BOOK REVIEW FORUM

Valerio Valeri, *Kingship and Sacrifice: Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii.* Translated from the French by Paula Wissing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. xxviii, 446, index. $22.50 paper, $55.00 cloth.

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The publication by a prestigious university press of a major book on the little-studied subject of Hawaiian religion is an important event for the development of a scholarly field. Such a book deserves careful attention, especially from the small number of other students of the subject. My purpose in this article is to make a detailed examination of Valerio Valeri's methods and major conclusions in this book. In so doing, I am continuing a work of criticism I began some years ago on the French typescript of an earlier version of this work (xv).[1] A subject as large as Hawaiian religion can naturally support a wide variety of opinions, and frank and open discussion is necessary for the arduous process of developing consensus on points of substance and proper method.

Many aspects of Valeri's work can be commended. Such a comprehensive book can remind scholars of neglected aspects of the subject. Moreover, an impressive number of sources have been used in the book. Most important, Valeri, unlike too many scholars, works from the Hawaiian language and uses diacritical marks. He also works from Hawaiian manuscript materials, which are sometimes quite different from the translations made of them (e.g., Malo 1951). In using these materials, he often makes good points about proper method. In the lat-

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ter part of the book, he provides useful descriptions of Hawaiian ceremonies based on correlations of different sources.

These positive aspects and many others will be evident to readers of Valeri's book. I will now concentrate on some of the criticisms I feel must be made of it.

Valeri states that writing the book constituted for him an "interpretive experience" of the "dialectical relationship between theory and interpretation." The more he "understood the logic of Hawaiian thought, the clearer certain crucial anthropological problems became," and vice versa (x). His book is best understood, I would argue, through an examination of the relation of his theory to the evidence. This is, I realize, a pressing issue in anthropology. For instance, Alfonso Ortiz has demonstrated that the theories of Claude L&i-Strauss cannot be applied to the Tewa.[2] After the publication of two major works on Hawai'i with a more empirical orientation (Linnekin 1985; Kirch 1985), it is instructive to study an exemplary model of another approach.

I start, therefore, not with Valeri's views but with his methods, especially his relation to his materials: historical documents, texts in Hawaiian and European languages. Valeri's book is interesting among other reasons as an example of a transition by some anthropologists from fieldwork to historical documentary research. The problems Valeri encounters are thus instructive and significant. Valeri makes valid theoretical points about method (xvii, xxiv, xxviii, 66, 96-97, 191-192), but criticisms can be made of his practice. (I will not discuss problems of translation).

A major problem of Valeri's book, in my opinion, is the quantity of inaccurate references. I give below a few examples and will add others in later sections of this article.

1. Valeri argues (149) that chiefs must maintain their purity partly "through their own comportment." He gives as an example: "divine ali'i . . . are obliged--men and women--to remain virgin until marriage."His source (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:88-89) refers, however, only to women: "Among ranking *ali'i,* girls were required to be virgin until the first planned union to conceive a child. This was a kind of precautionary virginity. Sexual adventure before this royal mating could well upset the genealogical applecart!" (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:89). This virginity was maintained, therefore, for purely practical genealogical reasons, not for the maintenance of ritual purity. Moreover, the authors go on to say that the emphasis on virginity in some Hawaiian legends is a result of missionary influence and that, in reality, practice was loose.[3]

After a semicolon, Valeri continues, "chastity belts are even used." His first reference, which is to the same work (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1978, 1:91), does not, however, discuss virginity before marriage, but fidelity within marriage. The example cited by the authors (Fornander 1916-1917, 4:172-173; see also 164-167) refers to the wife of an impotent and jealous husband. Moreover, the text belongs to the Moʻikeha stories, which are nontraditional in form and thus arguably nineteenth-century compositions. Valeri's other example (Fornander 1916-1917, 4:112-114) is also a Moʻikeha story about a woman living with a man who is unfaithful to her; for revenge, she binds herself to prevent his having intercourse with her.

Not one of Valeri's references supports his point. Indeed, the thrust of his first reference can be used against his view.

2. Valeri states that there was a Hawaiian "belief' that the aliʻi "just like the gods, have natural 'bodies' along with their human form. . . . this is particularly true of mythical aliʻi, who are readily placed at the origin of certain species, especially foods" (146). Of, the three examples he gives, the first (Fornander 1918-1919, 5:266) could better be understood as a story of the gods; and the second (ibid., 270, 272) does not state that the persons involved are chiefs. The third (ibid., 279) fits, but one example does not demonstrate a regular "belief."

Valeri then writes, "As for living aliʻi, it is believed that they often manifest themselves in powerful and sometimes terrible animals in order to punish or protect their subjects." All of Valeri's references are to chants in which a chief is called various animals, such as a shark, stingray, or frigate bird. Such metaphors are common in Hawaiian poetry and cannot be used to demonstrate that the chiefs in question actually assumed the bodies named. Moreover, the chiefs honored in the chants are historic figures: Kalaniʻōpuʻu and Kamehameha. Had they been able to assume nonhuman bodies, it would have been mentioned in the many historical accounts we have of them. (The final reference in Valeri's note 40 is to one of the legends he referred to when discussing mythical chiefs.)

Valeri argues against taking such poetic statements as "simple metaphors" (151). The chiefs have a "true affinity" to natural phenomena: "Thus, the king is not only compared to the shark, he is the shark because he can act through this animal, because he has a substantial relation to it, because he is its descendant." I myself have used such points to describe the Hawaiian view of the close relationship of all human beings to the other elements of the universe (Charlot 1983a: e.g., 35-44, 62), but these points do not prove an *identity* of the chief

with the shark or that he can assume a shark body. Valeri himself states higher on the same page, "the king is compared to a shark," and has himself insisted on the metaphorical character of chant (148).

3. Valeri states, "Sexual intercourse with inferiors is also polluting to superiors" (91; also 149). This is surprising because, as Valeri himself shows (150, 372 n. 56), such intercourse was extremely frequent, indeed, a stock theme of Hawaiian literature. The text from Malo that Valeri cites in support of his statement refers to marriage with the ***kauwā*** or pariah class, definitely a special case (Malo 1951, 70-71). Moreover, such a marriage is presented as bad for genealogical reasons --that is, one becomes *déclassé*--rather than for reasons of pollution.[4]

Valeri's second reference (Kamakau 1961, 128; used also on 149) describes Kahahana's losing certain Maui *kapu* privileges by having intercourse with "the lesser chiefesses." Chiefly *kapu* are, however, a complicated subject (Charlot 1985, 10-11, 37-40). *Kapu* often have particular rules, and one cannot generalize from one example. For instance, another Maui *kapu,* the *Po'oho'olewa i ka lā*, required its owner to shield her head from the sun's rays (Sterling and Summers 1978, 243). One could not argue from this one example that doing so was a general practice; it was simply the regulation of a particular *kapu.* Valeri's references do not, therefore, support his point.

In his related note (361 n. 12) Valeri states, "Note also that for a high-ranking woman the loss of virginity involves a loss of purity and mana." His one reference is to the nineteenth-century novel *Laieikawai* by S. N. Hale'ole. Despite its many qualities, the novel cannot be used as a reliable guide to classical Hawaiian culture, especially when dealing with sexuality and the novel's heroine, who receives in many ways a Victorian idealization.

4. Generalizations can be made only with caution from individual authors or works of literature. For instance, chiefs and their lands were often connected, but the extreme aspects of identification cited by Valeri (146, par. 2; see also 152) can be found only in Ke'āulumoku, who, however important, represents a very personal, uncommon view-point.

5. Valeri's references to secondary literature also need to be examined. He states that chiefs "are characterized by immobility and inactivity" (147). That Valeri takes immobility literally can be seen from other statements (272, 336). Neither of Valeri's references to G. W. Kahiolo and Samuel H. Elbert supports his view; they both portray chiefs as delaying a desired action and finally accomplishing it, a common motif in Hawaiian literature. To support his view, Valeri has only a pejorative

remark by a foreigner, amply refuted by contemporary literature (147 and n. 48).[5]

Such examples could be multiplied, and I will mention some in my discussion. The above suffice to show that Valeri's references must be checked by any serious user of his book.

Such references often depend, of course, on Valeri's interpretations of texts and here also problems can be found. Valeri often announces his interpretation of a text rather than offering arguments in support of it. For instance, he interprets a farming chant as "a verbal replica of the transfer of forces that is the condition of the success of the rite. . . . Like the waves coming from over the horizon to break on the Hawaiian shores, the gods come from Kahiki to bring life" (55). An examination of the chant reveals that this interpretation is based on only one line--a reference to a wave from Kahiki in a stereotyped wave list[6]--a small basis for understanding a thirty-two-line chant. An examination of the rest of the chant can provide an interpretation that accounts for more of its lines (Charlot 1983b, 64-65). Moreover, the idea that the gods must come from Kahiki every time they are invoked requires support. Valeri elsewhere recognizes the existence of the *wao akua,* "the uplands of the gods" (V.: "hinterland of gods"), where they can reside (273). The journey of Lono from Kahiki to Hawai'i is considered a major event (8).

Similarly, Valeri wants to use a story to prove that god, sacrificer, and victim are identified with each other (132). The story is about a priest, named Kānehekili after the thunder god, whose body, when he dies, is divided and distributed to people who establish the cult of the thunder god in their particular locations. The two problems for Valeri's interpretation are that the story is about the priest, not the god, and that he dies, rather than being sacrificed. Instead of addressing these problems, Valeri simply states, "worship of the god is made possible by the victimization of his priest, who is obviously identified with him (he even bears his name)." That is, Valeri takes as given precisely the two points he should prove. Alternatives are possible: the body of the priest could be efficacious without being considered a sacrifice, and so on.

On the other hand, Valeri dismisses texts that do not fit his views. After developing a theory of *mana,* Valeri writes, "But in certain contexts the word mana seems to be banalized, to lose its connection with both god and community" (100). After using part of a chant, he writes (391 n. 81), "I am not considering the entire chant because it is somewhat anomalous and most difficult to interpret." The chant is no more obscure than others Valeri uses. It just does not fit his theory; it is "anomalous."

When Valeri does explicitly analyze texts, other problems in method become evident. For instance, he can take one sense of a word and ignore others. He notes in the *Kumulipo* "a curious detail. The god Kāne bears the name of his worshiper, the human male (kāne)." The first man, on the other hand, "is called Ki'i ('image'), the generic name attributed to the anthropomorphic images of the gods used in worship." The result is, Valeri concludes, "a man named as god and a god named as man" (6). A glance at the dictionary will show that Valeri is selecting only one sense of *ki'i.* Moreover, the primary and strict sense of *kāne* is "male."[7] The word can be used for the human male, but for any other male as well: animal, vegetable, mineral, or god.

Another problem in method--unfortunately widespread--is using too many senses of a word. Polynesians' wordplay with the many homonyms of their languages is impressive, and the temptation to extend it by using the multiple meanings of a word now conveniently provided by dictionaries has proved irresistible to most workers in the field (e.g., Charlot 1983a, 87, 91). The problem is knowing when to stop. For instance, a ritual formula for weakening the god Kamapua'a contains repetitions of the word *lau.* Valeri writes (51), "In my view this is because of its double meaning, 'numerous' and 'seine' (PE, 179). *Lau* is a trick word, indeed, for 'numerous' offerings entice Kamapua'a and paralyze him in a 'seine.' " A pig in a seine is an unusual image. There are in fact no Hawaiian stories or accounts of a pig being caught in one, certainly not Kamapua'a.

