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PACIFIC STUDIES

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MOTIVES FOR MIGRATION AND LAND PRESSURE IN SIMBU PROVINCE, PAPUA NEW GUINEA

G. T. Harris
University of New England
Armidale, Australia

Internal migration is an important variable in the process of social and economic development. Accordingly, a number of social scientists have studied the causes and consequences of internal migration in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Studies have been carried out in single villages, rural regions, and urban areas, and include several comprehensive studies. Most were completed in the early to mid-1970s.[1]

Several survey articles review the literature written up until the early 1970s (Harris 1974; May and Skeldon 1977). In the period between December 1973 and January 1974, a major study of some 18,000 persons in 17 towns was carried out in the *Urban Household Survey (U.H.S.);* the major results are reported in Garnaut, Wright, and Curtain (1977), and May (1979). The *U.H.S.* revealed, inter alia, the importance of the Simbu Province as a source of urban migrants (Garnaut, Wright, and Curtain 1977, 34), and their relatively low mean incomes and high unemployment. Accordingly three Simbu villages, all located in the Gumine District, were among those chosen for intensive study by *The Rural Survey* 1975 (R.S.), which covered 50 villages and was carried out during December 1974 and January 1975.

The major results of the *R.S.* are reported in Conroy and Skeldon (1977), and its aims and methods are discussed in Clunies Ross, Cur-

tain, and Conroy (1975). The results for the three Simbu villages differ in some important respects from those for the rest of the nation. In particular, the rate of absenteeism was relatively low in Simbu and the propensity for migrants to return was relatively high. The predominant motive for migration from aI1 villages was economic and this was more pronounced in Simbu than elsewhere. The availability of land was a greater constraint than elsewhere, but even in Simbu it had only a minor influence on migration.

Simbu has the highest population pressure of any province in PNG, although by world standards its crude population density is modest. Average figures tend to hide considerable variation within the province, but the median crude density for the 22 census divisions in the early 1970s was about 50 persons per sq km. Several studies have attempted to monitor demographic changes and their relation to pressure on land (e.g. Howlett et al. 1976). A study covering the period 1957 to 1974 found evidence suggesting that pressure on land encouraged people to stay home (or to return home) in order, perhaps, to protect their land rights (Harris 1978).

This paper reports a study of migration patterns since the *R.S.* was carried out, that is, between 1975 and 1980. The three villages included in the *R.S.* were restudied, together with another four villages.

Methods and Definitions

The 1980 survey was carried out in seven villages with the field assistance of seven undergraduates from the University of Papua New Guinea. The survey was based on questionnaires broadly similar to those used in *The Rural Survey* 1975.[2] There are disadvantages in such an approach in village studies (e.g. Hill 1970; Harris 1975), but these were mitigated to some extent by the existence of considerable background knowledge of the villages and province, previous experience with the questionnaires, and the availability of field assistants able to communicate in the local languages.

The villages were selected in consultation with the Simbu Land Use Programme; three villages studied in the *R.S.* were also included. A degree of arbitrariness may have affected the drawing of boundaries to villages, which in some cases may have differed from boundaries used in the *R.S.* and in the Provincial Data System (P.D.S.) Census.

For the purposes of this survey, a migration was defined as an absence of more than a month, for reasons other than visiting other villages or medical treatment. Five categories of adults (defined as 15 years and over) were distinguished according to their migration experience:

1 those who have never migrated;

2A returned migrants whose migration experience ended before Independence;[3]

2B returned migrants whose migration experience ended after Independence;

3 those absent at the time of the survey;[4]

4 people from outside the village who settled there to grow food.

Particular attention was paid to categories 2B and 3, since considerable information on categories 1 and 2A is already available from the *R.S.* In addition to completing a questionnaire on each adult according to his/her migration category, the surveyor completed a questionnaire for each household. From the seven villages, a total of 239 households and 1376 persons (of whom 920 were aged 15 and over) were surveyed. Fifty-nine percent of the households produced export crops in 1980, resulting in median earnings of K59, and 35 percent produced food crops for sale, with median earnings of K7 in 1980. Of the 177 households with coffee, the median planting was 172 trees and almost 30 percent of trees had been planted since Independence.

Results

This section presents the major results of the survey for adults at the village level, together with comparisons between the situation in 1975 and 1980 for the villages of Mul, Kaukau-Omkalai, and Moramaule. Data from Bongugl have been omitted because of incompleteness.

Absenteeism. Table 1 presents the basic data on adults by migrant categories. It indicates that 13 percent of all adult males and 7 percent of adult females were absent. The combined figures for categories 2A and 2B, male and female, are 14 and 4 percent respectively; and 70 percent of males and 87 percent of females had never migrated.

A comparison of village absentee rates in Table 1 with those reported by the P.D.S. Census indicates considerable differences, although it should be noted that the P.D.S. Census reports total population data, whereas Table 1 covers only adults. Major divergences between the two sets of figures occur in the case of Kenama and Nogar. Two explanations may be offered. First, as discussed above, the sampling procedure adopted did not cover all households. Second, households not represented in the village (e.g. nuclear families with all their members absent either long term or temporarily--as in Moramaule and Alaune, because of food shortages) were included in the absentee and total populations in the P.D.S. Census, even if they had been absent for many years. The

TABLE 1 **Adults by Migrant Categories**

	1		2A		2B		3		4		Total	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Kenama	20	28	12	0	0	2	4	4	1	0	37	34
Wogar	46	37	7	1	2	2	9	2	3	2	67	44
Mul	42	54	4	2	5	2[a]	11[a]	7[a]	0	0	62	65
Alaune	48	50	2	1	2	0	9	4	4	4	65	59
Kaukau-Omkalai	53	60	2	0	7	3	7	3	0	0	69	66
Moramaule	56	58	1	0	10	1	10	2	1	0	78	61
	265	287	28	4	26	10	50	22	9	6	378	329
	(70.0)	(87.2)	(7.4)	(1.2)	(6.9)	(3.0)	(13.2)	(6.7)	(2.4)	(1.8)		

Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of row totals.
[a]Subsequent analysis of category 2B and 3 migrants includes only those persons for whom detailed information was collected, i.e. 68 of the 76 males and 31 of the 32 females. The missing data all relate to Mul.

survey collected data on these households to a limited extent only, but there appeared to be numbers of such "absentee households," particularly in Kenama and Nogar, in addition to temporary absences due to food shortages. In order to maintain comparability with the *R.S.,* absentee household data from the present survey are not included in the tabulations. I estimate that absentee households amounted to around 5 percent of all households.

A comparison of the proportion of adult males in categories 2 and 3 in 1975 and 1980 is presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2 **Adult Male Absentees, 1975 and 1980 (percent)**

	1975	1980
Mul	19	17.7
Kaukau-Omkalai	14	10.1
Moramaule	15	12.3

The proportion of absent males was lower in each case in 1980; this is consistent with evidence presented later that employment opportunities in 1980 were fewer than they were in the 1970s, that economically-motivated migration had diminished in importance (although it remains the most important motive), and that the length of time spent away had decreased.

Modal time away since Independence was a little over 20 months,

with another concentration (presumably those visiting friends and relatives) falling between one and three months. The number of migrations made since Independence by category 2B adult males was one in 80 percent of cases, and two in 17 percent of cases. The migrants were spread throughout the country in 1980; relatively few were absent within Simbu.

Motives for migration. Table 3 presents data on the main motives for the most recent migration of category 2B and 3 adults. Given the likely bias in favor of "economic motivations," the practice established in the *R.S.* of not including it specifically on the questionnaire was followed in the present survey. An economic motive was attributed to a respondent if his response was listed under "other reasons" and further specified as "to get a job," "to earn money," or '"to sell goods." Table 3 indicates that 48.5 percent of males were economically motivated, 20.6 percent migrated in order to visit friends and relatives, and 13.2 percent gave "education" as their main motive, with smaller proportions migrating to accompany a relative, or for other reasons.

These data may be compared with the results of *The Rural Survey 1975* where the proportion of economically motivated males from the Simbu villages was 81 percent. Despite the dramatic reduction in the proportion of males migrating for predominantly economic reasons, that remained the most important motive. There were corresponding increases in the proportions migrating to visit friends and relatives, obtain education, or for other reasons.

The 33 males who gave an economic motive as their main motive were questioned further as to why they needed to migrate to get money. Twenty-six said they had no opportunities to raise cash crops and 7 said they could save more quickly while away; none indicated that it was

TABLE 3 **Main Motives for Most Recent Migration, Category 2B and 3 Adults (percent)**

	Males	Females
Accompany husband or parent	7.4	58.8
Educational	13.2	12.9
Visiting friends, relatives	20.6	12.9
Economic[a]	48.5	6.5
Other	10.3	12.0
Total	100.0	100.1

[a]I.e. for money, for job, to sell goods.

because there was no land available. When asked why they needed money, 15 indicated the bride price, and there was a range of other responses. When asked how they intended to get money, 21 signified a job, and 8 indicated selling goods. Some of those whose major motive was not economic still wanted or hoped to find a job, and half of the economically motivated migrants had a job arranged in advance.[5]

Two other factors appear to have influenced the decision to migrate. Category 2B and 3 adults were found to be significantly more likely to have had primary or secondary education than category 1 adults. Absentees were concentrated in the 15- to 24-year age category; over 20 percent of males in this age range were absent and these made up over 80 percent of all male absentees.

In order to shed more light on motivations, an attempt was made at the village level to regress absentee rates against several potentially influential variables. The independent variables considered were modal village earnings from export crops, the proportion of primary and secondary educated persons in each village, and village population pressure.[6] Three dependent variables were tested: the proportion of category 3 adults, the proportion of category 2B plus 3 adults, and the P.D.S. 1980 Census absentee rates. It was hypothesized that absentee rates would be negatively related to cash crop earnings (as suggested for Omkalai by Kuange 1977, 127-128), and positively to population pressure and to the proportion of educated persons. However, such relationships as were found between the absentee rates and these independent variables were non-significant, both singly and in combination. In the case of population pressure (measured by occupational density) the relationship was negative, albeit non-significantly, which confirms previous research in the province (Harris 1978).

Table 4 presents the responses of category 1 males to the question why

TABLE 4 **Reasons for Not Migrating (category 1 males)**

	No.	Percent
Too young, still at school	15	6.0
Physically incapacitated	21	8.4
Care for aged relatives or young children	49	19.7
Lack of money to finance migration	46	18.5
Protect land rights	36	14.5
Other	27	10.8
No obvious reason	55	22.1
Total	249	100.1

they had not migrated. One important response was to protect land rights, an issue considered in the next section. More important motives were the need to care for relatives and lack of money to finance a migration.

Land Shortage. Of particular interest to this study was the collection of information on the extent and nature of land shortages as perceived by villagers; such information could be added to objective data being collected by the Simbu Land Use Project. At the household level, 88 households (37 percent) claimed they were short of land, and 54 of these (61 percent) reported it to be their main problem. An interesting range of reasons was given as to why land shortage was being experienced. The most common reason (reported by 49 percent of households) was too many sons in the household for the amount of land available, which resulted in the elder sons receiving most of the land. A second common reason (32 percent) was that the land inherited by the household from its forefathers was limited; this was sometimes related to the eviction of a group from land through warfare. Some households from which the male head was absent were said to have "no land"; the causal link was difficult to ascertain in these cases--did the person lose land rights as a result of his absence, or did he migrate because he had no land? The latter appears to be more common, and to be related to elder brothers receiving land and younger brothers losing out.[7]

Householders were questioned about the main ways in which they were affected by land shortage. Inadequate food for household consumption was mentioned by 24 percent (or 51 percent if the rather large number of households that did not mention any particular effect or did not know are omitted),

This study sought information on the land rights of male absentees. Almost all absentees had clear unchallenged rights to land, a situation very similar to that reported in 1975.

In individual villages there was substantial variation in the proportion of households reporting themselves short of land in general, and short of land for food and export crops. Bongugl and Alaune had the highest proportions in all three categories and Mul and Kenama the lowest. It is interesting and perplexing to note that these proportions have almost no correlation with the Occupational Index calculated by the Simbu Land Use Programme and presented in the last two columns of Table 5.[8] Whereas Bongugl and Alaune had the highest reported land shortage, their occupational densities were both less than one, indicating that the population was so great as to be placing excessive pressure on the land's productive potential. The opposite was true for Mul and

TABLE 5 **Village by Nature of Land Shortage (percentage of households)**

				Occupational Density	
	Short of Land	Short for Export Crops	Short for Food Crops	Based on village book pop.	Based on resident pop.
Kenama	25	10	5	2.70	1.99
Nogar	42	17	37	1.04	0.70
Mul	15	15	18	1.45	1.15
Alaune	54	50	50	0.85	0.74
Bongugl	55	48	48	0.79	0.43
Kaukau-Omkalai	27	24	19	0.48	0.39
Moramaule	40	34	28	0.68	0.61

Kenama, with low reported shortages but occupational densities of greater than one. Given a non-equal distribution of land between households, pressure could be felt by particular households and yet not by the village as a whole.

Finally, a comparison was made of the land shortage position of "non-migrant households" (defined as households with no persons in categories 2 and 3) and "migrant households" (with one or more members in categories 2 and 3).[9] There was very little difference of opinion between these two groups concerning land shortage.

Absentees' contact with home village. Data were also collected on the nature and extent of absentees' links with their villages. However, I have reservations about the quality of the data collected, largely because of the research methods used. For example, it proved difficult to get an accurate picture of cash flows to and from absentees using the questionnaire approach, and particularly to identify flows going to individuals as distinct from households. As a result, I have recorded generalizations in this section rather than numbers. This applies particularly to money flows.

First, strong links were/are maintained by previous/current migrants. Close to 90 percent of category 2B and 3 adult males sent money back to their villages either regularly or (more usually) occasionally or for special purposes. A slightly lower proportion received gifts of food from the village during their absences. The exception to both these generalizations was Alaune, whose absentees (mainly in Lae) neither received food nor sent money. Second, absentees used a variety of ways to keep in contact apart from sending money. In order of importance these

were sending goods, providing accommodation, and sending letters. Short visits to the village during the period of absence were uncommon, made by less than 10 percent of adult absentees. Third, it was not at all uncommon for villagers to send money to absentees. As suggested above, it was difficult to avoid double counting of both receipts and payments (i.e. several individuals might report receiving/sending the same money), but the ratio of money received by villagers to that sent by them appears to be of the order of 5 or 6 to 1. About three times as many villagers received remittances as sent money.

Summary and Conclusions

The changes in migration patterns in Simbu between 1975 and 1980 were fairly minor and can be explained in terms of limited growth of employment opportunities outside the village sector. The most important changes detected were:

1. Smaller proportions of adults were away from the three villages restudied in 1980 than had been in 1975.
2. Economic motivations for migration still predominated in 1980 but seemed much less important than in 1975. There was a corresponding increase in the proportion of absences due to visiting relatives and obtaining education. At the same time, some of those whose main motive for migration was not economic, still hoped for a job.

The data on motives, combined with information about numbers in categories 2B and 3, support Todaro's (1969) explanation of migration--that a potential migrant's decision to migrate is jointly influenced by the wage he expects to earn and his expectation of getting a job. It is apparent from Table 6 that the number of jobs available in urban areas and on plantations increased only to a limited extent during the latter half of the 1970s.[10] Thus the subjective probability of being employed, as perceived by the potential migrant, is likely to have fallen.

The data presented in Table 6 derive from a number of different sources which were obtained by different methods. Hence they cannot be directly compared with one another. However, the meaning of each column is clear: the rate of expansion of employment opportunities in all sectors of the economy during the latter half of the 1970s was very modest. Total employment of citizens in June 1979 was estimated at 132,600 (National Planning Office, 1981).

Subjective data on land pressure were collected at the household

TABLE 6 Employment Trends during the 1970s (citizens)

Year	Agricultural Largeholdings[a]	Secondary Industries	Government Employees[b]
1969-1970	53,989	11,378	25,520
1974-1975	47,990	14,357	37,893
1975-1976	43,493	15,950	36,978
1976-1977	45,503	16,565	39,043
1978	45,512	17,889	n.a.
1979	50,103	21,243	33,610[c]

Sources: Column 1: Bureau of Statistics, *Rural Industries 1973-74* (1977) and National Statistics Office, *Agricultural Largeholdings (Preliminary Year Ended 31 December 1979)*, Port Moresby, September 1981. Column 2: Bureau of Statistics, *Seconday Industries*, various issues. Column 3: Manpower Planning Unit, National Planning Office, *Manpower Trends* 3 (March 1979); National Planning Office, *National Manpower Assessment 1979-1980*, August 1981.

[a]I.e. plantations.

[b]Excludes laborers and casual workers.

[c]Excludes 11,000 Education Sector workers and 22,500 Central Government workers. Not comparable with pre-1978 figures.

level, and 37 percent of households claimed to be short of land. The main reason given for land shortages was the existence of too many sons for the available land. There was virtually no evidence of absentees losing their rights to land as a result of their absence and land pressure.

NOTES

This study was carried out with the friendly cooperation of the Simbu Land Use Programme, and I am grateful to the Programme's leader, Paul Wohlt. Anton Gois performed sterling work in arranging with village leaders for the placement of field assistants, and provided diverse aid and support during the course of the study. Seven field assistants--Rose Bolgi, Emily Dirua, Joe Gende, John Indoro, Alphonse Kee, Andy Kua, and Joe Kimark--collected the bulk of the data with an impressive degree of competence and persistence. John Alkin and Mary Henning provided valuable coding and computing services respectively. Finally, I am grateful to the Office of Environment and Conservation for its financial support, and to several referees for comments.

1. Examples of more recent work include Morauta and Hasu (1979) and Morauta (1980).

2. The *R.S.* questionnaires were based on those devised by the author and Anthony Clunies Ross for a pilot survey in 1972-1973 (Harris and Clunies Ross 1975).

3. Independence (16 September 1975) was chosen as a point in time which people could readily identify, and which roughly coincided with the *R.S.*

4. Members of the household provided information on any absent members.

5. All but one of those with a job arranged in advance gave an economic reason as their main motive.

6. The first two variables derive from the present study. Population pressure was measured by the proportion of households reporting themselves to be short of land, and on an "occupational density" index provided by Paul Wohlt of the Simbu Land Use Programme. The index, discussed later in this article, relates village population to the carrying capacity of the village's land area.

7. Kelly (1968) notes that in Simbu individual household heads hold full title to their land. This has resulted in less effective adjustments to local imbalances than in Enga, for example, where clan power dominates land tenure decision making.

8. This index is a ratio of population to the carrying capacity of the relevant land area. The carrying capacity includes allowances for uses of land other than food crops and variations in yields of sweet potato according to altitude and soil quality. An index value of one indicates a balance between population and carrying capacity.

9. It would have been preferable to have a less general categorization of households, but there were many households with both category 2 and 3 members, and this prevented a more precise definition.

10. There is no comprehensive set of statistics available on total employee numbers (Bank of Papua New Guinea 1979, 28) and this is particularly true for the 1970s.

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A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE PONAPEAN INDEPENDENCE VOTE IN THE 1983 PLEBISCITE

Glenn Petersen
Bernard M. Baruch College
City University of New York

> When in my Prague apartment Milan Hubl held forth on the possibility of the Czech nation disappearing into the Russian empire, we both knew that the idea, though legitimate, went beyond us and that we were speaking of the *inconceivable.* Even though man is mortal he cannot conceive of the end of space or time, of history or a nation: he lives in an illusory infinity.
>
> People fascinated by the idea of progress never suspect that every step forward is also a step on the way to the end and that beyond all the joyous 'onward and upward' slogans lurks the lascivious voice of death urging us to make haste.
>
> . . . we must never allow the future to collapse under the burden of memory.
>
> Milan Kundera
> *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*

On 21 June 1983, the Federated States of Micronesia (consisting of the Eastern and Central Caroline Islands) conducted a plebiscite. In most of these islands a "Compact of Free Association" with the United States, slated to replace American Trusteeship over Micronesia, was approved by an approximate 90 percent majority. The people of Ponape and the surrounding islands included in Ponape State voted against Free Association, however, and called instead for independence. While the

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margin of defeat was narrow in Ponape State as a whole (4,414 "No" votes, 4,116 "Yes" votes), the rural people of Ponape island proper (that is, the people of Madolenihmw, Uh, Kiti, and Net paramount chiefdoms, who make up the greater portion of the State's population) were strongly opposed to Free Association, defeating it by a two-thirds majority. Even in Kolonia town and the outer islands, where the measure was approved, the margin was much smaller than in the FSM as a whole.[1]

Free Association's unpopularity on Ponape contrasts sharply with the reception it received in the rest of Micronesia, and the Ponapeans drew criticism from other Micronesians, American observers, and even a few of their own leaders. They were accused of arrogance, ignorance, and selfishness. Yet the Ponapean call for independence, as singular as it may have been in its local context, forces us to confront the fact that it is the *Micronesian* vote that is peculiar in the wider context of the Pacific islands community of nations, where the quest for independence has been the norm and a vote to prolong colonialism, though certainly not unknown, the oddity. Indeed, the Ponapean vote should be seen as a proclamation in favor of independence, not as an opposition response. This said, we are still faced with the question of why Ponape sought to resist American demands for continued control of Micronesia.

Attempts to explore, and perhaps to explain, the Ponapean vote for independence must take a host of circumstances into account. Major topics that must be addressed are Ponapean relations with and attitudes toward the U.S., Ponapean interactions with the rest of the FSM, and--the subject of this paper--the attitudes, perceptions, and desires that have grown out of autochthonous Ponapean social and cultural experiences. In an earlier paper, "Ponape's Body Politic" (1984a), I examined certain aspects of traditional Ponapean culture and politics that shape contemporary Ponapean participation in state and national political systems. In this paper I intend to deal specifically with the ways in which Ponapeans' understandings of their own culture and cultural-historical experiences led them finally to insist upon independence. I will address Ponapean-FSM and Ponapean-American aspects of the plebiscite elsewhere.

The body of this paper has four parts. I begin with a discussion of Ponapean historical consciousness, and illustrate the characteristic habits of skepticism and analysis that shaped the Ponapean's critical approach to the plebiscite. Next, I examine relevant elements of Ponapean culture, showing how a set of specific values was applied to the analysis of Free Association. I then describe the context of the vote itself,

explaining how the *conduct* of the plebiscite served to confirm Ponapean doubts about what Free Association was likely to hold in store for them. Finally, I offer an interpretation of what Ponapeans saw themselves in favor of--the way of life they quite consciously want to maintain a degree of control over. My intention is to demonstrate that the Ponapean vote was not an example of spur-of-the-moment opposition to the FSM or the U.S., but grew, rather, out of the course of the Ponapean's history and their awareness of it.

In the lines from *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* that preface this paper, Milan Kundera, an expatriate Czech, expresses ambivalence about the virtues of memory. I do not know whether he has come upon some general truth, nor do I really mean to take issue with him, except to suggest that even though Ponapeans are in some degree fascinated by the idea of progress, they most assuredly do "suspect that every step forward is also a step on the way to the end." It is memory, above all else, that the Ponapeans have chosen as their guide on the suspect route toward that end. This is not to suggest that the Ponapeans live in the past, but to argue that they reflect upon their past as they contemplate their future.

Kundera has also written that "the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting." Ponapeans have forgotten very little. Specifically, they have not lost sight of the meaningfulness of their own lives. They interpreted the plebiscite--what it asked of them and the way that it was conducted--as something intended both to deny the existence of and wrench away that meaningfulness from them. The people of Ponape permitted me to sit with them in the weeks preceding and following the plebiscite, as they discussed it among themselves. I have, over the course of the past ten years, come to understand something of the context in which Ponapean discussions take place. What I report here is based on careful consideration of the contexts in which it was learned. It seems proper to note as well that when I describe what I believe are Ponapean analyses of events, I am doing so with the help of men and women who have read or who have had explained to them what it is that I write about their lives; they are my teachers and I hope I do them justice.

Ponapean Historical Consciousness

Ponapeans live in what appears at first glance to be a relatively homogenous society. The non-Ponapean immigrants on the island come from the surrounding atolls, and most speak Ponapean or related dia-

lects as their first language.[2] Ponapeans, however, perceive a wealth of diversity on their island. In addition to differences between themselves and outer-islanders, they perceive quite significant variations among communities and especially among the five paramount chiefdoms (Ponapean *wehi*). While there is a notion of a shared Ponapean way or culture *(tiahk en Pohnpei),* Ponapeans are also quick to stress differences in the customs, habits, and attitudes characteristic of the various chiefdoms. John Fischer has suggested that in precontact Ponape "somehow the same concepts were used but . . . were given different emphasis in different groups" (in Bascom 1965:v); and David Hanlon (personal communication, 1983) notes their insistence that *"Pohnpei sohte ehu,"* "Ponape is not one." This diversity does not merely exist; it is celebrated. Ponapean emphasis on hierarchy is continually counterbalanced by an overriding theme of individual autonomy; the stress placed on diversity is critical to this process. Small but ubiquitous variations allow individuals and communities to assert their distinctiveness without threatening consensus, and as the uses of matrilineal clanship have grown circumscribed and lines of descent less remarked upon (Petersen 1982b), it may well be that territorial distinctions become increasingly emphasized.

Some of the distinctions between the chiefdoms that were seemingly on the wane during the colonial period have begun to reassert themselves. Disputes over borders flared up when attempts were made to map and finalize them. In the course of the Ponapean Constitutional Convention, meeting in 1983, one of the thorniest disputes had to do with the status of the island's only town. Kolonia was carved off from the Net chiefdom in the late nineteenth century and it now has the status of a chartered municipality. Ponapeans employ the same term, *wehi,* for both paramount chiefdom and municipality (they also use the term in referring to independent nations and other political divisions), and as the Ponape State Constitution is drafted the term's use has come into question. Because in Ponapean eyes the traditional chiefdoms are sovereign and imbued with spiritual, moral, and social qualities, it was decided that granting Kolonia (erected on territory that is historically part of Net) *wehi* status would effectively cleave it off from Net, something that the framers of the Constitution felt neither inclined nor empowered to do. The chiefdoms' sovereignty and singularity remain fundamental to the Ponapeans' understanding of their world.

Indeed, Ponapean accounts of their own history seem to emphasize distinctions in space over temporal chronology. Individuals, events, and changes seem to be linked together by variations in spatial organization.

Events are marked by where they occurred, and epochs are known by names that usually refer to particular groupings of places rather than periods. Ponapean historical vision is enormously fluid--nothing is still, nothing permanent--but it is motion in space more than in time.[3] It is only the recent past, the colonial era, that shows a real emphasis on chronology. Ponapeans now speak of the Spanish, German, Japanese, and American eras. But even this episodic perspective focuses on externally generated cues--colonial regimes. Ponapeans continue to conceptualize events in terms of where they take place, and thus remain acutely aware of local variations in historical process.

Observing that different parts of the island have experienced the impact of colonialism with differing intensities and consequences, some Ponapeans have become keen students of the processes of history. We might say that they have a well-honed historical consciousness. The most immediate example of historical interpretation entailed in the I983 plebiscite is Ponapean understanding of Sokehs chiefdom's 1910 rebellion against the Germans. The Sokehs Rebellion has been written about a number of times (Ehrlich 1978; Hempenstall 1978; Bascom 1950). My purpose here is not to recount it but to examine the meaning it held for Ponapeans voting in the plebiscite.

At the time of the plebiscite a visitor to Ponape was surprised, and somewhat dismayed, to learn that the gravesite of the rebellion's executed leaders is untended and overgrown, and that Sokehs chiefdom is now ranked last in the ritual ordering of Ponapean paramount chiefdoms. By Ponapean standards the chiefdom did not exist during the Sokehs people's exile in Palau and thus it is the most recently established chiefdom. Ponapeans explain that even though the Sokehs Rebellion is reckoned an important event in recent Ponapean history, it is not thought of as a Ponapean struggle, but as an uprising of the Sokehs people. Sokehs had been acting as an independent, sovereign entity. The rebels, who are perceived as having acted in the finest tradition of the Ponapean warrior ethic, still command great respect, but it was their own fight, modern Ponapeans say, and they are not national heroes. It was this visitor's naive question about the rebels' modern status, however, that called forth from two older Ponapeans an incisive analysis of the rebellion, a discussion that an ethnographer comfortably acquainted with the facts of the event might not have otherwise heard.

As with any historical tradition, many interpretations of the Sokehs Rebellion exist. The version these two students of Ponapean history put forward is but one more in a long chain. According to their rendering, Sokehs rose, while the rest of Ponape did not, because of factors quite

specific to Sokehs and its relations with the Germans. At the time of the rebellion, they claim, only Sokehs had entered into a copra-production contract with the Germans. Demands for copra ran counter to the domestic needs of the Sokehs people, and their leaders found themselves in an untenable position. The rebellion was sparked in reaction to these conditions, with which only the Sokehs people were confronted. This account illustrates the facility with which contemporary Ponapeans observe the variable and idiosyncratic course of history. The people of Sokehs, not the Ponapeans as a general category, had specific pressures placed upon them by the Germans. In the absence of these pressures the rest of Ponape behaved one way, while Sokehs acted in response to its own circumstances.

The Ponapeans' tendency to view their past in spatial terms means that in effect they engage in the study of comparative history. They do not see history as unintelligible, nor as incomprehensible fate. What occurs in one place does not necessarily occur elsewhere, and what happens to the rest of Micronesia may not happen to Ponape.

Indeed, interpretations of the Sokehs Rebellion offer us a concrete example of historical revisionism--the attempt to give to events in the past more current meanings. Accounts of the rebellion recorded in 1946 by William Bascom (1950) suggested that clan revenge for a beating inflicted by the Germans lay at the heart of the rebellion. Paul Ehrlich's (1978) richly detailed study in the early 1970s found that factionalism among the leaders of the paramount chiefdoms had served to isolate Sokehs and edge it toward confrontation. In 1983 the rebellion was more often a topic of conversation than at any time in the preceding decade, and its implications for the Ponapean vote were manifest: Ponape must respond to current political and economic pressures with the decisiveness shown by the valiant warriors of Sokehs.

As I noted in "Ponape's Body Politic" (1984a:114-115), the Sokehs Rebellion marked a singular turning point in the Ponapeans' relationship to their own island. Not until the Germans forcefully put down the rebellion did Ponapeans find themselves no longer masters of their homeland. I have suggested elsewhere (1984b:351) that at this point Ponapeans realized that violent resistence was no longer an option open to them, and that their response was to adopt an explicitly nonviolent, informal means of preserving their autonomy. I call this response "cultural resistence." Similar methods have been described elsewhere as "everyday forms of peasant resistance" (Scott 1983). It is important to keep this history in mind while considering the Ponapean vote in the 1983 plebiscite, because the Ponapeans who voted against Free Associa-

tion were drawing upon cultural and historical themes as they prepared to vote. The votes of many were framed as a form of resistance.

Perhaps the most powerful example of the Sokehs Rebellion's relevance to the plebiscite appeared at the annual gathering of Ponape's Roman Catholic sodality. Held a few days after the plebiscite, the meeting's focal point was a full day of songs, dances, and sketches performed by various local Catholic congregations. One of the highlights was a production of the near-epic song and dance that relate the history of the Sokehs Rebellion. Evocatively performed by a congregation of Sokehs people descended from the rebels, they both celebrated their forebears' audacity and mourned Sokeh's sad fate.

While fragments of the song are occasionally heard, one rarely has an opportunity to witness a full-length performance of the dance. This one was done with gusto and skill, evidence of the dancers' months of preparation. They had in fact been rehearsing throughout the period preceding the plebiscite. The audience responded with thunderous acclamation. There had been a general sense of pride in the days following the plebiscite and the Sokehs dance simultaneously basked in and stirred up more of that exultation.

Ponapean Cultural Elements in the Plebiscite Vote

In *One Man Cannot Rule a Thousand* (1982a:122-123) I discuss complementary pulls between concepts of honor and humility in Ponapean culture. Both played roles in shaping Ponapean attitudes toward the plebiscite. Honor was the more visible and powerful of the values, but I shall begin this part of the discussion by examining Ponapean humility.

A critical part of the entire complex of Ponapean respect behaviors depends upon self-abnegation and self-denigration. To decline a gift or portion of food by protesting that one is unworthy of it or to offer a gift with accompanying disclaimers about its inadequacy are basic aspects of Ponapean etiquette. Self-criticism is commonplace, and Ponapeans are frankly critical about the self-aggrandizing aspects of this self-criticism. Ponapeans laugh continually at themselves and their own shortcomings.

This ready self-criticism gives the Ponapeans a sharp perspective on their own responses to historical circumstance. Their historical sense is overwhelmingly ironic. They laugh, for instance, at the cupidity of the nineteenth-century Ponapean who, according to both traditional and written accounts, exhumed the body of a European sailor in order to obtain his machine-made clothing, thereby setting loose a devastating

smallpox epidemic. They laugh at the story of the Lepen Net, a nineteenth-century chief, who signed away to a trader a large portion of territory in exchange for a few empty glass bottles. A legislator tells me, tongue-in-cheek, that the only way to foster economic development on Ponape would be to chop down all the breadfruit trees, thus forcing people to work for a living. Someone else says that Ponape's troubles with development stem from not having suffered enough: just look at the Filipinos, he says. Because of their islands' tribulations they have learned skills that provide them with good employment when they come to Ponape.

A proverb, "*Mwengki alasang kepin,*" "The monkey imitates the captain," may best summarize the Ponapeans' bemused perspective on the dangers of culture change. The proverb derives from an apocryphal story about a monkey who watches a sea captain shave. The captain spies the monkey and decides to play a dastardly trick upon him. As he finishes shaving he subtly flips the straight-edge razor over and runs its blunt side across his jugular vein. Then the captain sets the razor down and leaves. The monkey leaps from its perch in the trees, scampers over to the shaving kit, and grasps the razor. Fiddling before the mirror, the monkey mimics the captain's shave, then runs the razor across its throat. End of tale.

The story is a rather morbid commentary on the hazards of adopting habits of being that are not really suitable, and the monkey-mimicry epigram is used as a cautionary comment interjected into discussions about changes that are being contemplated. Many Americans who encounter change on Ponape, or who hear Ponapeans politely praising American customs, are prone to believe that Ponapeans want to become just like Americans. But Ponapeans are not Americans, Ponapeans say, and any attempt at such a transformation could be fatal.

Many Ponapeans ceaselessly examine changes taking place in their lives. When speaking publicly, chiefs invariably exhort the people to reclaim virtues that are thought to be disappearing. The plebiscite was in fact seen as a rare opportunity for Ponapeans to transform their concern about what they were allowing to happen to themselves into concrete action. Most Ponapeans do not think of themselves as mere pawns caught up in these unfortunate changes, but as responsible actors with decisions to make. Their ability to discern patterns and causes in history and to be critical of what they have done led them to approach the plebiscite as an event that would have profound consequences. Their self-critical predilections became analytical skills; their perceptions of how

they had responded to earlier circumstances guided their visions of the future.

The facility with which Ponapeans analyzed the plebiscite and the likely consequences of Free Association was aided in part by the presence of the FSM capital on Ponape: their propinquity gives them ready access to gossip, rumor, and unpublicized facts about their national government. The impact of this access is enormously enhanced by another fundamental aspect of Ponapean culture, the daily, communal kava *(sakau)* rituals. Participation in kava rituals is flexible, and the continually varying composition of the groups serves to transmit information rapidly and thoroughly. Little transpires on Ponape that does not become a topic of discussion at kava.

In "Ponape's Body Politic" (1984a) I emphasized the importance Ponapeans place upon being able to exercise direct oversight in their political affairs. The kava ritual is a fundamental part of this oversight. Determined not to be governed by a distant polity, and to take self-government seriously, Ponapeans strove to make good use of their proximity to the seat of authority. They examined the Compact of Free Association not merely as something that was going to be done to Ponape but as a proposition calling for analysis and response.

Ponapean analysis of the Compact was, of course, phrased in Ponapean terms. Two concepts, in particular, were central to discussions of their relationship with the U.S.: *kopwel* and *manaman.* In the following pages, I explore the meanings of these two concepts in detail, and demonstrate the thoroughly Ponapean interpretations the Ponapeans placed upon their participation in the plebiscite.

One of the basic points of departure for the Ponapean analysis of the Compact was the concept *kopwel.* There is no simple way to translate *kopwel*--its connotations resonate with the full complexity of Ponapean culture. A very rough gloss would be "to take care of," and it is often used as a reflexive, that is, "to take care of oneself." The concept is imbued with pride and a sense of propriety: Ponapeans deem it proper to expect that a person, family, or community be able to take care of him-, her-, or itself. To suggest otherwise may be construed as an insult. Thus an offer of assistance delivered, or perceived as being delivered, in a patronizing manner would be met with the statement, *"Se kopwelikin kiht,"* "We *kopwel* ourselves." "We can take care of ourselves, thank you," might serve as a free translation.

Kopwel can also connote "to protect, guard jealously, or cherish," as in the phrase *"kopwelikin tiahk,"* meaning to protect or cherish Pona-

pean custom or culture, to guard the Ponapean way of being from the harmful pressures impinging upon it. I first encountered the concept in an explicit reference to the Free Association. On the day of the plebiscite, a group of people preparing kava had begun discussing what each thought the notion of Free Association implied. One man said it meant that the U.S. was trying to *kopwel* the Ponapeans, to take care of them. "Yes," interjected someone else, "that's exactly what the U.S. is telling us. It's humiliating *(mwamwahliki)* us, insulting us, by suggesting that we cannot take care of ourselves, that we must be looked after." Said a third, "If a foreign nation offered to take care of the U.S., it would be terribly insulted; it would interpret it as a suggestion that *it* wasn't capable of looking after its own affairs." "Why should we be any less upset by the suggestion that the U.S. has to oversee our lives and affairs?" asked another.

Personal autonomy and independence are themes that appear again and again in an analysis of Ponapean culture, and *kopwel* is an aspect of these themes. Free Association was not judged as a purely bureaucratic arrangement--which is how most Americans seem to conceptualize it--but as a moral and philosophical issue.[4] Were the Ponapeans to agree to Free Association, many argued, they would effectively be denying personal and communal responsibilities, and thus lose their claim to *mana-man,* a concept often translated as "power" but in this case meaning something much more like sovereignty.

One of the most thoroughgoing Ponapean analyses of their relationship with the U.S. came in just this context of autonomy and sovereignty. In a later section of this paper, I address some of the constraints that limit discussion of public events. At this point I simply note one consequence of these constraints: Ponapean etiquette (Ponapean notions about smoothing the flow of interpersonal relations) does not sanction a great deal of frank expression. Much commentary is oblique, and straightforward statements are likely to be distrusted or even discounted. Kedrus, whose comments I am about to recount, is unusual in his outspokenness, in the strength of the opinions he voices, and in his willingness to be iconoclastic. In spite of, or perhaps because of, these qualities, his opinions are founded upon his own deep feelings about the quality of Ponapean culture and its rightful place in contemporary Ponapean life.

When Kedrus was a young boy, he said, his father was the hardest working man on Ponape. But his father was like *mwein America,* the "American era (on Ponape)." *"Mwein America,"* as he called his father, provided for Kedrus and his brothers and, as they grew and married,

for their families. He fed them, clothed them, gave them a home. Kedrus spent his days sleeping and his evenings drinking kava with his friends. Then, Kedrus said, between the births of his third and fourth children he was struck by the realization that if *"mwein America"* died, so would he, his wife, and his children. He saw that he was quite incapable of supporting himself or a family.

Kedrus moved his family to another community, where he had access to unplanted land, and began farming there. For the first few years, before his tree crops began to bear, he had to work night and day, farming and fishing, in order to feed his family. As time went on, however, and his efforts succeeded, he began producing the surpluses necessary for full participation in the political economy. Then his father began sending his brothers to him, to ask for food, a pig, a kava plant, or money. Others in the community likewise started making requests. This, Kedrus said, is when he became a real man, this is when he became independent. But in order to become independent, he continued, one must suffer as he suffered; it hurts when one takes on responsibility for oneself.

This is precisely the relationship contemporary Ponape has with the actual *mwein America,* he maintains. As long as the U.S. is supporting the Ponapeans they are not truly adults, they are children. (Many Ponapeans take pride in the number of mouths they can feed, and it is thus easy to understand why Kedrus's father was so willing to feed his grown sons and their families.)

In Kedrus's account the U.S. occupies a position identical to the father who keeps his children dependent. After he spoke of his father as *"mwein America,"* Kedrus explicitly contrasted American rule in Micronesia with the other colonial regimes the islands have known. "Those other rulers were hard on us, but we Ponapeans thrived under that harshness. We had to take care of ourselves." He pointed to the Sokehs Rebellion as an example. The Germans disciplined the Sokehs people and the people fought back. If their rebellion was ultimately unsuccessful, it was nevertheless a powerful reaffirmation of Ponapean dignity. In the American period, by contrast, everything is free and easy. The Americans seem to make few demands and to give the Micronesians whatever they want. As a consequence, the U.S. is systematically sapping the Micronesians' strength.

Then Kedrus delivered his coup de grâce. "Of all the colonial powers that have ruled Micronesia," he said, "the U.S. has been the most perfidious. The other regimes made no bones about it: their interest in Micronesia was self-interest and their policies were openly formulated

to serve those interests. The Ponapeans thrived in opposition to them. The U.S. has steadfastly maintained that its primary concern is the Micronesians' welfare, while doing everything in its power to destroy the vitality of the Micronesian people."

"As for me," Kedrus concluded, "I would prefer an honest tyrant to this treachery any day." His moving oratory notwithstanding, Kedrus was, finally, pessimistic. It was too late, he felt, for the Micronesians to reclaim their independence. The U.S. had succeeded in turning them into a permanently dependent people. While Ponapeans like to speak about independence, Kedrus argued, they won't bring themselves to vote for it. He was surprised when Ponape rejected Free Association in favor of independence, but he saw himself vindicated when it became clear that Ponape was the only state to defeat Free Association and would be carried into it by the majority vote of the FSM.

Kedrus's narrative neatly binds together the notion of *kopwel*--the Ponapeans' insistence upon taking care of themselves--with its complement, the concept of *manaman.* Even more than *kopwel, manaman* was at the center of the Ponapean debate about Free Association.

Like *kopwel,* the cultural meanings--and relevance to the issue--of *manaman* are entirely too complex for any single English-language term to bear. Etymologically, *manaman* shares its roots with the Polynesian *mana,* a concept fundamental to cultural anthropological theory. I shall discuss its Ponapean meanings in the contexts in which it was primarily used. People asked, "Is there *manaman* in Free Association?" "Will the Ponapeans have *manaman* under Free Association?" "Does the plebiscite on Free Association recognize the Ponapeans' *manaman?*" These questions were raised repeatedly during Ponapean discussions of political philosophy. In general, the Ponapeans' answer to them, echoed in their plebiscite vote, was a resounding "no."

As Raymond Firth long ago pointed out, it is wrong to assume that the "mana-concept," though it may be found throughout the Pacific islands, has identical connotations wherever it occurs ([1940]1967:177). Nor did Firth try to find a single suitable translation for the term, instead illustrating its usage in a variety of contexts. My analysis of *manaman* here will be limited to the contexts of Free Association and the plebiscite. Before proceeding, however, it should be pointed out that both the Compact of Free Association and the plebiscite are grounded in the very specific political philosophy set out in the United Nations Charter and related documents. Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement specifies that the "U.S. shall promote the development of the inhabitants . . . toward self-government or independence, as may be appro-

priate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and the freely expressed wishes of the people." General Assembly Resolution 1541 urges independence or free association as a "result of a free and voluntary choice." The notion of "self-determination" appears repeatedly in documents dealing with decolonization (see McHenry 1975:31-52). Free choice and self-determination are aspects of the Compact of Free Association that were of central concern whenever Ponapeans discussed it.

Ponapeans asked, "Is there *manaman* in Free Association?" raising questions about its official legal status. Would FSM be a truly sovereign state, its nationhood genuine, its independence real, its authority final? After nearly forty years of U.S. rule, many Ponapeans seem convinced that the version of Free Association finally approved by the U.S. negotiators does not have *manaman.*

One man described the agreement's financial arrangements, including provisions for health care, education, and road building, as being no more than "sugarcoating" meant to discreetly mask America's determination to ensure its own longterm control of Micronesia. Many argued that the U.S. would continue to hold the *manaman*--the control--just as it has under trusteeship.

A young man in his mid-twenties, discussing the issue with other young men, offered an apposite metaphor. What if, he asked his friends, you were a powerful sorcerer *(sounwinahni),* with the most *manaman* in the land, and another sorcerer asked you to share your sorcery with him? By sharing your sorcery you would (as Ponapeans see it) be diluting your own *manaman* while strengthening that of your rival. Would you share your sorcery with your rival? Of course not. And of course the U.S. will not share its *manaman* with Micronesia, it will not relinquish it; Micronesia will have no *manaman* under Free Association.

On a number of separate occasions I heard people speak of a more profound disillusion. The U.S. is not to be believed under any circumstances, it was suggested. It will do as it wishes. The Compact has no *manaman,* no inherent authority, in the face of American policy. The U.S. will ignore it if it is in its interests to do so. As a document, then, the Compact was seen by many as being impotent and in a sense unreal and untrue. It struck them as an essentially empty facade, devoid of the spiritual vitality that is one aspect of *manaman.*

In Ponapean cultural terms, this lack of *manaman* meant that the Compact would command no respect, had no rank, and did not meet their expectations of hierarchical status. Paradoxically, but in complete

keeping with the contradictory character of Ponapean culture, the Compact's perceived lack of hierarchical status offended Ponapean attitudes about egalitarianism and personal autonomy. Under the terms of Free Association, people told me, Ponapeans would still not be self-governing: without true national status they would continue to have no status.

One of the most adamant discourses made just this point. Ponapeans should rule themselves, a middle-aged man told me. It is right that all peoples should govern themselves. He recited a Ponapean aphorism, *"Ke sohte kak mihmi pahn ohl,"* "You can't be beneath another man." Then, drawing upon the same kind of example people used when explaining why Ponapeans had to *kopwel,* "take care of," themselves (that is, that Americans would be insulted if someone suggested that they needed to be taken care of), he said that if Americans were ruled by a foreign power they would feel just as Ponapeans do.

Shortly after the plebiscite, a man reflecting upon the large majorities with which approval of the Compact had carried the other FSM states said, "We Ponapeans voted for *manaman.* The rest of Micronesia voted for USDA." He was referring to the surplus food distributed in some parts of Micronesia by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Ponape long ago refused to accept the free food. To have taken it would have been to fail to *kopwel.* Ponape voted for autonomy, for control of itself, for *manaman*--not for assistance, for food, or for the embarrassing admission that it could not take care of itself.

Finally, the notion of *manaman* was raised in reference to the plebiscite itself. "Does the plebiscite on Free Association recognize the Ponapeans' *manaman*?" people asked. While other questions about *manaman* mirror U.N. concerns about the issues of self-government and independence, this question evokes U.N. stipulations regarding "the freely expressed wishes of the people" and "self-determination." It is also a deeply philosophical question about the relationship between the manner in which the Compact was drafted and its ultimate value and meaning. Firth notes that for the Tikopia the *mana*-concept frequently equates "the end product . . . with the means whereby that product is obtained" (1976:191). The Ponapeans judged the Compact (the end) on the basis of the negotiations (the means) that produced it.

