

## THE FIJI LABOR TRADE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 1864-1914

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In a recent article in this journal, Colin Newbury outlines the development of Pacific labor markets in the nineteenth century. Newbury's focus is on regional interdependence in the Pacific. He shows that employers in Queensland, Fiji, New Caledonia, Samoa, Hawaii, and French Polynesia could not satisfy their labor requirements from domestic sources, and they were obliged, accordingly, to recruit labor from other islands in the Pacific—such as the Gilbert Islands (Kiribati), the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), the Solomon Islands, and New Guinea,—and from Asia. Newbury argues that a regional labor market came into existence in which recruiters competed for labor (Newbury 1980).

Many contemporary observers called this recruiting activity the “labor trade,” and historians have written extensively about it. They have been concerned with such issues as the motivations of recruits, the procedures adopted by recruiters, and the experiences of recruits during their terms of labor. Considerably less attention has been paid to economic issues relating to the working of this regional labor market.

The economic analysis of the labor trade includes a consideration of the wage rates paid by employers to recruits and the “passage money” paid by employers to recruiters for the procurement and return of recruits. Newbury acknowledges that this “topic is relatively unexplored and requires more work from regional business records than has been attempted so far” (Newbury 1980:13-14). Since the publication of Newbury's article, I have completed an economic analysis of the Queensland segment of the labor trade (Shlomowitz 1981a, b; 1982a, b;

1985a, b). This economic analysis of the Fiji segment of the labor trade provides a complement for the Queensland study.

Drawing on these two case studies of the Queensland and Fiji segments of the labor trade and what fragments of information are available on economic trends in other segments of the labor trade, I will also offer some wider perspectives on the integrated nature of the labor trade in the Pacific more generally. These observations can be viewed as a response to Harry Maude's call for a comparative study of the Pacific labor trade (Maude 1983:70).

### **Theoretical Perspectives**

There are two basic theoretical approaches to the social and economic study of labor markets, and in recent debates on the postbellum American South these have been called the "class" and "market" approaches (Wiener 1979, Shlomowitz 1984, 1985c). According to "class" analysts, the outcomes of employer-labor relations—wages and working conditions—can be understood in terms of the conflicts between the capitalist and the working class and it is the inequality of power between these contending forces and the fact that the institution of the market itself becomes a vehicle for coercion that are emphasized. According to the "market" analysts, the outcomes of employer-labor relations can be understood in terms of the free interplay of competitive forces—employers competing for preferred workers and workers competing for preferred jobs—and the socially meliorative aspects of the competitive process, which afford a measure of protection to workers against the unbridled coercive power of employers, are emphasized.

The central difference in the underpinnings of these approaches is clear: whereas market analysts allow for the diversity of preferences and interests of the individuals making up the groups of employers and workers and assume that individuals formulate and implement their own strategies in the labor market, class analysts invest these two groups of individuals with common psychologies and interests and assume that employers and workers formulate and implement collective strategies in the labor market.

The starting point for an analysis of the labor trade in the Western Pacific is the recognition that the structure of this trade was defined by a legislative framework enacted by colonial governments, and that the operation of the labor trade was supervised by colonial officials. The primary ideological basis of this structure was the notion of the sanctity of legal contracts voluntarily entered into by both parties, who were then obliged to faithfully fulfill the terms of these contracts. This was

combined with a paternalistic concern that the inhabitants of the Pacific Islands and Asia should be protected from unscrupulous and rapacious recruiters and employers.

Accordingly, one theme of this article is that the structure or “boundaries” of Pacific Island labor markets were not simply a reflection of the class interests of planters in their quest for a certain supply of low cost and tractable labor, but that significant constraints were placed on the coercive powers of recruiters and planters.

A second theme of the article is that elements of the market and class approaches can be drawn upon to explain the working of these markets. In particular, it will be shown that trends in recruiting costs can best be explained in terms of the competitive behavior of recruiters; but trends in wage rates for some legal categories of labor, for some regions, and for some periods of time reflected the collusive behavior of planters while for other legal categories of labor, for other regions, and for other periods of time reflected their competitive behavior.

### **The Fiji Labor Trade: An Overview**

Pacific Island labor was recruited for Fiji between 1864 and 1911. Although contemporaries called such recruits “Polynesian” laborers, they were almost entirely Melanesian or Micronesian in origin. The primary recruiting grounds throughout this period were the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands; smaller numbers were obtained from the Gilbert Islands between 1866 and 1895, and from New Guinea between 1882 and 1884.

The historiography of the Fiji segment of the labor trade is extensive (Corris 1973; Derrick 1950; Legge 1958; Morrell 1960; Parnaby 1956, 1964, 1972; Scarr 1967a, 1967b, 1970). However, despite this considerable research effort, only recently have systematic attempts been made to estimate the total number of contracts that were entered into, voluntarily or involuntarily, by Pacific Islanders to work in Fiji. These estimates, 27,027 by Jeff Siegel (1982) and 26,460 by Shlomowitz,<sup>1</sup> match quite well. About 8 percent of these contracts were for females.<sup>2</sup> The proportion varied from island group to island group: recruits from the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, and New Guinea were overwhelmingly male while there was a considerably higher proportion of females among the roughly 3,000 recruits from the Gilbert Islands, as Gilbert Islanders usually migrated in family groups (Bedford, MacDonald, and Munro 1980; MacDonald 1982; Munro 1982).

As many recruits served more than one indenture contract in Fiji, returning to their home island between contracts, the actual number of

Pacific Islanders who migrated to Fiji is somewhat less than the total number of contracts entered into. Recruits who had previously served an indenture contract in Fiji or elsewhere were called "old immigrants." About 7 percent of all recruits between 1877 and 1911 were old immigrants who had previously worked in Fiji, while about 29 percent of all recruits between 1885 and 1911 were old immigrants who had previously worked in either Fiji, Queensland, New Caledonia, Samoa, or Hawaii.<sup>3</sup> There is also literary evidence that in the pre-Cession period, 1864-1874, some recruits were old immigrants.<sup>4</sup>

After completing their term of indenture, Pacific Islanders could choose either to stay on in Fiji or to be returned to their home island. Over time, an increasing proportion of recruits decided to remain on in Fiji at the completion of their contracts of indenture and, in consequence, the Pacific Island immigrant population in Fiji was made up of an increasing proportion of these time-expireds.

It is well known that Pacific Island labor was recruited to work on the plantations that produced Fiji's export crops. Initially, in the late 1860s and early 1870s, the primary export staple was sea island cotton; during the mid- to late 1870s this changed to copra; and from the early 1880s this has been sugarcane. As will be shown below, Pacific Island immigrant labor was unable to meet the requirements of the sugarcane industry at an acceptable cost, and from the mid-1880s Indian labor was largely substituted for Pacific Island immigrant labor on these sugarcane estates.<sup>5</sup> Despite its higher cost as compared to Indian labor, Pacific Island labor was preferred by copra and fruit planters and by many employers in urban areas; accordingly, Pacific Island recruiting, now on a much reduced scale, persisted until 1911.

In addition to their higher cost, the extraordinarily high crude death rate experienced by the Pacific Island immigrant population between 1880 and 1885, as shown in table 1, made islanders unpopular and encouraged the switch to Indians. The high crude death rate was largely caused by the spread of infectious diseases among newly arrived recruits, aggregated on large sugarcane plantations in the alluvial districts. The steady decline in the crude death rate statistic thereafter can be associated, in consequence, with the increasing proportion of the more seasoned time-expired element in the overall Pacific Island immigrant population, and to the dispersal of the Pacific Island immigrant population to the relatively healthier, small-scale copra and fruit plantations and to urban areas.<sup>6</sup>

The ending of the Fiji segment of the labor trade in 1911 was not brought about by adverse economic circumstances in Fiji, as the eco-

conomic viability of the trade was not in question. Neither was it brought about by the unwillingness of laborers to work in Fiji. Rather, the trade was ended by political decree: recruiting within the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands for employment outside the limits of these groups was simply prohibited. This political intervention was at the behest of local planters within the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, who desired sole access to this recruiting ground.<sup>7</sup>

### **The Legislative Framework**

The legislative framework that constrained the working of the post-Cession market for Pacific Island indentured labor in Fiji was largely embodied in Ordinance XI of 1877 and Ordinance XXI of 1888. This body of legislation permitted the recruiting of both adults and children, but recruits under fifteen years of age had to be accompanied by one or both of their parents. Two legal classes of recruits were distinguished on the basis of age: “adults” and “youth.” Adulthood, for the purposes of this legislation, was attained at the age of fourteen years; “youth,” in 1877, was defined as between the ages of ten and thirteen, and in 1888 as twelve or thirteen. Thus, the minimum age of a recruit, specified as ten years in the legislation of 1877, was increased to twelve years in the legislation of 1888. It was further increased to sixteen years in 1908.<sup>8</sup>

The enactments stipulated that prospective indentured laborers were to serve up to five years in Fiji and in compensation were to receive from their employer passage to and from Fiji, a wage of at least £3 per annum (youths were to receive at least £1 per annum), and various payments in kind such as food, shelter, clothes, and medical care. In 1891 the minimum wage of “old immigrants” was increased to £6 per annum.<sup>9</sup> This legislative change simply reflected actual practice since at least 1885 (see table 2). Although this legislation allowed for indenture contracts of up to five years, the Immigration Department, in practice, did not permit any indenture contracts of more than three years.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the primary constraints on the working of the post-Cession market for Pacific Island indentured labor were the three-year maximum length of the indenture contract and the £3 per annum minimum wage rate to be paid during its duration. Although these constraints were not present in the working of the pre-Cession market for indentured labor, the stipulations of most of the contracts entered into during this period appear to have been consistent with them; there were only isolated cases of contracts of more than three years and/or at wages of

**TABLE 1 Crude Death Rates of Pacific Island Immigrant Population in Fiji, 1874-1914**

Year	Total Population 31 Dec.	Deaths <sup>a</sup>	Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) <sup>b</sup>
1874	5,291	310	
1875	4,567	546	111
1876	3,087	180	47
1877	2,258	166	62
1878	2,897	172	67
1879	4,116	189	54
1880	5,885	475	95
1881	5,979	267	45
1882	5,883	603	102
1883	5,669	509	88
1884	5,256	749	137
1885	3,998	402	87
1886	2,774	169	50
1887	2,053	100	41
1888	2,064	77	37
1889	2,071	71	34
1890	2,298	87	40
1891	2,488	72	30
1892	2,486	85	34
1893	2,412	68	28
1894	2,226	55	24
1895	2,243	73	33
1896	2,310	65	29
1897	2,278	46	20
1898	2,074	38	17
1899	1,960	38	19
1900	1,922	39	20
1901	1,963	25	13
1902	1,885	17	9
1903	1,967	54	28
1904	1,959	66	34
1905	2,022	47	24
1906	2,162	36	17
1907	2,621	77	32
1908	2,736	31	12
1909	3,004	37	13

TABLE 1 **Continued**

Year	Total Population	Deaths <sup>a</sup>	Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) <sup>b</sup>
	31 Dec.		
1910	2,900	59	20
1911	2,749	40	14
1912	2,507	44	17
1913	2,504	30	12
1914	2,301	15	6

*Sources:* For 1874-1881, Fiji Colonial Secretary's Office, Minute Paper 2617 of 1882, letter of 13 Nov. 1882; thereafter, Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian).

