ke'āulumoku, who, however important, represents a very personal, uncommon viewpoint.

5. Valeri's references to secondary literature also need to be examined. He states that chiefs "are characterized by immobility and inactivity" (147). That Valeri takes immobility literally can be seen from other statements (272, 336). Neither of Valeri's references to G. W. Kahiolo and Samuel H. Elbert supports his view; they both portray chiefs as delaying a desired action and finally accomplishing it, a common motif in Hawaiian literature. To support his view, Valeri has only a pejorative

remark by a foreigner, amply refuted by contemporary literature (147 and n. 48).<sup>5</sup>

Such examples could be multiplied, and I will mention some in my discussion. The above suffice to show that Valeri's references must be checked by any serious user of his book.

Such references often depend, of course, on Valeri's interpretations of texts and here also problems can be found. Valeri often announces his interpretation of a text rather than offering arguments in support of it. For instance, he interprets a farming chant as "a verbal replica of the transfer of forces that is the condition of the success of the rite. . . . Like the waves coming from over the horizon to break on the Hawaiian shores, the gods come from Kahiki to bring life" (55). An examination of the chant reveals that this interpretation is based on only one line--a reference to a wave from Kahiki in a stereotyped wave list<sup>6</sup>--a small basis for understanding a thirty-two-line chant. An examination of the rest of the chant can provide an interpretation that accounts for more of its lines (Charlot 1983b, 64-65). Moreover, the idea that the gods must come from Kahiki every time they are invoked requires support. Valeri elsewhere recognizes the existence of the *wao akua*, "the uplands of the gods" (V.: "hinterland of gods"), where they can reside (273). The journey of Lono from Kahiki to Hawai'i is considered a major event (8).

Similarly, Valeri wants to use a story to prove that god, sacrificer, and victim are identified with each other (132). The story is about a priest, named Kānehekili after the thunder god, whose body, when he dies, is divided and distributed to people who establish the cult of the thunder god in their particular locations. The two problems for Valeri's interpretation are that the story is about the priest, not the god, and that he dies, rather than being sacrificed. Instead of addressing these problems, Valeri simply states, "worship of the god is made possible by the victimization of his priest, who is obviously identified with him (he even bears his name)." That is, Valeri takes as given precisely the two points he should prove. Alternatives are possible: the body of the priest could be efficacious without being considered a sacrifice, and so on.

On the other hand, Valeri dismisses texts that do not fit his views. After developing a theory of *mana*, Valeri writes, "But in certain contexts the word *mana* seems to be banalized, to lose its connection with both god and community" (100). After using part of a chant, he writes (391 n. 81), "I am not considering the entire chant because it is somewhat anomalous and most difficult to interpret." The chant is no more obscure than others Valeri uses. It just does not fit his theory; it is "anomalous."

When Valeri does explicitly analyze texts, other problems in method become evident. For instance, he can take one sense of a word and ignore others. He notes in the *Kumulipo* “a curious detail. The god **Kāne** bears the name of his worshiper, the human male (*kāne*).” The first man, on the other hand, “is called *Ki’i* (‘image’), the generic name attributed to the anthropomorphic images of the gods used in worship.” The result is, Valeri concludes, “a man named as god and a god named as man” (6). A glance at the dictionary will show that Valeri is selecting only one sense of *ki’i*. Moreover, the primary and strict sense of *kāne* is “male.”<sup>7</sup> The word can be used for the human male, but for any other male as well: animal, vegetable, mineral, or god.

Another problem in method--unfortunately widespread--is using too many senses of a word. Polynesians’ wordplay with the many homonyms of their languages is impressive, and the temptation to extend it by using the multiple meanings of a word now conveniently provided by dictionaries has proved irresistible to most workers in the field (e.g., Charlot 1983a, 87, 91). The problem is knowing when to stop. For instance, a ritual formula for weakening the god Kamapua‘a contains repetitions of the word *lau*. Valeri writes (51), “In my view this is because of its double meaning, ‘numerous’ and ‘seine’ (PE, 179). *Lau* is a trick word, indeed, for ‘numerous’ offerings entice Kamapua‘a and paralyze him in a ‘seine.’ ” A pig in a seine is an unusual image. There are in fact no Hawaiian stories or accounts of a pig being caught in one, certainly not Kamapua‘a.

Examples of using too many meanings or uses of a word abound in Valeri’s work. A tapa cloth around the waist of an image is called a *piko*, “navel,” and cut in clear imitation of the ceremony for cutting the navel cord of a child. Valeri finds it “probable” (316), even though unsupported by textual evidence, that the cord represents two other references for *piko*: genitals and crown of the head or fontanel. A child can be circumcised, but how could the crown or fontanel be cut?

To give another example, Valeri mentions the ritual expression “*lele wale ka ‘aha*, ‘the ‘aha (sacrificial rite, prayer) has flown away (*lele*)’.

*Lele* also means ‘messenger’. . . . The altar is indeed a ‘messenger’ that allows men and gods to communicate” (386 n. 20).<sup>8</sup>

Quite large sections of Valeri’s book can be based on such arguments (e.g., 294-299). Valeri combines a number of traditional uses of the place name Kahiki (8-9). The most common is that of a foreign land from which gods and other strangers come. Valeri combines this sense with references to cosmic points. He has also introduced the word “invisible,” which does not appear in those texts. The result of this oper-

ation is a definition of Kahiki as “the indeterminate and invisible transcendent place . . . conceived as that which encompasses the visible world.” This definition does not fit accounts of travelers sailing to Kahiki and setting foot on land.

Valeri also divides words into parts to get more meanings. *Kauila* wood can yield *ka uila*, “the lightning”: “a manifestation of divine power in its luminous but violent . . . form” (269).

A characteristic method of Valeri’s is to systematize texts. Valeri cautions against this method (191): “each of the principal texts must be considered separately and the elementary rules of source criticism be applied . . . to carefully evaluate the differences between the sources and to resist the temptation to arbitrarily construct a single account of the rites patched together from different sources.” However, Valeri writes that two gods who, in one text, “originate in Pō, are said in other texts to come from Kahiki” (8). This observation is used, among other things, to connect Pō and Kahiki. Later in the book (331-332) he puts together different versions of a story to make his point. Other examples will be discussed below.

Valeri’s arguments from texts are often tenuous. In the Kelou Kamakau text on a ceremony (289), the mood during an evening respite is described as *‘olu‘olu*, a reduplicative of *‘olu*, a word with many glosses: “cool, refreshing, soft . . . pleasant, comfortable; polite, courteous,” and so on (Pukui and Elbert 1971, s.v. “*‘olu*”). Valeri uses “affable.” Later (307-308), Valeri argues that *‘olu‘olu* is “the very word Malo uses to describe the effect the sacrifice has upon the god. This highlights the correspondence between the state of the god and that of society; thus K. Kamakau’s text makes it clearer that the god’s ‘affability’ is the result of the ‘affability’ reigning in society rather than the reverse, since the latter precedes the former.” *‘Olu‘olu* is a common word, so it would be difficult to make the correspondence argument even if it were appearing in the same text. To find the same word in two different texts at different points of the account of the ceremony and draw a connection between them is tenuous indeed.<sup>9</sup> Valeri, however, does not stop there. Because the word appeared earlier in reference to the people and later in reference to the god, the *‘olu‘olu* of the latter is, he states, the “result” of that of the former. That is, not only is there a correspondence between the two, but a causal relationship.

Valeri often draws conclusions such as the above, conclusions that go far beyond any support provided by the evidence. Valeri states that “dance is necessary to help develop the fetus of an ali‘i and to ease his birth.” He goes on to argue that dance “contributes to affirming the

reality of the ali'i's mana." He then goes a step further: "This is why it is believed that by dancing people help engender their ali'i" (218). No reference is given. Valeri goes even further: "Just as dance engenders the infant ali'i, it can be supposed that during the Makahiki it also engenders the god Lonomakua." A paragraph later, one reads, "The engendering of Lonomakua, like that of any god . . ." (219). A few pages later, the ceremony "presupposes that Lonomakua is rather inoffensive at the outset, since he is born of the feasting and thus is already very close to humanity" (223; compare 394 n. 146; I will give further examples later of Valeri's hypotheses becoming confirmed facts, e.g., 99 and 101). In a similar fashion Valeri moves from the fact that certain birds perch on a type of tree to the statement that the statue made from such a tree "is inseparable from the birds" (272-273).

Valeri's arguments are often very short. Page 161, paragraph 3, contains a series of such arguments. One is that the king's rivals "are not only enemies, but also close relatives of the victor. Hence they are his doubles" (161). Similarly, "the king's human sacrifice is always a fratricide: either a literal one . . . or a metaphorical one--since every transgressor implicitly identifies with him and therefore becomes his 'double' " (165). And "Atea, who in central Polynesia is a symbol of clarity and light and as such is a double for Kāne" (169). For a final example, "Kahōāli'i not only is a human incarnation of Kū but is also, by the same token, the king's double, as witnessed by his being called the 'royal companion' " (325). Many arguments would be necessary to support such conclusions.

There are a large number of such short arguments in the book. "The tooth sacrificed is probably a substitute for the whole person, since to dream of losing a tooth means death" (355 n. 27). "While a priest is announced by a single rainbow, a high-ranking ali'i is announced by two rainbows. . . . In short, one ali'i equals two priests" (369 n. 19).

Valeri does not hesitate to introduce his speculations into an interpretation: "The mode of the pig's death indicates that it is a piglet, since otherwise it could hardly be lifted by one person and dashed against the ground. It thus seems that by incorporating a very young victim in Kū, the god's rebirth in a new form (Kūnuiākea) is brought about" (313). I will not discuss the validity of his argument or conclusion, except to say it is important for the theme of his book. I will note, however, that Hawaiian pigs were in fact smaller than modern Western ones and, even full grown, could have been handled as described by a robust man.<sup>10</sup>

Very often, Valeri eschews argument, covering a conclusion with a

word like “clear,” “evident,” “obvious,” or “likely.” Some longer phrases are “It is immediately clear, then . . .” (7); “It must follow . . .” (58); “We must deduce . . .” (86); “we must suppose . . .” (86, 111-112); “it seems difficult to deny . . .” (86); “seems to indicate . . .” (86); “We may conclude, then . . .” (87); “It seems reasonable to suppose, then . . .” (87); “It seems to me that this ritual clearly displays . . .” (87); “the evidence suggests that, at least to some extent . . .” (88); “legitimate to assume . . .” (98); “Putting all these clues together, I feel inclined to hypothesize that . . .” (99); “one is tempted to define . . .” (133); “It is difficult not to recognize in these . . .” (251); “The text by Wilkes prompts another reflection . . .” (308); “one cannot help relating . . .” (316); “Is it too audacious to suppose . . .” (326); “Clearly what is implied . . .” (391 n. 92). Such phrases create much of the impression of the book.

The hypothetical character of his points does not prevent Valeri from using them as if they were confirmed. This can happen very quickly. “This classification of the fish species is in large part hypothetical. It does in any case confirm the theory advanced . . .” (26). “Although this last proposition is speculative, it is confirmed by the fact that . . .” (325). We read that the feather god referred to could be “**Kūkā’ilimoku** or some equivalent god” (222); then the very next sentence states, “the fact that **Kūkā’ilimoku** obtains a place . . .” At the end of the paragraph, we read of the imposition “of the god of force (**Kūkā’ilimoku**) over the god of the festival (Lonomakua).”<sup>11</sup> As a result of such methods, Valeri’s argumentation often seems nothing more than strings of hypotheses, each being treated as a fact by the one that follows (e.g., 315-317). These freshly minted hypotheses are so firm in Valeri’s mind that he can berate the writer of an earlier book for not taking one into account.<sup>12</sup>

Valeri’s entire book rests in fact on a circular argument: his theory developed in the first part of the book will be confirmed by his analysis of the ritual in the second (e.g., 191). But that analysis depends on his theory. For instance, he writes about his view of the hierarchy of gods: “the scheme I have presented is a simplified model; nevertheless I believe it is not an arbitrary construction. On the contrary, it will be confirmed by the analysis of the temple system” and the ritual (110). However, in his chapter on “The Hierarchy of Temples,” he finds so many problems and must use so many qualifications (184-187), that he is forced to conclude: “The details I have just enumerated are so many limits on the validity of the model. . . . Nevertheless, I believe this model offers a valid presentation of the ideal background justifying the

concrete temple hierarchy. At any rate, on this point as on many others we are reduced to speculation, for the actual relations between individual temples are very poorly known to us" (187). He has, however, presented enough evidence to cast the very idea of such a hierarchy in doubt. In any case, since neither passage gets beyond a simplified and speculative model, neither can confirm the other.<sup>13</sup>

Valeri's attitude toward his evidence can be apprehended in an important passage (96-98). Wanting to elucidate the meaning of *mana*, he mentions that "Firth studies the various meanings of mana as they occur in all texts he recorded." "As a starting point, this method is of course a must." He concludes, "we must study the textual occurrences of mana in their contexts." Unfortunately, "the word mana does not frequently occur in the texts." After looking at the few examples, he writes: "However, it would be wrong to make much of the rare occurrence of mana in these descriptions. For one thing, Malo and Kelou Kamakau give only very few of the prayers that were uttered in the ritual, in which the word mana must have been included rather often." Valeri's argument for this point is that all the useful examples he finds in K. Kamakau do occur in prayers. But he has shown that those examples are very few, and he has proper reservations about accepting others.

On what then does he base his view that the word "must have been included rather often"? In a similar passage (145), he writes: "even if the ancient texts in which the word *akua* refers to ali'i are few, it can be safely assumed that this usage really existed because it follows necessarily from the attribution to ali'i of the fundamental properties of the divine." Valeri is deducing evidence from his theory.

Valeri continues arguing against finding the rarity of *mana* "excessively relevant." The rituals "clearly involve the transmission of mana"; the texts are not "complete accounts" of the rituals "and especially of what is presupposed throughout it and therefore does not have to be explicitly stated." Though Malo and K. Kamakau "do not explicitly say so," another source--which Valeri argues should reflect Malo's opinion--does make the point. After further such arguments, Valeri concludes, "This example shows, I believe, the dangers of a blind literalism and of the assumption that only verbal statements are informative" (98).

No scholar would want to fall into such errors. Nevertheless, Valeri himself states that verbal expressions are clearest (e.g., 343-344), and the large quantity of available Hawaiian literature provides unusual opportunities for accurate understanding; but it also imposes responsibilities of precise interpretation and full documentation, in addition to

the fundamental responsibility of not going beyond the evidence. It is remarkable that at key points in his work, Valeri must admit that his views are not supported by the texts.<sup>14</sup>

Valeri's main thesis can fairly be said to depend on his interpretation of one section of the main temple ceremony: "the god 'is born' as a man, as the ideal man made possible by an ordered society. . . . The transformation of the god into the perfect type of the human male is thus completed. Therefore the true human nature of the god becomes fully apparent . . ." and so on (314-315; compare 250, 330, 345). Yet an examination of the text in question (Malo n.d., 175-176, sections 99-101; Malo 1951, 173; Valeri 1985,309) reveals that the two points Valeri is making--that the god is born and that it is "the ideal man" or "the perfect type of human male"--cannot be found.

Valeri puts "is born" in quotation marks (see also 287), but the Hawaiian equivalents do not appear in the Hawaiian text. Elsewhere, Valeri speaks of the birth as indeed taking place (e.g., 306, 330). What then do the quotation marks mean?

The ceremony described in the Hawaiian text is in fact that of cutting the navel cord, as Valeri himself states. Malo's description of the chiefly ceremony for male infants (Malo n.d., 141-142; Malo 1951, 136-137) shows that that ceremony could be separated from the birth. This is even clearer in the text of Kelou Kamakau:

*a puka mai la iwaho, kaawale ae la ia, lawe ia aku la imua o ke alo o ke akua, a me ke alo o na kahuna, hoali ae la ke kahuna i ka ohe e oki ai o ka piko*

"and when [the child] came out, he was separate/separated, he was taken out before the face of the god and the face of the priests. The priest waved the bamboo with which the navel cord was to be cut." (Fornander 1919-1920, 6:5, 7)

The ceremony is then briefly described.

Valeri has earlier treated a text on the chief 'Umi as a parallel: Liloa has 'Umi brought to the temple, "has his umbilical cord symbolically cut, and has him undergo other rites, following which he is 'reborn' as a noble" (277-278). In neither reference does the word "reborn" appear, although Valeri gives it in quotation marks. Moreover both translations have the expression *'oki ka piko* refer to circumcision rather than to cutting the navel cord, although the Fornander translation uses both. Furthermore, the navel cord cutting ceremony can be used as an image sep-

arate from birth, as can be seen from a vivid and unusual section of Ke'āulumoku's *Hauī Ka Lani* (Fornander 1919-1920, 6:394-395, ll. 407-414).

Polynesians could use a number of images to express the beginning of something, and the exact extension of an image must be carefully delineated in any one use. Moreover, the primary object of the ceremony under discussion is the statue, and some discussion is necessary on which ceremonial points apply to it and which to the god, however one conceives of the relation between the two. I would argue, therefore, that Valeri goes beyond the evidence in describing the section of the ceremony as the birth of the god. His characterization of that god as a man is derived wholly from his theory and has no basis whatsoever in the text.

There is, moreover, one further difficulty for Valeri's theory. Of the three descriptions of the sequence of temple rituals, "Malo is the only author who describes the rite of the god's birth" (315). That is, what should be the most important ceremony of the whole sequence is replaced by a different one in two of the three sources. Valeri admits that these "texts differ because they reflect alternative practices rather than because one of them reflects the 'true' form of the ritual while the others do not" (317). Valeri exerts his considerable powers of argumentation (315-317) to demonstrate that "the comparison of the different versions of the rite reveals new aspects of its meaning and confirms the cogency of our previous interpretations. . . . [All three] descriptions presuppose the same sense relationships, thus the same 'grammar' " (317). The birth of the god cannot, however, be found in the other descriptions. Valeri writes, "The equivalence of the *maki'ilohelohe* rite in K. Kamakau's account and of the image's birth rite in Malo's account appears to be truly paradigmatic because the two rites occur in the same syntagmatic position" (317). Again, the element missing is any hint of birth. Valeri later passes over this difficulty (334).

Such difficulties with the textual evidence are not uncommon in Valeri's section on ritual.<sup>15</sup> In a characteristic passage he writes,

The purpose of the rite is then clear; it brings about the growth of a god who, having just barely entered the men's temple, is like a small infant, still on the threshold of the human world into which he must be integrated. This "baby" is in fact not yet truly born, since the rite of the god's birth will take place later. But we must not take the metaphors of the rite too literally; this birth will not be the god's first (since each sacrifice uses the

birth/death metaphor), but only his final and definitive “birth” --a little like that of ‘Umi in the temple where his father sends him to “be born” a second time. (305-306)

In sum, one can apply to Valeri his criticisms of others: “They appear to be rationalizations; it is not clear whether they are produced by the informants or by the authors” (51; cf. 261).

Valeri’s attitude toward evidence is best understood, I would argue, from his theoretical orientation; he states that his “analysis . . . is of the structural kind, tempered, however, by as much skepticism and good sense as I am capable of” (193; see also 388 n. 37). As seen earlier, his book is a result of the “dialectical relationship between theory and interpretation” (x). He himself provides the necessary information on his philosophical orientation and the sources of his main ideas: “I take as my starting point the Hegelian idea that religion is ‘objective spirit,’ that is, the objectified system of ideas of a community” (x). Combined with Platonic ideas, this view leads to the theory of Hawaiian gods as “types” (31-33): “this idea is personified, given a concrete (albeit imaginary) form; therefore it becomes a type” (ix); “the god is a concept, a type” (103; see also 74, 100-101, 347, and many other places). Such gods are both concrete and abstract (32 and 351 n. 32 for Hegel and Feuerbach references).

Valeri’s interpretation of ritual and sacrifice is also inspired by these sources: “the major influence on my thought has been Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, for I have attempted to view Hawaiian ritual as a manifestation of the dialectics of consciousness” (xi). Thus ritual is interpreted as reproducing a thought process (e.g., 70-74, 300-301, 308, 323-325, 345-346, 348). Another influence on this point is Durkheim’s reductionist theory of “the efficacy of ritual as due to the power of collective consciousness on concrete social agents and relations” (xi).<sup>16</sup>

Also from Feuerbach Valeri takes the ideas that “Hawaiian religion is essentially anthropomorphic” (xi), that the state is a projection, so to speak, of human nature or essence, and that the head of state is “the representative of universal Man” (130). I will discuss below Valeri’s attempt to universalize the anthropomorphic element of Hawaiian religion. The above Feuerbachian idea, combined with “the famous Brahmanic saying: ‘Sacrifice is man. . . . Thus the sacrifice is the man’ ” (358 n. 65), provides also another central idea of Valeri’s interpretation of ritual (49, 70-73, 355 n. 28; cf. 64) and of Hawaiian sculpture (248-253).

Valeri thus approaches Hawaiian religion with considerable philo-

sophical baggage. His writing is in fact remarkable for the number and frequent use of terms from Western philosophy and religion, terms introduced without explicit justification and used as analytical tools (I enclose in quotation marks those so used by Valeri): particular and universal (270); "essence" and "matter" (56); essence (138: "conformity with the idea of human essence"; 357, 366 n. 24, etc.); "substantialist" and divine substance (363 n. 3; used to translate Hawaiian); consubstantial (139); transcendental and non-empirical, immaterial (268, etc.); invisible, the divine (discussed below); "supernatural" (350 n. 3); "sacred" and "profane" (113); sacred and profane (120); creation (75, 89, 156, and throughout); incarnates (134); "miracles" (362 n. 26); eternal life and sacrificial death (328); Utopia (226). The word "mandate" (370 n. 33) is taken from Chinese religio-political thought.

Moreover, Valeri expresses, again without argument, classic Western views or reads them into Hawaiian thinking: on humans being separate from nature, on the separation of religion from natural science (35), on the nature of women, on sight and intelligence being "what is most human" (252), and on the male standing "for the entire human species because he is its superior form" (270).<sup>17</sup>

From his sources and statements it is clear that Valeri represents an extremely intellectualist Western philosophical tradition. He speaks approvingly of "evoking immateriality in materiality, abstraction and generality in the concrete and the individual" (268); of "the passage from a particular to a universal and from something natural to something human" (270); and states that "the transition from knowledge of the visible (which is particular and limited) to knowledge of the invisible (which is general and unlimited) can be obtained only by negating man's empirical vision. . . . the transformation of man's consciousness, which moves from empirical vision to intellectual vision, from the particularity of percept to the universality of concept" (324; see also 325).

Valeri's extreme intellectualism can be seen in his applying uses from logic of terms like "identical" and "substitutable" (93) to things that are not merely ideas. In doing so, he is following or extending structuralist practice. My purpose in this article is, however, not to discuss structuralism itself, but only Valeri's application of it to Hawaiian religion and culture. In Valeri's perspective, the great enemy chiefs Keōua and Kamehameha can be described as "perfectly identical" (162);<sup>18</sup> Palila is "interchangeable with the god he worships" (276); "the king and his adversary form a pair of absolutely identical terms" (279); "the interchangeability of victim, sacrificer, and sacrificer" (308; see also 389 n. 63).

Valeri goes even further. In a Hawaiian story a father praises a

heterosexual couple, using a list of traditional expressions of praise for people of great physical beauty. Valeri interprets this speech as describing the couple as “perfectly identical” (166). But in the speech, there is no hint of such a “perfect identity,” which would be naturally impossible in such a couple.<sup>19</sup>

Valeri goes, however, even further than this: “There is, however, a logical and factual connection between the idea of royalty and that of twinship. The perfection innate in royalty implies that any plurality manifested within it is a plurality of identical beings. In fact, by definition, two or several perfect beings cannot be different without some of them being imperfect, since their perfection consists in fully instantiating the same type” (374 n. 87). In other words, perfection consists in looking a certain way, so two perfect beings would have to look exactly alike. Not many Western idealists would go to such an extreme. Valeri’s argument turns on his definitions of “perfection,” “type,” and “instantiate,” which he imposes without argument on Hawaiian culture.

Valeri’s philosophical bent has a strong influence on his study of Hawaiian religion. A characteristic example is his discussion of chiefs’ having “the fundamental properties of the divine” (145; also 145-153), several points of which I have discussed before. Valeri has argued “that the completeness, and therefore purity, of the gods is absolute and depends on no one but the gods themselves. Indeed a number of things considered *akua* evoke total autonomy and independence,” such as the watch, compass, and clock owned by Captain Cook and the full moon. “For the Hawaiians the circle evokes a being closed in on itself because it is complete and self-sufficient.” Valeri gives characteristic arguments for this, but then admits that “a different notion of the divine perfection is suggested by the *Kumulipo*.” He concludes, “two notions of divine perfection or purity seem to coexist” (88-89). I will not discuss this section except to remark that many nonround objects were considered *akua* and that a traditional expression for feminine beauty--*mahina ke alo*, “the face is like a moon”--does not evoke autonomy and self-sufficiency.

Turning to chiefs, Valeri finds them like gods in “their association with emblems of transcendence and perfection. . . , . celestial entities . . . whose circular form and movements connote perfection” (146). Valeri then concludes, “Conceived of as autonomous, from one point of view the ali‘i are also thought to be free of desire, precisely like the gods” (147).<sup>20</sup> As Valeri himself admits (150), this statement contradicts the evidence for chiefs, whose very genitals were lauded publicly in chant.<sup>21</sup>

It also contradicts the evidence for gods, which Valeri does not dis-

cuss. But he himself has shown that they eat and can be attracted in prayer by being offered food (56, 133). Moreover the gods have sex. Pele and Kamapua‘a are famous for their love affairs. Lonoikamakahiki is married in the myth that forms the foundation of the ritual Valeri is studying (214-215). Kū can be married in other stories. In a Hawaiian story, “*Komo ihola ka iini iloko o Kane a me Kanaloa no keia ui nohea*” (“Desire entered into Kāne and Kanaloa for this handsome young beauty,” my translation; Green and Pukui 1936, 114). Valeri himself says that fertility is divine (273).

After discussing the immobility (see above, p. 110) and invisibility of chiefs, Valeri writes, “Because he is supposed to be self-sufficient, without desire or sadness, always in control of himself, a divine ali‘i cannot openly display his emotions; this is why he expresses them metaphorically, poetically” (148). Curiously, the one chant to which he refers contains not a single metaphor--perhaps the only one in all Hawaiian literature not to do so (Hawaiian text in Dibble 1838, 95; Rémy 1862, 202-205). All classes of Hawaiian society used poetry, and all the poems, except the perhaps unique exception Valeri cites, have metaphors. Moreover, those metaphors, as Valeri argues (151), were not “simple” but truly expressive of man’s relation to nature. Poetry was used in many forms of communication, from joking, to courting, to praying, to politicking (Charlot 1985). Moreover, chiefs could use other genres. Stories picture them conversing, telling stories, and so on. Valeri shows them giving judgments in the ritual (e.g., 263, 289). I know of no evidence that Hawaiian chiefs and chiefesses had rank-related difficulty verbalizing. Similarly, there is no evidence that “high-ranking nobles always avoid situations where there is laughter, since laughing puts an end to taboos” (287). Kamehameha is reported making his courtiers laugh.

I cannot imagine a description of Hawaiian chiefs further from the richly available evidence. The *arhat*-like ideal Valeri extrapolates from his interpretation of circles contradicts even his own view of the interdependence of chiefs and the other elements of society (e.g., 7). Valeri sees that his picture contradicts the evidence. His solution--as in the case of the gods, discussed above--is to posit “an insurmountable contradiction” in Hawaiian culture on this point (149-150). The contradiction is between his theory and the evidence.

I would now like to criticize in less detail some of Valeri’s main points. In accordance with the ideas of Hegel, Valeri announces as a major theme that there is a Hawaiian religious “system” (x) just as there

is a system of rituals (189, an idea he seems to get from Mauss) and of society (“society as a consistent system,” 187). In this system can be found “the logic of Hawaiian thought” (x; also, e.g., 192). Valeri uses that underlying logic for his arguments<sup>22</sup> and for his reconciliation of conflicting sources (192). Because of this logic, which he has “understood,” he is “giving a coherent interpretation of Hawaiian religious ideas (the first one, to my knowledge)” (x). The last paragraph of the book--a single sentence--seems to refer to the logic of the system as he has explicated it: “How could it be otherwise?”

Valeri writes most often as if there were one historical system that, with a little more surviving evidence, could be reconstructed down to fine details (e.g., 14-17, 25, 109-128). He will find a system even through the welter of inadequate or conflicting evidence (25, 46 par. 3, 57 par. 4, 186 par. 2). He will sketch out a systematic analysis even if he has to admit that it cannot fit all the evidence (102-103, 180-181). He says he will avoid systematizing the conflicting descriptions of the ritual in his sources, but does.<sup>23</sup>

The evidence of religious disunity is, however, overwhelming--even on the testimony of Valeri's book.<sup>24</sup> To accommodate his theories, he himself must posit fundamental contradictions and differences in Hawaiian culture.