Ponapeans have been colonial subjects for a century now and they have few illusions about the nature of colonialism. Many are dubious about the entire context in which Micronesia's future political status negotiations with the U.S. have taken place. They did not need to read

the classified National Security Action Memoranda and the "Solomon Report" in order to understand that the U.S. had no intention of negotiating away its control over Micronesia (McHenry 1975:15-19, 231-239). They thus confronted the plebiscite, which asked them to confirm the product of those negotiations, with grave doubts about its *manaman.*

"The plebiscite has no *manaman,*" I was told. "In our relations with the U.S., we Micronesians have no *manaman*--we are not sovereign--and so we cannot negotiate for what we want. We have to take what the U.S. will give us." If the U.S. Congress decides that it will not approve the Compact (and at the time of the plebiscite there were certainly no assurances that it would), it was explained to me, "then we Micronesians are back where we started: a Trust Territory. How can these negotiations have *manaman* if we are not recognized as having an inherent right to freedom; how can this *manaman*--this inherent right--be recognized if we are subject, ultimately, to the decisions of the U.S. Congress?" Asserted someone else, "The U.S. continues to have the *manaman.* It is in control of everything. It shapes the form and the content of the negotiations. It has made the plebiscite suit its own needs, meet its own requirements. We Ponapeans have not established the terms--we have no *manaman.*" Another continued, "We have not been able to negotiate as we wish to because we do not have the *manaman*--we are not sovereign. Our inherent right to independence has never been recognized and so the negotiations themselves have no *manaman*--no authority; they are not between equals."

In order to demonstrate this lack of *manaman,* Ponapeans pointed repeatedly to the "Referendum on Future Political Status" held in 1975. At that time Ponape District (now Ponape State) voted 3,496 for independence, 2,386 for Free Association.[5] This is a 60 percent majority for independence. The rural Ponapeans (as distinct from the residents of Kolonia and the outer islands) voted 2,645 for independence, 926 for Free Association. This is a 75 percent majority for independence. The districts that eventually became the FSM voted 6,866 for independence, 5,445 for Free Association. This is a 56 percent majority for independence (Petersen 1979). What impact, what meaning, what *manaman* could the *plebiscite* have, Ponapeans asked, if their 1975 vote in favor of independence had been so disregarded that in 1983 they were being asked--or told--to vote for Free Association?

Many people linked the 1975 and 1983 votes. One said, "It seems to me that there have been many votes. None of them has accomplished much and we can only conclude that these previous votes had no *mana-*

man. We are thus inclined to be skeptical about this one, too. Why should we think that *it* will have any *manaman*? "

"What happened to our vote for independence in 1975?" asked another man. "We voted heavily, even overwhelmingly, for independence, and what do we get? Free Association. What more demonstration do you want that the U.S. runs everything here just as it pleases, including the negotiations and this so-called plebiscite?"

A sense of continuity with the 1975 independence vote was especially apparent after the plebiscite, when many people were clearly proud of the way Ponape had voted. While few Ponapeans had been willing to discuss their intentions before the plebiscite, some spoke afterward. Those who said they had voted "no" on Free Association frequently recalled the 1975 referendum and how they had then voted for independence. Nothing had happened in the interim, they said, to make them change their minds.

Having established contexts for the ways in which Ponapeans used the *manaman* concept in their deliberations about the plebiscite, I will now consider the translations offered in Kenneth Rehg's and Damian Sohl's *Ponapean-English Dictionary* (1979:56). "1. adjective. Magical, mysterious, spiritual; official. 2. noun. Magic, mysterious or spiritual power; miracle; authority." The contexts in which the term was used make it clear that of these glosses "official" and "authority" are the most immediate, along with "spiritual power," if this is understood in the sense of moral power, the power of a symbol, or the power ascribed to an official status. I refrained from giving the dictionary's translations first for the same reason that I chose to include references to both U.N. documents and the 1975 referendum. Though Rehg and Sohl gloss magical, mysterious, magic, and mysterious power before the other alternatives, it must be understood from the contexts of these discussions that the Ponapeans were not speaking about anything that would ordinarily be considered magical or mysterious. The *manaman* that concerned them differs little from the concepts addressed by the U.N. and their interpretation of the negotiations' *manaman* is as thoroughly rooted in an evaluation of the impact their vote in the 1975 referendum had on those negotiations as it is in their own political culture.

In these contexts *manaman* variously meant official, authority, power, control, sovereignty, and rights. There is as well an underlying concept of inherent, which is roughly equivalent to the mysterious or spiritual characterization offered by Rehg and Sohl. Raymond Firth's "empirical" analysis, in which he proceeded by first considering the contexts where *mana* is used, established that for the Tikopia the con-

cept can connote both means and end, cause and effect. Ponapeans used *mamaman,* in this case, in essentially the same fashion: the negotiations were the means, the Compact the end, and the plebiscite the point at which actions turned into substance. Because the negotiations did not recognize Ponapean *manaman,* they had no *manaman.* Because the negotiations had no *manaman,* the Compact of Free Association has no *manaman.* Because the Compact has no *manaman,* the FSM and Ponape will have no *manaman.*

The Ponapeans' analysis was, in spite of its concreteness, equally spiritual and symbolic. The Ponapeans are under no delusions about their material power or their political and economic place in the world. They are capable of seeing themselves as the small and isolated entity that the world perceives them to be. Their concern lies instead with what English-speakers would call inherent or inalienable rights, not unlike those heralded in the American Declaration of Independence, which asserts that all men are endowed with "certain unalienable rights." America's actions, many Ponapeans maintain, demonstrate that the U.S. does not respect Micronesia's inherent or inalienable right to sovereignty, American claims to the contrary notwithstanding. If the negotiations are not in good faith, then there cannot be any spiritual or moral power--any real meaning--in the documents. The Compact does not "officially" recognize their own ultimate authority.

Some Ponapeans point to Article X of the Compact's annexed "Agreement . . . Regarding Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Security," which stipulates that provisions of the Compact concerning U.S. military control of the region "shall remain in full force and effect until terminated or otherwise amended by mutual agreement." As Ponapeans (and indeed most Micronesians) interpret this clause, the Compact specifies that the U.S. retains military control until it decides otherwise. The history and nuances of this clause are subjects that must be discussed elsewhere, but it remains that Ponapeans interpret the clause as a denial and rejection of their *manaman.*

In the sense that the Ponapeans were more concerned with the official import of the Compact itself than with their material or realpolitik status, the issue might be cast as one of legitimacy, and is thoroughly grounded in traditional or native Ponapean political theory. In *One Man Cannot Rule a Thousand* I describe a Ponapean chiefdom, Upper Awak, in the process of splitting apart in order to form a new chiefdom. I stressed that for the Upper Awak people the greatest problem was not the fissioning process itself but the crisis of legitimacy touched off by a challenge to the genealogical status of their chief. Ponapean politics are

as pragmatic as any, yet that pragmatism is supported by a backbone of genealogical principle. A chiefs reign depends upon his personal acumen and political skills, but his *manaman*--as differentiated from acumen and skill--comes from his ancestors and his genealogical position with respect to them. For Ponapeans, genealogy is not an agreed upon, well-established biological fact. It is tenuous, fluid, and subject to argument, interpretation, and historical revision. Genealogy remains, nonetheless, as the source of legitimacy, and its highly flexible character is verification of its importance. If genealogy were rigidly interpreted, either the polity would be a shambles or claims of descent would have no meaning within it. Rivals for political titles each assert their genealogical primacy; the winner rests his argument on the fact of his victory. His genealogy is *the* genealogy--and the source of *manaman*--while he reigns, Approval of the Compact was interpreted as a victory for the U.S. and affirmation of its *manaman;* its corollary was denial of Ponapean *manaman.*

It must be understood, however, that this metaphysical interpretation of the Compact's force did not obscure the Ponapeans' practical analysis of what it holds in store for them. Just before the plebiscite, with timing that was not coincidental, the Ponapeans found themselves confronted with yet another matter to ponder, one that highlighted the dilemma upon which they had already focused their attention. A group of Hong Kong Chinese, worried about the forthcoming end of Britain's lease on the Crown Colony and thinking to take advantage of Free Association's American immigration provisions, offered $10 million to Ponape for land and citizenship there.

The Ponapeans greeted the proposal with mixed curiosity and humor, but in analyzing it they displayed their marked talent for self-critical reflection and their historical perspective. One wag argued that the Chinese are the only people on earth with a higher birthrate than the Ponapeans, and conjured up a scene of an agitated Ponapean husband urging his wife to bear children more and more quickly so that the Ponapeans would not be outnumbered on their own island. His joke reveals the Ponapean fear, never far from consciousness, of outsiders taking over their land.

Much opposition to the Hong Kong proposal, which was nearly universal, focused upon Ponapean attitudes toward what they speak of as their own irresponsibility. While current law makes it difficult to become an FSM citizen and prohibits noncitizens from owning land, the Hong Kong proposal included the stipulation that the Chinese would become FSM citizens. Whenever the proposal was discussed,

essentially the same predictions were repeated. The Chinese, it was argued,, would immediately begin buying land and votes. Soon they would own most of the island and control the Legislature. The Ponapeans would find themselves living under the same conditions they experienced during the era of Japanese rule on the island. Many Ponapeans claim that they simply do not trust themselves, or their compatriots, to act responsibly. They are frequently critical of the few who have sold land and of their own dependence on cash. Their response to the Hong Kong proposal was rather uniform: given their own perceived shortcomings, the safest course was to avoid temptation by rejecting the proposal. The proposal was rejected by Ponape's governor, after broad consultations (as nearly as I can determine), following genuine historical analysis of the likelihood that too many Ponapeans would choose short-term gains and suffer long-term consequences.

Ponapeans can be, as I have said, quite critical of their own past. The *kopwel* and *manaman* concepts do not function in a historical vacuum. They were asserted so forcefully, I believe, precisely because people saw them threatened. The Hong Kong incident is especially instructive because of the way in which the proposal was seized upon as a means of demonstrating both the lack of *manaman* in Micronesia's relations with the U.S. and the consequences that flowed from its absence. In the course of a discussion about the proposal, among a group of men and women drinking kava, it was suggested, sardonically, that an auction be held. Ponape would go to the highest bidder: the U.S., Hong Kong, or any other interested party, The response was immediate. It came from one of the most consistently thoughtful members of the group. "That is precisely the point. We could not auction Ponape off even if we wished to. We cannot negotiate freely among the nations that might be willing to help us. The U.S. controls us utterly and there is nothing we can do about it. The negotiations have never recognized our *manaman*--our right to choose--and the Compact was, in effect, imposed upon us. It cannot have any more *manaman* than Trusteeship. In fact, its only benefit is that it ends Trusteeship; we will no longer be beholden to the U.N. as well as to the U.S. One master is better than two."

Ponapean Reactions to the Plebiscite Campaign

Ponapeans prepared themselves for the plebiscite and Free Association at length, reflecting painstakingly upon their own history and culture, and then made carefully considered decisions. But their decisions were based upon more than the simple fact of the plebiscite and its por-

tents. The Ponapeans' concern was not only with their relationship to the U.S.; they were also interacting with the national government. While the FSM government is Micronesian, it is not Ponapean. (This is not to argue that it is Trukese or any other *specific* non-Ponapean culture, it is merely to state that Ponapeans do not view it as Ponapean, a point to which I shall return,) This truism is worth noting for at least two reasons, 1) Simply because it is not Ponapean, the FSM government's plebiscite campaign overstepped certain elemental Ponapean notions of propriety, and in doing so managed to provoke some unintended consequences, 2) Because the structure of the FSM government is quite similar to that of the U.S. government--even though in its operations it works quite differently--there were in the entire concept and process of the plebiscite important elements that expected the Ponapeans to make critical political choices in a fashion that had only slight relevance to the character of Ponapean politics.

A plebiscite is not an especially peculiar thing in and of itself. The U.N. has supervised a number of them, some in other Pacific island groups.[6] A majority vote is something that can be empirically verified with relative ease and it serves, to some degree, to bridge the cultural gaps between ruler and ruled, so that there can be some agreement about what is taking place. Though Ponapeans are no strangers to the electoral process, and take voting at least as seriously as most Americans, I am not at all convinced that the plebiscite was a truly Ponapean or Micronesian way of reaching a decision. And this plebiscite, in particular, was not conducted in a fashion that Ponapeans felt comfortable with. At least a few of the negative votes on Free Association may be attributable to the character of the plebiscite--rather than the issues--and the campaign that accompanied it.

It is useful to consider for a moment the etymology of the term plebiscite: what is it we are talking about? According to the *American Heritage Dictionary* (First edition, 1975), the Latin *plebiscitum* is literally "people's decree," but *scitum,* from the past participle *scitus,* has as its meanings "to approve, decree, 'to seek to know' " and is derived from *scire,* "to know," "to separate one thing from another," and "'discern." Science derives from this same root.

The term devised to translate plebiscite into Ponapean, *repen kupwur,* is remarkably faithful to the English term's Latin origins. *Repen* is glossed by Rehg and Sohl as "to search" and *kupwur* as an honorific term for "wish, intention, plan, decision, desire, heart." The root of plebiscite means both people's decree and to seek to know. *Repen kupwur* stresses the search for the people's wishes or intentions. The

Ponapeans were told in their own language that the purpose of the plebiscite was to find out what they wanted.

We would do well to recall that as they prepared to vote in the plebiscite many Ponapeans spoke of the 1975 referendum in which they had voted rather unequivocally in favor of independence. They were once again being asked--according to the *repen kupwur* translation--to state their preference. In bold contrast to this stands the FSM portrayal of the plebiscite's purpose: to ratify the Compact of Free Association. Because it is not my intention to analyze the dynamics of Ponape-FSM and Ponape-U.S. relations in this article, I shall not focus upon the reasons for the disparity between Ponapean and FSM views about the aim of the plebiscite. Rather, I wish to consider the ways in which this contradiction served to exacerbate already existing objections for essentially cultural reasons.

I stress that the underlying reasons for Ponapean misgivings about Free Association were multiple and complex, and that the following discussion deals with only one facet of that resistance. It was widely argued in the FSM, post facto, that the Ponapean vote was directly the result of the plebiscite's timing, and I do not want to see my analysis used to bolster that shortsighted interpretation.

After the June 21 date for the plebiscite had been announced during the preceding winter, the Ponape State Legislature passed a resolution asking the FSM president to postpone the plebiscite until people had had more time in which to consider the issues. The plebiscite was not postponed, according to several FSM government officials, for a number of reasons: the U.S. was pressuring FSM and the Marshall Islands to hold their plebiscites as soon as possible after the Palauan plebiscite, which had been held in February; the FSM government wanted to see the Compact approved by the U.S. Congress before the 1984 U.S. presidential elections, in hopes of not having to renegotiate the Compact with a new administration; and there was a palpable fear in the FSM that the Trust Territory bureaucracy, which had been severely limited by the transfer of responsibilities to the Micronesian governments, was trying to reclaim some of its former authority. Though there had been at the outset roughly four months in which to prepare for the plebiscite, the Ponape Legislature's request for postponement and the delays it entailed meant that on Ponape the "education program" that preceded the plebiscite was only about two months long.

When I arrived on Ponape, nine days before the plebiscite, the Ponapeans' dilemma was manifest. Though it was typical of their customary humility that they should claim in response to a direct question that

they do not understand an issue or have an opinion on it, the tone of the conversations and discussions touching upon the plebiscite ranged from indecision to outright confusion. I heard young college graduates with responsible bureaucratic jobs and old men who rarely left their farmsteads say much the same thing: their thoughts were churning, they did not have enough time, and they were not eager to make up their minds.

One elderly man, who had availed himself of every opportunity to hear the issues explained, despite the blindness that ordinarily keeps him from traveling about on Ponape's difficult trails, spoke to me with eloquence and great feeling about his confusion. "It seems," he said, "that every source of information I have turned to offers me a different explanation of what is entailed in this Compact with the United States. I don't know if it's more time that I need or more information, but I certainly don't think that I should have to make such an important decision right now." "What *are* the alternatives?" asked another man. "They haven't been made clear to us."

What was clear was that many people felt strongly about having more time and a more comprehensive education program to aid them in their preparations. On one of the outlying atolls, it was reported to me, people were outspoken in their unhappiness about having a government education team summarize fourteen years of negotiations in a three-day visit. Two expatriates who have long and intimate knowledge of several Ponapean communities that I do not know well gave me nearly identical accounts of local sentiments: throughout the island people were saying that the plebiscite was being held much too soon and that much fuller discussion about the meaning of the Compact was needed. Everywhere, people were saying that they were not happy with their understanding of the issues.

This expressed lack of understanding must be seen for what it was: an indication of the Ponapeans' intense interest in the issues. Most Ponapeans were treating the plebiscite as a matter of the utmost importance, and had begun to suspect that their interest in it was not widely shared in the rest of the FSM. Some went so far as to suggest that the national government wished to avoid serious debate about the Compact and its alternatives. Again, several expatriates with comprehensive knowledge of contemporary Micronesia commented that Ponape seemed to be the only place where there was real discussion of the issues. One remarked that not only were the Ponapeans alone in asking questions about the Compact, they were asking the *right* questions.

Indeed, the perplexity voiced by some of the people was belied by the questions they were asking. As one man put it, "This plebiscite really

must be important: everyone is talking about it!" What appeared as confusion was frequently an expression of concern or of a desire for more time and information. It often seemed that indecision and resolve existed simultaneously, for strong opinions were also voiced--not about how people should vote, but about interpretations of certain of the Compact's provisions. People explained their understandings of the Compact to one another and as they did they spoke of their wishes for more and better information. Following the presentations of the teams sent out by the education program, it was common to see groups of people clustered around information sheets and Ponapean translations of the Compact. When the Ponapeans voted, it was clear that most had made good use of the materials available to them. They knew what they were doing.

The Ponape State Legislature, having had its request for a postponement rejected by the FSM government, then asked the U.N. Visiting Mission, there to observe the plebiscite, if it could not get the vote postponed. They were again rebuffed. John Margetson, President of the U.N. Trusteeship Council, said that "The issues have been in the air for many years," and Trusteeship Council Vice President Paul Poudade added, "No one is expected to know the Compact by heart" (*Pacific Daily News*, 23 June 1983). Obviously, there was considerable divergence between the perspectives of the Ponapeans and the U.N. Trusteeship Council. In brief, the difference lies in Ponapean doubts about the level of their *manaman* under the Compact. Given general Micronesian resistance to the requirements for mutual U.S. and Micronesian agreement on termination of the "deniability" aspects of the Compact, and specific Ponapean fears about the rights of the U.S. military in the area, it should surprise no one that they felt they were being forced to vote before they were fully prepared to do so.[7]

The FSM position was most apparent in the days immediately preceding the plebiscite. FSM President Tosiwo Nakayama made radio and television[8] speeches urging voters to approve the Compact: "The Compact of Free Association provides us the vital financial resources necessary to assume this heavy responsibility with genuine promise of continued progress toward our country's goal. It is time for us to end the trusteeship, assume full governmental responsibility, and to join the world's community of nations." Bailey Olter, FSM Vice President, also asked for a "yes" vote, praising in particular the Compact's foreign affairs aspects and its provisions for "unilateral termination."[9] Andon Amaraich, who chaired all the FSM negotiations with the U.S., said, "For the first time in all these years we have a chance to say what we

want. We have a very good deal under the Compact. . . . We have been working so hard all these years. I would hate to see it all lost" (*Pacific Daily News,* 19, 23 June 1983).

On the eve of the plebiscite Ponape's radio station opened its broadcast studio to anyone wishing to speak about the following day's vote. Edwel Santos, Speaker of the Ponape State Legislature, made a brief statement over the air. He said that while he thought the "general principle" of Free Association was "well founded," "what bothers me is what I see of our so-called leaders, the propounders of the compact who were buoyed up with false hopes of deliverance, based on the predictions of fanatics and imposters." He went on to note the dissimilarity of the Micronesian islands' traditions and cultures, concluding that "the slogan of unity is and ought to be in this form:

"United we fall (our languages, customs and traditions and concepts in life are different) and like our forefathers who displaced no other men on this sacred altar *Pohn Pehi,* divided or separated we stand."[10]

Though most Ponapeans did not hear Santos's broadcast, it was widely discussed. And it drew an immediate response from the FSM leadership, A number of officials rushed to the radio station and delivered speeches in favor of the Compact. Given the Ponape Legislature's request for a postponement and Santos's known unhappiness with the timing of the plebiscite, it is perhaps not surprising that his speech was interpreted by some as opposing the Compact. Yet his remarks merely referred to the "false hopes" of those who "propounded' the Compact and suggested that these were based upon the predictions of nameless "fanatics and imposters."

These are strong words for Ponapean oratory, to be sure, but all that Santos actually said was that his support for the principle of Free Association was tempered by doubts about "deliverance." He did not say how he was going to vote, nor did he suggest how others should vote, His remarks were, in fact, deliberately vague, and had little, if any, direct effect on the Ponapean vote; he seems to have intended primarily to remind Ponapeans of the divergence between their aspirations and those of the national government. It is ironic that his brief statement drew such pointed response. The ensuing speeches in favor of the Compact served only to validate Ponapean feelings about the official FSM government position and to exacerbate the Ponapeans' growing sense of alienation from the plebiscite. They confirmed the Ponapeans' suspicions that rather than being asked their opinions they were being told how they should vote.

There was a widespread perception on Ponape, expressed by many

Ponapeans and by several expatriates sensitive to the climate of opinion, that every official pronouncement on Free Association was meant to place it in the most favorable possible light. One FSM government official told me that when he asked the head of the FSM's Plebiscite Commission (the body charged with preparing for and conducting the vote) to have the Compact's drawbacks explained to him he was informed that it had none; this, he said, was precisely the way the Compact was presented to the public. An outer-islander reported that his people were insulted when they were visited by the education team sent to prepare them for the vote. "The education team's attitude was that we should simply take the government's word that the Compact was the best arrangement we could get. They didn't want to discuss it with us."

The government's education teams seem to have been widely distrusted. The feeling stemmed in part from a perception that there was little or nothing being said about alternatives to Free Association, or about the arrangement's negative aspects. An expatriate advisor to the FSM government explained that since the plebiscite was about Free Association, there was no need to provide information about other statuses, and argued that even though all the presentations were distinctly neutral, the Ponapeans insisted on interpreting them as pro-Free Association.[11] (In light of the independence vote in the 1975 referendum, the Ponapeans' desire for a discussion of the alternatives was certainly understandable.) Perhaps an even more important factor in the Ponapeans' distrust, however, was the simple fact that most of those serving on the education teams were government employees, drawing--and depending upon--government salaries. Many suggested that the government education program was focused entirely on how much money FSM would be receiving from the U.S. "When so much money is at stake, how can we give complete trust to those whose salaries will be paid with that money?"

It was at this point that informal accusations of interference in the political process were made against the Catholic Church. The Bishop felt obliged to clarify the Church's position by recirculating a pastoral letter which had simply urged people to give the issue serious study; contrary to claims made against it, the letter did not suggest how Catholics should vote. Brother Henry Schwalbenberg, S.J., who had been writing a series of analyses of the Compact and alternative statuses for the Micronesian Seminar in Truk, was in fact brought to Ponape to help prepare government education teams there. But then the local Catholic Church began an education program, sending out its own education teams. These were widely perceived as being relatively free of the

implied restraints on the government teams, and as offering a great deal more information about alternative political statuses.

Antagonisms between the Protestant (Congregationalist) and Catholic communities on Ponape occasionally flare up, though their differences ordinarily remain low-key. Tension increased in the context of the plebiscite. The Catholic Church on Ponape has in recent years taken on a good deal of responsibility for effective political education and there was nothing out of character about its involvement in voter education for the plebiscite. The participants, and the impetus, were entirely Ponapean, The Catholic education teams presented an unbiased set of materials and, to my knowledge, strove to lead unbiased discussions. It was suggested, however, that a few of the more thoughtful and articulate discussion-leaders had difficulty hiding all traces of personal opinion over the course of several hours of give-and-take. Though never directly speaking their minds, several seem to have given some inkling of their unhappiness with aspects of the Compact. If people perceived doubts about the Compact among participants in these Catholic education teams, it is likely that they were sensing support among participants in the government's teams. Everywhere Ponapeans turned, it seems, they found the FSM pushing for approval of the Compact.

I have described the context of the plebiscite itself at such length because it is crucial to an understanding of the Ponapean reaction to it. Evidence suggests that the Ponapeans had ample reason for believing that they were being told how to vote. While FSM support for the Compact may explain the large majorities that approved it in other states, this same support, I think, helps explain Ponapean opposition to Free Association. The emphasis placed on individual autonomy within the fabric of Ponapean social and cultural life is a part of the explanation, one to which I will return, But I wish first to point to a much more direct way in which Ponapean custom *(tiuhk en Pohnpei)*--so vividly affirmed in Edwel Santos's speech--was contradicted by FSM pressures for approval of the Compact.

A very specific and fundamental thread running through all of Ponapean culture is *kanengamah.* I find it one of the most difficult to translate of all Ponapean terms. (I devote several pages of the Epilogue in *One Man Cannot Rule a Thousand* to my own misinterpretations of it.) The Rehg and Sohl dictionary glosses it as "patient," which is only one of its many meanings. The term is compounded of *kanenge,* "substance; inside of something, contents," and *mah,* "old, aged; ripe." It bears, then, the connotation that the self--the substance of the self--is mature, but this begs the question in a sense, because *kanengamah,* or

the ability to *kanengamah*, is that which is expected of a mature person. In some ways its closest approximation in English might be "face," in the sense of "saving face."

Kanengamah is a quality of being. It parallels *manaman* in its importance as a cause of behavior or a means to an end, but it seems to be an acquired, or learned, quality rather than inherent or ascribed. I have heard it described as the *poahsoan*, the "core" or "base," of a person. It can also be an action--a person can *kanengamah*--but when it is used in this way it is essentially an intransitive verb. The concept of *mahk*, which has its own multiplicity of meanings, sometimes serves, albeit loosely, as a sort of transitive form of *kanengamah.*

One of *kanengamah's* meanings is akin to "fortitude." It allows one to endure, to bear up under unfortunate circumstances without expressing one's anguish. But it also means, in the context of daily life, simply not expressing one's sentiments, feelings, or beliefs. It can mean, as I have heard it put, constructing and keeping a blank countenance.

The importance of *kanengumah* in the present context derives from this deeply engrained habit of being. It is fundamental to Ponapean culture and to Ponapeans' expectations of proper social behavior. In the course of the many discussions about the plebiscite, in the days leading up to it, only once or twice did I hear someone say how they would vote. In a matter of such great importance, a direct expression of opinion comes only in exceptional circumstances.[12] As with so many other aspects of Ponapean culture, the role played by *kanengamah* in the Ponapean plebiscite vote is intricate and complex.

Unwillingness to express an opinion, about the vote in this case, is at its most manifest level simply an element of courtesy. "What if you were to favor one candidate," I was told, "while someone else favored another? If you speak about your position, how you're going to vote, then you'll offend the other fellow and he'll feel bad. It would be the same if he were to speak his mind." Expatriates sometimes misunderstand this element of Ponapean etiquette. Several spoke of how Ponapeans, when asked how they were planning to vote, would respond by asking for the expatriate's opinion. This was mistakenly interpreted as an indication of how easily the Ponapeans could be swayed, how blindly they followed the opinions of leaders.

At a deeper level, *kanengamah* reflects another aspect of Ponapean courtesy. Any attempt to *directly* influence another adult's behavior is Perceived as improper deportment. "I don't like to give the impression that I am telling others what they should do. So I would never tell anyone how I am going to vote: it might be interpreted as a suggestion that

that is how I think they should vote. That would be embarrassing both to them and to me." In this *sense kanengamah* is related to *kopwel* and *manaman.* One should never imply that another cannot care for himself, or that another is not or cannot be autonomous.

Kanengamah holds an even more profound meaning in the context of the plebiscite. It was set before me in a discussion with a Ponapean philosopher who was teaching me about the *kanengamah* concept in general. "What if there is a man who helps me, takes care of me, has given me--over the years--food, clothing, money, help of various kinds, and now his brother is a candidate [for political office]? If I should be asked how I'm going to vote when I am in fact planning not to vote for this man's brother, and I say that I'm not going to vote for the brother, I will hurt the feelings of this man who's done so much for me. So I *mahk,* I say nothing," (In this *case mahk* can be understood as the transitive form of *kanengamah.*)

I confess that when I first recorded this conversation it did not occur to me that I had just been given a commentary on the plebiscite. In retrospect, however, his choice of example coincides with a host of examples people employed at the time of the vote. The plebiscite was on people's minds; when they spoke, the topic often managed to express itself, Here is a thoroughly polite, properly *kanengamah* Ponapean gentleman, speaking to an American he does not know well. The Ponapean chooses to illustrate *kanengamah* with a pleasantly ambiguous parable about the provision of food, clothing, money, and help of various kinds, and the expectation of a favorable vote. How should courteous Ponapeans respond in such a situation? *Kanengamah,* of course!

If we now consider the speeches given by the FSM leaders and the general Ponapean perception of the FSM position, we can see that preparations for the plebiscite, though conducted by Micronesians, were not carried out in a fashion culturally acceptable to the Ponapeans. Though this may strike some as trivial, it was of the utmost significance to the Ponapeans because it turned the entire plebiscite process into a symbol of precisely the kind of politics the Ponapeans saw themselves opposing.

I have, of course, no direct evidence of how any individual Ponapean voted in the plebiscite, so I cannot verify what individual Ponapeans said about their reactions to the conduct of the plebiscite. But relatively few people in the areas where I gathered most of my information voted for Free Association, and I have no explicit reasons for doubting those who told me, after the fact, that they had voted "no." Some Ponapeans said that they were quite disturbed, even insulted, by the radio speeches made in favor of Free Association.

Sitting among a group of kava-drinkers on the day of the plebiscite, when (discussion of the vote was particularly intense, a man explained to his companions why he had been so angered by the preceding night's speeches. He said that the speakers were *"kampainih"*--that is, "campaigning" (obviously an English loan word)--in favor of the Compact. "Those men were silent all through the period preceding the plebiscite, and then spoke only at the last minute. They did not care to engage in discussion with us, and help us get at the real meaning of the Compact by explaining their interpretations of it. The only purpose of such a tactic was to swing the vote in favor of the Compact. They were trying to influence those who hadn't yet made a decision or were irresolute. They were campaigning, just as if they were running for office [that is, they were making empty promises]. How can we ever trust these men again, after they have behaved in this fashion?"

A few weeks later, in another part of the island, I was speaking with an old acquaintance for the first time since the plebiscite. The matter of the radio speeches surfaced. "Those speeches really upset me, you know. They were like political campaign speeches. They just weren't Ponapean; they were improper and unsettling. They should not have been made. In fact, they may have worked just the opposite of the way they were intended; they may have had negative effects. We Ponapeans *mahngki* [*mahk*, again in the sense of a transitive form of *kanengamah*] our intentions, especially when it comes to such a public issue as a vote. We don't say what we're going to do--we hold it in. If you let your thoughts and your feelings out or if you tell people what you're going to do, you disturb them and they may well respond in unpredictable or directly contrary ways.

"I had been thinking that I would vote in favor of Free Association. Then I heard all these speeches telling me to vote 'yes.' I was so indignant, I went and voted 'no,' just to spite them. And I know that there were others around here who did just the same."

As with the allegory about the generous man whose brother becomes a candidate, my initial understanding of this commentary was quite literal. Again, when I see it placed in the context of all I heard at the time, I am inclined to perceive something a bit deeper. In the course of this short narrative my acquaintance says that he changed his vote to spite those who did last-minute campaigning in favor of the Compact, but there is a broader meaning in what he says. This is not a challenge to his veracity but an interpretation of his rationale.

Ponapeans analyzed the Compact of Free Association through terms of reference derived directly from their own cultural and historical

experiences. Concepts like *manaman, kopwel, kanengamah* and *mahk,* and *repen kupwur* expressed for them fundamental issues that English-speakers might formulate as dignity, sovereignty, and self-determination. They experienced the plebiscite, as well as Free Association, as a direct refutation of these fundamental categories. The very way in which the issues were set before them--that is, as a fait accompli to which they were to give formal approval--seemed to confirm all their misgivings about the nature of Free Association. As the majority of Ponapeans understood the plebiscite and FSM preparations for it, they were being told *how* to vote, despite the fact that the Ponapean translation of plebiscite accurately described it as a search for their opinions and desires.

By the time the Ponapeans voted, then, they had experienced a number of things that disturbed them. Their doubts about Free Association were aggravated rather than assuaged. The FSM approach to the plebiscite backfired: instead of satisfying Ponapean aspirations for true self-government, the plebiscite thwarted them. Most non-Ponapeans concerned with the vote, Micronesian and expatriate alike, did not understand this.

It is ironic that the generally accepted interpretation of Ponape's vote is that it was a protest against the short duration of the education program or the national government, and that it was orchestrated by the opposition of Ponapean leaders. This shows little comprehension of the vote's underlying meaning. The vote's implications for Ponapean relations with the FSM national government are manifold and I address them elsewhere (Petersen 1985), but as I have demonstrated here, the Ponapeans are deeply concerned about self-determination; to the extent that they perceived their national government acting as part of the political process keeping them from it, their vote can be interpreted as a protest against certain of the national government's policies. But any interpretation that stresses the Ponapeans' vote as largely or primarily a vote against the FSM government is both unfortunate and mistaken.

In the days and weeks following the plebiscite it quickly became the received truth that Ponapeans voted against the Compact because the education program had failed. There were three schools of thought about this, not mutually exclusive. The first was that the education program had started too late and that there simply had not been enough time in which to convince the Ponapeans of the Compact's value. The second held that the education program or the members of the education teams were in fact biased against the Compact and had persuaded the Ponapeans to oppose it. The third was that the Ponapeans were too

arrogant and lazy to learn from the education program and voted against the Compact out of willful ignorance.

The first and third of these propositions share the assumption that the purpose of the education program was to convince the Ponapeans that they should vote in favor of the Compact. Had there been ample time for the program to be effective, it is argued, or had the Ponapeans paid more attention to it, they would have voted as FSM wished. The second interpretation focuses the blame upon Ponapeans who may have strayed from the FSM's pro-Compact position. In each case we are confronted with a straightforward denial of, or obliviousness to, the great care with which Ponapeans prepared themselves for the plebiscite. Thus the Ponapean perception that FSM was telling them what to do, rather than asking them what they wanted, was unconsciously shared by the national government and the expatriate advisers and observers.

The peculiar notion that the education program was biased against the Compact clashes jarringly with the widespread Ponapean sentiment that the government's program did little but praise the Compact. There were charges that Ponapean leaders opposed the Compact and that that opposition had filtered into the education program. As I have pointed out, however, most Ponapean leaders took great care to avoid any semblance of open partisanship. From the Ponapeans themselves and the handful of expatriates who speak Ponapean and listened to the education programs, came strong assurances that the leaders of the programs had not spoken against the Compact.

Few Ponapeans gave credence to claims that the brevity of the education program was responsible for their "no" vote. Given that the request to have the plebiscite postponed was made explicitly in order to permit more study of the Compact, it is significant that after the plebiscite only a few Ponapeans thought it likely that their decisions would have been changed by more education. The education programs and the national government's refusal to postpone the vote had simply verified their own suspicions about what the Compact held in store for them. The confusion that people expressed was resolved, finally, by their interpretation not only of the Compact but of the way in which the vote on it was presented to them.

Ponapean leadership is highly responsive to community opinion. I believe that it is a grave misunderstanding of Ponapean society to attribute the defeat of the Compact to the opposition of the island's leaders. The evidence suggests that a two-thirds majority of rural Ponapeans voted against Free Association because they judged it inferior to independence. The manner in which the FSM presented the issue

merely confirmed that judgment. Indeed, the very notion of a plebiscite runs against Ponapean (and Micronesian) sensibility. The Ponapeans found themselves forced into what they perceived as the most profound decision they had ever had to make; they were asked to vote in an election that essentially ignored their own sensibilities about the nature of decision making. As I suggested in "Ponape's Body Politic" (1984a:126-127), Ponapeans regard legal decisions as perpetually negotiable. Contexts and conditions change, and as they do, so must decisions.

Plebiscites, which grow out of Western European tradition and its colonial history, take for granted that there is some single most acceptable answer to a vexed sort of question. Euro-American sensibilities may be comfortable with such solutions, but one wonders if there is anything inherently "democratic" about a process that obscures more complex perspectives on means of resolving dilemmas. The FSM plebiscite may have satisfied U.S. and U.N. proprieties, but it hardly reflected the careful, consensus-achieving, eternally flexible kind of processes that characterize the Ponapean body politic. In a sense the Ponapean "no" vote can be interpreted as a vote against the plebiscite itself.

What Ponapeans Were Voting For

Throughout the summer of 1983 Ponapeans expressed deep concern about the quality of their culture and its future. Confronted with a plebiscite, they responded with historical reflection, cultural analysis, and political courage. In drawing this paper to a close, I wish to consider the Ponapeans' commentary on their own culture, as it exists in 1983, and the ways in which that commentary represents the Ponapean vision of the future they saw themselves charting with their votes.

It seems necessary to note a common-sense fact that is easily lost sight of in an analysis such as this. Ponapeans are, like any other people, a diverse group: some are more committed to the political dimensions of life than others, some are more articulate, and some more impetuous. There are Ponapean cynics and skeptics and, perhaps, a few fools and innocents. Since most of what I have recorded comes from conversations among Ponapeans and not from responses to questions posed by me, it is possible that I am reporting the sentiments of a slightly more loquacious subset of the generally taciturn Ponapean population. There are of course some people with whom I have more contact than others and of whom I have more knowledge. Of this group two men admitted to me that they had not been paying much attention to the education programs. One of them said, "This plebiscite really must be important:

everyone is talking about it!" I know that neither of these men participates in the communal politics of their chiefdoms with much enthusiasm and that both are occasionally chided for their relative indolence. Their interest in the plebiscite was consistent with their involvement in politics in general. The pair stood out in contrast to their neighbors.

Among those I know well there are also a few men and women who have been able, or cared, to express their thoughts in more detail than most. I cannot say if this is because they are more articulate or simply because of our greater intimacy. I have tested the ideas they helped me formulate and found that they seem to ring true to other Ponapeans. It is worth repeating that much of what follows comes from people I have known for ten years and who have a good understanding of what it is that I do while I am on Ponape.

It should also be noted that I did encounter Ponapeans whose opinions differed from those I analyze here. Some argued that despite its drawbacks, Free Association would bring a swift end to Trusteeship and that this should be Micronesia's first priority. (This seemed, in fact, to be the unofficial FSM government position on the plebiscite.) I heard a handful of Ponapeans speak positively about Free Association, but many of those who voted in favor of the Compact claim that they did so only in order to rid Micronesia of American Trusteeship. The vote in favor of Free Association, which was heavy in Kolonia and on the outer islands, deserves full consideration but it must be addressed elsewhere.

Near the beginning of this paper I discussed Ponapean historical awareness and self-criticism in order to show that Ponapeans viewed their participation in the plebiscite as a historical act with both antecedents and consequences. Throughout the body of this work I have tried to illustrate the ways in which Ponapeans analyzed the social and political pressures bearing in upon them: they employed their own cultural terms to ensure that the decisions they arrived at would help them preserve their culture.[13] It is one thing for a scholar to set forth such arguments, another to show that it was truly the Ponapeans--and not the scholar--who were engaged in this reflection and analysis. It is now my intention to illuminate the quality of the cultural analysis Ponapeans applied to the 1983 plebiscite.

Several specific aspects of Ponapean culture were less directly connected to the plebiscite issues than the concepts of *kopwel, manaman,* and *kanengamah,* but still had great impact on the Ponapean vote. One of these was the identification of generosity as a--perhaps the--central element in Ponapean *tiahk,* "culture" or "custom." A second was the role this deep-seated generosity played in creating a sense of trust within

communities. And a third was the resiliency of Ponapean culture--its depth and strength and the qualities of endurance it has shown. Ponapeans contrast these aspects of their lives with what they know of the ways of American culture, and their vote in the plebiscite was at least in part meant as a reaffirmation of Ponapean culture.

I have described elsewhere (1984b:352-353) the continuity that the Ponapeans' active involvement in cultivating their land gives to their culture. Agricultural produce and the work that goes into processing it remain important cultural symbols. During the weeks surrounding the plebiscite, I heard several people speak of their land as the Ponapean equivalent of Americans' *mwohni kohl*--"gold money" or "hard currency." One man explained how the American paper currency in circulation, upon which people have come to place so much reliance, is backed up by gold that is not on Ponape or in Micronesia but in the United States. Even under Free Association, he observed, the bullion symbolized by the currency will remain in the U.S. "*My* gold is [in] my land. The money here is American and the gold that it stands for is in America. Ponape's gold is here: it is our land."

The Ponapean term for land, in this context, is *sahpw,* and as a cultural concept it of course has connotations that differ from "land" as an English-language term. Ponapeans plant much of their land--in many parts of the island, all of it--in permanent tree crops. The Ponapean staple, breadfruit, grows on enormous trees that bear for scores of years. While *sahpw* is used as a term for land in opposition to the sea or the sky, for a particular piece of land or farmstead, it also means planted land, land that feeds people, in opposition to *wehe* or *nanwel,* the "jungle." The Ponapean word for land connotes the place where people live, from whence they derive their livelihood, the crops that surround their homes. To have land is to have crops, to have food, and to therefore be a member of a community.

The phrase *lopkupwu,* "to cut down the food-basket," was another recurring image. Ponapeans store food in baskets hung from roof beams. When a guest arrives, the order is given to *lopkupwu,* cut down the baskets and feed the guest. (Cf. Paul Dahlquist's dissertation [1972], which is entitled "Kohdo mwenge," a Ponapean greeting which means literally "Come eat.") *Lopkupwu* connotes more than merely cutting down the basket and offering the food, however. The phrase refers, in a broad sense, to the Ponapean concepts of hospitality and generosity, and even more broadly to the whole notion of Ponapean *tiahk,* "culture."

There are really two kinds of *tiahk,* some Ponapeans say. One is *tiahk en wahu,* the *tiahk* of "honor" or "respect." This form might best be

translated as "custom." It refers to ritual proprieties, for example, the way a feast is to be conducted, and is the sort of thing that one learns as one becomes a mature person involved in the formal life of the community. The second *tiahk*, a friend explained to me, is *tiahk en Pohnpei,* literally "Ponapean culture." Used in this latter sense, *tiahk* does not refer to formal behavior so much as it implies being Ponapean in values, attitudes, beliefs, and general behavior. And *lopkupwu*, "cutting down the basket," is, my friend suggested, one of the central characteristics of this Ponapean culture. "Ponapean culture cannot be destroyed *[ohla]*. Some of the apparent aspects of it--the *tiahk en wahu*, the ritual and political formalities--will change, of course. These may become less dramatic than they are now and perhaps lose some of their importance. But the Ponapean way of being--the *tiahk en Pohnpei*--doesn't change very much. We still take care of each other." Then in what is a Ponapean variation on the Socratic method, he made a seemingly absurd statement that forced me to put what he was telling me to use. "I am not Ponapean, how can I do [or act according to] Ponapean culture?"

I pondered this awhile and then asked if he was telling me that he was part Indonesian (his father's father came to Ponape from Indonesia or Malaya, no one seems quite sure). "Yes. I'm only part Ponapean."

"But," I responded, "blood doesn't matter. Your parents were born here, you were born here."

"Which is important, then, blood or culture?"

"It seems to me that it's what little children learn as they grow."

"Ah, so you do understand what I am saying about Ponapean culture. You see, that which is on the surface, that which is apparent, the ritual formalities we learn as adults, for example, those are the parts of culture that change, But what lies underneath this, making us Ponapeans--the real *tiahk*--that doesn't change. This is what we learn when we are children, as we become Ponapean. We may take on new things, like money, and on the surface it will appear that we have changed. But it's still Ponapeans who are using the money and the way that we use it is Ponapean. Ponapean culture can't be destroyed."

At the heart of this resilient culture is generosity, hospitality, "taking care of each other," "cutting down the food-basket." And Ponapeans employ this deep-seated expectation of generalized benevolence in explaining other aspects of their culture. I used as an example of Ponapean self-criticism the ironic observation that little economic development would take place unless all the breadfruit trees were cut down. I first heard that in 1974. It was repeated to me in 1983, but in a very different context.

"Ponapeans resist changes. We try to keep foreign things at a distance, We work to preserve our *tiahk,* and I don't mean the feasts and ritual formalities. I mean that we preserve our traditional ways of treating each other and taking care of each other. In fact, one of the reasons that so little seems to get accomplished here is that it's so easy for us to go off on a visit. We can go anywhere and know that we'll get fed, without any worries about whether we've gotten much work done. We can always depend upon *lopkupwu*--someone will cut down a basket for us. *This* is the nature of Ponapean culture; it is what we are trying to preserve."

When a Catholic priest with a deeply empathic knowledge of Ponapean culture delivered a sermon centered on the New Testament story of Mary and Martha, the two sisters who quarreled over whether it was better to attend to the demands of hospitality or to sit and listen to Jesus preach, he spoke at length about Ponapean hospitality and the stress laid upon community service. "It is easy for you to get so caught up in the welcome *[kasumwoh],* that your responsibilities to your own families are set aside," he warned. Someone commenting about the quality of the sermon, later that day, chortled about the references to Ponapean welcomes. "Yeah, that sure sounds like Ponapeans. We really like to give things away to other people--that's what we think welcomes are for."

There is in all of this the Ponapeans' dramatic sense that their culture is distinct from the ways of other peoples, particularly Americans. Ponapeans have a degree of admiration for Western technology and the efficiencies of its social organization, but they quite specifically wish to avoid being swallowed up by them. They are dubious about the nature of progress. It was precisely this sort of historical and cultural reflection that characterized their analysis of the issues entailed in the plebiscite.

Ponapeans maintain a desire to keep the body politic small, so that communities may exercise direct oversight of their leaders. The internal organization of the Ponapean community emphasizes egalitarianism and generosity, the spirit of *lopkupwu.* Ponapeans perceive this habit of taking care of each other as fundamental to their culture, so much so that at times it actually seems counterproductive; this sense of being well taken care of is so complete that it is sometimes blamed for fostering irresponsibility. But this apparent irresponsibility is for Ponapeans the stuff of freedom. Generosity has two faces: that which is sometimes constricting, when demands must be met, is at other times liberating, when someone else has shouldered the burden.

Despite my attempts to place in their proper context the various concepts Ponapeans used in their analyses of Free Association, the very fact

of *my* analysis draws these concepts out of context. *Kopwel, manaman,* and *kanengamah* all exist within the broader context of Ponapean social life. Each in its own way is an aspect of the dignity with which so many Ponapeans try to conduct their lives. I have tried to show that most Ponapeans did not lose sight of this dignity as they made their decisions. The great emphasis they place upon responsibility to the community is but one face of a two-sided coin. The second is the community's freedom: both its inherent right to be self-governing and the right of every one of its members to have a part in governing it. Within the context of the Ponapean community, *kopwel* connotes responsibility, *manaman* connotes liberty, and *kanengamah* connotes respect for both the self and the other. Within this community of shared responsibility and respect, the Ponapeans find autonomy.

Conclusion

This, then, was the context of the 1983 plebiscite on the Compact of Free Association. Ponapeans scrutinized the terms of the Compact, discussed them at length, analyzed the conditions under which they were being told to vote, and a majority decided that Free Association did not adequately fulfill their requirements for self-government. I have tried to demonstrate both that the Ponapeans' evaluation of those conditions was quite objective and thoroughgoing, and that their decision was made on the basis of their own values, not the preconceptions of those who drafted the Compact.

The Honolulu Advertiser (23 June 1983) pronounced Ponape's vote a "sour note." It is unfortunate that this brave attempt at self-determination should be so misunderstood, but the error may be acute testimony to our disenchantment with our own civilization. "People fascinated by the idea of progress," writes Milan Kundera, "never suspect that every step forward is also a step on the way to the end and that behind all the joyous 'onward and upward' slogans lurks the lascivious voice of death urging us to make haste." Perhaps it is just because the Ponapeans are only marginally fascinated by the idea of progress that they see it so clearly as the way to an end they do not seek.

NOTES

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Ponape for their unceasing hospitality, friendship, and guidance. My wife, Victoria Garcia Petersen, has helped me with this work in more ways than I can hope to acknowledge.