<sup>a</sup>It was acknowledged by the agent-general of immigration that before 1879 returns of deaths were not regularly sent in and the data are, accordingly, understated.

<sup>b</sup>Based on mid-year population.

less than £3 per annum.<sup>11</sup> Thus, post-Cession legislation was, in large measure, an attempt to codify into law pre-Cession practice.

At the end of the period of indenture or at a later date if the recruit decided to stay on in Fiji, the recruit was to receive a return passage to his/her island of origin. The legislative arrangements for the responsibility for the payment of the return passage distinguished between the "original" employer of the islander during the three-year indenture and the "new" employer of the islander if the islander reengaged with another employer after completing the indenture. (With regard to the employment of any one islander, the original and new employer of the islander were clearly distinguished in the records of the Immigration Department and it is unlikely that original employers could have declared themselves new employers, or vice-versa, without detection by the Immigration Department.) The incidence of the cost of the return passage of immigrants who, on the expiry of their indenture contracts, reengaged with another employer was set out in Ordinance XI of 1877: the original employer was to pay £1 and the new employer £2. In Ordinance V of 1883 this was amended: the original employer was to pay one-third and the new employer two-thirds of the estimated cost of such return passage.<sup>12</sup>

Under this legislative arrangement the original employers would have attempted to recapture their one-third portion of the return passage money from the indentured laborer's wages, and the persistence of wage rates at the legal minimum level up to 1904 can be considered evidence of the success of their attempt. Similarly, the new employers attempted to recapture their two-thirds portion of the return passage

**TABLE 2 Indentured Pacific Island Immigrants in Fiji: Distribution of Adult Male Annual Wage Rates, 1877-1911**

Year	£3	£ 3 / 4 / 5 <sup>a</sup>	£4	£4/5/6 <sup>b</sup>	£5	£6	£7	£8	£9	£10	£12	£14	Number of Contracts	Average Wage Rate (£)
1877	4												4	3.0
1878	862				12								874	3.0
1879	1,169												1,169	3.0
1880	1,490												1,490	3.0
1881	1,109												1,109	3.0
1882	1,741		37		2	19	2						1,801	3.1
1883	1,211		3			21							1,235	3.1
1884	948		24		14	54							1,040	3.2
1885	66	110		1		74							251	4.3
1886	172					64							236	3.8
1887	168					59							228	3.8
1888	151		1			56							208	3.8
1889	70					31							102	4.0
1890	100					45							146	4.0
1891	235				1	57							293	3.6
1892	136					57							193	3.9
1893	2												2	3.0
1894	10					3							13	3.7
1895	67					89							156	4.7
1896	79					28							107	3.8
1897														
1898	64					31							95	4.0
1899	52					32							84	4.1
1900														
1901	51					13							64	3.6

1902					
1903	80	31		111	3.8
1904	49	11	16	76	4.5
1905	5	69	28	103	6.4
1906	26	142	61	229	6.2
1907	16	96	91	15 218	7.2
1908	14	89	88	191	6.7
1909		239	112	351	6.6
1910		61	17	78	6.4
1911		80	29	109	6.5

*Source:* Plantation Register of Immigrants (Polynesian), 1876-1914, Fiji, Immigration Department, National Archives of Fiji, Suva.

*Note:* The data in this table relate to 3-year indentures only. The Registers also contain data on indentures of less than 3 years. In 1882 there were eleven indentures for 1½ years and one indenture for 2 years; the wage rates on these subsets were £3 and £5, respectively. The indentures for 1½ years were for Gilbert Islanders; the indenture for 2 years was for a New Hebridean. In 1907 there were 347 indentures for 2 years that were entered into by recruits who had come directly from Queensland; their wage rate was £14 per annum.

<sup>a</sup>£3 for the first year, £4 for the second year, £5 for the third year of indenture.

<sup>b</sup>£4 for the first year, £5 for the second year, £6 for the third year of indenture.

money from the time-expired laborer's wage. Accordingly, the incidence of two-thirds of the cost of the return passage was, in effect, indirectly shifted from the new employer to the Pacific Islander as the proportion of the passage money to be paid was taken into consideration by the new employer when deciding the wage rate to be offered to the immigrant. This line of reasoning was accepted by the Immigration Department: "At present  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the cost of Return Passage Money on first reengagement forms a tax upon the Immigrants [*sic*] wages who Reengages and a most severe tax, as the second employer deducts the cost of the Return Passage from the wages he would otherwise offer."<sup>13</sup> The Immigration Department also acknowledged that this arrangement, in penalizing the reengaged immigrant, discouraged many of them from reengaging at the conclusion of their indenture contracts. In order to encourage more immigrants to reengage, the incidence of the cost of the return passage was, in consequence, altered in Ordinance XXI of 1888: thereafter, the original employer was to pay the entire return passage money.

The post-Cession legislative framework gave the Immigration Department a central role in the supervision of the labor trade. Before the close of each year prospective employers made application to the Department for the number of laborers they would require the following year. On the basis of these applications, vessels were chartered by the Department to transport the number applied for. On arrival in Fiji, the recruits were detained in the depot of the Department in order to recover from the effects of the voyage before being allotted by the Department to employers. Each stage of the recruiting process was supervised by the Department. For each voyage this involved deciding whether or not to grant a license for a particular recruiting vessel and, if granted, specifying the maximum passenger capacity of that vessel; appointing a government agent to accompany the recruiting vessel to see that the recruiting operation was conducted in conformity with the law; and requiring that the government medical officer inspect the recruits on their arrival in Fiji and pronounce whether they were fit for work.

The Immigration Department did not, however, bear the commercial risk of the recruiting voyage. This was usually borne by specialist middlemen, called "recruiters," who, except for the period 1882-1884, tendered to obtain recruits at a per capita rate, fixed before the commencement of the voyage. That recruiters were unwilling to offer such a fixed rate in the period 1882-1884 reflected, as will be shown below, the increased uncertainty of the recruiting business during this period.

Accordingly, during the period 1882-1884, the commercial risk of recruiting voyages was borne by the employers of Pacific Island labor.

Large planters, either on their own or by clubbing together, were permitted to directly charter recruiting vessels and by special arrangement with the Department were entitled to the allotment of all the laborers they procured.<sup>14</sup> Under this arrangement, the commercial risk of the recruiting voyage could either be assumed by the recruiter, charging a fixed per capita rate, or by the planters themselves. Contemporaries called these "private" charters to distinguish them from the vessels chartered by the Department. The actual recruiting operation for these private charters was still, however, conducted under the auspices of the Department in that for each voyage a license had to be obtained for the recruiting vessel, a government agent had to be appointed, and so on. These two institutional arrangements, "government" and "private" charters, coexisted for the period from 1876 to 1886; thereafter, government charters ceased and the Department left the business of chartering vessels in the hands of private enterprise.<sup>15</sup>

In order to recoup the cost of its supervision of the labor trade, the Immigration Department levied a number of charges: the recruiter had to pay a pro rata share of the salary of the government agent who accompanied the recruiter to monitor the recruiting operation; and the employer had to pay a fee to cover the cost of maintaining the newly arrived recruit in the depot, an engagement fee, and the medical officer's fee. These government charges, combined, do not appear to have exceeded £2 per recruit.<sup>16</sup>

The Immigration Department, on occasion, promoted the trade by subsidizing the cost of recruiting and returning immigrants. The cost of recruiting was subsidized on one occasion: in 1877 the Department paid one-half of the per capita charge of recruiters.<sup>17</sup> The cost of returning immigrants was subsidized on a number of occasions in the 1900s.<sup>18</sup> During the first few years after Cession, when many planters were unable to pay the wages and the return passage of their laborers, the Department financed these expenses, but it attempted to recover these funds from the employers to whom they were advanced.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast to the extensive regulation of the labor trade in post-Cession Fiji, there was little effective regulation of the trade during the period 1864-1874. Before the formation of the Cakobau government in 1871 the labor trade was, in theory at least, under the supervision of the British consul in Fiji. Recruiting vessels were to obtain a permit from the consul, and on the vessel's return to Fiji the consul was to satisfy himself that the recruits had been voluntarily engaged. The whole

arrangement was subject to abuse as the consul had little power to enforce his authority. The enactments of the Cakobau government, No. 8 of 1871 and No. 34 of 1872, were an attempt to place the regulation of the trade on a more official basis. Recruiting vessels had to obtain a license, and on the arrival of the recruits in Fiji the controller-general of labor or the minister of native affairs had to be satisfied that the contracts had been fairly entered into. However, like the British consul before it, the Cakobau government had difficulty enforcing these provisions, and instances of coercion of various kinds, including kidnapping, have been well documented in the literature.

### **Bonus and Wage Payments**

When a recruit entered into an indenture contract, it was customary that a bonus in the form of trade goods be given by the recruiter to the family and friends of the recruit. On occasion recruits requested that the bonus be given in cash on arrival in Fiji. It appears that the maximum such cash bonus was £2.<sup>20</sup>

Although the monetary compensation received by the recruit for labor services performed during the indenture was usually expressed in the form of an annual wage rate, the recruit was not paid annually but received a lump sum accumulated wage payment at the conclusion of the three-year indenture. For the post-Cession period, trends in the annual wage rate for different categories of recruits, males and females, "new recruits," and "old immigrants," can be gauged by using data on wage rates recorded in the Plantation Register of Immigrants (Polyneesian). In this Register new recruits were not explicitly distinguished from old immigrants. However, on the basis of other more fragmentary evidence on the relative wage rates received by new recruits and old immigrants,<sup>21</sup> combined with knowledge, as shown above, of their relative proportions in the annual intake of recruits, it is generally possible to distinguish the wage rates received by new recruits from those received by old immigrants.