Valeri attempts to solve aspects of disunity (45 par. 4, 225 and n. 62, 343). For instance, elements that do not fit his reconstructed system can be called “marginal,” such as priestesses and prophets (112, 138-139). Yet they do take part in the temple ritual (328). Sorcerers, the very antithesis of Valeri's system--“in clear opposition to the priests of the ‘central’ cult”--and the target of his polemic are “marginal and residual” (138).<sup>25</sup> Yet, surprisingly, they are found working alongside the priests at court (183, 185, 247-248, 380 n. 9).

The very idea of a single, unified system is, however, historically implausible. Hawai'i was settled around A.D. 500, if not earlier, and had an increasing population scattered widely over the large archipelago. No religious system could have remained static in such circumstances. Indeed, Valeri's system, as he himself states, is an “ideology imposed by the aristocracy” (19; also 348), the product of “a powerful class of priests, that is, of professional intellectuals. This systemic, priestly view of the pantheon . . .” (36). That priestly group and the high chiefly class with which it worked were, however, late developments in Hawaiian culture (e.g., Kirch 1984, 257-262; Kirch 1985, e.g., 301-308). Their religion presupposes then earlier stages or forms of Hawaiian religion. Valeri himself speaks of “a tendency to unify the

pantheon and the entire cult under the major gods" (110). There must then have been an earlier, pre-tendency period in which such unity did not exist. Would not a genetic approach, the study of the historical development of that priestly system, be helpful in understanding it? Should Valeri not have put his subject in its historical context? Evidence can indeed be found in Valeri's book for the view that elements of that system were developed from earlier religious views and practices (126, 173, 280, 302, 357 n. 56, 384 n. 71, 396 n. 178). For instance, the navel cord-cutting ceremony used in the temple ritual is arguably based on one used for male chiefly babies, a ceremony that is itself in all likelihood based on earlier practices surrounding the cutting of the cord (navel cords did after all have to be cut). But Valeri proceeds to describe the system ahistorically in a sort of "anthropological present."

In my view, given the evidence for the rich variety of Hawaiian religion, no one system could be expected to absorb all the earlier religious elements, as will be seen in my discussion below of Valeri's treatment of the gods. On the other hand, any system attempting to be comprehensive would need to absorb such a large amount of material that complete logical consistency could not be expected.

In any case, given a population of some two hundred thousand on separate islands under independent chiefs, there need not have been just one high-priestly system. Valeri in fact admits that "some traces of a different system exist, especially on the island of Kaua'i" (185; also 335). The system Valeri studies is, therefore, "valid mostly for the island of Hawai'i" (184). He can be even more specific: he will use Malo's calendar, "which was the one used in the western part of the island of Hawai'i, because the main descriptions of the ritual cycle refer to this area" (198).

None of these considerations prevent Valeri from claiming, "In the preceding two parts I have attempted to give a coherent picture of the Hawaiian ideological system by considering all available information" (191). But to take one geographically, historically, and socially delimited religious system out of several and call it *the* system of a culture is as incorrect as to claim that the Memphis theology represents all of ancient Egyptian religion or the Midéwiwin all of Ojibwa.<sup>26</sup> Ake Hultkranz's idea of different "configurations" of religious views and practices being used in a single society, which he applies to American Indian religions, would be a useful tool of analysis.

Valeri's discussion of the "pantheon" shows that (1) he wants to make it all-encompassing for Hawaiian religion as a whole, and (2) that he wants it to be coherent. He bases himself, as others have before him, on

systematizing nineteenth-century sources, especially Kamakau, and on the conventional idea of “the four great gods of Polynesia”: “There is no doubt that Kū, Lono, Kāne, and Kanaloa are the highest gods” (109). As is often necessary for Valeri, he leaves out a good deal of evidence: the Pele literature in which those gods are mercilessly subordinated to her (e.g., Pukui and Korn 1973, 55; Charlot 1983a, 24), the story of Kamapua‘a’s defeat of Lonoka‘eho (Kahiolo 1978, 32-43 and parallels), and the many other stories of the conflicts of the gods (Charlot 1983a, 21-25).

Curiously, Valeri resurrects notions now recognized as nineteenth-century, biblically influenced attempts to rationalize classical Hawaiian beliefs: *ke kōko‘ohā o ke akua*, “the quaternity of the god” (V.: “The association of four gods”), an idea based on the Christian Trinity (13).<sup>27</sup> He also adopts the Trinitarian notions of other nineteenth-century Hawaiian writers, who degrade Kanaloa to a sort of demon: “the quadripartition of the gods is a superficial phenomenon that conceals a tripartition on a deeper level” (18).<sup>28</sup>

A good deal of Valeri’s book is spent trying to subsume all the Hawaiian gods under the four he regards as principal (e.g., 13-30). He describes the process: “Deities are also created spontaneously and unsystematically at the lower levels of the pantheon, where their proliferation is allowed by the very system I have delineated. Spontaneous creation and systematic ordering are thus two dialectical moments in the constitution of the divine in this hierarchical society” (36). As a result of this process, “Lower-level deities are either particularizations of these gods or personifications of some of their predicates” (109). Valeri concludes, “All in all, I think that it is possible to view all inferior gods as encompassed by the major ones” (110).<sup>29</sup>

Such priestly connection of “lower-level” gods to “higher-level” ones is found in Hawaiian religion as it is in Hinduism and Buddhism. But again Valeri has taken the most extreme position in claiming that all Hawaiian gods were thus connected. His discussion has not demonstrated that all family gods and wandering spirits have been so treated. Most important, it is impossible to absorb the female gods of Hawai‘i into the four male gods. Valeri, therefore, belittles them, stating, “goddesses are few and have a marginal position in the Hawaiian pantheon. This corresponds to the marginal position of women in the ritual system” (19; cf. 12). Goddesses are in fact numerous and important. When Valeri does not ignore the great volcano goddess Pele, he groups her with “the female deities of sorcery” (112).<sup>30</sup> Sorcerers, he claims, are “marginal,” yet Pele’s priestesses take part in the temple ritual (328,

401-402 n. 251). Valeri is careful to state for his source that "these goddesses are ultimately controlled by the king" (402 n. 251), a judgment that contradicts the Pele chants mentioned above in which supremacy is claimed for her. Pele is indeed one of a number of other gods--besides Valeri's four principal ones--who take part in the ritual (e.g., 264, 290), an indication that they had not lost their identity and utility. Valeri is also anxious to deny Kamakau's statement that statues of goddesses were placed in the temple (238, 245).

From his view of a coherent, all-encompassing hierarchy of gods, Valeri draws important conclusions for the religious life of Hawaiians. For instance, he holds that an individual's relation to the gods is mediated by the hierarchy just as lower-level sacrifices are by higher-level ones (e.g., 19, 126, 185). As a result, "the ali'i are continually or almost continually in relation with the gods, while commoners are in relation with them only occasionally (during holidays, precisely) and always by means of a more or less direct mediation on the part of the ali'i" (127); "Direct contact with the most important gods of the society is possible only for the king and his chaplains" (140).<sup>31</sup> These views are contradicted by numerous accounts of visions; family, fishing, and farming gods; prayers on many occasions; the marriage of Kū into a commoner family (Green and Pukui 1936,127), and so on.

The second major principle of Valeri's book--influenced by Feuerbach--is that "Hawaiian religion is essentially anthropomorphic. All gods have in common what all subjects have in common: the fact of belonging to one single species, the human species" (xi; also, e.g., x, 272-273, and the argument discussed below). Valeri's exclusive equation of "subject" with "human" is unusual. Some worldviews recognize nonhuman subjects, such as angels and leprechauns. Valeri's use of "subject" corresponds to his use of the phrase "personal gods" as the equivalent of anthropomorphic ones: "personal, anthropomorphic gods such as Kāne and Kanaloa" (7; see also 6, 10, 65). However, in religious studies, the phrase "personal gods" can be and often is used of nonanthropomorphic ones.

Valeri's position seems to be derived more from his theory than from evidence. His one argument is that all Hawaiian gods have a human body in their *kino lau*, their system of multiple bodies (9-12, 21, 31, 35, 47): "the 'genus' of all species included in one god belongs not to the natural world but to the human, social world" (11); "the human form is the most generic component, while their natural forms differentiate them" (21); "each deity is characterized by two kinds of 'bodies,' . . . : natural

bodies and the human body. . . . the human species is the common element underlying all natural manifestations of the divine. . . . all gods equally represent the human species” (31). He concludes, “The unity of the divine is the unity of the human species” (35).

This position can be criticized on several grounds. First, the lowest common denominator need not reveal the genus or prove that the human form is primary. For instance, in Native American religion, animal gods can appear in human form, but are still thought to be animals. The Buffalo Maiden of the Sioux appeared to two youths as a young woman, but as she moved away, they saw her changing back into her buffalo body. Animal gods can appear in human form just because they are appearing to human beings, not because they are really human. The common denominator reveals the nature of the audience, not of the gods.

Most important, to prove his point, Valeri would have to demonstrate that all Hawaiian gods have human bodies. This he does not even begin to do (47).<sup>32</sup> On the contrary, in one of the major faults of his book, he simply ignores the large number of gods that have only animal or elemental bodies.<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, the animal body of the god can be presented as primary even when he or she has a human body as well (e.g., Green 1926,64-65 [rock]). The shark-man is really a shark. Pele tells her attracted sisters that Kamapua‘a is really a pig.<sup>34</sup> Kahiolo is definite (58-59): “*Aka, ua pololei no o Pele malaila, no ka mea, he puaa io no oia*, ‘But Pele was right, because he was a real hog.’ ” A literary motif found in numerous stories is that of the marriage between a human being and someone who is discovered to belong really to another species.<sup>35</sup> Such gods and stories can be found elsewhere in Polynesia.

Animal gods are a common phenomenon worldwide, and a heavy burden of proof lies on anyone who would deny their existence in a Pacific Island culture. In so dealing with Hawaiian culture, in which animal gods were and continue to be important, Valeri’s criticism of another scholar for “leaving out of the field . . . all that does not fit the theory” (66) turns against himself.<sup>36</sup>

The reason for Valeri’s strong anthropomorphization of Hawaiian religion--other than his intellectual sources--is his presupposition of a separation of human beings from “nature”: “natural phenomena extraneous to man” (30). This very Western view is used in a Western way: “Having become totally dehumanized, nature becomes totally distant from man. . . . the humanization of nature is the necessary correlate of

its appropriation by man" (78).<sup>37</sup> Thus the ritual is used for the purpose of anthropomorphizing nature (72-73, 269-270, 345-346, 353), as are other Hawaiian practices.<sup>38</sup>

This view is diametrically opposed to that of the *Kumulipo*, in which human beings are placed on the same family tree with the rest of nature. It opposes Valeri's own statements about Hawaiian metaphors (151), as seen above, as well as a number of other Hawaiian practices (e.g., Charlot 1979). I would argue that Valeri's presupposition of a fundamental separation of human beings from nature cannot be found in Hawaiian culture. In fact, in the section in which Valeri admits that his theory cannot be found in the Hawaiian texts, he states that Hawaiian thinking "presupposes the process of consciousness I am referring to, since it presupposes that the world of nature and the world of man are comparable and therefore that nature is already humanized and man already naturalized" (34). But Hawaiians need not have gone through that "process of consciousness"--even unconsciously, as Valeri seems to say--and need not have used his terms, if they did not start out with his presupposition. Valeri has made a mistake he himself warns against: "one unconsciously attributes to these writings our own principles of organization and criteria of intelligibility" (xxviii).

Similarly, in accordance with his separation of human beings from nature and with his philosophical orientation, Valeri seeks to establish a nonnatural or "supernatural," invisible, immaterial realm or dimension, just like the one in Western thinking: for example, " 'supernatural' and 'natural' or rather invisible and visible" (92). Valeri's arguments for this point are derived from his theory. For example, Hawaiian gods "retain a fundamental feature of the concept: nonempirical, transcendental reality. Thus, in principle, they cannot be confused with those among their instantiations . . . that are supposed to *empirically* manifest the god's properties" (32; see also 34, 261, 365 n. 23). In the next paragraph, he admits that this view cannot be found in Hawaiian texts, where they are always so "confused."

Valeri's introductions of Western philosophical terms--introductions without argument--are used to support this view. Moreover, Valeri's language is very irregular when explicating it. For instance, he writes not only that *mana*, the gods, and "the divine" are "invisible" (89, 99, 152), but that the *ali'i* are as well, giving such arguments as the fact that they were not usually seen by the commoners, that they went out at night, and so on (147, 150, 300-301): "It is only on this occasion that the commoners can see the most sacred ali'i . . . who are invisible through-

out the rest of the year” (380 n. 10). Similarly Kahiki is called “invisible” apparently because it can’t be seen from Hawai‘i (8-9).

Kahiki must be so treated--must be placed in a transcendental dimension rather than be accepted as a distant land within this universe--because of the requisites of Valeri’s theory: he uses this two-level or two-dimensional view of reality to interpret ritual. Ritual is “visible symbols” and “invisible realities” (131; cf. 56, 69, 215, 274, 300); “the gods’ point of passage from transcendence to immanence” (250; also 252). The offering is “the transfer into transcendence, outside the empirical world” (76). Such terms are used also in describing the ritual as thought process (323-325; also 268).

Objections can be raised to the application of this view to Hawaiian culture. The *Kumulipo* pictures the universe as a single whole, not split into natural and supernatural dimensions. Gods do not have to come from another dimension to meet their devotees; they can come from the *wao akua*, “the uplands of the gods,” which are found on each island, or from whichever part of the land or the sea they reside in. Moreover, I have seen no evidence that Hawaiians had the concept of immateriality. Gods, ghosts, and spirits--both in literature and contemporary testimony--have a body, which can be seen and even felt by those who are sufficiently talented or trained (for instance, Pukui and Elbert 1971, s.v. “*ike pāpālua*,” “second sight”). Cupped hands are used to catch souls (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, 1:194). Such points could be multiplied.

Valeri’s view introduces distortions at every level. For instance, he writes that at the *hale mua* the family “enters into relation with another aspect of the ‘outside,’ of the world that transcends the household: the gods” (174). In all my reading and listening, family gods appear very much part of the household, true family gods.

Having established to his satisfaction a supernatural dimension, Valeri characterizes it by using concepts well known from the history of religion. He draws “some preliminary conclusions on the Hawaiian notion of *akua*, ‘divine,’ ‘deity.’ This notion is clearly characterized by two dualities. The divine manifests itself in both . . .” (31). The word *akua* can be used as a noun, “god,” and as an adjective, “godly.” But it is never, to my knowledge, used as an abstraction, “the divine.” Valeri is introducing a non-Hawaiian idea, which he uses widely in his book, either in the vague sense of anything pertaining to the gods (e.g., 31, 88, 90, 153, 262) or as a generalized, undifferentiated “divine power”: “a category of divine power exists that is more encompassing than the indi-

vidual gods. From its point of view *the individual gods are particularizations associated with certain states of the process of transformation of the divine as it occurs at different levels of the ritual cycle*" (288; see also 78, 89, 215). As in Hinduism, the gods emerge from an undifferentiated divine and merge back into it.

Valeri seeks to identify this concept with the Hawaiian *pō*, "night," from the *Kumulipo*: "the divine coincided first with the undifferentiated principle Pō. . . . This identification of the undifferentiated divine with Pō . . ." (7);<sup>39</sup> "The closest approximation to a supreme divine principle found in Hawaii is Pō, the undifferentiated creative origin of the cosmos, which continues to exist in transcendence as its perennial source" (35; also 215), an idea similar, for example, to the Thomist description of God as creator and sustainer of the universe.

Valeri's Pō, as the divine, differentiates itself both into the generators of the *Kumulipo* (5, "manifestations of the generative principle Pō") and apparently into the major gods: by "producing the first man," the divine transforms itself in that "from now on it will be constituted by personal, anthropomorphic gods such as Kāne and Kanaloa" (7).<sup>40</sup>

Valeri has two texts to support his view that Pō is "the undifferentiated divine." The first text is the last line of the stanza used in the first four sections of the *Kumulipo*: " 'O ke akua ke komo, 'a'oe komo kanaka" ("It is the god who enters, the human being does not enter," my translation; 4, 7, 216, 222). Valeri bases his interpretation of this line on the idea that *akua* means "the divine," his abstraction: " 'the divine enters, man cannot enter'. . . . Being entirely divine, nature entirely excludes man" (7); "The Pō period is thus entirely divine" (4).

Valeri's argument depends, among other things, on whether the line from the stanza can be applied to Pō. But when first used (line 39), that line is twenty-five lines away from the last mention of *pō* (line 14).<sup>41</sup> The immediate context of the line in question is the stanza itself, the first line of which gives a clear sexual meaning (Charlot 1977:499-500; 1983a:49-52). The line could not, therefore, be applied to *pō* without further argument.

Valeri's only other text is the traditional expression "*mai ka pō mai*," "from out of the night" (V.: " 'out of the unseen' [out of the 'night']"), which, he states, "refers to anything of divine origin or 'supernatural' " (350 n. 3). Neither of his references supports his view or use of "supernatural." Moreover, Valeri's interpretation of the phrase would still not support the idea of Pō as the "undifferentiated divine."

Indeed, how could Pō be undifferentiated if the god or even "the divine" "enters" into it? when earth, sky, moon, sun, slime, and so on,

have already been mentioned as existing in earlier lines? Far from referring to a single, all-encompassing, undifferentiated principle, *pō* is being constantly paired--with *ao* in the structure of the whole chant, with *lipo* in lines 7-8, and with *lā*, “day,” in line 10. This use is congruent with that in creation texts from the Society Islands and elsewhere (Charlot 1987b), which Valeri ignores since he makes almost no attempt to relate Hawaiian religion to its Polynesian background.

Valeri has even less foundation for his view of *Pō* as the “creative origin of the cosmos” (35). The word *pō* appears first in line 5--after a description of the turning of the earth and sky and the sun being in shadow to illuminate the moon--and continues being mentioned alongside other elements (lines 6-10). Valeri himself sees those lines as identifying “the ‘source’ or ‘origin’ (*kumu*) of *Pō*” (4) (an interpretation with which I disagree). The generation of *Pō* is seen by Valeri as sexual: lines 1-2 are “the Hawaiian equivalent of the marriage of heaven and earth”; *walewale* (line 6) refers to part of childbirth. Despite all this, Valeri then writes: “In turn *Pō* engenders two forms that exhibit the first and fundamental biological difference, sex.” In other words, despite all he has said, Valeri still uses *Pō* as the origin and sees that origin as presexual; sex comes after *Pō*. Indeed, he uses *Pō* in this way throughout his book.

Valeri is doing no less than replacing a two-source, sexual, genealogical origin of the universe--the mating of the earth and sky--with a one-source, presexual one. His view can be arrived at only through his argumentation. He himself admits that “*Pō* and its immediate specifications are not personified and do not receive a cult” (35; see also 215). The mating of earth and sky and the dualistic, sexual view of the universe are, however, richly in evidence: “*Uwe ka lani, ola ka honua*” (“The sky weeps, the earth lives,” my translation; Pukui 1983, No. 2888; Charlot 1983a, 49-52; 1983b). Sky and earth are proverbially considered the ultimate framework of the universe, for example “*He lani i luna, he honua i lalo*” (“A sky above, an earth below,” my translation; Pukui 1983, No. 718). Valeri himself describes “above and below, inland and sea” as “the two pairs of opposites that together encompass all that exists” (146).

Because Valeri is replacing this two-source origin with a single-source one, he cannot use sex and procreation. He must use “creation” or “production”: “the entire land, indeed all of nature used by man, is produced by the gods and hence ultimately belongs to them” (156; see also, e.g., 7, 75). The *Kumulipo* is, however, a chant of the procreation, not the creation, of the universe. There is nothing other than late, biblically

influenced Hawaiian texts to compare with the extended creationistic systems of Samoa and the Society Islands (Charlot 1987b). Hawaiians knew the god associated with those systems--Tangaloa/Ta'aroa/Kanaloa--but, according to the evidence, never used creation by gods except in the limited sense of rearrangements of existing materials.<sup>42</sup>

In relating his undifferentiated single source to the gods, Valeri characteristically chooses the four masculine ones he regards as principal, as seen above. He divides the pantheon into male and female. In this pantheon, **Kū** "encompasses all the properties of the masculine gods," and Hina, "all the feminine attributes" (12; see also 13). Since goddesses will later be described as "marginal" to the pantheon, Valeri has managed to depict the pinnacle of Hawaiian religion as a masculine creator-god, a point, however, that he does not develop, as stated earlier.

Valeri thus downgrades the role of the female in Hawaiian religion from being half of the pair that generates the universe. He consequently downgrades Hawaiian goddesses and women, imposing on them an old-fashioned Western image: "dancing is an activity in which women have a predominant role" (111); "that preeminently feminine function procreation, especially childbirth" (111); "women have a privileged relationship with the female deities of sorcery . . . [as prophetesses and mediums]. Their mediating role thus takes on a typically feminine form: they are possessed, penetrated by the deity who speaks through them" (112); "superiority of action over passivity"; "Action is conceived as a masculine quality in contrast to feminine passivity. . . . Women are relegated to the unmarked, 'passive' category" (114); "the occupation of a young woman is to procreate, which in Hawaiian culture implies all that relates to seduction, in which it is said that women play a more active role than men. . . . This explains why properly feminine activities are making ornaments . . . and clothing, chanting, dancing, and other activities that promote eroticism . . . compose and chant the *mele inoa* 'name chants,' with their deliberately erotic content and even the *mele ma'i* 'chant [praising] the genitals' " (123). This picture depends more on Western views of women than on evidence about Hawaiian ones. In fact, all the activities mentioned above, except child-bearing, were performed by men as well.<sup>43</sup>

In Valeri's picture, women constitute ritual impurity and pollution: "purity is an essentially masculine property, while impurity is essentially feminine" (112; also 18-19), thus the "global inferiority of women relative to men in the sacrificial system" (113).<sup>44</sup> This view influences Valeri's interpretation of Hawaiian ritual,<sup>45</sup> and he often appears to argue against his sources, imposing a one-source picture upon the con-

siderable evidence for a two-source, sexual ritual (e.g., 206, 217, 219-220, 282, 288; cf. 302-303). He dismisses without argument Kamakau's statement that the images on the left side of the temple fence and to the left of the altar were female, although this receives some support from Cook's journal (238, 245). When a source states that priestesses participate in purification rites, Valeri responds, "Perhaps this rite reunites the sexes to represent their subsequent separation more emphatically" (389 n. 53). This negative view of women enters even into speculation on details (e.g., 277).

This imposition of a one-source view can be found in Valeri's interpretation of the Makahiki ceremony. Valeri correctly interprets the foundation myth, "the key to several aspects of the Makahiki ritual," as representing "the marriage of heaven and earth" (215). This is the basis for Valeri's holding "the identification of Lonomakua with a heavenly god uniting with the feminine earth" (214). Lonomakua is represented by a long pole with a crosspiece. Valeri writes, "Thus we ask ourselves as well if the long pole topped by a rounded head, which represents the god, is not a phallic symbol" (214). This pole is manipulated in various ways during a section of the ritual, held upright and laid down (208, 222). One would expect these points to be explicated in detail in Valeri's interpretation of the ritual (222-224). However, there is no sexual reference made to the pole and only passing reference to the sexual aspect of the ritual and its founding myth (222, par. 5; 224, par. 3). Valeri's characteristic emphasis is on the single male god Lonomakua, "manifesting that the earth and its products belong to the god that has produced them . . . the producer-god" (222); "Lonomakua is conceived of as the father or producer of cultivated plants," and so on (216). "Lono in the Makahiki rites" represents "all of the divine in a relatively concrete form" (215; see also 216) and is identified with "the divine origin" (216). A one-source picture is thus imposed on the evidence for a two-source one.

In accordance with his one-source, male-god sacrificial theory, Valeri follows Frazer and Sahlins in interpreting the Makahiki ritual by the idea of the death and rebirth of a god (e.g., Sahlins 1985, 104-134; compare Daws 1968a, 26-27; Daws 1968b; Jean Charlot 1976, 81-96). This idea and its application as a model in various contexts are well known from the elaborated theologies and rituals of other cultures. It is surprising, therefore, how little evidence exists for its use in Hawai'i and in the rituals Valeri is interpreting. In the *kālī'i* ceremony a spear is thrown at the king and misses. Another man touches the king with another spear. Valeri follows Frazer in interpreting this as "the king's

'execution,' symbolized by the spear that touches him" (225; also 211-212, 285). No textual evidence supports this interpretation. The action could just as easily be viewed as a demonstration of the king's invulnerability, as a gesture of surrender, and so on.

The above interpretation is, however, the point of departure for Valeri's application of the death-rebirth model to the god: "This reversal implies that Lonomakua is killed in turn, which is what happens immediately after the king's symbolic execution. In fact, conquered after a sham battle between the king's warriors and Lonomakua's defenders, the 'Makahiki gods' are brought into the king's temple and dismantled for storage" (226).<sup>46</sup> I cannot see how putting the images away after the ceremony is over implies that the god or gods are being killed. Again, no texts can be used to support this view. On the contrary, Lono is said to return to Kahiki (226). Moreover, the images of other gods are dismantled (392 n. 112), but Valeri says nothing about those gods being killed. Similarly, even the manipulation of the phallic pole is given a death-rebirth rather than a sexual interpretation: it is "placed in a horizontal position. Lono is thus 'beaten' and 'overthrown,' perhaps even symbolically killed" (222).

Valeri then argues for extending the death-rebirth idea to Kū and the temple ceremony (266, 285-288)--"the dubious world of eternal life that is in fact a world of sacrificial death" (326)--but his arguments are again tenuous. For instance, a *hala lei* is put around the neck of the god and the king. *Hala* can be used as a symbol or in wordplay for death. "Thus the king and god 'die' in one form in order to assume a superior one" (288). But in another historical account of the ceremony, a different *lei* is used.<sup>47</sup>

Again, one would expect textual evidence in this case because when Hawaiians want to say that a human being or a god is born or dies, they have no trouble doing so.<sup>48</sup> The problem to be solved is not, in my opinion, how to impose a death-rebirth theory where there is so little evidence for one, but, on the contrary, how to explain why the Hawaiians made so little of that ancient and widespread idea. There are indications that they and other Polynesians were acquainted with that idea: for instance, the Hawaiian story of Kū becoming a breadfruit tree (Green and Pukui 1936:127), the Samoan story of Sina and the eel, and perhaps aspects of the practice of sacrifice.<sup>49</sup> That Hawaiians made such sparing use of that powerful image could be due to many factors: lack of winter and spring, planting obviously living taro-tops rather than dead-looking seeds, etc. I myself would see the reason in the strong and consequent dualism of Hawaiian thinking. Life and death are conceived as

real opposites. For instance, Hawaiians never made wordplays with two senses of *make*, “desire” and “death.” When, at a conference I attended, a Western poet used the pun in a love song on a Hawaiian theme--“You’re desire, you’re death”--the Hawaiians listening were horrified. Hawaiians, as far as I can see, do not see death in life and life in death. They see life as health and vigor and joyous sexuality, and death as the opposite. Hawaiian ritual ideas and practices can be interpreted from that point of view, for which much evidence exists, and placed against an inherited background in which the death-rebirth idea is still perceptible. Hawaiian ideas and sensibilities should not be absorbed into foreign ones, but appreciated for their own special qualities and as the result of their own special development.

By dint of much theorizing and extrapolation from few indications in the Hawaiian sources, Valeri has constructed a whole theology of sacrifice and ritual: one-source, male-emphatic, creational, and spiritualistic, with divisions between human beings and nature and between the natural and the supernatural, and with major use of the death-rebirth model. The Hawaiian sources themselves abound in inescapable evidence of a very different theology: two-source, male-female, procreational, physical, with an all-encompassing cosmos and a strong emphasis on life over death. Valeri deals with this gap between his theory and the evidence just as he has handled earlier ones: he posits two different systems, a “genealogical system” connected to impure women and a “sacrificial system” connected to pure men (113); an “opposition between sexual reproduction, which is primarily associated with the feminine pole, and the sacrificial reproduction of social units with their natural correlatives, which is primarily associated with the masculine pole” (123-124; also 128). The former is characteristically subordinated to the latter; “Men’s superiority to women, then, expresses only the superiority of a sacrificial relationship with the gods over a purely genealogical relationship with them. . . . sacrifice is superior to genealogy” (113-114). According to Valeri, female sexual reproduction is possible only because of male sacrifice: “the ‘pure,’ that is, nonsexual, reproduction of the species as a concept is the sine qua non for the ‘impure’ (sexual) reproduction” (330); “fertility is actualized only by men . . . the ideal reproduction of the species by men translates into its empirical reproduction by women” (331). This male control can be seen in the king’s regulation of genealogies (157-158).<sup>50</sup> After the abolition of the sacrificial system, “the hierarchy survived only in its genealogical form and consequently in its female-centered mode of reproduction. It is no accident, then, that female, not male, chiefs played the most important

political roles after the abolition of the Old Regime" (128). Valeri provides as a reference for this point the whole first volume of Kuykendall's *The Hawaiian Kingdom*.