Some readers may find my use of Ponapean commentaries in this paper verbose or redundant. I do not apologize. Recent events suggest that the people of Ponape will be afforded few opportunities to make themselves heard, and my garrulity is meant to provide them with at least one secure platform.

1. The ballot was in two parts. The first part asked whether the voter approved ("Yes") or disapproved ("No") the Compact of Free Association. The second part asked if, in the event of the Compact's defeat, the voter wished the FSM government to pursue independence or some other relationship with the U.S. In Ponape State there were 4,830 votes for independence on the second half of the ballot, 1,916 for some other relationship.

2. The exceptions are groups that speak Mortlockese (a Trukese dialect) and the Polynesian dialects of Nukuoro and Kapingamarangi atolls.

3. *The Book of Luelen* (Bernart 1977) is a Ponapean history of Ponape. While it has a chronological framework, its underlying emphasis is on places, not chronicity.

4. The expatriate American community in Ponape State, which consists almost entirely of government employees and their families, was largely of the opinion that differences between Free Association and independence are inconsequential.

5. These figures exclude the vote in Kosrae, which was still administered as part of Ponape District in 1975.

6. Unlike the other plebiscites in which it has played a part, the U.N. did not supervise the Micronesian plebiscites. It had only observer status. There is a difference of opinion about why this was so.

7. Opposition to long-term U.S. military control of Micronesia has been widespread in the FSM. As recently as July 1982, the U.N. Visiting Mission encountered it among the general population and at every level of government (Trusteeship Council 1983:7-11). While the issue is complex (even a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. misinterpreted the relevant parts of the Compact), Ponapean sentiments about it do not seem to have wavered.

8. Ponape had at that time a privately owned television station (the radio station is government owned and operated) that broadcast to about one hundred subscribers in Kolonia. It has subsequently ceased broadcasting.

9. This "unilateral termination" does not include the provisions for U.S. military control, i.e., "deniability." These can only be terminated by "mutual agreement" of both the FSM and the U.S.

10. Some of Santos's language is drawn from the Preamble to the FSM Constitution, which reads in part, "Our ancestors, who made their homes on these islands, displaced no other people." The Ponapeans' name for their island is Pohnpei, which refers to an account of their ancestors, who built the island "upon an altar" *(pohn pehi)* that had been raised atop a stone they found jutting out of the sea.

11. See note 1.

12. Only one Ponapean told me how he was going to vote before the plebiscite. He said that he would vote for Free Association and independence, on the two parts of the ballot,

in order to bring Trusteeship to a sooner, rather than later, end. I know him well enough to have doubts about whether he actually voted this way. Kedrus, who told me the story about *"mwein America,"* told me how he voted shortly after he had done so but before the polls had closed.

13. One of the first decisions made during the Ponapean Constitutional Convention in 1983 was to draft the Constitution in Ponapean. This was done expressly as a means of ensuring that the Ponapean Constitution serves Ponapean cultural needs.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE SUGAR PLANTER IN FIJI 1880-1925

Bruce Knapman
International Training Institute
Middle Head, Mosman, New South Wales

From early in the period of British rule (1874-1970), capitalism in Fiji was conspicuously corporate. The Australian Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) dominated, and by 1926 monopolized, production of the colony's major export--raw sugar. However, the company did not begin operations in 1880 with the intention of growing much sugarcane. CSR policy, reaffirmed early in the twentieth century, was to buy from individual European planters employing indentured Indian labor. The economic rationale was that cane was acquired without capital outlay on risky cultivation. The related political rationale was that white sugar settlers were useful front-line allies in any battles against unwanted government intervention in the sugar industry.[1]

Fiji's sugar export growth, then, was to be accomplished through the harnessing of settler to corporate capital. This article provides a descriptive account of the sugar planters' involvement in export growth, their fortunes, and their demise in the 1920s when corporate capital, true to its profit ethic, turned from white settlers as readily as once it had retained them.

Prelude

In the aftermath of the early 1870s cotton collapse, Europeans on about six hundred plantations searched for a new cash crop that would

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
FIJI ISLANDS
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Penang Sugar Mill
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Vatukoula Gold Mines
Makogai
Lautoka Sugar Mill
Rewa River
Levuka
Ovalau
Moturiki
Nadi
VITI LEVU
Verata
Sugar Mill
Bau
Nausori
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Sigatoka
Navua
Suva
20°
178°30'
20°
Beqa
Vatulele
N
Ono-i-Lau
178°30'
Kadavu
178°


180°
179°
Sugar mill
Labasa
Rabi
0
50
100 Km
Savusavu
Taveuni
Naitauba
LAU
17°
Yacata
Kanacea
VANUA BALAVU
Lomaloma
Koro
Mago
GROUP
GROUP
Katafaga
Cicia
Gau
Nayau
18°
Lakeba
Tubou
Vanua Vatu
Oneata
MOALA
Moce
Namaka-i-Lau
Totoya
Kabara
19°
Ongea
Levu
Matuku
Fulaga
180°
179°

reduce their indebtedness. Some were fortunate enough to claim land partially planted in coconuts by the original Fijian owners, so that a little cash income could be generated from cutting copra while new plantings matured. Planters in Fiji's alluvial river valleys had no such option, for the land was unsuited to coconut palms. Coffee took several years to mature and in any case was quickly eliminated as an alternative in planters' minds because of leaf disease.[2] Maize could be grown in some areas, but the general preference was for sugarcane, of which there was an indigenous variety. By 1879, eighteen out of an 1870 total of thirty Rewa river plantations were under cane cultivation, accounting for 69 percent of the 1,800 acres planted throughout the colony.[3] Even with such a small area planted, there was a marketing problem: the two existing Rewa mills could crush no more than 50 percent of the potential harvest, and that inefficiently.[4] This was a short-lived difficulty though. In 1880, CSR decided to erect a mill that would treble milling capacity on the Rewa--on the understanding that two leading landholders would keep 1,000 acres of their personal estates under cane for ten years, and that all planters would accept a price for their cane fixed at 10*s.* per ton for twelve years.[5]

Planter acceptance of what they regarded as an inadequate cane price was a measure of their desperation. A CSR-induced revival of the Rewa river economy might at least permit quick sales of freehold land, capital gains sufficient to cancel debts, and rapid departures from Fiji, leaving new owners to live with 10*s.* per ton.[6] And indeed there was a speculative surge of activity in response to news of CSR's investment decision. Stores, hotels, butchers, and bakers appeared in the Rewa delta. The newly formed Plantation and Agricultural Society called for government financial assistance with bridge building--in the event, unsuccessfully. New towns were planned, with town blocks selling for up to £50 per acre, while the asking price for plantation land soared.[7]

Yet because of a lack of demand at going prices, only a few planters left Fiji with money from plantation sales. One was Edward Reece, who sold 1,600 acres of his Naitasiri plantation to CSR in 1881 for £10 per acre of flat land. Significantly though, the sale was part of an unplanned and undesired expansion of company landholdings beyond the 928 acres acquired for £2 per acre in 1880. Three planters had tried to renege on their cane contracts, which guaranteed supply of a fixed tonnage to the CSR mill. More important, there was an overall shortfall in the 1881 cane plantings promised by planters, precisely because they lacked the capital to acquire available Indian laborers, whose cost of introduction into the colony had to be covered by one lump-sum pay-

ment. E. W. Knox, CSR's general manager, perhaps exaggerated when he told the prolific letter writer and sometime planter W. Fillingham Parr that had he foreseen the difficulties over cane supply, a mill would not have been built; but he observed privately that CSR now needed more land on the Rewa to secure its investment, which by the time of the first crush in 1882 had reached £150,000.

This did not mean wholesale purchase of freehold land on offer. Until a return on invested capital was certain, Knox was unwilling to buy land at the £15 per acre asking price of the man owning more land than anyone else on the river, C. L. Sahl. Instead, CSR leased 860 acres from Sahl and--overcoming the reluctance of acting governor Thurston, who complained that CSR seemed to want the whole Rewa district--secured a lease of 800 acres of Fijian land at Navuso. Adding only one desirable 192-acre plantation to its freeholdings at a price of £11 per acre, the company could then cultivate 3,500 acres on its own account.[8]

Concomitantly, CSR was compelled into prominence as a financial intermediary by the need to ensure its cane supply from individual planters. The company lent at 8 percent against property mortgages, and advanced £2 per acre for four-month-old cane and a further £2 for nine-month-old cane at the rate of 6 percent on the security of the crops. The outstanding mortgager was Sahl, who early in 1882 borrowed £25,000 for five years, renewable for another five, at 7 percent against Property on the Rewa and Sigatoka rivers. But his was the planter's Position writ large. By April 1882, before the first crush, CSR had secured by mortgage eight Rewa plantations covering 2,000 acres, and held crop liens over most others.[9] Six months later it added J. C. Smith's 1,300-acre plantation to its list of mortgaged properties; and in March 1883 it purchased a 500-acre freehold.[10]

At the beginning of the age of export growth, then, CSR. as sugar grower owned or leased 4,000 acres in the Rewa river valley, and as moneylender held mortgages over 3,300. The latter, and crop liens, bound planters in a structure of forced growing from which they could escape only if fortunate enough either to find a buyer for their land, or to make a financial success of its cultivation.

Death of a Pioneer Generation: The 1880s Depression

From the outset, domestic and international factors worked against Plantation profitability. Cane yields below expectations, a low sugar content in cane, leaf mould disease, and high cultivation and transport costs attributable in part to weed growth--all resulted from a Rewa

rainfall in excess of 100 inches per annum. The cost of imported labor increased as competition from the Queensland sugar industry drove the money wage of Melanesian labor up to a level at which its total cost equalled that of Indian labor. Further restrictions on the mobility of Fijian labor were imposed by the government in 1883.

Nor did technological improvements in cultivation offset higher money wages. Only one or two planters had previous experience of cane growing, making management in general and cultivation in particular less efficient than it might have been; and before 1890 CSR concentrated on improving milling efficiency rather than cultivation techniques. In any case, given the uniqueness of the ecological environment, innovation proffered no immediate panacea. The only change made in cultivation practices affected planters adversely, at least in the short term: in the interests of producing sweeter cane, CSR required a reduction in crops harvested from three every two years to one annually.[11]

It soon became evident that an average cost of production in excess of the cane price threatened to undermine the Rewa planter economy. Planters had contracted to sell cane at the flat rate of 10*s.* per ton until 1892; and though CSR paid 12*s.* 6*d.* in 1884 and 1885, and 11*s.* from 1888 until 1891, the 53 percent drop in the world sugar price between 1882 and 1890 prevented payment of the 15*s.* per ton reasonably regarded by planters as the minimum necessary to ensure plantation profits. After all, CSR's own unit cost of production averaged 14*s.* 4*d*. in 1888-1890.[12]

CSR wrote off £20,000 on its plantation account in 1883, and concentrated its efforts thereafter on cultivating better quality land near Nausori mill and on attempting to reduce labor costs by purchasing food from Fijians instead off growing it on the plantations. Two planters tried to sell out, but CSR was the only likely buyer and it was undertaking a holding operation on the Rewa as it made a more careful assessment of the climatic and economic factors relevant to expansion on the dry side of Viti Levu. The company successfully took two planters to court for breaking their contracts in 1884, ceased advances to some planters, and, bailing others out with further advances, watched the debts accumulate as it held them to their contracts. By late 1883, for example, the old hand Amos Witherow owed CSR £2,300; J. C. Smith owed £12,000; Orr, a tenant of Sahl's, £3,000; and Parr, £4,000 secured by a second mortgage, £11,000 already having been advanced on the first by the Australasian Mortgage and Agency Company.[13]

Members of the Planter's Association of Fiji argued that costs of production were unnecessarily high because of the restricted supply of

Fijian labor, high costs of introducing immigrant labor, and low labor productivity resulting from protective labor regulations. In their view, six hours--the time in which a "task" ought to be completed--was not a "fair day's work." Predictably, planters wanted labor and taxation policies that would compel Fijians into wage labor as the "means of recalling into existence the class of small planters."[14] This hardy perennial had been dismissed so resolutely by colonial government that CSR at least accepted that protest was useless. The only concession obtained was an 1884 ordinance permitting payment for Indian laborers in five annual installments (6 percent being charged on deferred payments) and giving preference to small planters in allocation of laborers by limiting to thirty the number obtainable in any one season, unless there was a surplus after the small planter demand had been satisfied. In the absence of Colonial Office approval for loan finance, however, the ordinance was operative for only one year's labor supply and did little for the undercapitalized planters. In the late 1880s, CSR, the short-lived Rewa Sugar Company, and the debtors Sahl, Smith, Orr, and Harley were the only sugar planters on the Rewa employing Indian indentured labor.[15]

Inevitably, exploitation of plantation labor intensified. There was always exploitation under the indenture system in the sense that indentured labor was paid less than the going free-market wage.[16] But a falling sugar price and production costs in excess of the cane price were bound to increase its incidence, for labor costs were the most important cost item on sugar plantations, especially on the Rewa where there was one laborer for every 2.3 acres of cane land, compared with one for every 5 acres in Queensland.[17]

Planters reduced the hourly money wage rate by redefining a task to the point where nine hours had to be worked instead of six; and because inadequate staffing prevented detailed inspection by immigration officials, they got away with it. They also reduced real wages by charging exorbitant rates for rations they were obliged to provide during the first twelve months of a laborer's indenture. The daily ration for an adult (a person over ten years of age) was twenty ounces of rice, four ounces of dhal, one ounce of ghee or coconut oil, three-quarters of an ounce of curry powder, two ounces of sugar, and one ounce of salt. Children between five and ten received half this allowance; and those under five received one Imperial pint of milk. Between 1887 and 1891 the adult ration cost the employer an average fourpence per working day. He charged nearly sixpence ha'penny, or 81 percent of the adult male average earnings of eightpence per working day. The legal charge was fivepence.[18]

It is not saying much to point out that Indian indentured labor was nevertheless materially better off than it had been in India. The more relevant observation is that wage rates below the statutory minimum of 1s. per task did not necessarily make labor cheap. Death, absenteeism, and labor inefficiency due to low living standards were quantitatively significant on the Rewa. The death rate among Melanesian laborers in the early 1880s was 32 percent, reaching 56 percent at Naitasiri plantation. Death and disease (particularly hookworm) among Indians were so serious that ultimately the Imperial government threatened cessation of immigration. But the immediate results were apparent in days actually worked by Indians under indenture. In 1888 an average one-quarter of the Rewa Sugar Company's work force was absent, sick, or in jail. A similar proportion of CSR's work force did not work in the years 1890-1893. For the colony as a whole in 1890, laborers put in just over four days out of the five-and-a-half-day working week.[19] Not surprisingly, Knox had noted already: "Altogether, the time seems to have come for us to do something more for the comfort and health of the coloured labour staff."[20]

There was no reversal of the low wage policy, however. Output per man would need to have doubled from the typical 36 cwt. cut each task to leave unit costs unchanged after a doubling of money wages; and cane sugar's international competitiveness could be maintained only if wages in sugar colonies were sufficiently low to offset the advantage the continental beet sugar producer gained from heavy government subsidies and any productivity differential. Even then, profitability of Rewa plantations was not guaranteed: "up to the end of 1885 there was not a planter on the river who could say that he realized a profit."[21]

Only the date had to be altered when planters' supply contracts with CSR finally expired in 1892. The decline of the Rewa planter had been as rapid as the sugar price fall. European contractors supplied an estimated 82 percent of the 1885 crush. In 1890 they supplied just 20 percent and cultivated only 1,400 acres to CSR's 3,500.[22] Parr's plantation had gone to the Australasian Mortgage and Agency Company in 1887, and CSR had ceased advances to Sahl in mid-1888, shortly afterwards acquiring two more plantations to bring its landholdings to 5,000 acres. Many planters left Fiji. Orr, for example, had arrived in the colony with £1,500. He left indebted, his outward passage paid by CSR, and with the stolen cash deposits of Indian laborers in his pockets. Those remaining on the river cultivated small areas of cane (around 80 acres), sublet to free Indians, and tried banana planting. The company, mortgage agencies, and the banks now ran the thirteen larger estates employing indentured labor.[23]

A New Generation

Nevertheless, CSR retained a preference for drawing cane supplies from nominally independent planters. In effect, these planters could be friends at COurt who would help minimize, even eliminate, taxation. And if a loss were to be made from cane growing, better that it be made by someone else. Planters bore the risks of growing; they potentially reduced the miller's capital outlay; and, it was thought, they proffered the simultaneous possibilities of cane cheaper to the miller and more profitable to the grower through reduced. overheads and better labor relations.[24]

In the context of a stabilized raw sugar price, CSR therefore offered 12*s.* 6*d.* per ton to those company employees--and respondents to pamphleteers extolling Fiji's virtues as an El Dorado--who were prepared to sign a five-year contract as tenants on company land, or as contractors on other land.[25] Initially, the response was limited. But in the 1890s CSR turned its attention to cultivation technology; and as the yield-raising effects of horsepower, manuring,, proper drainage, and a new rain-tolerant cane variety (Malabar) became apparent, the area cultivated by individual planters expanded. Of the 8,000 acres under cane in 1898, just 2,500 were cultivated by CSR.[26]

CSR regretted contracting to pay 12*s.* 6*d.* when the raw sugar price fell further and reduced net profit on capital employed in the early 1890s to around 1 percent. Knox remarked that "Our Rewa venture . . . is, and has been, the worst investment we have made."[27] Planters, though, could make a profit in years free of drought, flood, or hurricane. Yields averaged 35 tons per acre on the Rewa in 1898, compared with 22 on CSR plantations in 1884, and permitted costs to fall as low as 9*s.* 7*d.* per ton on the Naitasiri plantation of ex-CSR overseer Peter Gordon.[28]

Indeed, low cultivation costs on CSR plantations revitalized the company's hopes of making a grower's profit from its estates.[29] But wide year-to-year fluctuations in costs on the Rewa prompted a continuation of the leasing-out policy; and in any case, CSR's monopsony could be used to capture as miller's profit part of what the company thought possible as grower's profit. The cane price was regulated by the company, and so too was the rent paid by tenants leasing CSR land--the extent of which had been increased with the acquisition in 1899 of Sahl's and Smith's plantations, and of 1,200 acres held by the Australasian Mortgage and Agency Company.[30]

Accordingly, in 1902 CSR reduced the contract price to 10*s.* per ton

of cane with a pure obtainable sugar content (P.O.C.S.) of 11 percent. For each percentage point above 11 an additional 1*s.* 3*d.* was to be paid; and for each point below, 1*s.* 8*d.* was to be deducted. Ten shillings was the minimum Knox thought the average European planter could afford to accept; and since the P.O.C.S. of the dominant Malabar cane usually was closer to 10 percent, this meant in practice a price closer to 8*s.* 6*d.*, the flat rate paid for Indian-grown cane. CSR executives therefore anticipated a large settlement of Indian growers; and to obtain both cheaper cane and relief from carrying an indentured labor force during the off-season, they encouraged Indian settlement by offering advances at 6 percent, 4 percent less than the going rate obtainable from merchants.[31]

But CSR did not intend to displace the white planter; and to Europeans with visions of planter prosperity, the Indian laborer was a cipher, and the emergent Indian cane grower a tolerable fringe operator --not a portent, CSR employees continued to take out leases in the belief that profits could be made. In 1904 European planters supplied 65 percent of the record amount of cane crushed by Nausori mill, with Indian growers and CSR estates contributing 20 and 15 percent, respectively.[32] The share was down slightly from 1898, yet it confirmed the basic fact that, after a serious decline in importance during the late 188Os, the individual European sugar planter was restored as the major cane supplier on the Rewa. In this, the Rewa experience pointed to colony-wide developments.

As on the Rewa, Europeans had been confirmed in possession of much of the first class land in Fiji's dry zones (rainfall below 100 inches); and, again as on the Rewa, there was more interest in selling cane than in cultivating it when CSR decided to erect mills at Rarawai (first crush 1886) and Labasa (first crush 1894). Confident of these areas' profitability after trial cane plantings, the company acquired 11,600 acres of freehold at Ba in 1883 and 1884, at the low price of £2 10*s.* per acre. Reassured that sugar could be made "very cheaply," it subsequently purchased and leased from Fijians and Europeans, and by 1906 held at least 18,000 acres of cane land to supply the Rarawai mill. Similar control over land use was achieved at Labasa, where in 1908 CSR held leases on 27,000 acres; and at Lautoka, where it held 16,000 acres to supply its largest Fiji mill, which began crushing in 1903.[33]

In contrast to the situation on the Rewa at the turn of the twentieth century, CSR estates dominated cane production in northwestern Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. The latter areas already accounted for 63 percent of the 25,000 acres under cane cultivation. Labasa mill drew all of

its supplies from eight estates for some years before 1906; Rarawai mill drew about one-third of its crush from white planters on non-CSR land; and Lautoka mill drew about 20 percent of its supplies from five planters, notably R. P. Carr & Co. and H. G. Carr and J. C. Doyle, who between them accounted for almost two-thirds of the independently cultivated areas.[34]

The limited reliance on planter supplies did not last long, however. Subdivision and leasing of CSR estates at Rarawai, Lautoka, and Labasa proceeded after 1905 for familiar reasons. Four dozen Australian overseers in their early twenties and anxious to make small fortunes were expected to get more out of 4,000 Indian laborers on individual plantations than they had on estates; and the governor himself had informed local management that leasing of estates would help disarm criticism of CSR.[35] This same governor was responsible for the short-lived opening of Fijian land to alienation (1905-1908) and the extension of leases from twenty-one to ninety-nine years, which produced, in France's words, "a festive atmosphere among the white settlers."[36] The old hand and the ex-CSR employee on his leasehold both 1ooked forward to "a new era of prosperity . . . ushered in on a substantial basis."[37]

Judged by the rate of export growth, 1906-1915 *was* the golden age anticipated by Fiji's white population, largely because of a 7 percent annual expansion in sugar export tonnage coupled with an annual 3 percent price rise (Table 1). The extent of planter prosperity varied widely between regions and among individuals, however; and nowhere was it sustained.

The Rewa Planters

On the Rewa, the remaining CSR estate was subdivided into three plantations in January 1909 and leased to company employees. Twenty

TABLE 1 **Fiji's Sugar Export Growth Rates, 1876-1934 (percent)**

	Value	Volume	Unit Value
1876-1906	6.0	8.5	-5.3
1906-1915	9.4	6.6	3.0
1915-1934	-2.2	1.4	-3.2

Note: Export data contained in the *Fiji Blue Books* were subjected to simple regression analysis. The export growth rate is measured by the regression coefficient divided by mean exports. Cf. Bruce Knapman and S. Schiavo-Campo, "Growth and Fluctuations of Fiji's Exports, 1875-1978," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 32 (October 1983): 92-119.

planters now owned or leased almost 17,000 acres on the river, and had contracted to grow cane for CSR on 8,000 acres of the cultivable area, 5,000 acres being cut annually.[38] Their output in the years 1906-1915 barely registered an upward trend, though, and was characterized by year-to-year fluctuations.[39] With the cane price stable at 10*s.* per ton of 11 percent P.O.C.S. until 1915, the planter's profitability depended on high yields and years free of natural disasters. Neither occurred consistently for the majority of plantations.

CSR's policy of adjusting the price to the sugar content of cane encouraged planters to replace Malabar cane with the much sweeter Badila variety. While successful in the dry zones of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu, on the Rewa the switch generally failed. Badila proved intolerant of the heavy rainfall, was lower-yielding, and showed unpredictable variations in yield from one plantation to another and from one year to the next. The overall yield on the river in 1915 was 16.5 tons to the acre, the lowest since 1905.[40]

Bad weather similarly cut into planters' returns. In 1901, for example, flooding wiped out 40 percent of ex-CSR employee R. J. Freeman's Baulevu crop. More serious, a hurricane early in 1910 damaged CSR mills and equipment to the extent of £18,000, and reduced the Rewa crop from an expected 142,000 tons to 100,000. The direct loss in cash proceeds from cane therefore was about £21,000, or an average 30 percent for each planter. Planters suffered a further loss of £5,000 through the resultant drop in cane quality, the 1910 price being 9*s.* 6*d.* compared with the previous year's 10*s.* 6*d.* In addition. buildings were damaged, proper preparation of land for planting prevented, and seed cane for the 1911 crop lost.[41]

1911 was an unusually dry year and saw only a limited recovery in cane output to 111,000 tons. Of eight white planters financed by CSR, five had losses in 1911 averaging £722, the biggest loss of £1,660 coming on a plantation yielding just 8.6 tons of cane. The three who made profits averaging £357 were tenants on CSR land who benefited from bullock cultivation and preferential allocation of fertilizer from the Nausori mill.[42]

Among the other planters the less efficient managers were hardest hit. Simeon Lazarus, sugar planter and partner in the merchant company A. M. Brodziak & Co., had lost money on his leases and mortgaged them to the Bank of New South Wales for £50,000 to cover the company's indebtedness, itself the result of reckless lending to Indian sugar growers at Navua.[43] The most notorious example was Waring, onetime manager of CSR's Navuso estate and CSR tenant from

1904. He was in CSR's estimation a failure in both positions, a man whose general remedy for plantation mismanagement was heavy applications of artificial manure, and whose increasing indebtedness sat lightly on his shoulders. Until his takeover in 1912, he had drawn an annual pension of £121 and a living allowance as a tenant of £240, and lost only CSR's money--£9,000 in all.[44]

His indebtedness was exceptionally large, but through his managerial incompetence, Waring exaggerated a truth increasingly apparent to planters: unfavorable growing conditions threatened every plantation's productivity and, through that, the CSR advances on which many depended. In mid-1910 CSR ceased advances to one planter, who then had to abandon his plantation. Even the Cordon brothers, acknowledged as the most successful and experienced planters on the river after fifteen years in which they had cleared their debts as CSR tenants, had been set back in 1910-1911.[45]

A record crop of 143,000 tons in 1912 was followed by a similar output in 1913, despite a March hurricane. Profitability was restored to most plantations, and with it the chance of reducing indebtedness. All but one plantation ended 1913 with a credit on the year's operations, though the credit was insufficient in one case to prevent CSR ceasing advances, and in another to reduce indebtedness to its 1909 level. Bad weather the following year was regarded as largely responsible for a reversal of this performance. Only two planters financed by CSR made a profit, One leasehold was transferred to the company, and one planter had to obtain additional financing from the Gordons.[46]

In 1915 five of nine planters financed by CSR lost an average £480 each, despite the fact that CSR now paid a 2*s.* 6*d.*-per-ton cane bonus, and gave planters up to 6*d.* a week per man in order to assist with higher labor costs resulting from the wartime shortage of indentured labor and from increased food prices. The contribution to ration costs covered food price increases of about 15 percent in 1915.[47] And back-of-the-envelope calculations show the cane bonus permitted increased absolute profits even though money wage rates increased 50 percent where free Indian labor was employed.[48] Again, therefore, low yields due to bad weather explained poor performance. The Rewa crop in 1915 had fallen to its 1911 level.

Contrary to their original expectations, then, many white sugar planters of the Rewa delta found increased indebtedness rather than a small fortune was the end result of years of rising at dawn in order to direct indentured laborers to the cane fields. H. T. Moltke's experience as a CSR tenant was typical. The assets of his plantation, and hence his

initial indebtedness, were assessed at £3,300 at the beginning of his tenancy in 1909. At the end of 1915 his debit balance was £6,631--£1,874 of the difference was interest and £1,434 represented excess of expenses over receipts.[49]

A few men of long experience in running particularly productive plantations *were* successful. Peter Gordon, over twenty-one years at Naitasiri, had cleared his initial takeover debt, drawn at least the typical tenant's living allowance of around £250 a year, taken trips to Europe with his brother, married, purchased property in Australia, and ultimately left the colony with a minimum of £5,000--the value of Naitasiri plantation assets.[50] He, his brother, and R. J. Freeman were conspicuous exceptions to the rule, though, examples of the successful planter reputedly found in greater numbers in Fiji's dry-zone sugar economy.

The Dry-Zone Planters

No small fortunes were ever made in Vanua Levu, where the sugar planters were all CSR tenants. Six company employees took out leases in 1909. By 1913 the number had grown to fourteen, accounting for about 80 percent of Labasa mill's cane supply, the remainder coming from CSR estates (Table 2). Tenants were attracted by a company policy of charging a rent on the typical 400-acre leasehold that theoretically left the tenant room to clear £500 annually, which in turn promised a relatively quick escape from initial indebtedness. Their own experience as CSR employees should have made them wary, however. It was no secret that CSR had found cane-growing on its Labasa estates less profitable than anticipated: yields averaged a low 16.5 tons per acre in the years 1901-1908; and the crop was not as sweet as in dry-zone Viti Levu because Labasa tended to suffer droughts that seriously impeded plant growth one year in four.[51]

The original six tenants' first two years' results showed them growing cane at an average cost of 12*s.* ½*d.* per ton and receiving 11*s.* 11*d.* Only two planters with higher yields from better weed control had a positive margin of price over cost. Bad weather in 1911 prevented the rally the mill managers felt sure would eventually take place. And in 1912 a hurricane unroofed fourteen of the thirty-nine houses on Labasa's residential hill, damaged tramlines, ruined mangrove swamp reclamations, and caused a 10 percent crop loss.

CSR management complained of difficulty in persuading planters to follow recommended rotation practice and intensive cultivation rather

than hoping for a "big year" from large tonnages on short-fallowed land. Yet CSR's own practice of placing optimistically high valuations on leaseholds and consequently charging high rents contributed to any tendency to mine the land. The fourteen tenants' plantations were valued on average well in excess of £4,500 on takeover; and rent on E. P. Masters plantation, which at best returned £4,800 annually, was £1,400, leaving £250 after working expenses were met. This meant Masters faced a minimum eighteen years of successful planting in order to clear his debt to CSR. The company accordingly revalued plantation assets and lowered rents at the end of 1912--and hoped for good seasons and an absence of hurricanes.[52]

There was an overall improvement in the Labasa tenants' position in 1913, debts being reduced by an average £560; and again in 1915, when all tenants showed a credit on the year's operations after a poor 1914 season. Five planters received an average £220 in cash and reduced debts by an average £270. Nine others reduced their debts by an average £705. But average debts still stood at around £3,500 at the begmning of 1916. Even if future seasons permitted realization of the CSR ideal of £500 annual reductions in indebtedness, planters contemplated! around seven more years of financial dependence.[53]

Planters on Viti Levu's dry side fared better. There, planter numbers increased steadily between 1906 and 1912 as CSR tenants joined planters on non-CSR land in supplying the Rarawai and Lautoka mills. By 1913 a total of fifty-four white planters were recorded as cultivating 70 to 75 percent of the cane area, with Indian farmers and CSR cultivating about 20 percent and 10 percent respectively (Table 2). All were favored by a relatively predictable climate and soils that produced sweet cane, especially in the Lautoka area where average P O.C.S. between 1905 and 1958 was 14.0 percent, compared with 11.5 percent on the Rewa.[54]

TABLE 2 **The White Planter Contribution to Cane Cultivation, 1913**

	White Planters		Percent of Total Cane Area Cultivated		
	Independent	CSR tenants	White planters	CSR estates	Indian farmers
Rarawai	14	13	75	8	17
Labasa	0	14	80	20	0
Lautoka	11	16	70	10	20

Sources: CSR 2078, no. 878; CSR 2079, nos. 47, 57, 95, 978; CSR 2138, no. 932; CSR 2139, nos. 40, 958, 985; CSR 2638, no. 628; CSR 2639, no. 693.

CSR sought to appropriate the benefits from a climate more suited to cane by paying dry-zone planters 10*s.* per ton for cane of 13 percent P.O.C.S., instead of the 10*s.* for 11 percent P.O.C.S. paid on the Rewa. Moynagh argues that in terms of cane price received, this policy placed planters on an equal footing throughout Fiji.[55] In fact, the P.O.C.S. of Badila cane--which was substituted progressively for lower-yielding, less sweet Rose Bamboo cane--typically reached 14 to 15 percent. Taking 14 percent as normal, dry-zone planters received 11*s.* 3*d.* per ton, since the cane price increased by 1*s.* 3*d.* per ton for every percentage point increase in P. O. C. S. On the Rewa, 10*s.* per ton was the usual price, given an average of 11.5 percent. Dry-zone planters therefore had a price advantage of over a shilling a ton.

They also had a cost advantage. Cultivation costs were lower in the dry areas because of reduced weed growth; and yields, at least in the Lautoka mill area, were higher, averaging over 21 tons per acre in the years 1904-1915. Whereas a cost of production below 10 *s.* per ton was a rarity on the Rewa, it was common in the Rarawai and especially the Lautoka mill areas. CSR itself had grown cane on its Lautoka estates at a cost of between 7*s.* and 9*s.* per ton.[56]

Little wonder, then, that plantation land on Viti Levu's western side was exchanging for £30 per acre in 1907, and that planters supplying Rarawai and Lautoka mills cleared themselves of their indebtedness to CSR fairly rapidly. The Carr brothers, in separate partnerships of H. P. Carr & Co. and H. G. Carr and J. C. Doyle, had both relied on CSR advances to establish plantations in 1903; and both were debt free within five years. H. G. Carr had begun with just £300 to £400 of his own capital and with previous experience of sugar planting in Jamaica. By 1911 he was reputedly the richest man in Fiji. Four other planters of the time were reducing their average indebtedness by £900 per annum when receiving 10*s.* 11*d.* per ton of cane.[57]

Subsequently the pace did not slacken. Planter prosperity was revealed most clearly and comprehensively in the improved financial positions of CSR's Ba tenants over the period 1913-1917 (Table 3). Of the ten tenants indebted on 1 January 1913, five had cleared their average debts of £4,244 by 1 January 1918 through average annual credits of £1,422; and two would clear their debts in two or three years, other things equal. Only three were in the position of the Labasa tenants--facing five, ten, and fifteen years of continued indebtedness. The debt reductions represented income over and above tenants' living expenses, house rent, servants' wages, and, in some cases, £200 for a holiday

TABLE 3 **CSR Tenants, Ba, 1913-1918**

	Average Annual Crop tons	Value (£)	Price (s.)	Debt 1 Jan. 1913 (£)	Average Yearly Debt Reduction (£)	Debt 1 Jan. 1918 (£)
Andrewes, G.	6,413	3,878	12.87	3,797	949	0
Brenan, F.	4,573	2.826	12.45	3,984	265	2,660
Clark, V.	6,675	4,481	13.84	5,875[a]	1,575	2,725
Francis, E. D.	6,113	4,110	13.76	4,672	934	0
Gale, R. A.	5,196	3,451	13.77	4,782	665	1,459
Holmes, B. H.	15,097	10,318	13.44	5,234	2,617	0
Hunt, C.	7,532	4,782	13.26	7,108[b]	1,522	1,021
Lamb, C. H.	4,986	3,226	12.97	4,140	515	1,567
Philbrooks, C. J.	3,507	2,396	14.13	3,410	164	2,591
Sidney, J. W.	9,827	7,133	14.64	3,697	1,848	0
Southey, C. M.	6,344	3,967	12.94	3,822	764	0
Southey, C. W.	4,577	3,168	14.59	3,975	379	2,082
Thomas, H. J.	8,656	5,548	13.69	7,331[b]	2,444	0
Youngman, H. J.	7,715	4,497	11.65	6,427[a]	1,293	3,840

Source: CSR 3395.
[a]Debt as of 1 Jan. 1916.
[b]Debt as of 1 Jan. 1914.

sometime between 1913 and 1918. The total of the items, excluding the latter, was usually £400 to £500. Financially successful tenants, therefore, were clearing £2,000 after plantation expenses were met. As the Rarawai mill manager observed, most of the tenants were doing exceedingly well.[58]

The same was true of planters on non-CSR land supplying Lautoka mill. In 1915, thirteen Ba planters received an average £542 in cane bonuses alone; six had an additional average £382 credited to their CSR accounts; and the remaining seven planters were free of debt to CSR. An average £589 was credited to fifteen Lautoka planters' accounts, and an average £400 paid in cash to an additional thirteen planters (three Carr partnerships taking 65 percent of the total).[59]

For most of the fifty to sixty dry-zone sugar planters of Viti Levu, then, 1906-1915 had indeed been the prosperous period it was forecast to be. Some fortunes had been made, and many small fortunes were within grasp. In contrast, the thirty to forty sugar planters on the Rewa and at Labasa trusted in good seasons and the passage of time to reduce what seemed to be a persistently high level of indebtedness. Time, however, was not on the planters' side.

Demise

The year 1916 was a boom year for Fiji's sugar plantation economy. Cane output reached a record level, and high wartime prices were passed on in part to planters, who received the 1915 bonus of 2*s.* 6*d.* per ton plus an additional deferred bonus.[80] But the British government had accepted a recommendation from the government of India that the indenture system be abolished: "In Fiji there were celebrations among the Indians and effigies labelled 'coolie' were burned."[61]

One labeled "white planter" appropriately could have been burned also. For the most efficient planter growing cane on the best soil at base depended on a steady supply of cheap labor to sustain his living standard; and there was no chance of that after all recruitment for the colonies stopped in March 1917. The daily wage of free Indian labor rose from 1*s.* 6*d.* in 1914, to 1*s.* 9*d.* in August 1917, to 2*s.* in 1918.[62]

On the Rewa, the successful Gordon brothers anticipated events and quit their plantations at the end of 1916. Two other CSR tenants abandoned their leaseholds early in 1917, leaving CSR to write off outstanding debts totaling around £8,000, And a third tenant died of typhoid fever in February. Most planters saw out the year in an effort to clear their debts. They were successful because of a record crop and high cane prices. Then, frightened by the uncertainty of the labor position, they left before their plantation assets depreciated further in value. By January 1918, O. Freeman and A. C. Pain were the only CSR-financed planters on non-CSR land who remained on what the *Fiji Times* called the "ruined Rewa." Pain was killed in action at the Front later in the year and left an uncovered plantation debt in excess of £2,000. Freeman abandoned Navuso at the end of the year having failed to clear his debt to CSR at any time since starting in 1907, having lost £1,500 of his own capital, and having incurred a debt of £1,300 to G. Gordon.[63] In 1917, 10,340 acres were under cane cultivation on the Rewa: 28 percent on CSR estates (over one-third sublet to Indians already); 32 percent on free Indian farms; and 40 percent on European plantations. The following year, with the total cultivated area stationary, the respective percentages were 51, 40, and 9. A few whites lingered on, growing a little cane on small plantations; but they were a remnant of a lost society. By the end of 1922, CSR management expected that company estates would provide 35 percent of the Rewa cane supply, and Indian farmers 61 percent.[64]

White planter society disintegrated at Labasa as rapidly as it did on

the Rewa, since there too poor yields and sourer cane made cheap labor even more crucial to plantation profitability than it was in dry-zone Viti Levu. By early 1918 only six CSR tenants out of fourteen remained --four of them original lessees of 1909. Two more retired at the end of the year. [65]

The more prosperous planters in dry-zone Viti Levu were less willing to leave their plantations. When recruitment of Indian labor for the colonies stopped in March 1917, they looked to reindenture, employment under the Masters and Servants Ordinance, and the supply of free labor to meet their short-term labor needs, which they hoped would be reduced by labor-saving technical improvements in cultivation and met in the long-term by a resumption of some form of labor immigration, CSR tenants accepted one-year extensions of their leases from the end of 1917, so that whereas by January 1918 few white planters were left in the Rewa and Labasa regions, planters in Ba accounted for 63 percent of the area under cane cultivation. The reduction from 75 percent in 1913 resulted not from a decline in European planting but from extensions in the Indian-cultivated area.[66]

The fact remained that Indians, including those under indenture, were no longer prepared to labor for the white planter for a shilling a day. Early in 1917 a strike occurred on R. P. Carr's plantation in demand of an increase in wages to 1*s.* 6*d.* per task. In May free laborers at the Lautoka mill went on strike for an increase in wages from 1*s.* 9*d.* to 4*s.* a day, and were joined by tram gangs and workers at the Sigatoka limestone quarry. The mill manager was stunned: "In all my experience of Indian labor I have never yet seen anything approaching so concerted an action where the castes and classes are mixed together."[67]

Forced to use planters' and its own indentured labor to get the mill started and to operate it through June and July, CSR dismissed two Punjabis considered ringleaders, and was subsequently successful in signing on free Indians--but only by increasing wages from 1*s.* 6*d.* to 1*s.* 9*d.* in August. In the interim, the strikes had restricted cultivation. Late cane planting in 1917 followed by flood in 1918 caused the yield in the Lautoka mill area to drop to 13.8 tons per acre, equaling the lowest on record.[68]

Knox, though he would continue a public fight for a resumption of immigration, already had privately conceded defeat and informed governor Sweet-Escott that further extension of cane cultivation was impossible, and that the sugar sector would have to be rendered independent of immigration by settling land with Indian growers constituting their own labor force.[69]

For white sugar planters, however, securing an imported labor supply was a matter of survival. Members of the Cane Growers' Association of Fiji contended that prior to the ending of immigration, thirteen laborers at 1*s.* 6*d.* per day were required to cultivate and harvest 100 acres of cane land. In 1918, they complained, not less than sixteen laborers were required at 2*s.* to perform the same amount of work. The March wage increase and lower labor effort had increased labor cultivation costs per acre by 63 percent, whereas cane prices were stable at the base rate of 10*s.* per ton plus the 2*s.* 6*d.* bonus. Moreover, prices of imported goods had increased by 27 percent over prewar prices: 40 percent in the case of food, drink, and tobacco, and 54 percent in the case of raw materials.[70] Money wage gains and tenants' living allowances were eroded substantially, reducing labor availability at a time when its continued supply at low wage rates was crucial to minimizing reductions in white planters' living standards. Against the wishes of CSR management, the colonial government therefore began in 1918 to finance an Immigration Fund by adding 5s. per ton to existing sugar and copra export duties.[71] The basic problem was still to be solved though. On precisely what labor could Fund money be spent?

Meanwhile, sweet crops in 1918 and 1919 produced cane prices 1*s*. 6*d.* per ton above 1917 prices, and contributed to healthy financial results for some planters. CSR's Ba tenants Brenan and Lamb, who died during the influenza epidermic of late 1918-early 1919, left respective debts of only £275 and £751 to write off. But at the end of 1918, Lautoka tenants debts had increased (Table 4), and the proportion of acreage cultivated by white planters had fallen to 32 percent. Generally, the labor shortage and retirement of planters was expected to lead to a two-thirds crop in 1919.[72]

As shown in Table 5, all but one Ba tenant started 1920 with a debt larger than that two years before. The same was true of Lautoka tenants (Table 4) and sixty-six Indian growers, who were carrying debts of £380 per capita. More leaseholds reverted to CSR, which took over plantation assets at a revaluation; and with cancellation of existing indentures in January, planter pessimism became a resolve to get out or, in some cases, bordered on. inactive fatalism. Planters now accounted for 15 percent of the reduced cultivated area of 23,000 acres supplying Lautoka mill.[73]

High cane prices slowed the abandonment of the remaining European plantations. Skyrocketing world sugar prices encouraged CSR to pay bonuses of 11*s.* per ton and £1 per acre under cane (equivalent to approximately 1*s.* 6*d.* per ton), effectively doubling the received price

TABLE 4 **CSR Tenant Debt as of 1 January 1918-1921, Lautoka (pounds)**

	1918	1919	1920	1921
Bossley	3,985	4,700	5,800	4,400
Sue Hook	n.d.	reduced	n.d.	880 credit
Lord	5,359	6,170	8,100	7,400
Nugent	319	739	2,100	700
Waddingham	n.d.	1,900	2,388	1,488
Wotton	347	747	2,400	almost clear

Source: CSR 2144, no. 647.
Note: Data were not available for four other tenants.

TABLE 5 **CSR Tenant Debt as of 1 January 1918-1922, Ba (pounds)**

	1918	1920	1921	1922	Comments
Andrewes	0	1,500	n.d.		
Clark	2,725	1,614	0		
Francis	0	1,500	0		
Gale	1,459	1,868	1,938	4,155	
Holmes	0				died in credit £2,600 c. 1919
Hunt	1,021	2,151	2,080	2,188	
Philbrooks	2,591	2,490			taken over 1 Jan. 1920
Southey, C .W.	2,082	4,500			taken over 20 June 1920
Youngman	3,840	n.d.	debt reduced by £2,053		

Sources: CSR 2640, no. 877; CSR 2641, no. 907; CSR 3394, 3395.

in 1920 and permitting a 6*d.* per day wage bonus. Cane output from dry-zone Viti Levu was also up 42 percent over the 1919 level, so that cane payments were up 284 percent.[74] Self-confessed merchant profiteering reduced the real benefits from the increased money payments: import prices rose by 25 percent in 1920, causing Labasa tenants to petition CSR for an increase in their £300 annual living allowance so that they could still afford overseas education for their children.[75] But the benefits remained substantial enough for Ba and Lautoka tenants to reduce debts significantly, except in two isolated cases of bad. management and misfortune (Tables 4, 5).

Any revived hopes of white planter prosperity were lost in 1921. A

falling world sugar price prompted CSR to eliminate the acreage bonus and to reduce the cane bonus to 10*s.* per ton. And a decline in Indians' real wages between 1913 and 1920 culminated in the "great Indian strike" from February to August 1920.[76] Planters accepted CSR's advice on resisting wage demands but did not advertise the fact. The letter written by the president of the Cane Growers' Association to the colonial secretary in March was calculatedly consistent with the CSR stand:

> a victory to the mob would not only mean a triumph of employee over employer but an immoral victory showing the dominance of Indians over Europeans unjustly gained by numerical superiority.[77]

Planters nevertheless sought assurances from the company, as they gathered their women and occupied strategic defense positions like the hill near the Rarawai tennis courts.[78]

CSR's general manager affirmed it was the general aim of the company to facilitate continued European planting, But a CSR circular expressed company understanding if planters responded to the precarious position by quitting their plantations;[79] and when crushing of the 1921 crop began in August, CSR rejected planter requests for preference in cane cutting and loading over Indian growers, whose own vested interests had been instrumental in ensuring a return to work by striking laborers. The mill manager explained that "as a Company we had no separate contracts for white and black.[80]

Nor did the company hesitate in exposing planters to the force of a major slump in the world sugar price at the end of 1921. The cost of cane grown on CSR estates had more than doubled between 1913 and 1921, but company management confirmed that a threatened reduction in the cane price to the 1913 level would be made nevertheless.[81] As the *Pacific Age* noted on November 28, the restoration of the 1913 price was "practically tantamount to ending the cane industry, as far as the European growers are concerned." In an editorial two days later it went on to complain of the purity of CSR's capitalist spirit:

> to the board of directors what is it if a man is white, black, or brindle, so long as the dividend is wrested from the far-off soil of Fiji, and the economic outlook for the future, according to the company's doctrines, is being assured?