The following are the most noteworthy trends derived from tables 2 and 3. The wage rate for male new recruits largely remained at the legal minimum of £3 per annum up until 1904; thereafter, most, but not all, new recruits received £6 per annum.<sup>22</sup> Male old immigrants also received the legal minimum of £3 per annum up until 1881; in general terms, their wage rate increased to between £4 and £6 per annum in the period 1882-1884, to £6 per annum in the period 1885-1903, and to £8 per annum thereafter. The wage rate for female new recruits largely

**TABLE 3 Indentured Pacific Island Immigrants in Fiji: Distribution of Adult Female Annual Wage Rates, 1876-1911**

Year	£3	£3/4/5 <sup>a</sup>	£4	£5	£6	Number of Contracts	Average Wage Rate (£)
1876	1					1	3.0
1877							
1878	113			1		114	3.0
1879	79					79	3.0
1880	71					71	3.0
1881	63					63	3.0
1882	193					193	3.0
1883	220				4	224	3.1
1884	80		2	2	2	86	3.1
1885	3	9		1	4	17	4.4
1886	20				3	23	3.4
1887	15			1	2	18	3.4
1888	13		2		6	21	4.0
1889	10				1	11	3.3
1890	25		4		6	35	3.6
1891	66				3	69	3.1
1892	8				5	13	4.2
1893							
1894	1					1	3.0
1895	18				16	34	4.4
1896	3				6	9	5.0
1897							
1898	2					2	3.0
1899	10				3	13	3.7
1900						1	4.0
1901	2				1	3	4.0
1902							
1903	10				1	11	3.3
1904	7					7	3.0
1905	5					5	3.0
1906	4					4	3.0
1907	2					2	3.0
1908	1					1	3.0
1909	2					2	3.0
1910							
1911	1					1	3.0

*Source:* Plantation Register of Immigration (Polynesian), 1876-1914, Fiji, Immigration Department, National Archives of Fiji, Suva.

*Note:* The data in this table relate to 3-year indentures only. The Registers also contain data on indentures of less than 3 years. In 1882 there were twelve indentures for 1½ years; the wage rate on these indentures was £3 per annum. These indentures were for Gilbert Islanders.

<sup>a</sup>£3 for the first year, £4 for the second year, and £5 for the third year of indenture.

remained at the minimum of £3 per annum throughout the period; from 1883 most female old immigrants received between £4 and £6 per annum.

These statistics suggest, in large measure, the uniformity of payment for different categories of recruits, brought about by the collusion of employers.<sup>23</sup> Yet they also show some flexibility in the response of employers: in the early to mid-1880s employers responded to the increased competition from Queensland recruiters by increasing the wage rate of old immigrants and of some new recruits (at least in the 1884 and 1885 recruiting years), while in the mid-1900s employers responded to the increased competition from local planters in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands by increasing the wage rate of both new recruits and old immigrants.

In short, minimum wage rates for different categories of recruits were set by the colonial government, and employers colluded to set uniform wage rates for these different categories of recruits—either at these legal minimum rates or at higher rates. Accordingly, recruiters were not free to compete for recruits by offering higher wage rates. In the face of employer collusion over wages, increasing the bonus was the only mechanism that recruiters could employ to compete with one another for recruits.

In the Queensland labor trade recruiters were allowed greater discretion. Although employers colluded to maintain the wage rate of new recruits at the legal minimum of £6 per annum, recruiters were permitted to compete for old immigrants by offering up to £12 per annum (Shlomowitz 1982a:64).

### **Recruiting Charges**

The operations of recruiting labor and returning time-expired labor to their home island were mutually dependent. A vessel licensed to recruit labor could return time-expired labor more economically than if separate vessels were required to do the recruiting and the return of labor. Accordingly, repatriation was generally regarded as ancillary to recruiting, and there were only isolated instances of vessels returning labor that were not also licensed to recruit labor.

The price charged by a recruiter for procuring a laborer, called the “passage money,” was considerably in excess of the price charged for returning a time-expired laborer, called the “return passage money”<sup>24</sup> (see tables 4 and 5). It is possible to suggest four separate reasons that together can account for this difference between the passage money and

the return passage money. First, there were, in most years, many more laborers being recruited than laborers being returned (see table 6); this meant that vessels generally had excess capacity on the voyage out to the recruiting grounds and competition among recruiters to take these relatively few time-expireds insured that the return passage money would be kept at a relatively low level. Second, there was considerable uncertainty in the process of trying to procure recruits but not in returning time-expireds; accordingly, the passage money would incorporate a premium for risk. Third, the process of recruiting was much more time-consuming than that of simply returning time-expireds. Fourth, a bonus was given by recruiters to prospective recruits but not to returns.

The following are the most noteworthy trends in the passage money rates shown in table 4. With regard to recruiting in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, there were two marked surges in the passage money leading to higher rates in the periods 1870-1874 and 1880-1885, followed by declines to lower rates in the periods 1875-1879 and 1886-1892; after 1892 a higher rate was again charged, and this was maintained until the ending of the trade. Unfortunately, data on passage money charged for recruits from the Gilbert Islands are too sparse to identify any patterns in the relative rates charged for recruiting in the Gilbert Islands as compared to the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands or to identify any trends over time in the rates charged for recruiting in the Gilbert Islands.

The following are the most noteworthy trends in the return passage money rates shown in table 5. With regard to the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, the rate climbed to successively higher levels over four distinct periods. Before 1875 the rate was between £1 and £1-10s; it increased to between £2 and £3 in 1875-1882; in large measure, to between £3 and £5 in 1883-1884; and, in large measure, to between £5 and £7 after 1884. The limited data on the Gilbert Islands suggests that after the mid-1880s the rate also increased for this region.

To gain an understanding of these trends in the passage money and return passage money, it is important to realize that the Fiji segment of the labor trade cannot be studied in isolation from the labor trade in the Western Pacific as a whole. To a large extent, the labor trade in the Western Pacific was an integrated market for migrant labor with recruiters from Queensland, New Caledonia, Samoa, Tahiti, and Hawaii competing with recruiters from Fiji in procuring recruits from the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, and the Gilbert Islands.<sup>25</sup> Local planters in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands were also, increasingly, competing for labor in their region. Thus, trends in the passage money and

**TABLE 4 Passage Money Paid to Recruiters for Procuring Pacific Island Indentured Labor for Fiji, 1866-1910**

Year	New Hebrides and Solomon Islands			Gilbert Islands		
	Number of observations	Average £	Range £	Number of observations	Average £	Range £
1866	1	3.0				
1867	2	3.3	2.5, 4.5			
1868	4	4.3	3.0, 5.5	2	4.4	4.0, 4.5
1869	4	4.8	3.0, 6.0	1	9.0	8.0, 10.0
1870	4	12.6	10.0, 15.0			
1871	4	12.0	10.0, 14.0			
1872	3	10.7	10.0, 12.0			
1873	2	12.3	10.0, 15.0			
1874	2	11.8	10.0, 15.0			
1875	3	5.7	5.0, 6.0			
1876	8	6.5	6.0, 7.0			
1877	8	8.2	7.0, 10.0	1	5.0	
1878	18	8.7	8.0, 9.0	3	7.3	7.0, 8.0
1879	11	8.9	8.0, 9.0	3	7.3	6.5, 8.3
1880	8	10.5	10.0, 12.0	1	8.5	
1881	6	11.8	10.0, 13.5			
1882	8	19.2	13.0, 30.0			
1883	6	27.3	18.0, 36.0			
1884	5	28.8	22.0, 50.0			
1885	6	23.4	20.0, 25.4			
1886	1	13.8				
1888	3	15.0				
1889	1	16.0				
1890	1	15.0		1	10.0	
1891	2	15.0				
1892	2	15.0				
1893	3	20.0				
1895	2	15.5	15.0, 16.0			
1896	1	20.0				
1899	1	28.5				
1902	2	25.5	25.0, 26.0			
1903	1	20.0				
1904	1	25.0				
1905	3	24.7	24.0, 25.0			

**TABLE 4 Continued**

Year	New Hebrides and Solomon Islands			Gilbert Islands		
	Number of observations	Average £	Range £	Number of observations	Average £	Range £
1906	1	23.0	22.0, 24.0			
1907	1	23.5	22.0, 25.0			
1908	3	22.5				
1909	1	22.5				
1910	1	22.5				

*Sources:* See note 24.

*Note:* The actual passage money disbursed, as presented in this table, should be distinguished from the annual estimates made by the agent-general of immigration of this passage money, published in the *Fiji Royal Gazette*. Children under fifteen were charged at half rates; see FCSO, MP 108 of 1885, letter of 5 Jan. 1885.

**TABLE 5 Return Passage Money Paid to Recruiters for Returning Pacific Island Labor from Fiji, 1868-1909**

Year	New Hebrides and Solomon Islands			Gilbert Islands		
	Number of observations	Average £	Range £	Number of observations	Average £	Range £
1868	1	1.0				
1869	1	1.1	1.0, 1.25			
1870	1	1.0				
1873	1	1.5				
1874	2	1.3	1.0, 1.5			
1875	2	3.6				
1876	1	2.1				
1877	4	2.6	2.0, 3.0			
1878	2	3.0				
1880				1	2.0	
1881	2	3.0		3	3.7	3.5, 4.0
1882	1	2.5	2.0, 3.0	1	3.0	
1883	3	4.6	3.0, 6.7			
1884	3	4.7	4.0, 5.0			
1885	1	6.4				
1886	1	7.1				
1887	1	7.3				
1888	1	6.5				
1889	1	6.3				

*continued*

TABLE 5 **Continued**

Year	New Hebrides and Solomon Islands			Gilbert Islands		
	Number of observations	Average £	Range £	Number of observations	Average £	Range £
1890	1	7.1				
1891	1	5.8				
1892	1	6.4				
1893				1	5.0	
1894	1	6.4		1	5.0	
1895	1	6.5		1	4.1	
1898	1	6.4		1	5.0	
1899	1	6.3		1	5.0	
1900				1	5.0	
1901	1	5.4				
1902	1	7.6				
1904	1	8.9				
1905	1	14.6				
1906	1	6.0				
1907	1	7.2				
1908	1	6.8				
1909	1	7.0				

Sources: See note 24.

Note: The actual return passage money disbursed, as presented in this table, should be distinguished from the annual estimates made by the agent-general of immigration of this return passage money and published in the *Fiji Royal Gazette*. Under Section 38 of Ordinance XI of 1877 and Section 73 of Ordinance XXI of 1888, the agent-general of immigration was required in December of each year to make an estimate, for the ensuing year, of this return passage money. The return passage money disbursed in 1902, 1904, and 1905 was subsidized by the government.

return passage money charged in the Fiji segment of the labor trade cannot be understood by an analysis of purely local conditions in the Fiji segment of the trade but must be based on an understanding of pressures that developed in the labor trade in the Western Pacific as a whole.

Accordingly, the rise in the passage money charged by recruiters both in the Fiji and Queensland segments of the labor trade in the early 1870s was brought about by the increased demand for labor by both cotton planters in Fiji and sugarcane planters in Queensland; the further rise in the passage money and in the return passage money in the early 1880s was brought about by the increased demand for labor by sugarcane planters in both Fiji and Queensland;<sup>26</sup> and, after the mid-1880s the

maintenance of these historically high levels in the Fiji and Queensland segments of the labor trade, despite their reduced scale, is an indication of the increased difficulty in procuring recruits in the Western Pacific as a whole.