Examples of using too many meanings or uses of a word abound in Valeri's work. A tapa cloth around the waist of an image is called a *piko,* "navel," and cut in clear imitation of the ceremony for cutting the navel cord of a child. Valeri finds it "probable" (316), even though unsupported by textual evidence, that the cord represents two other references for *piko:* genitals and crown of the head or fontanel. A child can be circumcised, but how could the crown or fontanel be cut?

To give another example, Valeri mentions the ritual expression *"lele wale ka 'aha,* 'the *'aha* (sacrificial rite, prayer) has flown away *(lele)'.*

Lele also means 'messenger'. . . . The altar is indeed a 'messenger' that allows men and gods to communicate" (386 n. 20).[8]

Quite large sections of Valeri's book can be based on such arguments (e.g., 294-299). Valeri combines a number of traditional uses of the place name Kahiki (8-9). The most common is that of a foreign land from which gods and other strangers come. Valeri combines this sense with references to cosmic points. He has also introduced the word "invisible," which does not appear in those texts. The result of this oper-

ation is a definition of Kahiki as "the indeterminate and invisible transcendent place . . . conceived as that which encompasses the visible world." This definition does not fit accounts of travelers sailing to Kahiki and setting foot on land.

Valeri also divides words into parts to get more meanings. *Kauila* wood can yield *ka uila,* "the lightning": "a manifestation of divine power in its luminous but violent . . . form" (269).

A characteristic method of Valeri's is to systematize texts. Valeri cautions against this method (191): "each of the principal texts must be considered separately and the elementary rules of source criticism be applied . . . to carefully evaluate the differences between the sources and to resist the temptation to arbitrarily construct a single account of the rites patched together from different sources." However, Valeri writes that two gods who, in one text, "originate in Pō, are said in other texts to come from Kahiki" (8). This observation is used, among other things, to connect Pō and Kahiki. Later in the book (331-332) he puts together different versions of a story to make his point. Other examples will be discussed below.

Valeri's arguments from texts are often tenuous. In the Kelou Kamakau text on a ceremony (289), the mood during an evening respite is described as *'olu'olu,* a reduplicative of *'olu,* a word with many glosses: "cool, refreshing, soft . . . pleasant, comfortable; polite, courteous," and so on (Pukui and Elbert 1971, s.v. " *'olu*"). Valeri uses "affable." Later (307-308), Veleri argues that *'olu'olu* is "the very word Malo uses to describe the effect the sacrifice has upon the god. This highlights the correspondence between the state of the god and that of society; thus K. Kamakau's text makes it clearer that the god's 'affability' is the result of the 'affability' reigning in society rather than the reverse, since the latter precedes the former." *'Olu'olu* is a common word, so it would be difficult to make the correspondence argument even if it were appearing in the same text. To find the same word in two different texts at different points of the account of the ceremony and draw a connection between them is tenuous indeed.[9] Valeri, however, does not stop there. Because the word appeared earlier in reference to the people and later in reference to the god, the *'olu'olu* of the latter is, he states, the "result" of that of the former. That is, not only is there a correspondence between the two, but a causal relationship.

Valeri often draws conclusions such as the above, conclusions that go far beyond any support provided by the evidence. Valeri states that "dance is necessary to help develop the fetus of an ali'i and to ease his birth." He goes on to argue that dance "contributes to affirming the

reality of the ali'i's mana." He then goes a step further: "This is why it is believed that by dancing people help engender their ali'i" (218). No reference is given. Valeri goes even further: "Just as dance engenders the infant ali'i, it can be supposed that during the Makahiki it also engenders the god Lonomakua." A paragraph later, one reads, "The engendering of Lonomakua, like that of any god . . ." (219). A few pages later, the ceremony "presupposes that Lonomakua is rather inoffensive at the outset, since he is born of the feasting and thus is already very close to humanity" (223; compare 394 n. 146; I will give further examples later of Valeri's hypotheses becoming confirmed facts, e.g., 99 and 101). In a similar fashion Valeri moves from the fact that certain birds perch on a type of tree to the statement that the statue made from such a tree "is inseparable from the birds" (272-273).

Valeri's arguments are often very short. Page 161, paragraph 3, contains a series of such arguments. One is that the king's rivals "are not only enemies, but also close relatives of the victor. Hence they are his doubles" (161). Similarly, "the king's human sacrifice is always a fratricide: either a literal one . . . or a metaphorical one--since every transgressor implicitly identifies with him and therefore becomes his 'double' " (165). And "Atea, who in central Polynesia is a symbol of clarity and light and as such is a double for Kāne" (169). For a final example, "Kahōāli'i not only is a human incarnation of Kū but is also, by the same token, the king's double, as witnessed by his being called the 'royal companion' " (325). Many arguments would be necessary to support such conclusions.

There are a large number of such short arguments in the book. "The tooth sacrificed is probably a substitute for the whole person, since to dream of losing a tooth means death" (355 n. 27). "While a priest is announced by a single rainbow, a high-ranking ali''i is announced by two rainbows. . . . In short, one ali'i equals two priests" (369 n. 19).

Valeri does not hesitate to introduce his speculations into an interpretation: "The mode of the pig's death indicates that it is a piglet, since otherwise it could hardly be lifted by one person and dashed against the ground. It thus seems that by incorporating a very young victim in Kū, the god's rebirth in a new form (Kūnuiākea) is brought about" (313). I will not discuss the validity of his argument or conclusion, except to say it is important for the theme of his book. I will note, however, that Hawaiian pigs were in fact smaller than modern Western ones and, even full grown, could have been handled as described by a robust man.[10]

Very often, Valeri eschews argument, covering a conclusion with a

word like "clear," "evident," "obvious," or "likely." Some longer phrases are "It is immediately clear, then . . ." (7); "It must follow . . ." (58); "We must deduce . . ." (86); "we must suppose . . ." (86, 111-112); "it seems difficult to deny . . ." (86); "seems to indicate . . ." (86); "We may conclude, then . . ." (87); "It seems reasonable to suppose, then . . ." (87); "It seems to me that this ritual clearly displays . . ." (87); "the evidence suggests that, at least to some extent . . ." (88); "legitimate to assume . . ." (98); "Putting all these clues together, I feel inclined to hypothesize that . . ." (99); "one is tempted to define . . ." (133); "It is difficult not to recognize in these . . ." (251); "The text by Wilkes prompts another reflection . . ." (308); "one cannot help relating . . ," (316); "Is it too audacious to suppose . . ." (326); "Clearly what is implied . . ." (391 n. 92). Such phrases create much of the impression of the book.

The hypothetical character of his points does not prevent Valeri from using them as if they were confirmed. This can happen very quickly. "This classification of the fish species is in large part hypothetical. It does in any case confirm the theory advanced . . ." (26). "Although this last proposition is speculative, it is confirmed by the fact that . . ." (325). We read that the feather god referred to could be "Kūkāʻilimoku or some equivalent god" (222); then the very next sentence states, "the fact that Kūkāʻilimoku obtains a place . . ." At the end of the paragraph, we read of the imposition "of the god of force (Kūkāʻilimoku) over the god of the festival (Lonomakua)."[11] As a result of such methods, Valeri's argumentation often seems nothing more than strings of hypotheses, each being treated as a fact by the one that follows (e.g., 315-317). These freshly minted hypotheses are so firm in Valeri's mind that he can berate the writer of an earlier book for not taking one into account.[12]

Valeri's entire book rests in fact on a circular argument: his theory developed in the first part of the book will be confirmed by his analysis of the ritual in the second (e.g., 191). But that analysis depends on his theory. For instance, he writes about his view of the hierarchy of gods: "the scheme I have presented is a simplified model; nevertheless I believe it is not an arbitrary construction. On the contrary, it will be confirmed by the analysis of the temple system" and the ritual (110). However, in his chapter on "The Hierarchy of Temples," he finds so many problems and must use so many qualifications (184-187), that he is forced to conclude: "The details I have just enumerated are so many limits on the validity of the model. . . . Nevertheless, I believe this model offers a valid presentation of the ideal background justifying the

concrete temple hierarchy. At any rate, on this point as on many others we are reduced to speculation, for the actual relations between individual temples are very poorly known to us" (187). He has, however, presented enough evidence to cast the very idea of such a hierarchy in doubt. In any case, since neither passage gets beyond a simplified and speculative model, neither can confirm the other.[13]

Valeri's attitude toward his evidence can be apprehended in an important passage (96-98). Wanting to elucidate the meaning of *mana,* he mentions that "Firth studies the various meanings of mana as they occur in all texts he recorded." "As a starting point, this method is of course a must." He concludes, "we must study the textual occurrences of mana in their contexts." Unfortunately, "the word mana does not frequently occur in the texts." After looking at the few examples, he writes: "However, it would be wrong to make much of the rare occurrence of mana in these descriptions. For one thing, Malo and Kelou Kamakau give only very few of the prayers that were uttered in the ritual, in which the word mana must have been included rather often." Valeri's argument for this point is that all the useful examples he finds in K. Kamakau do occur in prayers. But he has shown that those examples are very few, and he has proper reservations about accepting others.

On what then does he base his view that the word "must have been included rather often"? In a similar passage (145), he writes: "even if the ancient texts in which the word *akua* refers to ali'i are few, it can be safely assumed that this usage really existed because it follows necessarily from the attribution to ali'i of the fundamental properties of the divine." Valeri is deducing evidence from his theory.

Valeri continues arguing against finding the rarity of *mana* "excessively relevant ." The rituals "clearly involve the transmission of mana"; the texts are not "complete accounts" of the rituals "and especially of what is presupposed throughout it and therefore does not have to be explicitly stated." Though Malo and K. Kamakau "do not explicitly say so," another source--which Valeri argues should reflect Malo's opinion--does make the point. After further such arguments, Valeri concludes, "This example shows, I believe, the dangers of a blind literalism and of the assumption that only verbal statements are informative" (98).

No scholar would want to fall into such errors. Nevertheless, Valeri himself states that verbal expressions are clearest (e.g., 343-344), and the large quantity of available Hawaiian literature provides unusual opportunities for accurate understanding; but it also imposes responsibilities of precise interpretation and full documentation, in addition to

the fundamental responsibility of not going beyond the evidence. It is remarkable that at key points in his work, Valeri must admit that his views are not supported by the texts.[14]

Valeri's main thesis can fairly be said to depend on his interpretation of one section of the main temple ceremony: "the god 'is born' as a man, as the ideal man made possible by an ordered society. . . . The transformation of the god into the perfect type of the human male is thus completed. Therefore the true human nature of the god becomes fully apparent . . ." and so on (314-315; compare 250, 330, 345). Yet an examination of the text in question (Malo n.d., 175-176, sections 99-101; Malo 1951, 173; Valeri 1985,309) reveals that the two points Valeri is making--that the god is born and that it is "the ideal man" or "the perfect type of human male"--cannot be found.

Valeri puts "is born" in quotation marks (see also 287), but the Hawaiian equivalents do not appear in the Hawaiian text. Elsewhere, Valeri speaks of the birth as indeed taking place (e.g., 306, 330). What then do the quotation marks mean?