For anyone desiring to provide a coherent account of a logical system, such a division--along with the earlier ones noted--must pose a problem. To solve it, Valeri elevates the word "creativity" to the role of a unifying term. In discussing the Makahiki festival "at a somewhat abstract level," Valeri discovers "the most general attribute of humans: creative activity as such" (233). This attribute "finds its objective correlative in the renewed creativity of nature during the season of the festival." Valeri is using the word "creativity" as a synonym for "procreativity," an odd use influenced by the creationism discussed earlier. The word so used provides him with an anthropomorphic bridge between "man" and "nature."

But Valeri goes even further, "Pō and its immediate specifications . . . can be viewed as the projections onto the most general concept of nature of the most general aspect of the human species: pure activity, pure creativity. In the latter aspect the cosmos and the human species coincide and are therefore indistinguishable" (35). Students of the history of religions will be interested to see Hawaiian religion interpreted as the Vedanta: Atman and Brahman, Soul and Cosmos, Subjective and Objective Reality are one.<sup>51</sup>

Valeri's *Kingship and Sacrifice* takes its place in a long line of works that have understood Hawaiian religion from foreign religions and theories, be they Chaldean, Egyptian, Christian, psychic, or psychiatric. Acknowledging in key places that his view is not supported by the evidence and that the weight of evidence supports in fact a different view, Valeri uses tendentious interpretations, omissions, and tenuous arguments to theorize his way to a counter-system of Hawaiian religion, one combined from well-known elements drawn from the history of religions. In so doing, he--like others before him--leaves out those elements that are special and, I believe, valuable in Hawaiian religion: its strong sense of individuality and personality; its capacity for reverence and awe before the godly, human, animal, vegetable, and elemental; its sense of the interrelatedness of all things, including human beings; its placing of human beings within rather than above the universe; its understanding of everything in physical terms; the integrity of its search for wisdom through all the divisions created by Western culture; and so on. Bereft of such characteristic elements, Hawaiian religion ceases to be a challenge to Western thinking and becomes a mere example of religious themes available elsewhere.

Hawaiian religion can be seen as itself only if looked at closely and carefully, that is, following scholarly rules of interpretation and argument. Such rules must be formulated for each literature, and much discussion is necessary, for instance, on uses of Polynesian genres and on the proper method for understanding Polynesian wordplay. Works of synthesis or those dealing with broad subjects should follow intensive and detailed philological studies. Valeri's book is valuable among other things for raising inescapably such questions of approach and method, an essential step in the development of the field of Pacific studies.

**Appended Note: Valeri's Criticisms of my  
"The Use of *Akua* for Living Chiefs"**

Valeri discusses the question of "The Divine King" (142-145) and offers arguments against an appendix of my book *The Hawaiian Poetry of Religion and Politics*, "The Use of *Akua* for Living Chiefs" (Charlot 1985, 31-35), which he read some years ago in typescript. I was delighted to receive such an early response to my call for a general discussion of this question and take this opportunity to continue it.

Unfortunately, Valeri begins by misstating my position: Charlot "has maintained that Hawaiian ali'i were not traditionally called *akua*" (144). As indicated in the title of my appendix, I am speaking of the application of that word only to living chiefs. After death, ali'i can become gods. This misunderstanding of my position misdirects Valeri's discussion.<sup>52</sup>

In my appendix I noted that the commonly accepted notion that high-ranking Hawaiian chiefs were called gods during their lifetimes rested on nineteenth-century prose accounts, such as those of Malo and Kamakau. Abundant evidence of this practice can be found during the period from the death of Kamehameha I through the early missionary period. Earlier evidence has not yet been found, which is surprising because there are many genres, such as laudatory chants, in which such an appellation should have been used and is in fact used in the post-Kamehameha period. Because nineteenth-century prose historical accounts could easily have been influenced by the post-Kamehameha practice, I looked for evidence in arguably earlier chants. I studied in some detail the relevant texts in the *Chant for Kūali'i*, which has been cited as an example of the practice in question. I found that the direct applications of *akua* to Kūali'i occurred in Kamakau's prose accompanying the chant and that various problems attended the use of the word in the chant. I therefore drew the tentative conclusion that the

application of *akua* to living chiefs as found in the post-Kamehameha period and reflected in the nineteenth-century prose accounts was either a late innovation or a late extension of a genuine but restricted early practice. I cited several texts that suggested that Kamehameha I might have been the source of such an extension or innovation, as he was of so many others. This would have been one of the several religious changes accomplished during his lifetime and after his death (Charlot 1983a, 26-29, 147-148; Charlot 1985, e.g., 5-6, 34, 55). Although Valeri indulges in name-calling on this point, he himself refers on several occasions to Kamehameha's important innovations.<sup>53</sup>

In arguing for his own position,<sup>54</sup> Valeri has recourse to nineteenth-century prose accounts (several of which were cited previously in my appendix), ignoring the general objections I raised against them. He also ignores points I made against specific texts when he seeks to use them for his own position. For instance, Kamakau writes that some people worshipped a victorious chief *me he akua*, "as a god" (Charlot 1985,30; Valeri 1985, 143 "like a god"). Valeri is clearly not given pause by *me he*, "as" or "like," although a text of Kepelino's, which he cites (131), has a parallel use that shows its significance: the diviner was "*me he mea atua la*, 'like a god' " (Kepelino 1977, 60-61). Neither Valeri nor anyone else argues that diviners were called gods.

Similarly, in using a chant text cited by me (Charlot 1985, 31; Fornander 1919-1920, 6:387-388), Valeri refers to line 300, which mentions Kamehameha's *waiakua*, "godly blood" (143; V. "divine blood"), but leaves out the previous lines, which mention his *waikana-ka*, "human blood" (line 299), and the fact that he is indeed *he kanaka*, "a human being" (line 297).

Valeri offers two arguments that do not require a long refutation. Texts about chiefs being descended from the gods do not prove that they were called gods during their lifetimes, nor does the fact that they were given the names of gods. After all, Hispanics can call sons Jesús.

The decisive evidence on which to judge the difference of opinion between us can be reduced to a few texts from Hawaiian chants:

1. In his remarks on the *Chant of Kūali'i* (143, 145, 392 n. 98), Valeri does not take account of my objections to its use for his purpose (Charlot 1985, 32-35).

2. Valeri cites a chant in which he claims Kākuhihewa is called "*he akua 'ōlelo*," "a 'a god of speech.'" The chant is in Emerson's notes to Malo, which Valeri describes as "a mixture of data of great value and unfounded or misunderstood information" (xxiv). Emerson himself is vague about the provenance and reference of the chant (Malo 1951,

200). It contains in fact the word *mō'i* for “king,” which Valeri follows Stokes in characterizing as a usage introduced after 1842 under foreign influence (370 n. 36; also, 397 n. 192). The phrase under discussion refers not to Kākūhihewa but to the chief mentioned in the previous line, “Ka-ua-kahi-a-ka-ala,” who seems to be a child of Kākūhihewa by “Kanui-a-paneē.”<sup>55</sup> In any case, the fact that the word *'ōlelo* qualifies *akua*--as well as the uncertainty of any identification, reference, and interpretation of the chant--infirms this text for Valeri's purpose of demonstrating an absolute, not a qualified, application of the word *akua* to a living chief.

3. Valeri claims that, in Ke'āulumoku's *Hauī Ka Lanī* (Fornander 1919-1920, 6:408, line 734), “the ali'i of the district of Hilo are ironically referred to as *akua*” (143). The line reads, however, “*Liu na maka o na akua i ka paakai*, ‘Blinded are the eyes of the gods with salt.’ ” No mention is made of ali'i. Valeri is taking his interpretation without supporting argument from note 1 to the Fornander text. The line makes perfect sense when taken literally.

4. The saying, *He akua nā ali'i o Kona*, “The chiefs of Kona are *akua*,” was mentioned by me with two parallels (Charlot 1985, 31-32). I followed Dickey, who translates *akua* as “ghosts.” The first parallel I cited has not been translated. The second (Kahiolo 1978, 61) also translates the term as “ghosts.” Valeri polemicizes against the translators of Kahiolo (370 n. 37) for “following Dickey, without, however, naming him.” The translators were in fact working from the best-known reference, the parallel in the Fornander version of the saga of Kamapua'a (Elbert 1959, 222-223), which I unfortunately did not cite. The translators of Kahiolo very correctly describe their relation to the Fornander translation in their preface (Kahiolo 1978, ix-x). The above consensus in the translation of *akua* as “ghosts” in this line is based on its context in a taunting chant (or teasing in Dickey): Kamapua'a is taunting Pele by, among other things, using a typical description of ghosts against her (compare Fornander 1919-1920, 6:370-371). Such a chant is not the proper context for a glorifying reference to chiefs as gods, but for a taunting one, applying to the chiefs the Hawaiian idea of miserable and helpless ghosts feeding on scraps.

Not one of the texts produced up to now in this discussion has shown convincingly that living chiefs were called *akua* in pre-Kamehameha times. But even if all the texts Valeri cites were accepted, they would still be surprisingly few for a point so important and useful in praise. One cannot argue with Valeri for earlier times that “it can be safely assumed that this usage really existed because it follows necessarily from

the attribution to ali'i of the fundamental properties of the divine" (145), the prelude to a discussion I have criticized at some length above. Theories must be based on evidence, not the reverse. Until better evidence is found, scholars run the risk of projecting a later practice onto earlier times in assuming that the nineteenth-century accounts of this particular practice are accurate for earlier periods.

## NOTES

1. All references are to Valeri 1985, unless otherwise noted. Valeri has treated certain subjects and themes found in this book somewhat differently in the articles listed in his bibliography. I have not used them for this article, which discusses his most recent work in publication, if not in composition.

I read a preliminary version of this paper to the Humanities Forum, Institute of Culture and Communication, East-West Center, chaired by Wimal Dissanayake, and received valuable comments and criticisms. I thank also Jocelyn Linnekin and Jean-Paul Latouche for their detailed criticisms of the whole typescript.

2. Ortiz 1969, see Index, s.v. "Lévi-Strauss, Claude." Valeri states that "the disjunction between the raw offering and the cooked offering" cannot be found in Hawai'i (123).

3. An example of such practice in regard to a female *ali'i* can be found in a text cited by Valeri for another reason, but he ignores it as evidence against his point (166; Fornander 1916-1917, 4:540-541, 544-545). In a later passage (150, end of par. 3), Valeri offers further references, which arguably support the virginity of the male, but there is again no reference to purity. See also Elbert 1956-1957, 69:342.

4. The words from the English translation "free from the taint of *kauwa* blood" and "regarded as a defilement" (Malo 1951, 71) do not appear in the Hawaiian text (Malo n.d., 83-84). The first phrase has simply been added. The second is a misreading of "*ua kapa ia ka poe kauwa he palani, he hohono ke ano*" ("*Kauwā* were called *palani* fish, a type that has a bad odor," my translation). Genealogists try to *hoomaemae*, "cleanse," chiefly lines of such connections. The word *ho'oma'ema'e* can be used of ritual cleansing of pollution, but, not being a technical term, need not have such a sense in this context. It is the only word in the text that could offer support to Valeri's position.

5. Confusingly, Valeri later speaks differently of immobility (301-302): the wild chiefly woman is "immobilized" by being wrapped, which, Valeri states, makes her productive; but for that--as seen in his immediately previous paragraphs--she must surely be unwrapped.

6. Compare Fornander 1969, 1:92-93, quoted by Valeri (200).

7. Valeri thus translates the name of the god on p. 175. Valeri's view (expressed on p. 6) would make it very hard to translate lines 111-112 of the *Kumulipo*.

8. See also pp. 86, 93 par. 6, 390 n. 80, 391 n. 86; on *kāhea*, see 379 n. 3, 398 n. 201.

9. For other examples of such arguments, see pp. 279 par. 2, 391 nn. 86, 96.

10. For other problematical arguments of various kinds, see, e.g., pp. 60, 99, 232, 270, 287 par. 4, 302-303, 322, 323 par. 1, 324-325, 366 n. 26, 371 n. 49, 373 n. 69, 393 n. 124.
11. See also the hypothesis about *mana* (99) and how it is used (101, par. 7). Also pp. 251 par. 1, 252 par. 2, 270 par. 2.
12. "It seems that the opposition *akua/kanaka* is a relative one and that certain men may be called the gods of others. . . . Probably because he does not take this relativity into account, John Charlot . . . has recently maintained . . ." (144). I do not in fact agree with Valeri's view of the distinction. See Appended Note above, p. 137.
13. Similarly on p. 252, the points made are to be confirmed by the analysis of the temple ritual I discuss below.
14. See pp. 32, 34 par. 6, 215 par. 6, 225 par. 4. Compare p. 388 n. 41. This is true for a number of small points as well (e.g., 166).
15. See also pp. 258-262, especially 260 n. 61, 326.
16. See also pp. 304-305, 346; cf. 42, par. 3. This view also influences Valeri's interpretation. For instance, he speaks of "*collective recognition*" of the success of the ceremony; "*It is all of society that decides*" (304; also, 305, 394 n. 140), as seen in the fact that the crowd must keep absolute silence during the ceremony and could render it invalid by making or reporting a noise. It should be noted, however, that anyone who made a noise was killed.
17. Valeri's sensibilities seem Western: e.g., on white as the color of purity (52, 86); on sweet potatoes and excrement (123); on women composing "even" genital chants (123).
18. "Consanguinity implies identity" (163; see also 93). Each chief was proudly conscious of his many differentiating names, *kapus*, traditions, and so on, which were celebrated in story and song.
19. Valeri himself seems to say so (168, par. 5). His previous reference (166) does not contain the words he underlines or the idea they express.
20. A few lines down Valeri refers to the chiefs' "perfect self-control" (147); "the ali'i is divine as long as he acts like a god, as long as he manifests his perfection by not desiring or needing other human beings" (149); see also 166.
21. See also 123; above, p. 110; Charlot 1985, 3 and n. 11, p. 10 and n. 57; Elbert 1956-1957, 69:341-345. Valeri writes similarly of prophets (139), but the most famous one, **Lanikāula**, was married and had children.
22. "A deity is nothing but a reified representation of certain human properties. It follows from this that . . ." (46); "This is only logical . . ." (385 n. 5).
23. See pp. 191-194, 203, 232, 254-255, 260, 280, 304, 322, 401 n. 239.
24. E.g., pp. 25-27, 29-30, 112, 115, 119 and n. 6, 194-198, 225, 235-236, 248, 254, 351 n. 18, 364 n. 15, 365 n. 23, 369 n. 24, 372 n. 62, 377 n. 24, 382 n. 32, 390 n. 77, 398 n. 206.
25. "These 'residual' persons are destructive as is any residue with respect to the system that produces it" (370 n. 31).
26. The latter example is particularly instructive because the religious elements involved are similar. Compare, e.g., pp. 138-139 to Hoffman 1891, 156-162.

27. His example is faulty: the chant lists various groups of gods named by number, and then:

*E ke kokoo-ha o ke 'kua*

*E ke koo-lima o ke 'kua*

Oh association of four of the god(s)

Oh association of five of the god(s)

The chant is not referring to a single, overall supreme group, but to a number of groups. I do seem to remember the word being used as Valeri states, but have not found the text. For Trinitarian notions, see, e.g., Kepelino, in Beckwith 1932, 8-11, 14-15, 174-175. For such biblically influenced theologies, see Barrère 1969.

28. See also pp. 19, 119. Valeri admits some examples are “due to Christian influence,” but does not offer references for those he feels are not. He also recognizes other examples of biblical influence on Kamakau and others (353 n. 9, 358 n. 60, 377 n. 23).

At one point, Valeri goes even further. Ignoring evidence for the supremacy of **Kāne** in some areas (as seen above), he exalts **Kū** as the highest of the male gods, who “encompasses all the properties of the masculine gods” (12). Given the “marginal” position he accords to women in the “pantheon,” this approaches a henotheistic position (12-13). Valeri does not, however, develop this point.

29. Earlier, he claims this only of the “majority” (13).

30. He connects Pele elsewhere also with vulcanism and dance (8).

31. The Kamakau text cited, however, discusses only the statues of those gods and does not, therefore, support Valeri’s point.

32. Valeri seems to contradict himself, when he writes “as all other deities, the *'aumakua [sic]* can appear in human form” (21), and then mentions “the links connecting various individual *'aumakua [sic]* to a single natural species” (30).

33. A useful list of categories is given in Fornander 1919-1920, 6:52-55, a text Valeri refers to (266). Valeri (10 and n. 6) ignores the gods who emerge with animal species in the *Kumulipo* before the birth of anthropomorphic gods and human beings (e.g., **Kīwa'a**, line 366). For gods with only animal bodies reported, see, e.g., Fornander 1918-1919, 5:366 (shark); Green 1923, 16-17 (bird), 44-45 (caterpillars), 46-47 (squid); idem. 1926, 66-69 (rat and owl); Green and Pukui 1936, 174-175 (squid), 176-177 (fish). Many contemporary Hawaiian religious experiences involve animals with no reported human form (e.g., Charlot 1983a, 22). Elemental gods include rocks and waves, Fornander 1918-1919, 5:522-555 (waves). Sources differ on whether some gods possessed a human body as well as an animal body, for instance, the dog Pae or Pa'e (Green 1923, 48-49; cf. Green and Pukui 1936, 178). It would be systematizing to argue that if a human body can be discovered in one source, all others must implicitly agree with it. I sketch my own view of the subject in Charlot 1983a, 21-22, 146-147. I believe that anthropomorphism is a later element in Hawaiian religion that was applied secondarily to the older theriomorphic gods, partly through the identification of earlier animal gods with anthropomorphic ones; for instance, 'Ilioloa, “Long Dog,” can become either **Kū'ilioloa** or **Kāne'ilio**.

34. Kahiolo 1978, 52-59, and the parallel passages in the two other major Kamapua'a complexes. In Charlot 1987a, I demonstrate that the oldest stories of Kamapua'a depict him as a pig and that his human body is a later development of the literature.

35. E.g., Green 1923, 43 (caterpillar); Green and Pukui 1936, 170-173 (eel and sea cucumber); Valeri 1985, 331 (*mo'o*).

36. Similarly, Valeri rejects without argument a statement by Malo that nonanthropomorphic statues were made, stating, "The fact is that all surviving images are anthropomorphic" (9). In fact, a number of nonanthropomorphic, undeterminable, and unshaped stone gods can be seen at the Bishop Museum. Valeri places great theoretical emphasis on the use of such statues in ritual (72-73), going so far as to say "ritual is fully efficacious only when the god is present in an anthropomorphic, controllable form" (102). That was, however, not always the case, as he admits (103). For instance, the goddess Laka was represented on the altar by an uncarved block of wood.

37. See also pp. 75-81; cf. 24: "the social universe encompasses the natural universe"; and 119. On the general point of separation, see pp. 9, 18, 31, 34, 48, 76.

38. E.g., "By deanimalizing the animal that is the object of his fear, man deanimalizes himself" (24). This idea is applied to ritual following Hegel (48). See also pp. 75-81.

39. He speaks of *Pō* as one of the "metaphors designating the divine origins" (8). Valeri's descriptions of *Pō* often recall those of *mana* in the writings of other anthropologists. For my own view, see Charlot 1977, 498-500; Charlot 1983a, 124-125.

40. Similarly *Kū* and Lono can "represent" "the divine" (215-216). For the connection between the divine and *Pō* on this point, see p. 383 n. 48. Valeri's understanding of the chants cited in note 48 is again based on his theory.

41. The *pō* in line 37 of the Beckwith text reads *pou* in the manuscript (Beckwith 1972, 242).

42. The use of the word "creation" to designate all views or models of cosmic origins is an ethnocentrism widely and unconsciously perpetrated by Western scholars (e.g., Edmondson 1971, 7, line 63; 11, lines 173-174). Valeri's text is a good example of the power of distortion of such a use. Valeri's emphasis on creation--rather than procreation--entails his elevation of "sight and intelligence" to "what is most human" (252 and n. 44; also 324-325; but see 396 n. 174). He thus follows a characteristically Western line of argument. Significantly, Hawaiians had several differing terms for thinking. "Traditionally, the intellect and emotions were thought to exist in the intestinal regions" (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, 1:155). See also Pukui and Elbert 1971, s.v. "*na'au*," "*na'auao*," "*'imi na'auao*"; Charlot 1983a, 29. Moreover, a major Hawaiian literary form was the *mele ma'i*, "genital chant," which celebrated the recipient's sexual and fertilizing powers, a logical genre for a culture based on genealogical thinking.

43. Contrast the view of the "high position of women" in Elbert 1956-1957, 70:320; also, 69:348.

44. Valeri bases his ritual hierarchy on the idea of purity, but his discussion of purity--which he connects with completeness or wholeness of instantiation of type (e.g., 84, 88, 92, 148-149, 271, 276)--is marked by inconsistencies. For instance, he writes of the king, "Most of the taboos surrounding his sacred person are intended to maintain this purity" (148); but later, "any taboo surrounding a pure sacred being has as its aim to protect his purity" (374 n. 83).

Valeri writes (130-131), "What characterizes the sacrificer . . . is that he is permanently in contact with the god." (In fact, none of Valeri's references support that view.

To “have” a god or to be “connected” with a god does not mean that one is “permanently in contact” with it. On the contrary, in prayers one must call on the gods to come.) Valeri goes on to say that the sacrificer participates “in this way in the god’s nature and mana, even being his manifestation in a human form” (130-131). Yet, as Valeri shows, it is necessary for these “pure people (ali‘i, kahuna)” before the temple ritual “to be purified anew” (259; also 256-258, 267). How could they be in permanent contact with their gods if they were in a state of impurity, even of relative impurity?

Valeri does in fact speak at times in relative terms: “both what is marked *kapu* and what is marked *noa* can be pure or impure and are so only relatively” (259); “*Kapu* and *noa* are purely relative notions” (90; also 326, 330). But he can speak also in absolute terms: “at least some part of the divine must always remain *kapu* for the human sphere, otherwise the whole system would lose its fixed foundation” (91); “ ‘to pollute’ would be a more appropriate rendering, since the land is made accessible to human use (*noa*) by being desacralized and losing its divine purity” (259).

Despite his expressed separation of *kapu-noa* from pure-impure, Valeri can write as if pollution were the way to lift a *kapu* (e.g., 91-92, 259, 326). He does use the word “free” to translate *noa* when describing the rendering *noa* of a temple (327-329, 401 n. 247), not wanting apparently to suggest that the temple was polluted. But he does not hesitate to refer to the pollution of the earth in order to render it workable, as seen above (also 19, 120-121). This does not accord with Hawaiian literary expressions of love for the land and of feelings of awe before its numinous quality, or with the considerable evidence for Hawaiian practices in regard to the land (e.g., 154, 348, 360 n. 75).

The above Hawaiian view of the land is based on the genealogical, two-source, earth-sky picture of the universe. Valeri sketches an alternative view, “divine nature,” based on his theory of a “producer god” (7, 75, 156).

45. E.g., p. 326. This view influences also his interpretation of texts, as seen above, p. 131. Also, in his interpretation of a farmer’s chant, he misses the fact that one half of the god list is female (see above, p. 111).

46. Also “the Makahiki gods are taken down, wrapped up, and stored in the *luakin*” (212-213).

47. Cf. p. 308. Valeri uses equally poor arguments elsewhere (278): ‘Umi undergoes “a symbolic death (the death sentence that is not enacted).” Also pp. 232, 287.

48. E.g., *Kumulipo*, lines 612-615; Valeri 1985, 310. There are stories of killing gods and ghosts by trickery. A human being can die, *make*, and then his ghost can be killed or eaten by another spirit, in which case he is *make loa*.

49. See p. 359 n. 68 for other possible examples.

50. The practice Valeri refers to was, however, limited in time and place. Valeri here as elsewhere exaggerates the control of the “king.” For instance he states that noble rank depended on relation to the king’s genealogy (157-158 and n. 69, 296-297). To do this he must admit to going beyond the evidence in *Malo*. Such a relation to the king can be found after Kamehameha I (Charlot 1985, 5-6 and n. 30), but arguments would need to be offered to revise the general view that individual chiefly families could demonstrate their rank from their own historical backgrounds, traditions, and genealogical lines. To give just one aspect of this, families could have prestigious *kapu* and *kānāwai* that belonged to the family and were not connected to the “royal” line. By his use of the term “king” for the time before Kamehameha I, Valeri introduces a number of anachronistic elements.

51. The influence of Hinduism on Valeri's thinking has been noted earlier. Hinduism has also influenced the scholars who have influenced Valeri (64). Valeri does note differences between Brahmanism and Hawaiian religion (e.g., 66, 90, 92).

52. See p. 145 par. 2; also 370 n. 37, where he seems to forget that "ghost" is a perfectly legitimate dictionary meaning of *akua*.

53. "Charlot ends up treating Kamehameha as a culture hero who possesses quasi-supernatural powers of transformation and innovation" (145). This position is foreign to my thinking. On changes initiated by Kamehameha I, see Valeri, pp. 184, 222, 230-231, 369 n. 21, 372 n. 62, 385 n. 73.

54. Valeri is in fact inconsistent in his statements on the point. He states flatly, "the ali'i themselves can be considered deities" (44); but then he writes of "the king's 'divinity' (that is, of the fact that he is closer to the divine than any other human, and therefore *akua* relative to others)" (142). Valeri wants to turn *akua* into a relative term, just as he has done with purity-impurity and *kapu-noa*: "the king is a manifestation of his gods and is therefore himself a god relative to all other men" (145).

55. In other sources, the nearest son's name I have found is "Kauakahinui-a-Kakuhihewa," whose mother, however, bears another name than that given in the chant (Fornander 1969, 2:274, 276) The nearest daughter's name given is that of the descendant "Kauakahikuaanaauakane" (Fornander 1969, 2:276; Kamakau 1961, 62, 74). A further descendant "Kauakahi-a-Kahoowaha" is claimed as *mō'i*, "king," of O'ahu and was father of Kūali'i (Fornander 1969, 2:277-278). The nearest name I have found is that of "Ka-ua-kahi-a-kaha-ola" (Sterling 1974, 37), a counselor from Kaua'i at the court of Kalani'ōpu'u and later Kamehameha. The description of a famous counselor and educator as a "god of speech" would be hyperbolic but appropriate. But the other information in the chant does not seem to fit.

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*Response:* VALERIO VALERI  
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

John Charlot purports to have written a "critical review" of my book *Kingship and Sacrifice: Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii*. Critical it is, but a review of my book it is not.

It is not a review of my book because Charlot does not do what a reviewer should do: summarize the whole argument of a book before evaluating it. It is also not a review of my book because, by sheer power of misunderstanding, gross manipulation, and outright misquoting, Charlot has managed to create a travesty that has little recognizable relation to my book. He has thus accomplished the rare feat of seeing neither the forest nor the trees. Since he is mostly concerned with the trees, my rejoinder will have to follow him on his elective ground; however, I will repeatedly have to refer to the forest in order to indicate the true location of certain trees, or sometimes blades of grass that he mistakes for trees.

Before addressing Charlot's arguments I cannot avoid mentioning a rather unpleasant fact. Charlot seems to have been much disturbed by my criticism of one of his pet theories. As I shall show later at the end of this rejoinder, he has given me no reason to retract my criticism, but I find his accusation of having indulged in "name-calling" in the course of my criticism (Charlot 138) quite unacceptable. Far from being rude to him, in the acknowledgments I say, "I warmly thank him for his help" (Valeri xv). Since Charlot seems unable to recognize polite language, I have decided to be much less careful with my words in this rejoinder and to attempt to match, as far as I am able, the unpleasant tone of his prose. I may be allowed to observe that this false accusation is only the most offensive example of his systematic distortion or even falsification of my statements throughout his piece.

Charlot begins by saying that there are many "inaccurate references" in my book and gives a number of examples that, presumably, he finds particularly blatant. Let me examine each of these examples in the order in which they are discussed by Charlot.

1. My statement (V. 149) that "divine ali'i . . . are obliged--men and women--to remain virgin until marriage" is not, says Charlot, supported by the source that I quote at that page. He claims this because the source in question states that "girls were required to be virgin until the first planned union to conceive a child" and does not mention that the same rule was valid for men. However, Charlot must admit (characteristically in a footnote--C. 140 n. 3--which is then not taken into

consideration in his negative evaluation of my argument) that other sources that I quote on the following page (V. 150) “arguably support the virginity of the male” (C. 140 n. 3).<sup>1</sup> In other words, my statement is correct and my only fault consists in not having quoted all the evidence on page 149. Charlot also claims that the general statement that opens my discussion of this and related practices, namely that they are meant to preserve the purity of the ali‘i, is not supported by the source that I quote on page 149 (a text from Pukui, Haertig, and Lee, whose volumes I will henceforth quote as NK 1 or NK 2) nor by any other source. In his opinion, “virginity was maintained . . . for purely practical genealogical reasons, not for the maintenance of ritual purity” (C. 108). There are two points here: one is my alleged use of Pukui, Haertig, and Lee to support the thesis of a connection between virginity and ritual purity; the other is the validity of this thesis as such.