The integrated nature of the market for migrant labor in the Western Pacific is illustrated by a consideration of trends in the New Caledonia and Samoa segments of the trade. During the 1870s and early 1880s these segments matched the increase in the passage money in the Queensland and Fiji segments: in the New Caledonia segment: the passage money increased from £4-10s in 1871 and £4 in 1874 to £24: in 1884; in the Samoa segment the passage money increased from £5 in the 1870s to £15 (1883), £19 (1884), and £22-10s (1885).<sup>27</sup>

Although the primary trends in the passage money and return passage money charged by recruiters in the Fiji segment of the labor trade can only be understood by considering the labor market in the Western Pacific as a whole, some secondary trends in these rates are related to more local conditions specific to the Fiji segment of the trade. Three such local conditions can be specified.

First, the passenger-carrying capacity of recruiting vessels, specified in Ordinance XXIV of 1876 to be three adults for every two tons, was reduced in 1879 to one adult for every ton. This reduction increased the costs of recruiting and, in consequence, recruiters increased their passage money rate by between 25 percent and  $33\frac{1}{3}$  percent. Upward pressure was also placed on the passage money by the curtailment of the recruiting season to the period from April to November, thus avoiding the hurricane season. This restriction was in force for the period 1879-1883.<sup>28</sup>

Second, the level of the passage money relative to that of the return passage money was, in part, dependent, as has been shown above, on the number of recruits relative to the number of returns in any one year. During two exceptional periods in Fiji, 1875-1877 and 1885-1887, the number of returns was considerably in excess of the number of recruits (see table 6). This put upward pressure on the return passage money and downward pressure on the passage money during these periods (tables 4 and 5).<sup>29</sup> However, this is only a partial explanation for the decline in the passage money charged during the periods 1875-1879 and 1886-1892; it is not clear why these relatively low levels persisted through 1878-1879 and through 1888-1892.

Third, employers in Fiji appear to have offered a lower wage than what prevailed elsewhere in the Pacific. For the entire period in which

**TABLE 6 Recruiting Voyages: Some Indicators, 1864-1911**

Year	Number of Voyages <sup>a</sup>	Number of Recruits Introduced and Indentured	Number of Returns <sup>b</sup>	Average Length of Voyage (in days)	Average Tonnage of Vessels	Average Number of Recruits per Voyage	Average Number of Days Spent Recruiting per Recruit Obtained <sup>c</sup>
1864	1	35	35				
1865	3	145	45				
1866	6	423	55	111		71	1.56
1867	7	568	18	191		81	2.36
1868	1	80	0	97		80	1.21
1869	9	398	189	58		44	1.32
1870		1,700					
1871		2,276					
1872		1,227					
1873		924					
1874		754	590				
1875		404	582				
1876		469	1,829				
1877	7	539	1,193				
1878	19	1,520	700			80	
1879	21	1,858	338		73	88	
1880	26	2,534	187	73	99	97	0.75
1881	17	1,275	887	108	110	75	1.45
1882	33	2,036	1,137	110	93	62	1.79
1883	28	1,546	1,277	95	87	55	1.72
1884	22	1,258	922	132	98	57	2.30
1885	6	295	1,171		106	49	
1886	10	277	1,343		105	28	
1887		273	904				
1888	4	278	193		101	70	

1889	1	111	37		143	111	
1890	3	186	119		110	62	
1891	5	369	146	120	84	74	1.63
1892	2	210	140	142	143	105	1.35
1893			11				
1894	1	14	161	85	500	14	6.07
1895	2	206	135	116	350	103	1.13
1896	1	117		161	176	117	1.38
1897							
1898	1	102	276	143	225	102	1.40
1899	1	97	182	188	225	97	1.94
1900			9				
1901	1	69	46	153	133	69	2.22
1902			66				
1903	1	121	0	278 <sup>d</sup>		121	2.30
1904	1	96	64	120	106	96	1.25
1905	1	115	40	117	157	115	1.02
1906	3	239	91	104	157	80	1.30
1907	2	213 <sup>c</sup>	66	116	157	107	1.08
1908	2	209	89	126	157	105	1.20
1909	3	359	93	118	157	120	0.98
1910	1	78	141	169	157	78	2.17
1911	1	110	96	160	157	110	1.45
1912			219				
1913			0				
1914			209				

*Sources:* See note 1; FCSO, MP 2617 of 1882, enclosure in letter of 31 Dec. 1881; MP 4088 of 1899, enclosure in letter of 28 Sept. 1899.

<sup>a</sup>In many voyages, vessels departed from Fiji toward the end of one year and did not return until early in the following year. Unfortunately, in reporting these statistics, contemporaries did not follow a consistent procedure in allocating such voyages to particular years.

<sup>b</sup>On occasion, the number of returns included children.

<sup>c</sup>This was calculated by dividing the number of recruits per voyage into the average number of days of a voyage.

<sup>d</sup>This nine-month voyage was noted as the most protracted recruiting trip made from Fiji.

<sup>e</sup>In addition, 347 recruits came directly from Queensland in 1907.

Fiji and Queensland competed for labor in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, 1864-1904, employers in Fiji generally offered £3 per annum for new recruits while employers in Queensland offered £6 per annum; after the early 1880s employers in Fiji generally offered £6-£8 per annum for old immigrants while employers in Queensland offered £7-£12 per annum (Shlomowitz 1981a). In addition, the value of the bonus given by recruiters from Fiji appears to have been inferior to those given by recruiters from Queensland, and there is also evidence that the rations given to recruits in Queensland were more liberal than those given in Fiji.<sup>30</sup> Evidence on wage rates in the New Caledonia, Samoa, Hawaii, and Tahiti segments of the trade is more fragmentary but they appear to have been in excess of the wage rates prevailing in Fiji.<sup>31</sup>

From 1884 recruiters from Queensland and Fiji were not permitted to present firearms as bonus payments; nor could time-expired laborers in Queensland and Fiji purchase such weapons out of their wages and take them back to their home island.<sup>32</sup> As this prohibition did not apply to recruiters from other regions, contemporaries considered that it placed recruiters from Queensland and Fiji at a disadvantage (Corris 1973:37-38).

The question whether the relatively low wage rate offered by employers in Fiji affected the success of recruiting voyages in the Fiji segment of the labor trade was much debated by contemporaries. Some argued that the relatively low wage rate did not affect the success of recruiting as it was offset by the non-pecuniary preference of recruits to work in Fiji—climate, food, and the nature of the work being similar to what they were accustomed.<sup>33</sup> Others acknowledged that it affected recruiting in the New Hebrides but argued that it did not affect recruiting in the Solomon Islands, where potential recruits, at least in the 1870s, lacked the knowledge to discriminate among recruiters (Leefe 1878:44).

Most contemporaries, however, acknowledged that the relatively low wage rate had a detrimental effect on the success of recruiting voyages, as potential recruits were quite knowledgeable about the options open to them and the bargaining for terms was well understood.<sup>34</sup> They argued that the relatively low wage rate had a twofold effect on the success of the recruiting operation, namely, recruiters had to spend more time to procure a given number of recruits (and so had to charge higher rates)<sup>35</sup> and/or recruiters had to accept recruits who were inferior, in terms of age and physique, to those being procured by recruiters from

Queensland. As one contemporary expressed it, they had to “put up with the refuse of the labour market.”<sup>36</sup>

Statistical evidence on the Fiji and Queensland segments of the trade provides support for the viewpoint that the relatively low wage rate offered by employers in Fiji made recruiting for Fiji more difficult. Comparative data on the average annual number of days spent recruiting per recruit obtained is available for thirteen separate years in the period 1880-1903; during eleven of these years, recruiters in the Fiji segment of the trade had the higher statistic.<sup>37</sup> It appears that this differential in efficiency (as measured by the statistic on the average number of days spent recruiting per recruit obtained) was to some extent at least recouped by recruiters through the setting of higher rates for returning but not necessarily for recruiting labor.<sup>38</sup>

### **Preferences of Recruits and Employers**

The foregoing discussion suggests that potential recruits, in choosing to work in Fiji, Queensland, or in other regions, may have taken into account both pecuniary considerations relating to the acquisition of trade goods and non-pecuniary considerations relating to climate, food, and the nature of the work.<sup>39</sup> Employers also expressed preferences for recruits from different regions. In comparing recruits from within the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, employers in both Queensland and Fiji generally considered recruits from Tanna and Malaita to be the best workers.<sup>40</sup> Employers in Fiji viewed recruits from the Gilbert Islands with less favor than those from the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. They were considered a less tractable class of laborers, suitable only for work on copra plantations.<sup>41</sup>

There is also some fragmentary evidence on the preferences of employers for different categories of recruits: males and females, new recruits and old immigrants. Many employers expressed some opposition to females and old immigrants. They considered females to be unsuitable for the heavy work done on copra plantations while old immigrants were considered less tractable than new recruits. In particular, it was suggested that the objection of employers to old immigrants was “because ‘old hands’ know and claim their rights while raw hands do not. . . . ‘old hands’ are apt to be more ‘cheeky’ and objectionable in that way.”<sup>42</sup> The argument can be conceptualized as follows: old immigrants commanded a higher wage rate than new recruits in recognition of the experience and acclimatization that they had obtained on their

earlier indenture(s). However, many employers expressed a preference for new recruits—not because they were cheaper, but because they were considered more tractable.

### **Time-Expireds**

The legal framework that constrained the operation of the market for time-expired Pacific Island immigrant labor in Fiji was embodied in a number of ordinances enacted between 1877 and 1890 and a directive of the Fiji Department of Immigration issued in 1897.<sup>43</sup> Time-expired employment contracts were to be made before and registered with either the Department of Immigration or stipendiary magistrates. Between 1877 and 1896 the *first* reengagement contract after the conclusion of the three-year indenture was to be made before the Department of Immigration; *subsequent* reengagement contracts could be made before either the Department of Immigration or stipendiary magistrates. It appears that between 1877 and 1888 most of these further reengagement contracts were made before the Department of Immigration while after 1888 most of them were made before stipendiary magistrates. After 1896 the Department of Immigration in large measure restricted its contract registration activities to the market for indentured labor.

Time-expired employment contracts entered into before the Department of Immigration were recorded in the Plantation Register of Immigrants (Polynesian) and this is extant. The Register contains the following information on time-expired employment contracts: the name, sex, island of origin, and registration number of the Pacific Islander; the employer's name; the dates of the commencement and conclusion of the labor contract; and the wage and when it was paid.

In the Plantation Register time-expired wage data appear in the following way: First is a column for the annual wage rate paid by the employer through the Treasury (e.g., £10 per annum); further columns show when and how this was paid (e.g., £5 every six months); and then written across adjoining columns is information about supplementary payments made by the employer directly to the time-expired at the place of work (e.g., "and £3 direct"). These supplementary payments are listed, inter alia, as "extra," "additional," a "bonus," or a "bounty"; they could be made in advance, in installments during the period of the contract, or at its conclusion. Of the 7,102 time-expired contracts recorded in the Plantation Register, 2,163 (or 30 percent) include some form of extra payment.

In the Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian) for 1883-1885 and 1894-1896, the agent-general of immigration presented information on the average wage rate of time-expireds who had registered their contracts with the Immigration Department. It is clear that the agent-general of immigration, when calculating these averages, included information on supplementary payments because the averages presented in the Annual Reports and those computed, inclusive of supplementary payments, from the Plantation Register match closely.