The ceremony described in the Hawaiian text is in fact that of cutting the navel cord, as Valeri himself states. Malo's description of the chiefly ceremony for male infants (Malo n.d., 141-142; Malo 1951, 136-137) shows that that ceremony could be separated from the birth. This is even clearer in the text of Kelou Kamakau:

> *a puka mai la iwaho, kaawale ae la ia, lawe ia aku la imua o ke alo o ke akua, a me ke alo o na kahuna, hoali ae la ke kahuna i ka ohe e oki ai o ka piko*
>
> "and when [the child] came out, he was separate/separated, he was taken out before the face of the god and the face of the priests. The priest waved the bamboo with which the navel cord was to be cut." (Fornander 1919-1920, 6:5, 7)

The ceremony is then briefly described.

Valeri has earlier treated a text on the chief 'Umi as a parallel: Liloa has 'Umi brought to the temple, "has his umbilical cord symbolically cut, and has him undergo other rites, following which he is 'reborn' as a noble" (277-278). In neither reference does the word "reborn" appear, although Valeri gives it in quotation marks. Moreover both translations have the expression *'oki ka piko* refer to circumcision rather than to cutting the navel cord, although the Fornander translation uses both. Furhermore, the navel cord cutting ceremony can be used as an image sep-

arate from birth, as can be seen from a vivid and unusual section of Ke'āulumoku's *Haui Ka Lani* (Fornander 1919-1920, 6:394-395, ll. 407-414).

Polynesians could use a number of images to express the beginning of something, and the exact extension of an image must be carefully delineated in any one use. Moreover, the primary object of the ceremony under discussion is the statue, and some discussion is necessary on which ceremonial points apply to it and which to the god, however one conceives of the relation between the two. I would argue, therefore, that Valeri goes beyond the evidence in describing the section of the ceremony as the birth of the god. His characterization of that god as a man is derived wholly from his theory and has no basis whatsoever in the text.

There is, moreover, one further difficulty for Valeri's theory. Of the three descriptions of the sequence of temple rituals, "Malo is the only author who describes the rite of the god's birth" (315). That is, what should be the most important ceremony of the whole sequence is replaced by a different one in two of the three sources. Valeri admits that these "texts differ because they reflect alternative practices rather than because one of them reflects the 'true' form of the ritual while the others do not" (317). Valeri exerts his considerable powers of argumentation (315-317) to demonstrate that "the comparison of the different versions of the rite reveals new aspects of its meaning and confirms the cogency of our previous interpretations. . . . [All three] descriptions presuppose the same sense relationships, thus the same 'grammar' " (317). The birth of the god cannot, however, be found in the other descriptions. Valeri writes, "The equivalence of the *maki'ilohelohe* rite in K. Kamakau's account and of the image's birth rite in Malo's account appears to be truly paradigmatic because the two rites occur in the same syntagmatic position" (317). Again, the element missing is any hint of birth. Valeri later passes over this difficulty (334).

Such difficulties with the textual evidence are not uncommon in Valeri's section on ritual.[15] In a characteristic passage he writes,

> The purpose of the rite is then clear; it brings about the growth of a god who, having just barely entered the men's temple, is like a small infant, still on the threshold of the human world into which he must be integrated. This "baby" is in fact not yet truly born, since the rite of the god's birth will take place later. But we must not take the metaphors of the rite too literally; this birth will not be the god's first (since each sacrifice uses the

> birth/death metaphor), but only his final and definitive "birth" --a little like that of 'Umi in the temple where his father sends him to "be born" a second time. (305-306)

In sum, one can apply to Valeri his criticisms of others: "They appear to be rationalizations; it is not clear whether they are produced by the informants or by the authors" (51; cf. 261).

Valeri's attitude toward evidence is best understood, I would argue, from his theoretical orientation; he states that his "analysis . . . is of the structural kind, tempered, however, by as much skepticism and good sense as I am capable of" (193; see also 388 n. 37). As seen earlier, his book is a result of the "dialectical relationship between theory and interpretation" (x). He himself provides the necessary information on his philosophical orientation and the sources of his main ideas: "I take as my starting point the Hegelian idea that religion is 'objective spirit,' that is, the objectified system of ideas of a community" (x). Combined with Platonic ideas, this view leads to the theory of Hawaiian gods as "types" (31-33): "this idea is personified, given a concrete (albeit imaginary) form; therefore it becomes a type" (ix); "the god is a concept, a type" (103; see also 74, 100-101, 347, and many other places). Such gods are both concrete and abstract (32 and 351 n. 32 for Hegel and Feuerbach references).

Valeri's interpretation of ritual and sacrifice is also inspired by these sources: "the major influence on my thought has been Hegel's *Phenomenology,* for I have attempted to view Hawaiian ritual as a manifestation of the dialectics of consciousness" (xi). Thus ritual is interpreted as reproducing a thought process (e.g., 70-74, 300-301, 308, 323-325, 345-346, 348). Another influence on this point is Durkheim's reductionist theory of "the efficacy of ritual as due to the power of collective consciousness on concrete social agents and relations" (xi).[16]

Also from Feuerbach Valeri takes the ideas that "Hawaiian religion is essentially anthropomorphic" (xi), that the state is a projection, so to speak, of human nature or essence, and that the head of state is "the representative of universal Man" (130). I will discuss below Valeri's attempt to universalize the anthropomorphic element of Hawaiian religion. The above Feuerbachian idea, combined with "the famous Brahmanic saying: 'Sacrifice is man. . . . Thus the sacrifice is the man' " (358 n. 65), provides also another central idea of Valeri's interpretation of ritual (49, 70-73, 355 n. 28; cf. 64) and of Hawaiian sculpture (248-253).

Valeri thus approaches Hawaiian religion with considerable philo-

sophical baggage. His writing is in fact remarkable for the number and frequent use of terms from Western philosophy and religion, terms introduced without explicit justification and used as analytical tools (I enclose in quotation marks those so used by Valeri): particular and universal (270); "essence" and "matter" (56); essence (138: "conformity with the idea of human essence"; 357, 366 n. 24, etc.); "substantialist" and divine substance (363 n. 3; used to translate Hawaiian); consubstantial (139); transcendental and non-empirical, immaterial (268, etc.); invisible, the divine (discussed below); "supernatural" (350 n. 3); "sacred" and "profane" (113); sacred and profane (120); creation (75, 89, 156, and throughout); incarnates (134); "miracles" (362 n. 26); eternal life and sacrificial death (328); Utopia (226). The word "mandate" (370 n. 33) is taken from Chinese religio-political thought.

Moreover, Valeri expresses, again without argument, classic Western views or reads them into Hawaiian thinking: on humans being separate from nature, on the separation of religion from natural science (35), on the nature of women, on sight and intelligence being "what is most human" (252), and on the male standing "for the entire human species because he is its superior form" (270).[17]

From his sources and statements it is clear that Valeri represents an extremely intellectualist Western philosophical tradition. He speaks approvingly of "evoking immateriality in materiality, abstraction and generality in the concrete and the individual" (268); of "the passage from a particular to a universal and from something natural to something human" (270); and states that "the transition from knowledge of the visible (which is particular and limited) to knowledge of the invisible (which is general and unlimited) can be obtained only by negating man's empirical vision. . . . the transformation of man's consciousness, which moves from empirical vision to intellectual vision, from the particularity of percept to the universality of concept" (324; see also 325).

Valeri's extreme intellectualism can be seen in his applying uses from logic of terms like "identical" and "substitutable" (93) to things that are not merely ideas. In doing so, he is following or extending structuralist practice. My purpose in this article is, however, not to discuss structuralism itself, but only Valeri's application of it to Hawaiian religion and culture. In Valeri's perspective, the great enemy chiefs Keōua and Kamehameha can be described as "perfectly identical" (162);[18] Palila is "interchangeable with the god he worships" (276); "the king and his adversary form a pair of absolutely identical terms" (279); "the interchangeability of victim, sacrificer, and sacrifier" (308; see also 389 n. 63).

Valeri goes even further. In a Hawaiian story a father praises a

heterosexual couple, using a list of traditional expressions of praise for people of great physical beauty. Valeri interprets this speech as describing the couple as "perfectly identical" (166). But in the speech, there is no hint of such a "perfect identity," which would be naturally impossible in such a couple.[19]

Valeri goes, however, even further than this: "There is, however, a logical and factual connection between the idea of royalty and that of twinship. The perfection innate in royalty implies that any plurality manifested within it is a plurality of identical beings. In fact, by definition, two or several perfect beings cannot be different without some of them being imperfect, since their perfection consists in fully instantiating the same type" (374 n. 87). In other words, perfection consists in looking a certain way, so two perfect beings would have to look exactly alike. Not many Western idealists would go to such an extreme. Valeri's argument turns on his definitions of "perfection," "type," and "instantiate," which he imposes without argument on Hawaiian culture.

Valeri's philosophical bent has a strong influence on his study of Hawaiian religion. A characteristic example is his discussion of chiefs' having "the fundamental properties of the divine" (145; also 145-153), several points of which I have discussed before. Valeri has argued "that the completeness, and therefore purity, of the gods is absolute and depends on no one but the gods themselves. Indeed a number of things considered *akua* evoke total autonomy and independence," such as the watch, compass, and clock owned by Captain Cook and the full moon. "For the Hawaiians the circle evokes a being closed in on itself because it is complete and self-sufficient." Valeri gives characteristic arguments for this, but then admits that "a different notion of the divine perfection is suggested by the *Kumulipo*." He concludes, "two notions of divine perfection or purity seem to coexist" (88-89). I will not discuss this section except to remark that many nonround objects were considered *akua* and that a traditional expression for feminine beauty--*mahina ke alo,* "the face is like a moon"--does not evoke autonomy and self-sufficiency.

Turning to chiefs, Valeri finds them like gods in "their association with emblems of transcendence and perfection. . , . celestial entities . . . whose circular form and movements connote perfection" (146). Valeri then concludes, "Conceived of as autonomous, from one point of view the ali'i are also thought to be free of desire, precisely like the gods" (147).[20] As Valeri himself admits (150), this statement contradicts the evidence for chiefs, whose very genitals were lauded publicly in chant.[21]

It also contradicts the evidence for gods, which Valeri does not dis-

cuss. But he himself has shown that they eat and can be attracted in prayer by being offered food (56, 133). Moreover the gods have sex. Pele and Kamapuaʻa are famous for their love affairs. Lonoikamakahiki is married in the myth that forms the foundation of the ritual Valeri is studying (214-215). Kū can be married in other stories. In a Hawaiian story, *"Komo ihola ka iini iloko o Kane a me Kanaloa no keia ui nohea"* ("Desire entered into Kāne and Kanaloa for this handsome young beauty," my translation; Green and Pukui 1936, 114). Valeri himself says that fertility is divine (273).

After discussing the immobility (see above, p. 110) and invisibility of chiefs, Valeri writes, "Because he is supposed to be self-sufficient, without desire or sadness, always in control of himself, a divine aliʻi cannot openly display his emotions; this is why he expresses them metaphorically, poetically" (148). Curiously, the one chant to which he refers contains not a single metaphor--perhaps the only one in all Hawaiian literature not to do so (Hawaiian text in Dibble 1838, 95; Rémy 1862, 202-205). All classes of Hawaiian society used poetry, and all the poems, except the perhaps unique exception Valeri cites, have metaphors. Moreover, those metaphors, as Valeri argues (151), were not "simple" but truly expressive of man's relation to nature. Poetry was used in many forms of communication, from joking, to courting, to praying, to politicking (Charlot 1985). Moreover, chiefs could use other genres. Stories picture them conversing, telling stories, and so on. Valeri shows them giving judgments in the ritual (e.g., 263, 289). I know of no evidence that Hawaiian chiefs and chiefesses had rank-related difficulty verbalizing. Similarly, there is no evidence that "high-ranking nobles always avoid situations where there is laughter, since laughing puts an end to taboos" (287). Kamehameha is reported making his courtiers laugh.