Concerning the first point, had Charlot quoted me in full, it would have been evident that my reference to Pukui, Haertig, and Lee was not meant to support my interpretation of virginity as a sign of ritual purity, but to document two specific facts: the taboo on intercourse between sacred ali‘i and women of lower rank and the chiefly taboo on having sexual relations before the first marriage. Indeed, I write (V. 149): “The purity of sacred ali‘i is preserved not only by the behavior of their inferiors or rivals, but also by their own comportment. For example, divine ali‘i are forbidden to have sexual relations with women of lower rank, and they are obliged--men and women--to remain virgin until marriage (NK, 2:88-89).” NK 2 is mentioned as a source for the custom of premarital virginity, not in support of its connection with ritual purity. If anyone makes this source say what it does not say, it is Charlot, who writes: “the authors go on to say that the emphasis on virginity in some Hawaiian legends is a result of missionary influence” (C. 108). What the authors actually say is as follows: “In Hawai‘i’s stories, missionary influenced writers-translators who first put them in written form may have injected their own bias for chaste heroines” (NK, 2:89). Thus Charlot transforms a “may” (that is, a hypothesis for which, incidentally, no evidence is given) into an “is.”<sup>2</sup> This is an example of what he accuses me of doing: transforming a simple hypothesis into a proven fact!

I now address the second point, that is, the connection between virginity and purity. Charlot claims “this virginity was maintained . . . for purely practical genealogical reasons, not for the maintenance of ritual purity” (C. 108). His basis for this important interpretive claim is Pukui, Haertig, and Lee, a modern text useful as a compilation of

sources, but one whose interpretations should be used with caution.<sup>3</sup> In my book I have repeatedly attacked the very Western-modern view that Hawaiian rank was a “practical” or purely “political” matter and attempted to show that it is very much connected with ritual. I will not repeat these arguments here, but simply focus on the connection between virginity and ritual purity. In a footnote to my general discussion of pollution (V. 361 n. 12), I referred to a passage from the nineteenth-century novel *Laieikawai* by Hale‘ole, which supports the view that loss of virginity involves loss of purity (Beckwith 1919, 510-512). Charlot objects (C. 110) that this view is not traditional on the grounds that the heroine of that novel “receives in many ways a Victorian idealization.” Charlot forgets that Hale‘ole was one of the great experts of Hawaiian tradition (see V. xxv). His statement on virginity is at any rate confirmed by two texts that display no Victorian idealization.

One text is the story of a chiefly woman who has lost her virginity and is therefore banished by her father. She is met by emissaries looking for a new wife for their king. This king has a virgin daughter who lives on top of an extremely taboo terrace (*ka ‘anu‘u kapu loa*, Fornander 1916-1920, 4:545). This virgin daughter invites the heroine to sit by her on the platform, which, disliking the fact of her lost virginity, magically makes her slip. Later, the king’s daughter brings the heroine to a bathing pool “which was also a very sacred place, those having lost their virginity, or who were defiled, were not allowed to bathe in it” (“*‘a‘ole e ‘au‘au ka po‘e i nahā, a me ka po‘e haumia*,” *ibid.*). When the girl attempts to climb the bank of the pond she is again mystically pushed back because she is not a virgin. Had a priest not discovered that she was of higher rank than the king himself, and therefore taboo to him, the girl would have been put to death for having defiled the sacred platform and pool (*ibid.*).

The story demonstrates that loss of virginity implies loss of ritual purity, since it makes pure places mystically react against the deflowered woman. Furthermore, the text explicitly establishes a parallel between “deflowered persons” (*po‘e i nahā*) and “polluted persons” (*po‘e haumia*). It seems to me, therefore, that far from being evidence “against” my thesis, as Charlot incongruously states (n. 3), this text proves that my thesis is correct.

Another text illustrates the connection between virginity and ritual purity for a male. This is the story of Uweuwelekehau, a young man who “was always accompanied by his two gods, Kane and Kanaloa. His bringing up was surrounded by many restrictions; his house was sacred, people not being allowed to pass near it upon pain of certain death”

(Fornander 1916-1920, 5:194). The gods do not allow the man to have sexual intercourse with the woman he falls in love with, because he is “bound” by their mana (“*ua pa’a i ka mana o Kāne a me Kanaloa*,” *ibid.*, 197). This text indicates that there is an incompatibility between the presence of divine mana (a ritual state) in the man and sexual intercourse, and therefore vindicates my position against Charlot’s criticism. On the other hand, he is right in saying that my sources do not prove that chastity belts were used to preserve virginity before marriage: they only prove that chastity belts preserved fidelity within marriage.

2. Charlot questions the validity of three examples that I give to illustrate my point that mythical ali’i “are readily placed at the origin of certain species, especially foods” (V. 146). He acknowledges that my third example “fits” but claims that my first example “could better be understood as a story of the gods; and the second . . . does not state that the persons involved are chiefs” (C. 109). Had Charlot departed from his usual practice (at least in this “review”) of reading texts out of context, he would have discovered that his claim concerning the second example is false. Indeed the text to which I refer is but the continuation of another one, where it is explicitly said that the person (not persons!) involved--that is, **Maikohā**--who metamorphoses into the *wauke* (*Broussonetia papyriphera* plant), is the son of the ali’i Konikonika (Fornander 1916-1920, 5:269). As for my first example, I fail to see how it “could better be understood as a story of the gods,” since in the text to which I refer Hinaaimalama and her siblings--from whom various species originate--descend from grandparents who are alternatively called ali’i (chiefs) and *akua* (gods) (*ibid.*, 267). If anything, this myth proves my most general point--rejected by Charlot--that chiefs and gods are treated as interchangeable in many contexts.

My next sentence in the book is also the target of Charlot’s criticism. He claims that the chants in which chiefs are called various animals “cannot be used to demonstrate that the chiefs in question actually assumed the bodies named” (C. 109). My views are actually more subtle than Charlot represents, as is demonstrated by my statement: “It is as a shark, or by mystically controlling sharks, that the king often punishes transgressors and rebels” (V. 151). The statement that the king “is a shark” is further qualified on the same page--in the sentence quoted by Charlot--where I say that he is a shark, only in the sense that he can act through it and has a substantial relation to it, and so on. Charlot is wrong in interpreting this sentence as a claim that there is “an *identity* of the chief with the shark” (C. 109-110). But whatever the specific nature of the connection postulated between certain chiefs and certain

animals, my basic point is that it is not conceived as a simple "metaphor," but as a true "affinity" (V. 151). This is supported by the evidence, as Charlot must acknowledge. On the other hand, I find it hard to believe that he could seriously put forward the following argument against the view that ali'i can assume nonhuman bodies: "the chiefs honored in the chants are historic figures: Kalani'ōpu'u and Kamehameha. Had they been able to assume nonhuman bodies, it would have been mentioned in the many historical accounts we have of them" (C. 109). I thought that we were discussing beliefs in chiefly powers, not actual chiefly powers. But it seems that Charlot is prepared to believe in anything, even in the kind of objection that he is able to devise!

3. Charlot finds fault with my statement that "sexual intercourse with inferiors is also polluting to superiors" (V. 91; see also 149). He expresses his surprise that I say this, since I have myself shown on page 150 (and p. 372 n. 56) that such intercourse was extremely frequent. On the page to which he refers, I say that the rules concerning the sexuality of the ali'i reflect two contradictory requirements of chiefly rule: the preservation of the rank's purity by avoiding admixture with lower ranks, and the necessity of spreading life and of increasing the number of the chief's followers. I have also indicated, following Malo, that there is a partial solution to this contradiction: until an heir of the proper rank is born, sexual relations are restricted; after that, they become free. Charlot's criticism simply reflects his inability to see a statement as part of an argument: he sees two trees, but does not see that they are part of a wood.

Charlot's attempts to disprove that two texts which I use support the thesis that sexual intercourse with inferiors is polluting for sacred ali'i are also misguided. The first one (Malo 1951, 70-71), he says, concerns "definitely a special case," since it refers to the ban on intercourse with "the *kauwā* or pariah class." I would not call it a "special case," but an "extreme case" since the *kauwā* are the extreme opposite of the ali'i from the point of view of rank. Charlot's claim that marriage with *kauwā* is presented as "bad for genealogical reasons--that is, one becomes déclassé--rather than for ones of pollution" is typical of his superposition of modern Western ideas about "class" on the Hawaiian ideology of rank. As I have made abundantly clear, Hawaiian rank is measured by the degree of closeness to the gods from whom the ali'i descend. Those who are close to the gods are said to be pure, while the impure are separated from them. In Kamakau's words, "all those who were polluted were kept separated because the god desired only those who were clean and pure" (1964:64). This implies that in Hawaii, as

elsewhere in Polynesia, the higher the rank, the greater the purity, and that loss of rank is loss of purity. Indeed I have quoted cases in which sacred ali'i, because they were polluted by their enemies, were reduced to very low status. It is because they are impure that the *kauwā* are low in status and therefore avoided as marriage partners by those who are higher. "Genealogical reason" is derivative, as is also shown by the fact that nonsexual forms of intercourse with the *kauwā* are sufficient to produce a loss in rank: "The houses of the slaves [*kauwā*] were *tapu*. No one not a slave could go there. If any one not a slave was seen there he became like an eating sore, a disgrace to his descendants" (Kepelino 1932: 144). No *mésalliance* is involved here.

To uphold his point that the taboo of intercourse with *kauwā* had nothing to do with pollution, Charlot (n. 4) is forced to do away with Malo's statement that genealogists try to *ho'oma'ema'e* or "cleanse" ali'i lines of connections with *kauwā*. Charlot claims that since *ho'oma'ema'e* is not a "technical term" it need not have the sense of "cleansing" in such a context. What other sense, then? At any rate Charlot is in error in saying that *ho'oma'ema'e* is not used as a technical term: it is used by Malo, for instance, to refer to the purification of a woman after delivery (Malo 1951, 138-139), as I have noted on page 86 of my book. More importantly, Charlot forgets that Kamakau makes the same statement as Malo about cleansing ali'i rank, using the more common, and stronger ("technical," if he will) term *huikala*, "purify," "cleanse": "By mixing here, mixing there, the blood of lords has become mixed with the blood of *kauwa*, and there is nothing that can cleanse it (*'a'ole mea nana i huikala*)" (Kamakau 1964:9).

Charlot also betrays an utter lack of understanding of the notion of "pollution" (n. 4). He says that the sentence "the *kauwa* class were regarded as a defilement and a stench" (Malo 1951: 71) is mistranslated. The original Hawaiian reads "*ua kapa ia ka poe kauwa he palani, he hohono ke ano,*" which literally means "*kauwā* were called *palani* fish, a type that has a bad odor." Now to compare the *kauwā* to something that has bad odor is simply to call them "impure," "polluting." Indeed "impurity" and "pollution" are themselves physical metaphors of social states, as every anthropologist knows (Douglas 1966) and as I have myself noted (V. 85). Emerson's translation is therefore inaccurate but not conceptually misleading, as is confirmed by other texts. Thus Kamakau writes: "They [the *kauwā*] continued to hide their shameful blemish (*'alina hilahila*), but they could not wash out their tainted blood" (Kamakau 1964:9). And Kepelino writes that *kauwā* were called *hawahawa*, a reduplication of *hawa*, which Pukui and Elbert's

dictionary glosses as “defiled, unclean, filthy, daubed with excrement” (PE, 58). If this is not “pollution” what is it? (For these references and others, see V. 85, 164,360 n. 4.)

The second text discussed (Kamakau 1961, 128) says that the ali‘i Kahahana became “degraded” and lost the “tabu of fire (*Ahi*), heat (*Wela*) and extra-ordinary heat (*Hahana*)” because he made love to “lesser chiefesses.” The connection between high status and purity is clearly stated in this text (V. 149); Charlot, however, says that “*kapu* often have particular rules, and one cannot generalize from one example.” To this I will answer that my views on rank and its preservation by avoiding mixed unions do not rest on this single example and are not expressed in the single sentence of my book that Charlot quotes. If my critic wishes to demonstrate that Kahahana’s case is exceptional, he should do so by proving (1) that the state of *kapu* is not for the high chiefs a religious state, that is, a state that involves a connection with the pure gods; and (2) that sexual relations, particularly with inferiors, are not usually conceived as inimical to a *kapu* state.

I think that my entire book is an argument against the first point; as for the second, it is sufficient to remind the reader that all those who participated in temple rites--and were therefore in a state of *kapu*--were required to abstain from sexual relations on pain of death (Malo 1951, 164). Sexual abstinence was also prescribed when planting, which involved contact with the gods (NK, 1:201). This shows that the incompatibility between sexual relations and closeness to the gods (which implies a state of *kapu*) is such a general principle that the example of Kahahana cannot be considered exceptional. Therefore, Charlot’s comparison of the rule against sexual intercourse with inferiors attached to Kahahana’s *kapu* with one *kapu*’s peculiar requirement to shield the “head from the sun’s rays” is totally specious.

4. Next, Charlot declares that “generalizations can be made only with caution from individual authors or works of literature” (C. 110). Example: the “extreme aspects of identification” between chiefs and their lands that I supposedly postulate can only be found in the chant of Ke‘āulumoku “who, however important, represents a very personal, uncommon viewpoint” (C. 110). Whatever reason Charlot has to believe this, he does not share with us. Personally, I think that the viewpoint of an official bard at the court of two kings, and the half-brother of the wife of one of them (Fornander 1878-1880, 2:67, 157, 210) cannot be as idiosyncratic as Charlot claims. At any rate, any reader will see that I simply write “his [the king’s] kingdom is assimilated with his body” (V. 146) and “the body of an ali‘i is ritually interchangeable with

his land” (V. 152). Both statements imply (as is also made clear by my analysis of the *luakini* temple ritual) a relationship of symbolic equivalence or substitution, not “extreme aspects of identification,” which only exist in Charlot’s imagination.

5. Charlot’s final example is an example only of his inability to read a sentence as part of an argument. I am accused of having referred to Kahiolo and Elbert to support my view that chiefs “are characterized by immobility and inactivity”--a view which, in Charlot’s opinion, would only be supported by “a pejorative remark by a foreigner, amply refuted by contemporary literature” (C. 111). (Actually I also refer to a plethora of texts, which mention that very high ranking ali‘i do not walk but must be carried and are therefore in a prescribed state of inactivity [V. 147]; but Charlot conveniently forgets this fact.) His partial style of quotation hides the fact that I am referring to Kahiolo and Elbert only as sources for the mythical motive of the hero’s inaction (Kahiolo 1978; Elbert 1956-1957). But, had Charlot taken the trouble of reading through my argument, he would have discovered that I completely agree with Elbert in the view that this is only a provisional state of inaction, which inevitably turns into a state of action. Indeed, I write: “In mythology as in reality (cf. Beckwith 1940, 412-413) a time comes when passivity turns into an explosion of activity and the king reveals himself to be king precisely because he produces and acts” (V. 149). The two parts of the argument are separated because of a more general expository choice. I am arguing that ali‘i are depicted as having apparently contradictory behaviors. Thus I first discuss one series of behaviors (inactivity, rank endogamy, invisibility, etc.), then the contradictory series (action, sexual intercourse with inferiors, visibility, etc.).

In this case, as previously, Charlot, astonishingly, is not aware of the structure of my argument and is therefore under the impression that I am making erroneous or contradictory statements. Although I should have referred to Elbert in the second part of the argument too, no major fault is involved in quoting a source only for part of the information that it contains, unless this partial use has the purpose of making false accusations against the author, in the manner of Charlot.

The remark by a foreigner that Charlot defines as “pejorative” is: “The highest point of etiquette among illustrious Hawaiians was, *not to move*” (cited in V. 147). As the reader can see, nothing pejorative is meant here. I have used this remark because it is confirmed by many other such observations on Polynesian chiefs. Much of Polynesian (and Hawaiian) aristocratic etiquette is concerned with bodily control as an outward symbol of form and plenitude, which are chiefly and divine

attributes. I have often commented on the symbolic value of immobility, both in the book and in papers (Valeri 1982, 1985), and I do not have to repeat myself here. But Charlot has a mysterious comment: "that Valeri takes immobility literally can be seen from 272, 336." I don't understand what he means by "literal" immobility. But let me make clear once again that for me physical immobility is a sign of a spiritual or ritual state, as both passages of my book to which Charlot refers (V. 272, 336) demonstrate. The first reads: "This natural complex of relationships is perpetuated in a transformed state at the cultural level. The tree, immobile and attractive, appears as the complete, encompassing element. Thus it is transformed into the image of Kūnuiākea, 'Kū of wide expanse,' the supreme form of Ku" (V. 272). The second reference says: "as soon as the victim is captured, he is immobilized and set apart--a sign of his consecration" (V. 336).

These are, then, the best examples that Charlot can find of inaccurate references in a book of more than four hundred pages! And I have indeed shown that if there is a person guilty of inaccurate and selective use of reference, both to my text and to many Hawaiian texts, it is Charlot himself. No doubt any serious user of my book (as of any book) will want to check my references; but he will want even more to check Charlot's references. Readers will also want to reflect on this strange fact: All the above examples of "inaccurate" references come from a few pages of a chapter in which I criticize a thesis put forward by Charlot and attempt to prove the contrary thesis.<sup>4</sup>

The next section of Charlot's critique addresses the question of interpretation. Unfortunately, we are faced once again with the myopic and atomistic style of criticism with which Charlot has acquainted us. I am immediately accused of announcing my interpretation of a text instead of offering arguments in support of it. The first example given is once again an example only of Charlot's inability to keep focus on the reality of what I have written. He claims that my interpretation of a whole chant is based on one line only. But anyone can see that I do not claim to interpret the chant (V. 55). I am simply commenting on *one* of the metaphors used in its *third* part. Likewise, my reference to the gods coming from Kahiki is limited to that specific context. Interpreting this reference as a claim "that the gods must come from Kahiki every time they are invoked" (C. 111) is a truly herculean feat of distortion. As Charlot himself is forced to acknowledge, I have often mentioned other abodes of the gods.

Next, Charlot questions my interpretation of the story of the origin of the *Kānehekili* cult. He writes: “Two problems for Valeri’s interpretation are that the story is about the priest, not the god, and that he dies, rather than being sacrificed” (C. 111). Charlot is apparently questioning as unproven the equivalence of the god and his priest. Their equivalence, however, is suggested by the fact that they have the same name (*Kānehekili*) and even more by a statement at the end of the myth: “Those who had the head [of the priest], they worshipped it; and also his eyes, or his mouth; they were called the eye of the god, or mouth of the god, and so on” (Thrum 1909, 48-49, cited in V. 132). Through the priest’s body, then, the god becomes accessible for worship. This fact also demonstrates that the priest’s body has the *same value* as a sacrificial victim’s body; this is all I implied by saying that the priest (i.e., by definition, a sacrificer) is equated with a victim. I did not imply that the *manner of his death* was identical to that of an ordinary victim. Indeed, I have repeatedly shown in my book that the manner of death is far less important in Hawaiian sacrifice than the act of consecration, that is, of giving an object, animal, or person the status of mediator between god and worshipper. This is precisely what happens with the priest *Kānehekili*, since the pieces of his body mediate between the god *Kānehekili* and his worshippers. I may add now, however, that the mysterious and sudden death of the priest in the god’s temple suggests that the god has killed him in order to make the spreading of his cult possible by distributing pieces of the priest’s body. The alternative proposed by Charlot (“the body of the priest could be efficacious without being considered a sacrifice” C. 111) is unacceptable because he does not tell us what would make it efficacious. I spare the reader my comments on Charlot’s other “hypothesis,” contained in his words “and so on.” I will simply say that this example shows that Charlot has understood nothing of my interpretation of Hawaiian sacrifice.

Let us now turn to the accusation that I can dismiss texts that do not fit my views. Two examples are given. The first concerns a cryptic reference by Kamakau to “mana” as “property” of baits (V. 100). This reference does not in the least contradict my basic definition of the term mana, which is “potency, to be potent,” “efficacy, to be efficacious,” “success, to be successful”--properties that baits should have (V. 98). Kamakau’s text, however, is an instance of the occasional extension of the term mana outside the properly religious and ritual context. It is for this reason that I say that in this case mana is “banalized” (that is “made commonplace”), not because I want to dismiss Kamakau’s text as irrele-

vant. On the contrary, I mention it because it is relevant to my thesis that in Hawaii the notion of mana has a greater range of applications than in some other Polynesian cultures (cf. V. 100-101).

The second example given by Charlot is puzzling. I have used certain lines of a chant for a limited purpose, more corroborative than demonstrative of an interpretation of mine. Charlot asserts but does not demonstrate that the rest of the chant contradicts my interpretation. Since he gives no reason to believe otherwise, I continue to consider the chant as “somewhat anomalous” because it contains lines that are not found in any other account of the rite in which it was chanted. At any rate I don’t see anything in these lines that contradicts my interpretation of the rite.

Charlot then addresses a methodological question that seems at first interesting: too few senses of a word versus too many senses. Unfortunately we are disappointed again. My interpretation of lines 613-614 of the *Kumulipo* chant is questioned on the grounds that I select only one meaning for *kāne* (“human male”) and only one meaning for *ki’i* (“image of a god”). According to Charlot, other meanings of the terms *kāne* and *ki’i* should be considered: hence it would be impossible to claim, as I do, that the god (Kāne) is called after the man, and the man (Ki’i) is called after the god (V. 6). But I will stick to my interpretation because the context rules out any of the other meanings for *kāne* suggested by Charlot. “The word can be used for the human male, but for any other male as well: animal, vegetable, mineral, or god” (C. 112). The god *Kāne* is represented as neither mineral nor animal in the context of the *Kumulipo*, but as human, in fact all too human, since he is jealous of his wife and angry at Ki’i for his secret union with her (a union which, incidentally, means taking the god’s place) :

She slept with Ki’i  
 Kane suspected the first-born, became jealous  
 suspected Ki’i and La’ila’i of a secret union [?]  
 They pelted Kane with stones  
 hurled a spear; he shouted aloud  
 “This is fallen to my lot, for the younger [line]”[?]  
 Kane was angry and jealous because he slept last with her  
 his descendants would hence belong to the younger line  
 the children of the elder would be lord (Beckwith 1951:106,  
 lines 696-704).

So much for animal, vegetable, and mineral! As for *ki’i*, Charlot tells us: “A glance at the dictionary will show that Valeri is selecting only one

sense of *ki'i*" (C. 112). Let us glance at the dictionary to establish whether my choice is justified. *Ki'i* receives five groups of glosses in the dictionary of Pukui and Elbert:

1. Image, statue, picture, doll, petroglyph; features, as of a face; plans, as for a house; carved, as end of an '*auamo* pole . . .
2. To fetch, procure, send for, go after, attack; to seek for sexual ends.
3. Hula step . . .
4. Same as *alani*, a tree.
5. Gesture, as in hula. (PE, 136-137) . . .

Glosses in groups 1, 3, and 5 are probably related, but they are obviously unrelated to groups 2 and 4, which are unrelated to each other. The signifier *ki'i*, therefore, does not constitute one single polysemous word, but at least three different homophonous words. To suggest that all these meanings should be involved in the translation of the proper name *Ki'i* is to incur in the error denounced by Charlot himself of "using too many senses of a word" (C. 112). In fact, it would be a worse error: it would imply treating several homophonous words as one polysemous word! It seems to me that only a meaning in group 1 can be a candidate for translating *Ki'i* as used in this context of the *Kumulipo*. And among those meanings only the main one, "image" (that is, "image of a god," V. 6), makes contextual sense. As I have mentioned (V. 7), this translation receives further support from another episode related in the *Kumulipo*, where *Wākea*, the apical ancestor of all Hawaiians, conceals himself in the image of a god (*ki'i*) to seduce a divine woman. Here *Wākea* is like *Ki'i* relative to *La'ila'i*: hence it makes sense to say that the name *Ki'i* refers to a divine image in lines 696-698 (Beckwith 1951, 123, cf. 102-103 and the analogous myths in Valeri 1981). My translations of the names *Ki'i* and *Kāne* in those lines are thus the most likely; Charlot cannot suggest any credible alternative, only a fan of dictionary meanings among which he does not choose.

The next case is one of "too many senses." Charlot finds fault with my suggestion that the word *lau* is used in a magical formula for weakening the god *Kamapua'a* because of a deliberate word play on two signifi-cata: "numerous" and "seine." He comments: "A pig in a seine is an unusual image" (C. 112). Charlot is too literal-minded, which is not conducive to understanding the metaphors of a magical spell. The same literal-mindedness makes it impossible for him to understand my suggestion that the belt around the waist of the main temple image--called

*piko*, “navel”--probably also evokes the two other references for *piko*: genitals and crown of the head (fontanel). Charlot objects: “A child can be circumcised, but how could the crown or fontanel be cut?” (ibid.). I never suggested that the symbolic “cutting of the *piko*” of the image was also a cutting of the fontanel. As a material act, the rite is only a cutting of the umbilical cord of the god, who is represented as a newborn child. But as a symbolic act, it probably constitutes the three *piko* that define every human: a connection with his consanguines (through the navel), a connection with his ancestors (through the fontanel), and a connection with his affines and descendants (through the genitals). Indeed the latter two connections are made possible by the first, that is by birth. The fact that the rite is symbolically overdetermined and that his various meanings are not reducible to the materiality of an act escapes Charlot who, as we shall see again and again, doesn’t seem to understand the properties of symbolic thought.

Next Charlot questions the connection that I tentatively suggest in a note between the two meanings of *lele*: “altar” and “messenger.” But the two significata do have a common ground: their mediating role. Charlot gives no argument whatsoever against this connection.

I am also accused of combining Kahiki as a place name with Kahiki as various cosmic points. But all these meanings constitute one single grouping in Pukui and Elbert’s dictionary. I am simply attempting to make sense of a connection that clearly existed in the Hawaiian mind, as testified, for instance, by the text of Kamakau to which I refer in my book (V. 9). One passage of this text reads: “Here are some terms for the *kukulu o ka lani*, ‘the borders of the sky,’ or *kukulu o Kahiki*, ‘borders of Kahiki.’ These are what *ka po’e kahiko* called all lands beyond the Hawaiian archipelago--the lands beyond the circles of Kahiki-moe [the horizon] and Kahiki-ku [defined as “the (first) band of the firmament where it ascends upward” on p. 5]. These lands were called the lands of *kukulu o Kahiki* [*kukulu* is another word for “horizon,” p. 5] or of *kukulu o ka lani* or of *na paia ku a lani*, the standing walls of heaven or of *kumu lani*” (Kamakau 1976, 6). Moreover, since Kamakau connects Kahiki with all lands beyond the horizon and the lowest zone of the celestial dome, we must conclude that these lands are indeed considered invisible from Hawaii. Indeed, contrary to Charlot’s statement that I introduce in my discussion “the word ‘invisible,’ which does not appear in these texts” (C. 112), the word “invisible” appears in Kamakau’s text, which speaks of the “invisible horizon” whose “only boundary is where it adjoins the solid walls of the sky” (Kamakau 1976, 5), where he situates the “lands of Kahiki-ku” (ibid., 6). Charlot completely misun-

derstands my definition of Kahiki as “invisible transcendent place.” My references to the above texts should have made clear to him that I do not conceive of the lands of Kahiki as invisible in an absolute sense; they are invisible from Hawaii. Indeed I am well aware (since I have mentioned the fact several times) that mythical travelers sailed to Kahiki and set foot on land! This is another case where Charlot confuses his misconceptions with what I actually say. He also demonstrates that he is not a careful reader of the Hawaiian texts to which I refer, since he claims something completely untrue about at least one of them.

Charlot also accuses me of dividing “words into parts to get more meanings” (C. 113). He can produce only one example for this: I am supposed to assert that “*kauila* wood” is to be interpreted as *ka uila*, “the lightning” (ibid.). I say nothing of the sort. I am referring to *kauila* as the name of a rite, and saying that this name may be “a metonymy for the feather gods, which are supported by a handle or pole made from *kauila* wood” and could also be associated “with lightning (*ka uila*), that is, a manifestation of the divine power in its luminous but violent (as befits the *akua hulu manu* [feather gods]) form” (V. 269).

Charlot often claims that I formulate the correct methodology, but then do not follow it in practice. The problem is that he understands neither my methodological points nor what I do in practice. Two examples of this double misunderstanding can be found on page 113 of his text. Charlot notes that I caution against “the temptation to arbitrarily construct a single account of the rites patched together from different sources” but on page 8 combine two texts to “connect Pō and Kahiki” and, on page 331, different versions of a story. Charlot is confusing two different things. My methodological statement concerns patching together different descriptions of whole rituals to construct a single *descriptive* statement; it does not concern, as should be obvious, the establishment of structural relations and equivalences at the level of interpretation. At any rate, nowhere on page 8 do I say that Pō and Kahiki are connected. I say that they are two metaphors of “divine origins” that differ in that Kahiki, contrary to Pō, is one of “more concrete metaphors . . . with primarily spatial connotations” (V. 8). On the next page I state: “Pō and to a certain extent Kahiki are metaphors for the undifferentiated state of the divine power, which is placed at the origin of the living universe” (V. 9). If there is a connection between Kahiki and Pō it is the connection between two different metaphors. With regard to page 331 of my book, I do not put together different versions of a story to produce an artificially constructed version. I am simply trying to uncover a system of relations common to all versions.