In order to distinguish between the *first* reengagement contracts of Pacific Islanders in their fourth year in Fiji and any *subsequent* reengagements they may have entered into before the Department of Immigration, it is necessary to know when they were recruited to work in Fiji. This information is recorded in the General Register of Immigrants (Polynesian). By linking information on each Pacific Islander in the General and Plantation Registers through the registration number of the Pacific Islander, the date of arrival of Pacific Islanders who subsequently completed an indenture and entered into a reengagement contract can be retrieved.

It is possible to link information for 6,183 of the 7,102 contracts in the Plantation Register. The attrition is mainly due to registration numbers not always being recorded in the Plantation Register. In addition, there are occasional discrepancies between information in the Plantation and General Registers (e.g., time-expireds contracting after they had been noted as “dead” or “gone home”) and these cases have also been omitted.

In addition to this data set based on individual time-expired contracts, aggregate data on the annual number of reengagements entered into before the Department of Immigration were recorded in the Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian).

The steady increase in the number of time-expired contracts registered with the Department of Immigration up to the mid-1880s reflects the corresponding increase in the time-expired population (see table 7). However, the decline in the number of contracts from the mid-1880s does not imply a corresponding decline in the time-expired population. Rather, it reflects the Immigration Department’s stage-by-stage withdrawal from its function of registering time-expired contracts.

Time-expired contracts registered with the Department of Immigration were usually for twelve months. Only 6 percent of these contracts were for less than twelve months and there were only two cases of contracts exceeding twelve months (see table 8).

Time-expireds received for their labor a monetary remuneration and

**TABLE 7 Number of Time-Expired Contracts Registered with Department of Immigration, 1875-1902**

Year	From Annual Reports on Polynesian Immigration	From Plantation Register	
		Before linking with General Register	After linking with General Register
1875	20		
1876	189		
1877	382		
1878	350	196	
1879	277	164	15
1880	302	193	38
1881	435	350	244
1882	689	689	606
1883	1,168	1,084	1,023
1884	1,087	1,039	994
1885	806	803	775
1886	703	713	682
1887	630	762	729
1888	404	491	463
1889	76	77	77
1890	30	30	30
1891	131	129	128
1892	91	90	90
1893	87	86	84
1894	74	74	74
1895	67	67	66
1896	55	55	55
1897			
1898	1	1	1
1899	1	1	1
1900	3	3	3
1901	1	1	1
1902	3	4	4
<b>Total</b>		7,102	6,183

*Sources:* Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian); Plantation Register of Immigrants (Polynesian), National Archives of Fiji, Suva; General Register of Immigrants (Polynesian), National Archives of Fiji, Suva.

*Note:* The statistics obtained from the Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian) and the Plantation Register match quite well. However, there are notable discrepancies in 1878-1881, 1883, and 1887-1888. The discrepancy in 1878-1881 can be accounted for—pages were missing from the Plantation Register for this period.

**TABLE 8 Time-Expired Contracts Registered with Department of Immigration, by Length of Contract, 1878-1902**

Year	Males			Females		
	Less than 12 months	12 months	Total	Less than 12 months	12 months	Total
1878	1	173	174		22	22
1879	5	131	136		28	28
1880	16	140	156	1	36	37
1881	12	292	304	1	45	46
1882	78	548	626	1	62	63
1883	126	863	989	9	86	95
1884	66	873	939	16	84	100
1885	54	687	741	3	59	62
1886	20	617	637	2	74	76
1887	28	690	718	1	43	44
1888	4	466	470		21	21
1889		70	70		7	7
1890		28	28		2	2
1891		123	123		6	6
1892		89	89		1	1
1893	2	75	77		9	9
1894		66	67 <sup>a</sup>		7	7
1895		64	65 <sup>a</sup>		2	2
1896	4	47	51	2	2	4
1897						
1898		1	1			
1899		1	1			
1900		3	3			
1901		1	1			
1902		2	2		2	2
<b>Total</b>	416	6,050	6,468 <sup>a</sup>	36	598	634

*Source:* Plantation Register of Immigrants (Polynesian).

*Note:* The statistics presented in this table relate to the complete set of 7,102 contracts recorded in the Plantation Register (i.e., the set is inclusive of those contracts that do not record the registration number of the Pacific Islander).

<sup>a</sup>In 1894 and 1895 there were two cases of Pacific Islanders entering contracts of 24 months' duration.

various payments in kind such as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. The monetary remuneration for contracts of twelve months' duration entered into before the Department of Immigration is shown in tables 9 and 10. The most noteworthy findings from tables 9 and 10 can be summarized as follows: Before 1882 the wage rate paid to time-expireds was almost identical to that paid to islanders serving indenture contracts. This reflects the successful collusive action of employers in

**TABLE 9 Male Time-Expired Wage Rates on 12-Month Contracts Registered with Department of Immigration, by Years of Experience, 1879-1896**

	3 Years			4 Years			5 Years			6 Years			7-12 Years		
	no.	mean £	st. dev. £	no.	mean £	st. dev. £	no.	mean £	st. dev. £	no.	mean £	st. dev. £	no.	mean £	st. dev. £
1879	13	3.0	0												
1880	24	3.0	0.2	4	3.0	0									
1881	170	3.1	0.5	25	3.2	1.0	9	3.0	0						
1882	349	5.2	1.3	101	5.3	1.0	28	5.6	1.5	4	5.0	0			
1883	549	7.4	2.2	201	7.8	2.4	47	8.1	2.2	13	7.7	2.8	5	6.0	0
1884	319	8.2	2.0	278	10.1	2.7	150	10.3	3.1	62	10.3	2.2	25	11.2	3.2
1885	208	7.7	1.8	164	10.6	2.0	139	10.6	1.8	95	11.5	3.2	58	11.0	2.1
1886	190	7.7	2.2	95	11.0	1.9	92	11.3	1.6	120	11.4	1.7	95	11.8	1.4
1887	225	6.5	1.2	91	11.1	1.7	71	11.4	1.6	97	12.7	2.2	178	12.1	2.5
1888	82	7.7	2.2	95	11.1	1.6	49	11.4	1.9	40	11.2	2.4	172	12.3	2.4
1889	67	7.1	1.5				2	9.5	0.7				1	11.0	0
1890	12	8.1	2.3	16	7.6	2.1									
1891	74	8.5	1.8	41	8.2	1.4	6	8.2	1.1	1	13.0	0			
1892	69	11.2	2.4	10	7.0	1.3	8	7.4	2.3	2	7.5	0			
1893	57	10.3	2.3	12	12.1	0.3	2	11.3	7.4	2	9.3	3.9	1	6.0	0
1894	57	11.8	1.4	2	12.0	0	1	14.0	0				6	9.3	1.9
1895	57	11.7	1.6	6	11.8	0.4									
1896	41	11.6	1.2	5	11.6	0.9							1	7.5	0
<b>Total</b>	2,563			1,146			604			436			542		

*Sources:* Plantation Register of Immigrants (Polynesian); General Register of Immigrants (Polynesian).

*Note:* The statistics presented in this table relate to the subset of contracts recorded in the Plantation Register that were linked to information in the General Register. Three cases of islanders who entered time-expired contracts after serving 2-year indentures were omitted; six contracts entered into after 1896 were also omitted. The wage data is inclusive of supplementary wage payments. The number of years between the date of arrival in Fiji and the date of signing the time-expired labor contract is used as the proxy variable for the extent of experience gained on the job. Thus, an islander on completing an indenture and entering a first reengagement contract is placed in the “3 Years” experience category.

**TABLE 10 Female Time-Expired Wage Rates on 12 Month Contracts Registered with Department of Immigration, by Years of Experience, 1879-1896**

Year	3 Years			4-11 Years		
	Number of observations	Mean £	Standard deviation £	Number of observations	Mean £	Standard deviation £
1879	2	3.0	0			
1880	1	3.0	0	3	3.0	0
1881	18	3.3	1.4	11	3.0	0
1882	36	4.3	1.0	17	4.7	0.6
1883	44	5.8	1.5	35	5.6	1.7
1884	23	7.6	2.4	53	7.1	1.9
1885	25	7.1	1.9	31	8.7	1.7
1886	33	6.4	1.6	38	9.2	1.9
1887	12	5.8	1.6	29	8.8	2.7
1888	3	5.7	0.6	18	9.5	2.7
1889	5	6.4	1.5	2	8.0	2.8
1890	1	6.0	0	1	18.2	0
1891	4	6.8	1.0	2	7.0	1.4
1892				1	5.0	0
1893	6	8.7	2.0	2	8.5	2.1
1894	5	9.0	2.2	2	9.0	0
1895	2	9.0	0			
1896				2	9.0	1.4
<b>Total</b>	220			247		

*Sources:* See source note for table 9.

*Note:* See note to table 9. Three cases of islanders who entered time-expired contracts after serving 2-year indentures were omitted; two contracts entered into after 1896 were also omitted.

setting the wage rate for time-expireds. Acknowledgement of this collusion was made by the Department of Immigration:

Polynesians were rarely reindentured before 1882 at wages in excess of the minimum rate of wages for new recruits, viz., £3 per annum. How the low rate was maintained in former days it is difficult to say. That it was maintained is a fact, and that it was maintained to the great dissatisfaction of Polynesians is matter of experience. One can only presume that the labourer was allowed no voice in the matter—the question of wages being settled for him.<sup>44</sup>

In 1882, it appears the agent-general of immigration was instrumental in getting the wage rate of time-expired Pacific Islanders raised by one shilling per week—that is, from £3 to £5-12s per annum.<sup>45</sup> This government initiative seems to have acted as a catalyst for the dissolution of the employer cartel, and after 1882 the market for time-expired labor was significantly opened to the influence of competitive forces.

Although direct evidence on the post-1882 competitive or collusive behavior of employers of time-expired Pacific Islanders does not appear to be available, there is some indirect evidence to support the view that competitive forces were ascendant. Pacific Islanders rarely reengaged to the plantations on which they had served their indenture.<sup>46</sup> High job turnover rates are good evidence that time-expireds were not bound to particular employers. However, in the absence of information on the reasons for their job changes, this evidence on turnover is consistent with the presence of either collusive or competitive forces in the labor market. Stronger evidence for the presence of competitive forces is provided by data on the dispersion of wage rates in any one year and year-to-year changes in the average level of such wage rates. This evidence is presented in tables 9 and 10. There is no evidence after 1882 of either uniform or maximum wage rates being set by employer combinations.

Despite the influence of competitive market forces, however, wage rates of Pacific Islanders on their *first* reengagement remained relatively depressed during the rest of the 1880s. In consequence, a significant gap emerged between the wage rates paid to Pacific Islanders on their first and second reengagements. The explanation for the depression in wage rates of first reengagement islanders can be found in a consideration of the effects of the legislative arrangement apportioning the responsibility for the payment of the return passage of those islanders who opted to remain on in Fiji at the conclusion of their indenture contracts. It has been shown above that during the 1880s this arrangement resulted in the lowering of the wage rate by the amount of the return passage money to be paid by the employer of the first reengagement islander.