The strike, of course, had hampered cultivation and planting for the 1922 season, so many planters took the advice given in the *Fiji Times*

and Herald of November 2: to take the 1921 cane payment and quit before debts increased further (Table 5). If they needed additional encouragement to leave, it came early in 1922. By then it was clear there would be no resumption of Indian immigration, and that the foundation of the plantation system consequently had been undermined.[82] No alternative, equally cheap supply source had been located. Suggested importation of West Indians had been rejected because "they have peculiar ideas on their equality with white folk," and were expected to demand half-castes' wages.[83] Planters had clung to the "promise" in Lord Hardinge's March 1916 statement in Delhi that the secretary of state had asked the viceroy of India to maintain the existing system of recruitment pending establishment of a substitute. Now, after twenty years residence in most cases, twenty-nine planters of dry-zone Viti Levu stood "grasping at the shadow of labor unsupplied."[84]

They could not have employed imported labor anyway. CSR ceased advances in January 1922; and though advances warranted by hardship and the expected crop size were permitted later, the decision left planters without working capital, and, for those whose securities were pledged to the company, without a chance of raising it elsewhere.[85] Long a political ally of CSR, the planter community now became a sacrificial lamb. The 1922 cane price and wage rate offer was made conditional upon removal of the sugar export duty imposed since 1916 and increased to £1 per ton in 1920. Given the dominant view--expressed by Maynard Hedstrom in the Legislative Council--that the planter was the "greatest asset of the Colony and should be preserved at any cost,"[86] CSR's general manager explained how removal might be hastened: "just now it will be as well for us not to hurry about smoothing out difficulties besetting the independent planters."[87]

After CSR's general reassurance, epitomized in the assertedly much used slogan "Trust the Company," planter pessimism turned to despair and resentment. Planters felt CSR--which admitted wartime profits were very large--had appropriated a disproportionate share of the income generated by high wartime sugar prices, leaving planters, despite substantial profits in 1920, with inadequate reserves. And they were dismayed at the brutal immediacy with which CSR chose no longer to protect them from market vicissitudes.[88] The abandonment of their plantations and, for most planters, the subsequent departure from Fiji, even though inevitable, had, in their eyes, been hastened indecently. As planter R. A. Harricks commented:

> After one has tackled a bare hill and gradually made a comfortable home and resided therein for nearly 16 years, and has

> increased one's crops per acre over 50%, it is not an easy matter to decide to give it up.[89]

But give it up he, and others, did. By March 1922 the remaining four Labasa tenants had left their leaseholds. Forty-six percent of the area usually cropped at Ba was abandoned, the seven, remaining white planters accounting for just 11 percent of the 1922 crop: output on Clapcott's plantation, which had averaged 7,800 tons between 1912 and 1921, dropped to 2,000 tons. At Lautoka, R. P. Carr was quitting. Planters there cultivated just 6 percent of the acreage under cane.[90]

The few who stayed on as planters, in defiance of the trend, went further into debt. S. Coffey at Ba was indebted to CSR for £3,465 in January 1920, which was reduced to £1,024 by January 1921, but had increased steadily to £6,000 by January 1925. Before the strike and sugar slump, he had been worth "some thousands" according to local CSR management. Individual Europeans, aside from several CSR tenants taken back into the company's employ, now made money from sugar only as landlords to Indian growers, themselves heavily in debt and bound for a poverty that white planters had never experienced.[91]

A Kind of Prosperity

Prospective white settlers always were attracted to Fiji by two things, "the halo of romance that surrounded a full-blown 'planter,' "[92] and the promise of rapid wealth. All that was necessary to acquire both, so the propaganda went, was a little capital and a knowledge of tropical agriculture.[93]

What kept white settlers in Fiji after the cotton collapse of the 1870s, and forced them into sugar planting on the Rewa, was indebtedness. And it was an indebtedness frequently unrelieved by expertise in sugarcane cultivation. In 1886 one member of the Levuka Chamber of Commerce contended that the failure of the small planter was the result of the fact that he had the same capital and less experience than a cockatoo settler in Australia.[94] Only one or two of the first generation of Rewa sugar planters had had previous experience in cane growing. Unfounded optimism and general managerial inefficiency also had led in some cases to initial overextension in land acquisition and cultivation, and subsequent increased borrowing against crop liens and ultimately against mortgages.[95]

But these were factors magnifying the basic nonviability of plantation enterprise on the Rewa in the 1880s, a time when individual white planters and even CSR could not grow cane at a profit--this despite the

maintenance of the sugarcane price in the context of a falling world raw sugar price, and despite intensification of the exploitation of indentured Indian laborers. Planter indebtedness increased to the point where their land went to CSR, the banks, and the mortgage companies.

The fascination of a planter life in the Pacific proved compelling nonetheless, and from the 1890s the white sugar planter community was reborn as ex-CSR employees took up company offers of leaseholds, first on the Rewa and then in dry-zone Fiji, and as new white immigrants settled on freehold land and land leased from Fijians. Sweeter cane and improved yields generally permitted a plantation profit margin; but on the Rewa and at Labasa it was not large, and bad seasons tended to set planters back. Good management and long experience of cultivating especially fertile land were needed in these areas if wealth was to be accumulated. By this criterion, only three Rewa planters were successful.

Even in the more profitable sugarcane areas of dry-zone Viti Levu, infertile land producing sour cane could catch competent managers in a web of debt (see the examples of Lord and Gale in Tables 4 and 5). Conversely, incompetent management of good land could lead to similar entrapment, especially if rent was set according to land quality rather than plantation profitability. Ragg's estate at Ba, for example, was managed poorly by Theodore Riaz, and over the period 1914-1921 produced at a net loss of 3*s.* 5*d.* per ton, inclusive of rent equivalent to 6*s*. per ton. A more typical rent equivalent to 1*s.* 6*d.* per ton would have permitted a profit margin of 1*s.* 1*d.*; but even then returns would have been unduly low.[96]

However, the incompetent and the unfortunate were not the first to go when an end to importation of indentured Indian laborers was announced in March 1916. A few successful planters who thought realistically about future prospects instead of clinging to the white planter's dream left Fiji, by choice in the case of the Gordon brothers on the Rewa, and providentially in the case of H. G. Carr's death.[97] For most of the planters who remained, the years of prosperity from 1906 to 1915 had left them on the verge of accumulating savings, and they held on in the hope that wartime cane prices would offset rising labor costs pending a new system of labor immigration. But CSR saw itself relying on the small-scale Indian cane grower in the future, and by 1922 white planters faced Hobson's choice. In one respect, they retired as they had started--without a competency. The difference was that they were older, doubted their ability to succeed in another occupation, and had families to support.

The experience of one CSR tenant, C. Hunt, exaggerated the truth.

Given four weeks notice to vacate his plantation house, in ill-health, and with a young wife and growing children to support, he pleaded a poverty that his CSR benefactors preferred to interpret as a kind of prosperity:

> The Hunts state they have no money; they have a governess, at least two servants, an overseer and their own living allowance evidently all provided by us: they also run a motor car.[98]

As CSR management complained, "comfortable living at someone else's expense has almost invariably been the first thing our tenants have looked for."[99] That Hunt found it meant that when he joined other ex-planters in forced retirement, he could at least nurse recollections of a brief, lost golden age--an age ending with a retreat of the white settler frontier in Fiji and a confirmation that the white capitalist grip on the colonial economy was emphatically a corporate one.

NOTES

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11. E. W. Knox to J. Robertson, 27 Nov. 1883, CSR 2188; H. H. Thiele, "Agriculture in Fiji," *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute,* vol. 21 (1889-1890), p. 362; Sir William C. Des Voeux, *My Colonial Service* (London: John Murray, 1903), p. 335; Moynagh, p. 44.

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13. CSR 2188, pp. 200-201, 215, 285, 486, 637; CSR 2189, p. 188.

14. CSO 2803/1885.

15. CSR 2189, pp. 238-244; *Fiji Royal Gazette,* vol. 11 (1884); Indian immigration Reports, *Fiji Royal Gazette,* 1888, 1889.

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27. CSR 2209, pp. 342, 345.

28. CSR 2212, p. 301; CSR 2211, p. 496; CSR 2188, p. 617.

29. CSR 2212, p. 90; CSR 2213, pp. 15-16.

30. CSR 2213, pp. 278, 340.

31. CSR 2211, pp. 454, 496; CSR 2212, pp. 301, 394; CSR 2215, pp. 3, 26; CSR 2218, p. 365; CSR 2260, letter nos. 136, 333, 338, 345; CSR 2261, letter no. 427.

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38. CSR 3391, 2932.

39. From a simple regression analysis of data in CSR 2262-2270.

40. CSR 2270, letter no. 623.

41. CSR 2265, letter nos. 501, 663.

42. CSR 2266, letter no. 884.

43. CSR 2264, letter no, 204; CSR 2266, letter no. 843; CSR 2261, letter no. 457.

44. CSR 2266, letter no. 666; CSR 3126, letter nos. 123, 58, 92, 99.

45. CSR 2265, letter no. 503; CSR 2266, letter no. 884.

46. CSR 2267, letter no. 41; CSR 2268, letter no. 267; CSR 2269, letter nos. 452, 458.

47. CSR 2270, letter nos. 621, 623; Moynagh, pp. 101-102; Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants,* p. 175.

48. A plantation cropping 600 acres annually, yielding 20 tons per acre, and employing 200 laborers at £10.10.0 p.a., would have had a total revenue of £6,000, a wages bill of £2,100, and, assuming the latter was 55 percent of working expenses, total expenses of £3,800. Gross profit would thus equal £2,200. An increase in the cane price from 10*s.* to 12*s.* 6*d.* would have increased total revenue to £7,500. An increase in wages to £15.15.0 would have increased the wages bill to £3,150 and total expenses to £4,850, assuming other working expenses were unchanged. Gross profit would have equaled £2,650.

49. CSR 2270, letter no. 614.

50. CSR 2271, letter no. 760; CSR 3126, letter no. 99.

51. CSR 2076, letter no. 386; W. P. Dixon to general manager, 12 June 1899, CSR 2909; CSR 2932, 3391; R. G. Ward, *Land Use and Population in Fiji* (London: HMSO, 1965), p. 53.

52. CSR 3391; CSR 2078, letter no. 940; CSR 2079, letter nos. 950, 951; CSR 2078, letter nos. 945, 847, 950, 951; Moynagh, p. 53.

53. CSR 2079, letter nos. 57, 105, 155.

54. Ward, p. 53.

55. Moynagh, p. 46.

56. CSR 2134, letter no. 189; CSR 2135, letter no. 354; CSR 2136, letter no. 580; CSR 2142, letter no. 428; CSR 2639, letter nos. 693, 744; CSR 2640, letter no. 801; Moynagh, p. 146.

57. CSR 2136, letter no. 530; CSR 3106, letter no. 496; CSR 3126, letter nos. 77, 99; Palgrave Carr to Claudia Knapman, pers. comm., 28 Aug. 1981; CSR 2136, letter no. 580; CSR 2137, letter no. 784; CSR 2138, letter no. 900.

58. CSR 2640, letter no. 861.

59. CSR 2640, letter no. 784; CSR 2142, letter no. 434.

60. CSR 2271, letter no. 760.

61. Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants,* p. 181.

62. Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants,* p, 183; F.C.T. Lord to Corbett, 28 Feb. 1922, CSR 3127.

63. CSR 2271, letter nos. 774, 812, 858, 787; CSR 2272, letter no. 894; CSR 2272, letter nos. 4, 915, 989; Fenner to Freeman, 29 June 1911, CSR 3126; Fiji Times, 3 Jan. 1918.

64. CSR 2272, letter no. 934; CSR 2273, letter no. 46; CSR 2274, letter no. 285; CSR 2275, letter no. 446; *Cyclopedia,* p. 238.

65. CSR 2080, letter nos. 228, 263, 290, 296.

66. CSR 2640, letter nos. 821, 857, 849.

67. CSR 2143, letter no. 560.

68. CSR 2143, letter nos. 568, 572; CSR 2145, letter no. 778.

69. E. W. Knox to Sir Bickham Sweet-Escott, 13 Nov. 1917, CSR 2935.

70. R. A. Harricks to general manager, 1 Nov. 1918, CSR 3397; Notes of CSR meeting with Cane Growers' Association, 6 Nov. 1918, CSR 3397.

71. Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants,* p. 186.

72. CSR 2640, letter no. 877; CSR 2641, letter no. 907; CSR 2145, letter no. 780; Annual Report no. 128, CSR 3528.

73. CSR 2146, letter nos. 879, 858, 876; CSR 2641, letter no. 908.

74. CSR 2923, 2146, 2147, 2641. Cane tonnage crushed is indexed in the last three volumes.

75. CSR 3105, letter no. 230; CSR 2081, letter no. 358.

76. K. L. Gillion, *The Fiji Indians: Challenge to European Dominance 1920-1946* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977), p 53.

77. Cane Growers' Association of Fiji to the Colonial Secretary, 7 Mar. 1921, CSR 3146.

78. CSR 3146, letter no. 122.

79. Acting Colonial Secretary to F.C.T. Lord, 26 Nov. 1921, CSR 3127; CSR 3146, letter no. 125.

80. CSR 3146, letter no. 156.

81. W. P. Dixon, Note, 26 Dec. 1923, CSR 2923.

82. Moynagh, p. 111.

83. G. H. Allen to general manager, 2 Nov. 1921, CSR 3146.

84. Cane Growers' Association of Fiji to the Colonial Secretary, 4 Jan. 1922, CSR 3106.

85. CSR 3146, letter no. 170; W. P. Dixon to general manager, 11 Feb. 1922, CSR 2923.

86. *Legislative Council Debates,* 1917.

87. General manager to W. P. Dixon, 17 Jan. 1922, CSR 2923.

88. R. A. Harricks to Managing Director CSR, 2 Dec. 1921, CSR 3106; R. A. Gale for the Cane Growers' Association of Fiji to Managing Director CSR, 2 Dec. 1921, CSR 3146; CSR 3146, letter no. 159.

89. R. A. Harricks to Managing Director CSR, 5 Dec. 1921, CSR 3106.

90. CSR 2642, letter no. 148; CSR 2643, letter nos. 169, 270, 302; CSR 2644, letter no. 339; W. P Dixon to general manager, 11 June 1923, CSR 2923.

91. CSR 3146, letter nos. 218, 222; CSR 2641, letter no. 977; CSR 2644, letter no. 443; CSR 3146, letter no. 188; Memo of interview between the government and a deputation of Indian cane growers from Nadroga, Nadi, Lautoka, Ba, and Tavua districts, 14 June 1922, CSR 3106.

92. Journal of J. L. Young, 11 Oct. 1875, PMB, quoted in Deryck Scarr, *Viceroy of the Pacific: The Majesty of Colour, A Life of Sir John Bates Thurston,* Pacific Research Monograph No. 4 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980), p. 3.

93. CSO 1068/1892.

94. Scarr, pp. 2-3; *Legislative Council Journal,* 1886 Sessions.

95. Thiele, p. 362.

96. CSR 3146, letter no. 157.

97. Palgrave Carr to Claudia Knapman, pers. comm., 28 Aug. 1981.

98. CSR 3146, letter no. 175 (Rarawai mill manager writing).

99. CSR 3126, letter no. 123 (Nausori mill manager writing).

EDITOR'S FORUM

TO LIMLIMBUR, THE "WANDERERS." REFLECTIONS ON JOURNEYS AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Roderic Lacey
Institute of Catholic Education
Victoria, Australia

> Thus there passed to rest a spirit which had ever been turbulent in the cause of the people, one who in life had been aptly named *To Limlimbur,* the Wanderer, for in his time few men, white or black, could match the restless grandeur of his vision.[1]

What is fascinating in these words about Sumsuma by a historian of the "Rabaul Strike" of 1929 is the writer's vision of the man as a hero. This paper focuses on innovators of the colonial era in Papua New Guinea such as Sumsuma, Mambu, Yali, and Anton Misiyaiyai, as well as some recent urban migrants. My argument has three elements. First these innovators, and their struggles to bring about change within the confining structures of a colonial order, echo each other across generations, particularly when seen as "wanderers"--men who journeyed beyond their own people, beyond the horizons of their "traditional" world and its moral order, who in their journeys had their own vision of the world transformed, and then returned and sought to bring new worlds into being. Despite differences off historical context and local

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culture and traditions, these common threads of journeys, transformations, and returns are woven through these wanderers!' life histories.

A second element lies in the details of the wanderers' narratives and their reflections of the richer, more complex, and more ancient narrative traditions of Papua New Guinea. Our understanding of the narratives and the lives of the wanderers is enriched and extended by locating them within the precolonial oral traditions about heroes, heroines, founders, traders, migrants, and initiates and their varied journeys and transformations. This premise has two corollaries. The "modern" wanderers, their narratives, and struggles echo and build on the preexisting narrative traditions and suggest that there are continuities in the history of innovation and change between the precolonial and colonial eras. This would suggest that historical interpretation of colonial events that draws upon insights from indigenous precolonial traditions instead of relying upon sources from the colonizers adds new dimensions to our understanding.

The final element of the argument, which is underlined by the detailed investigation of Anton Misiyaiyai's narrative that begins this paper, is that this and the other wanderer narratives can be seen as paradigms for understanding the process of innovation and change in colonial Papua New Guinea, and perhaps beyond, in other contexts.

Anton's Narrative: A Paradigm?

Anton Misiyaiyai, a man from Moseng, an inland Sepik village, told his story to B. J. Allen in the 1970s.[2] In many ways his narrative captures the life of a generation of young workers who signed labor contracts in the 1920s and 1930s that took them far from their home village and landed them, from 1942, in the midst of a vortex of destruction and change; they survived as men transformed and restless to bring about a new world. Perhaps Anton, like a few others, is remarkable among the men of that generation for the clarity of his dreams of change and the fierce and persistent will with which he sought to make those dreams reality. For these reasons his story is worth hearing.

He was born about 1920 and was still a small child when the first white man, a government officer, visited Moseng. Anton was recruited as a laborer in the mid-1930s. He recalled that he was then merely a boy with "no beard and no hair on my genitals." Once recruited Anton set out from home on his first journey, to the coast. He was not to see his home again for another ten years, and then in changed circumstances. He and his young fellow recruits walked to the coast, signed on, and

sailed to Rabaul. His first contract was served in Kavieng where he "cut grass underneath the coconuts," for three years. The work was hard, but the manager of the plantation was harder still and the workers revolted. Company officials investigated, and removed him. Anton then worked as a domestic servant in the house of the new manager.

He was deeply impressed with the glimpse he caught of the foreigners' way of life.

> When I came out of the bush I was like a fool. When I saw how the whitemen lived my head went around. I saw their houses. When I became a servant I saw inside their houses. I saw their beds and their chairs and tables. Their food and clothes. I thought all these things were good. I saw the stores too. I was amazed at the things in them. The knives and clothes and all the different sorts of food. I thought this was good too. . . . (353)

After two years' work as a domestic servant on his second contract, the Pacific War began in New Guinea in the early months of 1942. The invaders came and Anton met a new group of foreigners, some of whom were prepared to teach him new ways.

A new and significant chapter had begun in this young man's life. Anton was made a garden *bosboi* by the Japanese. He began learning new methods of cultivation from some of these strangers who learned to speak a little *tok pisin.* Anton and his fellow workers learned to plant sweet potato, arrowroot, Chinese taro, pumpkin, melon, corn, onions, and rice. He gained some ideas from these new men; in particular he began thinking about the importance of rice cultivation.

> When I was with the Japanese I got my first ideas. When I saw this rice, I thought, what is this? We eat rice. But what is this stuff? I watched. We planted it. I watched it come up from the ground. I thought, ah, the rice we eat, this is the way it is made. . . . I saw the other things too, the tapioca, and the corn, but my thoughts stayed with the rice. . . . I thought rice would be best. I thought, this is the way to get money. I took it into my mind. I didn't write it. I don't know how to write. (354)

Anton also gained practical knowledge about rice planting and milling. His detailed memory of this process showed that he had learned well.

The war came to an end with the Japanese defeat and surrender of August 1945. Now it was time for Anton to return home after many years away. His initial return was to be brief, He saw with his own eyes what had happened to his home, Moseng, and his people under the Japanese invader. After only a three-month stay he returned to the coast, taking with him other village men. They were employed clearing up Madang after the War. Again he was a *bosboi* for one year and like many workers at that time he made a lot of money for this work.

His experience in the foreign plantation enclave in New Ireland, with Australians and then with Japanese, had sown a vision of change in Anton's mind. That seed was to mature in this other enclave, the town of Madang. He went with his employer to a large meeting addressed by the bishop, who made promises that Anton sought to fulfill.

> The bishop held a big book. He spoke to us. He said the war is over, there will be no more fighting. We are very worried about all the Papuans and New Guineans who died. . . . Men from all over New Guinea stood together with the Americans and the Australian soldiers. I saw them fighting and I was proud and happy. I have seen the strong men and women of New Guinea. Now I have some advice for you. If you follow it you will get the same standards of living as Europeans have. If you take no notice you will stay like your ancestors. (356)

Also in Madang, Anton was taught the elements of banking by his employer. Now, after his time in Madang, he was armed to put his vision into action in order to improve the living standards of the people of his area. On his journey home with his ideas and money he stopped in Aitape. There began his long struggle with colonial authorities. The *kiap* (government field officer) was suspicious of Anton when he deposited his savings and challenged him roughly about what he planned to do with this money. This testing of his ideas helped Anton to clarify them. He resolved to begin by building a house like those he had seen out in the foreign towns and stations.

Anton began his program for improvement by trying to win over the village people to his vision and plan for change. In particular he told them that, like so many other young men before the war, he had followed the common path to the new world outside the village: working on a plantation. But that was a bitter road to follow, So he had searched for another road inside his own village and now he had found it. "I have seen the way," he claimed, and he offered it to them. His own people,

his own clan, seemed to him to be the people with whom he could best begin.

> So I told my clan, the wild taro clan, *samas,* I told them to go and cut the timber and we built the house. Then the house was finished. There were no roads then, no roads anywhere. No road to Wewak. No road to Maprik, A patrol officer came to Dreikikir. . . . I thought I will take this money and go and ask him to help me. . . . (357)

By seeking support from the local colonial official, Anton made a grave tactical error in his plan for reform. Another briefer journey to the government station at Dreikikir led to a bitter confrontation rather than support from this officer *(kiap).* When Anton asked for his help, the man was uncertain whether he should side with a man who seemed to be a troublemaker.

> He said, I don't know about this. I asked, why not? I have been to Rabaul and Madang. I have seen the way it works. The ships bring the cargo and it goes into the stores. It is lined up and sent to the other stores and they sell it and get money. I know about this, And he said, so you want to do the same eh? I said, I want to try that is all. (357-358)

When he said this the *kiap* became afraid and angry. He refused to have anything to do with Anton. Anton too became angry and returned home. But his anger did not lead him to abandon his vision. He was even more convinced that he must gain cooperation, if not support, from the colonial authorities. This time he set out from home on a much longer journey, first to Maprik on the Sepik river, and then to Wewak, the district headquarters. This was to be a decisive journey. It brought unexpected victory in his struggle with the authorities, and new knowledge that gave substance to his dreams. The *kiap* at Maprik, Havilland, was more sympathetic to his pleas for help. Though he had no resources to help with, he sent Anton by plane to Wewak with a letter for the District Officer, Niall. The meeting with this powerful official was decisive. He, unlike others, listened to what Anton was saying.

> He got his book and said, alright, I want to hear what you are thinking about. I want to see if you can do it. I told him and he wrote it all down. All my thinking he wrote down. We talked

> for three days. Then it was finished. He asked me questions. He said, you put goods in your house, what will you. do with them? I said, I will get this cargo and I will sell it to the people. They will buy it. Okay, he said, how will you sell it? He got some tinned meat and some fish. Now, he said, for this meat, if it cost you four shillings how much will you sell it for? I said, for five shillings. . . . He explained it all to me. . . . So I knew these things. This District Officer and I talked and talked. He asked me, where is the money going to come from? He said there was no money in my area. It was then I told him about the rice. (358)

So they discussed how Anton had gained his knowledge about rice from the Japanese in Kavieng. He told Niall: "I planted Japanese rice during the War, now I want to try Australian rice"; and how he had already begun the task by planting some "along the edge of my yam garden." He also told how be planned to put aside what he harvested to plant a larger area the next year. Niall made up his mind to support this self-help scheme: "At last he said, alright I will give you a letter. When you start this work, if any man wants to take you to court or if the Patrol Officer wants to stop you, show them the letter. . . " (359). Then Anton returned home.

This decisive encounter with the District Officer not only brought Anton the covering support of his letter, which he later invoked for his protection, but as with the previous exchanges of knowledge with the Japanese in Kavieng and the Australians in Madang, he acquired more knowledge as a result of his entry into another foreign enclave, Wewak. This new knowledge fed and matured his vision still further. He was even summoned to Maprik station again to receive a guarantee from the *kiap* there that, if he produced a good quality rice in his first crop, he would be helped in seeking support from the Department of Agriculture. Anton told him how his idea of planting spread along links of kinship and affinity through the villages of the region. In other words, a new idea, an innovation for improving living standards, followed ancient pathways in its diffusion from Anton throughout the community. While it spread along these links, others not tied to Anton and his clan waited and watched before they chose to follow the new ways. He and his people joined up with Kokomo, an innovator from the other clan group in the region. These two worked together in their efforts to spread the idea of rice production and marketing as a means of self-help for their people. They were also in contact with what grew into a larger

postwar experiment in self-help under the leadership of Pita Simogun, who emerged from the Pacific War as a highly decorated soldier-hero and who championed schemes that drew upon the skills and ideas of local innovators like Anton.

Opposition came soon from local leaders, "stone knives from the old times," disturbed by challenges to their authority and by what they saw as revolutionary effects upon their traditions and ancestral heritage produced by these innovations in production. These entrenched opponents knew they could appeal to conservative colonial officials to contain the power and influence of "new men" such as Anton. Again, opposition served to challenge the innovators to refine their goals and strategy. The time was ripe, not only for a refinement of Anton's ideas and plans, but for a large-scale and public confrontation between reformers and conservatives. "Now, many of the big-men were afraid of this rice. They said, it is no good. What if this rice destroys our gardens, our yams, our *tambaran, yera' engai,* our annual feast? They shouted at us. Get rid of this stuff! Hurry up! But we would not, so they ran to the Patrol Officer" (359).

The case put to the *kiaps* by local opponents was that this new business would cause the people to "lose the way of our ancestors." This struck a sympathetic chord with officials, who summoned Anton and his men to appear before them. The *kiap* warned Anton that if he threatened people to get them to join his scheme, he would go to jail. In the face of this threat Anton began a new strategy.

> I looked for smart men in each village. I told them, I want a man who can stand up before all their eyes, who can work, who can speak well and who is intelligent. No smart clothes or a nice shiny skin. Smart thinking. So I looked and when I saw one I said, you are the committee for this village. You can organise this village, organise the rice planting here. And I told them, take only those who want to. Show them how to plant rice and leave the rest. (360)

Mobilization of such lieutenants brought another angry response from the *kiap* and trouble boiled over. The *kiap* saw rice planting as a direct threat to his colonial power.

> The Patrol Officer sent word for all of us. We lined up. He said, ah, you are Anton's *luluai* and *tultul* are you? Well you can work for him and he can pay you. They were afraid and said,

> yes sir, yes sir. But I was strong. I said, *kiap,* what is this? You want us to get rid of the rice. Where will we get money from? The whitemen and the government don't give US any. . . . (361)

The *kiap* saw the reality of Anton's vision and scheme. In a colonial situation any viable program for self-help and independent income based on local production was a direct challenge to colonial authority. Threats hung in the air. Anton's lieutenants stood firm even though the *kiap* "cooked" them. These innovators all spoke the same dialect, but others outside their language group weakened and "ran away from the argument." In this trial of strength between Anton and the *kiap,* the District Officer's letter proved a talisman which protected Anton from imprisonment as a rebel and contained the *kiap* in his angry despotism:

> Then he shouted, alright! I don't want to see your faces again. Clear! Get off the station! He is your *kiap* now! So I said, if that is what you want, alright, but look at this. And I showed the letter from Niall. . . . He looked at it. Then he said, alright, but look out. If you break the law I will finish you. (361)

As if this challenge were not enough, another public testing of Anton's ideas awaited him, this time from officers with higher authority than the local *kiap.* Once more he was required to refine and defend the dream and new knowledge he had won so long ago by his journey away from home. But his name had gone so far and the rumors against his innovations were so strong and widespread that Anton no longer needed to journey out into the enclaves of foreign power and influence to gain more knowledge. The colonial officers journeyed from their stations to Moseng to challenge him. In particular, the *kiaps* charged Anton and his followers with "destroying all the old ways." Anton and his men argued that the two, old ways and new, could go together; they were not trying to "throw away the old ways" because that would be foolish. They were working "to bring money here." And Anton persuaded the officials that his enemies had misinformed them about their aims. "We have said, the things of the ancestors can stay, but we must think about working business." And so they won more official support in their struggles. They also reached agreement with the *kiap* about modifying the forceful methods they had used to control local rice planters and about persuading people to think more realistically about returns on their investments.

A new crop of troubles arose, both from personal entanglements resulting from his growing fame, and from problems of marketing, business management, and milling the rice. A deeper source of trouble came from the gap between the growers' expectations of income and what they actually earned from a small-scale inland scheme that had few effective outlets for the sale of produce. "Now all the people thought they would get a lot of money for one bag of rice. Ten pounds or something like that. But I said, no, the Agricultural Officer did not say ten pounds for one bag, he said two pounds. But the people thought if they planted rice they would get a lot of money. . . . Many men went to the Patrol Officer" (363). He took their hulling machines away. To save the scheme, to keep the dream from withering so early, Anton attempted to keep some of the money he was ordered to return so that he would have reserves with which to begin again when opinion was more favorable. While some government officers said, "this is the way of people new to business. They do not understand," and sought to protect the people's interest, others saw the wisdom of Anton's society holding onto a reserve of capital. But, in the end, the conservatives won the day. He ended the story of his struggles with mixed feelings. Looking back on those days of journeys, dreams, and struggles, he recalled:

> The agricultural officer said this work was finished. I sat down and thought about this. I was very upset. I said, it cannot finish now. I thought, they have taken the machines but we still have the rice seed. They have only got the machines. . . . But we kept on going to the meetings. All the time. We walked to Supari and went to the meetings. We would not give up. Later they said, so you are still here. We said yes, we are ready to make another Society. And we did. Now we have the Sepik Producers' Co-operative Association, and I am the Dreikikir director. (364)

* * * *

Anton did not stand alone in the history of the people of Papua New Guinea. He was only one of a larger generation, and his journeys, dreams, schemes, and struggles stretched back in time to earlier generations of workers who, through their travel experiences, made far-reaching discoveries about themselves, their worlds, and the possibilities for innovation and change. Many young men traveled away from their home villages to work in foreign enclaves and saw this other world.

After the Pacific War Anton was part of a much larger wave of reformers who swept through the villages seeking to challenge the ways of their ancestors in order to plant the seeds for a new life. In some areas of the country such goals were more attainable and the people more receptive because much of what remained from earlier times had been destroyed in the holocaust of modern warfare.

There are many elements in this remarkable and moving story of Anton Misiyaiyai's struggles to bring about economic change among people living in a remote area of the Sepik. I have related it in detail here because it tells much about the forces at work for and against economic change among ordinary villagers during the postwar generation. His story is a paradigm of the manner in which "new men" sought to achieve change when they returned home to their villages after their wartime experiences. The most important elements should be noted.[3]

First are Anton's ideas and wishes for bringing about change. His early experiences of life on plantations and the ways in which the foreigners lived led him to compare their lives to those of people in villages. As a result, he began searching for means by which he and his people could live more like the foreigners. His journey away from home, his experience of foreign life on plantations and in towns like Rabaul and Kavieng, gave him a new view of village life and sowed in him this urgent desire for change. That shift in thinking by young men like Anton was a basic and necessary beginning to bringing about change.

Next Anton found a road to change, what he called "the way." On the plantation he saw the importance of money as a way to give his people new opportunities for raising their standard of living and improving their lives. But then came the war, an important turning point in the lives of so many young survivors of Anton's generation. What he discovered, as a result of his earlier search, was a particular "road' to change: the production and sale of a crop that would bring the people steady, regular income, unlike the small and irregular incomes they gained from sending their young men away to work on foreign plantations. Some reformers chose this kind of road, others different ones. But it was not simply finding a road to change that began the process for Anton's people. Anton brought home a body of knowledge, together with some particular techniques and the means needed to put a program of change into action: knowledge about rice planting and growing, about its husking and milling, its sale and marketing, as well as some ideas about the management and use of capital and basic elements of banking, savings? and investment. Other men, following different paths and programs, gathered different knowledge and techniques, as has been recently noted by historians:

> In the 1950's Papua New Guinea could look back to the War as an awesome disruption that brought few permanent changes. But for many there was no return to the 1930's. Communities on Manus, in Madang, the Sepik and the Gulf of Papua took their own initiative. Paliau, Yali and Kabu were revolutionaries who conceived plans in varying degrees of knowledge about the economic situation that they hoped to change. The soldiers returning to Toaripi had been aware that the foreigners had power not just through wealth and knowledge, but through organisation. The Toaripi were determined to do more for themselves by combining into larger units and drawing on more manpower and capital. . . .[4]

Anton's story also shows clearly that this young man of Moseng, no matter what his experiences had been, needed to win his people over to his ideas if he wished to bring about change among them. Much of the central part of his story is filled with these struggles. He tells of his conflicts with local leaders, "stone knives from the old times," men who were disturbed by this challenge from young men. These elders assessed his challenge as guardians and conservers of their ancestral heritage. They imagined that new ways of production would turn the people away from that heritage and tradition. Some postwar reformers were also radicals in that they wished to break with their past and its traditions, to overthrow traditional elders and sweep away the ways of the ancestors. Tommy Kabu--a soldier returning home to the Purari Delta after war service--was one of these. He believed that it was necessary for the people to burn their ancient *ravi* (sacred mens' house) and masks, to abandon their riverbank settlements, and to embrace Christianity and the Motu language if they were to enter the modern world.[5] Anton chose differently. He argued with the elders that he wanted only to mix old and new together and have them working in harmony. To spread the new ideas, and help the people to work together growing rice, Anton used the ties already there. Other reformers would try to bring the people together into new societies, closing their eyes to or breaking with existing ties.

Anton's greatest struggles were with colonial officers, but some of his most effective allies also came from the ranks of the *kiaps.* Men like Niall listened with care and sympathy to ideas like Anton's because they were living through their own time of questioning and rethinking, a time of searching for new colonial policies, Colonial administrations, now viewed within a larger context of events and ideas, were being reshaped and new ties were being shaped between villagers and *kiaps.*

It was also a time in which many *kiaps* were trying to force the people back into the old colonial roles in existence before the Japanese invasion, but which the invaders and then the new defenders had swept away as they battled for control over country and people in the campaigns of the Pacific War.[6]

If we view Anton's story as a paradigm of innovation and change, the elements that make up this process are: a vision of change born from contrasts discovered through a traumatic journey away from home; the discovery of a "way," a path to change; the acquiring of a body of knowledge and techniques to make change possible; the winning over of people to the new ways and the struggle with those who resist change; and the larger context in which the process and struggles unfold.

Precolonial Hero Traditions

These insights on innovation and change in the postwar decades come from reflections on a single individual's story. But men of earlier generations had also journeyed away from home and discovered the bitter realities of working life; for some, their experiences had similarly opened their minds to new possibilities and new ideas. These were the travelers, the culture heroes and village founders -who, according to tradition had come from another world to bring new gifts, new techniques, crops, and possibilities for change. Whether men such as Anton will themselves become transformed in the oral traditions of their people and be immortalized as culture heroes is a question worth pondering. Its answer depends partly upon what kinds of changes are now taking place and will take place in the near future in the villages to which they returned.

The Antons of modern Papua New Guinea and these earlier generations of voyagers, as well as the migrants of postwar generations arriving in new towns and cities, are all part of a stream of travelers in the colonial age. They join and blend with another stream of travelers, the foreigners, who came by sea and later journeyed overland and along rivers searching for new places to "discover" and map, new wealth to draw into their treasuries, new lands, resources, and people to control or conquer, new heathen souls to convert. These recent travelers and their journeys cover several centuries of recorded history, beginning, at least for writers of European documents, as far back as the early decades after Portuguese and Spanish mariners sailed into and across that vast ocean to which they gave the name Pacific. These voyages to the coastal and reef-strewn edges of what became Papua New Guinea,

islands that these sailors, at the end of long journeys, believed to be "the last unknown," continued intermittently and then, in more recent centuries, frequently, until the islands were declared to be spheres of European influence and control. In the last one hundred years, journeys along rivers and over harsh landscapes have become far more frequent than the earlier journeys across the seas surrounding these islands.[7] But Melanesian travelers--workers, police, evangelists, and migrants of Anton's and other generations--have far outnumbered the foreigners. They too have made new discoveries, and have been carriers of new ideas.

The scattering of written records, and the more recent narratives of travel and experiences of villagers and workers, cover only 450 years. They tell much about journeys and the transformations such experiences bred in the travelers. That time span is brief in a country where remains left behind by hunters and gatherers, who rested on their journeys through high valleys at Kosipe, date back 28,000 years.[8] Echoes and glimpses from that very long history of human migration, settlement, and change, which resulted in a great diversity of languages, cultures, and local histories, can be found in rich oral traditions and ceremonies recorded in more recent decades. These sources tell of journeys by culture heroes and heroines and by lineage, clan, and village founders, who while journeying far and bringing new cultures and peoples to life, were also the bearers of significant innovations. They tell, along with the fragments of the past studied by archaeologists, much about an ancient history of trade, and journeys of migration and settlement. Finally, they tell of initiation rituals in which young people journeyed out, often into terror and the unknown, to return enlightened with ancestral knowledge and transformed into mature and productive men and women.

Before returning to the colonial context within which Anton and other modern wanderers journeyed, I will draw briefly on this rich treasury of oral tradition that contains evidence of journeys and transformations from the precolonial era. From these three strands of tradition about journeys--by founders and culture heroes, by migrants and settlers, and initiates--I will consider one example.

* * * *

Many versions of the legend of the culture hero Manarmakeri (the one with the scabby skin) have been recorded. It may have originated in Biak Island, but has been recorded along the coast to both the east and

the west of that island and into the hinterland of Irian Jaya, deep in the Mamberamo River valley.[9] Its main elements can be paraphrased as follows:

> An old man living in a mountain village pursued a pig that he discovered was despoiling his taro garden. He wounded the animal with his spear and followed its trail of blood into the high mountains until he was led into a great cave. There he was confronted with challenging voices and given a glimpse of the spirits of ancestors living the perfect life, Koreri. He was also told some of the ways in which Koreri could be achieved.
>
> He returned to his village, neglected his gardens and himself, and became a scabby-skinned old man (Manarmakeri) who failed to convince his people that he could give them knowledge of a better life. Driven out by their scorn and their lack of concern about changing their ways, he left his mountain village for a beach village.
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> At this village he helped the local chief win a beautiful bride from the cassowary because he was endowed with his new knowledge and power. But once more the scabby old man was rejected by people whom he helped.
>
> From this village of Sopen, Manarmakeri set out on a long sea voyage, sometimes bringing islands and reefs into being with his power, often rejected by villagers when he offered them the new knowledge and life.
>
> At last he settled down on Meokbundi Island. There he became addicted to drinking palm wine, but discovered that he was again a victim of thieving. The thief was caught in his trap and proved to be the Morning Star. To free herself from the withering power of the Sun, she promised the old man anything he desired. His wish was to know more fully how he could achieve Koreri. Morning Star told Manarmakeri that if he threw a special fruit at the breasts of a beautiful maiden, she would bear as her child his son who would be the bringer of true peace.
>
> Once more Manarmakeri faced ridicule and disbelief when the villagers discovered, through the child's revelation, that he was indeed the offspring of the beautiful woman and the scabby old man. In their horror and shame, the villagers abandoned the family and fled with all their possessions to another island a long distance away. Manarmakeri and his small family

> then began to live the Koreri life. The old man burnt off his diseased skin in a bush which he had set on fire. He was transformed into a handsome mature man and his scabby skin and sores became changed by the fire into wealth and decorations. The hero brought his family wealth by simply striking the ground with his walking staff; and so new crops were introduced to this island.
>
> Finally they set out to visit many communities and offer them the Koreri which he had now fully acquired. Each group was tested by Manarmakeri and each ended by failing to recognize what he was offering them. So he journeyed from one rejecting people to another until he penetrated far into the interior along the Mamberamo River. In disgust he finally left the people of Irian Jaya to their old ways and went off to another world in the west.

In the complex cycle of epics from which the main elements of this legend have been extracted, Manarmakeri enacts a widespread and familiar role as a Papua New Guinea culture hero. Like so many others, he is an ambiguous, enigmatic figure with a range of hidden powers; like them he engages in a dangerous journey into the unknown, where he acquires new knowledge and power; like them he journeys from people to people, sometimes bringing landscapes and cultures into being, offering new knowledge and potential, only to be rejected by many until he eventually moves away into another world or life beyond the horizon of human perception. Manarmakeri's offers of a new life and cultural endowments and his exploits during his great journeys were, according to these traditions, for the most part rejected by unenlightened and ungrateful people, but his unfulfilled promise, as well as his knowledge and achievements, was immortalized in many different places. Over the last hundred years these traditions about his vision, achievements, journeys, and promises--partly in response to pressures from Dutch colonizers and Japanese invaders--became changed into ideologies for resistance movements and a form of regional nationalism among the peoples of Biak and the surrounding areas of Irian Jaya.[10]

Although the details of the journeys, transformations, and achievements of heroes like Manarmakeri differ in accordance with the diversity of environments and cultures from which the tellers of these legends came, the basic elements of new knowledge and life that they bring to or offer people on their journeys are similar. Recently the anthropologist Roy Wagner found some important common elements in a group of tra-

ditions about culture heroes (he has called them "Papuan hero tales") that cover the deeds of a wide range of heroes from a large number of cultures in the region. These are Wagner's findings:

> The tradition or series of myths known as "Papuan hero tales" is among the most impressive features reported for the flamboyant coastal cultures lying between the Purari Delta and the Kumbe River in West New Guinea. Many ethnographers dealing with the area have commented on the legends, and a number of texts are available, but it is unlikely that the anthropological literature represents anything but an irregular sampling, geographically as well as textually, of the total complex. . . .
>
> An important feature of these myths is that the hero is generally portrayed as journeying across the known world in some significant way, and that this movement is linked to the major action of the plot; he travels across the sea seeking women and bringing vegetable food, or journeys to the land of the dead, or flees from a pursuing woman with whom he has shamed himself. Landmarks and curious features along his route are often linked to his passage, and at Karamui (in a Highlands version) he is said to have created many of the prominent land forms. . . .

Wagner goes on to trace what he calls "a set of homologous mythic elements" associated with the journeys and achievements of heroes such as Iko-Sido-Hido and Souw.[11]

Only a few examples from this rich treasury of traditions from Papua New Guinea have been explored here. These strands can best be drawn together by pinpointing the main elements in another famous legend, that telling of the achievement of Edai Siabo.

Edai Siabo was the founder, perhaps the "discoverer" of the trading voyages (called *hiri*) between the Motu of Port Moresby and their partners living in villages scattered along the beaches and around river mouths in the Gulf of Papua. He was to discover the knowledge that made the *hiri* possible, with all its positive benefits for Motu and Gulf participants. Many versions of the Edai Siabo legend have been recorded.[12] Their main elements can be summarized as follows:

> Edai Siabo and his clan brothers went out in a fleet of canoes on a fishing expedition. They came from Boera village on the

> south coast near Port Moresby. Few fish were caught and toward the end of the day's work Edai Siabo's canoe became separated from those of his brothers. Suddenly the canoe was overturned and Edai Siabo was held in the strong grip of an underwater monster, which dragged him headfirst into a cave. There he was introduced to a whole new world and taught new knowledge, including that about the making of the many-hulled *lagatoi* canoes and the secrets of the long and hazardous trading voyages that would take their builders and owners annually into the Gulf of Papua to exchange their pots and shells for sago and timber.
>
> His brothers searched in vain for the lost Edai Siabo, only to return home to Boera with a poor catch of fish and the tragic news of his loss at sea. Next day they went out to search again, while mourning for him began. Eventually his upturned canoe was found. They dived near it and found what they thought was their brother's dead body wedged tightly in a deep cave mouth. After a long struggle, his brothers released the body and brought it to the surface; then they brought him home for his funeral rites. Shortly after, Edai Siabo awakened, as if from a sleep or trance, and told his brothers what had happened. He then taught them about *lagatoi* making by using a model of what he had been given under the sea. He also taught them how to make the trading voyages. Thus began the 'voyages of the *hiri.*

A number of journeys are contained in the legend of Edai Siabo. The first is the fishing expedition away from the security of Boera village; the men cross a beach boundary, entering onto the dangerous sea from which they seek food for survival. Edai Siabo's plunge into an underwater cave deep in the sea is a second journey. There he is initiated into the knowledge that transforms him into a culture hero: the making of the *lagatoi* and the secrets of the trading voyages. This journey to the deep is linked with his funeral journey home over the sea, back across the beach to Boera, where he emerges from his death-trance-dream to communicate to his people the new knowledge taught him in the depths of the ocean These journeys then open the way, once *lagatoi* have been built and pots made, for the great annual ocean-going trading voyages of the Motu which link two contrasting environments along the Papuan coast in highly complementary, beneficial, and productive ways. So the kernel of this tradition is contained in the theme of a culture hero

who, through a dangerous and death-like journey across a boundary out into the unknown, acquires significant new knowledge, which he brings back and teaches to his people. At first, the tradition tells us, there is questioning about Edai Siabo's true identity, resistance to knowledge that brings with it the dangerous innovation of sailing through hazardous seas on long voyages, and opposition toward the acceptance of the new crop, sago. Finally he wins his people over and other Motu also accept these innovations. These changes improved their living conditions and, in their turn, they immortalize the hero and his gift of knowledge in legend, song, and institution (the *hiri*).

In winning acceptance from the people for the knowledge he brought back from his journeys, Edai Siabo was unlike a number of the other journeying heroes and heroines of Papua New Guinea. Manarmakeri, for instance, was so consistently misunderstood that he finally left men behind and traveled to the land of spirits in the west. And that, more often than not, was the fate finally of the "Papuan Heroes," those prodigious beings who set the world of ordinary men and women on its ears, but who were shamed into flight.[13]

Even a brief taste of the exploits of these heroes shows their actions, powers, and achievements to be on a different plane from Anton's struggles to improve himself and his people's living standards in the 1940s and 1950s. But is this really the case? Certainly Anton did not slough off his skin, nor take on a fresh identity. As a member of *samas,* the wild taro clan, he claimed ties with his clan brothers. Until recently, the emblem of the wild taro gave clan members their name and identity, and was claimed by them as the totemic spirit who founded the clan. He was not snatched from a boat and taken down into the depths to be taught new and vital knowledge. But for a village youth of no more than thirteen years--a boy with "no beard and no hair on [his] genitals," not yet initiated--to go away to the coast and then over the seas to strange new places like Rabaul and Kavieng was to court death, or at least to venture into an unknown from which he might never return There were many villages, like Moseng, in the Papua and New Guinea of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as in earlier and more recent decades of colonial history, that were remote from the scattered foreign enclave with their puny networks of tracks and sea or river lanes, which barely made an imprint on the huge island landscape. Often youths recruited from these remote settlements did not return, or only briefly many years later when they could hardly be recognized or understood. It could be argued that Anton's departure from his home in Moseng in the 1930s was little different from Edai Siabo's crossing the beach and entering

the sea in his fishing canoe, or his descendants' journeying into the Gulf toward the land of the dead in their cumbersome *lagatoi*. Both Manarmakeri and Edai Siabo did more than this on the journeys by which they were transformed and through which they acquired new knowledge. But the same was indeed true for Anton Misiyaiyai who, like Edai Siabo, reappeared in Moseng almost ten years after leaving; he must then have seemed to his clansmen and fellow villagers to have come back from the land of the dead. Also like Edai Siabo and Manarmakeri, he returned home burning with a vision for a better way of life and seeking to win his people and the *kiaps* to his way. These parallels suggest possible continuities between what the hero traditions teach and reflect of the precolonial societies in which they were formed, and events like Anton's journey and return recorded in colonial times.