Clearly, Charlot has no idea of the structural method, as is demonstrated by remarks found throughout his paper. For instance, he seems to believe that structuralism is a method based on finding "the raw and the cooked" everywhere. He even enlists me against Lévi-Strauss, by misquoting one of my sentences: "Valeri states that 'the disjunction between the raw offering and the cooked offering' cannot be found in Hawaii (123)." What I actually say is: "It does not seem that the disjunction between the raw offering and the cooked offering exists in the everyday appropriation of taro (cf. Kamakau 1976, 36-37); however, it exists during the celebration of the New Year and on other occasions when cultivators place their offerings of raw taro on the altar of their district" (V. 123). I hope that in his essays Charlot does not quote his Hawaiian sources in the way that he quotes my book! Note also that on pages 57-58 I show that offerings are differentiated into raw, roasted, broiled, and cremated.

On pages 113-114 Charlot illustrates two of his claims: "Valeri's arguments from texts are often tenuous"; "Valeri's arguments are often very short." My arguments are tenuous and short only in Charlot's distorted rendering. The first of the two examples of "tenuousness" concerns my hypothesis that a correspondence exists between the state of the audience in a certain rite, a state described as *'olu'olu* by K. Kamakau (in V. 289), and the state--also described as *'olu'olu--induced* in the god according to Malo (ibid.). Charlot objects that I translate *'olu'olu* only as "affable," while the word has many glosses. I have already explained that only the context allows us to decide how to translate a word. K. Kamakau is describing the mood of the participants: this can hardly be described by such glosses as "refreshing," "soft," or "comfortable," to which Charlot contrasts my gloss "affable." The latter seems to me a good general term summarizing all glosses that are relevant in this context: "cool," "pleasant," "polite," "courteous." Moreover, it is not true that I translate *'olu'olu* by "affable" only: I also give it the meaning "cool" and "to soften" (V. 289). Thus I use all the relevant meanings of this word, while Charlot adds other meanings that are either redundant or irrelevant.

Not happy with just distorting what I say, Charlot adds a strange argument: " *'Olu'olu* is a common word, so it would be difficult to make the correspondence argument even if it were appearing in the same text" (C. 113). *'Olu'olu* may be a common word, but it is not common in the narratives of the *luakini* temple ritual. Hence the use of the same word to describe the state of both god and worshippers may be significant indeed, even if each state is described by a different source.

Furthermore, to object that the two states refer to “different points of the account of the ceremony” is to miss the point, which is, precisely, that one state results from the other, and is therefore preceded by it (V. 307). Because I use the word “results,” Charlot claims that I view the relationship between the two states as causal. Charlot could have spared himself this false claim if he had considered my statement (V. 307-308) in the light of what I have said about the relationship between god and worshippers throughout my book: that it is dialectical and reciprocal, not causal. But I have also said that this reciprocal relation is often weighted toward the worshippers, as is made clear in several contexts discussed in my book (V. 101-104, for instance), including the one misrepresented by Charlot (V. 307-308). It is because of this weighting that I say there that the state of the god “results” from that of the worshipper.

Another example given by Charlot is even worse. He claims that I give no reference for my various statements concerning the effect that (lancing has on the development of the fetus of an ali‘i. In reality I give several references to texts describing facts that lend themselves to my interpretation, particularly K. Kamakau (1919-1920, 2-4; because of an unfortunate typo, the printed text has “24” instead of “2-4”). K. Kamakau says that the ali‘i commands the people to dance in honor of his soon-to-be-born child and to compose and sing songs in his praise. These actions are said to have the power to ward off the negative effects of sorcerers and angry gods on the fetus (*ibid.*, 2). Does not this justify my interpretation that “dance is necessary to help develop the fetus of an ali‘i and to ease his birth” and therefore “help engender” it? What other interpretation does Charlot propose? As for my statement that “dance contributes to affirming the reality of the ali‘i’s mana” I would claim that, given the common association between mana and growth (cf. V. 96-97, 330-331), it is indirectly supported by K. Kamakau’s text. It is, at any rate, supported by the facts mentioned on page 384, note 56.

Charlot connects the above statements of mine and a hypothetical one derived from them (V. 219) with two other sentences in order to prove that I transform hypotheses into “confirmed facts” (C. 114). This “proof” is achieved by distorting what I say. The first sentence (“the engendering of Lonomakua, like that of any god” V. 219) has no connection with the hypothetical statement (also on V. 219) quoted by Charlot on the relationship between dancing and the engendering of the god Lonomakua. That no connection exists is made clear by the rest of the sentence, which Charlot omits: “. . . is represented as the growth of a human.” This continuation indicates that the sentence refers, not to

the engendering of the god through the dance, but to the fact that the process of construction and consecration of the god's image is represented in ritual as the growth of a human (cutting the navel cord, girdling with loincloth).

Charlot has no more justification in using the next sentence that he quotes, since there the expression "is born of the feasting" is a purely metaphoric expression and one that implies a relationship between the production of the god and the feast as a whole, not with the dancing alone, contrary to what Charlot attempts to suggest. I also fail to see how Charlot can say that hypothesis on page 99 becomes a confirmed fact on page 101 when he leaves both unspecified. Such an allusive style of reference and criticism, which is abundantly used by Charlot, especially in his footnotes, hardly corresponds to the conventional rules of scholarly debate.

Charlot misreads my statement on page 273. It is not the statue made from the Haku 'ōhi'a tree, but the tree itself that "is inseparable from the birds." Indeed in the section to which this sentence belongs, the name Haku 'ōhi'a ("Lord 'ōhi'a tree") refers to the tree or to the god in tree form, as is made clear by this passage: "In his 'wild' state the god is called by the name of the tree, Haku 'ōhi'a" (V. 271). The immediate context of the sentence quoted by Charlot, in which I write that "the Haku 'ōhi'a is fetched" (V. 273) from the forest, should leave no doubt of the fact that there Haku 'ōhi'a refers to the god in tree form.

As for the criticism of my allegedly "short" arguments, it can be disposed of in a very short time. I say that the relatives of the king are his "doubles" because they replicate his rank (V. 161, par. 3). Indeed the whole discussion in this chapter concerns the role of sacrifice in "reestablishing differentiation in a hierarchical system that, paradoxically, produces a certain coefficient of undifferentiation because of the overlap of different principles" (V. 168). The statement on the identification of the transgressor with the king whose taboos he transgresses (V. 165) is not a "short argument," but simply the repetition of a thesis that has been previously argued in full (V. 92, 94). The statement on Atea (V. 169), a Marquesan god, is a purely incidental remark, which is nevertheless supported by my references (Tregear 1891; Williamson 1933). Charlot does not give any reason to believe that they are wrong. As for the statement on Kahōālī'i (325), Charlot forgets that it begins with the expression, "It will be recalled that," which refers to a demonstration given on pages 260-262. I don't know who, apart from Charlot, would be in need of longer demonstrations for the next two statements of mine that he quotes.

Charlot also claims that Hawaiian pigs were smaller than modern Western ones (C. 114). This fact would make a speculation of mine concerning the age of a pig being sacrificed unlikely or at least unnecessary. European explorers, however, were impressed by the size of many Hawaiian pigs (Beaglehole 1967, 511 n. 1, 522, 1157, 1188). Samwell, for instance, notes that on the island of Hawai'i "there are great plenty of large hogs" (ibid., 1188).

I leave to the reader to judge the value of Charlot's claim (C. 114) that I "eschew argument" because I use various stylistical conventions to link sentences or to announce hypotheses or speculations. It is Charlot himself--it seems to me--who eschews argument by quoting these expressions out of context and by failing to demonstrate that they are substitutes for argument. Such methods of criticism create much of the impression of the "review." Nor is this impression dispelled by the method (partial quotation and no argument) by which Charlot attempts to prove his view that I tend to use hypothetical points as if they were confirmed. I don't see how my statement--"This classification of the fish species is in large part hypothetical. It does in any case confirm the theory advanced , . ." (V. 26)--can be given by Charlot as an example of my supposed tendency. Anybody reading the rest of the sentence quoted by Charlot can see that "the theory advanced" concerns not the fish species, but "the principal 'aumakua species" (V. 26). The latter is well supported by the evidence offered by the principal 'aumakua species, and only receives further confirmation by the fact that it can be applied, hypothetically but not unreasonably, to the fish *aumakua*.<sup>5</sup> Sadly, Charlot has misunderstood my argument.

The supposed slippage from the hypothetical to the confirmed in the case of **Kūkā'īlimoku** (V. 222) exists only in Charlot's imagination. Must I repeat constantly "or some other equivalent god" after **Kūkā'īlimoku**? I have made abundantly clear that the latter name is only that of the main feather god in the island of Hawai'i, but that the differently named feather gods of other islands and dynasties are *functionally* equivalent to **Kūkā'īlimoku** (V. 247). In my use, therefore, this name is just a shorthand for the entire type of these gods. As a result of such methods, Charlot's criticism often seems nothing more than strings of partial quotations, each treated as a valid argument.

The results are no better when Charlot tries his hand at logic. He says that my entire book is based on a circular argument: my theory will be confirmed by the analysis of the ritual, but that analysis depends on my theory (C. 115). Charlot is probably under the impression that the hermeneutical circle is the same thing as a "circular argument," but even

so, it is somewhat surprising that he can believe that I have first formulated my theory, and then simply proceeded to apply it to the ritual without making any change in the theory as a result of the analysis. The fact is that he is confusing an expository device (I first summarize the argument in schematic form, then proceed to illustrate and enrich it by the analysis of a concrete ritual action) with the actual steps of my research! Moreover it is surprising that he does not see that indeed my preliminary statements about gods, sacrifices, ali'i, and so on, are much enriched and made more complex the further I advance in the analysis, particularly in the analysis of the *luakini* temple ritual.

As for the supposed "example" given by Charlot of this circularity, namely the relationship between the model of the hierarchy of the gods and the model of the hierarchy of the temples (C. 115), I will simply observe that

1. Charlot does not take into consideration my statement that the first model is confirmed by the analysis of ritual, not only by that of the temple hierarchy;

2. The evidence that I have offered on the temple hierarchy does not "cast the very idea of such a hierarchy in doubt"; it simply shows that several details of my model of this hierarchy are open to discussion. No discussion, however, is offered by Charlot: only a dogmatic statement. Others better qualified to judge the case than he have found my ideas interesting and worth incorporating (Kirch 1985, 258, 260, 262);

3. It seems that Charlot is an extreme positivist: no conjectural model and no argument from coherence (cf. Dumézil 1948, 18) are admitted in his epistemological universe. Charlot himself hardly follows such strictures in his theses; no wonder, because otherwise he would not be able to formulate them.

My "attitude toward [my] evidence" (C. 116), writes Charlot, is shown by my discussion of mana. I claim that we should not make too much of the rare occurrence of this word in the descriptions of the temple ritual by K. Kamakau and Malo. My claim is based on the following chain of arguments: All occurrences in K. Kamakau's text are found in prayers, which suggests that mana was mostly used in prayers; but only very few of the many prayers that were uttered in the temple ritual are given by K. Kamakau and Malo; hence the rare occurrence of the word mana may only be due to the rare occurrence of prayers in these sources. Charlot objects that there are too few examples of prayers to be able to hypothesize, as I do, that the word mana "must have been included rather often" in prayers (V. 98). To this I will answer that even if the recorded prayers are few, they do establish a significant contrast

between “presence of mana” in prayers and absence of mana in prose descriptions. It is this contrast, and not the absolute number of available prayers, that is the basis of my hypothesis which, incidentally, plays a marginal role in my discussion of mana. The main role is played by another argument: ritual action itself is the best evidence on mana, since a key source (not simply “another source” as Charlot defines it), the *Mooolelo Hawaii*, says that the whole ritual is about the transmission of mana (V. 98). Charlot cannot deny this point. Nevertheless he continues to believe, without argument, that since “verbal expressions” are the fundamental evidence, my “views are not supported by the texts.” Must one assume, then, that for him the texts describing the *luakini* temple ritual and related rituals are not texts?

Next Charlot argues: “Valeri’s main thesis can fairly be said to depend on his interpretation of one section of the main temple ceremony” (C. 117). He refers to the section that, in Malo’s description, identifies the cutting of the navel cord and the girdling of the loincloth around the main temple image, with the image’s transformation into an *akua maoli*, “true god”—that is to say, a true embodiment of the god (V. 314-315). Charlot immediately distorts my argument by leaving out the reference to the girdling with a loincloth from his quotation of my thesis (C. 117). The sentence excised by Charlot is: “This birth rite and the rite for putting the loincloth on the god that follows it are identical to those performed for any male child to transform him fully into a social being.” Only after having said this do I say that “the transformation of the god into the perfect type of the human male is thus completed.” It is clear, therefore, that both rites, the cutting of the navel cord and girdling the statue with a loincloth, are involved in the transformation. Charlot, however, gives the impression that my thesis is based only on the navel-cutting rite.

Against my view that the navel-cutting rite for the god symbolizes his “birth,”<sup>6</sup> Charlot uses a strange argument. He says that both Malo’s and Kelou Kamakau’s descriptions of the similar rite performed for male infants of the ali’i rank show “that that ceremony could be separated from the birth” (C. 117) because it was performed in the temple, not in the house where the child was born. It seems that for Charlot this is in itself proof that the rite could have nothing to do with birth. This argument can only be sustained by reducing birth to a mere biological fact, that is, the expulsion of the fetus. But this modern Western definition of birth was certainly not shared by Hawaiians. Indeed, I see nothing in Malo and Kelou Kamakau suggesting that the navel-cutting rite is not considered part of the process of bringing the child to life: they only

imply that, in the case of male infants, this process cannot be left to women alone, but must be concluded by a ritual act performed by men in the presence of the gods. The small spatial and temporal hiatus between the parturition and the navel cutting cannot therefore be seriously used as an argument against my interpretation.

Nor does the use of the navel-cutting rite as an image "to express the beginning of something" (C. 118) prove anything against my interpretation<sup>7</sup> either, since the rite can function as an image of beginning precisely because it evokes birth, which is the most compelling image of beginning. However metaphoric, then, the cutting of the navel cord of the god evokes the idea of birth; contrary to what Charlot claims, I do not go beyond the evidence in claiming this. Moreover, one should consider the navel-cutting rite in its syntagmatic context. This context shows that the images of gestation and birth permeate the ritual. The statue of the god is often treated as a fetus or as a baby in the rites preceding the cutting of its "navel cord." Furthermore, the rite is followed by the girdling of the loincloth on the statue. This sequence does suggest a passage from birth to social adulthood: therefore the cutting of the navel cord cannot be considered as a mere beginning; it is a much more concrete image. Once again, we see that Charlot commits the capital methodological sin of interpreting a fact out of context.

Charlot also states that "the primary object of the ceremony under discussion is the statue, and some discussion is necessary on which ceremonial points apply to it and which to the god, however one conceives of the relation between the two" (C. 118). On the basis of Malo's (1951, 171) statement that when the sequence of rites concerning the image is concluded, the image becomes an *akua maoli*, "a real god," I would say that Charlot's query is meaningless, since obviously the statement implies that by acting on the image one acts on the god, that to the visible process of the ritual corresponds the invisible process of the god. The idea of such correspondence is well known from other parts of Polynesia as well (cf. Firth 1970).

Charlot's argument that I go "beyond the evidence in describing the section of the ceremony as the birth of the god" can fairly be said to have been disposed of. But what about his other claim: "His [Valeri's] characterization of that god as a man is derived wholly from his theory and has no basis whatsoever in the text" (C. 118)? Reading this sentence, I wonder what qualifies as textual evidence with Charlot. From all his arguments it appears that only explicit statements qualify as such. If one can find in a text a sentence that supports an interpretation by explicitly saying that a thing is indeed as the interpretation claims it

to be, the text can be said to support the interpretation; if not, it does not. Obviously, Charlot confuses one level of the text, and one mode in which it provides evidence, with the notions of text and textual evidence in general.

If he means that my “characterization of that god as a man” is not supported by the text because the text does not contain the sentence “that god is a man,” I agree with him. Indeed, it would be surprising if such statement existed. As a matter of fact, its existence would contradict my theory, which is based on the assumption that the human character of the god is recognized only in mystified form by Hawaiian consciousness (otherwise it would not be religious, V. 345-346). I therefore expect to find only clues to that identification in the textual material. But these clues are quite clear. If a god is represented in ritual--however metaphorically--as being generated, born, and given a loincloth, am I wrong to say that he is represented as human? If, moreover, the statue representing the god is the icon of a perfectly developed man, both physically and socially (in that he recalls the highest ranking ali‘i), can I not say with some justification that he is “the perfect type of the human male”? Charlot is blinded by his literalism. He disregards the fact that a text is a complex entity that communicates in different forms and at different levels, not only at the propositional one. I would maintain, therefore, that he misses a whole dimension of the meaning of the Hawaiian texts to which we both refer.

Finally, Charlot addresses “one further difficulty for Valeri’s theory”: only Malo describes the “birth” rite. Charlot comments: “That is, what should be the most important ceremony of the whole sequence is replaced by a different one in two of the three sources” (C. 118). This objection disregards the fact that I do not give the same importance to all sources, but consider Malo as the most valuable. More importantly, it reflects Charlot’s initial distortion of my position. As I have indicated above, the final transformation of the god, and therefore the most important ceremony of the whole sequence, is produced in Malo’s account not simply by the “birth” rite, but by the sequence “birth” rite and girdling of the image with a loincloth. Indeed, it is the latter rite that is the fundamental one, since it marks the god’s accession to full “manhood,” the accomplishment of his development. Now this rite is also mentioned by the second most important source, K. Kamakau.<sup>8</sup>

Another unacceptable claim made by Charlot is that my thesis (V. 315-317) on the paradigmatical relation between the *maki‘i lohelohe* rite in K. Kamakau’s account and the “birth” rite in Malo’s account is invalidated by the lack of “any hint of birth” in the first rite. But the

“paradigmatic relation” between the rites only implies that they are substitutable in the same context--not that they have the element of birth in common. The fact that this element is not mentioned in K. Kamakau’s text does not invalidate my thesis, which is based on the entire sequence describing the development of the god, a sequence common, with minor variations, to all the sources.

But my analysis also makes clear that the birth rite in Malo and the *maki’i lohelohe* rite in K. Kamakau have one important element in common: the presence of “cords” that can all be considered as “navel cords” of sorts (and therefore metaphoric extensions of the birth image). In the birth rite, the image has a “navel cord”; in the *maki’i lohelohe* rite, the tower which, like the statue, is a device for rendering the god present, has four cords that are placed each at one of its corners. That these cords are like navel cords is a hypothesis, but one that makes sense (V. 316). The connection between the two rites illustrates my point that the texts describing the *luakini* ritual describe different practices, but at the same time share certain sense relationships (V. 317). Charlot’s criticism reflects the arbitrary belief that material differences necessarily imply differences of meaning. Finally, let me say that it is simply by willfully ignoring the scrupulously maintained difference between the sections where I summarize the evidence and those where I give my interpretations, that Charlot can attempt to apply to my statements the criticism that I level against the statements of those who do not make this distinction: “It is not clear whether they are produced by the informants or by the authors” (V. 51).

After all the belaboring of details, for the most part without much importance, it is a relief to turn to what seems to be a more serious discussion: that of my “theoretical orientation” (C. 119). Unfortunately, we are quickly disappointed. Charlot begins by piecing together a few statements from my book that refer to some sources of my theoretical inspiration: Hegel, Feuerbach, and Durkheim. He immediately displays his talent for misunderstanding and distortion. For instance, he says that I take from Feuerbach the idea that Hawaiian religion is anthropomorphic. That Feuerbach wrote about Hawaiian religion is news to me. Nor have I made the mistake of associating the age-old theory that religion is anthropomorphic with Feuerbach alone. Charlot is confusing this theory with Feuerbach’s thesis that man’s consciousness of himself as species-being is reflected in his gods. He is misquoting from my page xi, where I say that “my argument has a certain Feuerbachian ring.” Certainly, it is not the extremely common thesis of the anthropo-

morphic character of religious representations that has a Feuerbachian ring! I am also accused of having taken from Feuerbach the idea “that the state is a projection, so to speak, of human nature or essence” (C. 119). However, I do not speak of “state” anywhere in my text.

Quite novel, and indeed unprecedented in the annals of scholarship, is the method Charlot uses to “demonstrate” that a “central idea” for my interpretation of Hawaiian ritual and sculpture is inspired by a Brahmanical saying. The method consists in leaving unmentioned the fact that I quote the saying in a passing remark (V. 358 n. 65) on the sacrificial gift in general, not on Hawaiian sacrifice specifically. Although he must acknowledge at one point that I myself often stress the differences between Brahmanical ideas and Hawaiian ones, Charlot claims that I have derived my interpretations from Indian conceptions. His “proofs” for such statements remind me of the “proofs” adduced by an anonymous writer of about the year 200 to “demonstrate” that Homer borrowed from Moses: “Among his many ‘proofs’ were the ‘borrowing’ of the opening of Genesis for one bit of the description of the shield of Achilles in the *Iliad*, the portrayal of the Garden of Eden in the guise of the garden of King Alcinous in Book VII of the *Odyssey*; and Homer’s referring to the corpse of Hector as ‘senseless clay,’ copied from ‘Dust thou art and to dust thou shalt return’ ” (Finley 1977, 167).

Other statements by Charlot remind me more of the art of collage than of the rules of serious scholarly argument. An example of this art (perhaps in its surrealist form) is his list of “terms from Western philosophy and religion” that he says I frequently use in my book “without explicit justification.” The justification, when it is needed, is given by the analysis itself. For instance, “particular” and “universal” are used (V. 270) to describe the passage of the temple image from a “particular” (that is, an individual phenomenon) to a “universal” (a term applying to all individual phenomena included in it). What concrete objection does Charlot have to the use of such terms? Does he wish to claim that Hawaiians do not think in terms of particulars and universals, like all other humans? Don’t they make a distinction between, say, “a man” and “man”? Note also that a majority of the terms mentioned by Charlot are used by me in quotation marks, to signify either that they are taken in a special sense or that they are used by default, because no better term is available. Such is the case, for instance, of “supernatural,” which I use only in a couple of cases, contrary to what Charlot implies (see below, p. 188).

Charlot is not averse to stating plain falsehoods either, as when he claims that I use “substantialist” to “translate Hawaiian.” What I write

is "I would give the word *la'a* a [the indefinite article was omitted because of a typo] more 'substantialist' meaning" (V. 363 n. 3). I am afraid that such a style of criticism reflects more on the critic than on the person criticized.

Other terms to which Charlot objects without argument are "sacred," "profane," and "substance," which are extremely common in anthropological discourse, where they do not have the philosophical or religious connotations that Charlot attaches to them. Analogously, in my (rare) use, the term "creation" is only a generic term referring to the multiple modes of the gods' productive activity (see below, p. 196). Note also that some of the terms whose use Charlot criticizes are in fact glosses taken from translations of Hawaiian texts or from dictionaries. For instance, he gives the impression that I use the word "miracles" frequently and as a matter of course. In fact, I used it only as a gloss given by Pukui and Elbert (PE, 53) of the expression *hana mana* (V. 324 n. 26).

More importantly, Charlot ignores the fact that anthropological interpretation is first and foremost translation; we cannot escape translating the ideological terms of another language into our own ideological terms. Charlot does not escape this predicament either. In fact, as I have already indicated, he is prone to borrowing the tritest terms from the arsenal of Western common sense. We have already encountered "practical," "class," "déclassé"; we shall soon encounter "religion and natural science," and many others.

Ironically, Charlot does not hesitate to accuse me of reading "classic Western views" into Hawaiian thinking. The list of such "readings" is simply ludicrous. I am supposed to think that in Hawaiian thought humans are "separate from nature," although I say just the contrary. Evidently Charlot has not read my interpretation of firstfruits sacrifices (V. 76-78), where I claim that since no difference is felt to exist by itself between humans and nature, nature could not be appropriated by man if ritual did not create some difference, although pretending all the time to *reaffirm the absence of any difference* (cf. V. 34, 359 n. 75). Furthermore, all my interpretation of Hawaiian ritual is based on the principle that in various aspects of nature Hawaiians found aspects of themselves and of their social and mental life, that in Hawaii nature is naturalized man (Lévi-Strauss' "l'homme naturalisé") and man is humanized nature. Hence, saying that I claim that humans are "separate from nature" is tantamount to showing that one has not even understood the most basic thesis of my book.

Even more ludicrous is Charlot's thesis that I separate "religion from

natural science,” a statement he supports by referring to page 35 of my book. The reader who takes the trouble to read the page will discover that there I simply criticize Horton’s “intellectualist” theory, which postulates strong similarities between “primitive religion” and modern science (n.b. “science,” not knowledge). I suggest that this theory does not apply to Hawaiian religion. Charlot understands this as reading into Hawaiian thinking a Western distinction between “religion” and “natural science”! I shall discuss below other supposed instances of Western-influenced interpretations mentioned by Charlot.

My criticism of Horton’s intellectualist theory of religion should show Charlot’s statement that I am an extreme intellectualist to be simplistic at best. But it is simply absurd to view my various statements on symbolic identity or “substitutability” as proofs of my supposed “extreme intellectualism.” Symbolic substitution and its correlate, symbolic identity, have nothing to do with “identity” in the sense that this term has in formal logic, contrary to what Charlot believes (C. 120). As I have made abundantly clear, the idea of substitution--in sacrifice, for example--postulates the symbolic identity between a thing or person that stands for another, *at the same time that it presupposes their actual difference.*<sup>9</sup> It is precisely on this combination of postulated identity and actual difference that the efficacy of ritual, and more generally of symbolism (cf. Valeri 1981), rests. The identity of the king and his adversary or transgressor of his taboo is not an absolute identity: it is identity relative to a certain quality that is highlighted--for instance identity relative to rank, *kapu*, powers, ambitions, and so on. What normally should be defined as a simple similarity becomes something more than that, however, because it is correlated with a symbolic and even psychological process of identification. In other words, the “other” becomes a “double” (cf. Girard 1972; Rank 1925; Vernant 1974 2:65-66). This seems to me to imply that a person and his double relate in a mode already oriented by the rules of ritual and more specifically of sacrifice. In other words, the transgressors or adversaries of the king are already seen as his sacrificial substitutes, for reasons that I explain in chapter 5.

In sum, it is because he denies the essentially ritual nature of the hierarchical system and wants to see it in exclusively Western, “practico-genealogical” terms, that Charlot completely misunderstands my use of the terms “identical” and “substitutable.” To my use of such terms--motivated by a symbolic “logic” that eludes him--Charlot opposes his Western common sense, saying that such identities “would be *naturally* impossible” (C. 121, italics added).

Charlot also attacks my argument that twinship is logically related to

the idea of royalty with his usual argument that I “impose” my own terms on Hawaiian culture. He is unable, however, to demonstrate that my use of such terms is arbitrary, nor does he propose an alternative explanation that would demonstrably be closer to Hawaiian ideas. Such criticism is very easy but does not cut very deep. In a passage of my book I write that “circular things and things capable of circular movement are often considered divine, especially if they are powerful and distant, such as the stars or the moon” (V. 88-89). Charlot’s objection to this--“many nonround objects were considered *akua*”--is surprising, to say the least. Where and when have I said that only round objects were considered *akua*? And what can we make of this “objection” to my point that the moon and the stars are used as metaphors of gods because, as circular objects capable of circular movements, they evoke autonomy and self-sufficiency: “A traditional expression for feminine beauty-- . . . ‘the face is like a moon’--does not evoke autonomy and self-sufficiency” (C. 121)? Evidently Charlot thinks that comparing the moon to the gods in one respect is incompatible with comparing it to feminine beauty in a completely different respect (shininess and roundness of face, etc.)!

His next observation on my supposed contradictions in the characterization of chiefs and gods is once more due to his failure to grasp the structure of my argument, as already indicated. Indeed, Charlot’s constant repetition of the same misunderstanding is most tiresome. As for his claim that a chant that I mention (V. 371 n. 51) as an example of the ali‘i’s tendency to express themselves “metaphorically, poetically” on certain occasions “contains not a single metaphor” (C. 122), it is simply untrue. The chant contains one clear case of metaphor (“eaten by deep sorrow”) and possibly others (for instance, “skies” and “mountains” may refer metaphorically to chiefs). At any rate, I mention the chant as an example of poetical expression in general, not simply as an example of that particular form of poetical expression which is metaphor (V. 148).

Nowhere do I say that only the poetic genre was used in communication among chiefs, nor that--most absurd of all--“Hawaiian chiefs and chiefesses had rank-related difficulty verbalizing” (C. 122). All I imply is that while, as Charlot says, “all classes of Hawaiian society used poetry,” this use was much more important and elaborate among chiefs, as testified by ‘Īī, among others, in the passage to which I refer (V. 148). To say, as Charlot does, that there is no evidence for my statement that high-ranking nobles avoid situations of laughter is to ignore, for instance, that they cannot participate in crucial rites marked by laugh-

ter (V. 284). It is also to ignore a text that I mention (V. 276). On the other hand, Charlot gives no source for his claim that Kamehameha (a chief who, incidentally, did not have the highest rank and lived in a period of change) made his courtiers laugh. The few mentions of laughter that I have found in the narratives concerning the kings of the past refer to an anomalous king and to private or at any rate not ritually charged situations.