A final noteworthy finding from table 9 is that the more experienced male islanders received higher wages.<sup>47</sup> This is further evidence supporting the viewpoint that there existed a flexible labor market for time-expireds.

The foregoing discussion has dealt with employment contracts registered with the Department of Immigration. Considerably less is known about contracts that were entered before stipendiary magistrates,

Although reasonably complete data is available on the annual number of contracts entered before stipendiary magistrates (see table 11),

**TABLE 11 Number of Time-Expired Contracts Registered with Stipendiary Magistrates, 1885-1914**

Year	Under Ordinances XXI of 1885 and XXI of 1888	Under Ordinances XVI of 1888 and XI of 1890
1885	10	
1886	46	
1887	60	
1888	95	
1889	199	134
1890	253	242
1891	180	217
1892	233	162
1893	339	206
1894	283	204
1895	198	252
1896	227	218
1897	151	175
1898	267	156
1899	241	173
1900	165	156
1901	228	189
1902	58	248
1903	159	212
1904	103	236
1905	72	140
1906	73	173
1907	52	195
1908	73	185
1909	36	261
1910	28	262
1911		212
1912	2	490
1913		494
1914		450

*Sources:* Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian); Hunter 1890:48-50.

*Note:* Time-expireds engaging under Ordinances XXI of 1885 and XXI of 1888 were primarily employed on plantations; time-expireds employed in urban pursuits were engaged under Masters and Servants Ordinances XVI of 1888 and XI of 1890. The contracts for 1885-1888 in this table were entered into before stipendiary magistrates in the provinces (i.e., excluding Suva); the contracts for 1889 in this table were entered into before the chief police magistrate, Suva.

information on the average wages received by these Pacific Islanders is only available for 1889, 1894, and 1895, and then the average is only available for men and women combined. In contracts entered before the chief police magistrate at Suva in 1889, the average wage received

by time-expireds engaging under Ordinances XVI and XXI of 1888 was £12-13s and £11-11s-6d, respectively (Hunter 1890:49). The chief police magistrate also commented:

. . . it is evident that they [time-expireds engaging under Ordinance XXI of 1888] thoroughly knew and appreciated the merits or demerits of the several plantations on which they were engaged to work. In some cases, they absolutely refused to engage, for the reasons that they either disliked the district, or the plantation, or the kind of work required, or that the wages offered were insufficient. (Hunter 1890:49)

In the mid-1890s the agent-general of immigration reported that the average wage received by time-expireds engaging under Ordinance XXI of 1888 was £14-0s-3d in 1894 and £13-7s in 1895, while the average wage received by time-expireds engaging under Ordinance XI of 1890 was £12-10s in 1895.<sup>48</sup> The agent-general of immigration inferred that this was a competitively determined wage: "Complaint is sometimes rather unreasonably made of the wages demanded by them for their work, as if they alone were debarred from taking advantage of the circumstances by which the rate of wages is customarily governed."<sup>49</sup> The evidence on wages suggests that between the late 1880s and the mid-1890s, time-expireds engaging under Ordinance XXI of 1888 received an increase in wages while time-expireds engaging under the Masters and Servants Acts received no increase.

A comparison of wage rates paid on contracts registered with the Department of Immigration with those registered with stipendiary magistrates shows that the higher rates were received on the latter. As the more experienced time-expireds contracted before the stipendiary magistrates, this finding reinforces the proposition advanced above, that experience had a market value.<sup>50</sup>

A significant number of time-expireds, after completing their first reengagement, did not enter into further employment contracts before either the Department of Immigration or stipendiary magistrates. Some of them entered verbal agreements with employers to work on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. They were employed at a variety of jobs that included agricultural work, stevedoring, store work, and domestic service. Others took up small lots of land to cultivate sugarcane or other products on their own account. Still others joined together to form small settlements in townships or in country districts where they cultivated small areas of land and obtained occasional employment on plantations

in the vicinity. There were even some Pacific Islanders who became residents in Fijian villages, undertaking a share of the communal work and being rated as taxpayers.<sup>51</sup>

### **Fiji Indian Trade**

The primary focus of this article is the study of the Fiji trade in Pacific Islanders and the placement of this trade within the wider context of the labor trade in the Western Pacific as a whole. However, further comparative perspectives can also be obtained by comparing and contrasting the Fiji trade in Pacific Islanders with the Fiji trade in Indians.

Although detailed studies on the origins of the Indian migrants, the organization and experiences of Indians under indenture in Fiji, and the Fiji sugarcane industry have been made (Gillion 1962; Lal 1980, 1983a, b, 1984; Moynagh 1981), we lack an economic analysis of the Fiji Indian trade. The brief remarks on the Fiji Indian trade in this article are not intended to fill this lacuna in the literature—though they do suggest some of the issues to be addressed in such a study.

It has been estimated that between 1879 and 1916, 60,695 Indians migrated to Fiji under indenture contracts (Lal 1983a:13). The legislative framework that governed the organization of the trade is well known, Recruits were to be indentured for five years; to receive a free passage to Fiji; to work a five-and-a-half-day workweek; and, if their fieldwork tasks were completed, to receive one shilling a day for their labor. The recruits were to provide for their own food out of their earnings. At the conclusion of their indentures, the migrants could either return to India at their own expense or remain on in Fiji. If they chose the latter option, they could claim their right to a free return passage to India after ten years. Employers were to pay the cost of introducing the migrants to Fiji and the colonial government took responsibility for the cost of returning those migrants who took up the option of the free return passage.

The organizational frameworks of the Fiji trade in Indian and Pacific Islanders, accordingly, allowed for significant differences in the types of costs to be incurred by employers of these labor groups. Whereas employers of Indian labor were faced only with the cost of introduction and wage costs that were related to work performed (presented in table 12), employers of Pacific Island labor were faced with the cost of introduction, government charges (such as depot fees), wage costs that were independent of work performed, the cost of providing the laborer's food, and the cost of the return passage. The organizational frameworks

**TABLE 12 Cost of Recruiting and Employing Indian Labor: Fiji, 1884-1913**

Year	Average Cost of Introduction per Statute Adult Allotted <sup>a</sup> £	Average Rate of Passage Money per Statute Adult <sup>b</sup> £	Average Earnings of Males per Working Day <sup>c</sup> (pence)
1884	21.2		8.5
1885	19.1	11.0	
1886	22.3		
1887 <sup>d</sup>			
1888	23.3	11.5	
1889	19.2	10.0	
1890	16.8	8.5	9.6
1891	20.0	11.4	8.9
1892	19.1	10.9	10.0
1893	16.3	7.6	10.1
1894	15.4	7.0	11.0
1895	13.1	6.5	10.4
1896	13.4	6.0	11.0
1897	13.9	7.0	11.0
1898	16.4	7.9	11.1
1899	16.4	9.8	11.3
1900	17.9	9.9	11.0
1901	12.9	6.5	11.2
1902	13.0	5.5	11.5
1903	14.8	5.9	11.6
1904	15.6	6.5	11.6
1905	18.2	10.0	10.9
1906	16.0	8.0	11.2
1907	16.5	8.0	11.6
1908	16.0	8.0	12.1
1909	17.4	8.0	12.2

TABLE 12 **Continued**

Year	Average Cost of Introduction per Statute Adult Allotted <sup>a</sup> £	Average Rate of Passage Money per Statute Adult <sup>b</sup> £	Average Earnings of Males per Working Day <sup>c</sup> (pence)
1910	16.7	8.0	11.7
1911	15.8	5.8	12.4
1912	16.5	5.8	12.2
1913	16.9	5.8	12.3

*Source:* Annual Reports on Immigration (Indian), *Fiji Legislative Council Journals*.

<sup>a</sup>The cost of introduction includes the recruiting expenses in India, the passage money charged by the shipping firm, and the cost of supervising the recruiting process by the colonial government. This actual cost of introduction should be distinguished from the annual estimate of this cost, on which the application and allotment fees were based. By Ordinance No. 1 of 1891, any balance between the actual cost of introduction and the application and allotment fees was to be settled by the parties concerned. A statute adult was defined as ten years and over (Lal 1983a:102).

<sup>b</sup>The passage money refers to the rate at which the shipping firm had tendered to transport Indians to Fiji.

<sup>c</sup>“Non-workers” (i.e., indentured laborers absent from work for the whole year) have not been taken into account in these calculations. They include prisoners sentenced by the Supreme Court, incapables, and deserters. The calculation has been based on a five-and-a-half-day workweek and averaged over a twelve-month period. Workers include field and mill labor; field labor was mostly task-work whereas mill labor was mostly time-work. Before 1900 staff labor—*sirdars* (gang leaders), cooks, hospital attendants, watchmen, and domestic servants—were excluded from this calculation. From 1901 they were included with the general body of field and mill workers.

<sup>d</sup>No laborers were introduced this year.

also allowed for differences in the length of the indenture—five years for Indians and three years for Pacific Islanders—and hence for the period of time over which the capital outlays for recruiting could be recouped.

A comparative cost analysis of Indian and Pacific Island labor would also take into account two further types of costs: an allowance for interest (as capital outlays for recruiting had to be met at the commencement of the indenture) and an allowance for the death of a certain proportion of the laborers during the period of the indenture (as the death of a laborer during the indenture meant that only a part of the recruiting outlays could be recouped).

Contemporary observers were cognizant of the various types of costs that had to be included in such a comparative cost analysis. “Their rough calculations indicated that Indian labor was considerably cheaper than

Pacific Island labor and this conclusion is supported in a more systematic analysis.<sup>52</sup>

Accordingly, it is unlikely that sugarcane planters would have entertained the idea of reverting to a Pacific Island labor force. In fact, such a strategy would have widened the cost advantage of Indian labor—their attempt to recruit more Pacific Islanders would have put upward pressure on recruiting costs, and they could count on Pacific Islanders experiencing much higher crude death rates on the large sugarcane estates in the alluvial districts as compared to the smaller copra and fruit estates in the non-alluvial districts.

It should also be noted that even if Pacific Island labor had become cheaper than Indian labor in, say, the 1890s and 1900s, the Immigration Department might not have permitted employment of islanders on sugarcane estates in the alluvial districts. From the mid-1880s the Immigration Department had, in large measure, refused to allow Pacific Island recruits to be introduced on the large sugarcane estates in the alluvial districts due to the high mortality there, and it is not at all clear that they would have reversed this policy if the cost advantage had gone in favor of Pacific Island labor in later years.