What is missing from this pursuit of echoes from the ancient past is a structured and recognizable chronological framework. Is that possible to achieve? In his recent book on the Marquesas, Greg Dening has made an arresting point in reflecting on "history at the edges of culture":

> . . . Claude Levi-Strauss drove a wedge between anthropology and history by imagining that primitive cultures, the object of study of anthropology, are timeless, outside of history in their isolation from the European intruder. Primitive cultures enter time, become the objects of study of history, through the changes that contact made. There is only one way in which this totally other primitive culture can be known and that is by contact--by the anthropologist's contact if he is the first, by all the other intruders' contact if the anthropologist comes late. The totally other is either not known or in the context in which it is known it is changed. Ethnohistory's preoccupation with cultures beyond the European frontier had meant . . . the pursuit of an "ethnographic present" as an imagined moment prior to the impact of intrusion. It is a moment that *historically* has never existed. It is a moment that existed in the past--these cultures had an existence before European intrusion. *Historically* --that part of the past which is knowable because of historical records--there is no "ethnographic present" of traditional societies which is not post-intrusion. . . . Even myths and legends which purport to be about pre-intrusion reality are collected, indeed rendered lifeless, unchanging and permanent, by translation of the living word to paper, a metamorphosis that comes only with the intruder. The *historical* reality of traditional

> societies is locked together for the rest of time with the historical reality of the intruders who saw them, changed them, destroyed them. There *is* no history beyond the frontier, free of the contact that makes it.[14]

What messages are the hero traditions carrying? Only messages from the contexts in which they were recorded or written down by foreign intruders? If that were so, then this could explain why their echoes are heard so clearly in Anton's narrative. My conviction--gained from dialogue with wise Enga informants who taught me their traditions--is otherwise. The conversations took place in their high valleys in the early 1970s when these men were deeply affected by the changes taking place in their lives and societies, changes that had occurred in their fathers' generation as a result of the arrival of foreigners. (The issues they talked about and the ways in which contexts and experiences shaped their memories and testimonies have been explored elsewhere.)[15] The evidence of their culture, the shape and content of the traditions they communicated, and more crucially, the links between elements in their testimony and material remains that can be dated scientifically all point to the fragments these traditions carry from the past; all suggest that, while there "*is* no history beyond the frontier, free of the contact that makes it," all evidence is not simply a total product of that contact. Oral cultures do contain mechanisms enabling evidence from the past to be transmitted down many generations into the particular present when they are recorded to become sources used by historians. Their unraveling, their "decoding" as Vansina would call it, requires sensitivity to the cultures from which they come and specialized interpretative skills, something true to a lesser extent of all historians' work.[16]

Sumsuma and the "Black King"

The historical record offers evidence of many journeys by Melanesians. Markings in a temple in Java, dating the arrival of "Papuan" slaves in its workforce to one thousand years ago, are the oldest surviving evidence of an early diaspora of young Melanesians into a wider world.[17] Later, in the period ushered in by the arrival of the earliest for eign voyagers, myriad other journeys took place. Around 1600, adolescents captured by the Spanish at Mailu were voyaging to Manila or Spain in the ship of Captain Prado.[18] Other Spaniards and captains of other nations in this and later centuries may also have taken New Guinea captives back to Europe on their return voyages, in line with the

practice of bringing home living human proof of their visits to unheard of places. Then, as shipping contacts with the islands grew, a trickle became a tide. By the 1870s, some beach villages, strategically located near major shipping lanes, found a good portion of their youth siphoned off. A few instances are known in detail.

The first comes from the island of Murua (Woodlark)[19] and belongs to the diaspora phase, when Australian colonial influences had not yet begun to close off the area to wider contacts. It is the 1850s, a generation before the first continuous settlement and the beginning of either British or German colonial administration. As part of a rapidly expanding French missionary and political frontier in the Pacific Islands, Marist priests had arrived in 1849 on the beach at Guasopa in the south of Woodlark Island to begin the task of evangelizing the people. They had been led there by advice from whaling captains in Sydney, and were met on the beach by a man (Pako) who had served on whaling ships and spoke some English. Relations between the islanders and the missionaries, as recorded in the writings of these Frenchmen, were touchy and tense. In their arrogance, the missionaries assumed these "heathens" were awaiting enlightenment at their hands. So they were disappointed with the unbending resistance of the Muruans to their teachings. The Muruans also had their minds and energies absorbed in conserving their dwindling resources during a severe year-long famine. In an attempt to shatter the Muruans' stubborn resistance the missionaries took several young men with them on a voyage to Sydney in 1850.

The record of what these young men gained from their journey out into "civilization" shows how shocked the Frenchmen were. The Muruans saw a number of things that fascinated them, but nothing that really impressed upon them the superiority of the lives and culture of the citizens of Sydney, nothing to suggest to them that Europeans had anything better to offer them than what they had received from their ancestors. The missionaries did note some enthusiasm for "building Sydney at Murua." They also recorded that by mid-1852 the metropolis had become "not a town but an entire world." These were the only discernible ripples. The journey by these young Muruans beyond the known horizon into a new and unfamiliar world and their safe return home seems to have brought no real disruption or challenge to their existing village culture.

It is not surprising that the pathway that led the French missionaries to Murua in the 1840s, as well as the previous experiences of Pako, the mediator who met them on the beach, were both products of the whaling industry. American whaling ships out of New England ports began

visiting beach villages in the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago as early as 1799. The number of visits by whaling ships increased in the 1830s and 1840s, SO it is no wonder that the Frenchmen came to Guasopa on this whaling tide, which lasted until the 1880s. That later tide brought Herman Melville into the Pacific and gave birth to his "dream of islands."[20]

Foreign visitors were also greeted by English-speaking men who had worked overseas in the Duke of York and New Ireland Island groups. The first recorded visit by an American whaler to this area took place in October 1799. The pattern was the same as in other islands of the Bismarck Archipelago, with the number of visits increasing in the 1840s. So it was not surprising that traders and missionaries in the 1870s and 1880s were greeted by men who had this overseas experience and could speak English.[21]

At the same time as some young men in the islands around New Guinea were working with whalers and other crews in search of marine products--such as pearl shell and bêche-de-mer--sandalwooders out of Sydney and ports in New England were gathering this timber to exchange for tea in China. The busy period was between the 1830s and 1850s in Melanesia, and in some cases these sandalwood gatherers came into the islands in the Bismarck Archipelago. When they found the wood, they set up camps for treating it, and often young village men gained work experience in these camps, rather than sailing the seas as did those who worked with whalers.[22] Sometime between the 1850s and 1870s, according to one source, young men from New Ireland were taken in ships from their homes right across the Pacific to work saltpeter mines in South America.[23]

From the 1860s, when plantations were being established in Samoa, Fiji, and Queensland, young men from the Loyalty, New Hebrides, and Solomon Islands were recruited as laborers under contract to develop these industries. By the 1890s, when it was effectively outlawed, this labor trade had extended further afield into islands of New Guinea. There has been much written on what used to be called "black birding." One recent study concluded that, throughout a total of fifty years' operation, this trade touched the lives of many young men from the islands. From 1863 to 1914 "about 100,000 islanders went as indentured labourers to Queensland, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia from the New Hebrides, Solomon Islands, Banks and Torres Islands, the Loyalties, the Gilberts and New Guinea and the adjacent islands and archipelagoes"[24] A more recent study of the movement of island laborers into Queensland sugar plantations has shown that between 1863 and 1904 a total of 62,475 laborers were brought from the islands into the cane fields.[25]

During the German period the flow of Chinese, Malay, and Indonesian laborers into New Guinea was matched by an outflow of islanders into German plantations in Samoa and elsewhere in the Pacific, In fact a handful of the survivors of these journeys, exiles from their island homes for at least sixty years, were encountered recently by a Samoan historian. The Germans also had New Guinean police troopers working for them and it has been claimed that some of them may also have served the Germans in East Africa during the Maji Maji rebellion in Tanzania. They certainly were among the German forces that put down rebellions in Ponape between 1908 and 1912.[26] There also developed an expanding network of regional traveling, a feature of the spread and growth of a colonial system and the plantation and mining economies in these islands. From the time of the first mission stations close to the mainland in the 1870s and the first plantations of the 1870s and 1880s, Papuans and New Guineans, in increasingly large numbers, have traveled away from their homes to work for missionaries, be educated by them, or more frequently to work on plantations. If we were to tabulate the journeys away from home taken by villagers over the last century, we would conclude that the most frequent, involving the greatest number of people, were those leading to work in the foreign system and that the routes most often taken were not overseas, but from one part of the island to another. One historian who analyzed the German sources concluded: "At the very least, . . . 85,000 Islanders went as indentured labourers to plantations in German New Guinea in the 30 years 1884 to 1914 from villages within that colony: from northeast New Guinea or "Kaiser Wilhelmsland," from the Bismarck Archipelago, and from the German Solomons. A further 15,000 or more New Guineans worked for the Germans as day labourers."[27]

The whole scale of labor recruitment expanded greatly under the German colonial system. The volume of labor recruitment in German times was not equalled during British rule in their colony nor under the Australians in Papua. But, guided by the annual statistics for laborers under contract in Australian New Guinea (an average of about 32,500 per annum), it would seem that, over twenty years of rule under the League of Nations Mandate, from 1921 to 1942, perhaps a total of 650,000 contracts were made. Again, these young men came from villages in the German and Australian co1onies.[28] So, while the distance covered in the journeys taken by young men away from their home villages may have contracted with the growth of colonial enclaves, this diaspora of Melanesian youth expanded in volume from a trickle to a flood in the century between the 1840s and the Japanese invasion of 1942, and in the years of the Pacific War. Journeys by young laborers far

outnumbered in quantity and certainly outweighed in quality and effects, the journeys made by European foreigners.

The meaning of Anton's journeys, transformations, and struggles is deepened by this context of diaspora, this new pattern of migration, The quality of his visions and achievements can be seen in a clearer light when contrasted with the journeys of another worker, Sumsuma, born a generation earlier. Sumsuma's story--now being pieced together more surely by those investigating his involvement in events in the colonial town of Rabaul in 1929[29]--contains many levels of meaning.

* * * *

Sumsuma was born in Sasa village in the Tanga island group off the east coast of New Ireland around 1903. Sometime during the first two decades of the century Sasa people moved from strategic hamlets scattered in the hills to the beach. This pattern of migration, involving the movement and consolidation of villages, was common in colonial times. When he was around twelve years old, Sumsuma ran away from home because of a dispute with his mother. Like so many of his and Anton's generations, he embarked on his first journey away from home as an adolescent, prior to his initiation. He stowed away on a trading vessel and the captain took him to a plantation in Namatanai on the central west coast of New Ireland. In going to work in Namatanai, Sumsuma followed a path to the outside world taken by Tanga youths for a number of decades. Some had gone to Queensland in the 1880s and whaling vessel logs show that some ships made trading visits to Tanga some decades earlier. Sumsuma served his contract time as a plantation worker and then took on seaman's work, at which he would excel. Within a short time, he became the captain of a coastal vessel and, by the mid-1920s, was the master of one of the vessels owned by Captain F. R. Jolley, who founded his own trading company in 1927 and made Sumsuma the master of his motor schooner.

> By 1929 Sumsuma had an impressive record. He was still only in his late 20s, and although not the only New Guinean boat's captain he was exceptional among them. He was earning £5 a month plus bonuses which raised his pay to around £12 in some months--an astronomical sum for a New Guinean in the 1920s --and by 1927 he had banked at least £70, possibly in the hope of buying a boat of his own in time. . . .[30]

The "strike" of January 1929, in which Sumsuma played so significant a part, has been carefully investigated in a recent study.[31] It was a movement, highly organized and disciplined, in which three thousand indigenous workers and police in Rabaul town left their work places and moved to mission stations outside the town, demanding from their employers a much larger share in the foreign economy in which they labored as the condition for their return to work. There is much debate on the sources of the ideas and organizing principle by which these workers acted. Seamen like Sumsuma and Bohun of Buka were clearly catalysts and organizers, though they won the necessary support of key leaders in the police force. While this peaceful attempt to change the colonial system failed and met with a fierce response from the entrenched white *mastas,* it is significant that seamen played so important a role in applying ideas gathered from a wider world during their sea voyages.

For his part in the events of January 1929, Sumsuma was condemned to serve three years' imprisonment in Aitape and Kavieng. He returned to Sasa in 1932 on completion of his sentence and married a second time, since his first wife had left him while he was in prison. He then vigorously set about working his way back into the life and economy of Boang island. We catch glimpses of his energy and enterprise in a thriving economy in those first few years after his return from prison, and see reflected the same great talents he displayed in reaching so high a position in the colonial economy in the decades before January 1929.

The ethnographer F. L. S. Bell lived among the people of Boang island from April 1933 to February 1934. He noted, in June 1933, less than a year after Sumsuma's return, that this man owned one of the biggest gardens in Boang. This is echoed in villagers' recollections in 1973 of Sumsuma's energetic enterprise forty years before: "He worked hard in his gardens often by lamplight at night, clearing land and planting coconuts. . . ."[32]

Sumsuma's concentrated outlay of work served a dual purpose: he won for himself a prominent place among his fellow villagers in the fierce competition over feasting (recorded in great detail in a report by Bell),[33] and he secured a role as an important participant in the cash economy by investing in coconut planting. He achieved his position of eminence in feasting and exchange shortly after his return in 1932, even though he belonged to a family that had not been very influential in the Boang polity when he ran away to work years before.[34]

His achievements in the cash economy can also be glimpsed from other records. The district officer, on a census and tax patrol in August

1934, noted a shortage of tax funds in Tanga. On Boang he received payments amounting to £37.10.0 from various hamlets. He reported that "The natives of practically all these places were very short of cash and many natives had no money at all. The deportee Sumsuma together with a few other natives eventually financed all those who were short of cash."[35] Sumsuma had by then won for himself a stake in the exchange economy of Boang; but here is evidence that he had money at his disposal from his stake in the colonial cash economy. With it he could protect his fellow villagers from tax demands. In later years he sought to win over the village government officials, the *luluais,* into involving the people in a cooperative venture of coconut planting and copra production.[36] Earlier, in October 1929, while on a visit to Tanga, the administrator had noted the need for adequate trading links between the island and the port of Namatanai in order to encourage the Tanga islanders to engage more fully in copra production.[37]

At that time Sumsuma was in prison, and it seems that these links were not yet in operation in August 1934, since so many Boang villagers could not find the money to pay their taxes. Perhaps Sumsuma's later scheme to organize a cooperative venture was his solution to that problem; and perhaps he was still aiming to have his own trading vessel. His plans were frustrated by the suspicions of government officers against him. During the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, Sumsuma's power and influence continued to rise among his people, so that the *luluais* sought to make him a "king" in the 1940s. When implacable Australian government officers returned to Namatanai at war's end, Sumsuma had once more to face trial and imprisonment at their hands.

On his second return from prison he founded, in 1953, a Copra Marketing Society. It seems his dreams for a place for his people in the cash economy now bore some fruit because this scheme prospered. Tragically, the Society's vessel was lost at sea soon after. Sumsuma, now nearing the end of his life, continued unabated in his search for ways to improve his people's standard of living. The historian of the strike closes his narrative with these words:

> He died of asthma on 20 August 1965, after a lingering illness . . . and he was buried under a plain concrete slab in Filamat (clan) ground near Rambamur village, in inland Boang. Thus there passed to rest a spirit which had ever been turbulent in the cause of the people, one who in life had been aptly nicknamed Tolimlimbur, the Wanderer, for in his time few men, white or black, could match the restless grandeur of his vision. He deserves to be remembered in Papua New Guinea, for he

> saw what others could not see, and he trod a path which only in recent years his countrymen have begun to follow.[38]

Thus he is cast as a hero of Rabaul, 1929. He joins Anton, Manarmakeri, Edai Siabo, and other visionary wanderers who journeyed into the unknown, acquiring new experiences, new knowledge and vision, and who sweated and struggled, in many different ways, to make those dreams into reality.

In the 1930s, the same decade in which Sumsuma was establishing a place for himself as a mature and productive participant in the society and economy of Boang, another wanderer was treading a different path to renewal and innovation. This man would be called the "Black King." The major eyewitness account of the rise of this prophet, Mambu, on the coast north of Madang town comes from the pen of a German Catholic missionary, Reverend George Höltker, who was working in that region. His record has been translated and added to by K. O. L. Burridge, who worked in the area in the early 1950s.[39]

As a young man Mambu returned to the mission station at Bogia after working on contract in Rabaul. A series of strange events unfolded on the station toward the end of 1937 that won him the reputation among the missionaries as a fanatic and a troublemaker. For instance, he engaged in a public outburst of intense prayer and was suspected of being the silent marauder who had once crept close to the bed of a sleeping missionary sister, After these strange happenings at the station, Mambu launched his career as prophet, first in his home village of Apingan. Winning few followers there, he traveled into Tanga villages where he was more readily accepted. There he persuaded people to refuse payment of taxes to government and mission and to make their payments to him, When the resident missionary discovered this, he forced Mambu to return the money to the people. The prophet then moved to more remote villages further inland where he was more easily accepted, The gist of his message, as summarized by Höltker, was as follows:

> At the present time [villagers] were being exploited by white men. But a new order . . . was at hand which was dependent on no longer submitting to white men. . . . The ancestors had the welfare of their offspring very much at heart. Even now some were in . . . the volcano [on] Manam island, manufacturing all kinds of goods for their descendants. Other ancestors, adopting the guise and appearance of white men, were hard at work in the lands where white men lived. [In fact] the ancestors

> had already despatched much cargo to [the people]. Cloth for *laplaps,* axes, khaki shorts, bush-knives, torches, red pigment, and ready-made houses had been on their way for some time. But white men, who had been entrusted with the transport, were removing the labels and substituting their own. In this way [the people] were being robbed of their inheritance. Therefore, [they] were entitled to get back the cargo from white men by the use of force. The time was coming, however, when all such thievery and exploitation would cease. The ancestors would come with cargo for all. A huge harbour would be created in front of his [Mambu's] house in Suaru, and there the ships of the ancestors--laden with cargo--would make fast. When this time came, all work in the gardens should cease. Pigs, gardens--everything--should be destroyed. Otherwise the ancestors--who were going to bring plenty for all--would be angry and withhold the cargo.[40]

Mambu urged the people to refuse to pay taxes. They were to tell the *kiaps* that they had already made this payment to "the Black King" and therefore they could not pay. Neither should they attend mission schools nor go to church. If they disobeyed these orders from the prophet they would be consumed by fire when the new age dawned.

> Mambu used to pray by the graves of the deceased, and he demanded payment for doing so. He introduced a form of baptism which, he said, would give full dispensation in the rights of the new days to come. Men and women in couples--two men or two women, but not a man and a woman--would stand before Mambu, cast off their breech-clouts or grass skirts, and have their genitals sprinkled with water. Mambu said, too, that it was not fitting that [villagers] should wear native apparel. Instead, they should wear European clothes, throw away their breech-clouts and grass skirts and bury them. By doing these things the ancestors would be pleased. And seeing the cast-off breech-clouts and grass skirts, they would say, "Ha! Our children are truly doing well."

These new rituals were presided over by Mambu, who would often use Christian rituals and ritual objects, such as the crucifix, as part of them.

> In some villages Mambu [had small buildings erected]. Nothing is known of the purpose of these buildings, but it is perhaps rel-

> evant that from the top of the conical roof of palm thatch there emerged a small pole to which was affixed a cross and red flag. Mambu said of himself that he could not be wounded, he was immune. He liked to call himself "King long ol Kanaka, the King of all Kanakas," and chose the title "Black King." On a parting his closest associates used the formula "Goodbye King!" Mambu also said that marriage was not for him, and although at the peak of his power he might have taken any woman he fancied there does not seem to be any evidence that he actually did so. Like a priest, he remained celibate. Finally, it is recorded . . . that Mambu once distributed rice and fish as from the ancestors as an earnest of their good intentions.

His preaching and rituals caused much trouble for missionaries and colonial officials. For instance, there was a drop in attendance at schools and churches and much resistance to the *kiaps* and their enclaves. As a result Mambu was imprisoned first in Bogia and then taken in chains to Madang.

When the chained prophet did not return from prison, as he had promised, his followers became disillusioned, and, according to the missionary, the movement had entirely collapsed after about three months. By June 1938 "things had returned to normal." But the anthropologist Burridge, during his fieldwork in the region in the early 1950s, recorded an oral tradition in the making about a most significant journey that Mambu had taken. This was related to him after the people had suffered the effects of the Japanese invasion, the collapse of the colonial system, the bombardment and terror of modern warfare, and the return of their prewar colonial *mastas*--all of which gave them new perspectives on the impermanence of the old colonial system, and opportunities for building new ways of living, questioning their ancestral inheritance, and forming new relationships with foreigners, whether from overseas or from other parts of Papua New Guinea. Here is Burridge's record of the legend of Mambu and his actions and promises from a different perspective than Höltker's account.

> Mambu, say Tangu today, . . . had been working in Rabaul. When he finished his contract he stowed away in a steamer bound for Australia. He was, however, discovered and hauled before the captain of the ship. The captain was very angry with Mambu for stowing away.
>
> He was about to have Mambu thrown overboard lest by

going to Australia he should chance upon the secret of the white man, when Mambu's former employer, his "master" who was on the same ship, intervened and saved him. The same man, an Australian, saw Mambu safely to an Australian port.

Arrived in Australia, Mambu was clothed and fed. His master showed him the sights, gave him rice, spare clothing, beads, knives, canned goods, razor blades--heaps of good things. All this cargo was packed into cases and sent to the quayside for loading. The master's sister, wrote a letter, stuck it into Mambu's hair, and told him to go down to the quay where he would find all his cargo marked with such-and-such a sign. Mambu was to board a certain ship together with his cargo and return to New Guinea. If there was any trouble, or if anyone questioned him, Mambu was to produce the letter.

Mambu boarded his ship. He survived several attempts by the captain to have him thrown overboard, but eventually he reached Bogia. If it had not been for the letter probably he would have been killed.

In Bogia, Mambu claimed that he knew the secret of white men, and that they, being jealous, were preventing Kanakas from obtaining it. Kanakas, said Mambu, should not submit to things. They should be strong and throw the white men out of New Guinea into the sea. And to make themselves strong Kanakas needed money. To this end Mambu travelled around the countryside collecting pennies and shillings. But for doing so Mambu was reported to the administration by a missionary and then gaoled. He was dangerous to white men and might destroy their over-lordship.

When the policemen came to arrest him, Mambu said to them: "You can hit me--never mind! You can maltreat me--never mind! Later, you will understand!"

The policemen were awed, but took him to gaol. That night, though supposedly behind bars, Mambu was seen chewing betel in a nearby village. In some mystical way he had slipped out of his chains. The policemen--who knew of this escape--were too frightened to report the nocturnal excursion--and some informants say that there were several such forays--lest they be accused of neglect of duty. Nevertheless, Mambu could not escape his fate, and he was taken away to Madang. Before he left, however, he prophesied the coming war.

Mambu also performed another kind of "miracle." He pro-

> duced for an informant, who had gone to "try" him, a banker's packet or "stick" of money out of thin air--money, moreover, that was actually used to buy an axe and some beads. He said to my astounded informant: "You do not understand. You are like a child who has yet to learn much. You do not understand the things that I know." Mambu then went on to claim that he was able to get more (money) whenever he wanted to.

* * * *

In telling of Mambu's journeys from the colonial enclave in Rabaul town to the metropolitan center in Sydney, and then his successful return home again to Bogia, the Tangu people were, in the 1950s, lending a two-fold legitimacy to the Black King's revolutionary claims and teachings about a new way of living for them in the 1930s. His journey to the source of wealth meant that Mambu became transformed in the mould of the ancient culture heroes of the region, becoming part of the process by which the people were reshaping and extending these hero traditions in a colonial context in which they were effectively cut off from participating in the wealth and power manifest in the actions and enclaves of the foreigners. Secondly, Mambu's claim that he had journeyed from Rabaul to Sydney, and had survived that journey and the return home, meant that he had seen with his own eyes the secrets and knowledge that foreigners were withholding from the villagers, few of whom could claim to have traveled beyond Madang or Rabaul.

Anton of Moseng spoke of the acute transformation of his perceptions and understanding that took place in the 1930s when he journeyed out into enclaves in New Britain and New Ireland and even into the houses of the foreigners. These transformations of his mind made him receptive to the idea of rice cultivation and marketing as the "new road": "When I came out of the bush I was like a fool. When I saw how the white-men lived my head went around. I saw their houses. When I became a servant I saw inside their houses. I saw their beds and their chairs and tables. Their food and clothes. I thought all these things were good. . . ."[41] The Muruan youths in the 1850s, taken to Sydney town by French missionaries to be exposed to "civilization," were also transformed by this journey into the metropolis, though on their own terms. They resisted the implication that they should embrace the new religion and reject the old, though they did desire to "build Sydney at Murua," and Sydney became for them "not a town but an entire world."

Other wanderers in the diaspora, workers and seamen, from Murua

and other islands in the Louisiade Archipelago, from New Ireland, the Duke of York Islands and others in the Bismarck Archipelago, and elsewhere in Papua New Guinea followed the paths of the "Papuan" slaves into Java and the young Mailuans into Manila, the workers into Chilean mines, as well as the troopers to Ponape and East Africa, and those numerous laborers into plantations in Samoa, Fiji, and Queensland. Few records remain of the return home of these wanderers; fewer of the transformations they underwent through their journeys into foreign and sometimes distant enclaves; or of the ideas, visions, dreams, and plans they brought back from these encounters. Perhaps Mambu became the Black King because he did indeed stow away on a ship from Rabaul to Sydney and back again. Perhaps he did carry a letter back from the enclaves as proof and talisman, just as Anton did. Or perhaps, instead of journeying to Sydney himself, he heard tales of such journeys in Rabaul from seamen.

In this context, it is very important for understanding the life, the struggles, and the achievements of that restless wanderer Sumsuma to note two things: he was a sailor and he lived and worked in the town of Rabaul. Being a sailor on a coastal schooner not only gave him the opportunity to prove himself--on this "ship," this foreign enclave--as a master mariner. It also gave him the mobility and opportunities for coming to know other enclaves and for meeting sailors from elsewhere. Since Rabaul was a port open to shipping from Australia, the Pacific, and from Europe and America, he and his fellow seamen "conspirators" could mix with black seamen from these places even within the confines of this colonial town. In his trial after the strike failed in 1929, he claimed under questioning that he took the idea for organizing concerted action for improved wages from seamen who were from the port of Samarai. They had organized a successful strike in that port a few years earlier. These two experiences, being a seaman and a town worker, came together in Sumsuma's life in 1929.

The journeys and transformations experienced by wanderers moving in and out of colonial towns and, sometimes, metropolitan cities is a major theme running through the final chapter in the long history of the Melanesian diaspora. It is an experience and theme linking the lives and achievements not only of workers like Anton, Mambu, and Sumsuma, but extending into the lives and achievements of prophets and reformers who survived the Pacific War, and it embraces a new generation of migrants on the move in more recent decades. I have chosen two examples from the many experiences that make up this recent history of movement, change, and innovation: the journeys of Yali, a postwar

prophet in Madang and the Rai coast to the south of that town, and the story of "Tali," the alienated, town-dwelling son of a migrant worker, written by a member of the emerging educated elite.

War and Beyond

Recent studies of the Pacific War, fought on the soil of Papua New Guinea between 1942 and 1945, estimate the loss of life at about 200,000, of whom about 50,000 were Papua New Guineans. At least a further 61,000 were forcibly removed from their villages to make way for airstrips, roads, army bases, and installations. At the height of the recruitment of laborers to support the armed forces, nearly 50,000 young men were taken from their homes into military bases and battle zones, to reshape the landscape for modern warfare and carry supplies into battle on nightmare journeys along the Kokoda trail and the Bulldog-Wau track. These carriers sometimes formed stretcher parties to carry wounded and dying soldiers back to safety and they earned the praise and gratitude of these men who transformed them mawkishly into "Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angels." Often these young villagers, drafted into a meaningless and terrifying foreign war, tried to escape back to their homes again, some fleeing all the way through hostile mountain forests, from Kokoda or Bulldog back through swamps and along beaches to their homes in Mekeo or the Gulf. Armed units, manned by Papuans and New Guineans--of whom a substantial proportion had carried the government's rifle as policemen before the Japanese invasion--were assembled to fight special campaigns. In addition, over 3,000 men were in the police force during the war, some of whom also took part in military actions.[42]

Besides all these men absorbed into the Allied war machine, or villagers killed or moved because of battles, there were those who lived under Japanese occupation in New Guinea, whose villages were destroyed, resources swallowed up, or whose men were pressed into serving the invaders. Some, caught by the sudden arrival of Japanese forces, sought to escape to more friendly or familiar places. Here is a record of the adventures of one such Manus islander:

> Choka . . . , the *bosboi* on Lagenda Plantation, Talasea New Britain, assisted in the collection and evacuation of Australians after the fall of Rabaul. Captured in 1943 while working for coastwatchers on New Britain, he was sent to Kavieng to man a schooner fishing for tuna to supply Japanese troops in Rabaul.

> After deserting in Rabaul Choka found more congenial employment cutting firewood and doing odd jobs at a house for geisha girls in Chinatown. Paid five shillings a week in invasion notes which he could sometimes spend in a tradestore, he had a little freedom to wander about town but none to consort with the Japanese and Korean geisha girls. Transferred to a whaleboat crew he helped transport pit-sawn timber from the Duke of York Islands to Rabaul. When bombing became intense he took refuge on Mioko in the Duke of York Islands for four months. Again rounded up by New Guinean police working for the Japanese, Choka dug and cemented air-raid shelters. Joined by other Manus Islanders in another escape attempt, he set up camp in the bush. When the Manus refugees learnt that the Allies had returned to Talasea, they spent a fortnight building a canoe. In spite of Paliau's request that they stay and the Japanese who opened fire on them as they passed Saragai Plantation, they rejoined the Australians in June, 1944. Choka gave the allies one of their few accounts of life in Rabaul with its bombings, brothels and talk of European, Chinese and New Guinean prisoners being bashed and executed.[43]

A fierce and uncompromising sense of independence and desire for survival mark the stories of epic journeys and escapes from battles by men such as Choka. Their struggles and experiences expanded their horizons; fierce journeys of initiation brought them quickly to maturity and radically altered their earlier perceptions of colonial ties. Any assessment of the nature of this holocaust's influence on the recent history of the people of Papua New Guinea must be measured in terms of the journeys, experiences, and transformations of people such as these.

Unlike Sumsuma and his fellow conspirators, who sought entry to the fortress of power, privilege, and caste in order to bargain for a greater share of wealth, men who served in the armed forces were warriors no longer outlawed by colonial authorities but accepted and praised for their skill in this new white man's war--men who broke through the fortress to fight as equals with white men in battles on their own soil. Like the workers who embarked on epic journeys of escape, these soldiers covered a much larger landscape and met and fought beside a much wider variety of strangers and foreigners than was conceivable or possible in the prewar colonial world.

The experience of one famous soldier, William Metpi, who died in Manus in the late 1970s provides more details of the wartime environ-

ment. In 1972 he told his story to Kakah Kais. Nelson has used that personal testimony, along with evidence of his achievements from surviving military records, to piece the following account together--an amalgam of his hopes and achievements, as well as those of other members of the Pacific Islands Regiment. Metpi had been captured by the Japanese when they landed in Rabaul in February 1942, and taken by them with six hundred other New Guinean workers as part of their invasion force to Buna later that year. He escaped behind Japanese lines to join a small Australian guerilla force, proving himself an adept jungle soldier. Drafted into the Papuan and later the New Guinea Infantry Battalion, he traversed large tracts of a hostile landscape in special strike forces (it is claimed that by February 1944 he had a tally of 110 enemy dead to his credit). He led a strike by soldiers in Bisiatabu Camp when they sensed that the return of the old colonial system was robbing them of their dignity and identity (he asserted that "he had been a good soldier, and should have a proper uniform like the Australians and Americans with whom he had fought side by side"). Finally, he was decorated and returned home at the War's end. Nelson writes:

> The accumulated experience of war made Warrant Officer Matpi [an official version of his name], awarded the DSM at a final parade in 1946, a different man from the one that signed his first contract as an indentured labourer and left his home in Lorengau, Manus Island, in 1940. Like the 3,500 others who volunteered for the PIR he had been given opportunities to demonstrate abilities that allowed him to believe that he was equal to other sorts of men in the world. . . . Yet now when old members of the PIR meet what do they choose to remember? . . . As well as remembering the praise and the photographs, they probably also talk about the promises. Some were promises that they made to each other about making a better life for themselves and their home communities after the war; other promises they believed were made to them on many parades. Always there was the suggestion that they fought now for a reward to come; blood and sweat would be paid back with a "good time." But like all the other promises of better uniforms, pay and food they came to little. . . . [44]

It is no wonder that in the turmoil on Manus in the 1940s and 1950s, from which Paliau Maloat and his reform movement would emerge, one of the key "trouble makers" was William Metpi himself. It is in this

context--of shared journeys and triumphs as a new breed of warriors; shared promises and dreams should they live till tomorrow; and shared frustrations, hopes, experiments, and visions of change--that Yali's life assumes some of its meaning. His life history and the shifting context of the series of popular movements into which he was moved on his return from the Pacific War have been detailed by Peter Lawrence. The prime focus here will be on two events in his experience as a serviceman in that War: his journey to Madang from Hollandia in Irian Jaya and a number of journeys to Australia. But first, a brief sketch of his prewar life, particularly as policeman and local reformer-prophet .[45]

* * * *

Yali was born around 1912 in a bush village in Ngaing, inland from the Rai coast, south of Madang. His father was a respected man of knowledge and a warrior. Yali was fully initiated into the Kabu ceremony "but was never properly trained in garden ritual, sorcery, or other similar skills." He left home as a youth to seek work, remaining away for a long period, and so never filled this gap in local education. The mission, government, and plantation enclaves, developed on the coast from German times, were beginning to spread their influence into the hinterland soon after Yali's birth, so that at the close of the 1914-1918 war (which marked the end of German rule) young Ngaing men were being regularly recruited. But his people were not so willing to be drawn into the spreading sphere of the Christian missions. This was largely because the Lutheran evangelists and elders in the region had decided that villagers should renounce the Kabu ceremony and dance as a prerequisite for taking on the new religion. The Ngaing village elders were not prepared to follow such a road.

Journeying away to work in a growing mining enclave put Yali in touch with a whole new network of influences and ideas, One early influence came from workers exiled to the goldfields from Rabaul town. These men expressed their antagonism toward Australian rule and some also spread "cargo" rumors.

> One of [these workers exiled from Rabaul] was Tagarab of Milguk, who for a while cultivated Yali's acquaintance on the grounds that they were both from the same general area and virtually trade friends. Tagarab had a great deal to say about the Rabaul Strike. Although he did not emphasize its religious background, he described the general feeling among the police-

> men and labourers that their European employers were both underpaying them and holding back the cargo sent them by their ancestors. . . .

On his return from this first contract, the young man Yali followed a path taken by many homecoming workers. He became a middleman between the new and the old systems. Sumsuma had become a ship's master, Anton had briefly worked as a plantation *bosboi* after the War, and Mambu seems to have been a mission worker. They were all members of a growing group of young men who went beyond being simply contract workers in plantations, mining, or domestic service. In 1931 Yali himself became a *tultul* (a colonial village official, usually an interpreter). He is remembered as a close ally of the *kiaps* in this work. He accompanied them on a number of patrols, some involving confrontations with cargo cultists and prophets. In another sense he became a mediator and go-between for his people: faced with increasing pressure from Lutheran missionaries, the Ngaing people still resisted their coming; Yali negotiated for the entry of another mission, largely because of what he had heard of their policies while away at the mine in Wau. So, like so many of these men who trod that dangerous middle path as mediators, Yali assisted in the process by which his people were drawn into the sphere of colonial influences, The study of this process and the consequences of decisions taken by such mediators and interpreters is a theme of some importance in the colonial chapter of Papua New Guinea history. Yali bowed to the inevitable in that he persuaded his people to accept the coming of missionaries into their lives. But, these missionaries were permitted access because they had shown that they, unlike the Lutherans, would be tolerant toward the Kabu ceremony and dance.

Yali himself did not become a very active participant in the new religion. He continued his work as a local official until tragedy struck. At the end of 1936 or early 1937 his wife, to whom he was deeply attached, died, This led him to another series of mind-opening journeys and a significant occupation: he decided to become a policeman.

While engaging in this new career, Yali had two kinds of experiences that greatly influenced his later life, First, he learned the power, and the potential for its corruption, that came to those wearing the government's uniform and carrying the government's rifle. He openly divulged to Lawrence in the 1950s a number of instances where this potential was demonstrated, particularly the policeman's power over property and women. The second experience to which Yali was exposed came from the general ferment of ideas and dreams in this region in which

Mambu, transformed into the Black King, was preaching his doctrines of rebellion against the new religion and government taxation, and in which the people generated their own heroic traditions of his journeys in search of wealth and knowledge. Echoes of the cargo rumors and talk that he had heard first from exiled Rabaul workers in Wau were revived in the police force. Some policemen spoke openly of ridding themselves of their Australian rulers as news of the war in Europe spread.

While still serving as a policeman in the new colonial town of Lae (which was being transformed into the colonial capital after the destruction of Rabaul by the 1937 volcanic eruption), he heard more and more predictions of the impending destruction of this town in the coming war. He also became curious about the news he was receiving of cargo movements among the people of Madang. Wanting to see the prophets at work first hand, he took another journey home when granted leave toward the end of 1941. He returned to work in December 1941 in Madang and took part in the arrest of cargo leaders on Karkar. There he heard prophesies that Madang would be bombed. But he had been posted back to Lae by the time of the Japanese raid on Madang.

In the chaos and anarchy that followed the bombing and swift occupation of colonial towns like Madang and Lae on the north coast, Yali emerged as a highly skilled leader and organizer, helping workers to return home in an orderly and safe way. He now launched into his series of war journeys and exploits, from which he emerged a new man and a hero in the eyes of Madang people. These included visits to metropolitan cities and towns. First he fled from the captured capital to Finschhafen along with a small police party. From there he traveled to a number of trouble spots in the Bismarck Archipelago. After courageous exploits with coastwatchers he was promoted and sent to Brisbane for special training in jungle combat.

> In Brisbane and Cairns, Yali saw things which he had never before even imagined; the wide streets lined with great buildings, and crawling with motor vehicles and pedestrians; huge bridges built of steel; endless miles of motor road; and whole stretches of country carrying innumerable livestock or planted with sugar cane and other crops. He was taken on visits to a sugar mill, where he saw the cane processed, and a brewery. He listened to the descriptions of other natives who saw factories where meat and fish were tinned. Again, he suddenly became more aware of those facets of European culture he had already

> experienced in New Guinea: the emphasis on cleanliness and hygiene; the houses in well-kept gardens neatly ordered along the streets; and the care with which the houses were furnished, and decorated with pictures on the walls and vases of flowers on the tables. In comparison, his own native culture . . . seemed ridiculous and contemptible. He was ashamed. But one thing he realized: whatever the ultimate secret of all this wealth . . . the Europeans had to work and organize their labour supply to obtain it. . . .

Here were echoes of the experiences of Anton of Moseng when he "first came out of the bush." Yali then resigned and took on a new occupation in the Australian Army as a member of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (A.I.B.). In this new life he achieved great distinction and heard those promises about a better life that were to ring true in the ears of so Imany Papua New Guinean servicemen. When they returned home to their villages, their minds and hearts were filled with visions and hopes for improvement.

Around June 1943 Yali and his close associate, Captain G. C. Harris, returned to New Guinea and worked in a number of posts. Later that year they went back to Queensland for more training. Yali also trained other New Guineans for A.I.B. and was made a Sergeant Major. A new strategy was drawn up by which attacks would be launched by a special commando force in Hollandia, the capital of Dutch New Guinea. They would be preceded by the landing of a special coastwatching force near Hollandia. It would be made up of twelve men: Harris in command, Yali the senior New Guinean N.C.O., plus six other Europeans, three New Guinean soldiers, and an Indonesian interpreter. Late in March 1944, they were landed from an American submarine but walked into a Japanese ambush after losing much of their equipment in the heavy surf. Harris and four others were killed. Three Europeans, the Indonesian and the three New Guinean soldiers, including Yali, escaped. He would later recall his journey with one of these soldiers for Lawrence.

> When it was obvious that further resistance was useless, Yali and Buka [a Manus soldier] got away from the battle into the jungle. They had neither food nor matches. Buka was unarmed, but Yali had a carbine and about fifty rounds of ammunition, a bayonet and a compass, in the use of which he claims to have been proficient. Both had wristwatches and could tell the time. With these slender resources, Yali managed to return

> from Hollandia to Vanimo and then Aitape by an inland route, arriving after the landing of the main American forces. Buka failed to reach Allied lines. He became very ill . . . and although Yali supported him to the end, he was lost somewhere in the hinterland of Vanimo. Yali's escape was, and still is, regarded as one of the native epics of the war in New Guinea. It won him great respect among European troops at the time and . . . had an even more significant effect on the natives of the southern Madang District. The distance of the journey was about a hundred and twenty miles, and the time spent in the bush about three months. Yali and Buka existed on the hearts of black palms, bush fruits, any vegetables they could find in gardens, and the few animals they were able to shoot. At one stage, they came upon a Japanese outpost under bombardment by Allied aircraft. They made use of the temporary absence of the Japanese in their slit trenches to rob a house of matches, taro, and other necessities.
>
> Yali appears to have reached Aitape about June or July 1944. After reporting to A.N.G.A.U., he was sent at once to Finschhafen. . . .

In Finschhafen he made a detailed report of his experiences and recuperated in the hospital for two months, Then followed another journey to Brisbane where he learned more about life in the metropolis, visiting in particular the museum where he saw and reflected upon collections of artifacts from Papua New Guinea. In February 1945 he took another journey, this time to Sydney. Here he was shown over the Harbour Bridge, an aircraft repair shop, and the Burns Philip stores and warehouses. Then came a posting to New Britain, followed by a few months' home leave and service in Madang, Lae, and Nadzab. His war service came to an end in November 1945.

Long after the journey from Hollandia to Aitape his experiences were to haunt Yali. His account to Lawrence of two very important episodes in that journey helps explain why he believed that he survived while Buka perished.

> On the journey they slept each night under a shelter of boughs. . . . [Their] only food was what they could find in the bush, until one day they came upon an opened tin of fish by the road. Yali's first reaction was that it was a Japanese booby trap and that the fish had been poisoned. But, as there were no foot-

prints nearby, he decided to try it. Buka, who was a practicing Catholic, tried to dissuade him, saying that Satan had put the tin there to deceive them. But Yali risked drinking the fluid from the top of the tin, and, as he found it palatable and suffered no ill effects, they both shared the fish. 'Iwo days later, as both of them were still quite well, Buka decided that God had put the tin there to help them.

Some time afterwards they saw a man. Thinking he was a Japanese they ran off but the man did not follow. Yali claims that he vanished and that all they could see was a dog. That night Buka said he saw a man who appeared to turn into a cassowary. He had the same experience the following night also. At first they were mystified but later interpreted what they had seen as the spirit of one of their companions killed at Hollandia, who had followed them to see how they were faring on their journey.

Then occurred the most important episode of the whole adventure. Yali and Buka found a crocodile. Buka at once wanted to shoot it for food. Yali, however, remarked that it was odd that there should be a crocodile in the bush with no river nearby. It was probably, he said, a local deity and they had better respect it as such. Buka replied: "Let us think only of God. This is meat. You and I must not think about local deities." Yali gave in. Buka shot the beast in the head and then Yali shot it through the heart. They had cut up the animal and were making a fire to cook the meat when, Yali claims, it became quite dark. They could no longer see each other. Then wild pig, wallabies, cassowaries, possums, and other animals surrounded them, and bared their teeth as if to attack and kill them.

When at last the sun rose, they packed up the crocodile meat --although neither of them had dared to eat any--and went on, walking all day. But at sundown they came back to the same shelter in which they had spent the last terrifying night. They did the same thing next day, and now Yali was convinced that the crocodile had been in reality a local deity. They threw the meat away. Yali reproved Buka for thinking only of God and having no respect for the local deities, and Buka became very frightened. Thereafter things went from bad to worse. Buka, now positive that the local deities would kill him for shooting the crocodile, became so ill that Yali had to carry him. They staggered on for several days and by this time were in the

> hinterland of Vanimo. They heard the sound of shooting nearby and Yali, in the hope that Allied forces might 'be in the area, left Buka under a tree and went off to get help, marking the trees so that he would know the way to return. He met some retreating Japanese and immediately ran away. But he avoided going back at once to the place where he had left Buka because he did not want the Japanese to follow and capture him. Later, when he judged it safe, he went back to look for Buka but he had disappeared. He searched everywhere but could not find him and at last was forced to give up. He then made his way to Vanimo and finally Aitape. Subsequently he concluded that the local deities had devoured or carried off his companion as punishment for having insisted on the shooting of the crocodile, one of their number. He himself had been saved not by his wits or physical endurance but because, although he was not entirely blameless, he had shown some respect for the old religion. . . .[46]

Yali's nightmare journey from Hollandia, his encounter with the mysterious crocodile, and the loss of his wounded and fearful companion Buka all echo the hero traditions. Similarly, Manarmakeri, the old scabby man, pursued the marauding pig he had wounded and thus journeyed out of the ordered existence of his settlement into dangerous mountain passes to come in the end upon the cave where the secrets of Koreri were revealed by ancestor spirits. Edai Siabo, seized by a *dirava* sea spirit, was dragged down into an underwater cave where the secret and beneficial knowledge of *hiri* and *lagatoi* were communicated to him. The echoes are not simply there in the telling, in the discourse and narrative by which Yali communicated his remembrance to Lawrence. News of his return from Hollandia spread through communities in Madang and the Rai Coast, which were being torn by the turmoil of the Japanese occupation and were already receptive to the dreams and promises of the return of their ancestors with the secret knowledge that would open the *rot bilong kago* for their people. At war's end, when he returned home with his great fame, he was seen as a ghost who had journeyed out of the land of the dead, as a prophet and reformer who could help the people improve their lives, and as a culture hero, returned to open the way, In his own mind, he emerged from a journey in which Buka had succumbed to the power of hostile spirits and powers, but he had survived their onslaughts. He returned at once deepened in his faith in the ancestral heritage, yet committed to build a

new world in the image of what he had seen and heard in the foreign cities. He drew memories and perceptions together into a program for reform and renewal.

Just as Sumsuma sought reform in the colonial town and then in the rural village, so Yali sought a marriage between a vision gained in his journey through the forests and his journeys to colonial towns and Australian cities. These two men belong to two generations of wanderers, caught up in the Melanesian diaspora and the holocaust of the Pacific War, which left memories and deep scars on Yali and his generation of soldiers, reformers, and prophets. The experience of the Pacific War is what separates these two generations. The new generation, born generally after the end of the war, but inheriting ideas and dreams from Sumsuma's and Yali's struggles, was marked by urban migrations and entered into a new age of independence and nationhood after September 1975. Much research has gone into the study of this new phase in journeys and migrations into towns and cities, and it confirms the impression that this is perhaps the largest migration in the history of the people of Papua New Guinea. Though a large portion of a population that has expanded in size in the thirty years from 1945 to 1975 still lives in villages and still gains a living from those ancient arts of agriculture developed so long ago, the movement to cities and the impact and spread of ideas and dreams coming from the cities already are shaping new societies.

Tali and the Migrants

Papua New Guinea is not alone in this new diaspora; just as its people were not alone drawn into colonial spheres in the 1880s, nor alone invaded by a new imperial force from Japan in the 1940s. Port Moresby, Panguna, Lae, and Mount Hagen on a smaller scale join other cities in the Third World such as Calcutta, Tokyo, Djakarta, and São Paulo growing apace and draining manpower and resources from villages in the countryside. The focus here, in this most recent phase of journeys and transformations, is a modern narrative that pictures the life and struggles of the son of a town migrant--a story that is itself an image of the people of Papua New Guinea.