I cannot imagine a description of Hawaiian chiefs further from the richly available evidence. The *arhat*-like ideal Valeri extrapolates from his interpretation of circles contradicts even his own view of the interdependence of chiefs and the other elements of society (e.g., 7). Valeri sees that his picture contradicts the evidence. His solution--as in the case of the gods, discussed above--is to posit "an insurmountable contradiction" in Hawaiian culture on this point (149-150). The contradiction is between his theory and the evidence.

I would now like to criticize in less detail some of Valeri's main points. In accordance with the ideas of Hegel, Valeri announces as a major theme that there is a Hawaiian religious "system" (x) just as there

is a system of rituals (189, an idea he seems to get from Mauss) and of society ("society as a consistent system," 187). In this system can be found "the logic of Hawaiian thought" (x; also, e.g., 192). Valeri uses that underlying logic for his arguments[22] and for his reconciliation of conflicting sources (192). Because of this logic, which he has "understood," he is "giving a coherent interpretation of Hawaiian religious ideas (the first one, to my knowledge)" (x). The last paragraph of the book--a single sentence--seems to refer to the logic of the system as he has explicated it: "How could it be otherwise?"

Valeri writes most often as if there were one historical system that, with a little more surviving evidence, could be reconstructed down to fine details (e.g., 14-17, 25, 109-128). He will find a system even through the welter of inadequate or conflicting evidence (25, 46 par. 3, 57 par. 4, 186 par. 2). He will sketch out a systematic analysis even if he has to admit that it cannot fit all the evidence (102-103, 180-181). He says he will avoid systematizing the conflicting descriptions of the ritual in his sources, but does.[23]

The evidence of religious disunity is, however, overwhelming--even on the testimony of Valeri's book.[24] To accomodate his theories, he himself must posit fundamental contradictions and differences in Hawaiian culture.

Valeri attempts to solve aspects of disunity (45 par. 4, 225 and n. 62, 343). For instance, elements that do not fit his reconstructed system can be called "marginal," such as priestesses and prophets (112, 138-139). Yet they do take part in the temple ritual (328). Sorcerers, the very antithesis of Valeri's system--"in clear opposition to the priests of the 'central' cult"--and the target of his polemic are "marginal and residual" (138).[25] Yet, surprisingly, they are found working alongside the priests at court (183, 185, 247-248, 380 n. 9).

The very idea of a single, unified system is, however, historically implausible. Hawai'i was settled around A.D. 500, if not earlier, and had an increasing population scattered widely over the large archipelago. No religious system could have remained static in such circumstances. Indeed, Valeri's system, as he himself states, is an "ideology imposed by the aristocracy" (19; also 348), the product of "a powerful class of priests, that is, of professional intellectuals. This systemic, priestly view of the pantheon . . ." (36). That priestly group and the high chiefly class with which it worked were, however, late developments in Hawaiian culture (e.g., Kirch 1984, 257-262; Kirch 1985, e.g., 301-308). Their religion presupposes then earlier stages or forms of Hawaiian religion. Valeri himself speaks of "a tendency to unify the

pantheon and the entire cult under the major gods" (110). There must then have been an earlier, pre-tendency period in which such unity did not exist. Would not a genetic approach, the study of the historical development of that priestly system, be helpful in understanding it? Should Valeri not have put his subject in its historical context? Evidence can indeed be found in Valeri's book for the view that elements of that system were developed from earlier religious views and practices (126, 173, 280, 302, 357 n. 56, 384 n. 71, 396 n. 178). For instance, the navel cord-cutting ceremony used in the temple ritual is arguably based on one used for male chiefly babies, a ceremony that is itself in all likelihood based on earlier practices surrounding the cutting of the cord (navel cords did after all have to be cut). But Valeri proceeds to describe the system ahistorically in a sort of "anthropological present."

In my view, given the evidence for the rich variety of Hawaiian religion, no one system could be expected to absorb all the earlier religious elements, as will be seen in my discussion below of Valeri's treatment of the gods. On the other hand, any system attempting to be comprehensive would need to absorb such a large amount of material that complete logical consistency could not be expected.

In any case, given a population of some two hundred thousand on separate islands under independent chiefs, there need not have been just one high-priestly system. Valeri in fact admits that "some traces of a different system exist, especially on the island of Kaua'i" (185; also 335). The system Valeri studies is, therefore, "valid mostly for the island of Hawai'i" (184). He can be even more specific: he will use Malo's calendar, "which was the one used in the western part of the island of Hawai'i, because the main descriptions of the ritual cycle refer to this area" (198).

None of these considerations prevent Valeri from claiming, "In the preceding two parts I have attempted to give a coherent picture of the Hawaiian ideological system by considering all available information" (191). But to take one geographically, historically, and socially delimited religious system out of several and call it *the* system of a culture is as incorrect as to claim that the Memphis theology represents all of ancient Egyptian religion or the Midéwiwin all of Ojibwa.[26] Ake Hultkranz's idea of different "configurations" of religious views and practices being used in a single society, which he applies to American Indian religions, would be a useful tool of analysis.

Valeri's discussion of the "pantheon" shows that (1) he wants to make it all-encompassing for Hawaiian religion as a whole, and (2) that he wants it to be coherent. He bases himself, as others have before him, on

systematizing nineteenth-century sources, especially Kamakau, and on the conventional idea of "the four great gods of Polynesia": "There is no doubt that Kū, Lono, Kāne, and Kanaloa are the highest gods" (109). As is often necessary for Valeri, he leaves out a good deal of evidence: the Pele literature in which those gods are mercilessly subordinated to her (e.g., Pukui and Korn 1973, 55; Charlot 1983a, 24), the story of Kamapua'a's defeat of Lonoka'eho (Kahiolo 1978, 32-43 and parallels), and the many other stories of the conflicts of the gods (Charlot 1983a, 21-25).

Curiously, Valeri resurrects notions now recognized as nineteenth-century, biblically influenced attempts to rationalize classical Hawaiian beliefs: *ke kōko'ohā o ke akua,* "the quaternity of the god" (V.: "The association of four gods"), an idea based on the Christian Trinity (13).[27] He also adopts the Trinitarian notions of other nineteenth-century Hawaiian writers, who degrade Kanaloa to a sort of demon: "the quadripartition of the gods is a superficial phenomenon that conceals a tripartition on a deeper level" (18).[28]

A good deal of Valeri's book is spent trying to subsume all the Hawaiian gods under the four he regards as principal (e.g., 13-30). He describes the process: "Deities are also created spontaneously and unsystematically at the lower levels of the pantheon, where their proliferation is allowed by the very system I have delineated. Spontaneous creation and systematic ordering are thus two dialectical moments in the constitution of the divine in this hierarchical society" (36). As a result of this process, "Lower-level deities are either particularizations of these gods or personifications of some of their predicates" (109). Valeri concludes, "All in all, I think that it is possible to view all inferior gods as encompassed by the major ones" (110).[29]

Such priestly connection of "lower-level" gods to "higher-level" ones is found in Hawaiian religion as it is in Hinduism and Buddhism. But again Valeri has taken the most extreme position in claiming that all Hawaiian gods were thus connected. His discussion has not demonstrated that all family gods and wandering spirits have been so treated. Most important, it is impossible to absorb the female gods of Hawai'i into the four male gods. Valeri, therefore, belittles them, stating, "goddesses are few and have a marginal position in the Hawaiian pantheon. This corresponds to the marginal position of women in the ritual system" (19; cf. 12). Goddesses are in fact numerous and important. When Valeri does not ignore the great volcano goddess Pele, he groups her with "the female deities of sorcery" (112).[30] Sorcerers, he claims, are "marginal," yet Pele's priestesses take part in the temple ritual (328,

401-402 n. 251). Valeri is careful to state for his source that "these goddesses are ultimately controlled by the king" (402 n. 251), a judgment that contradicts the Pele chants mentioned above in which supremacy is claimed for her. Pele is indeed one of a number of other gods--besides Valeri's four principal ones--who take part in the ritual (e.g., 264, 290), an indication that they had not lost their identity and utility. Valeri is also anxious to deny Kamakau's statement that statues of goddesses were placed in the temple (238, 245).

From his view of a coherent, all-encompassing hierarchy of gods, Valeri draws important conclusions for the religious life of Hawaiians. For instance, he holds that an individual's relation to the gods is mediated by the hierarchy just as lower-level sacrifices are by higher-level ones (e.g., 19, 126, 185). As a result, "the ali'i are continually or almost continually in relation with the gods, while commoners are in relation with them only occasionally (during holidays, precisely) and always by means of a more or less direct mediation on the part of the ali'i" (127); "Direct contact with the most important gods of the society is possible only for the king and his chaplains" (140).[31] These views are contradicted by numerous accounts of visions; family, fishing, and farming gods; prayers on many occasions; the marriage of Kū into a commoner family (Green and Pukui 1936,127), and so on.

The second major principle of Valeri's book--influenced by Feuerbath--is that "Hawaiian religion is essentially anthropomorphic. All gods have in common what all subjects have in common: the fact of belonging to one single species, the human species" (xi; also, e.g., x, 272-273, and the argument discussed below). Valeri's exclusive equation of "subject" with "human" is unusual. Some worldviews recognize nonhuman subjects, such as angels and leprechauns. Valeri's use of "subject" corresponds to his use of the phrase "personal gods" as the equivalent of anthropomorphic ones: "personal, anthropomorphic gods such as Kāne and Kanaloa" (7; see also 6, 10, 65). However, in religious studies, the phrase "personal gods" can be and often is used of nonanthropomorphic ones.

Valeri's position seems to be derived more from his theory than from evidence. His one argument is that all Hawaiian gods have a human body in their *kino lau,* their system of multiple bodies (9-12, 21, 31, 35, 47): *"the 'genus' of all species included in one god belongs not to the natural world but to the human, social world"* (11); "the human form is the most generic component, while their natural forms differentiate them" (21); "each deity is characterized by two kinds of 'bodies,' . . . : natural

bodies and the human body. . . . the human species is the common element underlying all natural manifestations of the divine. . . . all gods equally represent the human species" (31). He concludes, "The unity of the divine is the unity of the human species" (35).

This position can be criticized on several grounds. First, the lowest common denominator need not reveal the genus or prove that the human form is primary. For instance, in Native American religion, animal gods can appear in human form, but are still thought to be animals. The Buffalo Maiden of the Sioux appeared to two youths as a young woman, but as she moved away, they saw her changing back into her buffalo body. Animal gods can appear in human form just because they are appearing to human beings, not because they are really human. The common denominator reveals the nature of the audience, not of the gods.

Most important, to prove his point, Valeri would have to demonstrate that all Hawaiian gods have human bodies. This he does not even begin to do (47).[32] On the contrary, in one of the major faults of his book, he simply ignores the large number of gods that have only animal or elemental bodies.[33]

Moreover, the animal body of the god can be presented as primary even when he or she has a human body as well (e.g., Green 1926,64-65 [rock]). The shark-man is really a shark. Pele tells her attracted sisters that Kamapua'a is really a pig.[34] Kahiolo is definite (58-59): *"Aka, ua pololei no o Pele malaila, no ka mea, he puaa io no oia,* 'But Pele was right, because he was a real hog.' " A literary motif found in numerous stories is that of the marriage between a human being and someone who is discovered to belong really to another species.[35] Such gods and stories can be found elsewhere in Polynesia.