The coexistence of Indian and Pacific Island labor in Fiji reflects the different requirements of different groups of employers. That copra and fruit planters persisted in employing Pacific Islanders implies that these employers perceived efficiency advantages in employing Pacific Islanders that must have offset the cost advantages in employing Indians. These efficiency advantages could have related to the particular tasks in copra and fruit farming and/or the general view that Pacific Islanders were more tractable than Indian labor. In the latter regard, one contemporary observer suggested that the Pacific Islander was “much in demand with the smaller planter by reason of his gentler nature and general submissiveness to authority.”<sup>53</sup>

### **Pacific Labor Markets**

This study has attempted to place the Fiji segment of the labor trade in the context of the labor trade in the Western Pacific as a whole. It has been suggested that, to an important extent, the labor trade in the Western Pacific should be perceived as an integrated market for migrant labor. At first blush this may appear a surprising suggestion considering that while integrated labor markets exhibit a uniform price for uniform qualities of labor, the persistence of the wage differential between what Queensland and Fiji planters offered may suggest that labor markets

were actually disintegrated. The analysis of this article, however, suggests that mechanisms of adjustment to this wage differential were activated, and the effectiveness of these mechanisms of adjustment is strong evidence for the viewpoint that, to an important extent, labor markets were integrated. In particular, labor market adjustment took the form of different hiring standards adopted by recruiters for the two regions, in terms of the age and physique of potential recruits, and the varying degrees of success of recruiters for the two regions, in terms of the time spent and cost, in attempting to procure recruits.

This analysis provides a new perspective to the question of why the wage differential between what Queensland and Fiji planters offered persisted through to 1904—a question that was debated by contemporary observers and has exercised the minds of historians. This perspective is that because labor markets in the Western Pacific were reasonably integrated, the wage differential was not necessarily translated into a differential in the overall cost (i.e., recruiting and wage costs) of employing Pacific Islanders of uniform qualities (in terms of age and physique) in the two regions and that this proposition was understood by contemporary observers. In short, recognizing the economic imperatives of integrated labor markets, Fiji planters probably realized that they had little control over the overall cost of employing Pacific Islanders of uniform quality and, accordingly, any alteration in their wage offers would not: necessarily lessen these overall costs.

This article has also brought to bear another body of evidence in support of the contention that labor markets in the Western Pacific were integrated. This body of evidence relates to the similarity of trends in recruiting costs among the various segments of the labor trade; in particular, the marked increase in recruiting costs in the 1870s and 1880s and the maintenance of the historically high levels reached in the 1880s through the 1890s and 1900s were trends experienced in all segments of the labor trade. It follows that recruiting costs in any one segment of the labor trade were not insulated from changes in the demand for labor in the other segments of the labor trade because such changes in the demand for labor affected the rate at which the common pool of labor in the New Hebrides, Solomon Islands, and Gilbert Islands was being depleted.

## NOTES

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1. This estimate was compiled as follows: The number of contracts for 1864-1869, 1,649, is reported in an enclosure in March to Clarendon, 17 Dec. 1869, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, XLVIII, c399, p. 403; for 1870, 1,700, *Fiji Times*, 7 Jan. 1871; for 1871, 2,276, *Fiji Times*, 6 Jan. 1872; for 1872, 1,227, in an enclosure in Robinson to Carnarvon, 12 Feb. 1875, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1875, LII, c1337, p. 263 (this is an estimate of the number of indenture contracts, presumably of three year's duration, whose term expired in 1875); for 1873-1875, 2,082, in Gordon to Carnarvon, 28 Apr. 1876, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, LIV, c1624, p. 130; and for 1876-1911, 17,526, in Annual Reports on Immigrants (Polynesian), 1877-1914.

These Annual Reports can be located as follows: for 1877, Fiji Royal Gazette, 1878, pp. 51-60; for 1878, enclosure in Fiji Colonial Secretary's Office, Minute Paper (hereafter FCSO, MP) 386 of 1879; for 1879, enclosure in FCSO, MP 704 1/2 of 1880; for 1882, enclosure in FCSO, MP 2766 of 1903; for 1883, enclosure in CO 83/41, Thurston Dispatch No. 145, 31 Aug. 1885; for 1884-1886 and 1888-1914, Fiji Legislative Council Papers. The Annual Reports for 1880, 1881, and 1887 are either missing or have never been compiled.

The difference in estimates, 26,460 as compared to 27,027, is due to Siegel's use of alternative sources: his estimate for 1870-1875 is based on Fiji Times shipping reports, while his estimate for 1876-1911 is based on data in the General Register of Immigrants (Polynesian), National Archives of Fiji.

2. This statistic is based on data relating to 15,474 indenture contracts for the period 1876-1911 recorded in the Plantation Register of Immigrants (Polynesian), National Archives of Fiji. The 15,474 contracts were for 13,848 adults and 1,626 youths. The female proportion of adult contracts was 8.3 percent. The number of contracts recorded in the Plantation Register is less than that in the General Register of Immigrants (Polynesian), 17,818, as a number of pages from the Plantation Register for 1878-1881 are missing.

3. Data on the number of old immigrants is reported in Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian).

4. Britton 1870:18; Pechey 1870:48-49; Report of Captain Chapman, 6 July 1873, CO 83/4.

5. Only occasionally after the mid-1880s were Pacific Island recruits procured for sugarcane farming. However, on one such occasion, 1890-1891, over 60 percent of all recruits were allotted to sugarcane estates, See FCSO, MP 225 of 1892, letter of 12 Feb. 1892.

6. For very detailed discussions of the probable causes of the high crude death rates during the early 1880s, see Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1882-1884.

7. Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1910, p. 5; *Fiji Times*, 4 Mar. 1911; Scarr 1967a:283-284; Corris 1973:147-148.

8. *Fiji Legislative Council Paper* No. 13 of 1908.
9. *Fiji Legislative Council Paper* No. 33 of 1891.
10. *Fiji Times*, 2 Feb. 1878; Dispatch No. 93, 5 Sept. 1879, CO 83/19.
11. March to Clarendon, 17 Dec. 1869, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, XLVIII, c399, pp. 397-398; Dispatch Nos. 184, 3 Oct. 1871, and 240, 4 Feb. 1874, Chief Secretary's Office, Inwards Correspondence—General Records of the Cakobau Government; Report of Captain Chapman, 6 July 1873, CO 83/4; *Fiji Times*, 21 June 1871; *Australasian*, 10 Aug. 1867, p. 168; 22 Aug. 1868, p. 247; 24 Oct. 1868, p. 527; 12 Nov. 1870, p. 630; Brewster 1937:216; Ceres 1869:44-47; Moss 1868:21.
12. The contribution made by new employers amounted to £5-4s-10d (1885), £5 (1886), £4-17s-8d (1887), and £4-10s (1888). This information was published in *Fiji Royal Gazette* and *Fiji Legislative Council Papers*. The statistic for 1884 does not seem to be available.
13. FCSO, MP 2151 of 1887, letter of 24 May 1887 (for quotation). See also MP 2000 of 1887, letter of 25 Aug. 1887; MP 3502 of 1889, letter of 13 Dec. 1889. The economic logic of this argument is expounded upon in Shlomowitz 1981a:75-77.
14. *Australasian*, 21 Jan. 1882, p. 86.
15. FCSO, MP 892 of 1905, letter of 22 Feb. 1905.
16. *Fiji Times*, 7 Jan., 27 Sept. 1882; FCSO, MP 483 of 1880, letter of 17 Mar. 1880; MP 102 of 1884, letter of 28 Dec. 1883; MP 428 of 1902, letter of 18 Jan. 1902.
17. *Fiji Times*, 30 June 1877; 2 Feb. 1878; FCSO, MP 483 of 1880, letter of 17 Mar. 1880.
18. Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1904, p. 6; FCSO, MP 1030 of 1905, letter of 3 Mar. 1905; MP 2697 of 1905, letter of 20 June 1905.
19. Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1878, pp. 21-22 (of draft); Gordon 1897-1912, II, 275, 278, 682, 686.
20. Fiji, Agent-General of Immigration, Journals of Government Agents, 1876-1914.
21. *Fiji Times*, 27 June 1885; *Fiji Royal Gazette*, 1885, p. 9; Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1884, pp. 4-5; 1888, p. 1; 1891, p. 2; FCSO, MP 108 of 1885, letter of 5 Jan. 1885; MP 2697 of 1905, letter of 20 June 1905; MP 576 of 1906, letter of 14 Feb. 1906; MP 3994 of 1906, letter of 20 Aug. 1906.
22. Between 1877 and 1904 there were three occasions when a significant number of new recruits received more than £3 per annum; these occurred in 1884, 1885, and 1895. Evidence is not available on whether the twelve recruits engaged at £5 per annum in 1878 were new recruits or old immigrants.
23. In 1900 it was acknowledged that "there has been a kind of unwritten law that 'old hands' should have £6 and raw hands £3 per annum." See FCSO, MP 4088 of 1899, letter of 30 July 1900.
24. Table 4 was compiled from data in the following primary sources: General Register of Immigrants (Polynesian), passage money on 30 voyages, 1876-1879; Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1878, p. 5 (of draft); 1879, pp. 9-10 (of draft); 1882, pp. 2, 3; 1883, p. 8; 1885-1886, p. 4; 1908, p. 6; Annual Reports on Immigration (Indian), 1881,

1883; FCSO, MP 1031½ of 1877, letter of 27 July 1877; MP 1849 of 1879, letter of 5 Nov. 1879; MP 1875 of 1879, letter of 8 Nov. 1879; MP 483 of 1880, letter of 17 Mar. 1880; MP 295 of 1882, letter of 14 Sept. 1882; MP 2529 of 1882, letter of 2 Nov. 1882; MP 2974 of 1882, letter of 21 Dec. 1882; MP 2031 of 1883, letter of 16 July 1883; MP 108 of 1885, letter of 5 Jan. 1885; MP 1606 of 1885, letter of 18 June 1885; MP 3001 of 1885, letter of 10 Nov. 1885; MP 744 of 1886, letter of 5 Sept. 1885; MP 42 of 1892, letter of 8 Jan. 1892; MP 4088 of 1899, letter of 10 Aug. 1899; MP 428 of 1902, letter of 18 Jan. 1902; MP 473 of 1902, letter of 28 Feb. 1902; MP 892 of 1905, letter of 24 May 1905; MP 2465 of 1905, letter of 13 June 1906; MP 2697 of 1905, letter of 20 June 1905; MP 4467 of 1907, letter of 29 Nov. 1907; MP 654 of 1908, letter of 4 Feb. 1908; MP 4240 of 1908, letter of 8 Sept. 1908; MP 6685 of 1908, letter of 15 Dec. 1908; MP 6393 of 1910, letter of 3 Aug. 1910; *Fiji Times*, 20 June 1871; 9 July 1873; 28 Jan., 22 July 1874; 2 Oct., 24 Nov. 1875; 30 June, 14 July, 17 Oct., 17 Nov. 1877; 2 Feb. 1878; 1 Jan. 1879; 1 May 1880; 9, 16 Nov., 31 Dec. 1881; 7 Jan., 29 Sept. 1882; 23 Feb., 18 Oct., 16, 19 Nov. 1884; 19 Sept. 1885; 27 Feb. 1886; 29 Feb., 21 July 1888; 21 May 1890; 25 Jan. 1893; 17 Feb. 1894; 13 July 1895; 18 Jan. 1896; *Fiji Gazette*, 19 Oct. 1872; *Fiji Argus*, 13 Aug. 1875; 28 May 1876; *Queenslander*, 20 Sept. 1873; *Town and Country Journal*, 5 Aug. 1871; *Melbourne Argus*, 10 Sept. 1870; *Australasian*, 2 June 1866, p. 264; 10 Aug. 1867, p. 168; 22 Aug. 1868, p. 247; 24 Oct. 1868, p. 527; 12 Nov. 1870, p. 630; "Fiji" 1892, 1895; Stephens 1883, 1889, 1890; "Fearful Mortality of Polynesians," *Tropical Agriculturist* 5 (1 Oct. 1885), 271; Leefe 1878:41; March to Clarendon, 17 Dec. 1869, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, XLVIII, c399, pp. 397-401; Circular letter from A. W. Brodziak & Co., 6 Nov. 1883, Fiji Miscellaneous papers, Mitchell Library; Ceres 1869:29, 44-45, 46-47; Moss 1868:21; Pechey 1870:48-49; Brewster 1937:216; Dunbabin 1935:198, 218, 242-244, 299-300; Palmer 1971:222; Udal 1871:19-21; Forbes 1875:73; Wawn 1973:121; *Fiji Planting and Commercial Directory: A Handbook of Fiji* (Levuka, 1879), 27; *Fiji in 1881: Some of the Reasons Why a Royal Commission Should Be Sent from England* (Levuka, 1881), 5; *Handbook to Fiji: New Zealand and South Sea Exhibition 1889 and 1890* (Suva, 1889), 32-33; *Handbook to Fiji* (Suva, 1906), 11.