A vignette from a study of Mount Hagen migrants in Port Moresby captures something of the urban migrant's struggle. The writer is Marilyn Strathern; the book is called *No Money on Our Skins: Hagen Migrants in Port Moresby.* Her opening words are pertinent: "Hagen migrants say they come to Port Moresby to make money; some go home

with small amounts; others stay because they cannot save enough: 'We have no money on our skins.' This is how they explain it. In fact people migrate to town for many reasons and many things about urban life hold them there. . . ."[47] She notes that one of her purposes in using this title for her study was to record and analyze what the migrants had to say about their experiences. The book is rich in migrants' testimonies.

Some songs which she recorded capture the ideas and dreams of the mountain dwellers who have undertaken long and dangerous journeys out of their valleys down to the major city on the seaboard.

> As I climb up on the big plane's back
> I forget my elder brother
> As we cross the river Wahgi
> I forget my younger brother.
> My brother, he said no to me,
> I would not listen to him.
> I went against his will and so
> I'll stay and see it through here.[48]

Men such as the singer of this song are full of thoughts of the world they are leaving behind and of fears that perhaps the city will have so strong a pull that they may become permanent exiles. They also give hints of the ties of kinship, emotion, and loyalty binding the migrants into larger networks, so that in some ways, with modern communications systems at work, the village is extended out by its sons going into the city. Those tics and networks were much harder to build and maintain in the earlier colonial phase because the landscape proved so difficult to bridge: it was by foot or by canoe and schooner that links between villages and enclaves were maintained.

These enigmas, lures, and tensions resulting from migration to towns are caught in a tragic light in the story called "Tali," written by Jim Baital.[49] There is much sociological and economic evidence and some testimonies available on urban migration, which show how close to reality this story is.[50] The writer's own life provided a rich context which germinated this story. He was born in February 1949 into a large Finschhafen family. Like many of his generation he grew up in a foreign enclave. His father was *nambawan bosboi* on the Lutheran mission plantation where Baital grew up. Being a man in the middle, his father believed that his children should have as many opportunities as possible in the newly emerging postwar society. So his son went to local Lutheran schools and then traveled to Rabaul where he received an education

in the Australian syllabus at Gaulim College. In 1965 he was chosen to travel on a scholarship to a Lutheran College in Australia, an overseas journey echoing an ancient and varied history of voyaging, Baital and his generation of young scholars went to the metropolis along a network of mission pathways out from their enclave in search of learning and knowledge with which to build a new nation, He returned from Australia three years later to complete his schooling in the Lutheran High School at Asaroka in the Highlands. In 1969 he returned to the coast and began studies for the ministry at Martin Luther Seminary in Lae. After his graduation he moved with his wife to Port Moresby, where he wrote this tale.

The story of Tali opens in Port Moresby when the hero was a youth of about sixteen. His father was being paid off as a house servant by the Australian family that had employed him for a number of years because they were returning to Australia at the end of their term of colonial service. The father had left his village on Siassi Island when he was a youth and had lived and worked on the edge of expatriate and town communities ever since. Now he felt that it was time for him and his family to return home. Once the formalities of receiving gifts and saying farewell to his employer were over, he set off with his family on the first stage of their own homeward journey.

They arrived first in the town of Lae where they were complete strangers, but there Kanek, the father, set out to find *wantoks* (people from the same village or cultural region) from Siassi who would assist and guide him on his journey. Soon he met a long-lost clan brother from his village and they were reconciled to each other in a tearful and beery reunion. Through this man's help the family found itself on a boat bound for home.

Their reception in their village, after so long an absence, was cool at first and then quite ambiguous. Kanek, as a man of the city who had lived for many years in the white man's world, was received as a bearer of new wealth and knowledge, but the basis for his place in the village society and economy was uncertain since he had never cultivated gardens as a mature man. To the young people, Tali was most attractive, with his shining white teeth and smart city clothes; yet he was uncertain about his people's customs or whether he was outside the powers of their law.

A crisis soon grew around Tali. He seduced or was seduced by a village girl, who warned him too late that she was his clan sister. News of their liaison broke over the village like a thunderclap: Tali's parents were publicly shamed, he was rejected by his father, and a curse fell

upon him for his incest. Because Kanek still had no firm base in the economy and had rejected Tali, he did not attempt to lift the curse by organizing a feast of reconciliation between his family and the aggrieved family of the girl.

Tali fled to town, acquiring the ways of the modern world at a high school in Rabaul. His life away from home and parents in Siassi was torn by dreams and visions about what he had left behind. He did well in this new life, succeeded in his studies, and was offered a career in business. He shunned these offers and possibilities to take up instead a career in the Army as an ordinary soldier. His decision to seek this life, and possibly death, was confirmed by the successive shocks of hearing of the deaths of his father and mother in Siassi.

Tali did well in this career, even becoming a decorated hero because of his bravery in a campaign inside New Guinea against secessionist forces. He also found a wife in Port Moresby where he was stationed and launched into family life. When his term of service came to an end Tali decided to retrace his father's journey and return to make his own way on Siassi. The first journey through Lae to Siassi was repeated but disaster awaited Tali there.

The curse against him had not been lifted because his parents were no longer there to bring peace. His attempts to find a place and to cultivate land were firmly resisted by the unbending villagers. Because he could not provide for them, tensions mounted between Tali, his wife, and child until she finally escaped to her people's home in the city. The last glimpse we catch of Tali, that young man so full of promise, is of him stumbling through the village in a lonely and abandoned state of madness, homeless at home.[51]

* * * *

The tragic picture of Tali's end, homeless on Siassi, is not only a contemporary portrait of the fate of those wanderers who lose their roots by a too easy movement across the gulf between two worlds of village and city; it may also be a moving commentary by a writer of a new generation on the course and character of innovation and change in the ancient and more recent history of Papua New Guinea.

These explorations into journeys and transformations have now run full circle, for Kanek and Tali together bridge Anton of Moseng's generation. The stark contrasts between Anton's vision of some hope and Baital's portrait of the disintegration of dreams and promise point up the truism that there is not one pattern appropriate to one particular

generation or context of these journeys and struggles. In fact in this, the final generation before the achievement of political independence, the experiences chosen catch some sense of the great varieties and contrasts at work among the many wanderers making up the full tide of this Melanesian diaspora. The landscape, scope, frequency, and framework of journeys undertaken by Kanek and Tali, Anton, the urban migrants, and the wartime workers and soldiers like William Metpi and Yali, are all larger than those of earlier generations of wanderers like the Rabaul workers. In that earlier stage of the growth of colonial rule and control in two separate colonies on each side of the Central Highlands valleys, mobility was severely defined and restricted by the colonial authorities. That definition and those restrictions were products of financial shortages, colonial perceptions and policies, and the resulting difficulties in building anything but primitive infrastructures and transportation systems in what was seen as a harsh landscape. Only exceptional men in exceptional circumstances--such as seamen who met sailors from across the borders or on international ships, or who themselves went to other ports (men like Sumsuma); or those who went with prospectors beyond the boundaries of colonial control; or sought new lands and fame with explorers--ventured beyond these severe limitations on mobility in the early colonial age. Most workers,, within the plantation and mining economy or mission and government enterprises, followed familiar and defined pathways and sea lanes between regions. The original journeys and careers of Sumsuma, Mambu, and before the Pacific War, of Anton and Yali, followed these patterns--they went out of their home regions to serve in more "developed" enclaves around Rabaul, Samarai, or elsewhere.

The Pacific War shattered these familiar, limited patterns and pathways. During the war and in the new postwar world men could, on the whole, journey more freely in search of work, cross boundaries between colonial territories, and penetrate into situations of work and living that brought them closer to the centers of power and wealth in the enclaves. And not only was there opportunity for wider mobility; equally significant was the growth in opportunity in terms of the volume and number of participants in the diaspora.

Finally the writer Baital, in his particular creation, "Tali," expresses another contrast growing out of the thirty short years from 1945 to 1975, a contrast marked in the difference of opportunity for Kanek and Tali; or in that between Sumsuma and his son, a graduate from the University of Papua New Guinea.; or between the father of Jim Baital, a *nambawan bosboi* on a mission plantation and church elder, and the

writer himself, the product of an Australian high school and a graduate from a Seminary: that is, the increased opportunity available in a new postwar colonial system and economy for young people to embark on new forms of initiation, journeying, and education that were not permitted to their fathers and prewar generations.

"Tools . . . to Change Your Minds With"

James Chalmers, that missionary, tireless traveler, and bringer of the "good news" to many villages on the south coast, entered the villages of the Gulf of Papua through the *hiri* trading voyages, traveling out of Port Moresby to the northwest on a Motu *lagatoi.* He was a new Edai Siabo, not for the Motu, but for the Gulf people. From the 1870s *lagatoi* crews brought proof of the presence of the new strangers--residing in what grew later from a mission station to a colonial headquarters and town--and they also carried news of the new men and their teachings to their *hiri* partners in the Gulf beach villages. Then Chalmers himself set sail in the *hiri* expedition of October 1883. He landed, made friends, and spoke of peace; building on existing friendships he walked along the Orokolo beaches visiting new places and people.[52]

In the ferment of talk and rumor that preceded (and accompanied) his coming, Koete Lorou, an elder and wise man of the Iokea people living on the eastern rim of the Gulf, had a dream that would give legitimacy to this new stranger and open pathways for his peaceful reception and a hearing for his teachings. A record of Koete Lorou's dream was made by a missionary several decades later, as it was becoming transformed into oral tradition and charter:

> Long ago, a man dreamed about a white man, In that dream a man said to him, sometime you will be watching on the beach and a man will come to you. He will bring you good tools to use for the garden and to change your minds with. His skin will be different from yours. . . . Then in the morning, he got up from the bed and told the Eravo people about his dream. The man's name was Koete Lorou. The first one came to our village, we called his name Tamate. . . . At that time Iokea was very dark. Then they saw him and some of them said to one another, this is not a true man, he is the spirit of a dead body. Then Koete said to these people, no this is the man I dreamed before. So that man made a good friend to Mr. Tamate. Then another day he went to the village and gave a present to the Iokea people and

> made them happy and they followed him. . . . Many of them had gone away to fight up the Miaru river so that when Tamate arrived in Iokea and the people saw him they were afraid and talked about him among themselves. Then Koete sent his cousin to tell the fighting men to come back from the fight. These fighting men asked him what kind of man is that. He said to them his hair is like a cloud, his body is very red and white, and he has a sharp nose. He is a very kind looking man, so they . . . threw their fighting tools, bows and arrows and spears in the water. They came without these things and until today, there has been no big fight.[53]

This dream and its consequences show a subtle but very real fusion and continuity of the ancient traditions of the journeys of culture heroes and those more recent ones undertaken by foreigners, strangers, and wanderers. In the dream Chalmers became transformed into a "Papuan culture hero"--in this instance and in this region, called Iko, rather than Sido, Hido, or Souw. In the context of the dreams and beliefs of the Iokea people, this tradition told that the spirits of ancestors foretold the coming of this new Iko (Chalmers) who would not bring new crops, or fashion new segments of the landscape, but would come bearing "good tools." Speaking with a wise man in his dreams was the normal way in which the spirits would communicate with the people and prepare them to meet new challenges. When they heard of the dream, the people used its messages as a basis for their diplomatic actions toward the stranger. That gave Chalmers entry to their village and lives, as a stranger bearing these gifts.

This is not a case of simple continuity, but of fusion between old and new. The spirits told Koete Lorou that the stranger would not come only as a culture hero. When he had been received by the people in a peaceful way on their neutral beach, they then communicated with their warriors waging war on people up the Miaru river. And they spoke of him in particular ways, again through a man close to the dreamer, Koete Lorou's cousin: "He said to them his hair is like a cloud, his body is very red and white, and he has a sharp nose. . . ." Clearly the consequences that followed their reception of this new culture hero, both stranger and man--the end of war, his bringing of messages of peace, and these "good tools"--represented their emergence out of a time in which "Iokea was very dark" into a new age. So this tradition and the dream that was so central to the people's relations with Chalmers rang with promises of a new age into which he would usher them.

But this dream about Iko-become-Chalmers is not just an instance of continuity between old traditions and new journeys and of fusion between the people's perceptions and beliefs and the promise of new things to come. It is more. The tradition reveals that Chalmers was received because the dream and dreamer communicated that he was a bearer of "good tools" and promises. Chalmers as hero, stranger, and person was legitimated by the dream. The key figure is not Chalmers, the bringer and missionary, but Koete Lorou, the dreamer. It was; to Koete Lorou that the messages from ancestral spirits, which would legitimate Chalmers, were communicated in the dream. Koete's dream and his speaking of it to the elders and wise men, "the Eravo people," opened the way for the people to receive this stranger and his gifts and to listen to messages that would "change their minds." It was also through the dream and a discussion of its meaning that the warriors accepted Chalmers and "threw their fighting tools, bows and arrows and spears in the water" and entered a path of peace. A key issue, caught in this narrative, was whether the people in the beach village, and their warriors inland on the frontier, would accept the stranger, his gifts, and messages, or not, once they had been told of the dream and interpreted it.

The dream of Koete Lorou, and its communication and effects upon these events at Iokea in 1883, all belong to that phase where precolonial history flowed into the beginnings of the colonial era. It is easy, from the vantage point of the Iokea people, to see the continuities between the arrival of this stranger, James Chalmers--in the wake of the *lagatoi* of their Motu *hiri* partners from the east--and his crossing of their beach with "good tools" and the "good news," and the ancient journeys and arrivals from the west of Iko and other culture heroes, heroines, and founders. For them 1883 was a border region from which they could observe eddies and tides flowing into their beaches from both ancient and more recent sources.

In the 1980s we stand at another vantage point of history: a border region, or perhaps a "beach" between the ebb tide of the colonial age and the inflows of the currents of the age of independence. We have considered a number of journeys stretching back beyond 450 years of written records, well beyond the limits of human memory (which has a structured tenacity in oral cultures like those of Papua New Guinea), into those times from which durable fragments of human life and economy need the scientific and imaginative skills of archaeologists, botanists, geomorphologists, and others to decipher. The few journeys upon which we have focused are a small part of a much larger body of evi-

dence. It is time now to look across this variety and to draw some threads together.

Three common elements show the significance of these journeys and the transformations which came from them. First, all of these journeys demanded feats of endurance of their protagonists. Hardship and danger were common to them all, But the protagonists did not simply endure physical hardships. Challenges and decisions that touched their moral being also had to be faced. Those who endured these experiences and underwent the challenge grew in knowledge about themselves and the new world through which they journeyed. In the cases of Edai Siabo, Manarmakeri, and, more recently, Sumsuma, Anton, and Yali, their endurance and journeying opened for them the way to new and deeper knowledge and wisdom, which so captivated them that they wished to transform others by implanting in them the vision of a new life.

Second, these protagonists ventured out beyond the known horizon into a world unknown by their fellows--down into the depths of the sea, through unknown landscapes into a cavern, into the foreigners' enclaves and towns. No wonder such journeys were so often conceived of as a kind of death, burial, or initiation. In that new world, when they had survived their journey, they had to encounter, embrace, or do battle with ambiguous and powerful forces by which they were in danger of being destroyed. (Yali's return from Hollandia is an instance which springs to mind.) Survival from these encounters and the encounters themselves transformed the minds of the protagonists, so that they no longer saw the world in the same way as their fellows and were restless to bring about changes in conformity with their new vision. The powers they encountered and the knowledge they acquired on their journeys were always ambiguous, having in them potential for good and ill.

These first two elements relate directly to the process of journeying away, out from their homes; the return home is the third. Some survived and were remembered as being transformed only because they returned home again bringing with them new ideas, new insights, new knowledge and wisdom, and a will to change the existing order. So the return home was an essential ingredient in the remembrance and recording of these transforming journeys. It opened the way for survivors to tell of their experiences and in so doing to communicate their message of change, their challenge to build a new life. Some societies adapted existing initiation rites or developed new institutions to absorb and contain the young men, their ideas, wealth, and restlessness as they re-

turned home.[54] For these reasons these journeys, and the transforma, tions coming from them, are an integral, perhaps a central part of the historical experience of the people of Papua New Guinea. There are a number of ways in which their significance can be explored further.

The sources through which these themes about journeys and transformations have been explored are themselves to be taken as examples of deeply rooted and widespread ideas and movements in this region's history. Since they are typical, they lead to the following conclusions.

First, they express perceptions and ideas about innovation and change and the possibilities for radical transformations of the existing order of society and the world. Culture heroes and heroines are remembered as shaping a new landscape, bringing new crops, techniques, institutions, or culture from a world outside. Foreign visitors are also remembered as coming from a world beyond the horizon, opening the pathways for change, "breaking through the forests for us," or bringing new tools, ideas, or sources of wealth and power from that distant and strange world outside, and sometimes they are revered for that: "'Yes, do praise them," says the refrain in one song from the Enga.[55] It is their coming from outside and their bringing of new ways that is immortalized, and so they fit the mould of and become transformed into new culture heroes just as Chalmers was transformed into Iko. Immigrant founders are also often foreigners, or people who come from outside and then begin the founding of a new community, whose present survivors recall their links of descent back to them and their coming from outside. Young workers or initiates leave the security of their homes and come back as men with new ideas, new forms of wealth, new challenges to change. All these point to remembrance, perceptions, and attitudes that show that new directions in the people's history, new beginnings, and significant endowments in their heritage have very often come from outside sources, carried in by heroes, those who have journeyed from another world, a different environment. The people thus perceive the sources of change as being not necessarily local invention, but innovation through borrowing or adoption" Tradition may be a true reflection of history in that cultures, crops, technology, languages, and people of Papua New Guinea may frequently have been the products of immigrations from outside, which have then undergone local adaptations.

A second conclusion centers around the nature of these journeys, particularly those by foreigners, or their local intermediaries, taken in recent times. Records and memory say they were undertaken with the simplest of technological aids, relying largely on the strength and endurance of men's legs and backs, and undertaken at the cost of great

effort, in the face of a most challenging and difficult environment. (Again, Yali's trek springs readily to mind,) Over the last century at least, when foreigners committed themselves to the task of conquering this environment, of opening and traveling along pathways into the hamlets and minds of the people, this colonizing process was gradual and extremely uneven. This means that, for good or ill, until the decades following the Pacific War with its consequent influx of new technology, the process and pace of diffusion has had this character, a character shaped by the limitations of human motor power over a rugged landscape. In a country so rich in traditions about the exploits and travels of ancient culture heroes, more recent travelers, again bringing new ways, have also succumbed to the power of the landscape and moved very gradually on their "epic journeys" into and across this land. Only in the last three decades, when funds, men, and technological improvements in transportation and communications were more readily available to them, did the pace of diffusion and journeying increase.

The tyranny of this landscape has colored men's perceptions of change and possibilities for innovation, as well as dominated the processes by which changes have been diffused into the peoples lives. But the "tyranny of distance" (to use Blainey's apt image)[56] created by the location of these, islands away from sources of change in other parts of the world, as well as the local distance between villages and pockets of modern change within the islands, have been potent factors in shaping recent history. This distance and these barriers, which required men to go on difficult journeys in order to discover the sources of change, were not simply facts of physical landscape--though that should never be minimized. The implanting of mutually suspicious and distant British and German systems along the coastal fringe from the 1880s was hardened by the succession of two separate Australian systems early this century in those two places, thus creating two new distancing factors: limitations within this region on the spheres of movement and the degree and framework of mobility allowed to the people; and gradual closure of the islands to world influences other than those mediated by Australians or originating from Australia.

This has bred two significant consequences for recent history. If the foreigners are seen as bringers of crates containing the implements of new ideas and techniques (which could be called "modernization") then the landscape over which these boxes were carried (generally on the backs of villagers), the distance from sources of modernization, and the restrictions placed by colonial laws on what could be imported from outside--all these meant that crates of a special character were brought

into the villages by these recent travelers and those who went with them. Some of their most obvious contents would be: steel axes, spades, and bush knives suitable for road building and cultivating and clearing plantations rather than intermediate technology suitable for improved housing and living standards in villages;[57] forms of labor and resource management, patterns of work fitted for the work force in plantations and mining economies rather than for local economic management and resource development; institutions off police rule, "pacification" and "law and order" (what Lord Hailey dubbed as being "no more than a benevolent and well-regulated type of police rule")[58] rather than institutions allowing adaptation and change in local political systems or the sharing of power or negotiation between local and central structures.

Anton of Moseng, exiled from his Sepik home by the Pacific War, acquired from Japanese peasants turned soldiers a new form of agricultural production: rice growing. In his ensuing struggles he added to this the organizational knowledge of financial management and marketing. These he gained by his tenacity and firm belief in the viability of this new way. He gained that knowledge from men in the colonial enclave, who were willing to share this with him in a time of questioning and turmoil, when the fortress of caste had been shattered. The tenacity and daring of Anton was an exception in the flow of knowledge in the colonial period and before. Dorothy Shineberg has shown that, even in early trading relations between sandalwooders and Melanesian islanders, before the net of caste barriers had fallen to delineate and proscribe the flow of communications and ideas between colonizers and colonized, there was already a severe limitation on the Western knowledge and skills that passed to islanders in trade. Metal tools, the shift from "stone to steel," caused a "technological revolution in these islands." Patterns and relationships of labor and production changed, as did social and political ties. New patterns of demand for the goods flowing from the trading ships grew. But the real limitation on transfer of technology and patterns of change was that "the Melanesians did not produce goods themselves," nor perhaps did they "'understand how they were produced." In this lack of transfer of knowledge, she argued, lay the seeds of future cargo cults, "for when they no longer had a valuable commodity [in this case, sandalwood, in others copra, or, finally, their young mens' labor] to exchange for these things, the supply was cut off, at a time when they had become dependent upon them."[59] This was a consequence of limitations upon the flow of knowledge and skill from enclave to village, which so characterized the colonial era. The foreigners carried very particular types of cultural baggage with them when they

journeyed from their European and Australian homes and "crossed the beaches" to settle in the islands of Papua New Guinea and elsewhere. They created new islands and built them after their own image and they planted seeds, as they spread through the world in their ships. These seeds grew, in this century, into the particular ties that link the "developing world" to "developed countries."

In this colonial context, the distance and barriers facing those young men in Papua New Guinea who journeyed away from their villages into this other foreign world were soon quite apparent. They had eyes to see that they were journeying through at least three different worlds: the world of their own people and ancestors in the village; the very limited and harsh world in which they carried on their everyday work as laborers; and the world in which the white men lived in a kind of indolent luxury and wealth, without any apparent need for productivity or bargaining to acquire that power and wealth. Tali and his father Kanek, Sumsuma and Mambu, knew these worlds, particularly the second two; Anton acknowledged their presence too, especially when he began working as a domestic servant. The presence of the white man's world and their own minimal share in it led to the frustrating problem of how to best bring its benefits into their lives.

The search by the workers of Rabaul in 1929, the eve of the Great Depression, for a just opportunity to share in a new life--an impossible dream from the *mastas'* point of view--and their angry frustrations point to another kind of distance that needed to be traversed. The heroes, the foreign travelers, and the young Papua New Guineans all either needed to move out of the familiar world of village life or else came from another world bringing promises of change--but came into village life from other worlds outside. So we are left with that world inside the village, which underwent transformations very early in its history, or was offered the promise of transformation but repudiated it. That is one world. And across a boundary--a kind of no-man's land--there are these other new worlds, the enclaves, into which, in recent times, young men have gone, or from which those "red men" (foreigners) have come. But these are separate worlds. Edai Siabo and other culture heroes remained among Motu villagers and were accepted, as did the village founders. Both Manarmakeri and Tali, so different in what they attempted to achieve and offer, were repudiated--as were many of the "new men" who saw the possibilities of planting new worlds in the ashes of the old after the holocaust of the Pacific War.

Manning Clark, reflecting *in medias res* on his large-scale explorations through Australia's past, reminded his listeners in 1976:

> These lectures . . . are given on the assumption that there are many ways of looking at the past. All that any writer or teacher can hope for is that what he saw when he opened a window on our past helped others to get their own view into sharper focus, or even perhaps to get them to see more than they had seen before. . . .[60]

Perhaps, while Papua New Guinea awaits the emergence of its own truly indigenous Manning Clark, this view of patterns of innovation and change in the ancient and more recent past, clothed in images 'borrowed from hero traditions, may help some to "get their own view into sharper focus." And perhaps then the journeys, visions, and struggles of men such as Edai Siabo, Manarmakeri, Sumsuma, Anton Misiyaiyai, and many other wanderers will not have been in vain. A French writer who expressed this hope in an apt way, will have the final word:

> Development is not a matter of dressing in other people's clothes and imitating their way of life but of using the instrument of technology to achieve an honourable style of existence. It is not a matter of escaping from one's society and one's history, but rather of creating a society capable of inventing a history.[61]

NOTES

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national Vice-Chancellor of the University of Papua New Guinea: "new man," thinker, reformer, nationalist, and friend.

1. B. Cammage, "The Rabaul Strike," *Journal of Pacific History* 10, no. 3 (1975): 29.

2. The references to the story told by Anton Misiyaiyai of Moseng come from B. J. Allen, "Information Flow and Innovation Diffusion in the East Sepik District, Papua New Guinea" (Canberra, Australian National University, Ph.D. diss., 1976). I am very grateful to Dr. Allen for permitting me to use this valuable evidence. The quoted excerpts are from Dr. Allen's English translation of Anton's original communication in *tok pisin.*

3. The most recent study of the impact of the Pacific War and the emergence of "new men" from these experiences is found in J. Griffin, H. Nelson, and S. Firth, *Papua New Guinea: A Political History* (Richmond: Heinemann Educational Australia, 1979), chap. 7. More details about individual movements of reform will be noted below.

4. Griffin, Nelson, and Firth, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 99.

5. Only a few major studies of this important postwar experiment have appeared. They include R. F. Maher, *New Men of Papua: A Study in Culture Change* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1961), and N. D. Oram, "Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement.," in N. E. Hitchcock and N. D. Oram, *Rubia Camp: A Port Moresby Migrant Settlement* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1967), New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin no. 14.

6. It was a "time for questioning" and some studies of policy reveal aspects of this. Two principal contemporary studies are: L. P. Mair, *Australia in New Guinea* (Melbourne University Press, 1970), a revised and updated version of the original edition published in 1948; and W. E. H. Stanner, *The South Seas in Transition* (Sydney: Australasian Publishing Co., 1953).

7. Two surveys of these voyages by Europeans can be found in I. M. Hughes, *New Guinea Stone Age Trade: The Geography and Ecology of Traffic in the Interior* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1977), particularly chaps. 2 and 3; and J. L. Whittaker et al., *Documents and Readings in New Guinea History* (Milton: The Jacaranda Press, 1975), see particularly section B, "The Intrusion of the Europeans." The major earlier survey of European journeys still remains that massive work of A. Wichmann, *Nova Guinea: Entdeckungsgeschichte von Neu-Guinea,* 3 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1909-1912). "The last unknown" was the title given to a history of European exploration in Papua New Guinea by Gavin Souter in his *New Guinea: The Last Unknown* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974). This book captures the European perception of the Pacific, Melanesia, and Papua New Guinea as all being at the end of their long journeys of exploration out from their homeland.

8. Over the last ten years the volume of evidence on hunters and gatherers has grown considerably. Some of it can be seen in the following: P. Bellwood, *Man's Conquest of the Pacific: The Prehistory of Southeast Asia ond Oceania* (Auckland: Collins, 1978); S. Bulmer, "Settlement and Economy in Prehistoric Papua New Guinea," *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* 31 (1975): 7-76; J. P. White et al., "Kosipe: A Late Pleistocene Site in the Papuan Highlands," *Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society* 36 (1970): 152-170; J. H. Winslow, ed., *The Melanesian Environment* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977).

9. The major work, based on versions recorded in a wide range of locations in northwest Irian Jaya is F. C. Kamma, *Koreri: Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). B. R. Wilson, *Magic and the Millenium* (St. Albans: Paladin, 1975), contains a review of the legend and other evidence as a case study (see pp. 199-206). The paraphrase used here comes from chapter two of Kamma's work.

10. See Wilson, *Magic and the Millenium,* especially pp. 199-206.

11. These legends from the south coast and its hinterland are reviewed in R. Wagner, *Habu: The Innovation of Meaning in Daribi Religion* (University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 19-24. A wide variety of the Iko-Sido-Hido complex of hero legends are noted and compared in A. Riesenfeld, *The Megalithic Culture of Melanesia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1950).

12. In addition there is a large body of writing about the *hiri,* and its history and context. Versions of the legend can be found in: P. F. Irwin, "The Legend of Edai Siabo," in *Papua: Annual Report, 1911-12,* pp. 103-105; N. D. Oram, "Environment, Migration and Site Selection on the Port Moresby Coastal Area," in J. Winslow, ed., *Melanesian Environment,* p. 85; A. Ova, "Motu Feasts and Dances," in *Papua: Annual Report, 1922-23,* pp. 39-40; C. C. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea* (Cambridge University Press, 1910), pp. 97-100; P. Swadling, "The Settlement History of the Motu and Koita Speaking People of the Central Province, Papua New Guinea," in D. Denoon and R. Lacey, eds., *Oral Tradition in Melanesia* (Boroko: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1981). In February 1980 a conference on historical, linguistic, and archaeological aspects of the *hiri* was held in Canberra. Most of the papers from this seminar appear in T. Dutton, ed., *The Hiri in Histoy: Further Aspects of Long Distance Motu Trade in Central Papua* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982).

13. The heroes and heroines discussed here only represent a very small sample of a large body of recorded traditions. Riesenfeld, *Megalithic Culture of Melanesia,* is a significant treasury of published versions up to the 1940s. This and other collections are noted in J. L. Whittaker et al., *Documents and Readings,* section A., and some are also noted in my "Religious Change in a Precolonial Era: Some Perspectives on Movement and Change in Religious Life during the Precolonial Era," *Point* no. 2 (1978): 159-205. The Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies and the journal *Oral History* have also published translations and transcriptions of hero and origin legends.

Some culture-bearing heroes and heroines, for instance Tudava in the Trobriand islands (see B. Malinowski, *Coral Gardens and Their Magic* [London: Allen and Unwin, 1935], especially vol. 1, pp. 68-75) and Mala the father and son heroes of the Vitiaz Straits (see L. Allace, "Siassi Trade," *Oral History* 4, no. 10 [1976]: 2-23) were responsible, among other achievements, for bringing to their people staple crops or basic technology highly significant for economic development. Tudava and others also brought skills of cultivation. But it is important to note that archaeological investigations over the last decade at Kuk near Mount Hagen in Western Highlands Province are unearthing a much more ancient and profound change in cultivation and water control of great significance to agricultural change and development. These particular beginnings and their consequences in the region do not seem to be echoed in the traditions. Perhaps those who told and spread the hero and heroine legends took these basic activities for granted. For reports on Kuk see the following writings by J. Golson: "Ditches before Time," *Hemisphere* 21, no. 2 (1977): 13-21; "No Room at the Top: Agricultural Intensification in the New Guinea Highlands," in J. Allen et al., eds., *Sunda and Sahul: Prehistoric Studies in South East Asia, Melanesia*

and Australia (London: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 601-639; "New Guinea Agricultural History, a Case Study," in D. Denoon and C. Snowden, *A History of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea* (Boroko: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1981), pp. 55-64.

14. Chronology is a vexed issue, with few satisfactory solutions. The comment from Dening comes from his *Islands and Beaches; Discourse on a Silent Land: Marquesas 1774-1880* (Melbourne University Press, 1980), p, 42. Other attempts at solution can be found in D. Henige, *The Chronology of Oral Tradition* (Oxford University Press, 1974); J. Kolia and R. Lacey, "Papua New Guinea's Past: A Guide for Writing Local History," *Oral History* 3, no. 6 (1975): 2-25; N. D. Oram, "Taurama: Oral Sources for a Study of Recent Motu Prehistory," *Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society* 2, no. 2 (1968): 79-91; and M. Panoff, "The Notion of Time among the Maenge People of New Britain," *Ethnology* 8, no. 2 (1968): 53-66.

15. My writings on the Enga and their traditions have included "The Enga Worldview: Some Thoughts from a Wandering Historian," *Catalyst* 3 (1973): 37-47; "A Question of Origins: An Exploration of Some Oral Traditions of the Enga of New Guinea," *Journal of Pacific History* 9 (1974): 39-54; "Oral Traditions as History: An Exploration of Oral Sources among the Enga of the New Guinea Highlands" (Madison, University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1975); "Holders of the Way: A Study of Pre-Colonial Socio-Economic History in Papua New Guinea," *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 88, no. 3 (1979): 277-325; "Coming to Know Kepai: Conversational Narratives and the Use of Oral Sources in Papua New Guinea," *Social Analysis* (1980): 74-88. These writings note references to other works on the Enga. A major anthropologist recently published some studies on aspects of the colonial experience of some Enga clans which he saw as historical essays. See M. J. Meggitt, *Studies in Enga History* (Sydney: University Press, 1974), Oceania Monograph no. 20.

16. Vansina has discussed issues of "decoding" in his *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973) and "Once Upon a Time: Oral Traditions as History in Africa," *Daedalus* 100, no. 2 (1971): 442-468. I have explored some of the particular issues facing historians when they interpret oral testimonies and traditions in my "Coming to Know Kepai."

17. Hughes, *New Guinea Stone Age Trade,* p. 17, notes that "Papuan slaves were found in Java in the tenth century." The source he records for this is J. C. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1967), pp. 90-111. Van Leur notes that "the hunting of Papuans for slaves . . . as early as the tenth century appears from the fact that Papuan slaves were found on Java then (from the record of the foundation of a Buddhist sanctuary . . .)"; see especially p. 101, n. 64 and p. 355. "Diaspora," a term that comes from the history of the people of Israel as recorded in the Bible, refers in particular to the movement and exile of the people of ancient Israel when they were invaded by foreign powers. It seems an appropriate term to use for the movement of young men away from home, sometimes to far-flung places, sometimes to colonial enclaves. It also appropriately describes the even larger and more recent migrations to towns and cities in the late colonial and the post-colonial eras.

18. The account of the encounter between Torres, Prado, and their crew and the people of Mailu Island is reported in H. N. Stevens, ed., *New Light on the Discovery of Australia as Revealed by the Journal of Captain Don Diego de Prado y Tovar* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1930), ser. 2, vol. 64, pp. 154-157. This and other accounts of such meetings with for-

eign strangers are found in Whittaker et al., *Documents and Readings,* particularly in section B, "The Intrusion of the Europeans," pp. 173-309. Some of the more famous early encounters between foreigners and coastal villagers include William Dampier near Gasmata in southern New Britain in 1700 (see Whittaker, ibid., pp. 282-283); John Hunter at what was later named Port Hunter in the Duke of York Islands in 1791 (ibid., pp. 289-291); and John Moresby at Traitor's Bay in Milne Bay in 1874 (ibid., pp. 301-304).

19. The references to the journey to Sydney by a group of young men from Murua island come from two studies of the activities of French Marist missionaries there in the mid-nineteenth century. They are H. M. Laracy, "Xavier Montrouzier: A Missionary in Melanesia," in J. W. Davidson and D. Scarr, eds., *Pacific Islands Portraits* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), pp. 127-146; and his *Marists and Melanesians: A History of Catholic Missions in the Solomon Islands* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976), pp. 22-31. The fate of Muruans who labored for gold prospectors in more recent times has been explored in H. Nelson, *Black White and Gold: Goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1878-1930* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976), chap. 4, pp. 49ff.

20. The raw materials for the study of whalers and their impact on the societies and economies of coastal and island villages in Papua New Guinea, lie scattered in different libraries and archives in England and America. There has been one important recent project to index whalers' logs surviving in some of the major American collections. See, for instance, R. Langdon, ed., *Thar She Went: An Interim Index to the Pacific Ports and Islands Visited by American Whalers and Traders in the 19th Century* (Canberra: Australian National University, Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, 1979). Notes on one famous whaler are to be found in H. E. Maude, "The Cruise of the Whaler 'Gypsy,'" *Journal of Pacific History* 1 (1966): 193-194. Some whaling sources are collected and reviewed in Whittaker et al., *Documents and Readings,* section C, part 1, "Shipping Routes and Whaling Grounds in New Guinea Waters," pp. 314-327. The reference to Melville comes from G. Daws, *A Dream of Islands: Voyages of Self-Discovery in the South Seas* (Milton: The Jacaranda Press, 1980).

21. It was the Surgeon on the Gypsy who noted in 1840 that some men at Gower's Harbour in New Ireland had been to Sydney and spoke English. For this extract see Whittaker et al., *Documents and Readings,* p. 325.

22. The most detailed study of the role of Sydney merchants in the sandalwood trade still remains D. Shineberg, *They Came for Sandalwood: A Study of the Sandalwood Trade in the South-West Pacific* 1830-1865 (Melbourne University Press, 1967).

23. The evidence that New Irelanders traveled as far across the Pacific as South America to work in saltpeter mines comes from references in P. Lomas, "The Early Contact Period in Northern New Ireland (Papua New Guinea), from Cannibalism to Copra" (Simon Fraser University Department of Sociology and Anthropology, mimeographed seminar paper, 1978), pp. 6-7.

24. P. Corris, *Passage, Port and Plantation: A History of Solomon Islands Labour Migration 1870-1914* (Melbourne University Press, 1973).

25. C. A. Price and E. Baker, "Origins of Pacific Islands Labourers in Queensland, 1863-1904: A Research Note," *Journal of Pacific History* 11, no. 2 (1976): 106-121.

26. A major recent study on the size and impact of labor migration within the German Pacific empire as it affected New Guineans is S. G. Firth, "The Transformation of the Labour Trade in German New Guinea, 1899-1914," *Journal of Pacific History* 11, no. 1 (1976): 51-65. For the study by a Samoan historian, see M. Meleisea, "The Last Days of the Melanesian Labour Trade in Western Samoa," *Journal of Pacific History* 11, no. 2 (1976): 126-132; and his *O Tamu Uli: Melanesians in Samoa* (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 1980). Some aspects of the activities of New Guinean police troopers in the Ponape rebellions are noted in P. J. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islanders under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), chaps. 3 and 4, pp. 73ff. The claim, based on a reference to G. F. Sayers, ed., *Handbook of Tanganyika* (London: Macmillan, 1930), p. 30, that New Guinean troopers also saw service in the German empire in East Africa appears in P. Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of "Cargo" Cu1ts in Melanesia* (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), 2nd revised ed. He states: "It is worth noting that Melanesian troops were used by the Germans in the suppression of the Maji-Maji rebellion in Tanganyika in 1905-6" (p. 114). One other reference I have heard to this was that Miss M. Levi, a student from Northern New Ireland, had heard in her village a tradition that people had seen trooper's equipment, which one of their recent ancestors had used while on service with the Germans in Africa. Professor Peter Lawrence, in a recent communication has reported that Otto Dempwolff recorded in 1906 that some Bilbil islanders from near Madang had been recruited into the German Army and were stationed in Tanzania. Perhaps they may have seen action in the attacks on Maji-Maji rebels; see O. Dempwolff, "Sagen und Märchen aus Bilibili," *Baessler-Archiv* 1 (1911): 63-102.

27. Firth, "Labour Trade in German New Guinea," p. 51. See also S. Firth, *New Guinea under the Germans* (Melbourne University Press, 1982), especially chap. 6.

28. Some uneven statistics of the volume and trends in the movement and employment of young laborers can be drawn from the *Annual Reports* of Australian New Guinea from 1921 to 1941 and of Australian Papua from 1906 to 1941. Some writers have drawn on this evidence, in particular S. W. Reed, *The Making of Modern New Guinea: With Special Reference to Culture Contact in the Mandated Territory* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1943), and R. T. Shand, "The Development of Cash-Cropping in Papua and New Guinea," *Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 7, no. 1 (1963): 42-54. H. Nelson, *Black White and Gold*, studies in detail one area of employment, that of gold prospecting and mining. See also R. Lacey, "Our Young Men Snatched Away: Labourers in Papua New Guinea's Colonial Economy, 1884-1942" (*Occasional Papers in Economic History, No. 3*, Department of History, University of Papua New Guinea, 1983).

29. Much of the evidence on Sumsuma's life and achievements comes from B. Gammage, "Rabaul Strike," and his "Oral and Written Sources" in D. Denoon and R. Lacey, eds., *Oral Tradition in Melanesia.* Some of the evidence from Sumsuma and others appears in *Commission of Inquiry into the Causes of the Native Disturbances at Rabaul . . . 1929, Transcript of Evidence* (a copy of which is held in the New Guinea Collection of the Library of the University of Papua New Guinea). Also held in that collection are the tapes and transcripts from interviews conducted by Dr. Gammage and Mr. R. Namaliu with survivors from the events of 1929.

The anthropologist F. L. S. Bell, who lived on Boang island in the Tanga group in 1933-34 and witnesed Sumsuma's return home and reentry into his people's life and economy, has written a large number of field reports on Tanga society. Some of these activities

by Sumsuma are recorded by Bell in his field diary. I was fortunate to see some extracts of these by permission of Mr. Bell's sister, who passed them on to me through Dr. J. Specht of the Australian Museum, Sydney.

30. Gammage, *Rabaul Strike,* pp. 4-5.

31. Ibid., *passim.*

32. Ibid., p. 28; F. L. S. Bell, Field Diary.

33. F. L. S. Bell, "The Place of Food in the Social Life of the Tanga," *Oceania* 18 (1947): 50-58, cited in Whittaker et al., *Documents and Readings,* pp. 65-68.

34. Gammage, *Rabaul Strike,* p, 3.

35. *Namatanai Patrol Report No. 1 1934-35,* entry for 28 August 1934 (held in the National Archives of Papua New Guinea).

36. Gammage, *Rabaul Strike,* p. 28.

37. *Territory of New Guinea: Annual Report, 1929-30* (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1930), p. 122.

38. Gammage, *Rabaul Strike,* p. 29.

39. The sources for the activities of the "Black King" and the subsequent "myths" developed by the people of Tangu can be found in K. O. L. Burridge, *Mambu: A Melanesian Millenium* (London: Methuen, 1969), pp. 183-190, and his *New Heaven and New Earth: A Study of Millenarian Actiuities* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). The contemporary report on which he draws for his account of Mambu's activities is G. Höltker, "Die Mambu Bewegung in Neuguinea: Ein Beitrag zum Prophetentum in Melanesia," *Annali Lateranensi* 5 (1941): 181-219.

40. For this and subsequent citations about Mambu, see Burridge, *Mambu,* pp. 183-190.

41. B. J. Allen, *Information Flow,* p. 353.

42. Griffin, Nelson, and Firth, *Papua New Guinea,* chap. 7, is a recent review off the impact of the Pacific War on villagers in Papua New Guinea,

43. A detailed study of the activities of laborers in the war appears in H. Nelson, "*Taim Bilong Pait Na Taim Bilong Hatwok Tru:* Papua New Guinea Labourers during the War, 1942-45" (Australian National University mimeographed seminar paper, 1979). The story Choka is drawn from this paper; see pp. 12-14.

44. The story of William Metpi comes from K. Kais, "Interview with William Metpi," *Oral History* 4, no. 1 (1974): 2-36, though the details of his service and those of others come from military records used in H. Nelson, "Hold the Good Name of the Soldier: The Papuan and New Guinea Infantry Battalions of the Australian Army, 1940-1946" (Australian National University mimeographed seminar paper; see pp. 30-31). The experiences of some laborers from the Sepik region in the 1930s and the Pacific War have been recorded in R. Curtain, "Labour Migration from the Sepik," *Oral Histoy* 6, no. 9 (1978). The Paliau movement, in which William Metpi played some part, is explored in M. Mead, *New Lives for Old: Cultural Transformation--Manus 1928-1953* (New York: Mentor, 1961), and in T. Schwartz, *The Palian Movement in the Admiralty Islands, 1946-1954,* Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 49, no. 2 (1962).

45. The major source for Yali's experiences and travels before and during the Pacific War is P. Lawrence, *Road Belong Cargo: A Study of the Cargo Movement in the Southern Madang District, New Guinea* (Melbourne University Press, 1967); see especially pp. 117-126, 130-321. More recently L. Morauta, *Beyond the Village: Local Politics in Madang, Papua New Guinea* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974) takes another view on Yali's life and role in the region.

Recently there has been a collection of studies on prophets, of whom men like Mambu and Yali can be seen as examples. See G. Trompf, ed., *Prophets in Melanesia: Six Essays* (Boroko: Institute of Melanesian Studies, 1977).

46. Lawrence, *Road Belong Cargo,* pp. 117-126, 130-132.

47. A. M. Strathern, *No Money on Our Skins: Hagen Migrants in Port Moresby* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1975), New Guinea Research Bulletin 61, p. xv.

48. Strathern, *Hagan Migrants,* p. xix.

49. The story can be found in the collection M. Greicus, ed., *Three Short Novels from Papua New Guinea* (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1976). The other two short novels in this collection are also relevant to the themes of this study: B. Umba, "The Fires of Dawn," is about a Simbu village's response to the arrival of foreigners; and A. Kituai's "The Flight of a Villager" tells of the experiences of a Bundi migrant in the town of Goroka.

50. A recent collection of papers reflects the trends in urban migration studies and gives a helpful bibliography: R. J. May, ed., *Change and Movement: Readings in Internal Migration in Papua New Guinea* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977).

51. Baital, *"Tali,"* p. 140.

52. The most recent study of the activities of James Chalmers in the Gulf of Papua and elsewhere is D. Langmore, *Tamate--A King: James Chalmers in New Guinea 1877-1901* (Melbourne University Press, 1974).

53. Langmore, *James Chalmers in New Guinea,* p. 58. Note 14 on p. 146 states that this came from a text by Avosa Eka on "Arrival of Tamate at Moru" filed in the London Missionary Society Papua Papers with a report of 1914 by the missionary Nixon. In my "Where Have All the Young Men Gone? Village Economies in Transition in Colonial Papua New Guinea" (paper read at ANZAAS Congress, Auckland 1979), I have recorded these and other foreign activities, by traders and labor recruiters, as well as missionaries in the area around Orokolo during the early colonial period.

54. A case in which new forms of initiation developed in response to the journeys of young men away to work comes from the Siane people of Eastern Highlands Province, studied in R. F. Salisbury, *From Stone to Steel: Economic Consequences of a Technological Change in New Guinea* (Cambridge University Press, 1962). It is possible to generalize beyond the Papua New Guinea context about these journeys. Following Victor Turner's interpretation, we could argue that, in crossing boundaries and going beyond the known horizon, the "wanderers" were breaching the strictures of "liminality" in their cultures and entering a dangerous zone beyond the protection of local rituals and spirits. In so doing they were creating conditions in which they would be either transformed or destroyed; see V. W. Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), especially chap. 3. The narratives of these journeys echo those of journeying

heroes and heroines and in so doing point toward what Joseph Campbell has seen as a "monomyth" of the journeying hero who moves beyond his everyday world., crosses the "threshold of adventure," enters the kingdom of darkness, is transformed, and returns to remake the world with his new powers; see J. Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (New York: Meridian Books, 1970), especially 245ff.

55. This song is found in the collection K. Talyaga, *Modern Enga Songs* (Boralko: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1975), song 3.

56. This image is borrowed from G. Blainey, *The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History* (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1976). Professor Blainey argued that the costs of transporting goods and people between Australia's first European settlements and England have been very important in shaping many aspects of Australia's economic history. He also saw that distance between settlements, both those scattered along the coast and those inland, was of almost equal importance. It seems to me that the challenges presented to human settlement and enterprise by terrain and the resulting costs are also important factors in historical development and change in Papua New Guinea; so I have applied his original ideas to these islands and their history.

57. One recent study of the implications of the draining off of young men from village economies is P. Fitzpatrick, " 'Really Rather Like Slavery': Law and Labour in the Colonial Economy of Papua New Guinea," in E. L. Wheelwright and K. Buckley, eds., *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism* (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1978), vol. 3, pp. 102-118.