Animal gods are a common phenomenon worldwide, and a heavy burden of proof lies on anyone who would deny their existence in a Pacific Island culture. In so dealing with Hawaiian culture, in which animal gods were and continue to be important, Valeri's criticism of another scholar for "leaving out of the field . . . all that does not fit the theory" (66) turns against himself.[36]

The reason for Valeri's strong anthropomorphization of Hawaiian religion--other than his intellectual sources--is his presupposition of a separation of human beings from "nature": "natural phenomena extraneous to man" (30). This very Western view is used in a Western way: "Having become totally dehumanized, nature becomes totally distant from man. . . . the humanization of nature is the necessary correlate of

its appropriation by man" (78).[37] Thus the ritual is used for the purpose of anthropomorphizing nature (72-73, 269-270, 345-346, 353), as are other Hawaiian practices.[38]

This view is diametrically opposed to that of the *Kumulipo,* in which human beings are placed on the same family tree with the rest of nature. It opposes Valeri's own statements about Hawaiian metaphors (151), as seen above, as well as a number of other Hawaiian practices (e.g., Charlot 1979). I would argue that Valeri's presupposition of a fundamental separation of human beings from nature cannot be found in Hawaiian culture. In fact, in the section in which Valeri admits that his theory cannot be found in the Hawaiian texts, he states that Hawaiian thinking "presupposes the process of consciousness I am referring to, since it presupposes that the world of nature and the world of man are comparable and therefore that nature is already humanized and man already naturalized" (34). But Hawaiians need not have gone through that "process of consciousness"--even unconsciously, as Valeri seems to say--and need not have used his terms, if they did not start out with his presupposition. Valeri has made a mistake he himself warns against: "one unconsciously attributes to these writings our own principles of organization and criteria of intelligibility" (xxviii).

Similarly, in accordance with his separation of human beings from nature and with his philosophical orientation, Valeri seeks to establish a nonnatural or "supernatural," invisible, immaterial realm or dimension, just like the one in Western thinking: for example, " 'supernatural' and 'natural' or rather invisible and visible" (92). Valeri's arguments for this point are derived from his theory. For example, Hawaiian gods "retain a fundamental feature of the concept: nonempirical, transcendental reality. Thus, in principle, they cannot be confused with those among their instantiations . . . that are supposed to *empirically* manifest the god's properties" (32; see also 34, 261, 365 n. 23). In the next paragraph, he admits that this view cannot be found in Hawaiian texts, where they are always so "confused."

Valeri's introductions of Western philosophical terms--introductions without argument--are used to support this view. Moreover, Valeri's language is very irregular when explicating it. For instance, he writes not only that *mana,* the gods, and "the divine" are "invisible" (89, 99, 152), but that the *ali'i* are as well, giving such arguments as the fact that they were not usually seen by the commoners, that they went out at night, and so on (147, 150, 300-301): "It is only on this occasion that the commoners can see the most sacred ali'i . . . who are invisible through-

out the rest of the year" (380 n. 10). Similarly Kahiki is called "invisible" apparently because it can't be seen from Hawai'i (8-9).

Kahiki must be so treated--must be placed in a transcendental dimension rather than be accepted as a distant land within this universe--because of the requisites of Valeri's theory: he uses this two-level or two-dimensional view of reality to interpret ritual. Ritual is "visible symbols" and "invisible realities" (131; cf. 56, 69, 215, 274, 300); "the gods' point of passage from transcendence to immanence" (250; also 252). The offering is "the transfer into transcendence, outside the empirical world" (76). Such terms are used also in describing the ritual as thought process (323-325; also 268).

Objections can be raised to the application of this view to Hawaiian culture. The *Kumulipo* pictures the universe as a single whole, not split into natural and supernatural dimensions. Gods do not have to come from another dimension to meet their devotees; they can come from the *wao akua,* "the uplands of the gods," which are found on each island, or from whichever part of the land or the sea they reside in. Moreover, I have seen no evidence that Hawaiians had the concept of immateriality. Gods, ghosts, and spirits--both in literature and contemporary testimony--have a body, which can be seen and even felt by those who are sufficiently talented or trained (for instance, Pukui and Elbert 1971, s.v. " *'ike pāpālua,*" "second sight"). Cupped hands are used to catch souls (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, 1:194). Such points could be multiplied.

Valeri's view introduces distortions at every level. For instance, he writes that at the *hale mua* the family "enters into relation with another aspect of the 'outside,' of the world that transcends the household: the gods" (174). In all my reading and listening, family gods appear very much part of the household, true family gods.

Having established to his satisfaction a supernatural dimension, Valeri characterizes it by using concepts well known from the history of religion. He draws "some preliminary conclusions on the Hawaiian notion of *akua,* 'divine,' 'deity.' This notion is clearly characterized by two dualities. The divine manifests itself in both . . ." (31). The word *akua* can be used as a noun, "god," and as an adjective, "godly." But it is never, to my knowledge, used as an abstraction, "the divine." Valeri is introducing a non-Hawaiian idea, which he uses widely in his book, either in the vague sense of anything pertaining to the gods (e.g., 31, 88, 90, 153, 262) or as a generalized, undifferentiated "divine power": "a category of divine power exists that is more encompassing than the indi-

vidual gods. From its point of view *the individual gods are particularizations associated with certain states of the process of transformation of the divine as it occurs at different levels of the ritual cycle"* (288; see also 78, 89, 215). As in Hinduism, the gods emerge from an undifferentiated divine and merge back into it.

Valeri seeks to identify this concept with the Hawaiian *pō*, "night," from the *Kumulipo:* "the divine coincided first with the undifferentiated principle Pō. . . . This identification of the undifferentiated divine with Pō . . ." (7);[39] "The closest approximation to a supreme divine principle found in Hawaii is Pō, the undifferentiated creative origin of the cosmos, which continues to exist in transcendence as its perennial source" (35; also 215), an idea similar, for example, to the Thomist description of God as creator and sustainer of the universe.

Valeri's Pō, as the divine, differentiates itself both into the generators of the *Kumulipo* (5, "manifestations of the generative principle Pō") and apparently into the major gods: by "producing the first man," the divine transforms itself in that "from now on it will be constituted by personal, anthropomorphic gods such as Kāne and Kanaloa" (7).[40]

Valeri has two texts to support his view that Pō is "the undifferentiated divine." The first text is the last line of the stanza used in the first four sections of the *Kumulipo: " 'O ke akua ke komo, 'a'oe komo kanaka"* ("It is the god who enters, the human being does not enter," my translation; 4, 7, 216, 222). Valeri bases his interpretation of this line on the idea that *akua* means "the divine," his abstraction: " 'the divine enters, man cannot enter'. . . . Being entirely divine, nature entirely excludes man" (7); "The Pō period is thus entirely divine" (4).

Valeri's argument depends, among other things, on whether the line from the stanza can be applied to Pō. But when first used (line 39), that line is twenty-five lines away from the last mention of *pō* (line 14).[41] The immediate context of the line in question is the stanza itself, the first line of which gives a clear sexual meaning (Charlot 1977:499-500; 1983a:49-52). The line could not, therefore, be applied to *pō* without further argument.

Valeri's only other text is the traditional expression *"mai ka pō mai,"* "from out of the night" (V.: " 'out of the unseen' [out of the 'night']"), which, he states, "refers to anything of divine origin or 'supernatural' " (350 n. 3). Neither of his references supports his view or use of "supernatural." Moreover, Valeri's interpretation of the phrase would still not support the idea of Pō as the "undifferentiated divine."

Indeed, how could Pō be undifferentiated if the god or even "the divine" "enters" into it? when earth, sky, moon, sun, slime, and so on,

have already been mentioned as existing in earlier lines? Far from referring to a single, all-encompassing, undifferentiated principle, *pō* is being constantly paired--with *ao* in the structure of the whole chant, with *lipo* in lines 7-8, and with *lā*, "day," in line 10. This use is congruent with that in creation texts from the Society Islands and elsewhere (Charlot 1987b), which Valeri ignores since he makes almost no attempt to relate Hawaiian religion to its Polynesian background.

Valeri has even less foundation for his view of Pō as the "creative origin of the cosmos" (35). The word *pō* appears first in line 5--after a description of the turning of the earth and sky and the sun being in shadow to illuminate the moon--and continues being mentioned alongside other elements (lines 6-10). Valeri himself sees those lines as identifying "the 'source' or 'origin' *(kumu)* of Pō" (4) (an interpretation with which I disagree). The generation of Pō is seen by Valeri as sexual: lines 1-2 are "the Hawaiian equivalent of the marriage of heaven and earth"; *walewale* (line 6) refers to part of childbirth. Despite all this, Valeri then writes: "In turn Pō engenders two forms that exhibit the first and fundamental biological difference, sex." In other words, despite all he has said, Valeri still uses Pō as the origin and sees that origin as presexual; sex comes after Pō. Indeed, he uses Pō in this way throughout his book.

Valeri is doing no less than replacing a two-source, sexual, genealogical origin of the universe--the mating of the earth and sky--with a one-source, presexual one. His view can be arrived at only through his argumentation. He himself admits that "Pō and its immediate specifications are not personified and do not receive a cult" (35; see also 215). The mating of earth and sky and the dualistic, sexual view of the universe are, however, richly in evidence: *"Uwe ka lani, ola ka honua"* ("The sky weeps, the earth lives," my translation; Pukui 1983, No. 2888; Charlot 1983a, 49-52; 1983b). Sky and earth are proverbially considered the ultimate framework of the universe, for example *"He lani i luna, he honua i lalo"* ("A sky above, an earth below," my translation; Pukui 1983, No. 718). Valeri himself describes "above and below, inland and sea" as "the two pairs of opposites that together encompass all that exists" (146).

Because Valeri is replacing this two-source origin with a single-source one, he cannot use sex and procreation. He must use "creation" or "production": "the entire land, indeed all of nature used by man, is produced by the gods and hence ultimately belongs to them" (156; see also, e.g., 7, 75). The *Kumulipo* is, however, a chant of the procreation, not the creation, of the universe. There is nothing other than late, biblically

influenced Hawaiian texts to compare with the extended creationistic systems of Samoa and the Society Islands (Charlot 1987b). Hawaiians knew the god associated with those systems--Tangaloa/Ta'aroa/Kanaloa--but, according to the evidence, never used creation by gods except in the limited sense of rearrangements of existing materials.[42]

In relating his undifferentiated single source to the gods, Valeri characteristically chooses the four masculine ones he regards as principal, as seen above. He divides the pantheon into male and female. In this pantheon, **Kū** "encompasses all the properties of the masculine gods," and Hina, "all the feminine attributes" (12; see also 13). Since goddesses will later be described as "marginal" to the pantheon, Valeri has managed to depict the pinnacle of Hawaiian religion as a masculine creator-god, a point, however, that he does not develop, as stated earlier.