Finally, anyone who has taken the trouble to glance through the most elementary introductions to Buddhism will find it difficult to take seriously Charlot's accusation that I extrapolate an "*arhat* --like ideal" from the evidence on Hawaiian ali'i. How, indeed, can my account of Hawaiian ali'i be compared with "the arhat ideal, that of the human being who, by strenuous effort, acquires Enlightenment" (Humphreys 1985, 49)? Where have I suggested that Enlightenment was a religious concept of the Hawaiians? And how can Charlot dream of comparing the hereditary rank of the ali'i with a state reached individually "by strenuous effort"?

Charlot announces next that my idea that Hawaiian religion and society constitute a system is derived from Hegel. But it is not necessary to know anything about Hegel, just to read my book, both for its analytic practice and explicit methodological declarations, to realize that my notion of system derives from Structuralism and particularly from Saussure. Charlot seems to have read only bits and pieces of my book<sup>10</sup> and seems not to have read Hegel at all. He accuses me of believing that Hawaiian religious phenomena can be reduced to "a single, unified system" (C. 122-123) and of ignoring the "evidence of disunity." These accusations are strange, to say the least, since Charlot himself must acknowledge that I mention contradictions, conflicts, and differences from island to island.

Indeed, I have elicited information hitherto neglected that seems to prove that the hierarchy of the major gods on Kaua'i (and even on Maui) was different from that on the island of Hawai'i (V. 185, 335). Charlot also mentions my view that the systematization of Hawaiian religious beliefs and practices is due to priestly and chiefly influence, although he fails to add that I stress the constant tension between spontaneous, unsystematic creation from below and systematization from above (V. 36). This tension contributes to the historicity of the Hawaiian religious system, which I have never denied. I am all for considering Hawaiian religion historically. Indeed, I have written a special essay (Valeri 1982) based on an actually documented case of historical change, to which I have repeatedly referred in my book. But to pretend

to study the "historical development" of the priestly system in the absence of positive historical documents, as Charlot suggests that I should have done, is to confuse the writing of history with the writing of science fiction. Writing a synchronic study of Hawaiian religion at the end of the eighteenth century, as it is documented by the sources, means to be more historically minded than to indulge in the gratuitous pseudo-historical fantasies of Charlot (C. 123-124, C. n. 33 *in fine*). To construct arbitrary diachronic sequences does not make one a historian.

Charlot professes to be very surprised when, having given much evidence of conflict, diversity, and having warned that my analysis concerns the system of the island of Hawai'i (which is essentially the one documented in the sources), I claim: "I have attempted to give a coherent picture of the Hawaiian ideological system by considering all available information" (V. 191). But Charlot's surprise is due only to his misunderstanding of my use of the notion of system in this statement. I use "system" here in its structuralist sense: an abstract group of relations underlying a variety of concrete configurations, even conflicting ones. The system that I have attempted to reconstruct is neither the "priestly" system nor the "popular" system, nor is it the system of the island of Hawai'i alone; it is a set of relations underlying them all, and such that it does not deny, but makes intelligible their differences. This is precisely the structuralist notion of system. But having mistaken my use of this notion for the "Hegelian one," and having on top of that confused the latter with the crassest empiricist use of "system," Charlot claims that I contradict myself or that I want to reduce all religious views and practices to the priestly system of the island of Hawai'i pure and simple. I repeat that since most of our documents do indeed refer to that island, we have no choice but to use them; at the same time, we can abstract from the system of the island of Hawai'i more general principles that are not necessarily in conflict with whatever facts we know about other islands or other views. I have not claimed anything else. But not only does Charlot misunderstand my most general point, he also distorts and falsifies the evidence in a hopeless attempt to prove that I contradict it.

One example concerns his reading of some of my statements about priestesses, prophets, and sorcerers. He accuses me of calling these religious figures "marginal" because, he says, they do not fit my system (C. 123). He is simply disregarding the fact that this "marginality" is an indigenous evaluation. Malo, for instance, writes that the prophets (*kāula*) "were a very eccentric class of people. They lived apart in desert places, and did not associate with people or fraternize with any one" (Malo 1951, 114, cited in V. 138). "Marginal" means "to be at the mar-

gins.” Are not asocial people who live apart in desert places marginal? Moreover Charlot confuses my structuralist use of the notion of “marginality” (derived from, among others, Victor Turner, Edmund Leach, and Mary Douglas), which is value-free and implies that what is marginal is powerful and therefore important, with his everyday use, which implies lack of value and importance.

It is unforgivable that Charlot quotes page 328 of my book as evidence for the alleged fact that priestesses and prophets “take part in the temple ritual” and cannot therefore be considered marginal. The sources that I quote there do not mention priestesses at all--only high-ranking female ali‘i who do not officiate and who, therefore, have no priestly function. Furthermore, they participate in a rite that takes place outside the temple proper (V. 237) and at the conclusion of the main ritual (V. 327-328). It is, therefore, structurally marginal, especially since, as I have made clear, it marks the passage of men from the sacred world of the temple to the profane world of everyday life (V. 326). As for the prophets, they come on the scene even after the female ali‘i, and they worship the goddesses (not the gods, who are the object of the temple worship), imploring them thus: “Make the ali‘i treat us well when we are in their presence, and see to it that we are granted forgiveness (*kala*) when we ask for it” (V. 328). This prayer indicates that the prophets are not simply marginal relative to the chiefly-centered temple ritual,<sup>11</sup> but are actually in a state of tension and potential conflict with the ali‘i, since they have to implore the goddess to intercede with the ali‘i on their behalf. Indeed, goddesses mediate between the temple ritual and the religious practices of the prophets, but are not part of that ritual in a strict sense. By claiming the contrary (C. 126), Charlot makes an incorrect statement and has the gall to give as supporting reference a text of mine that denies it flatly.

Moreover, the sorcerers (more exactly, the black sorcerers) are not the “target” of my “polemic” (C. 123), but of that of most Hawaiian texts known to me. Kamakau, for instance, refers to black sorcery as “these evil ways of killing men” (Kamakau 1964, 137; cf. V. 138). Evidence of the sorcerers’ categorical marginality is given by the texts that I quote on pages 138 and 370 (n. 31). Charlot refers to these pages but, surprisingly, he seems to ignore their content. Even more surprising are the other references (pp. 183, 185, 247-248, 380 n. 9) he uses as evidence that sorcerers are not marginal. At these pages I refer to the sorcery gods of the king, who form a very special category, including forms of the major gods Kū, Kāne, and probably Kanaloa as well. The king himself is the priest of many of these sorcery gods, who are meant to counteract

the practices of black sorcerers (cf. Valeri 1982). No ordinary sorcerers are involved in these rites, contrary to what Charlot implies.

Charlot's criticism of what he calls my notion of the pantheon is simply appalling. Each sentence contains so many errors and absurdities that to expose them all would require a separate rejoinder. I shall therefore concentrate on the essentials. "Valeri's discussion of the 'pantheon' shows that (1) he wants to make it all-encompassing for Hawaiian religion as a whole, and (2) that he wants it to be coherent" (C. 124). From this first sentence and what follows, it appears that Charlot identifies "pantheon" with the "system" of the four major gods and their particularizations. This is a very curious interpretation. Pantheon simply means "the assemblage of all the gods; the deities of a people collectively" (OED). It is with this meaning that I use this word, as other Polynesianists--for instance Firth (1970, 85) or Johansen (1954, 218)--have done before me. I do not limit its reference to the system of four gods and their particularizations, as should have been evident to Charlot had he read, at the very least, the subtitles of the section "The Pantheon" in my first chapter. These subtitles are: "The Major Gods and Their Particularizations," "Goddesses, *Akua Wahine*," "The *Akuu 'Aumakua*," "The *Akua 'Unihipili*." In other words, "pantheon" simply means "all the gods"; whether or not these gods are systematically related is irrelevant to my use of this term. For this reason, the statement that I make the pantheon "all-encompassing for Hawaiian religion as a whole" is either tautologous (the set of all the gods includes all the gods!) or incorrect (since I do not refer to the four major gods by the word "pantheon").

Charlot also accuses me of basing my view that the "pantheon" is "coherent" "on systematizing nineteenth-century sources, especially Kamakau, and on the conventional idea of 'the four great gods of Polynesia'" (C. 125). This statement contains an error of fact and a grave misunderstanding. The grave misunderstanding consists in assimilating my hypothesis (this is indeed the status that it has in my book, cf. V. 110) that minor deities are encompassed by the major ones with Kamakau's thesis that "subordinate gods are produced by a 'segmentation' (*maha'e'ana*) of the major gods" (V. 14). Kamakau's thesis does not correspond to my view, as should be evident even from the sentence quoted by Charlot to illustrate his claim (V. 36). There I refer to the already mentioned tension between the spontaneous proliferation of gods and the priestly attempts at systematizing them--a position that amounts to denying that Kamakau's segmentation model applies to all gods. While I consider Kamakau's model as one interesting conceptual-

ization of the relation between major and minor gods (cf. V. 14), my own view of this relation is more complex than his. Readers of my book will know that minor gods can be considered as encompassed by the major ones principally because their cults are hierarchically linked. For instance, I have given evidence proving that minor gods could not be worshipped until the worship of the major gods was completed in the royal temples (V. 187-188). Furthermore, the gods of the subordinates of a king or major ali'i (even their *'aumakua* or "family gods") and those of their lands had to participate in the rites of the major gods where they were relegitimated and reconstituted (V. 263-270, 281-282, 290, etc.). In sum, my basic argument is that the hierarchy of the gods must be understood through the hierarchy of their rites and of the places and times of their performance.

Because Charlot refuses to face the fact that the relations between Hawaiian gods cannot be interpreted independently of their relations in ritual, he fails to understand my Dumontian (cf. V. xv) use of the notion of "encompassment" (Dumont 1966). The use of this notion does not imply the view that all minor gods are forms of the major ones (although many are), but that the major gods are presupposed by the minor ones,<sup>12</sup> at least in the priestly theory that is predominant in most traditional texts. On the other hand, that ritual is the most generalized and important expression of the encompassment of minor gods by the major ones does not exclude other more direct expressions, through descent, names, or shared predicates (V. 109-110). Another way of relating inferior gods to superior ones is through the predicate of purity (ibid. and passim). As I make clear, none of these models are generalized to include all gods (cf. V. 14); hence my case for encompassment rests more on what ritual shows than on the attempts at reflective conceptualization of Hawaiian priests and wise men. Indeed, I completely subscribe to Jane Harrison's view: "What a people does in relation to its gods must always be one clue, and perhaps the safest, to what it thinks" (Harrison 1903, vii). Furthermore, I have repeatedly mentioned that certain gods are outside the official hierarchy of the cults: the *akua 'unihipili* (V. 30), the *akua lele* (V. 351 n. 31), and at least some of the sorcery gods (V. 42, 138, 370 n. 32). (No doubt Charlot's "wandering spirits" may also be included in the list.) I have also stressed that the goddesses "are not as hierarchized" as the gods (V. 113, cf. 19), a fact that has ritual correlates (V. 127). Indeed, I have not attempted to include the goddesses in my simplified summary of "the hierarchy of the gods and the hierarchy of men" (V. 109). But Charlot ignores all this and isolates a single sentence of that summary (the only sentence in my

book to appear so extreme), disregarding, too, that I qualify it by saying that it is "a simplified model" and that "the reality is more complex" (V. 110, cf. V. 36).

Let us now turn to the error (or rather errors) of fact made by Charlot. He claims that my statement, "there is no doubt that Kū, Lono, Kāne, and Kanaloa are the highest gods" (V. 109), derives from "the conventional idea of 'the four great gods of Polynesia'" and especially from Kamakau. First, I nowhere use the expression "the four great gods of Polynesia," which he gives as a quotation. Second, my statement derives neither from that "conventional idea" nor from Kamakau, but from the best available sources. One of the earliest Hawaiian sources, Malo himself, writes: "The names of the male deities worshipped by the Hawaiians, whether chiefs or common people, were Ku, Lono, Kane, and Kanaloa; and the various gods worshipped by the people and the ali'i were named after them" (V. 81). Note, incidentally, that the last sentence supports the view that minor gods were encompassed by the four major ones, an additional proof that Charlot is wrong in attributing this theory to "systematizing nineteenth-century sources." More importantly, Malo's statement is fully supported by many prayers uttered during the *luakini* ritual that invoke the four main gods together (V. 269-270, 281-283, 290, etc.). These prayers are given, again, by the oldest sources: Kelou Kamakau and Malo. Those given by 'Ī'i, who witnessed the rituals, also confirm that the four gods were worshipped together in the *luakini* temple. This evidence undermines Charlot's curious thesis that "the association of four gods" is "an idea based on the Christian Trinity" (C. 125). Apart from all other differences with Christian Trinitarianism, I fail to see how a quaternity can be based on a trinity. Moreover, the fact that various quaternities are symbolically important in all Polynesian cultures is well known. Note also that Charlot attaches a different translation to the expression *ke kōko'ohā o ke akua* ("the quaternity of the god") from the one that I give ("the association of four gods," V. 13). No doubt Charlot wanted to suggest a connection with the "Trinity."

Charlot claims that my use of this expression is "faulty" because the expression "oh association of four of the god(s)" is followed, in a chant, by the line "oh association of five of the god(s)" (Fornander 1916-1920, 4:605). Thus, according to Charlot, "the chant is not referring to a single, overall supreme group, but to a number of groups" (C. 142 n. 27). This argument is strange. First, I have never suggested that other groups are not referred to in the chant, simply that the expression "oh association of four of the god(s)" refers to Kū, Kāne, Lono, and Kana-

loa. Second, Charlot forgets that, with the exception of the line he quotes, all other numerical groups in the chant are multiples of four: forty thousand, four hundred thousand. This shows that the chant reflects in part the usual formula, “the 40000 deities, the 400000 deities, the 4000 deities” (cf. V. 13), which expresses the postulated equivalence of the totality of the gods and the numerical index four--the one, precisely, which defines the group **Kū**, Lono, **Kāne**, Kanaloa. I don’t know what the “group of five” gods stands for, although I have noted that five is connected by one source with the god **Kū** (V. 350 n. 15). It may thus stand for five forms (or, as I call them, “particularizations”) of **Kū**.

Charlot’s next statement that I adopt “the Trinitarian notions of other nineteenth-century Hawaiian writers, who degrade Kanaloa to a sort of demon” (C. 125) is completely false. Actually, my statement that “the quadripartition of the gods is a superficial phenomenon that conceals a tripartition at a deeper level” (V. 18), from which Charlot derives his extravagant interpretation, is the logical implication of the traditional pairing of **Kāne** and Kanaloa as two sides of the same whole--a pairing reflected by the *Kumulipo*, in which the two gods appear as twin brothers. Perhaps Charlot believes here, for once, that even the *Kumulipo* is inspired by “the Trinitarian notions” of nineteenth-century writers?

The statements on the preeminence of **Kū**, Lono, **Kāne**, and Kanaloa contained in the texts of Malo and Kelou Kamakau should be sufficient to demonstrate that the preeminence was real and traditional. Yet Charlot does not simply ignore that crucial evidence: He also falsely accuses me of leaving out “a good deal of evidence” that would prove that those four gods were not the highest. The first evidence that he mentions is a chant about the goddess Pele in which “those gods are mercilessly subordinated to her” (C. 125). But this chant dates from the late 1890s and was recorded in this century by Pukui (Pukui and Korn 1973, 52). It mentions a geographical name (Borabora) not known traditionally. Its reference to Pele as “ruler of the Menehune” (Pukui and Korn 1973, 55) in the context of a migration from Tahiti also betrays the fact that it is recent, since only in late nineteenth-century theories does one find mention of Menehune as migrants from the Society Islands to Hawaii (Barrère 1969, 41; cf. 36). Note also that only **Kū** and Lono, not **Kāne** and Kanaloa, are put in a position inferior to Pele in the chant. In sum, this late and nontraditional text cannot support Charlot’s claim that the four major gods were “mercilessly” subordinated to Pele in ancient Hawaii.

More importantly, Charlot confuses different genres. The Pele litera-

ture, especially in its revised, nineteenth-century form, reflects an anti-hierarchical bias that is perfectly consonant with the dominant role that goddesses (whose antistructural role I have emphasized)<sup>13</sup> play in it. Furthermore, tales in which not only inferior gods, but even men, subordinate important gods and even ridicule them exist in Hawaii as elsewhere in Polynesia. But, as I have shown in a study of some of these, tales (Valeri 1981), such explicit reversals are limited either to contexts in which they were ritually permitted (such as the Makahiki festival, when the "Pele literature" was performed in the dances), or to playful narration. Charlot, as usual, lumps all texts together without attempting to establish beforehand their signification by an analysis of the genres and contexts in which they appear. He thus violates one of the basic rules of source criticism. No doubt the abolition in 1819 of the ritual system on which the hierarchy of gods was based changed the value of these playful reversals. By eliminating their very contrast with the serious contexts of temple ritual, it created a condition for transforming them into permanently valid charters of status for certain groups (particularly in Ka'ū). Precisely because of this, Charlot's use of some Pele chant as evidence against the idea that Kū, Lono, Kāne, and Kanaloa were the highest gods is unsound both from a historical and a sociological point of view. Indeed, it is sufficient to remember that Pele is often considered as the daughter of Kūwahailo (Beckwith 1940, 30)--that is, Kū as introducer of human sacrifice (the very basis of temple ritual)--to put Charlot's claims in their true place. As a daughter of Kū, Pele can hardly be considered to dominate him, since she is genealogically encompassed by him.

Charlot's second piece of evidence, the myth of Lonoka'eho's defeat by Kamapua'a, does not prove his point any better than the first. Lonoka'eho is considered an ali'i, not a god, in the principal text of the Kamapua'a legend (Fornander 1916-1920, 5:327). Even the Kahiolo text, the only one to which Charlot refers, does not say that he is a god. At any rate, I have found no reference anywhere to Lonoka'eho as a god who is worshipped. More importantly, the Kamapua'a legend belongs to a playful and comic genre in which the desire for a reversal of hierarchical relations is given an imaginary satisfaction. Even if Lonoka'eho were in the class of Lono gods, then, the legend would not prove the existence of a *serious* and *ritually implemented* alternative to the view that Lono is one of the supreme gods.

As a further piece of evidence against the supremacy of the four gods, Charlot refers to a published work of his that I cannot find in any library to which I have access. I cannot therefore evaluate the examples he gives there.

Charlot also claims that since “it is impossible to absorb the female gods of Hawai‘i into the four male gods” (C. 125), my view that inferior gods are encompassed by major ones is further invalidated. This is a strange argument, since I have explicitly said that goddesses form a class apart from the male gods and are themselves encompassed by Hina, who is paired with Kū. At the pinnacle of the Hawaiian pantheon, then, there is a male/female pair. Indeed I have written: “The structure of the pantheon--like that of the *Kumulipo*--reflects the primacy of the sexual principle” (V. 12). Hence Charlot’s “deduction” that I “belittle” goddesses because I cannot reduce them to the major gods is totally wrong.

Charlot argues against my statement that “goddesses are few and have a marginal position in the Hawaiian pantheon” (C. 125), saying: “Goddesses are in fact numerous and important.” As I have already explained, Charlot misunderstands my use of the anthropological notion of marginality, which does not imply lack of importance, but an antistructural power. In noting the preponderant role that goddesses have in sorcery I have underscored that their importance consists precisely in their power to transcend and threaten the official hierarchical system, not in the fact that they participate in it. Charlot, who naively equates “important” with “central,” attempts instead to demonstrate that the goddess Pele and her priestesses “take part in the ritual” (of the *luakini* temple). The “demonstration” is effected by referring to pages of my book that, as I have already noted, demonstrate nothing of the sort. Pele is not worshipped in the *luakini* temple proper and appears only at the conclusion of the ritual. Furthermore, I find no mention of “priestesses of Pele” in the texts to which I refer. Only *po‘e kāula* (“seers” or “prophets,” sex unspecified) are mentioned, but none of them officiate in the rite. Charlot’s statements are a product of his fantasy, and I find it particularly objectionable that he refers to my book as evidence to support them.<sup>14</sup>

Charlot also criticizes my statement that Pele and the other goddesses are “ultimately controlled by the King” on the grounds that it contradicts “the Pele chants mentioned above in which supremacy is claimed for her” (C. 126). I don’t see how chants that allegedly claim the supremacy of Pele over other gods can prove anything about who ultimately controls the *cult* of the goddess. Charlot confuses mythology with ritual. That Pele and other goddesses are ultimately controlled by the king is demonstrated by the fact that the worship of these goddesses is initiated at the beginning of the ritual year by a sacrifice consecrated by the king in an annex to his main temple (V. 328-329).

As for Charlot’s statement that the goddesses are “numerous and

important"--a statement for which he gives no evidence--I wonder what exactly he means. Given the immense number of Hawaiian deities, it is obvious that, in an absolute sense, goddesses are numerous. But when I say that "goddesses are few, . . . in the Hawaiian pantheon" (V. 19), I use "few" in a comparative sense. Indeed, the number of male deities, at least in our sources, is overwhelmingly superior to the number of goddesses. As for the question of "importance," while, as I have said, some goddesses are important in an antistructural sense, a great many goddesses cannot be considered important in terms of Hawaiian values. This is because they are specifically defined as "patron deities" of certain groups of women involved in technical activities (such as beating and printing tapa cloth, see Malo 1951, 82) or even aesthetic ones (such as dancing, *ibid.*) that, however valued, do not have the same importance as the activities of war and production over which the great male gods preside.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, Charlot says that the idea that an individual's relation to the gods is mediated by the hierarchy is contradicted by numerous accounts of direct contact (C. 126). After reading this criticism, I began to doubt that Charlot had read my book in its entirety. Not only do I treat at length the kinds of direct contact to which he refers, and more, but I specifically state at different points that there are two rival modes of relating with the gods: one hierarchically mediated, the other direct (V. 19-20, 138-140).<sup>16</sup>

The important point to grasp, however, is that direct contact through means such as dreams, visions, and descent is not in itself evidence of the absence of hierarchical encompassment. For instance, many of the family gods (*'aumakua*) result from the marriage of an important god (Charlot cites *Kū*) with a human woman (cf. NK, 1:36). The attributes of a local or familial god may be identical to some at least of the attributes of a more encompassing god and therefore provide a link between them. This link is often expressed in ritual subordination. Thus, as I have noted, the altars of local and familial fishing gods are reconsecrated yearly after the altar of the king's fishing god (a form of *Kū*) has been reconsecrated (V. 187, 378 n. 28). The same is true of the altars of local and familial agricultural gods, which can be reconsecrated only after the king's agricultural temples (centered on Lono) have been rebuilt or reinaugurated (V. 187). The linkage between family cults and the cults of the society as a whole (controlled by the king) is explained by the fact that they both have analogous aims, which they realize at different social levels: they promote agriculture, fishing, and human fertility, sanction moral laws, and so on. As "families" are

“nested” in the social hierarchy, so family gods are “nested” in the gods of the global society. Direct relationships with certain deities thus imply, logically and usually ritually as well, indirect relationships with more distant and encompassing deities.<sup>17</sup> As the family cult is inconceivable without the cult of the society as a whole, so the family gods are inconceivable without the gods of the society as a whole. The relationship of family  $x^1$  with the fishing deity  $y^1$  is “direct,” but at the same time implicitly inscribed in its relationship with a larger social unit  $x^2$ , which corresponds to the fishing deity  $y^2$ .

In contrast to these relationships, many relationships with gods are *only* direct because they are individualistic or even antisocial (as in many cases of sorcery, V. 30, 33, 42, 138) or because they claim to transcend the social hierarchy (as in the case of many *kāula*, “seers,” “prophets,” V. 138-140). Charlot is unable to see the significance of these different types of relations with the gods because, among other things, his view of Hawaiian religion is completely asociological. He ignores the fact that representations are connected with actions and are actions themselves. Their meaning is therefore inseparable from the context of action, which includes the system of social relations.

New peaks of misunderstanding are reached in Charlot’s discussion of what he calls “the second major principle of Valeri’s book,” that is, my thesis that Hawaiian gods are essentially anthropomorphic. I leave out all the minor oddities<sup>18</sup> to concentrate on the basic point. Charlot makes an egregious error that completely vitiates his entire argumentation: He thinks that “anthropomorphic” simply means “having the physical form of man.” He therefore claims that my point that Hawaiian gods are conceived anthropomorphically can only be proven if it can be proven “that all Hawaiian gods have human bodies” (C. 127). Since he himself believes that there are a “large number of gods that have only animal or elemental bodies” (*ibid.*), he concludes that my thesis is wrong. Charlot does not realize that, following anthropological and philosophical usage, I give “anthropomorphism” a much wider sense than the one that he gives to it. In Lalande’s classic definition, for example, anthropomorphism “se dit de tout raisonnement ou de toute doctrine qui, pour expliquer ce qui n’est pas l’homme (par exemple Dieu, les phénomènes physiques, la vie biologique, la conduite des animaux, etc.) y applique de notions empruntées à la nature ou à la conduite humaine” (Lalande 1956, 63).

Another modern philosopher defines anthropomorphism as “that promiscuous mixing of our own intuitions of meaning, relevance, importance, with objective reality” (Taylor 1985, 1, 249). Thus if I

interpret the behavior of an animal in terms of human feelings, intentions, reasoning, I anthropomorphize it. In other words, I give animal feelings and thoughts the *form* of human feelings and thoughts. Thus anthropomorphism does not necessarily imply the projection of the bodily form of man on something nonhuman, as Charlot seems to believe.<sup>19</sup> Throughout my book, I have made abundantly clear that the anthropomorphic character of Hawaiian gods is to be found, first and foremost, at the level of the signified, not that of the signifier: not in the gods' material manifestations, but in the human and social attributes they symbolize by means more complex than the purely iconic one offered by the human body. Thus I have repeatedly pointed out that most of these human attributes are signified by the natural, nonhuman "bodies" of the gods.<sup>20</sup> Indeed this is one of the central theses of the book that Charlot has managed to misunderstand.

But Charlot is never happy with misunderstanding alone: he must also use objectionable means to achieve his aim. Thus he writes (C. 126): "His [Valeri's] one argument [for anthropomorphism] is that all Hawaiian gods have a human body in their *kino lau*, their system of multiple bodies (9-12, 21, 31, 35, 47):" and he quotes my page 11: "*the 'genus' of all species included in one god belongs not to the natural world but to the human, social world.*" In this passage, Charlot gives the impression that the sentence he quotes from my book is equivalent to his own sentence, which precedes it. In other words, he is making me say that the genus of all species included in the god is the same thing as the human body that the god can assume. Charlot is confusing this statement, which is only due to him, with my thesis that the human body of a god is able to symbolize more clearly the genus (*human in the cultural sense*) that is also symbolized by the sum total of his natural bodies. At any rate the sentence that he quotes specifically refers not, as he says, to the human body of a god (who happens to be Kamapua'a), but to his *porcine body*. This shows, precisely, that the anthropomorphic character of Kamapua'a does not depend on his being able to assume the physical body of man, but on the fact that his pig body "represents human properties evoked by certain of the pig's qualities: virility, activity, bellicosity, and so on" (V. 11). This is enough to dismiss as irrelevant Charlot's elucubrations on whether it is the pig body or the human body of Kamapua'a that is the principal one and similar arguments about other gods. Charlot is simply fighting figments of his own imagination, since my idea of what constitutes the "anthropomorphic" character of the gods is quite different from the one that he attributes to me.

The same can be said of his statements on my supposed “presupposition of a separation of human beings from ‘nature,’ ” which, with characteristic illogic, he thinks is at the basis of my “strong anthropomorphization of Hawaiian religion” (C. 127). As I have pointed out (V. 34), if there were such separation, there could be no anthropomorphization because natural phenomena could not signify human ones! Charlot attributes to me just the opposite of what I say. He then proceeds to defy decency when he defines the sentence where I have pointed out that no such separation exists as “the section in which Valeri admits that his theory cannot be found in the Hawaiian texts” (C. 128). The “theory” to which Charlot refers is Charlot’s own theory of what my theory is.<sup>21</sup>

Let me repeat, then, once and for all, that my main thesis is that Hawaiian gods are anthropomorphic in the sense that their *natural bodies* are signs of *human properties*. But, as I just mentioned, I have also said that Hawaiian gods are usually anthropomorphic in another sense: they are able to manifest themselves in human form. However, I have made clear that the “human form” assumed by the gods must be conceived in its widest sense: not only as a human form spontaneously assumed when they appear in visions or dreams or even in physical presence, but also as the human form that men give to the gods when they ritually incorporate them into anthropomorphic images or into human mediums (cf. V. 9 and my reference there to Firth 1930-1931; V. 72, 345). Whatever the mode (spontaneous or contrived by man) and the quality (natural or artificial) of the gods’ anthropomorphic manifestation, it has the effect of making more evident the fact that *all his non-human manifestations symbolize human predicates*. In this sense, the frequently documented presence of a human body among the multiple bodies of gods is not without importance for my thesis, although it is not necessary to it.