58. Lord Hailey, the eminent British colonial administrator, wrote an introduction to the first edition of L. P. Mair, *Australia in New Guinea* (London: Christophers, 1948). Here he viewed the prewar achievement by the Australians in terms of "benevolent . . . police rule." He was commenting not simply on limitations or absence of colonial theory and policy about "native development and participation," but also on the severe restrictions to colonial rule presented by the terrain and the scattered nature of village settlement through that landscape. It would have required a far larger input of funds and manpower as well as thought to overcome these obstacles to the spread of colonial administration.

59. This interpretation about the ways in which products of western technology rather than new methods of production (for instance, iron axes rather than the art of metal work and smelting) were traded on the "frontier," was made in D. Shineberg, *They Came for Sandalwood,* p. 162.

60. C. M. H. Clark, *A Discovery of Australia* (Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1976), p. 7.

61. J. M. Domenach, *Our Moral Involvement in Development* (New York: United Nations Center for Economic and Social Information, 1971), 33; quoted in A. Amarshi, K. Good, and R. Mortimer, *Development and Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 60.

BOOK REVIEW FORUM

K. R. Howe, *Where the Waves Fall. A New South Sea Islands History from First Settlement to Colonial Rule.* Pacific Islands Monograph Series, No. 2. Pacific Islands Studies Program, Center for Pacific and Asian Studies. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984. Pp. 403, illustrated, index. $29.95.

Review: MALAMA MELEISEA
UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Howe's book is a welcome addition to the small number of general works in Pacific history. It is also a worthy successor to Oliver's *The Pacific Islands,* which has served students and teachers of Pacific history so long and well. Howe presents a fine synthesis of "the new Pacific history," which owes so much to the late Professor J. W. Davidson and the products of the School of Pacific and South East Asian History in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. I count myself fortunate to have been at the University of Papua New Guinea between 1972 and 1975 and a student of historians such as Sione Latukefu, Ken Inglis, Bill Gammage, Edgar Waters, Donald Denoon, Rod Lacey, Stewart Firth, and Hank Nelson. We not only benefited from the new historiography but learned to think about new sources of evidence from oral tradition and prehistory.

Howe summarizes many of the subjects, ideas, and new interpretations that made Pacific history an exciting subject for Pacific island students, perhaps for the first time. The old orthodox chronology of Pacific

history presented events in terms of the actions of successive groups of Europeans: the explorers, the beachcombers, the missionaries, the traders and planters, and finally the colonial officials. Islanders were victims, change was "fatal." The new Pacific history has tried to reinterpret this reconstruction of the past with greater emphasis on interaction between islanders and outsiders. The greatest contribution to the decolonization of Pacific history has been made by prehistorians working on sources of evidence other than the written word, with its inevitable Eurocentric bias. Thus Howe's history does not begin in the sixteenth century with European explorers but in 50,000 B.P. with the earliest evidence of human settlement south of Sunda.

Howe examines four themes: the settlement of the Pacific islands and the nature of precontact island societies; the motives and historical forces that motivated European exploration, trade, and conquest; the nineteenth-century centralized monarchies that developed (or conversely failed to develop) in Polynesia as a result of the dynamics of early islander-outsider interaction; and the relatively late Nevangelization and exploitation of the western Pacific islands of Melanesia. He concludes with an essay on the new historiography of the Pacific islands, tracing the processes of thought in scholarly circles through which Pacific islanders were removed from the role of passive victims to participating actors in the historical events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Although scholarly, readable, and accessible to nonspecialists, Howe's book leaves plenty of room for debate. Take the argument, for example, that there were indigenous structural forces in the political systems of Tahiti, Hawai'i, and Tonga lacking in those of New Zealand, Samoa, and Fiji, which allowed centralized monarchies to develop in the former but not the latter. This argument owes much to the evolutionary theorizing of Goldman (1970) and, to a lesser extent, Sahlins (1958). In both these works there is much misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the political institutions of early nineteenth-century Samoa. Howe might have considered the historically convincing argument by Freeman (1966) that pre-Christian Samoa possessed a highly stratified system of rank and political authority, despite the political autonomy of the *nu'u* in everyday matters. Howe recognizes and points out the pitfalls of the ethnographic present in past descriptions of island societies (44), but then fails to consider the probability that the political systems of Polynesia fluctuated between periods in which power was highly centralized and periods of decentralization, rivalry, and dispersed political authority, depending on dynastic complica-

tions, fortunes of war, economic conditions, religious movements, and so on.

The notion that the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political systems of Polynesia as they were variously described, represented culminations of hundreds, even thousands of years of unidirectional evolution, is long overdue for reexamination and criticism. To imply that lack of stratification in Samoa, for example, inhibited the development of am indigenous centralized state when conditions presented themselves as they had done in Hawai‘i, Tahiti, and Tonga seems to me to be founded both on an incorrect understanding of Samoan politics and false analogy. There were unique forces at work in all these island nations, In the case of Samoa, great power and settler rivalry, as much as the rivalry between the two most powerful Samoan ruling families and their supporting territories, impeded the creation of a stable centralized government. To underestimate the force of settler intriguing and international wrangling on Samoan affairs in order to give priority of explanation to indigenous political structures is taking the argument a great deal too far, as I suspect Howe has also done in his chapters on New Zealand and Fiji. The new historiography is in danger of promoting a new orthodoxy if it tries to diminish the tragic consequences of land grabbing, kingmaking, and gunboat diplomacy by Europeans in destroying the political capacities of islanders to respond on equal terms. To conclude as Howe does that the Samoans simply lacked the capacity to unite and that the three powers, in the face of this intransigence “had little option but to formally take over the country” (254), carving up the Samoan nation between them in the process, uncritically reiterates an orthodox criticism long overdue for questioning.

But uncontroversial books are dull and Howe’s arguments, whether one accepts them or not, will make his book all the more useful in teaching Pacific history. We are already using it at the University of the South Pacific. Howe’s succinct summary of the major findings of linguists and prehistorians and many other complex studies is invaluable.

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Review: CAROLINE Ralston
MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY
NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA

The welcome appearance of a new general history of the Pacific provides an excellent opportunity to review not only the book itself but also to examine the development of Pacific history since its beginnings as a distinct subdiscipline in the late 1940s, and to consider the present state of the art. Over the past thirty years numerous books, monographs, and articles have been published on specific topics in the field of Pacific history, but general histories have been scarce indeed. Of the few published in the period, the earliest, Douglas Oliver's *The Pacific Islands* (first published in 1951, revised in 1961, and frequently reprinted since then) has remained the most popular and readily available, although teachers of history have been increasingly uneasy about its continued use.[1] Even the revised 1961 edition of *The Pacific Islands* benefited little from the new research and scholarship, most of which has been published since that date. While genuinely concerned about the political, economic, and social position of the Pacific Islanders in the 1950s, Oliver analyzed and interpreted their experience as the inevitable outcome of a fatal Western intrusion. At all times the foreigners were viewed as the motivating agents for change, the Islanders the passive victims. Hartley Grattan's *The Southwest Pacific to 1900* (1963) and *The Southwest Pacific since 1900* (1963) cover Australia, New Zealand, and Antarctica, as well as the oceanic Pacific Islands, which inevitably received insufficient attention to make these two volumes an acceptable general history of that area. In 1978, at a time when a substantial amount of new Pacific material had been published, Glen Barclay produced in 264 pages *A History of the Pacific from the Stone Age to the Present Day,* a thin, under-researched book taking little cognizance of the island orientation Pacific historians were attempting to elucidate.

Given the deficiencies in the field of general Pacific histories, the publication in 1984 of Kerry Howe's *Where the Waves Fall* is most important for the subdiscipline. The book is beautifully produced and illustrated, lucidly written, and well attuned to the basic philosophic outlook of many Pacific historians. At last there is a general history that will give students a good introduction and grounding in the Pacific's past. Despite its price (hardback U.S. $29.95) I believe *Where the Waves Fall* will be widely used and appreciated at the university level by students and staff for many years to come. That in itself is an outstanding achievement. I wish to state this clearly and unequivocally at

the outset, since I do not want the criticisms that follow (some of the book, more of Pacific history writing in general) to detract from my recognition of Howe's valuable contribution.

Unfortunately Howe's book is not as comprehensive as Oliver, Grattan, or Barclay in terms of geography or chronology. Papua New Guinea, the Marquesas, the Cooks, Tuvalu, and all of Micronesia are omitted, while chronologically almost nothing since the imposition of colonial rule, whenever that occurred in each island group, has been tackled (see p. 317). These limitations notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that Howe's book supersedes all other attempts at general precolonial Pacific history, or more precisely precolonial Polynesian and Island Melanesian history. The focus on islands and islanders is closer than any achieved before and the tone is markedly different from the inevitable Fatal Impact or the vision of island savagery and Western civilization that permeates Oliver's outlook.

Howe goes to great lengths to emphasize the Islanders' depth of culture, independence of action, and ability to manipulate contact events. Any suggestion of a Fatal Impact is anathema to him. But his methodological approach, neatly encapsulated in the book's title, places severe limits on the island perspective Howe hoped to create. The image, *Where the Waves Fall,* echoes an idea from J. W. Davidson's Ph.D. thesis, "European Penetration in the South Pacific 1779-1842" (Cambridge, 1942), in which he compared foreign movement into the islands with a series of waves breaking on an island shore, each one overtaken by the next before its energy was quite spent (Howe 1984: xiii). As the metaphor suggests, the motivating agents in Howe's history are still Western forces, be they working-class beachcombers or ostrich-plumed (not "plimed," see p. xiii) governors. The genesis and organizing principies of his history, like Oliver's, are imposed from outside; they do not evolve out of island cultural patterns and process. Once the foreigners arrive in the island world their presence, activities, artifacts, and preoccupations, particularly the question of leadership, dominate the enquiry. Indigenous imperatives and cultural processes are viewed, if at all, only as adjuncts or responses to alien activities. The eurocentricity of this approach is most certainly not unique to Howe. Too many Pacific historians, myself included, have believed that concentrating on an island group, particular trade, or Christian mission automatically produced an island orientation. A move from agents of the imperial metropolitan powers to small-time operators on the periphery has certainly been effected, but history of this type was and still is organized through foreign factors.

Despite Howe's assertion of island autonomy and ability to adapt, his dependence on foreign agency leads him at times to interpretations that are very similar in basic approach to Oliver's. To give one example. According to Howe the declaration of a protectorate in Tahiti in 1842, which he analyzes in seven lines (151), was the result of increased British and French interest. Increased British interest I would contest, but that is not germane to my argument here. Oliver on the other hand suggested the machinations of French Roman Catholicism were the prime factors in Tahiti's decline into protectorate status (Oliver 1961:113). Neither author examines the episode from a Tahitian perspective, which would have revealed the complex dynastic/clan rivalries within the Tahitian polity that were an essential factor in the events under review.[2] One suspects that Howe was loath to analyze in depth Tahiti's last years of political independence because during that time the Tahitians' autonomy and initiative were already undeniably restricted.

Oliver's synoptic view of the Pacific Islanders' position in 1939 offers greater insight into Island experience for today's reader than Howe's concluding view of the Islanders at the point of annexation. Oliver argues as follows:

> In addition to these specific kinds of losses and gains, there were the more comprehensive ones. Islanders in general gained some security of person with the outlawing of feuding. And, although the immediate advantages could not be ascertained, they were given every opportunity to acquire "eternal life." Also, they were brought out of their isolation into contact with larger polities; in the process, however, they were invariably placed in subordinate caste roles, and the more they became assimilated into the new economies, the more vulnerable they were to world price fluctuations. (367)

Howe in contrast is much more optimistic. Of course he is looking at an earlier period, but he gives no intimation that the mutuality of exploitation and accommodation that he emphasizes was only temporary and already almost completely lost by the time of annexation, particularly in Polynesia.

> Recent historical research suggests that the processes of culture contact were not always so one-sided, that Islanders were quite capable of taking their own initiative and, rather than passively accepting Europeans and their ways, either rejected or deliber-

> ately exploited the newcomers for their own reasons. Individual Islanders or whole communities made use of explorers and missionaries and traders, using, adopting, adapting, applying new ideas and customs and technologies and institutions within the context of the priorities and perceptions of their respective indigenous cultures. In some situations Europeans held the advantage; in others the Islanders did. But *usually* as I have attempted to show in this book, there were many subtle and complex levels of mutual exploitation and accommodation. (348, emphasis added).

While Oliver's blinkered insistence on a Fatal Impact in Pacific island societies enabled him to forego any close analysis of historical process, be it trade activities, conversion to Christianity, or political change, Howe's conviction that contact with the West and increasing interaction with foreigners was usually mutually beneficial or exploitative, ignores Islanders' loss of land and political initiative, and their increasing dependency and economic vulnerability in the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century. An epilogue (347-352) that concentrates almost exclusively on a refutation of a Fatal Impact interpretation of Pacific history is an exercise in European intellectual history; it does not grow out of or speak to Islander experience directly at all. Howe's determination to present the Islanders as active and often equal participants in the process of change has produced a fuller and more complex analysis of early contact than Oliver, but the argument cannot be sustained into eras of intense European activity, for example land speculating or plantation development, in either precolonial or colonial periods.

* * * *

The major historical focus of *Where the Waves Fall* is on political change in Polynesia and Island Melanesia after contact with the West. This analysis is preceded by two sections--one setting the Pacific scene which includes a very useful synthesis of the work of many specialists, particularly prehistorians and archaeologists; and one tracing the background and activities in the Pacific of early foreign explorers, beachcombers, traders, and missionaries. Concerned to establish that traditional sociopolitical institutions and practices were influential determinants in Islanders' responses to contact, Howe does not make the mistake of starting his history with the arrival of the first European visi-

tors. But his analysis of precontact island populations, health, settlement patterns, subsistence agriculture, trade, sociopolitical organization, and religious beliefs is static, offering no insight into the dynamic interplay between political, economic, religious, and social activities; no understanding of the processes of change in precontact time nor how these complex cultures would respond to foreign intrusion. Howe is aware of the problem (44) but unable to deal with it, and as argued above, once present, aliens and their activities become the preponderant generators of change.

The third section, which examines the rise of the island kingdoms of Tahiti, Hawaii, and Tonga, is in many ways the most successful, the analysis moving as it does between indigenous and introduced determinants that influenced the process. But the consequences of this political centralization are ignored and in fact appear to have been misunderstood. Howe argues that political centralization was most effective in these three archipelagoes (196), but one must ask, effective for what? Tahiti was taken over by the French in 1842, while the Hawaiian monarchs were little more than political puppets in the hands of American business interests during the second half of the nineteenth century. Only the Taufa‘ahau dynasty could claim any long-term success, and even that has been exaggerated, as the author willingly concede (195). Howe seems to believe that political centralization was an end and ultimate good in itself. Its immediate impact and long-term significance for the Islanders of all social groupings is left largely unexplored, as is the question whether island monarchies were able to withstand foreign pressures more successfully than other island polities.

In the final two sections of the book, “Monarchs Manqué?” (New Zealand, Samoa, and Fiji) and “Western Isles” (Island Melanesia), Howe attempts to explain the reasons why island rulers did not evolve in these areas and the implications of that nonappearance. Here the limitations of Howe’s methodological approach are most obvious. In his search for monarchs, which is highly reminiscent of certain early European explorers, Howe’s discussion of historical change in New Zealand, Samoa, and Fiji becomes at times a series of negative instances rather than an examination of how these societies developed and adapted after contact. Meleisea (see this Book Review Forum) has cogently highlighted the dangers and possible misinterpretations of such an approach. Finally, the analysis of change in the Melanesian section does not evolve from within those island cultures: foreign agents, missionaries, and traders are the generative forces. Melanesian initiative or a Melanesian-centered perspective rarely is visible.

Howe offers three reasons for terminating his study at the point of annexation. (Clearly any foray into the colonial period would have necessitated a second volume, but that consideration is not raised.) First and undeniably Howe argues that there is "little historical analysis of colonial systems on Pacific islands" (xv), but there were some histories available before 1980 that covered the colonial period in several island groups included in this book[3] and more have been published since across the Pacific.[4] Tellingly none of these studies has placed much emphasis on mutual accommodation or exploitation of island and foreign interests. Second, without naming any examples Howe claims that the few studies of the colonial period available to him relied on imported explicatory models derived from other places rather than indigenous ones, and that by implication these alien imports were unsuccessful. Without specific examples this claim cannot be concretely tested but given that imperialism, integration into capitalist market economies, modernization, and individualization have been worldwide phenomena there seems to be no reason per se why models devised to explain such phenomena could not be sensitively and persuasively used in the Pacific. Finally, Howe argues: "[T]he changes that occur in historiographic perceptions as they now exist when passing from precolonial times can result in certain opinions about colonial experiences being projected backward to earlier years, so distorting interpretations of what took place" (xv). This may happen but it is by no means automatic. It is possible to analyze Islanders' early responses and manipulations of contact with foreigners and then proceed to analyze the factors such as loss of land and economic self-sufficiency, dependence on Western goods and markets, and/or capitulation to superior military force, that reduced their autonomy and independence.

A close examination of *Where the Waves Fall* suggests to me that Howe's interpretative system, his insistence that "processes and developments in many precolonial culture contact situations were greatly influenced not by European decree but by the initiatives of various Islanders and by their respective social and political arrangements" (xv), cannot be sustained into the late precolonial or colonial era. Howe copes well with early contact experiences and events at which time Islander initiative and occasional exploitation can be clearly illustrated. But in Polynesia even before the imposition of formal colonial rule Islanders' powers were greatly restricted. In the denouement section of each of Howe's Polynesian studies his interpretative difficulties are revealed. The case of Tahiti has been discussed above. Hawaii between 1839 and 1899, a period when Hawaiians were increasingly marginal-

ized and subordinated within their own country, is dealt with in one and a half pages, despite the availability of several works that cover this period.[5] Similarly in the other Polynesian island groups analyzed (with the exception of New Zealand), the final years of the precolonial period are only glanced at. Close examination of this period would reveal the seriously diminished control Islanders had, but Howe is loath to confront such facts, although in passing he admits their truth: "When Fijians, like Samoans, eventually saw the need to form a centralised administration to control the consequences of European settlement, which blossomed from the 1860s, events were already beyond their control. Instead initiative lay with the conflicting interests of Europeans" (277; see also 196-197 for the fate of the island monarchies). The interpretative framework that Howe attempts to apply generally to Island Melanesia and Polynesia is illuminating and useful to illustrate that Islanders were active, thinking participants in early contact events, but it fails to identify their vulnerabilities or to explain their eventual loss of political and socioeconomic independence.

* * * *

Finally I want to outline briefly the development of Pacific history over the past thirty years, examine the criticisms of that history made by certain of its practitioners in the late 1970s, and discuss the new directions some Pacific historians are now exploring.[6] From this overview the important role I foresee that *Where the Waves Fall* will play in the future teaching of Pacific history should become clear. Before the late 1940s the little Pacific history written was focused almost exclusively on the exploits and ambitions of Western imperial and missionary agents.[7] Oliver's general history was very much a product of these sources. Since the Second World War there has been an envigorating expansion in Pacific research in disciplines ranging from geology and oceanography to archaeology, anthropology, demography, linguistics, and history. The latter was encouraged and in many cases guided by the late J. W. Davidson, who established the first department of Pacific history at the Australian National University in the 1950s. By the 1970s undergraduate courses in Pacific history were being taught in many Australian universities and elsewhere, based on the research and publications of the previous two decades.

Davidson's dictum that the new subdiscipline of Pacific history should be island-oriented led to the reconsideration of many highly eurocentric interpretations of past interactions between Islander and

white. Long-held beliefs that Islanders were the passive victims of alien exploitative trading and labor recruiting practices were convincingly exposed as false or only partial truths, particularly by the works of Shineberg, Maude, Starr, and Corris.[8] Islanders' rational and active responses to new opportunities, material and spiritual, have been revealed in island group after island group.[9] At the same time work by other disciplinary specialists has had profound influence on historical interpretations, particularly the demographic arguments of Norma McArthur[10] and more recently Peter Bellwood's important publications on Pacific prehistory.[11] Postcontact histories of many island societies have been written and detailed studies of the impact of beachcombers, Christianity, firearms, and specific trades, and patterns of violence and resistance have been produced.

The *Journal of Pacific History* has for the last nineteen years provided an important publication outlet for new research, and several other journals, established in the last two decades have offered substantial space to Pacific historical material.[12] The *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, for many decades a prime outlet for Polynesian anthropological material, has more recently also published articles of a distinctly historical nature.

During the 1950s and much of the 1960s, historians in the Pacific field were not of island origin. The first island-born historian to join the academic group appeared in the 1960s and today their number is increasing. The creation of the University of the South Pacific and the University of Papua New Guinea, both offering historical and anthropological studies, and the publishing enterprises sponsored by both institutions have played an important role in encouraging island historians and other specialists to produce, and those publications have been offered at prices island audiences can afford.[13] Early publications by Islanders revealed the heavy hand of conventional academic historical practice,[14] but more recently island historians have combined rigorous Western academic procedures with an understanding of their own societies' notions of historical knowledge, significance, and value.[15] To date little of this work has been available in published form but already it is clear that island-born historians offer a complexity and depth of insight that will benefit Pacific historiography immeasurably.

By the second half of the 1970s several Pacific historians were becoming critical of the state of Pacific historiography. O. H. K. Spate and Howe pointed out that as a group Pacific historians were becoming enmeshed in more and more refined and circumscribed studies concentrated on a single island or island group, on a particular trade or institu-

tion.[16] Generalizations and comparisons, they suggested, were being studiously ignored by all but a very few. Both these critics have since attempted to redress this problem, Spate on a large oceanic scale and Howe on a smaller insular basis.[17] Their works are most important additions to the field, but neither, despite the scope of their endeavors, has offered encompassing generalizations or theoretical insights into what are basically empirical studies.

On an interpretative, theoretical level Stewart Firth offered a brief but trenchant critique of what he saw in 1975 as a rapidly solidifying orthodoxy in Pacific historical interpretation:

> Pacific historians have been too much concerned with a region and too little with that region's place in, for example, the history of capitalism and colonial rule. Eager to show the local diversity of the Pacific, the discipline has lacked world perspective. Its judgments on the coming of foreigners, the recruiting of labour, the domination of island economies from outside and the decay of custom have been generally liberal and benign, as if to say: the islanders were at the centre of the picture, they must have triumphed. To portray Pacific Islanders as exploited victims of the Europeans has become close to a sin in the new Pacific historiography. In fact, the islanders did not triumph. The island economies are still today owned by foreigners. Political independence, where it has been achieved, is limited.[18]

As all three reviewers in this forum have noted, Howe in *Where the Waves Fall* has not recognized or attempted to confront this kind of objection.

Finally, Greg Dening discussed the underdeveloped nature of Pacific historiography, which he argued was the outcome of its determinedly empiricist preoccupations: "[Pacific] [r]esearch is dominated by a narrow geographical area, an institution, a period. History is what happens or what the sources let know what happens within those limitations. No problem, no theory, no methodology takes the researcher outside these confines."[19] Largely dependent on the published works that are products of this empiricist tradition, Howe has allowed himself to be confined by their limitations. Little detailed research has been done anywhere in Pacific history on the fundamental change in island societies from affluent subsistence to varying degrees of dependency either in precolonial or later eras. Howe (341) acknowledges the phenomenon but nowhere investigates it. Similarly echoing his sources

Howe reveals little interest in the internal process and meaning of conversion, the nature of island Christianity, or the effects of literacy on oral tradition and nonliterate civilizations.[20] The impact of pacification on gender relations, internal island social and political structures, and on island-foreign relations has received piecemeal attention, predominantly in Melanesia,[21] but no general, comparative perspective has been attempted in this book or elsewhere.

In keeping with his sources Howe has offered culturally homogeneous interpretations of large Polynesian societies such as Hawaii and Tahiti and rarely considers that different groups within island societies may have experienced precolonial change in different ways (149-150, 162). Similarly notions of gender-specific experience are recognized only superficially in discussions (83-90, 162) of what Howe calls "prostitution," but which might less judgmentally and eurocentrically be termed "a sale of sexual services." To argue that Howe's book reveals no interest in or sensitivity about these fields is on one level an unfair criticism, These approaches are only now being explored among Pacific historians, and most have become available since the research for Howe's book was completed. Gunson has discussed the problems of assuming cultural homogeneity in the Society Islands[22] and some detailed research has been published on social group and gender differentiation.[23]

Significantly, if one keeps Dening's strictures in mind, it is the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins who has offered Pacific historians a challenging new theoretical and methodological model. In his early contact history of Hawaii he has attempted to demonstrate the dynamic interplay between culture (structure) and history (process).[24] His methodology is problematic, particularly for later periods of postcontact history, but the light he has shed on chiefly-commoner and male-female relations, on the political implications of intercultural economic exchange, and on the death of Cook is clear evidence of the value of his approach. To date at least one Pacific historian has used this method,[25] which in other areas of historical endeavor has been labeled "ethnographic history."[26] Slowly problem areas that have been foci of debate in social history in Britain and America and in other third world histories are being tackled in Pacific history, as are the methodological problems of combining analysis of cultural structure with historical process.

At mid-decade in the 1980s it is clear that Pacific history is productive on many levels--consolidating and expanding an essential data base of work on hitherto unresearched topics and areas,[27] offering new general histories off island groups,[28] and exploring problem areas and methodologies which until recently Pacific historians had not considered. Given

this state of the art the appearance of *Where the Waves Fall* is most timely, While it gives little intimation of the recent new directions Pacific history has taken and presumably will develop in the late 1980s, it is an excellent synthesis of much that has been published between 1950 and 1980 in precolonial Polynesian and Island Melanesian history. With this book to proceed from or fall back on students should be able to grapple intelligently with the Pacific history that is now developing. I only hope that a general history informed by the new material will not take a third of a century--the interval between the first publication of Oliver and Howe--to appear.

NOTES

1. Kerry R. Howe, "Pacific History in the 1980s: New Directions or Monograph Myopia," *Pacific Studies* 3, no. 1 (1979): 88, and personal discussions with several Pacific history lecturers.

2. Colin Newbury, "Aspects of Cultural Change in French Polynesia: The Decline of the Ari'i," and "Resistance and Collaboration in French Polynesia: The Tahitian War: 1844-1847," *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 76 (1967): 7-26 and 82 (1973): 5-27; Cohn Newbury, *Tahiti Nui, Change and Survival in French Polynesia 1767-1945,* Honolulu, 1980, 87-128, all of which were available when Howe's book was being written.

3. J. W. Davidson, *Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa,* Melbourne, 1967; Gavan Daws, *Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands,* New York, 1968; Peter J. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islanders under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance,* Canberra, 1978; J. D. Legge, *Britain in Fiji, 1858-1880,* London, 1958; Newbury, *Tahiti Nui;* Noel Rutherford, ed., *Friendly Islands: A History of Tonga,* Melbourne, 1977. Numerous studies of the early colonial period in New Zealand had also been published prior to 1980, but as Howe (227) points out New Zealand's colonial experience, as a major settler colony, was markedly different from that of the more northerly archipelagoes.

4. See for example: Greg Dening, *Islands and Beaches. Discourse on a Silent Land, Marquesas 1774-1880,* Melbourne, 1980; Stewart Firth, *New Guinea under the Germans,* Melbourne, 1982; *Kiribati: Aspects of History,* Suva, 1979; Richard Gilson, *The Cook Islands 1820-1950,* Wellington, 1980; Barrie Macdonald, *Cinderellas of the Empire: Towards a History of Kiribati and Tuvalu,* Canberra, 1982; Timothy J. Macnaught, *The Fijian Colonial Experience. A Study of the Neotraditional Order under British Colonial Rule Prior to World War II,* Canberra, 1982; Deryck Scarr, *Fiji: A Short History,* Sydney, 1984; *History of Tuvalu,* Suva, 1983; H. Vilitama et al., *History of Niue,* Suva, 1982.

5. R. S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom. 1854-1874, Twenty Critical Years,* and *The Hawaiian Kingdom. 1874-1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty,* vols. 2 and 3, Honolulu, 1953 and 1967; Theodore Morgan, *Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change 1778-1876,* Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948; Jean Hobbs, *Hawaii: A Pageant of the Soil,* Stanford, 1935; Gavan Daws, *Shoal of Time.*

6. 1 am considering here only Pacific historical works in English.

7. An outstanding exception to this generalization is R. S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom. 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation,* vol. 1, Honolulu, 1938.

8. Dorothy Shineberg, *They Came for Sandalwood: A Study of the Sandalwood Trade in the South-West Pacific 1830-1865,* Melbourne, 1967; H. E. Maude, "The Tahitian Pork Trade: 1800-1830," in *Of Islands and Men. Studies in Pacific History,* Melbourne, 1968; Deryck Scarr, "Recruits and Recruiters: A Portrait of the Labour Trade," in J. W. Davidson and Deryck Starr, eds., *Pacific Islands Portraits,* Canberra., 1970; Peter Corris, *Passage, Port and Plantation. A History of Solomon Islands Labour Migration 1870-1914,* Mellbourne, 1973.

9. For example: W. H. Pearson, "The Reception of European Voyagers on Polynesian Islands, 1568-1797," *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* 26 (1970): 121-153; G. S. Parsonson, "The Literate Revolution in *Polynesia,"Journal of Pacijic History* 2 (1967): 39-57; J. D. Freeman, "The Joe Gimlet or Siovili Cult," in J. D. Freeman and W. R. Geddes, eds., *Anthropology in the South Seas,* New Plymouth, New Zealand, 1959; K. R. Howe, "The Maori Response to Christianity in the Thames-Waikato Area 1833-1840," *New Zealand Journal of History* 7, no. 1 (1973): 28-46.

10. Norma McArthur, *Island Populations of the Pacific,* Canberra, 1967; "Essays in Multiplication: European Seafarers in Polynesia," *Journal of Pacific History* 1 (1966): 91-105.

11. Peter Bellwood, *Man's Conquest of the Pacific,* Auckland, 1978.

12. They include *New Zealand Journal of History,* established 1967; *Hawaiian Journal of History,* established 1967; *Pacific Perspective,* established 1972; *Oral History,* established 1973; *Pacific Studies,* established 1977.

13. The Institute of Pacific Studies, associated with the University of the South Pacific, and the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, associated with the University of Papua New Guinea, have published journals, books, and monographs by island and non-island authors in the Pacific historical field. Some books have been jointly produced with Australian and New Zealand publishing houses.

14. Sione Latukefu, *Church and State in Tonga. The Wesleyan Methodist Missionaries and Political Development, 1822-1875,* Canberra, 1974. Latukefu's article "Oral Traditions: An Appraisal of Their Value in Historical Research in Tonga," *Journal of Pacific History* 3 (1968): 135-143, led one to hope that oral evidence and the author's knowledge of Tonga would be prominent in his later work.

15. J. D. Waiko, "Be Jijimo: A History According to the Tradition of the Binandere People of Papua New Guinea," Canberra, Australian National University, Ph.D. thesis, 1983; John D. Waiko, "Binandere Oral Tradition: Sources and Problems," in Donald Denoon and Roderic Lacey, eds., *Oral Tradition in Melanesia,* Port Moresby, 1981, 11-30; Malama Meleisea, *O Tama Uli. Melanesians in Samoa,* Suva, 1980; K. S. Eteuati, "Evaevaga a Samoa; Assertion of Samoan Autonomy 1920-1936," Canberra, Australian National University, Ph.D. thesis, 1983.

16. O. H. K. Spate, "The Pacific as an Artefact," in Niel Gunson, ed., *The Changing Pacific: Essays in Honour of H. E. Maude,* Melbourne, 1978, 41-42; Howe, "Pacific History in the 1980s."

17. O. H. K. Spate, *The Pacific since Magellan. The Spanish Lake* and *Monopolists and Freebooters,* vols. 1 and 2, Canberra, 1979 and 1983; K. R. Howe, *Where the Waves Fall.*

18. Stewart Firth comment in Gavan Daws, "On Being a Historian of the Pacific," in John A. Moses, ed., *Historical Disciplines and Culture in Australasia,* St. Lucia, 1979, 127-128.

19. G. M. Dening, review of Hugh Laracy, *Marists and Melanesiuns: A History of Catholic Missions in the Solomon Islands,* in *New Zealand Journal of History* 12, no. 1 (1978): 81-82. In his own history of the Marquesas, *Islands and Beaches,* Dening combined an encyclopedic knowledge of the available sources with reflective asides into theoretical arenas. No comparative Pacific or Polynesian perspective however was attempted.

20. James Clifford, "The Translation of Cultures: Maurice Leenhardt's evangelism, New Caledonia 1902-1926," *Journal of Pacific History* 15, no. 1 (1980): 2-20; Greg Dening, *Islands and Beaches,* chap. 5 and Reflection; Charles W. Forman, *The Island Churches of the South Pacific,* Maryknoll, N.Y., 1982; Jack Goody, ed., *Literacy in Traditional Societies,* Cambridge, 1968; Jack Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind,* Cambridge, 1977; John D. Waiko, "Binandere Oral Tradition."

21. Margaret Rodman and Matthew Cooper, eds., *The Pacification of Melanesia,* Ann Arbor, 1979; E J. P. Poole and G. H. Herdt, eds., *Sexual Antagonism, Gender, and Social Change in Papua New Guinea,* in *Social Analysis,* Special Issue, no. 12, 1982.

22. Niel Gunson, "Polynesian Studies: A Decade of Tahitian History," *Pacific History Bibliography and Comment 1982,* 67-68.

23. Marshall Sahlins, *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities. Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom,* Ann Arbor, 1981, 33-43; Caroline Ralston, "Hawaii 1778-1854. Some Aspects of *Maka'ainana* Response to Rapid Cultural Change," *Journal of Pacific History* 19, nos. 1 and 2 (1984): 21-40; Patricia Grimshaw, " 'Christian Woman, Pious Wife, Faithful Mother, Devoted Missionary': Conflicts in Roles of American Missionary Women in Nineteenth Century Hawaii," *Feminist Studies* 9, no. 3 (1983): 489-521; Sherry B. Ortner, "Gender and Sexuality in Hierarchical Societies; The Case of Polynesia and Some Comparative Implications," in Sherry B. Ortner and Harriet Whitehead, eds., *Sexual Meanings. The Cultural Construction of Gender and Sexuality,* Cambridge, 1981, 359-409; F. Allan Hanson, "Female Pollution in Polynesia?" *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 91 (1982): 335-381; Christine W. Gailey, "Putting Down Sisters and Wives: Tongan Women and Colonization," in M. Etienne and E. Leacock, eds., *Women and Colonization,* New York, 1980, 294-322; Kerry James, "Gender Relations in Tonga, 1780 to 1984," *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 92 (1983): 233-243; Penelope Schoeffel, "The Origin and Development of Women's Associations in Western Samoa, 1830-1977," *Journal of Pacific Studies* 3 (1977): 1-21.

24. Sahlins, *Historical Metaphors.*

25. Bronwen Douglas, " 'Written on the Ground': Spatial Symbolism, Cultural Categories and Historical Process in New Caledonia," *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 91 (1982): 383-415.

26. Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia 1740-1790,* Chapel Hill, 1982, see especially 5-7 and 323-357; June Philipp, "Traditional Historical Narrative and Action-Oriented (or Ethnographic) History," *Historical Studies* 20, no. 80 (1983): 339-352;

Bronwen Douglas, "Some Impressions of Ethnographic History and Trends in Ethnography," paper presented at the Pacific History Association meeting, December 1983.

27. Despite the volume of publications in Pacific history there are still gaps in the field. The Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and the Marquesas in the twentieth century require general histories, while economic topics have won few publicists. The coconut oil and copra trade, one of the most widespread and significant economic activities for many small and large islands, remains uncharted, except for a few specific area1 studies. Similarly a general history on the impact of whaling on island societies has not been produced.

28. Francis X. Hezel, S.J., *The First Taint of Ciuilization. A History of the Caroline and Marshall Islands in Pre-Colonial Days, 1521-1885,* Honolulu, 1983; Noel J. Kent, *Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence,* New York, N.Y., 1983; see note 4 for other recent publications.

Review: O. H. K. SPATE
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Kerry Howe has attempted, in the main very successfully, to meet the acute need for a general survey of Pacific Islands history reflecting not only the increasing store of knowledge but also the increasing sophistication in its handling. This means an Islands-oriented history, breaking away from the Eurocentric stance in which Islanders were seen as mere supers in the saga of colonial expansion, but transcending also the cramping limits of what Howe has elsewhere aptly called "Monograph Myopia."[1] His book is finely presented and very readable, well proportioned (perhaps Melanesian missions get a bit more than their fair share of space), and solidly based on a wide documentation. There is an immense amount to stimulate discussion, yet even when one disagrees one must applaud the temperate way in which Howe presents his own views, the judicious arguments, the range and aptness of his illustrations. The good things in the book outweigh its few failings by far; and even where I disagree, the divergence of our views is not fundamental but rather one of degree and emphasis.

A few points of detail. Howe's Pacific scholarship seems to me all but impeccable; he is not quite so surefooted at the European end. It is surely long past time for serious writers to get rid of "Rousseau's Noble Savage" (47); the man begat enough as it were legitimate bastards to be spared having this fictitious one fathered on him. To say that "hopes for trade and new lands to rule were not entirely forgotten" in the great eighteenth-century exploring voyages (81) is a large understatement; the answer to the question "Science or Empire?" is "Empire and Science." And again it was surely not so much "Crozet's tirades" (208) as

the far more widely diffused accounts of Cook's death and La Pérouse's losses in Samoa that brought onstage the ignoble savage.

Such minor questionable points are not of great significance, But while I am in cordial sympathy with the general thrust and temper of *Where the Waves Fall,* I think that at times Howe pushes his reasoning too far. For instance, it is true that the Melanesian/Polynesian dichotomy--Big Men by achievement, Chiefs by ascription--was initially overdrawn and made too prescriptive. But it can still be a useful tool, discreetly handled. For instance, the lack of "polities" in Melanesia seems to me to help explain the high incidence and the informality of violence in the region, and hence contributed to its bad press. Howe's virtual dismissal of the concept (60-64; cf. 255) as "so general as to be not very helpful" could be described in those very words; and his dismissal is put in very prescriptive terms: "none can be classified," "they must not be termed," as Melanesian. But "Once the notion of a 'Melanesian' or a 'Polynesian' system is abandoned," what are we left with? A congeries of tribal solipsisms? The fact that the colors in the spectrum overlap does not mean that we cannot distinguish violet from red. or even blue from green, I do not see that the suggested verbal shift from a cultural to a geographic usage helps. It seems to me that in a laudable effort to get away from insufficiently discriminating system-mongering, Howe risks falling into the opposite error and so negating his own desire, so well expressed in "Monograph Myopia," of transcending an over-particularizing empiricism.

There is another, and humanly speaking a more serious, danger connected with the stress on uniqueness. It is a truism that every autonomous society is unique, and it is important that every people should have a just pride in its past; and for the pride to be just, it must include a correct estimate of its place in the world. (This does not depend on size and power: as the great Portuguese historian Alexandre Herculano said, "We are small . . . but that will not prevent the great nations respecting us if we are respectworthy.")[2] But all too often a real uniqueness is equated with an unreal superiority, and this can lead to very damaging miscalculations and/or an introspective brooding on past glories: the old Iberian disease now more than incipient in Britain.

Pacific societies can be hurt by too-ardent friends as well as by open oppressors and exploiters; I think, for instance, that in the long run the Fijians may prove to have been ill-served by those who married Old School Tie with Old Clan Tapa, seeing in Fijian society the mythical Squire's Merrie England of their nostalgic dreams. A historiography too sharply Island-oriented could lead to a perilous estimate of self-suffi-

ciency; the elements of likeness as well as of individuality must be given due weight if the human family is ever to climb out of its present disrupted state.

This does not mean that there should not be a continued emphasis on the "inside" view--there is still a good deal of retributive justice to be done to correct past chauvinistic errors, and one value of Howe's book is as a survey of the current state of the art. It does mean, however, that the local or regional historian, indigenous or not, must not stay marooned on some particular atoll or group, "regardless of the sweep of the currents which bring life to the isles";[3] otherwise there will be new chauvinistic errors. Howe's balanced approach could be a good guide.

In this connection, however, I have an uneasy feeling that Howe may have rather overstressed Islander success in riding the waves of Euramerican incursion. It is not a question of "Fatal Impact," (although Dening's *Islands and Beaches*[4] suggests that for one group at least this might not be too strong a term. Howe's reasons for limiting his geographical scope (xiv) are in principle unexceptionable, but in practice it is perhaps unfortunate that so significant a group as the Marquesas--the first in Polynesia to experience substantial European contact--should be left out.

Howe gives many examples of the Islanders' adroitness in coping with Euramerican intrusions, secular and religious, and in manipulating the intruders to their own ends. But how much of this was initiative, how much a reactive response? Change had occurred before the intruders came, and would have continued--not necessarily always in a positive sense, as Easter Island shows--but on what scale, at what pace? Might not the missions, and the Euramerican presence in general, have been a necessary though insufficient factor? We should remember the wise words of Vidal--which are not Eurocentric, since he is speaking of his own country: "The impulse comes from without. No civilized country is altogether the creation of its own civilization. Or at any rate it can produce only a limited civilization . . . its life must be in touch with a wider sphere, which enriches it with its own substance and instils into it new ferments."[5] Granted that the fermentation is often painful, as it was indeed for Celtic and later again for Saxon Britain at contact with the "wider spheres" of Romans and Normans.

However decisive Islander action might be in local detail, where--except to a certain extent in Hawaii and Tonga--was there any lasting success, any true independence after the "Denouement" (Howe's term in each case) had begun? Howe is of course not writing a history *of* colonial rule, but his restriction "*to* colonial rule" practically precludes dis-

cussion of a question most vital to any discussion of the extent and effect of Euramerican impact on Islander societies: *What happened to the land*--and especially the good land. Had this been taken into account, it may reasonably be doubted whether the rather euphoric tone in which Howe describes Islander successes in fobbing off intruders, or using them, or playing them off against one another, could be altogether sustained. (This is not in the faintest degree discreditable; even the greater societies of Asia, never subjugated culturally, could only react, and Japan's success was in fact enforced upon her.) I think this limitation might have been recognized, whether by slight expansion of the "Denouement" sections or by a rider to the preface or epilogue.

There are a number of topics, of less scope, which might be debated. Except in New Zealand and when treating specific trades such as sandalwood and recruiting, Howe gives too little attention to environmental and economic factors for my taste. This is particularly noticeable in "Background to Hawaiian politics" (152-154). Again, granting that tales of the Charlie Savage variety are probably largely nonsense, I am not quite convinced by the downgrading of musketry: if muskets, although clumsy and unreliable, were "psychologically important," did not that very fact transcend these defects and so make them "technically effective" (259)? There seems to be an element of chicken-and-egg reasoning here; to analyze it would take us into too much detail.

What has been said in these pages is enough to show that Howe's book is rich in matter that any serious student of Pacific Islands history should ponder over; and yet this review has given a very inadequate impression of its positive qualities. Douglas Oliver's *The Pacific Islands* was a great book in its day. I am confident that *Where the Waves Fall* will prove its very worthy successor.

NOTES

1. K. R. Howe, "Pacific History in the 1980s: New Directions or Monograph Myopia?" *Pacific Studies* 3, no. 1 (1979), pp. 81-90.

2. A. Herculano, "Solemnia verba" (1850), in A. Sergio, ed., *Sôbre história e historio*grufia (Lisboa, 1937), pp. 94-120 at 116.

3. O. H. K. Spate, "The Pacific as an Artefact," in N. Gunson, ed., *The Changing Pacific: Essays in Honour of H. E. Maude* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 32-45 at 34.

4. G. Dening, *Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land, Marquesus 1774-1880* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980).

5. P. Vidal de la Blache, *Tableau de la géogruphie de la France* (Paris, 1908), p. 17, quoted in L. Febvre, *A Geographical Introduction to History* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932), p. 337.

Response: K. R. HOWE
MASSEY UNIVERSITY
NEW ZEALAND

I am grateful to *Pacific Studies* for arranging this review forum. It is a fitting conclusion to my "Pacific Islands History in the 1980s" (*Pacific Studies* 3, no. 1, 1979), which argued that *one* of the things badly needed for Pacific islands studies was a general history putting together all the detailed but fragmented research of thirty years of "modern Pacific history."

Naturally I am pleased that the reviewers here agree that my efforts have been worthwhile and that they concur in the view that my book is a "worthy successor" to Oliver's *The Pacific Islands,* which was first published in 1951. I am particularly pleased that the reviewers confirm our experience in New Zealand that the book is most suitable for the teaching of Pacific history.

Of course I unreservedly accept all the nice things that the three reviewers say and, lest the following comments seem too defensive, let me make clear at the outset that I thank them for all their opinions whether I agree with them or not. Let me also emphasize that I am perhaps in a better position than anyone else to be aware of the book's limitations. Some of these limitations have been mentioned by the reviewers, others that I believe exist in the book have not (but I'm not going to list them here!).

I shall deal first with certain points raised by the reviews of Spate and Meleisea, and then at more length with that of Ralston.

Spate's introductory statements and overall assessment are indeed generous and I am very grateful for them. On some points of detail: his critique of my brief introductory discussion of political structures in Melanesia and Polynesia is rather abrupt and his compression of selected sentences, especially from page 60 of my book, puts the least favorable interpretation on my views. But I accept his warning that I risk the "error" of "negating . . . [my] desire . . . of transcending an over-particularising empiricism." Both Meleisea and Ralston however suggest that with regard to some Polynesian political systems my error is precisely the opposite!

Spate's warnings about the dangers of too much emphasis on the "uniqueness" of each island and of the historian being conceptually "marooned on some particular atoll or group, regardless of the sweep of the currents which bring life to the isles" is well worth stressing. One of Spate's significant contributions to Pacific history in his multivolume work *The Pacific Since Magellan* is his oceanic as opposed to insular

perspective. I am pleased that he feels I have taken a balanced approach in this context of assessing the relative importance of indigenous as opposed to exotic influences. I shall return later to Spate's point about my decision to write a history to colonial rule.

Meleisea is also generous in his overall assessment. He nicely, but all too briefly, captures the sense of excitement that modern Pacific history has had for him as it unfolded from the late 1960s; and his distillation of my book into "four themes" is more succinct than my efforts at a similar exercise.

I agree with his contention that in discussions of Polynesian political systems there has been far too much arbitrary categorizing and stereotyping, which seems to stem largely from the works of Sahlins and Goldman. But contrary to what Meleisea says, I have certainly not accepted the proposition (and nor, I think, has Goldman) that Polynesian political systems represent the "culminations of hundreds, even thousands of years of unidirectional evolution."

Meleisea's comments on Samoa are also most pertinent and again I find myself in complete agreement with his interpretations. I hope I have not, as he claims, tried "to diminish the tragic consequences of land grabbing, king-making, and gunboat diplomacy by Europeans in destroying the political capacities of islanders to respond on equal terms." I believe that there is plenty of material illustrating precisely these features on pages 247-254. And I must take issue with his comment that I conclude that "the Samoans simply lacked the capacity to unite and that the three powers, in the face of this intransigence" carved up Samoa among them. The word "intransigence" is most certainly not mine. What I do argue (which is presumably in accord with Meleisea's views) is that at those times, especially from the 1870s onward, when Samoans did agree upon a form of government to represent them

> their hopes of creating a centralized administration were to be dashed by the economic and political interests of rival European concerns. . . . The overall economic needs of the white population were much more demanding and more complex. Samoa was needed for its land; Samoans were needed as plantation labourers. The Europeans wanted a strong government which could recognize their land claims, guarantee them rights to buy more, and generally sanction and protect their interests and property. But since the English, American, German, and French communities were riven by religious, national, and commercial conflicts they could never agree on how such a gov-

> ernment should operate. Various European interest groups could divide and rule the Samoans, which was easy enough given Samoan factionalism, yet in doing so they quarrelled bitterly amongst themselves. The Europeans were less united than the Samoans. (249-250)

This theme then becomes the dominant one and is illustrated by many examples for the remainder of the chapter on Samoa.