Valeri thus downgrades the role of the female in Hawaiian religion from being half of the pair that generates the universe. He consequently downgrades Hawaiian goddesses and women, imposing on them an old-fashioned Western image: "dancing is an activity in which women have a predominant role" (111); "that preeminently feminine function procreation, especially childbirth" (111); "women have a privileged relationship with the female deities of sorcery . . . [as prophetesses and mediums]. Their mediating role thus takes on a typically feminine form: they are possessed, penetrated by the deity who speaks through them" (112); "superiority of action over passivity"; "Action is conceived as a masculine quality in contrast to feminine passivity. , . . Women are relegated to the unmarked, 'passive' category" (114); "the occupation of a young woman is to procreate, which in Hawaiian culture implies all that relates to seduction, in which it is said that women play a more active role than men. . . . This explains why properly feminine activities are making ornaments . . . and clothing, chanting, dancing, and other activities that promote eroticism . . . compose and chant the *mele inoa* 'name chants,' with their deliberately erotic content and even the *mele ma'i* 'chant [praising] the genitals' " (123). This picture depends more on Western views of women than on evidence about Hawaiian ones. In fact, all the activities mentioned above, except childbearing, were performed by men as well.[43]

In Valeri's picture, women constitute ritual impurity and pollution: "purity is an essentially masculine property, while impurity is essentially feminine" (112; also 18-19), thus the "global inferiority of women relative to men in the sacrificial system" (113).[44] This view influences Valeri's interpretation of Hawaiian ritua1,[45] and he often appears to argue against his sources, imposing a one-source picture upon the con-

siderable evidence for a two-source, sexual ritual (e.g., 206, 217, 219-220, 282, 288; cf. 302-303). He dismisses without argument Kamakau's statement that the images on the left side of the temple fence and to the left of the altar were female, although this receives some support from Cook's journal (238, 245). When a source states that priestesses participate in purification rites, Valeri responds, "Perhaps this rite reunites the sexes to represent their subsequent separation more emphatically" (389 n. 53). This negative view of women enters even into speculation on details (e.g., 277).

This imposition of a one-source view can be found in Valeri's interpretation of the Makahiki ceremony. Valeri correctly interprets the foundation myth, "the key to several aspects of the Makahiki ritual," as representing "the marriage of heaven and earth" (215). This is the basis for Valeri's holding "the identification of Lonomakua with a heavenly god uniting with the feminine earth" (214). Lonomakua is represented by a long pole with a crosspiece. Valeri writes, "Thus we ask ourselves as well if the long pole topped by a rounded head, which represents the god, is not a phallic symbol" (214). This pole is manipulated in various ways during a section of the ritual, held upright and laid down (208, 222). One would expect these points to be explicated in detail in Valeri's interpretation of the ritual (222-224). However, there is no sexual reference made to the pole and only passing reference to the sexual aspect of the ritual and its founding myth (222, par. 5; 224, par. 3). Valeri's characteristic emphasis is on the single male god Lonomakua, "manifesting that the earth and its products belong to the god that has produced them . . . the producer-god" (222); "Lonomakua is conceived of as the father or producer of cultivated plants," and so on (216). "Lono in the Makahiki rites" represents "all of the divine in a relatively concrete form" (215; see also 216) and is identified with "the divine origin" (216). A one-source picture is thus imposed on the evidence for a two-source one.

In accordance with his one-source, male-god sacrificial theory, Valeri follows Frazer and Sahlins in interpreting the Makahiki ritual by the idea of the death and rebirth of a god (e.g., Sahlins 1985, 104-134; compare Daws 1968a, 26-27; Daws 1968b; Jean Charlot 1976, 81-96). This idea and its application as a model in various contexts are well known from the elaborated theologies and rituals of other cultures. It is surprising, therefore, how little evidence exists for its use in Hawai'i and in the rituals Valeri is interpreting. In the ***kāli'i*** ceremony a spear is thrown at the king and misses. Another man touches the king with another spear. Valeri follows Frazer in interpreting this as "the king's

'execution,' symbolized by the spear that touches him" (225; also 211-212, 285). No textual evidence supports this interpretation. The action could just as easily be viewed as a demonstration of the king's invulnerability, as a gesture of surrender, and so on.

The above interpretation is, however, the point of departure for Valeri's application of the death-rebirth model to the god: "This reversal implies that Lonomakua is killed in turn, which is what happens immediately after the king's symbolic execution. In fact, conquered after a sham battle between the king's warriors and Lonomakua's defenders, the 'Makahiki gods' are brought into the king's temple and dismantled for storage" (226).[46] I cannot see how putting the images away after the ceremony is over implies that the god or gods are being killed. Again, no texts can be used to support this view. On the contrary, Lono is said to return to Kahiki (226). Moreover, the images of other gods are dismantled (392 n. 112), but Valeri says nothing about those gods being killed. Similarly, even the manipulation of the phallic pole is given a death-rebirth rather than a sexual interpretation: it is "placed in a horizontal position. Lono is thus 'beaten' and 'overthrown,' perhaps even symbolically killed" (222).

Valeri then argues for extending the death-rebirth idea to Kū and the temple ceremony (266, 285-288)--"the dubious world of eternal life that is in fact a world of sacrificial death" (326)--but his arguments are again tenuous. For instance, a *hala lei* is put around the neck of the god and the king. *Hala* can be used as a symbol or in wordplay for death. "Thus the king and god 'die' in one form in order to assume a superior one" (288). But in another historical account of the ceremony, a different *lei* is used.[47]

Again, one would expect textual evidence in this case because when Hawaiians want to say that a human being or a god is born or dies, they have no trouble doing so.[48] The problem to be solved is not, in my opinion, how to impose a death-rebirth theory where there is so little evidence for one, but, on the contrary, how to explain why the Hawaiians made so little of that ancient and widespread idea. There are indications that they and other Polynesians were acquainted with that idea: for instance, the Hawaiian story of Kū becoming a breadfruit tree (Green and Pukui 1936:127), the Samoan story of Sina and the eel, and perhaps aspects of the practice of sacrifice.[49] That Hawaiians made such sparing use of that powerful image could be due to many factors: lack of winter and spring, planting obviously living taro-tops rather than dead-looking seeds, etc. I myself would see the reason in the strong and consequent dualism of Hawaiian thinking. Life and death are conceived as

real opposites. For instance, Hawaiians never made wordplays with two senses of *make,* "desire" and "death." When, at a conference I attended, a Western poet used the pun in a love song on a Hawaiian theme--"You're desire, you're death"--the Hawaiians listening were horrified. Hawaiians, as far as I can see, do not see death in life and life in death. They see life as health and vigor and joyous sexuality, and death as the opposite. Hawaiian ritual ideas and practices can be interpreted from that point of view, for which much evidence exists, and placed against an inherited background in which the death-rebirth idea is still perceptible. Hawaiian ideas and sensibilities should not be absorbed into foreign ones, but appreciated for their own special qualities and as the result of their own special development.

By dint of much theorizing and extrapolation from few indications in the Hawaiian sources, Valeri has constructed a whole theology of sacrifice and ritual: one-source, male-emphatic, creational, and spiritualistic, with divisions between human beings and nature and between the natural and the supernatural, and with major use of the death-rebirth model. The Hawaiian sources themselves abound in inescapable evidence of a very different theology: two-source, male-female, procreational, physical, with an all-encompassing cosmos and a strong emphasis on life over death. Valeri deals with this gap between his theory and the evidence just as he has handled earlier ones: he posits two different systems, a "genealogical system" connected to impure women and a "sacrificial system" connected to pure men (113); an "opposition between sexual reproduction, which is primarily associated with the feminine pole, and the sacrificial reproduction of social units with their natural correlatives, which is primarily associated with the masculine pole" (123-124; also 128). The former is characteristically subordinated to the latter; "Men's superiority to women, then, expresses only the superiority of a sacrificial relationship with the gods over a purely genealogical relationship with them. . . . sacrifice is superior to genealogy" (113-114). According to Valeri, female sexual reproduction is possible only because of male sacrifice: "the 'pure,' that is, nonsexual, reproduction of the species as a concept is the sine qua non for the 'impure' (sexual) reproduction" (330); "fertility is actualized only by men . . . the ideal reproduction of the species by men translates into its empirical reproduction by women" (331). This male control can be seen in the king's regulation of genealogies (157-158).[50] After the abolition of the sacrificial system, "the hierarchy survived only in its genealogical form and consequently in its female-centered mode of reproduction. It is no accident, then, that female, not male, chiefs played the most important

political roles after the abolition of the Old Regime" (128). Valeri provides as a reference for this point the whole first volume of Kuykendall's *The Hawaiian Kingdom.*

For anyone desiring to provide a coherent account of a logical system, such a division--along with the earlier ones noted--must pose a problem. To solve it, Valeri elevates the word "creativity" to the role of a unifying term. In discussing the Makahiki festival "at a somewhat abstract level," Valeri discovers "the most general attribute of humans: creative activity as such" (233). This attribute "finds its objective correlative in the renewed creativity of nature during the season of the festival." Valeri is using the word "creativity" as a synonym for "procreativity," an odd use influenced by the creationism discussed earlier. The word so used provides him with an anthropomorphic bridge between "man" and "nature."

But Valeri goes even further, "Pō and its immediate specifications . . . can be viewed as the projections onto the most general concept of nature of the most general aspect of the human species: pure activity, pure creativity. In the latter aspect the cosmos and the human species coincide and are therefore indistinguishable" (35). Students of the history of religions will be interested to see Hawaiian religion interpreted as the Vedanta: Atman and Brahman, Soul and Cosmos, Subjective and Objective Reality are one.[51]

Valeri's *Kingship and Sacrifice* takes its place in a long line of works that have understood Hawaiian religion from foreign religions and theories, be they Chaldean, Egyptian, Christian, psychic, or psychiatric. Acknowledging in key places that his view is not supported by the evidence and that the weight of evidence supports in fact a different view, Valeri uses tendentious interpretations, omissions, and tenuous arguments to theorize his way to a counter-system of Hawaiian religion, one combined from well-known elements drawn from the history of religions. In so doing, he--like others before him--leaves out those elements that are special and, I believe, valuable in Hawaiian religion: its strong sense of individuality and personality; its capacity for reverence and awe before the godly, human, animal, vegetable, and elemental; its sense of the interrelatedness of all things, including human beings; its placing of human beings within rather than above the universe; its understanding of everything in physical terms; the integrity of its search for wisdom through all the divisions created by Western culture; and so on. Bereft of such characteristic elements, Hawaiian religion ceases to be a challenge to Western thinking and becomes a mere example of religious themes available elsewhere.

Hawaiian religion can be seen as itself only if looked at closely and carefully, that is, following scholarly rules of interpretation and argument. Such rules must be formulated for each literature, and much discussion is necessary, for instance, on uses of Polynesian genres and on the proper method for understanding Polynesian wordplay. Works of synthesis or those dealing with broad subjects should follow intensive and detailed philological studies. Valeri's book is valuable among other things for raising inescapably such questions of approach and method, an essential step in the development of the field of Pacific studies.

Appended Note: Valeri's Criticisms of my "The Use of *Akua* for Living Chiefs"

Valeri discusses the question of "The Divine King" (142-145) and offers arguments against an appendix of my book *The Hawaiian Poetry of Religion and Politics,* "The Use of *Akua* for Living Chiefs" (Charlot 1985, 31-35), which he read some years ago in typescript. I was delighted to receive such an early response to my call for a general discussion of this question and take this opportunity to continue it.