I readily admit that I cannot produce for all of the thousands of Hawaiian deities texts that state expressly that they have a human body as Charlot would like me to do. But such texts can be produced for a great many gods, and for all of the more important deities, male and female.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, the few texts produced by Charlot as evidence of gods “with only animal bodies reported” either do not support or flatly contradict his point.<sup>23</sup>

Charlot asserts that “in accordance with his separation of human beings from nature and with his philosophical orientation, Valeri seeks to establish a nonnatural or ‘supernatural,’ invisible, immaterial realm or dimension” (C. 128). It is not clear how this supposed “dimension” could possibly be related to my supposed “separation of human beings

from nature” or to my monistic philosophical orientation (made clear by my references to Feuerbach and Hegel). The important facts, however, are as follows. As I have already indicated, I use the word “supernatural” only a couple of times and exclusively in quotation marks to indicate that I refer to another author’s usage (as, precisely, in the sentence from V. 92 quoted on C. 128 as evidence), or that I am reluctant to use it. When I myself use it, I use it in its current anthropological sense, that is, as referring not to a nonnatural “dimension” of reality, but to a mode of operation that is different from the ordinary one and imputed to invisible divine action. It is in this sense that the term is used by anthropologically minded Polynesianists like Firth (1970).

That the being of the gods is not reducible to that of their empirical manifestations is not an idea derived from my theory, contrary to what Charlot claims, but from the facts. Indeed, I do not think that anyone before Charlot (with the exception of the missionaries who accused Polynesians of idolatry or brute-worship) has ever doubted this. Malo, for one, writes: “All these gods, whether worshipped by the common people or by the ali‘i, were thought to reside in the heavens. Neither commoner nor chief had ever discerned their nature; their coming and their going was unseen; their breadth, their length and their dimensions were unknown” (Malo 1951, 83).

I do not think that these views have been influenced by Christian ideas;<sup>24</sup> on the contrary, comparative evidence from the Tikopia, a Polynesian people whose religion appears to have been uninfluenced by Christianity at the time they were studied by Firth, fully confirms its genuinely traditional character. Firth writes that “only in specific contexts did the Tikopia attribute definite form to [the gods]. Linked with this view was the conception of *atua* as for the most part invisible to men. Hence the question of their ‘proper’ shape did not readily arise. Indeed, the absence of shape might be stressed--‘we do not see them: how do we know what they look like?’ ” (Firth 1970, 67; cf. 117-118). Moreover, Tikopia belief (cf. Firth 1967, 207) confirms my claim (and Malo’s) that the gods “cannot be confused with those among their instantiations . . . that are supposed to empirically manifest the god’s properties” (V. 32).<sup>25</sup>

Comparative evidence thus further belies Charlot’s claim that Hawaiians did not distinguish between the invisible reality of the gods and their visible manifestations (a thesis he needs in order to uphold his denial of the fundamentally anthropomorphic character of the gods). As I have myself pointed out, the two were strongly connected, particularly in ritual, but this is no justification for claiming that no distinction existed and therefore for maintaining that Hawaiian culture was char-

acterized by “its understanding of everything in physical terms” (C. 136). Indeed, the latter claim shows to what an extent Charlot can project typically Western views (here the physicalist monism of modern science) onto Hawaiian ideas.

Moreover, Charlot’s thesis has the effect of attributing to Hawaiians his own illogic. Indeed, if the god were not something more than, say, an animal in which he manifests himself, then there would be no difference between a mere animal and a god! Charlot mistakes the view that the god is only accessible through some empirical phenomenon for the view that the god only has empirical reality (cf. C. 129). By doing so he does serious injustice to the “considerable powers of abstraction” (Firth 1970, 109) indicated by the Hawaiian, as by the Tikopia, notion of “god.”

Having established to his satisfaction that the Hawaiians were at his intellectual level, Charlot proceeds by attacking my use of the word “divine” in a section where I draw some preliminary conclusions. He claims that I introduce there a non-Hawaiian idea, because the word *akua* “is never . . . used as an abstraction, ‘the divine’ ” (C. 129). But with one single (and partial) exception--to which I shall return and which is not the text quoted by Charlot--have never used “the divine” as a translation of *akua*, only as a descriptive term that refers to an abstraction: the quality of “divinity” common to all gods,<sup>26</sup> that is, the quality that makes it possible to define them as “gods.”<sup>27</sup> Although the existence of such a quality is clearly implied by the notion of *akua*, Charlot claims that it is a “non-Hawaiian idea” simply because it is not signified by a specific linguistic form. This is a very naive and incorrect view of the relationship between language and ideas.

Not happy with formulating a disingenuous criticism alone, Charlot proceeds to misinterpret a sentence (V. 288) that refers to the transformative relation existing between different gods or states of the same god in the *luakini* temple ritual. This transformative relation, I hypothesize, has the effect of suggesting to the audience a category of divine power more abstract than the individual gods. There is nothing particularly strange about this hypothesis. Anthropologists have noted that in polytheistic religions one often finds, expressed in ritual form, extremely general ideas of divine power. This is the case, for instance, in the Chihamba ritual of the Ndembu (Turner 1962), or in the *ida* ritual of the Umeda of which it has been said: “By studying the sequence of *ida* as a whole one arrives rapidly at the idea that there are not many ritual figures, but basically one such figure in process of transformation” (Gell 1975, 296).

Analogously, the sentence of my book quoted and criticized by

Charlot (C. 130) refers to an implied category of divine power made apparent by ritual transformations, not, as he believes, to a cosmogonic argument in which "the gods emerge from an undifferentiated divine and merge back into it." Indeed, I refer there to a synchronic hierarchy of categories: In my view the category of divine power in the *luakini* ritual presupposes the different gods and is not separable from them. The idea of a "pulsation" back and forth from an "undifferentiated divine" cannot be found in my interpretation of the *luakini* ritual. On the contrary, I make it clear that the different stages of the process of transformation are always "frozen into personalities" (V. 288). Indeed, the transformation is summarized in my interpretation by the contrast between the gods Kū and Lono, not by the contrast between the undifferentiated and differentiated divine, which applies to the cosmogonic process.

When I do claim that there is an analogy (but never an identity) between the ritual process and the cosmogonic process it is at a much higher level: that of the yearly ritual cycle. This is because the beginning of the year seems to be conceived as a return to the beginning of the world (V. 215). Since the god connected with the beginning of the year is Lono--whom a text (by K. Kamakau in V. 206) explicitly associates, in that particular temporal context, with a variety of attributes normally associated with other gods; indeed, it associates it with the entire cosmos--I have hypothesized that the god represents at that moment the divine in general. I have also argued that, to some extent, the same is true of Kū in the *luakini* ritual, because this god often stands there for the other three major gods, whom it constantly implies, and for other reasons mentioned in my book. But the analogy between Lono or Kū and Pō ("Night") as the most general metaphor of the divine is limited to what they refer to, since, as I have made abundantly clear, Pō is not individualized, let alone personalized like Kū and Lono. Furthermore, none of these gods have the generality that the Pō image has. I stand by this argument, against which Charlot offers no concrete criticism and which indeed he completely ignores.

Having thus shown my actual views on the relationships between individual gods and a more generic category of divine power that has a variety of analogous (but by no means identical) ritual and cosmogonic expressions, let me turn to the basic point of contention between me and Charlot. This is my identification of the "undifferentiated divine"--that is, in my interpretation, the divine in its most generic form--with the Pō ("Night") image. First let me note that Charlot is falsely giving the impression that my discussion of the age of Pō has a great deal of

importance in my argumentation. This is not so. I say at the outset that I only give a “brief look at the genesis of the cosmos according to Hawaiian mythology” (V. 3). Indeed, my discussion of the *Kumulipo* only takes up four pages at the beginning of my book. On pages 35-36 I venture the hypothesis, which is presented as such, that Pō is “the closest approximation to a supreme divine principle found in Hawaii” (V. 35), as it is perhaps in Maori cosmogony (Shortland 1882, 10). But whatever the merits of such a hypothesis, my interpretations of the Hawaiian religious system do not depend on it, contrary to what Charlot seeks to suggest by totally invalid or captious arguments, as I shall now demonstrate.

Charlot’s criticism of my association of Pō with the “undifferentiated divine” is based on his usual error: he misconstrues a relative term as an absolute one. Although brief, my discussion of Pō in the *Kumulipo* (V. 7) shows that I view it as “the undifferentiated divine” only in a relative sense. It is “undifferentiated,” first and foremost, relative to the myriad of individualized, personalized deities that appear in the age of Ao, “Light,” which follows the age of Pō, “Night,” or “Darkness.” Indeed, as I have pointed out (V. 30), it is believed that deities or ancestors who cease to be worshipped, or who leave the concrete form in which they can be approached, return to Pō and dissolve in it (this “dissolution” of course is such only from the point of view of human perception, for which the world of Pō is the “Unseen” [gloss of Handy and Pukui 1972, 131]). This dissolution is clearly mentioned in the text to which I refer (V. 30): “When the kahu or keeper felt it was unwise or even dangerous to keep the *‘unhipili* as a household presence, he could release the spirit and let it merge into the more tranquil eternity of Pō” (NK, 1:196). Analogously, the spirits of the dead plunge from the *leina* (cliffs or sea-coast promontories) into Pō, which Pukui defines as “measureless expanse of all space . . . timelessness of all time . . . eternity” (NK, 1:35; cf. 40, 137). Pō also stands for the generic divine in common expressions such as *he hō‘ike na ka pō*, “a revelation of the night,” which Pukui explains as “a revelation from the gods in dreams, visions and omens” (Pukui 1983, 68). Since Pō stands here for the gods in general, it can be called “undifferentiated [i.e., generic] divine” as I do in my book. In the expression *mai ka pō mai*, translated as “from the gods, of divine origin” (PE, 307) or “out of the unseen” (Handy and Pukui 1972, 131), Pō has the same meaning of generic divine that it has in the previously quoted expression. It indicates that something that is not individually identified belongs to the realm of the divine. Charlot nevertheless claims that this expression does not support my view.<sup>28</sup> This is only

because he understands neither the meaning of the expression nor my view.

That I view the “undifferentiated divine” as undifferentiated only relative to its differentiation into individualized gods becomes perfectly clear once the passage of my book criticized by Charlot (C. 130) is put in its context:

Until this point, the divine coincided first with the undifferentiated principle Pō and then with its impersonal specifications presiding over the great divisions of nature. This identification of the undifferentiated divine with Pō is made evident by the refrain that characterizes the age of Pō: “the divine enters, man cannot enter. . . .” Being entirely divine, nature entirely excludes man. By producing the first man, however, the divine brings about its own transformation. From now on it will be constituted by personal, anthropomorphic gods such as Kāne and Kanaloa. Moreover, as I shall demonstrate, these personal gods regroup the natural species on the basis of a human “moral” logic that takes the place of or modifies the “natural” classificatory logic that the *Kumulipo* identifies with the state of the divine until man appears on the scene. (V. 7)

Charlot’s selective style of quotation covers not only the fact that Pō is called “undifferentiated divine” relative to the personal gods of the age of Ao, but also that I do not consider it internally undifferentiated. Indeed, in the passage just quoted I refer to the fact that Pō includes its impersonal specifications presiding over the great divisions of nature. Before that I give them in detail and show that they are sexually paired couples in which Pō divides itself and which generate the biological cosmos (V. 4-5). Charlot’s objections to my view of Pō betray his total misunderstanding of it, since they seem to imply that I identify Pō only with its absolutely initial state, prior to its differentiation into the above mentioned paired forms.

Thus he criticizes my use of the refrain *o ke akua ke komo*, ‘*a’oe komo kanaka*--which I translate as “the god [or the divine] enters, man cannot enter” (V. 4)--to prove the “identification of the undifferentiated divine with Pō,” by the strange argument that it cannot be applied to Pō because, says Charlot, “when first used (line 39), that line is twenty-five lines away from the last mention of *pō* (line 14)” (C. 130). Charlot’s argument is erroneous with regard both to the *Kumulipo* and to the text of my book. The reason is that the refrain is a refrain, which means that it returns several times in the section of the chant describing the age of

Pō. Therefore it refers to that age as a whole, not to a single mention of Pō in a single line. This is precisely why I use the line as evidence for the fact that “the Pō period is . . . entirely divine” (V. 4; cf. 7, 216, 222), not simply, as Charlot seems to believe, for the fact that Pō as mentioned for the first time in line 14 of the *Kumulipo* is divine.

In sum, when I speak of Pō as “undifferentiated divine” I refer principally to the age of Pō as a whole, in contrast to the age of Ao when personal gods are differentiated; only secondarily do I refer to Pō before it differentiates itself internally in its “impersonal specifications presiding over the great divisions of nature” (V. 7). The basic point missed by Charlot is that the *Kumulipo* transforms a relationship of logical inclusion (which implies that Pō is viewed as “the realm of the gods,” “pertaining to or of the gods” [PE, 307]; in sum as a metaphor for the generic divine) into a genetic relation (which implies that Pō is viewed as the undifferentiated origin of the individual gods who become distinct in the age of Ao, “Light” [V. 6-7], and therefore vision, distinct knowledge).<sup>29</sup> Analogously, the relationship between Pō and its paired sexual specifications (symbolizing the great realms of animal life) is represented both as one of logical inclusion (as is made clear by their names, which all consist of the morpheme Pō plus a specifying suffix, V. 4-5) and one of genetic differentiation.

Pō is thus both past as generative principle and present as the most encompassing category of the divine. This is precisely why I have written that Pō is “the undifferentiated creative origin of the cosmos, which continues to exist in transcendence [i.e., in the “unseen,” another meaning of Pō] as its perennial source” (V. 35). Saying, as Charlot does, that this is an idea similar to “the Thomist description of God as creator and sustainer of the universe” is betraying a total misunderstanding of my argument and a profound ignorance of Thomist philosophy, for which God (a perfect and intelligent substance endowed with free will) creates and sustains the universe providentially, that is, in view of an end that coincides with him (Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, 1). None of these characterizations are implied in my account of Pō.

Let me now turn to some criticism of particular points. Charlot attacks me for translating the already mentioned expression ‘o ke akua ke komo, ‘a‘oe komo kanaka (quoted on V. 4, 7, 216, 222) as “the divine enters, man cannot enter.” Strictly speaking, this criticism applies to only one case (V. 7). Charlot fails to mention that I also translate the expression as “the god enters, man cannot enter” (V. 216, 222). These two translations are considered equally possible in my first quotation of the line (V. 4), although the translation “the god” is given preeminence

(“the god [or the divine] enters, man cannot enter”). The reason I use “the divine” as an alternative to “the god” in this expression is as follows: *Ke akua* cannot refer to an individual, personal god (such as, say, Kāne) when it occurs in an expression qualifying the age of Pō, from which personal gods seem to be absent. Indeed, they are said to appear only at the beginning of the age of Ao, together with man (V. 6-7). It seems to me, therefore, that the expression *ke akua* is used in Hawaiian exactly like in Greek ὁ θεός, where it means “the god,” but in two senses: in the sense of an individual, named god, and in the sense of the power common to all gods. “Les diverses puissances surnaturelles dont la collection forme la société divine dans son ensemble peuvent elles-mêmes être appréhendées sous la forme du singulier, ὁ θεός, la puissance divine, le dieu, sans qu’il s’agisse pour autant de monothéisme” (Vernant 1974, 2:87). What Vernant says of the Greek ὁ θεός applies perfectly well to the Hawaiian case. The abstract idea of divine potency is referred to by an individualizing expression that means “the god.” But “the god,” in this usage, refers neither to an individually named god, nor to a supreme god; it is just the generic idea of divine power. This is why I find it legitimate to translate *ke akua* as “the divine” in one context.

Charlot also objects: “Far from referring to a single, all-encompassing, undifferentiated principle, pō is being constantly paired--with *ao* in the structure of the whole chant, with *lipo* in lines 7-8, and with *lā*, ‘day,’ in line 10” (C. 131). Let us look into these claims.

1. It is not clear what Charlot means by saying that pō is paired “with *ao* in the structure of the whole chant.” My understanding, however, is that the age of Pō is paired with the age of Ao only in the sense that the former precedes the latter and indeed generates it (V. 6). This confirms that Pō is conceived as the encompassing generative principle relative to Ao. If there is “pairing” here, it is certainly not one that belies the all-encompassing status of Pō.

2. “Pairing” is a vague term: there can be pairing of opposites (such as “male” and “female,” “dark” and “clear”) or pairing of equivalents. Lines 7-8 simply use the device of poetic parallelism to enumerate a series of equivalents of Pō, which are in a relationship of redundancy to it, not of complementary opposition:

From the source in the dark (*lipo*) was the earth formed  
from the source in the night (*pō*) was darkness formed.

(Johnson 1981,3)

3. The pairing of *lā*, “day,” with *pō* in line 10 demonstrates precisely the opposite of what Charlot claims, since it neutralizes their opposition: ‘*o ka lipo o ka lā*, ‘*o ka lipo o ka pō*, “darkness of day, darkness of

night.” In other words, the day is as dark as the night; there is no contrast of night and day-darkness reigns supreme. Indeed the next line states: *pō wale ho‘i*, which Johnson (ibid.) translates “of night alone” and Beckwith (1951, 58) “nothing but night.” Thus Pō is the true encompassing principle at this point, contrary to what Charlot claims; the very evidence that he gives to disprove my point proves it.

Let me consider now Charlot’s argument for denying my view of Pō as “creative origin of the cosmos” (V. 35). The argument is that since “the word *pō* appears first in line 5--after a description of the turning of the earth and sky and the sun being in shadow to illuminate the moon” (C. 131), Pō cannot be considered the primal principle. Heaven and Earth, who are husband and wife, are this principle; hence--argues Charlot--“the mating of the earth and sky” is the “origin of the universe” (C. 131). Charlot’s argument is unconvincing for several reasons:

1. That the word *pō* (“darkness”) is mentioned a few lines after Heaven and Earth is not in itself proof that darkness appears after the “mating of the earth and sky.” On the contrary, the first lines imply that darkness is present from the beginning because “At the time when the earth became hot/ At the time when the heavens turned about” (*Kumulipo*, lines 1-2, Beckwith’s trans., p. 58) the sun was darkened and the moon shone, as at night. Thus Pō, darkness, is indicated as truly primordial.<sup>30</sup>

2. The *Kumulipo* does not describe the “origin of the universe” as a whole, as Charlot implies, but only of the biological universe, the “living universe,” as I call it (V. 9). The inorganic universe is taken for granted.

3. In contrast to the explicit mention of the mating of the paired forms of Pō to produce the biological cosmos, there is no *explicit* mention in the *Kumulipo* that the life-forms derive from the mating of Heaven and Earth (which is itself only implicit). This couple, therefore, has an unclear status in the chant; it is more a generic image of generativity (cf. V. 215) than a true ancestral couple.

In sum, in treating Pō as the ultimate source of the cosmos, I am in agreement with what the *Kumulipo* (like many similar Polynesian cosmogonies) states. But stressing that Pō is the initial source does not in the least imply asserting that sex and procreation have no role in the generation of the universe, since Pō includes its sexually paired forms. Indeed, Charlot’s statement--“Because Valeri is replacing this two-source origin [the mating of earth and sky] with a single-source one [Pō], he cannot use sex and procreation. He must use ‘creation’ or ‘production’ ” (C. 131)--ranks as perhaps the falsest in his “critique.”

Although I describe the cosmogonic process in the *Kumulipo* as gene-

alogical and sexual, and I quote approvingly Beckwith's view that this process is "actuated by desire, which is represented by the duality of sex generation" (1919, 300, V. 5), Charlot has the gall to retort to my supposedly "creationist" interpretation of the *Kumulipo* that "the *Kumulipo* is, however, a chant of the procreation, not the creation, of the universe. There is nothing other than late, biblically influenced Hawaiian texts to compare with the extended creationistic systems of Sāmoa and the Society Islands" (C. 131-132). That the *Kumulipo* chant describes "the sexual production of the cosmos" (V. 89) is precisely what I have argued in the book; moreover, in a subsequent paper I have myself drawn the contrast between the *Kumulipo* and the later Hawaiian biblically influenced texts or the Central Polynesian cosmogonies (Valeri 1986). Charlot does not see (or does not want to see) that our only real disagreement on what the *Kumulipo* says concerns the stage at which procreation first appears. I claim that this happens as soon as Pō, "Night, Darkness," divides itself in female and male forms (V. 4); he claims that it is with the "mating of the earth and sky" (C. 131). Since the two events are practically contemporary, there is very little difference between our positions. On the other hand, I strongly disagree with Charlot's reductionist extension of the "procreational" model of the *Kumulipo* to the relation between the personal gods and their manifestations and to the rituals that I analyze in my book.

The evidence indicates that he is in error: the relationship of personal, individualized gods with nature (more generally, with the "phenomenal" world) cannot be reduced simply to a "procreational," "genealogical" relationship of gods with the phenomenal world. Indeed, in Hawaii, as in every other Polynesian culture, the relationship of the gods with the world takes a great variety of forms (cf. Firth 1970, 98-99). It is precisely because I recognize this fact, not because I rule out procreation when it exists, that I use the term "production" or even "creation."<sup>31</sup> I do not contrast these terms to "procreation" (for instance in a passage quoted above I speak of "sexual production" V. 5), and they are not in a relationship of logical exclusion with it, contrary to what Charlot asserts without demonstration. They are simply more generic terms covering the totality of the relations between the gods and what they bring about, by sexual and asexual means.

In my book, I have referred to many cases of nonprocreational production of species by gods, for instance by transformation of parts of their bodies (e.g., V. 359 n. 74).<sup>32</sup> Moreover, nonprocreational accounts are often used as alternatives to procreational ones. Malo, for instance, writes: "In the genealogy of Wakea it is said that Papa [Wākea's wife]

gave birth to these islands. Another account has it that this group of islands were not begotten, but really made by the hands of Wakea himself" (Malo 1951, 3). The "labor model" testified by this text seems to be used particularly to account for the god's way to bring about the growth of food plants. Thus the lands where "the best time to plant was during the winter rains" were called "the lands cultivated by Kanepua'a [a god]" (Kamakau 1976, 25). Some of the works of the gods to which the prayers refer are digging "the earth to soften and pulverize it," watering the plants, and shading them against excessive sun (*ibid.*, 27-29). This work is the god's share in producing the fruits of the earth; no mention of the gods mating with goddesses to make the plants grow exists in these prayers (even if goddesses are mentioned in one--Kamakau 1976, 30). Other sources confirm the absence of mating. For instance, Malo (1951, 206-207) says that any of the four major gods could be worshipped by the farmers to obtain crops, but he does not mention that any goddess was paired with them. This is not what we would expect if Charlot's "pan-procreational" thesis was correct. On the other hand, I have noted, although not enough for Charlot's taste, that the Makahiki ritual indicates that the god's action on plant growth has a sexual component (V. 214, 222, 224). Thus I do not deny this component; I simply claim that it is arbitrary to reduce to it all the forms taken by the god's productive action. Charlot forgets that not even the *Kumulipo* accounts for everything with a procreational-genealogical model. As I have already noted, all of inorganic nature is not so derived.

More importantly, Charlot's attempt to reduce all facets of Hawaiian religious ideology to the *Kumulipo* model is flawed because his failure to consider the chant's purpose keeps him from correctly assessing the significance of its genealogical idiom. As I have shown elsewhere (Valeri 1986), the *Kumulipo* must be viewed as an incantatory formula (cf. Beckwith 1951, 36, 38), whose purpose is to establish the absolute legitimacy of the ali'i for whom it was composed. His legitimacy is made unassailable by "naturalizing" the historical process that brought him to his exalted position. Such "naturalization" is obtained by two convergent means: by reducing the process of succession to mere genealogy, that is, to mere procreation, without taking into account all properly political, action-based events; and by connecting human genealogies to a genealogy of natural species. Thus the complex process of human history (partly documented in narratives) is reduced to genealogy, which is then projected onto the entire cosmos. This results in making the ali'i for whose birth the chant was composed into the outcome and the summary of the entire biological universe, that is, absolutely unquestionable

(Valeri 1986).<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, the genealogical idiom by which the *Kumulipo* links the divine world to the phenomenal one should not be taken too literally. Indeed, one can apply to this chant what has recently been said of an Indonesian cosmogonic tradition also dominated by genealogy: "genealogical images sound more like figurative expressions for relations of world creation rather than literal genealogical truths" (Hefner 1985,202).

While Charlot's exclusive focusing on the procreative model may be explained by a peculiar obsession, no amount of obsession can justify his absurd claim that "Valeri has managed to depict the pinnacle of Hawaiian religion as a masculine creator-god" (C. 132). The only "proof" advanced for this claim is my description of goddesses as "marginal." I have already shown that Charlot misunderstands this. But even this misunderstanding does not explain how he can put forward such a claim when I have explicitly stated: "The structure of the pantheon--like that of the *Kumulipo*--reflects the primacy of the sexual principle. The duality of the sexes is in effect divinized in the couple Kū (male)/Hina (female)" (V. 12). This statement stands true for me even when I recognize, in agreement with the evidence, the hierarchical asymmetry of male and female in Hawaiian culture. That no contradiction is involved here is shown, for instance, by what a modern Hawaiian scholar has to say about the pervasiveness of both gender dualism and gender asymmetry in the *Kumulipo*: "The dichotomous style of balanced opposition of the opening chant of the *Kumulipo* is a brilliant reduction of the theme and metaphysics of dualism within a compressed poetic context. In philosophically reducing all organic and abstract form to dualistic categorization and opposition, however, the ancients were inevitably to grant greater respect to the masculine component of the universe and human life and to diminish the importance of the feminine" (Johnson 1981, 29).

Ignoring all this, and the even stronger evidence of gender asymmetry provided by ritual, Charlot claims that I downgrade "Hawaiian goddesses and women, imposing on them an old-fashioned Western image" (C. 132).<sup>34</sup> He tries to deny the fact that Hawaiians considered women as ritually impure and excluded them from temple ritual, but he has no documentary basis to do so. His claim that in reiterating this well-known fact I appear "to argue against [my] sources, imposing a one-source picture upon the considerable evidence for a two-source, sexual ritual (e.g., 206, 217, 219-220, 282, 288; cf. 302-303)" (C. 132-133), simply displays what I am forced to call his considerable lack of honesty. None of the pages of my book that he mentions provide evi-

dence for his claim. On pages 206, 217, and 219, I refer to the Makahiki festival which, as a ritual transgression of the ordinary system of worship, suspends the separation of the sexes associated with that system and has sexual components, as I have myself emphasized. Indeed, on page 206 I mention the fact that all temple sacrifices were taboo during this period. Charlot's other references presumably are to the dangling penis of the man-god Kahōāli'i (V. 282) and the "dangling penis" of the temple image before it was covered with a loincloth (V. 288). I fail to see how this is evidence for a "sexual ritual"<sup>35</sup>; as I have shown, it is not sexuality but nudity, as symbol of the divine in its "untamed" state, which is significant in those contexts. Here again, Charlot sees too much sex in Hawaiian symbolism, perhaps due to his own Western bias. Hawaiians, however, do not seem to have believed that sexual intercourse was possible with a dangling penis! Charlot's reference to pages 302-303 presumably concerns my discussion of the symbolism of the Hawaiian house; again, this does not constitute evidence that the *luakini* ritual is a "sexual ritual."<sup>36</sup>

In his discussion on the alleged participation of "priestesses" in the purification rites preceding the entrance of men into the *luakini* temple, Charlot fails to mention that no Hawaiian source refers to it, and that it is only alluded to by Emerson (a source that Charlot disparages) in a footnote to Malo's text. At any rate, the rite occurs before the main ritual, from which women are notoriously excluded on pain of death. Furthermore, my comment on Emerson's dubious piece of information in no way reflects a "negative view of women." I am also at a loss to discover what speculation on page 277 reflects this supposed negative view. Such veiled remarks are hardly acceptable in scholarly argument.

Charlot's final criticism is that I use a "death-rebirth idea" (C. 133) borrowed from Frazer and Sahlins to interpret Hawaiian sacrificial ritual. He uses my discussion of the *kāli'i* rite as an example. In fact, I do say that the *kāli'i* is a symbolic death, but I do not say that it represents "rebirth." Charlot misunderstands my interpretation, which is based on my more general idea that ritual avoids the occurrence of what it represents (here the death of the king) by producing it fictitiously. The rite does not have to emphasize this result by representing it as a "rebirth," especially here where the effect sought is the "taming" of the king's violence. Indeed, in the *kāli'i* "to strike the king" (one translation of *kāli'i*) is immediately equated to "to make the king" (another translation of *kāli'i*). Charlot suggests that simple "surrender" to the king may be involved in the rite, but his interpretation does not stand up to the evidence, which shows that the alleged "surrender" is in fact an attack in

which the king can be killed (V. 211). Moreover, if it were a surrender, why would it be followed by a sham battle between the king's party and the opposing party?<sup>37</sup>

While there is no trace of the so-called "death-rebirth" model in my analysis of the *kāli'i* rite, I do use this model to interpret certain rites of the *luakini* temple. Although my interpretation is presented as conjectural, I find it justified for reasons that I have already stated in my book and which I will not repeat here. More generally, I will say that, in Hawaii as elsewhere (cf. Turner 1977), sacrifice employs an implicit death-rebirth idiom. For, as I have demonstrated at length with arguments Charlot does not counter, Hawaiian sacrifice is based on the principle of substitution. To kill a victim who stands for the sacrificer implies that the latter dies symbolically. But since this death is fictitious, and its only purpose is to transform the state of the sacrificer, its outcome can be (although is not necessarily, as I have mentioned) represented as a rebirth in a new state.