Ralston's lengthy review, again with a most gracious introduction, could well be used as a basis for a course on Pacific islands historiography! Unfortunately space does not permit me to reply in kind. I will deal with what I feel are the most substantive points, some of which will refer back to Spate and Meleisea.

I accept that my history (and Pacific islands history in general since J. W. Davidson days) has what Ralston calls a "eurocentricity" of structure, that is, that the basic "organizing principles" have to do with the arrival of the West and the Islanders' responses, Martin Silverman, in reviewing another book (*Pacific History Bibliography and Comment 1983,* p. 80) has aptly called this approach the Oceanic Epic: "The population. adapts to its environment; it has its own history for a while; it responds to a succession of alien forces which are either ripples or waves; it looks forward toward an uncertain future." I'm not quite sure why Ralston (who admits to her own contribution to this Epic) feels so uneasy about it. One can acknowledge and accept its obvious limitations yet still find it a perfectly valid and useful perspective. Ralston certainly offers no alternatives, and in any case alternatives will have their own particular limitations--the universally valid perspective on the past does not exist. The problem is that Ralston slips too readily from saying that the "genesis and organizing principles" of my book "are imposed from the outside" to saying several times in her review that the events I examine are determined by outside or exotic influences. This contradicts a main theme of the book which suggests that for much of the period under discussion "the course of events was very much influenced by the nature of the Islanders' own social and political arrangements" (352). And I must say that there seems to be a contradiction in her dissatisfaction with the view (which she erroneously attributes to me), that foreigners were always the "motivating agents," "the preponderant generators of change," and her insistence that I have not given enough weight to European interference causing the Islanders' "loss of land and political initiative, and their increasing dependency and economic vulnerability." There is a flaw in her logic somewhere.

Ralston proceeds to survey the various sections of my book and for the most part our views coincide, though I am a little surprised at her comment that my account of precontact Pacific societies is "static." I do devote an entire chapter to change in island communities from initial settlement to the advent of Europeans. Also I would like to state emphatically that I have not assumed (as Ralston says I have) that those islands which saw the emergence of monarchies are in any sense superior to those which did not. Nor do I ever claim that these centralized states were better placed to cope with Western contact.

> Whatever the island contexts in which these kingdoms emerged and operated, outside influences far beyond the control of kings and their subjects ultimately determined the fate of the royal regimes. The French took over Tahiti in 1843. . . . the United States annexed Hawaii in 1898. The Tongan monarchy survived, not just because of certain attributes and strengths it possessed, but because the Great Powers agreed to allow it to survive, under British protection. . . . Had any of the powers wanted to annex Tonga there would have been little the Tongan monarchy could have done to prevent it. (197)

I chose to examine the issue of political centralization, or lack of it, since this provided a narrative structure and a convenient theme around which many aspects of culture contact could be investigated. And I wished to do so in a comparative context since, to my knowledge, no one has ever done so.

I would now like to turn to Spate's and especially Ralston's view that I should have said more about the fate of Pacific Islanders in colonial and postcolonial times and contrasted this with my more optimistic analysis of their precolonial experience. I have every sympathy with the thrust of their opinions. Clearly this is an issue that so much of the "new Pacific historiography" must come to terms with. To what extent should Pacific historians, in choosing to write about events of a hundred years ago, constantly look ahead? I believe that I *have* adequately foreshadowed less happy colonial times in terms of loss of land and economic and political initiatives. Ralston even quotes several of my comments to this effect (though to suit her argument she then dismisses them!). But though I refer to these issues far more than the reviewers indicate, my emphasis on them has, in their view, been insufficient. I can only say that my views about the colonial and postcolonial experience for Pacific Islanders do not differ from theirs.

The root cause of the reviewers' unease in this context is my decision to stop at the point when colonial rule was established. I am acutely conscious of the structural difficulties this has caused. Ralston seems unconvinced with the reasons that I offer in my preface for not coming into the twentieth century. I still can't think of more compelling ones. All I can say is that I would very much like to have brought the story through to the present day but given the sparse nature of twentieth-century studies on the Pacific I felt unable to do so--and so has everybody else over the last thirty years! Ralston says it can now be done and if she is so confidently informed as she claims I hope she (or somebody else) makes the attempt, but I'm not aware of any moves in this direction (and I have no immediate plans for a *Waves Two*). I think it should be stressed for the benefit of those readers not familiar with Pacific historiography that Pacific historical studies are overwhelmingly precolonial in setting. Ralston's own work is, and so is the work of other leading contributors whom she quotes--for example, Greg Dening whose recent book on the Marquesas covers the period from 1774-1880. And perhaps it is no coincidence that Francis Hezel's just published book on Micronesia (*The First Taint of Civilization*, 1984)--which nicely fills a gap in the coverage--is subtitled "A history of the Caroline and Marshall islands in pre-colonial days, 1521-1885."

I am certainly not trying to defend or justify this chronological bias; indeed I wish it did not exist, but it *does*, and thus it is necessarily reflected in the structure of my book.

Ralston's concluding outline of the "development of Pacific history over the past thirty years" is a useful and at times provocative summary of directions, strengths, weaknesses. But not much is new. There is little I wish to take issue with, indeed much of it is in complete accord with my own published views. What does disturb me somewhat though is the fact that whenever and wherever Pacific historians meet, we seem to chew over these issues ad nauseam. People are always pointing out what should be done, but very few actually do anything about it. We are our own best critics, yet also, I fear, our worst since the atmosphere engendered by the often negative (dare I say cynical) self-examination our discipline is prone to indulge in has not encouraged people to break out and, to use Spate's words, "play the generalist game." After all, as Ralston says, there is a "third of a century" between Oliver's and Howe's histories of the islands. I can only endorse wholeheartedly her hope that another general history will not take a similar length of time to appear.

REVIEWS

Ahmed Ali and Ron Crocombe, eds., *Politics in Melanesia.* Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific, 1982. Pp. xii., 170, illustrated, maps, index. F$10.00 cloth. F$7.00 paper.

———, *Politics in Micronesia.* Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific, 1983. Pp. xii, 168, illustrated, maps, index. F$8.00 paper.

Melanesia and Micronesia are studies in geopolitical contrast. The decolonial process alone separates the recent historical events of these two cultural areas in a distinct manner. For Kiribati, the "local concept of independence . . . meant more than political autonomy." Though there was a noticeable absence of I-Kiribati nationalism, individual island patriotism governed the course toward independence. Once separation from Tuvalu was achieved, the issue of Banaban secession became a primary obstacle to final self-government. While such a complex issue obfuscated negotiations, Roniti Teiwaki believes that the decolonial process "could have been better facilitated if the British Government had so wished by stalling separatist aspirations."

Changes in the political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands also followed a curious course of events and circumstances. Though American policy in the early 1970s was committed to preserving the geopolitical integrity of Micronesia, the differing objectives of each major island group soon led to fragmentation of the area. In the Northern Marianas, Agnes McPhetres remarks that it was easy to become both "pessimistic and critical" with the rapid manner in which decisions were made, commitments given, and structures established

during the negotiations for commonwealth status, without any real understanding of what was really happening. With the Federated State of Micronesia the problem was the "slow transfer of administrative and budgetary authority from the Trust Territory Government." One of the more creative responses by the FSM government was to seek status as a state agency in order to facilitate direct federal appropriations to the islands. The principle of decentralization of authority, according to David Hanlon and William Eperiam, has been one of "the most delicate problems," especially over questions of jurisdiction between the local and central governments.

In Belau (Palau), economic development and self-determination are the "generally accepted goals" of the islanders. The local leadership, however, has yet to develop a "consensus on the strategy and methods of achieving these goals." In spite of such aspirations, there is still a "strongly-felt desire to maintain and preserve selected aspects of culture and tradition amidst the many changes taking place in the region." Curiously, however, Belauans have a "marked propensity, almost a predilection, to adopt foreign ways while firmly believing the adoptions will not change them fundamentally." Among the paramount questions facing the new republic is how to reconcile local aspirations with the American demands emanating from their strategic interests. The negotiations over "free association" and the corresponding controversy over the ratification of the final document revealed the underlying tensions among the competing members of the local elite groups. Land use, environmental pollution, and economic development, conclude Gwenda Iyechad and Frank Quimby, will likely persist as paramount issues in this particular respect.

Similar though distinguishable questions confront the Marshalls. Divisiveness is a "significant problem for the Marshalls." Building consensus and trust is as "important as political and economic independence," Following the political separation of the islands from the Trust Territory, the development of factions was hardly surprising. Although the government is accomplishing certain things, it has not been building either trust or confidence. Differences, says Daniel Smith, based upon party affiliation, traditional status, and family ties enter into political consideration across a broad front.

The struggle for civil and political rights has been a long-term matter for Guam. After lengthy periods of colonial rule, increased contact with American mainlanders "intensified the desire of the Guamanians for citizenship and self-government." In spite of the impetus to liberalize the territorial government, the "notion of separating from the United States is difficult to accept." As a ward of Congress, Guamanians, in the

opinion of Carlos Taitano, will find it necessary to continue the struggle for greater self-determination.

For Nauru, the first independent Micronesian state, "there are no extremes of wealth and poverty, nor any rigid class lines." Unlike the rest of Micronesia, Nauru's economic condition is without anxiety. Although expenditures have been lavish by any standard, the resources and reserves are still substantial. Such fortunate circumstances, however, are not without problems, both real and potential. For Nauru, the politics of the island are synonymous with the politics of phosphate. According to Ron Crocombe and Christine Giese, absentee leadership due to this fact makes the island republic especially vulnerable to mischief.

While distance and isolation characterize much of Micronesia, cultural differences operating within relatively small and populous areas are typical of Melanesia. For Papua New Guinea, the colonial legacy has persisted in the domestic psychology and administration of government to the extent, in Stephen Pokawin's opinion, that the "lack of major changes in the inherited institutions have been caused by the lack of political will and initiative from both leaders and the population." Independence has become more complicated "with Papua New Guineans going against themselves." Many people are now "scheming for political advantages which in the colonial period were not so obvious."

By contrast, Irian Jaya's path to independence has a long and bitter history. The "Indonesianisation" of the Melanesian population has contributed to the emergence of a native resistance movement with attendant raids, reprisals, and refugees. The political and diplomatic history of Irian Jaya is an example of "constant betrayal in which the interests of a small Melanesian population have been sacrificed to those of its larger neighbors." Peter Savage notes that with such an observation in mind, any attempt to fashion a "Pacific way" will be constrained by the needs of metropolitan capital.

In New Caledonia, colonial repression of the native society approached genocidal proportions. Yann Celene Uregei feels that there are two major sources of tension. The economic causes are attributed to local mineral resources wherein a small number of metropolitan consortia have managed to monopolize the metalurgical industry with the aid of the French administration and armed forces. Politically, the French administration has consistently refused to consider the demands of the Melanesians for self-government. Successive metropolitan statutes have suppressed Kanak aspirations while enhancing metropolitan power.

Many of the independent Melanesian states have been almost routine-

ly confronted with maintaining the integrity of their respective plural societies. As described by Ahmed Ali, Fiji society possesses a "symbiotic economic relationship" among its constituent communities. In politics, to the contrary, major political parties follow communal and ethnic lines. The seeming paradox in the political configuration has produced mutual anxieties and insecurity in local society. The Indians dominate the mercantile and agricultural sectors as well as the demographic profile. The Fijians, on the other hand, possess substantial landholdings much of which is in demand by Indian agriculturalists. The differences contribute to strengthening racial stereotypes, which in turn has led to a decline in inter-community relations since independence. The compensatory advantages given to Fijians in education and the civil service compelled a drop in Indian support for the Fijian-dominated Alliance party. Correspondingly, the rise of the Fijian nationalist party intensified not only racial divisions, but also the divisions among the Fijians themselves. Similarly, religious distinctions among the Indian community underscored this aspect in the internal politics of the Indian-dominated Federation party. If nothing else, Fiji has managed to maintain a modicum of social stability even though race remains "the most significant factor in politics."

The insular fragmentation of Vanuatu is a fundamental consideration in its politics. In spite of French resistance to independence, a political turning point in Vanuatu's political development came not out of a change in colonial policies, but rather out of the mistaken belief that a francophone political majority would soon emerge that would enable continued metropolitan presence in the islands. The success of ni-Vanuatu nationalism produced contrary results and an impetus that France and Great Britain could neither overcome nor inhibit. Multiple intervention in post-independence affairs, concur Grace Molisa, Nikenike Vurobaravu, and Howard Van Trease, resulted in short-lived secessionist actions on Espiritu Santo and Tanna. Though independence became a reality, economic developlment was left to an uncertain future. The former condominium government provided little in the way of support for an economically viable infrastructure. The colonial government, moreover, did little or nothing to qualify the islanders to fill key administrative posts. Such factors aside, one of the critical issues facing the new state is that of "maintaining and expanding the support of the majority, to embrace those disaffected groups which were involved in the pre-independence rebellion."

The concept of an independent Solomon Islands is a "new phenomenon" to the majority of Melanesians. The symbols of nationhood for the most part came into existence only since independence. The develop-

ment of a national identity, however, has been encouraging. Two important factors, argues Francis Saemala, are integrally important in this particular respect. First, "senior public servants must become more sensitive to the real social needs of the people for education, health services, and a sense of belonging to the government and the nation," The second consideration is that "the development of the economy must be such that important resources are not drained out in the pursuit of modernization along the line of industrial nations."

The similarities and differences in the experiences of various Pacific island groups make for interesting copy. What is especially salient is the growth of nascent forms of nationalism. Though most of the independent states in Melanesia assumed the same territorial configurations imposed by previous colonial regimes, almost the opposite occurred in Micronesia where separation or fragmentation became a key characteristic of pre-independence development. Such permutations in national self-perceptions are in themselves important features of the region. While each chapter of these two volumes is prefaced with useful data, it would have been a service for the editors to have provided a final summarizing chapter analyzing the major directions that political movement in these two cultural regions has taken. The two works, however, are most useful in understanding the politics unique to these island groups.

William E. H. Tagupa
Office of Hawaiian Affairs
State of Hawaii

Roger Bell, *Last among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984. Pp. 377, bibliography, index, notes. $24.95.

The history of Hawaii's quest for American statehood has emerged in Roger Bell's *Last among Equals.* Rather than being just another mundane example of orthodox public history, Bell's study examines the theories, trends, rhetoric, and politics governing Hawaii's transition from an American territory to a state. The fundamental issue is restated at the outset: "The question of statehood for Hawaii was not simply about home rule. It was also about who should rule at home." The changes occurring during the early twentieth century precipitated considerable reflection over the eventual political destiny of the islands. The revolutionary Americans responsible for the overthrow of the

Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 swept away the last remaining vestiges of native rule and proceeded to govern Hawaii in oligarchic fashion and with considerable success. The growing population of Asians augured increased oriental influence in the political climate, which the ruling patriarchs wished to forestall. With some ideological support from some native Hawaiian personalities, resistance to statehood based on anti-Asian sentiment would permeate the statehood scenario for the next six decades.

The emergence of political parties institutionalized ethnic rivalries, giving opposing segments legitimate affiliation to pursue statehood or to hinder it. In spite of growing Asian participation in the Democratic party, the white elite nonetheless controlled the fundamental political, economic, and social institutions in the islands and would continue to do so as long as their relationship with Washington was based on the appointive process. Changes in political outlook did not come with any liberalization in philosophy, but rather as the result of identifiable situations that clearly indicated the vulnerability of territorial status to congressional actions. Adverse publicity surrounding the traumatic Massie rape trial which pitted white and non-white communities against each other aroused the ire of many congressmen who threatened commission government for Hawaii. The overextension of martial law during World War II and passage of legislation unfavorable to Hawaii sugar convinced many oligarchs that congressional wardship over the islands could only be terminated with statehood. Consequently, during the late 1940s an uneasy alliance between the dominant Republican party and the fledgling Democrats was struck in a concerted effort to obtain statehood. Nothing less than a well organized and relentless campaign to convince conservative congressmen that Hawaii was qualified to enter the Union as a coequal partner could succeed. While questions concerning the noncontiguousness of the islands and the size of its populations were raised as obstacles, the major concern was anxiety over Hawaii's Asian-American population, Southern state control over key congressional committees, especially those in the Senate, would be diluted by two additional seats for Hawaii. Persistence and well-conceived strategies among Democrats and Republicans alike carried the campaign.

The decolonization of Hawaii was thus completed in 1959 and signaled “the triumph of American values and institutions over those indigenous to the islands” in spite of marked misgivings among some native Hawaiians over the “forced transformation of their vulnerable community” away from their monarchical past.

Bell’s work is significant for several reasons. First, he demonstrates

considerable sensitivity in his analyses while maintaining a forthright detachment from the high emotionalism connected with the issues. Second, Bell integrates oral history sources into his documentary evidence with considerable skill and uncommon ease without resorting to anecdotal methods. Third, his juxtaposition of local and national issues relevant to the statehood movement makes this volume an important account on perhaps the rarest legislative act that can be taken by Congress. The extension of the American frontier into the Pacific thus became a settled issue and incorporated the islands irrevocably into the Union.

William E. H. Tagupa
Office of Hawaiian Affairs
State of Hawaii

Josephine Flood, *Archaeology of the Dreamtime.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983. Pp. 288, illustrated. $19.95.

This is an interesting and well-written book that incorporates many of the recent developments in Australian prehistory. It is both informed and informative.

Much has happened since 1975 when the last major synthesis on Australian prehistory, John Mulvaney's *Prehistory of Australia,* was published, and Flood manages to touch on most major issues now current. Together with White and O'Connell's recently released *A Prehistory of Australia, New Guinea and Sahul* (1982), I imagine that this book will be standard fare for any course dealing with Australian prehistory.

Despite some structural problems, *Archaeology of the Dreamtime* is very readable. As Flood notes in her preface, she has attempted to avoid jargon and unnecessary technical terms. As a result, it is a book for the general public as well as the specialists; I *know* that it is being used very successfully by teachers in local high schools. In contrast White and O'Connell's work is drier and more difficult--the type of book anyone interested in Australia must have on their shelf but definitely not recommended for light reading,

The real strength of Flood's writing is her intimate knowledge of the Australian "scene" and her ability to give background details to many of the discoveries. She conveys well the chance factor inherent in all archaeological work, the excitement of discovery and near misses, in a way uncharacteristic of other general syntheses of Australian prehistory.

Some of the details have not appeared in print before. For instance, here you will find out the "true story" of how Roger Luebber first heard of the wooden artifacts being excavated from Wyrie Swamp and how this led to the recovery of the world's oldest boomerangs, Here you will also learn how the Upper Swan Site, dated to 38,000 B.P., was discovered and almost lost, the significance of John Mulvaney's suitcase at Mungo, and so on. These tales of interesting finds/events/people from the annals of Australian archaeology demystify the discipline for the general public. They make it clear that archaeology is a social science carried out in a social context by (sometimes) sociable people.

The book is divided into five major "topics" incorporating eighteen chapters. These are said to be in a chronological framework organized by topic and region but in some sections structural continuity is overruled by the urge to provide yet another interesting example--the text becomes a series of case studies which are only loosely connected. This is a reasonable approach if done in moderation. For instance, chapter 1 begins with a general description of what archaeologists do and how they work; this is illustrated with an account of Flood's own fieldwork involving the discovery and excavation at Clogg's Cave. Here the strategy works quite well but elsewhere it does not. Chapter 3, a description of discoveries made at Lake Mungo in southwest New South Wales, is given as an example of a significant site in Australia's semiarid area. However, there is no attempt to relate this information to some of the issues raised later concerning colonization models, or to relate it to other sites in the semiarid zone. The chapter is well written but just seems intrusive at this point in the book.

This element of intrusiveness is more apparent in later sections. Chapter 10, for instance, is mainly about the massive Kartan assemblages of Kangaroo Island and the adjacent South Australian mainland, but there is a sudden switch to a discussion of Koonalda and Allen's Caves on the Nullarbor Plain and the Roonka site on the lower Murray River. These latter sites are not particularly relevant to the "Kartan question" and the only connection is that they are all in South Australia. The concluding section, however, is not a general assessment of all South Australian sites; it reverts instead to the Kartan question, leaving the impression that Allen's Cave and Roonka have only been sandwiched into this chapter because Flood had to mention these important sites and could not easily fit them in anywhere else.

In fact, some sections of the book definitely have a rushed feel about them, as if Flood had collected a quantity of data/stories about broadly defined aspects of Australian archaeology but had not assimilated the information properly before writing, Chapter 16, entitled "Harvesters,

engineers and fire-stick farmers," paraphrases the work of a number of researchers including Beaton, Bowdler, Flood, Lourandos, Coutts, McBryde, Lampert, and Jones. Each "report" is inherently interesting and together they offer insight into the development of large-scale gatherings, more intensive use of a wider range of resources, changes in settlement patterns, and so on. However, Floods introductory and concluding remarks are surprisingly brief and offer little guidance as to the significance of these changes, even though Lourandos' "social" interpretations of the same data base represent one of the most exciting developments in Australian archaeology (Lourandos 1983).

In contrast, some of the explanations Flood does offer for aspects of Australian prehistory would not be supported by many Australian prehistorians. For instance, the appearance of dingos and specialized small tools in Australia from ca. 4,000 B.P. is explained in terms of migrations between India and Australia. Differences in the distribution of traits within Australia are also explained in terms of mass movements of people:

> The different distributions of backed blade and point industries in Australia can be neatly explained by two main migration routes: one through Australia's north in the region of Arnhem Land by people using stone projectile points and the other via the north-west coast by people using backed blades. (198)

This is a peculiarly idiosyncratic viewpoint but will probably be accepted uncritically as "fact" by most readers from the general public.

Returning to more mundane matters, the book is well produced, illustrated, and edited. Mistakes of scholarship or "typos" are few. To mention two examples, Flood states (198) that Pacific voyages had reached Tonga and Samoa by 5,000 B.P., adding 2,000 years to the known occupational sequence. Later she claims that "Dozens of rockshelters have now been excavated in the Carnarvon Ranges" (201-202) when eleven is the actual number. But these are minor lapses in an otherwise excellent book.

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M. J. Morwood
University of New England

Viktor Krupa, *The Polynesian Languages: A Guide.* Languages of Asia and Africa Series, Volume 4. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982. Pp. vii, 193, bibliography. $17.95.

Viktor Krupa's *The Polynesian Languages: A Guide* is the revised translation of a volume with the same title (Krupa 1975), originally published by Nauka, Moscow, in a series entitled "Languages of the Peoples of Asia and Africa" *(Jazyki Narodov Azii i Afriki).* The monograph is a brief overview of the structure of Polynesian languages, and the audience it addresses is described as "linguists who do not know any of the Polynesian languages and need some information on them for their theoretical work," and, secondarily, "those who intend to study the Polynesian languages and want to get acquainted with their structure"' (1).

The book consists of five main sections devoted to "Phonology" (chap. 2), "The Structure of the Morpheme" (chap. 3), "Word and Phrase" (chap. 4), "The Structure of the Sentence" (chap. 5), and "Vocabulary and Semantics" (chap. 6). Illustrations throughout the survey are taken principally from the better documented languages of the family (Tongan, Samoan, Maori, Hawaiian), although examples from languages about which less is known, such as Tahitian, Rapanui, and Niuean, are sometimes cited.

While the sections of the book vary greatly in the sophistication and detail of the discussion, the disappointing overall impression one gets from the book is of mediocrity and superficiality in both the presentation and the discussion. To cite but a few examples, the chapter on syntax only presents the very broad lines of the most well-known studies of Polynesian grammatical structures, which any curious newcomer to the field with access to a university library catalog would be able to locate readily anyway. The discussion of "Vocabulary and Semantics" makes no mention of the extensive body of literature on the implications of Polynesian kinship terminologies for ethno-semantic theories of meaning (Carroll 1966; Epling 1967; Epling, Kirk, and Boyd 1973; etc.), even though nearly a page and a half is devoted to kinship terminology (158-159). The section on phonology, instead of reviewing the interesting and still poorly understood problems raised by the phonological structure of the languages of the Polynesian family (such as those raised by Schütz 1970, 1978; Harlow 1982; and others), consists principally of long tables of sound correspondences and of the distinctive features off all consonantal phonemes for the major languages of the family (the value of which is not entirely clear to the reviewer). Finally, the survey

lacks any discussion of the growing and theoretically significant literature on Polynesian sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics (for example, the works of Duranti 1980, 1981; Keesing and Keesing 1956; Kernan 1974; Mitchell-Kernan and Kernan 1975; Salmond 1974), much of which was in print long before the publication of the survey.

While some of these lacunae may be attributed to production delays, many other shortcomings of the book are less easily forgivable. Much of the text deals with details that would mean very little to anyone not already familiar with the languages of Polynesia, and they would already know these details anyway. An important proportion of the chapter on morphology, for example, is devoted to listing the grammatical morphemes of the major languages of the family, much of which (apparently with a few revisions) appears to be lifted directly from comparative works like Pawley (1970), where they are much better contextualized. The same discussion of some of the features, furthermore, can be found in more than one section of the book, like the rather unenlightening discussion of the focus marker *ko* that appears on both pages 123 and 130. In short, this chapter (and most of the survey) adds nothing to our understanding of the structure of the languages in question, and is useless to the uninitiated reader. The more difficult task of providing the audience with an abstracted and theoretically contextualized overview of what is found in Polynesian languages is given no attention whatsoever.

Not only is this survey incomplete and poorly conceived, but it also contains a great deal of incorrect information and questionable assertions. One of my favorite examples is the analysis (52) of the Maori word *kaainga* 'village' as the nominalized form of the verb *kaa* 'to burn' (even though **-inga* does not resemble the nominalizing suffix discussed in the same paragraph), obviously the fabrication of an imaginative folk etymologist. It is also surprising to read from the pen of a contemporary linguist the statement "Before the advent of Europeans, Polynesian languages were vehicles of oral communication . . . *Therefore* simple, fairly short sentences are clearly predominant and complex sentences are rather infrequent" (139, emphasis added); obviously, the author has yet to experience the difficulties of analyzing the multiply embedded structures typically used by Polynesian speakers even in the most informal contexts.

To add insult to injury, the book contains countless misprints and inconsistencies, both in the English text and in the Polynesian examples: the same words appear in different forms in different parts of the book (Tongan for "scrutinize" *is *vakaivakai* on page 49, *vakavakai* on page

98; only the latter is attested); the languages from which illustrations are drawn are misidentified (such as the Maori example identified as Rarotongan on page 74); linguistic terms are scrambled (/v, f, s, h/ are identified as stops on page 22); and so on. This, combined with the single font used to produce the camera-ready copy (examples are neither separated from the text nor underlined for clarity), makes the reading of this book extremely tedious, and the price of this 200-odd page paperback volume scandalous.

In addition to the list of references at the end of each chapter, the volume closes with a bibliography, most of which overlaps the reference lists. The general bibliography, however, is less than adequate as a working bibliography: many important works on Polynesian languages are missing (a couple of these are nevertheless cited in one of the lists following the chapters); some works are cited in manuscript form despite the fact that they have been in print sometimes for more than a decade; and the years between the publication of the first Russian edition of the book (1975) and the year of publication of the present edition are only scantily represented (despite the claim made on the back cover that this edition was "completely revised and updated").

Though the author conveniently makes no reference to it in this book, an earlier and very similar monograph of his, published and widely distributed by Mouton under the title *Polynesian Languages: A Survey of Research* (1973), was very poorly received in reviews by Chapin (1976) and Clark (1975), among others. Yet some of the inaccuracies and misrepresentations found by Chapin and Clark in that previous monograph (and also found in the original Russian version of the present survey) are corrected here, though sometimes only partially. The reviewers' assessments of the Mouton monograph obviously influenced the author in his preparation of this volume, but did not convince him that a complete rewriting was needed.

The much needed critical overview of the state of the art in Polynesian linguistic research has yet to be written.

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Niko Besnier
University of Southern California

Ryutaro Ohtsuka, *Oriomo Papuans: Ecology of Sago-Eaters in Lowland Papua*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. 180, maps, figures, tables, plates, appendixes, references, index. $20.00.

The book *Oriomo Papuans* describes the subsistence system of the fairly isolated village of Wonie, Western Province, Papua New Guinea. Wonie is one of thirteen villages where Gidra is spoken, a language within the Eastern Trans-Fly Family that totals some 1800 speakers.

Relatively little research has been done in Western Province, where current events have stepped up the demand for information. Attention was drawn to the province in 1984 by the start of gold mining at Ok Tedi, with its potential for environmental damage down the Fly River into the Gulf of Papua, as well as by the flood of refugees from Irian Jaya into the border area.

The author, Ohtsuka, is a Japanese human ecologist who earlier studied hand-line fishermen in rural communities in Japan. The book is based mostly on seven months of fieldwork in 1971-1972, although it occasionally draws on his more recent fieldwork in 1980-1982. Some of the material has been previously published (e.g. Ohtsuka 1977).

Readers seeking a general ethnographic study of the Gidra will be disappointed, as this is a work focused on ecologly in the narrowest sense: the temporal and spatial distribution of food-getting activities. Very little is said about the cultural context of these activities, even the most directly relevant aspects such as ethnoscience and technology. This sometimes limits the usefulness of the data presented. For instance the exact loss of weight in stored sago as it dries out for thirty days is reported (see p. 107), but the methods used by the villagers for storing sago are not described.

The use of language was minimized in collecting data, apparently as a deliberate strategy. Linguistic communication was admitted to ‘be poor. Unfortunately this admission casts some doubt on the use of genealogical data for drawing demographic conclusions. But within the limits it sets for itself, the book is very useful.

Two sets of data that other researchers will want to reanalyze and use in comparative studies are the dietary studies and the activity surveys. Each of these was repeated in the wet season and dry season because the region shows marked seasonality.

The food consumption surveys were conducted for two periods of twelve days each in four sample households containing seventeen persons. The unit under study was not the individual but the household, food being weighed as it entered the house or left through interhousehold transfers rather than as it was eaten. Sago accounted for about 60 percent of energy intake and game for about 60 percent of protein. Bananas and taro were the other important foods.

All forty-one adult villagers in the main settlement were included in the activity surveys. Records were kept for two periods of thirteen days on time of departure from and return to the village, and on food-getting activities. A useful aspect of the data is its classification by locally recognized age categories (young, middle-aged and older males, younger and

older women). Children were excluded because they were found not to make a significant contribution to family subsistence, though we are left to wonder if they might be gathering small bits of wild plants and animal foods of significance for preventing deficiencies in their own diets, even if they are not contributing to producing staple foods.

Considered together, the food and activity data allow comparison between activities, showing, for example, that sago work is twice as productive as the type of horticulture practiced by Wonie villagers. The numbers involved are necessarily small, given the limited time available and the small size of the community. The small numbers sometimes leave the reader wondering what to make of reported findings--for example, that three of seven births during the fieldwork were stillbirths. In another case of small numbers, a computer-aided cluster analysis was done of a matrix showing cooperation between households in working parties for making sago and gathering coconuts, Since only forty-one working parties were involved, the clusters that emerged would probably have been equally clear without the computer exercises.

The book is attractively produced. Only occasional lapses of English occur, for example, “lighting wood” and “lightening wood’ for “torch” (174), and “mounted” for “mound” (81).

This is a useful short account of subsistence in a region that has been too little studied in the past. The author suggests in his preface that perhaps Europeans are not as physiologically adapted as the Japanese to studying the swamps. We can look forward to further publications from the 1980-1982 research team, in which Ohtsuka brought four other Japanese researchers back into the swamps with him.

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Patricia K. Townsend
Papua New Guinea Institute
of Applied Social and Economic Research

Kay Saunders, ed., *Indentured Labour in the British Empire, 1834-1920.* London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984. Pp. 327, illustrated. $38.00.

Shula Marks and Peter Richardson, eds., *International Labour Migration: Historical Perspectives.* London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1984. Pp. 280. £17.50.

These two volumes bring together nineteen essays on labor migration and labor systems. The volume edited by Kay Saunders includes essays on indentured Indian migration to Jamaica (by William A. Green), British Guiana (Alan H. Adamson), Trinidad (Mariane D. Ramesar), Mauritius (M. Daniel North-Coombes), Fiji (Brij V. Lal), and Malaya (Ravindra K. Jain); indentured Chinese migration to South Africa (Peter Richardson); indentured Pacific Islander migration to Queensland (Kay Saunders); and the employment of Aboriginal labor in Queensland (Raymond Evans). The volume edited by Shula Marks and Peter Richardson includes essays on English migration to North America (David Souden and Charlotte Erickson); Cornish overseas migration (Gill Burke); indentured Indian migration to Surinam (Pieter Emmer) and, more generally, overseas (Hugh Tinker); indentured Chinese migration to South Africa (Peter Richardson); indentured Pacific Islander migration to Queensland (Adrian Graves); migrant labor in Southern Africa (Martin Legassick and Francine de Clerq); settler societies in the southern hemisphere (Donald Denoon); and European migration to New Zealand and local migration in Nigeria and New Guinea (Colin Newbury).

Readers of *Pacific Studies* will be familiar with the scholarship of Colin Newbury, Brij Lal, and Kay Saunders and will find their essays on New Guinea, Fiji, and Queensland to be of particular interest.

Newbury's essay includes a discussion of indentured labor in Australian New Guinea, 1914-1971. His concern is with, inter alia, the regulatory role of the government; sectoral competition for indentured labor among plantations, mines, commerce and industry, domestic service, and government; and occupational mobility.

Lal's essay, which draws on material from his fine monograph on indentured Indian labor in Fiji (Lal 1983), deals with, inter alia, the provincial origins of the emigrants; the changes taking place in rural Indian society that made Indians amenable to recruitment; and a number of aspects of their experience as plantation workers in Fiji.

Saunders' essay is primarily concerned with the interconnection between institutional change in the Queensland sugarcane industry and

changes in the recruitment and employment of Pacific Islanders in Queensland. It is shown that the rationale for the demise of the plantation system is to be found in developments in these agricultural labor markets and that, in turn, the growth of the small farm system altered the structure of demand for Pacific Island labor. Although this essay draws on her previously published findings, most notably her well-received monograph (Saunders 1982), the focus of this research is extended to include a discussion of the experience of those Pacific Islanders who were allowed to remain on in Queensland after 1906; Saunders continues their story to 1920.

In general, Saunders' essay is meticulously researched; however, there are a number of statements that can be questioned.

First, it is well known that the Queensland government legislated the restriction of indentured Pacific Islanders to employment in tropical and subtropical agriculture in the coastal districts. However, scholars differ on the date from which this restriction became effective. Saunders suggests on page 223 that this restriction became effective from 1877; others suggest that this 1877 legislation was set aside and the restriction only became effective with the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1880 (Corris 1973:74). There is one piece of evidence that may help resolve this dispute: statistics are available on "transfers" from employers in the coastal districts to employers in the interior and they show that indentured Pacific Islanders continued to be sent to the interior between 1877 and 1880 (*Queenslander*, 10 April 1880, p. 453).

Second, it is stated on page 225 that by 1883 the cost of returning time-expired Pacific Islanders (what contemporaries called the "return passage money") reached £10 per head and that by the mid 1880s Pacific Islanders were able to command a wage of £15 per annum during their terms of indenture. Citations to page 124 and 311 of the 1889 Royal Commission on the Queensland sugar industry are given in support of these statements.

Unfortunately, the citation supposedly in support of the statement on the return passage money does not, in fact, mention the return passage money. Furthermore, the citation in support of the statement on the wage rate commanded by indentured Pacific Islanders has been incorrectly interpreted. This citation relates to evidence given by the Inspector of Pacific Islanders of the Bundaberg District on the effect of a provision of the Pacific Island Labourers Amendment Act of 1884 on the wages of time-expired Pacific Islanders. According to this provision, employers of time-expired Pacific Islanders had to deposit £5 with the Department of Immigration for the return passage of the Pacific Islander. The Inspector argued that this provision shifted the incidence of the

return passage money onto the Islander as his wage rate was lowered by this £5--in the example given, from £20 to £15 (Shlomowitz 1981:76-77). Accordingly, the £15 refers to the wage rate of a time-expired Pacific Islander, not that of an indentured Pacific Islander as inferred by Saunders.

In an investigation undertaken by the present reviewer, the return passage money did not generally exceed £5 (the figure used in setting the deposit for the return passage) and the wage rate of indentured Pacific Islanders does not appear to have exceeded £12 per annum (Shlomowitz 1981:78, 82).

Third, Saunders suggests on page 226 that the extraordinarily high crude death rate of Pacific Islanders in Queensland was primarily due to the lack of sufficient care and consideration given to Islanders during their first twelve months in the Colony, the so-called "seasoning" period when Islanders were most at risk. The change in the epidemiological environment, however, rather than any lack in care and consideration, appears to be the strategic variable explaining the high crude death rate during this period. Clearly more research is needed on the issue.

These remarks are not intended to detract from the merit of Saunders' research; together with Deryck Scarr, Peter Corris, and Clive Moore, Kay Saunders has made an outstanding contribution to our understanding of the labor trade and the experience of Pacific Islanders in Queensland.

It has often been suggested that there is insufficient controversy in the historiography of the Pacific; Adrian Graves' essay will, however, stir up such controversy. Graves' essay draws on his doctoral dissertation (Graves 1979), and the content of this essay forms, perhaps, the main novelty of his dissertation.

Graves' concern is to explain why recruiters were able to procure Pacific Islanders for labor service. His essay commences with a review of the historiography of the subject, contrasting the view of many earlier treatments--most Pacific Islanders were coerced into the trade--with the view of the so-called "revisionists" that after an initial phase of coercion, Pacific Islanders became willing participants in the recruiting trade as they saw advantages in it for themselves. This revisionist view, which has become the "new" orthodoxy, is associated with scholars of the stature of Deryck Scarr, Peter Corris, Dorothy Shineberg, Judy Bennett, Kerry Howe, Kay Saunders, and Clive Moore.

Graves is critical of the emphasis that the new Pacific historiography has placed on "voluntarist explanations," claiming that "the revisionists have by their own historical method reduced the Pacific island immigrant to a caricature, a Pacific Sambo, mindlessly lusting for the bright

lights of civilization" (114). He argues that the "ultimate failure of the revisionists is "their inability to recognize the interactive and disruptive effects of expansive, intrusive capitalism on the agricultural subsistence economy and its role in the migration of clansmen to colonial labour service" (115). "At the heart of the analysis," Graves argues, is the process of *proletarianization*--"the transformation of the Melanesian economy during the nineteenth century, its increasing dependence on the sale of labour power to secure the subsistence of its members" (115).

Graves' hypothesis challenges two of the mainstays of received opinion on the recruiting trade: first, that in the nineteenth century, capitalist penetration in the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, and the Gilbert Islands was slight; second, what limited capitalist penetration did occur was detrimental to the success of recruiting and, accordingly, from the 1870s recruiters increasingly sought out relatively "low" contact areas in the Solomon Islands rather than relying on the relatively "high" contact areas in the New Hebrides.

The evidence that Graves has brought to bear, however, is too meager to support the hypothesis that Pacific Islanders were proletarianized in the nineteenth century, and I suspect that Pacific historians will conclude that Graves has made a serious error of judgment in this matter.

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Ralph Shlomowitz
Flinders University of South Australia

Deryck Scarr, *Fiji.* A Short History. Laie, Hawaii: The Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young University--Hawaii Campus; Sydney: George Allen & Unwin Australia, 1984. Pp. 202, illustrations, bibliography, index. $18.95.

Lying on the supposed boundaries of Polynesia and Melanesia, the seat of British colonial power in the South Pacific in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the home of a complex multicultural population with competing political and economic interests, Fiji has a unique historical past among the island nations of the Pacific. It has long been in need of an integrated general historical account. We have several excellent histories of the individual segments of the Fijian population but not, until now, a book that told the story of the Fijian mosaic as a whole. We should be grateful to Dr. Deryck Scarr of the Australian National University, the preeminent scholar of Fijian history, for attempting such a difficult task. Dr. Scarr already has to his credit a masterly survey of the Western Pacific High Commission, as well as exhaustively researched though controversial biographies of Sir John Bates Thurston and Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, two influential individuals whose legacy is lovingly described in this book. It is, in the judgment of this reviewer, Scarr's best written study to date.

The book covers an impossibly large ground, from the beginnings of the human settlement of the Fijian Islands some fifteen to sixteen hundred years before the birth of Christ, through the advent of Western colonialism in the nineteenth century, to the traumatic aftermath of the 1982 general elections--all within the span of a mere 177 pages of text organized in four chapters! Compression has its advantages in this age of exorbitant publishing costs, but it has disadvantages too. The narrative moves at a brisk pace with little time or space for a reflective assessment of the leading personalities or a measured judgment of critical problems. Instead, the author keeps to the high road, frequently using the shortcut of cameos. This is understandable and some of the examples chosen bring history to life, but the general reader is left uncertain about how representative these in fact are.

The Fijians, the *taukei,* occupy the center stage in this book, a very large part of which is devoted to chronicling their hopes and fears and their varied attempts to come to terms with the alien forces impinging on their lives. Dr. Scarr writes with assurance and infectious enthusiasm about Fijian tribal conflicts and chiefly intrigues, leaving the firm impression of a dynamic traditional society. Still, the uninitiated reader will have some difficulty following the complex genealogies and the

course of traditional political affiliations. Dr. Scarr writes about Indians with objectivity though with less sure-footedness. This is betrayed by his reliance chiefly on secondary published sources on the Indian community, and occasional misspellings of Indian names: *Samatan* should be *Sanatan* (156), *krishnik* should be *krishak* (150), Manilal not Manalal Doctor (125). However, Dr. Scarr does give more credit to Manilal and A. D. Patel than does Ahmed Ali, his former graduate student turned politician, in his foreward to the book.

Dr. Scarr's scholarly bias gives the book a lopsided structure. Of the 177 pages of text, 128 are devoted to the period before 1914. There is only one chapter that deals with the major developments in twentieth century Fijian history. Even if one conceded the author's implicit argument that the basic foundations of Fijian history were laid in the nineteenth century, one can still point to critical aspects of the twentieth century that deserve more attention than they have been given here: the powerful, if ultimately futile, challenge mounted by the Indians against the ideological foundations of British colonialism in the 1920s; the Second World War and the intense debate about political representation; the gradual move toward self-government in the 1960s; and the continuing dilemmas of independence since 1970. These issues are all touched on but not analyzed, and they are probably more significant in the long run than the much discussed problems of Fijian provincial administration in the nineteenth century. And what about social and cultural themes and the emerging Fijian literature at the University of the South Pacific to which reference is made? But close criticism of this kind is perhaps unfair for a work that claims only to be a short introductory history. This book is a welcome addition to Fijian history. Its conclusions will provoke debate and encourage further enquiry, and that, as the foreward says, is what any good history should do.

Brij V. Lal
University of Hawaii

De Verne Reed Smith, *Palauan Social Structure.* New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983. Pp. xx, 348, maps, figures, tables, glossary, references, index. $35.00.

On the endcovers, two prominent anthropologists praise this book as a detailed, well organized, and theoretically advanced work. Their praise is truly earned: this is in many ways a good account of social

structure. Smith draws on anthropological traditions to confront the complexity of Palauan social life and does much to clarify matters. But the question remains: how much can a social-structural account tell us about Palau?

Palau, now the Republic of Belau, has puzzled many outsiders. While their Yapese neighbors to the north appear conservative, Palauans have been quick to embrace new social and economic opportunities. While traditional authorities in most Caroline Islands societies have little visibility in contemporary politics, the young Aibedul of Koror has appeared on American television in opposition to the presence of nuclear materials on Palau. While the social systems of neighboring groups have been described in fairly precise ways in terms of standard anthropological categories, the literature on Palau is more vague, qualified, and, in the end, unsatisfactory. Is this because of a situation of social flux? Earlier analysts have suggested that much of Palauans' willingness to innovate proceeds from a dedication to time-honored competitive ends. Smith goes further, to argue that much of the complexity of Palauan social life is structurally based.

The heart of the book is an account of kin relations and units. Smith moves from introductory accounts of *telungalek* property-holding units and *kebliil* clans to detailed discussions of the negotiation of kin ties. She shows that cross-siblingship is not simply a type of role-relation. On Palau, cross-sibling ties can be created and developed in several ways and are central to the organization of groups and events. Hence cross-siblingship deserves the status of a structural principle, alongside descent and exchange. Dealing with exchange, Smith gives clear descriptions of transfers of food, land, and valuables. She discusses marriage and adoption as transactions and as points at which the interests and strategies of many concerned parties intersect. The account of different types of adoption is exhaustive, for this topic allows Smith to specify both relationships between classes of actors and processes whereby actors can be promoted within landholding units.

For the reader who finds confusing Palauans' ability to juggle exchange ties and to change the definition of relationships among kin,, the chapter on death and "final decisions" is reassuring. After a person dies, kinsmen must resolve the network of kin ties, debts, and obligations that the deceased activated. At this point, these relationships are reviewed and confirmed or broken. Much as in Trobriand life (Weiner 1976), mortuary exchanges provide a context for social accounting.

This review skims over many detailed descriptions in Smith's book. It suffices to show that Smith emphasizes the juncture between continuing

structures and particular events of transaction. She deals with actors' attempts to consolidate and advance their place in Palauan society, but in so doing she suggests how ties between *telungalek* and *kebliil* can be understood.

One virtue of Smith's work is her attention to polysemy. Instead of rigidly importing analytical glosses for Palauan concepts, Smith patiently reviews, for example, *telungalek* as units of people linked by blood, by property, and by residence. Similarly, she raises the question of male versus female power, identifies the different contexts in which men and women control others, and provides a balanced summary. In these two areas of anthropological dispute, Smith's work is hardly ground-breaking, but it is descriptively strong.

Theoretically, Smith draws on the revision of a classic tradition proposed by Kelly (1977). She treats "social structure" as her analytic objective, but faults classic British models of social structure as overly rigid and static. Kelly argues that a contradiction between two structural principles is central to Etoro society; on Palau, Smith identifies three such principles and shifting relations among them. She proposes that the principles combine synergistically in different ways in different contexts. Smith does not pretend to have a definitive model of every possible interaction among principles and every context, much less a formula for specifying how such interactions amount, over time, to a social order.

Her approach is just intricate enough to allow her to illuminate complex data, without making overblown claims--unless the very terms she uses presuppose such claims. To this reader, the notion of social structure she uses is problematic. The concept of social organization proposed by Firth (1964) as an alternative to social structure seems more promising. This is because Firth allowed for both the attention to social process and the critical view of rigid models notable in Smith's work. Smith's "principles" would hardly be congenial to Firth's empiricist style of analysis, but that is a minor matter, What deserves emphasis here is that social anthropologists are uncertain of the fruitfulness of the several concepts labeled "social structure" and are engaged in yet another reformulation of the term. Smith's book contributes to that project, but it is burdened somewhat by the jargon and the ambiguities inherent in the project. Her concepts of synergy and structural principles are helpful but, given the state of the art, understandably somewhat opaque.

The book is limited in significant ways. The difficulty of the subject matter makes the exposition slow, although Smith's writing is usually

lucid. Despite an emphasis on social processes and a bow toward Palauan history, the account is ahistorical. We learn little in detail about Palauan history, and less about contemporary social and political changes. While Smith suggests that municipal and archipelago political processes are founded on the elements and principles she examines, they are beyond the scope of the present book. Consequently, few readers other than specialists will find answers to their questions about Palau. As an anthropologist puzzled by Palauans' dazzling adaptations to new conditions, I am somewhat disappointed by the omissions in Smith's book. But then, no scholar can be expected to keep up with, much less explain, all the complexities of social order and change in contemporary Palau.

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John Kirkpatrick
Nomos Institute
Honolulu, Hawaii