Unfortunately, Valeri begins by misstating my position: Charlot "has maintained that Hawaiian ali'i were not traditionally called *akua*" (144). As indicated in the title of my appendix, I am speaking of the application of that word only to living chiefs. After death, ali'i can become gods. This misunderstanding of my position misdirects Valeri's discussion.[52]

In my appendix I noted that the commonly accepted notion that high-ranking Hawaiian chiefs were called gods during their lifetimes rested on nineteenth-century prose accounts, such as those of Malo and Kamakau. Abundant evidence of this practice can be found during the period from the death of Kamehameha I through the early missionary period. Earlier evidence has not yet been found, which is surprising because there are many genres, such as laudatory chants, in which such an appellation should have been used and is in fact used in the post-Kamehameha period. Because nineteenth-century prose historical accounts could easily have been influenced by the post-Kamehameha practice, I looked for evidence in arguably earlier chants. I studied in some detail the relevant texts in the *Chant for Kūali'i,* which has been cited as an example of the practice in question. I found that the direct applications of *akua* to Kūali'i occurred in Kamakau's prose accompanying the chant and that various problems attended the use of the word in the chant. I therefore drew the tentative conclusion that the

application of *akua* to living chiefs as found in the post-Kamehameha period and reflected in the nineteenth-century prose accounts was either a late innovation or a late extension of a genuine but restricted early practice. I cited several texts that suggested that Kamehameha I might have been the source of such an extension or innovation, as he was of so many others. This would have been one of the several religious changes accomplished during his lifetime and after his death (Charlot 1983a, 26-29, 147-148; Charlot 1985, e.g., 5-6, 34, 55). Although Valeri indulges in name-calling on this point, he himself refers on several occasions to Kamehameha's important innovations.[53]

In arguing for his own position,[54] Valeri has recourse to nineteenth-century prose accounts (several of which were cited previously in my appendix), ignoring the general objections I raised against them. He also ignores points I made against specific texts when he seeks to use them for his own position. For instance, Kamakau writes that some people worshipped a victorious chief *me he akua,* "as a god" (Charlot 1985,30; Valeri 1985, 143 "like a god"). Valeri is clearly not given pause by *me he,* "as" or "like," although a text of Kepelino's, which he cites (131), has a parallel use that shows its significance: the diviner was "*me he mea atua la,* 'like a god' " (Kepelino 1977, 60-61). Neither Valeri nor anyone else argues that diviners were called gods.

Similarly, in using a chant text cited by me (Charlot 1985, 31; Fornander 1919-1920, 6:387-388), Valeri refers to line 300, which mentions Kamehameha's *waiakua,* "godly blood" (143; V. "divine blood"), but leaves out the previous lines, which mention his *waikanaka,* "human blood" (line 299), and the fact that he is indeed *he kanaka,* "a human being" (line 297).

Valeri offers two arguments that do not require a long refutation. Texts about chiefs being descended from the gods do not prove that they were called gods during their lifetimes, nor does the fact that they were given the names of gods. After all, Hispanics can call sons Jesús.

The decisive evidence on which to judge the difference of opinion between us can be reduced to a few texts from Hawaiian chants:

1. In his remarks on the *Chant of Kūali'i* (143, 145, 392 n. 98), Valeri does not take account of my objections to its use for his purpose (Charlot 1985, 32-35).

2. Valeri cites a chant in which he claims Kākuhihewa is called " *'he akua 'ōlelo,'* 'a 'a god of speech.' " The chant is in Emerson's notes to Malo, which Valeri describes as "a mixture of data of great value and unfounded or misunderstood information" (xxiv). Emerson himself is vague about the provenance and reference of the chant (Malo 1951,

200). It contains in fact the word *mō'ī* for "king," which Valeri follows Stokes in characterizing as a usage introduced after 1842 under foreign influence (370 n. 36; also, 397 n. 192). The phrase under discussion refers not to Kākuhihewa but to the chief mentioned in the previous line, "Ka-ua-kahi-a-ka-ala," who seems to be a child of Kākuhihewa by "Kanui-a-panee."[55] In any case, the fact that the word *'ōlelo* qualifies *akua*--as well as the uncertainty of any identification, reference, and interpretation of the chant--infirms this text for Valeri's purpose of demonstrating an absolute, not a qualified, application of the word *akua* to a living chief.

3. Valeri claims that, in Ke'āulumoku's *Haui Ka Lani* (Fornander 1919-1920, 6:408, line 734), "the ali'i of the district of Hilo are ironically referred to as *akua"* (143). The line reads, however, "*Liu na maka o na akua i ka paakai,* 'Blinded are the eyes of the gods with salt.' " No mention is made of *ali'i.* Valeri is taking his interpretation without supporting argument from note 1 to the Fornander text. The line makes perfect sense when taken literally.

4. The saying, *He akua nā ali'i o Kona,* "The chiefs of Kona are *akua,*" was mentioned by me with two parallels (Charlot 1985, 31-32). I followed Dickey, who translates *akua* as "ghosts." The first parallel I cited has not been translated. The second (Kahiolo 1978, 61) also translates the term as "ghosts." Valeri polemicizes against the translators of Kahiolo (370 n. 37) for "following Dickey, without, however, naming him." The translators were in fact working from the best-known reference, the parallel in the Fornander version of the saga of Kamapua'a (Elbert 1959, 222-223), which I unfortunately did not cite. The translators of Kahiolo very correctly describe their relation to the Fornander translation in their preface (Kahiolo 1978, ix-x). The above consensus in the translation of *akua* as "ghosts" in this line is based on its context in a taunting chant (or teasing in Dickey): Kamapua'a is taunting Pele by, among other things, using a typical description of ghosts against her (compare Fornander 1919-1920, 6:370-371). Such a chant is not the proper context for a glorifying reference to chiefs as gods, but for a taunting one, applying to the chiefs the Hawaiian idea of miserable and helpless ghosts feeding on scraps.

Not one of the texts produced up to now in this discussion has shown convincingly that living chiefs were called *akua* in pre-Kamehameha times. But even if all the texts Valeri cites were accepted, they would still be surprisingly few for a point so important and useful in praise. One cannot argue with Valeri for earlier times that "it can be safely assumed that this usage really existed because it follows necessarily from

the attribution to ali'i of the fundamental properties of the divine" (145), the prelude to a discussion I have criticized at some length above. Theories must be based on evidence, not the reverse. Until better evidence is found, scholars run the risk of projecting a later practice onto earlier times in assuming that the nineteenth-century accounts of this particular practice are accurate for earlier periods.

NOTES

1. All references are to Valeri 1985, unless otherwise noted. Valeri has treated certain subjects and themes found in this book somewhat differently in the articles listed in his bibliography. I have not used them for this article, which discusses his most recent work in publication, if not in composition.

I read a preliminary version of this paper to the Humanities Forum, Institute of Culture and Communication, East-West Center, chaired by Wimal Dissanayake, and received valuable comments and criticisms. I thank also Jocelyn Linnekin and Jean-Paul Latouche for their detailed criticisms of the whole typescript.

2. Ortiz 1969, see Index, s.v. "Lévi-Strauss, Claude." Valeri states that "the disjunction between the raw offering and the cooked offering" cannot be found in Hawai'i (123).

3. An example of such practice in regard to a female *ali'i* can be found in a text cited by Valeri for another reason, but he ignores it as evidence against his point (166; Fornander 1916-1917, 4:540-541, 544-545). In a later passage (150, end of par. 3), Valeri offers further references, which arguably support the virginity of the male, but there is again no reference to purity. See also Elbert 1956-1957, 69:342.

4. The words from the English translation "free from the taint of *kauwa* blood" and "regarded as a defilement" (Malo 1951, 71) do not appear in the Hawaiian text (Malo n.d., 83-84). The first phrase has simply been added. The second is a misreading of *"ua kapa ia ka poe kauwa he palani, he hohono ke ano"* (" *Kauwā* were called *palani* fish, a type that has a bad odor," my translation). Genealogists try to *hoomaemae,* "cleanse," chiefly lines of such connections. The word *ho'oma'ema'e* can be used of ritual cleansing of pollution, but, not being a technical term, need not have such a sense in this context. It is the only word in the text that could offer support to Valeri's position.

5. Confusingly, Valeri later speaks differently of immobility (301-302): the wild chiefly woman is "immobilized" by being wrapped, which, Valeri states, makes her productive; but for that--as seen in his immediately previous paragraphs--she must surely be unwrapped.

6. Compare Fornander 1969, 1:92-93, quoted by Valeri (200).

7. Valeri thus translates the name of the god on p. 175. Valeri's view (expressed on p. 6) would make it very hard to translate lines 111-112 of the *Kumulipo.*

8. See also pp. 86, 93 par. 6, 390 n. 80, 391 n. 86; on ***kāhea,*** see 379 n. 3, 398 n. 201.

9. For other examples of such arguments, see pp. 279 par. 2, 391 nn. 86, 96.

10. For other problematical arguments of various kinds, see, e.g., pp. 60, 99, 232, 270, 287 par. 4, 302-303, 322, 323 par. 1, 324-325, 366 n. 26, 371 n. 49, 373 n. 69, 393 n. 124.

11. See also the hypothesis about *mana* (99) and how it is used (101, par. 7). Also pp. 251 par. 1, 252 par. 2, 270 par. 2.

12. "It seems that the opposition *akua/kanaka* is a relative one and that certain men may be called the gods of others. . . . Probably because he does not take this relativity into account, John Charlot . . . has recently maintained . . ." (144). I do not in fact agree with Valeri's view of the distinction. See Appended Note above, p. 137.

13. Similarly on p. 252, the points made are to be confirmed by the analysis of the temple ritual I discuss below.

14. See pp. 32, 34 par. 6, 215 par. 6, 225 par. 4. Compare p. 388 n. 41. This is true for a number of small points as well (e.g., 166).

15. See also pp. 258-262, especially 260 n. 61, 326.

16. See also pp. 304-305, 346; cf. 42, par. 3. This view also influences Valeri's interpretation. For instance, he speaks of *"collective recognition"* of the success of the ceremony; *"It is all of society that decides"* (304; also, 305, 394 n. 140), as seen in the fact that the crowd must keep absolute silence during the ceremony and could render it invalid by making or reporting a noise. It should be noted, however, that anyone who made a noise was killed.

17. Valeri's sensibilities seem Western: e.g., on white as the color of purity (52, 86); on sweet potatoes and excrement (123); on women composing "even"' genital chants (123).

18. "Consanguinity implies identity" (163; see also 93). Each chief was proudly conscious of his many differentiating names, kapus, traditions, and so on, which were celebrated in story and song.

19. Valeri himself seems to say so (168, par. 5). His previous reference (166) does not contain the words he underlines or the idea they express.

20. A few lines down Valeri refers to the chiefs' "perfect self-control" (147); "the ali'i is divine as long as he acts like a god, as long as he manifests his perfection by not desiring or needing other human beings" (149); see also 166.

21. See also 123; above, p. 110; Charlot 1985, 3 and n. 11, p. 10 and n. 57; Elbert 1956-1957, 69:341-345. Valeri writes similarly of prophets (139), but the most famous one, Lanikāula, was married and had children.

22. "A deity is nothing but a reified representation of certain human properties. It follows from this that . . ." (46); "This is only logical . . ." (385 n. 5).

23. See pp. 191-194, 203, 232, 254-255, 260, 280, 304, 322, 401 n. 239.

24. E.g., pp. 25-27, 29-30, 112, 115, 119 and n. 6, 194-198, 225, 235-236, 248, 254, 351 n. 18, 364 n. 15, 365 n. 23, 369 n. 24, 372 n. 62, 377 n. 24, 382 n. 32, 390 n. 77, 398 n. 206.

25. "These 'residual' persons are destructive as is any residue with respect to the system that produces it" (370 n. 31).

26. The latter example is particularly instructive because the religious elements involved are similar. Compare, e.g., pp. 138-139 to Hoffman 1891, 156-162.