The argument implicit in sacrifice (a rite that has no place in Charlot's romanticized view of Hawaiian religion) finds its way into verbal utterances, contrary to Charlot's claims. Thus many sacrificial prayers associate the death of the victim who stands for the sacrificer with obtaining *ola*, "life," for him. Consider, for instance, these lines, a motto for one of my chapters:

*A hiki a ola  
no nei make ia oe e Lono*

Life is obtained  
by this death by you, o Lono (V. 200)

This text confirms what anybody who is not deaf can hear cried out by all sacrificial ritual: that life and death are dialectically connected, not radically separated, contrary to Charlot's opinion.<sup>38</sup> I find it peculiar, to say the least, that he uses the reaction of a modern Hawaiian audience as evidence for this alleged separation in ancient Hawaii. What contemporary Hawaiians say is no evidence for what their ancestors thought two hundred years ago. Furthermore, their suspect overreaction to the suggestion that the two senses of the word *make* ("desire" and "death") are connected cannot be taken, without further argument, as evidence that no such connection exists. It could legitimately be taken as evidence of the contrary, unless, of course, one decides that Hawaiians have no unconscious. But I, for one, do not subscribe to the paternalistic Western idea that Polynesians are Arcadian nature children, without dark

undersides. To say with Charlot that ancient Hawaiians, who used human sacrifice and other violent rituals to obtain *ola*, “life,” saw “life as health and vigor and joyous sexuality, and death as the opposite” (C. 135), that they did not “see death in life and life in death,” is to confuse them disrespectfully with modern California hippies. That some modern Hawaiian youths are closer to their California counterparts than to their ancestors, I would not deny, but to use their views as evidence on traditional values seems to me particularly unacceptable.

I will now briefly discuss the content of Charlot’s appendix, which concerns my criticism of his essay, “The Use of *Akua* for Living Chiefs.” I have never implied that Charlot’s thesis also referred to dead ali’i. It is not clear, for that matter, how this supposed misunderstanding of his position “misdirects Valeri’s discussion,” since the note where Charlot presumably illustrates his claim only refers to a discussion of the divinization of living ali’i (V. 145) and to our disagreement on the proper translation of the word *akua* in the sentence *he akua na ali’i o Kona* (V. 370 n. 37). In neither case do I imply that Charlot denies the well-known fact that dead ali’i were divinized.

It is not really necessary to spend much time on Charlot’s rebuttal of my criticism of his thesis that the use of the term *akua* to refer to living ali’i is an innovation due to Kamehameha and “used in the post-Kamehameha period.” The reason is very simple. Charlot does not even answer my basic and decisive criticism: How could Hawaiians begin addressing ali’i as *akua* precisely “when traditional religious concepts were undergoing a crisis (cf. Choris 1822, 123; von Chamisso 1864, 4:133-140) and the ali’i were losing their sanctity in the eyes of the people” (V. 145)? “Charlot attributes no motivation to this supposed innovation and no cause for its alleged success in the proto-missionary period” (ibid.). In particular, how could the usage of addressing the ali’i as *akua* have spread precisely when the Hawaiian aristocracy had ceased to believe in the gods and had abolished their cult? Charlot should know that explanation of human action requires the reconstruction of motives. But, as I have already noted, his way of writing history is most unhistorical: it consists in creating unmotivated sequences of events. Yet every historian knows that it is not sequencing in time, but motivation or “causation” that constitutes historical explanation.

To these arguments I would now add one more. Charlot’s thesis rests on a devaluation of the texts of Malo and Kamakau, where one finds explicit reference to the fact that high-ranking ali’i could be addressed or referred to as *akua*. Charlot argues that these texts have no documen-

tary value because they “could easily have been influenced by the post-Kamehameha practice” (C. 137). But with regard to Malo, at least, this argument holds no water: Malo was born in 1795 and thus had every chance to become aware of such an important innovation as that of giving the title *akua* to living ali‘i. He would have mentioned this innovation by Kamehameha. The same argument is valid, a fortiori, for the compilers of the *Mooolelo Hawaii* (1838).

Finally, Charlot has nothing to say against another of my basic claims, that whatever one wants to say about the texts where ali‘i are explicitly called *akua*, “one cannot hope to solve the question of the ‘divinity’ of the ali‘i by considering some texts independently of the global ideology that has produced them. Notions are not expressed only in words” (V. 145). It is precisely because of this that I rest my case that the highest ali‘i were considered *akua* on the abundant evidence demonstrating that the attributes and prerogatives of the ali‘i were similar or identical to those of the gods (V. 145-153). Although Charlot’s muteness in the face of the above arguments makes a detailed response to his reiterations unnecessary, I cannot leave unchallenged some of the erroneous statements or fallacies in which he indulges.

He claims that I try to prove that ali‘i “were called gods during their lifetimes” because they were descended from the gods. What I actually claim is that descent from the gods establishes that high-ranking ali‘i have qualities considered divine (V. 144). To my argument that ali‘i who were given the proper names of their gods must have been considered divine, Charlot retorts that one thing does not follow from the other, as demonstrated by the fact that “Hispanics . . . call sons Jesus” without implying that they are divine. The objection would be valid if the Spanish usage were comparable to the Hawaiian one. But it is not: the name Jesus may be given to any Spaniard irrespective of rank and is therefore totally unmarked, but the names of an ali‘i’s gods could only be given to him, as far as I know (see sources quoted in V. 145). Furthermore, I do not claim that the usage of calling ali‘i “by their god’s proper name” (V. 145) necessarily indicates that they also receive the common name *akua*; rather, I say: “In my opinion the custom of naming kings after their gods attests to the belief that the king is a manifestation of his gods and is therefore himself a god relative to all other men” (V. 145). As I have made abundantly clear, my discussion of whether or not Hawaiian ali‘i were called *akua* is secondary in my eyes because it is only part of the wider discussion of whether or not they were considered “gods” in the sense that they had divine qualities not available to inferior men.

This brings me to another false statement by Charlot, who writes of “Valeri’s purpose of demonstrating an absolute, not a qualified, applica-

tion of the word *akua* to a living chief” (C. 139). Charlot displays here an insufferable disregard for what I actually say, which is as follows: “Generally speaking, the opposition *akua/kanaka*, ‘god’/‘man,’ seems to be relative when applied to ali‘i” (V. 143); “some kings, at least, are called *akua*, ‘gods.’ This is because no sharp distinction is made between the gods and their closest manifestations among humans. Indeed, it seems that the opposition *akua/kanaka* is a relative one and that certain men may be called the gods of others” (V. 144). It is precisely for not having understood the relative character of the appellation *akua* that I have taken Charlot to task in my book (V. 144)!

Finally, two small points:

1. Charlot objects to my interpretation of line 734 of *Hauī ka lani*, which I take from note 1 to the Fornander text. The issue is whether or not the word *akua* in that line is a veiled reference to the ali‘i of Hilo. Charlot claims that “the line makes perfect sense when taken literally,” that is, when translated “blinded are the eyes of the gods with salt” (C. 139). I fail to see how this literal translation can make “perfect sense”: Who has ever heard that the eyes of Hawaiian gods were blinded with salt? In contrast, vanquished ali‘i were often blinded. I trust the interpretation contained in the footnote of Fornander’s collection because that interpretation is due to a respectable Hawaiian source, “J. P. Kuluwaimaka, a famed chanter” (Fornander 1916-1920,6:368).

2. Charlot complains that I do not take account of his objections to the chant of Kūali‘i as a document of the traditional use of the term *akua* to refer to living ali‘i. The reason for my neglect of his objections is that I do not find them convincing, particularly because he fails to give a motive to Kamakau’s alleged interpolation of references to King Kūali‘i as *akua* in the text of the chant (lines 593-594).

In his conclusion, Charlot says that “Hawaiian religion can be seen as itself only if looked at closely and carefully, that is, following scholarly rules of interpretation and argument” (C. 137). This is the only statement of his with which I wholeheartedly agree. But I have shown that Charlot has rarely followed scholarly rules in his “review” of my book. His implicit suggestion that “Pacific studies” follow his own example would be its end as a serious intellectual enterprise.

## NOTES

1. Another source that implies this and not simply the virginity of the female (as Charlot, n. 3, claims) is Fornander 1916-1920, 4:540.

2. Incidentally, Charlot does not even refer to this source properly. He quotes it as Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:88-89. In fact, the passage is from the second, not the first volume of the book, which was published in 1979, not in 1978. Nor was the first volume published in 1978; it appeared in 1972.

3. However, Mary Pukui is quoted there as saying: "Hawaiians placed very high value on virginity when a girl was reserved for the ali'i. Ali'i were considered to be under the keeping of the gods" (NK, 1:201). Pukui seems here to establish a connection between a religious fact (the ali'i are "under the keeping of the gods") and the requirement that their spouses be virgins, although later she speaks of virginity as a means of insuring legitimacy. The two views are not incompatible.

4. Even a couple of examples quoted from another chapter are in fact repeated in the chapter where I criticize Charlot.

5. Some Hawaiian words (such as *'aumakua*) have a special form in the plural. In conformity with common practice concerning the use of foreign words in English sentences, here as in my book, I have treated those words as invariable and therefore used them in their singular form only. In the same vein, English and Americans always write "twenty *lira*," using the singular form instead of the plural form of the Italian word.

6. Charlot (C. 117) observes that in the passage that he quotes, as in others (e.g., V. 306, 330), I put "is born" in quotation marks. He objects to this because "the Hawaiian equivalents do not appear in the Hawaiian text." Charlot seems to be ignorant of the fact that quotation marks (or inverted commas) may be used to indicate a nonliteral statement. Obviously, the god is not born in a literal, ordinary sense, and this is why I use the expression with quotation marks. Analogously, when I say that 'Umi is " 'reborn' as a noble" (V. 278), I imply that he is "reborn" in a metaphoric sense only. Charlot thinks instead, quite gratuitously, that the inverted commas imply that I claim to be quoting from my sources.

7. Let me remark in passing that Charlot attempts to support his interpretation with a reference to Ke'āulumoku's chant, which is precisely the kind of evidence that, when I use it, he finds objectionable because it "represents a very personal, uncommon viewpoint" (C. 110).

8. The rite is not mentioned in the third source (Wilkes 1845), but this is an extremely abbreviated (less than three pages) description of the *luakini* temple ritual.

9. "Thus for the sacrifice to be efficacious, it is necessary for the victim to be at once identified with and distinct from the sacrificer" (V. 48).

10. Also a result of his inattentive reading is the statement that my final (and ironic!) sentence refers to the logic of the entire system. It simply refers to the relationship between material and ideal conditions of the system, the discussion of which takes less than a page in my book.

11. This marginality is also indicated by the fact that the prophets leave before the king consecrates the offerings of chicken (in part at least contributed by them) and dogs to the goddesses (V. 329). Technically, then, they do not participate in the sacrifice proper.

12. The presuppositional nature of the notion of encompassment implies that it can even take the form of "encompassment of the contrary," Dumont's very definition of hierarchy

(Dumont 1966). In other words, even gods in stark contrast with the major ones may be viewed as encompassed by them.

13. The antistructural role of Pele and the goddesses associated with her is also manifested by their role as *akua noho* (gods of possession), which is emphasized by Malo (1951, 116).

14. Charlot (C. 126) also seems to suggest that I claim that only the four main gods participate in the *luakini* temple ritual; but since he himself refers to my book as evidence for the worship of other gods as well, he cannot be serious.

15. I may be allowed, in this context, to react to another author's criticism. In an otherwise perceptive review (for which I am very thankful), Jocelyn Linnekin takes issue with my use of a quotation from Malo: "The majority of women . . . had no deity and just worshipped nothing" (Malo 1951, 82). Linnekin writes that this statement is inconsistent with the "long list of female deities" (Linnekin 1985, 789) that precedes it. But she disregards the fact that Malo says that most of the female deities he enumerates were worshipped by certain women only--in most cases women who were involved in specialized activities (medicine, sorcery, dancing, tapa-printing). Therefore his general statement does not contradict his list of female deities.

16. It is ironic that Charlot accuse me of ignoring the direct relationship with "family gods," since my extensive analysis of these gods (V. 19-30) is preceded by a statement in which a "sharp contrast" is noted between the relation with the "great gods" and the relation with the family gods (*'aumakua*). Of the former relation I say that it may or it may not be hierarchically mediated (V. 19), but that it always "presupposes the social totality, precisely because everybody may invoke them" (V. 19-20). In other words, the four main gods are gods of all Hawaiians and therefore index the maximal level of Hawaiian society. In contrast, the *akua 'aumakua* are gods of kinship groups (or even individuals) only, and are directly related to them. My treatment of *akua 'unihipili* and more generally of sorcery should leave no doubt about the importance I give to direct relations with the gods. The cases of dreams, visions, and marriage of gods with humans mentioned by Charlot are treated in my book (V. 20-21).

17. As is noted by Pukui et al., an *'aumakua* can be " 'a spiritual go between,' passing on prayers to the akua" (NK, 1:35). Thus they mention "praying to the *aumakua* as link to the *akua*" (36), another indication of the encompassment of *'aumakua* by the *akua*, often represented by descent (ibid.).

18. I found the following statement rather entertaining: "Valeri's exclusive equation of 'subject' with 'human' is unusual. Some worldviews recognize nonhuman subjects, such as angels and leprechauns" (C. 126). I naively thought that angels and leprechauns were imaginary creatures in which the human subject projected himself!

19. My view of anthropomorphism is also the view that Raymond Firth found adequate to Tikopia religion: "*Atua* generally seem to have been thought of by the Tikopia as anthropomorphic in the sense that they were endowed with human characteristics in most contexts of discussion" (Firth 1970, 67); yet "when they wished to manifest themselves they might assume alternative forms: they might inhabit an inanimate object . . . or they might enter an animate body, as a bird or a human being" (V. 109). In other words, the anthropomorphic character is present even when the gods manifest themselves in natural objects (*fakatino*, a cognate of the Hawaiian *kino*): "It is not held that the object reveals

the actual shape of the god; he is spoken of and treated as if he were anthropomorphic" (Firth 1967, 207).

20. See for instance this sentence: "the *kino lau* of gods are constituted by the projection of human predicates and their subjects (individual or collective) on the species and other phenomena of the natural world that evoke them" (V. 11).

21. Analogously, the contradiction that Charlot attributes to me in his note 32 is of his own making.

22. I believe, moreover, that most 'aumakua gods could manifest themselves in human mediums, thereby assuming human shape. As ancestors, furthermore, they must have been able to appear in human form in dreams and visions.

23. Let me consider these texts in the order in which they are given by Charlot:

1. "Fornander 1918-1919, 366 (shark)." This text mentions a king (ali'i) of the sharks, not a god. His brother is said to be "a famous shark deity," not by the text but by its editor, Thrum. There is no reference anywhere that this supposed shark deity was not able to assume the physical form of man, contrary to what Charlot claims.

2. "Green 1923, 16-17 (bird)." This text is simply an animal tale and does not say that the two birds it mentions are gods.

3. "Green 1923, 44-45 (caterpillars)." Possibly Charlot's idea that the caterpillar mentioned in this text is a god is based on the arbitrary analysis of the name of its species, *kuawehi*, into *kua* (=akua) and *wehi*. This analysis is an example of Charlot's category "too many meanings" and is therefore erroneous by his own standards. Pukui and Elbert do not analyze the word at all, but define it as "dark caterpillar resembling *poko*, cutworm" (PE, 158).

4. "Green 1923, 46 (squid)." This text does not say the squid is a god.

5. "Green 1926, 66-69 (rat and owl)." In this animal tale, Rat and Owl (capitalized in the text as proper names) are said to be *kupua*, "demigods" (PE, 171). The editor of the tale explains what this means: "the animals are represented as *kupua*, or beings who can take either animal or human form at will." This flatly contradicts Charlot's claim that the tale is evidence of gods who can only take animal form. Note, moreover, that the tale refers to Owl as "*he kanaka mahia'i*," "a man who farms," and to Rat as "*he kanaka palaualeo*," "a lazy man." The use of *kanaka*, "human being" (PE, 118), leaves no doubt of the fact that these two *kupua* are conceived more anthropomorphically than theriomorphically, and that it is dangerous to infer animal character from an animal proper name.

6. "Green and Pukui 1936, 174-175 (squid); 176-177 (fish)." I don't have access to this text.

With the possible exception of the last, none of the sources cited by Charlot as evidence prove his point. Moreover, they have little value as evidence, since they were collected in the twentieth century. Rut Charlot is not afraid of anachronism, since he also cites "many contemporary Hawaiian religious experiences" as proofs of his point. It is on this faulty or anachronistic evidence that he bases his theory that "anthropomorphism is a later element in Hawaiian religion that was applied secondarily to the older theriomorphic gods" (C. n. 33).

Charlot also mentions "a useful list of categories . . . in Fornander 1919-1920, 6:52-55" (ibid.). It is not clear what he means by "categories." The text--a mere fragment--lists various natural phenomena and claims, quite erroneously, that they are worshipped as such. It does not say that these phenomena are manifestations of deities, let alone that they are their only manifestations. Charlot's cavalier use of evidence and quotation is

again very much apparent here and in his other claim that I neglect the “gods who emerge with animal species in the *Kumulipo* before the birth of anthropomorphic gods and human beings (e.g., *Kīwa‘a*, line 366).” Where does the *Kumulipo* say that the bird *kiwa‘a* or any other such species is a god, I pray? And what exactly are these “gods who emerge with animal species”?

24. Indeed, they are confirmed by a statement of Hewahewa, the last high priest, in conversation with Judd: “In conversation with Hewahewa today, he said they always thought that God lived in heaven, that they made the idol and presented offerings hoping the spirit would descend and take possession of the idol and give answer to their enquiries as to the *pono* and the *hewa*. The old people said God had done so formerly” (J. P. Judd, Notes on his tour of Oahu, beginning 27 March 1834, Hawaiian Mission Children’s Society Library, Judd Papers). (This reference was kindly provided by Marshall Sahlins.)

25. Incidentally, I nowhere “admit” that my view “cannot be found in the Hawaiian texts”.

Charlot’s accusation that my language is “very irregular” when speaking of “invisible” because I apply this term not only to the gods, but also to the *ali‘i* or to *Kahiki*, is in fact directed against the English language, where “invisible” means both “that cannot be seen; that by its nature is not an object of sight” and “not in sight; not to be seen at a particular place or time, or by a particular person” (OED). More importantly, I make clear that the nonvisibility of *ali‘i* from commoners and of *Kahiki* from Hawaii is used as an experiential analogue of the invisibility of the gods that *Kahiki* and *ali‘i* are ultimately meant to evoke. Thus I call *Kahiki* a spatial “metaphor” of the divine origins (V. 8), and I define the prostration taboo (*kapu moe*) of the *ali‘i* as “a means of making these sacred beings invisible by acting not on their persons, but on their beholders” (V. 147). For other methods of creating experiential analogues of invisibility, see pages 148, 268-269, 300-301, 323-325. Note also that I speak of “relative invisibility. . . . of high-ranking *ali‘i*” (V. 147), not of absolute invisibility.

Even on this question, Charlot does not fail to offer us an amusing example of his tendency to contradict himself from one sentence to another. Just after having written that “*Kahiki* is called ‘invisible’ [by Valeri] apparently because it can’t be seen from Hawai‘i (8-9),” he continues: “*Kahiki* must be so treated [by Valeri]--must be placed in a transcendental dimension rather than be accepted as a distant land within this universe . . .”

Note also that I nowhere say “that Hawaiians had the concept of immateriality” (C. 129). The origin of this extraordinary statement may be in Charlot’s misunderstanding of a general statement of mine about the use of perfume in ritual in general: “Note also that, like music, speech, or color, perfume has the property, precious from a ritual standpoint, of evoking immateriality in materiality, abstraction and generality in the concrete and individual (cf. Lewis 1980, 69)” (V. 268). In the analysis of the Hawaiian fact, which immediately follows this general statement, I do not use the term “immaterial” at all. On the contrary, I say that the gods “exist in experience thanks to a contrast between ‘absence from sight’ and ‘presence in smell’ ” (V. 268-269).

26. See, for instance, V. 153, where the sentence “the predicates of the divine” means: the predicates that characterize all the gods.

27. Note also that I use the expression “the divine” very seldom and not “widely” as Charlot claims. Moreover, two out of five references given by Charlot for this use are bogus. Thus “the divine” is not mentioned on page 88: on page 90, as the reference to

Dumont makes clear, it is used as an abbreviation of the expression "divine sphere," which is contrasted to the expression "human sphere."

28. Charlot also manages to distort what I say about this expression, by failing to mention that I quote it with Pukui's translation "out of the unseen." This translation evokes, precisely, cognitive undifferentiation: what remains unseen cannot be differentiated. Only insofar as the gods have emerged from the "unseen" (Pō) can they be identified and therefore differentiated one from another.

29. Note that the *Kumulipo*--exactly like some Maori cosmogonies (cf. Taylor 1855, 14-16)--is not simply a cosmogony. It is also a gnoseology; it accounts for the possibility of knowing the divine.

30. I now consider erroneous my statement that the Earth's slime is the *kumu* "source" of Pō (V. 4). This interpretation was suggested to me by Beckwith's (1951) translation of lines 6-7 of the *Kumulipo* and by her rather confusing comments on pages 44-45, which made me think that the slime was produced by the union of Sky and Earth. The new translation by Johnson (1981), which unfortunately I read only after my book was in press, unequivocally shows that Pō is its own source:

From the source in the slime was the earth formed  
from the source in the dark was darkness formed  
from the source in the night (pō) was night (pō) formed. (Johnson 1981, 3)

Thus Pō is not generated sexually by the "marriage" of Sky and Earth, but generates itself, asexually, as the last line clearly states.

31. Note, however, that in none of the pages quoted by Charlot (V. 156, 7, 75) to support his statement that I "must use 'creation' or 'production' " (C. 131) do I use the word "creation." With a characteristic non sequitur Charlot, after having assimilated my use of the word "creation" to that of a certain "Western scholar," claims (n. 42): "Valeri's text is a good example of the power of distortion of such use. [In fact my use is different.] Valeri's emphasis on creation--rather than procreation--entails his elevation of \*sight and intelligence' to 'what is most human.' " I fail to see the logical connection between Charlot's two claims. While the intestinal regions were indeed involved in intellectual processes, the privileged connection between "sight and intelligence" is demonstrated by the word *'ike*, which means: "To see, know, feel, greet, recognize, understand . . . to receive revelations from the gods; knowledge, understanding, recognition, comprehension and hence learning; sense, as hearing or sight; vision" (PE, 90). The superiority of seeing (and hearing, which is associated with it in *'ike*) in humans is explicitly claimed by at least one Polynesian text and cannot therefore be dismissed as a "typically Western" view: "The eyes and ears of man govern the muscles and head. If the eyes sleep, the ears are closed also; but if the ears hear a voice or sound, the eyes open. They are thus the guardians of the body, and see or hear things nigh or distant by which the body may be injured" (White 1887-1890. 1:163).

32. The transformation of bodily parts of a god and other modes of nonprocreational production found in Hawaii are also common elsewhere in Polynesia, for instance in Tikopia (Firth 1970, 87; 66). Note that in Tikopia the most generalized idiom to account for the production of food plants by the gods is not procreational but defecational, if one may say so. In effect, these plants are considered to be the gods' excrements (Firth 1970, 66; Firth 1967, 159-160).

33. This shows, incidentally, that the *Kumulipo* is more anthropocentric and sociocentric than Charlot would have it.

34. His evidence for this alleged imposition of an (unspecified) old-fashioned Western image is a string of quotations, given out of context, which he thinks he can refute by writing: "In fact, all the activities mentioned above, except childbearing, were performed by men as well" (C. 132). Charlot's quotations from my book do not say otherwise, since they refer to women's "predominant role" in dancing, to their "privileged relationship with the female deities of sorcery," and to "properly feminine activities." None of these expressions implies that these activities are exclusively feminine. At any rate, it is not clear how Charlot's statement "proves" that my picture of Hawaiian women is based on Western views of women. Furthermore, I object to his constant mode of argumentation: if there is some similarity, however vague, between an account of Hawaiian views and Western views, then the description is false. Such argument is unacceptable because it denies a priori, and without demonstration, that points of similarity may exist between Hawaiian views and Western views.

35. How can the *luakini* temple ritual be considered a "two-source, sexual ritual" when any participant who is caught having sexual intercourse with a woman is put to death? Such prohibition indicates the explicitly nonsexual character of the ritual.

36. I dismiss as dubious Kamakau's statement that the temple images to the left of the altar were female, because he is the only author to claim so and because his account of whatever concerns the *luakini* temple and its ritual is often untrustworthy (cf. V. 335-336; 382 n. 32). Furthermore, the earliest source (Samwell 1967, 1177-1178) does not support the view that images on the left side of the altar were in any way contrasted to those on the right side; the iconography confirms this, since it does not show that the left-side images had female traits. To my claim that "all surviving images are anthropomorphic," Charlot objects that "a number of nonanthropomorphic, undeterminable, and unshaped stone gods can be seen at the Bishop Museum" (C. n. 36). But if these stones are shapeless and undeterminable, how can Charlot determine that they are images of gods? Simply because it is said so by curatorial tradition? At any rate, a former curator, Brigham, seems to have had a different opinion on this matter. He noted that he never saw any carved image of animals (let alone of theriomorphic gods), with the single exception of fish (Brigham 1902, 92-94). The existence of these few fish images, however, does not prove that there were purely theriomorphic gods. Indeed, fish-gods are explicitly given both human and fish form in myth (V. 76-79). Shark-gods, in particular, seem to have often been given this double nature (Beckwith 1940, 129-130, 138-139, 140-143, etc.). With the exception of a couple of fish images in the Bishop Museum, then, my statement that "all surviving images are anthropomorphic" (V. 9) remains correct. Note, moreover, that my statement is followed by the qualification that "sometimes nonanthropomorphic components are included." It is implied that these components may have motivated Malo's claim that there were cases of theriomorphism. The essential point, however, is that anthropomorphic images played an absolutely dominant role in Hawaiian ritual, particularly in the temple ritual (cf. Brigham 1902, 93). This fact supports my view that ritual is fully efficacious only when the god is made present anthropomorphically. But I have never denied that the gods were made present indexically as Charlot claims with his Laka example (which I myself give, V. 396 n. 177). On the contrary, I have mentioned a variety of purely indexical signs of the gods in ritual (V. 267-269, 270, 272, 281, 300, 308)--only I do not call them "images," since, precisely, they are not icons!

37. Charlot again displays his literal-mindedness in his objection that disassembling the image of Lonomakua cannot imply that this god is killed. First, let me note that no act occurring in the context of ritual can be considered as a purely material, technological act. The ritual disassembling of a god's image is not the same thing as the dismantling of something without symbolic signification: the image represents the god and even embodies him. Second, the dismantling cannot be evaluated independently of its syntagmatic context. Since it follows the king's violent termination of the Makahiki, the undoing of the image of the god who functions as Lord of Misrule appears as much more than a material undoing. Contrary to what Charlot suggests, this hypothesis is not in the least contradicted by the fact that Lono returns to Kahiki, since this return is effected by the god's neutralization through his symbolic death (again, without rebirth).

38. Charlot admits that Hawaiians were "acquainted" with the "death-rebirth theory" (C. 134), but claims that they made "sparing use" of it. His pseudo-ecological hypothesis to explain this alleged sparingness ("lack of winter and spring, planting obviously living taro-tops rather than dead-looking seeds") cannot be taken seriously. A great number of cultures, even in the Pacific and Indonesia, employ the death-rebirth metaphor although they lack winter and spring and cultivate tuberous plants instead of seeds (why these should look dead is a mystery: rice seeds, for instance, are often conceived as alive in Southeast Asia). Charlot's other hypothesis--that "strong and consequent dualism" in Hawaii rules out the death-rebirth model because it excludes any dialectical connection of life and death--is also contradicted by comparative evidence. No wonder, since I cannot think of a deeper misunderstanding of the relationship between opposites in a dualistic system! It remains to be demonstrated, moreover, that Hawaiian thought is as dualistic as Charlot makes it. Dualism is certainly not the only mode of Hawaiian culture.

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## CONTRIBUTORS

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John Charlot, Institute of Culture and Communication, East-West Center, 1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96848, U.S.

Katharine Luomala, Department of Anthropology, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Porteus Hall 346, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, U.S.

Keith L. Morton, Department of Anthropology, California State University-Northridge, Northridge, California 91330, U.S.

Doug Munro, School of Arts, Darling Downs Institute of Advanced Education, Toowoomba, Queensland 4350, Australia

Valerio Valeri, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637, U.S.