Table 5 was compiled from data in the following primary sources: for the period up to 1884, Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1883, p. 19; Annual Report on Immigration (Indian), 1881; FCSO, MP 1031 1/2 of 1877, letter of 27 July 1877; MP 1193 of 1881, letter of 5 July 1881; MP 1584 of 1881, letter of 17 Aug. 1881; MP 47 of 1882, letter of 31 Dec. 1881; MP 862 of 1884, letter of 22 Apr. 1884; MP 1807 of 1884, letter of 23 Aug. 1884; *Fiji Times*, 9 July 1873; 22 July 1874; 14 July, 17 Oct., 17 Nov. 1877; 9 Nov. 1881; 27 June 1885; *Fiji Argus*, 31 July 1874; 13 Aug., 13 Sept. 1875; *Melbourne Argus*, 10 Sept. 1870; *Australasian*, 22 Aug. 1868, p. 247; Henning to Thurston, 28 Aug. 1869, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, XLVIII, c399, p. 371; Great Britain, Royal Navy, Australian Station, Vol. XXIX, Australian No. 77, "Labour in Fiji," July 1879, p. 18; Wawn 1973:121; Leefe 1878:41. For the period after 1884, the actual per capita return passage money disbursed was published in the Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian). See also FCSO, MP 1115 of 1905, enclosure in letter of 9 Mar. 1905.

25. On competition among recruiters "mobbing one another and bidding one against the other for recruits," see Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1883, p. 7.

26. The dramatic rise in the passage money charged by recruiters in the period 1880-1884 reflects the increased costs of recruiting in trying to meet this increased demand for labor.

ity in the success of individual recruiting voyages during this period is shown by a consideration of the variability of this statistic for individual voyages. In 1884 the range in this statistic was from 1.2 to 15.1; for the raw data on which this statistic is calculated, see Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1884, p. 4. For comparable data on this increase in costs and in the increase in the variability of success of individual voyages in the Queensland segment of the labor trade during this period, see Shlomowitz 1981b.

27. For data on the New Caledonia segment, see Evidence of William Sturt, 9 Oct. 1871, to "Committee on Polynesian Labour," Great Britain, Confidential Print, CO 881/4, No. 4, July 1874, p. 230; *Fiji Times*, 22 Dec. 1875; *Town and Country Journal*, 30 Aug. 1884, p. 433. For data on Samoa, see Firth n.d.

Lower passage money rates appear to have been charged for interisland recruiting in the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands: between 1890 and 1914 the range seems to have been from £7 to £14. See Buckley and Klugman 1981:61, 280; Jaciomb 1914:149; Thompson 1970:266; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Confidential Print, Western Pacific, Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in the New Hebrides, 13 June to 30 Dec. 1911; CO 881/12, Australian No. 201, King to High Commissioner, 29 May 1911, enclosure 3 in High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 21 Aug. 1911, p. 36.

28. Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1879, pp. 9-10 (of draft); FCSO, MP 483 of 1880, letter of 17 Mar. 1880; MP 705 of 1881, letter of 18 Apr. 1881.

29. Contemporaries were aware of this set of relationships. See *Fiji Argus*, 13 Aug. 1875; FCSO, MP 4088 of 1899, letter of 2 Oct. 1899.

30. Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1877, p. 53; 1883, p. 7; FCSO, MP 2974 of 1882, letter of 21 Dec. 1882; Im Thurn 1906.

31. Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1882, p. 4; 1894, p. 1; Leefe, 1878: 41-42; FCSO, MP 2974 of 1882, letter of 21 Dec. 1882; Evidence of Captain Sinclair given to Committee on the Traffic in Polynesian Labourers, 7, 8, Nov. 1871, Fiji, Records of the Cakobau Government; Bennett 1976:17; Miller to Clarendon, 21 Feb. 1870, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, XLVIII, c399, p. 425; Evidence of William Sturt, 9 Oct. 1871, to "Committee on Polynesian Labour," Great Britain, Confidential Print, CO 881/4, No. 40, July 1874, p. 230.

32. It appears that the prohibition against the export of firearms was already in force in the Fiji, but not the Queensland, segment of the labor trade before 1884. See Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1882, p. 3; 1883, p. 7; FCSO, MP 2974 of 1882, letter of 21 Dec. 1882.

33. *Fiji Argus*, 8 Oct. 1875; *Australasian*, 30 Mar. 1878, Supplement, p. 2.

34. Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1877, p. 53; 1894, p. 1; FCSO, MP 4088 of 1899, letter of 30 July 1900; *Fiji Times*, 17 Oct. 1877; 2 Feb. 1878; *Fiji Argus*, 1 Dec. 1876; *Australasian*, 11 Aug. 1877, p. 178.

35. Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1882, p. 3; 1883, p. 19; 1901, p. 2; 1904, p. 2; FCSO, MP 296 of 1889, letter of 28 Jan. 1889; MP 4088 of 1899, letter of 30 July 1900; MP 2710 of 1900, letter of 14 July 1900; MP 3235 of 1900, letter of 17 Aug. 1900; *Fiji Times*, 24 May 1884.

36. FCSO, MP 4088 of 1899, letter of Aug. 1900 (for quotation). See also MP 937 of 1883, letter of 16 Nov. 1882; MP 3235 of 1900, letter on 17 Aug. 1900; MP 4883 of 1901, letter of 15 Jan. 1902; *Fiji Times*, 17 Nov. 1877.

37. For data on Fiji, see table 6; on Queensland, see Shlomowitz 1981b:204.

38. After the mid-1880s the cost of returning islanders from Fiji was usually £1-£2 higher than the £5 charged for returning islanders from Queensland; there is no overall trend in the cost of recruiting for Fiji relative to that for Queensland. For data on Fiji, see tables 4 and 5; on Queensland, see Shlomowitz 1981a:81-82. In a more complete analysis of the relative cost structure of the recruiting operation in the Fiji and Queensland segments of the labor trade, a number of other considerations would have to be kept in mind. For example, recruiters for Fiji, but not for Queensland, had to pay a pro rata share of the salary of the government agent, which usually amounted to about £1 per recruit, and Fiji recruiters appear to have offered a bonus that had a lower monetary value than that offered by Queensland recruiters. In addition, the decline in the scale of the Fiji segment of the trade after 1884 might have had an effect on this cost structure.

39. For a general discussion on these considerations, see Corris 1973:38-41.

40. Caulfield 1937:56; Gilchrist 1927:261; Gordon Cumming 1885:59; Forbes 1875:64, 249; Corris 1973:89; Shlomowitz 1982b:354-355.

41. Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1883, p.6; 1890, p. 2; FCSO, MP 194 of 1892, letters of 26 Feb., 1 Mar. 1892; March to Clarendon, 17 Dec. 1869, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, XLVIII, c399, pp. 397-401; "Fiji" 1892:239; De Ricci 1875:170-171; *The Colony of Fiji, 1880: Melbourne International Exhibition* (Levuka, 1880), p. 79.

42. FCSO, MP 4088 of 1899, letter of 30 July 1900 (for quotation). See also letters of 14 July, 7 Aug. 1900; Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1899, p. 2.

43. Ordinances XI of 1877, V of 1883, XXI of 1885, XVI and XXI of 1888, XI of 1890; Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1897, p. 3. On the interpretation and implementation of these ordinances, see FCSO, MP 1775 of 1878, letter of 5 Dec. 1878; MP 838 of 1880, letter of 13 May 1880; MP 1768 of 1880, letter of 14 Oct. 1880; MP 1210 of 1881, letter of 9 July 1881; MP 159 of 1881, letter of 1 Sept. 1881; MP 47 of 1882, letter of 31 Dec. 1881; MP 2534 of 1882, letter of 2 Nov. 1882; *Fiji Times*, 11 Nov. 1885.

44. Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1883, p. 19.

45. *Fiji Times*, 15 Apr. 1882.

46. Annual Report on Immigration (Indian), 1883, enclosure in FCSO, MP 2646 of 1884; *Fiji Times*, 16 June 1888.

47. There was also a monotonically positive relationship between the probability that a time-expired would receive a supplementary wage payment and years of experience. The percentage of male time-expireds receiving supplementary wage payments increased from 29% (with 3 years experience), to 34% (4 years), 38% (5 years), 44% (6 years), 51% (7 years), 53% (8 years), 60% (9 years), and 72% (10-12 years). The percentage of female time-expireds receiving supplementary wage payments increased from 15% (with 3 years experience), to 18% (4 years), to 19% (5-11 years).

48. Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1894, p. 3; 1895, p. 3.
49. Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1894, p. 7.
50. However, this conclusion will be biased to the extent that employers commuted their obligation to provide rations to time-expireds by the payment of higher money wages. See Annual Report on Immigration (Polynesian), 1894, p. 3.
51. FCSO, MP 838 of 1880, letter of 13 May 1880; *Fiji Times*, 10 Feb. 1894; Annual Reports on Immigration (Polynesian), 1890, p. 2; 1892, p. 3; 1894, p. 7; 1895, p. 7; 1896, p. 6; 1901, pp. 5-6; 1904, p. 6; 1907, p. 8; 1912, p. 4; 1913, p. 3.
52. *Fiji Times*, 28 Feb. 1894; 18 Jan., 14 Mar. 1896; Shlomowitz 1985d (for analysis),
53. *Fiji Times*, 18 Jan. 1896.

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