27. His example is faulty: the chant lists various groups of gods named by number, and then:

E ke kokoo-ha o ke ʻkua
E ke koo-lima o ke ʻkua

Oh association of four of the god(s)
Oh association of five of the god(s)

The chant is not referring to a single, overall supreme group, but to a number of groups. I do seem to remember the word being used as Valeri states, but have not found the text. For Trinitarian notions, see, e.g., Kepelino, in Beckwith 1932, 8-11, 14-15, 174-175. For such biblically influenced theologies, see Barrère 1969.

28. See also pp. 19, 119. Valeri admits some examples are "due to Christian influence," but does not offer references for those he feels are not. He also recognizes other examples of biblical influence on Kamakau and others (353 n. 9, 358 n. 60, 377 n. 23).

At one point, Valeri goes even further. Ignoring evidence for the supremacy of Kāne in some areas (as seen above), he exalts Kū as the highest of the male gods, who "encompasses all the properties of the masculine gods" (12). Given the "marginal" position he accords to women in the "pantheon," this approaches a henotheistic position (12-13). Valeri does not, however, develop this point.

29. Earlier, he claims this only of the "majority" (13).

30. He connects Pele elsewhere also with vulcanism and dance (8).

31. The Kamakau text cited, however, discusses only the statues of those gods and does not, therefore, support Valeri's point.

32. Valeri seems to contradict himself, when he writes "as all other deities, the *ʻaumakua [sic]* can appear in human form" (21), and then mentions "the links connecting various individual *ʻaumakua [sic]* to a single natural species" (30).

33. A useful list of categories is given in Fornander 1919-1920, 6:52-55, a text Valeri refers to (266). Valeri (10 and n. 6) ignores the gods who emerge with animal species in the *Kumulipo* before the birth of anthropomorphic gods and human beings (e.g., Kīwaʻa, line 366). For gods with only animal bodies reported, see, e.g., Fornander 1918-1919, 5:366 (shark); Green 1923, 16-17 (bird), 44-45 (caterpillars), 46-47 (squid); idem. 1926, 66-69 (rat and owl); Green and Pukui 1936, 174-175 (squid), 176-177 (fish). Many contemporary Hawaiian religious experiences involve animals with no reported human form (e.g., Charlot 1983a, 22). Elemental gods include rocks and waves, Fornander 1918-1919, 5:522-555 (waves). Sources differ on whether some gods possessed a human body as well as an animal body, for instance, the dog Pae or Paʻe (Green 1923, 48-49; cf. Green and Pukui 1936, 178). It would be systematizing to argue that if a human body can be discovered in one source, all others must implicitly agree with it. I sketch my own view of the subject in Charlot 1983a, 21-22, 146-147. I believe that anthropomorphism is a later element in Hawaiian religion that was applied secondarily to the older theriomorphic gods, partly through the identification of earlier animal gods with anthropomorphic ones; for instance, ʻIlioloa, "Long Dog," can become either Kūʻīlioloa or Kāneʻīlio.

34. Kahiolo 1978, 52-59, and the parallel passages in the two other major Kamapuaʻa complexes. In Charlot 1987a, I demonstrate that the oldest stories of Kamapuaʻa depict him as a pig and that his human body is a later development of the literature.

35. E.g., Green 1923, 43 (caterpillar); Green and Pukui 1936, 170-173 (eel and sea cucumber); Valeri 1985, 331 *(mo'o).*

36. Similarly, Valeri rejects without argument a statement by Malo that nonanthropomorphic statues were made, stating, "The fact is that all surviving images are anthropomorphic" (9). In fact, a number of nonanthropomorphic, undeterminable, and unshaped stone gods can be seen at the Bishop Museum. Valeri places great theoretical emphasis on the use of such statues in ritual (72-73), going so far as to say "ritual is fully efficacious only when the god is present in an anthropomorphic, controllable form" (102). That was, however, not always the case, as he admits (103). For instance, the goddess Laka was represented on the altar by an uncarved block of wood.

37. See also pp. 75-81; cf. 24: "the social universe encompasses the natural universe"; and 119. On the general point of separation, see pp. 9, 18, 31, 34, 48, 76.

38. E.g., "By deanimalizing the animal that is the object of his fear, man deanimalizes himself' (24). This idea is applied to ritual following Hegel (48). See also pp. 75-81.

39. He speaks of Pō as one of the "metaphors designating the divine origins" (8). Valeri's descriptions of Pō often recall those of *mana* in the writings of other anthropologists. For my own view, see Charlot 1977, 498-500; Charlot 1983a, 124-125.

40. Similarly Kū and Lono can "represent" "the divine" (215-216). For the connection between the divine and Pō on this point, see p. 383 n. 48. Valeri's understanding of the chants cited in note 48 is again based on his theory.

41. The *pō* in line 37 of the Beckwith text reads *pou* in the manuscript (Beckwith 1972, 242).

42. The use of the word "creation" to designate all views or models of cosmic origins is an ethnocentrism widely and unconsciously perpetrated by Western scholars (e.g., Edmondson 1971, 7, line 63; 11, lines 173-174). Valeri's text is a good example of the power of distortion of such a use. Valeri's emphasis on creation--rather than procreation--entails his elevation of "sight and intelligence" to "what is most human" (252 and n. 44; also 324-325; but see 396 n. 174). He thus follows a characteristically Western line of argument. Significantly, Hawaiians had several differing terms for thinking. "Traditionally, the intellect and emotions were thought to exist in the intestinal regions" (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972, 1:155). See also Pukui and Elbert 1971, s.v. *"na'au," "na'auao," " 'imi na'auao";* Charlot 1983a, 29. Moreover, a major Hawaiian literary form was the *mele ma'i,* "genital chant," which celebrated the recipient's sexual and fertilizing powers, a logical genre for a culture based on genealogical thinking.

43. Contrast the view of the "high position of women" in Elbert 1956-1957, 70:320; also, 69:348.

44. Valeri bases his ritual hierarchy on the idea of purity, but his discussion of purity--which he connects with completeness or wholeness of instantiation of type (e.g., 84, 88, 92, 148-149, 271, 276)--is marked by inconsistencies. For instance, he writes of the king, "Most of the taboos surrounding his sacred person are intended to maintain this purity" (148); but later, "any taboo surrounding a pure sacred being has as its aim to protect his purity" (374 n. 83).

Valeri writes (130-131), "What characterizes the sacrificer . . . is that he is permanently in contact with the god." (In fact, none of Valeri's references support that view.

To "have" a god or to be "connected" with a god does not mean that one is "permanently in contact" with it. On the contrary, in prayers one must call on the gods to come.) Valeri goes on to say that the sacrificer participates "in this way in the god's nature and mana, even being his manifestation in a human form" (130-131). Yet, as Valeri shows, it is necessary for these "pure people (ali'i, kahuna)" before the temple ritual "to be purified anew" (259; also 256-258, 267). How could they be in permanent contact with their gods if they were in a state of impurity, even of relative impurity?

Valeri does in fact speak at times in relative terms: "both what is marked *kapu* and what is marked *noa* can be pure or impure and are so only relatively" (259); "*Kapu* and *noa* are purely relative notions" (90; also 326, 330). But he can speak also in absolute terms: "at least some part of the divine must always remain *kapu* for the human sphere, otherwise the whole system would lose its fixed foundation" (91); " 'to pollute' would be a more appropriate rendering, since the land is made accessible to human use *(noa)* by being desacralized and losing its divine purity" (259).

Despite his expressed separation of *kapu-noa* from pure-impure, Valeri can write as if pollution were the way to lift a *kapu* (e.g., 91-92, 259, 326). He does use the word "free" to translate *noa* when describing the rendering *noa* of a temple (327-329, 401 n. 247), not wanting apparently to suggest that the temple was polluted. But he does not hesitate to refer to the pollution of the earth in order to render it workable, as seen above (also 19, 120-121). This does not accord with Hawaiian literary expressions of love for the land and of feelings of awe before its numinous quality, or with the considerable evidence for Hawaiian practices in regard to the land (e.g., 154, 348, 360 n. 75).

The above Hawaiian view of the land is based on the genealogical, two-source, earth-sky picture of the universe. Valeri sketches an alternative view, "divine nature," based on his theory of a "producer god" (7, 75, 156).

45. E.g., p. 326. This view influences also his interpretation of texts, as seen above, p. 131. Also, in his interpretation of a farmer's chant, he misses the fact that one half of the god list is female (see above, p. 111).

46. Also "the Makahiki gods are taken down, wrapped up, and stored in the *luakini*" (212-213).

47. Cf. p. 308. Valeri uses equally poor arguments elsewhere (278): 'Umi undergoes "a symbolic death (the death sentence that is not enacted)." Also pp. 232, 287.

48. E.g., *Kumulipo,* lines 612-615; Valeri 1985, 310. There are stories of killing gods and ghosts by trickery. A human being can die, *make,* and then his ghost can be killed or eaten by another spirit, in which case he is *make loa.*

49. See p. 359 n. 68 for other possible examples.

50. The practice Valeri refers to was, however, limited in time and place. Valeri here as elsewhere exaggerates the control of the "king." For instance he states that noble rank depended on relation to the king's genealogy (157-158 and n. 69, 296-297). To do this he must admit to going beyond the evidence in Malo. Such a relation to the king can be found after Kamehameha I (Charlot 1985, 5-6 and n. 30), but arguments would need to be offered to revise the general view that individual chiefly families could demonstrate their rank from their own historical backgrounds, traditions, and genealogical lines, To give just one aspect of this, families could have prestigious *kapu* and ***kānāwai*** that belonged to the family and were not connected to the "royal" line. By his use of the term "king" for the time before Kamehameha I, Valeri introduces a number of anachronistic elements.

51. The influence of Hinduism on Valeri's thinking has been noted earlier. Hinduism has also influenced the scholars who have influenced Valeri (64). Valeri does note differences between Brahmanism and Hawaiian religion (e.g., 66, 90, 92).

52. See p. 145 par. 2; also 370 n. 37, where he seems to forget that "ghost" is a perfectly legitimate dictionary meaning of *akua.*

53. "Charlot ends up treating Kamehameha as a culture hero who possesses quasi-supernatural powers of transformation and innovation" (145). This position is foreign to my thinking. On changes initiated by Kamehameha I, see Valeri, pp. 184, 222, 230-231, 369 n. 21, 372 n. 62, 385 n. 73.

54. Valeri is in fact inconsistent in his statements on the point. He states flatly, "the ali'i themselves can be considered deities" (44); but then he writes of "the king's 'divinity' (that is, of the fact that he is closer to the divine than any other human, and therefore *akua* relative to others)" (142). Valeri wants to turn *akua* into a relative term, just as he has done with purity-impurity and *kapu-noa:* "the king is a manifestation of his gods and is therefore himself a god relative to all other men" (145).

55. In other sources, the nearest son's name I have found is "Kauakahinui-a-Kakuhihewa," whose mother, however, bears another name than that given in the chant (Fornander 1969, 2:274, 276) The nearest daughter's name given is that of the descendant "Kauakahikuaanaauakane" (Fornander 1969, 2:276; Kamakau 1961, 62, 74). A further descendant "Kauakahi-a-Kahoowaha" is claimed as *mō'ī*, "king," of O'ahu and was father of Kūali'i (Fornander 1969, 2:277-278). The nearest name I have found is that of "Ka-ua-kahi-a-kaha-ola" (Sterling 1974, 37), a counselor from Kaua'i at the court of Kalani'ōpu'u and later Kamehameha. The description of a famous counselor and educator as a "god of speech" would be hyperbolic but appropriate. But the other information in the chant does not seem to fit.

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