

PACIFIC STUDIES

a journal devoted to the study of the Pacific--
its islands and adjacent countries

FALL 1984

Anthropology
Archaeology
Art History
Ethnomusicology
Folklore
Geography
History
Sociolinguistics
Literary Criticism
Political Science
Sociology

Published by

INSTITUTE FOR POLYNESIAN STUDIES
(Brigham Young University--Hawaii Campus)

Funded by the
Polynesian Cultural Center

EDITORIAL BOARD

Roger Green	<i>University of Auckland</i>
Reneé Heyum	<i>University of Hawaii</i>
Francis X. Hezel, S.J.	<i>Micronesian Seminar</i>
Rubellite Johnson	<i>University of Hawaii</i>
Adrienne Kaeppler	<i>Smithsonian Institution</i>
Robert Kiste	<i>University of Hawaii</i>
Robert Langdon	<i>Australian National University</i>
Ioane LeMamea	<i>Pacific Islanders'</i> <i>Educational Research Center, N.Z.</i>
Stephen Levine	<i>Victoria University</i>
Katharine Luomala	<i>University of Hawaii</i>
Barrie Macdonald	<i>Massey University</i>
Cluny Macpherson	<i>University of Auckland</i>
Leonard Mason	<i>University of Hawaii</i>
Norman Meller	<i>University of Hawaii</i>
Richard M. Moyle	<i>University of Auckland</i>
Colin Newbury	<i>Oxford University</i>
Douglas Oliver	<i>University of Hawaii</i>
Margaret Orbell	<i>Canterbury University</i>
Nancy Pollock	<i>Victoria University</i>
Karl Rensch	<i>Australian National University</i>
Bradd Shore	<i>Emory University</i>
Yosihiko Sinoto	<i>Bishop Museum</i>
William Tagupa	<i>Office of Hawaiian Affairs</i>
Francisco Orrego Vicuña	<i>Universidad De Chile</i>
Tuaopepe Felix Wendt	<i>University of the South Pacific</i>
Edward Wolfers	<i>Macquarie University</i>

PACIFIC STUDIES

Editor
GLORIA L. CRONIN

Associate Editor
ANITA HENRY

Book Review Editor
DALE B. ROBERTSON

Editorial Policy

Pacific Studies is published twice yearly by the Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young University--Hawaii Campus, Laie, Hawaii, 96762, but responsibility for opinions expressed in the articles rests with the writers alone.

Subscription rate is US \$15.00. Accounts payable to the Institute for Polynesian Studies should be sent to the editor. Articles submitted to the editor should be the original typewritten copy, double spaced, following a recognized, scholarly style. Books for review should also be sent to the editor.

The Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young University--Hawaii Campus, is an organization funded by the Polynesian Cultural Center. The Institute assists the Center in meeting its cultural and educational goals by undertaking a program of teaching, research, and publication. The Institute cooperates with other scholarly and research institutions in achieving their objectives. It publishes monographs, produces films, underwrites research, and sponsors conferences on the Pacific islands. Further information on the activities of the Institute may be obtained by writing to its Director, Jerry K. Loveland, at the address above..

©1982 Brigham Young University--Hawaii Campus. All Rights Reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.

ISSN 0275-3596

CONTENTS

Articles

- Alienated Land and Independence in Melanesia*
PETER LARMOUR 1
- The Quest That Failed: Jack London's Last Tales
of the South Seas*
DAVID A. MORELAND 48
- Hungry Sharks: Japanese Economic Activity in
Melanesia, 1960-1980*
JAMES A. BOUTILIER 71
- Schools in Micronesia Prior to
American Administration*
FRANCIS X. HEZEL, S.J. 95

Editor's Forum

- Ponape's Body Politic: Island and Nation*
GLENN PETERSEN 112

Reviews

- Bruce Carrad, David A. M. Lea, and Kundapen K. Talyaga, eds.,
*Enga: Foundations for Development. Vol. 3 of Enga Yaaka
Lasemana*
(TERENCE E. HAYS) 137

Stewart Firth, <i>New Guinea under the Germans</i> (ALLAN M. HEALY)	138
Francis X. Hezel, S. J., <i>The First Taint of Civilization: A History of the Caroline and Marshall Islands in Pre-Colonial Days, 1521-1885</i> (DAVID HANLON)	142
Michael E. Hoare, ed., <i>The Resolution Journal of Johann Reinhold Forster, 1772-1775</i> (PAULINE N. KING)	145
Amirah Inglis, <i>Karo: The Life and Fate of a Papuan</i> (DOUG MUNRO).....	146
Roger M. Keesing, <i>Kwaio Religion: The Living and the Dead in a Solomon Island Community</i> (ROGER C. GREEN)	150
Klaus-Friedrich Koch, ed., <i>Logs in the Current of the Sea: Neli Lifuka's Story of Kioa and the Vaitupu Colonists</i> (DOUG MUNRO)	149
Barry Macdonald, <i>Cinderellas of the Empire: Towards a History of Kiribati and Tuvalu</i> (SANDRA J. RENNIE)	154
Sterling Robbins, <i>Auyana: Those Who Held onto Home</i> (RICHARD SCAGLION).....	156
Melford E. Spiro, <i>Oedipus in the Trobriands</i> (STEVEN ZUCKERMAN)	158
Jehane Teilhe-Fisk, <i>Paradise Reviewed: An Interpretation of Gauguin's Polynesian Symbolism</i> (DEBORAH WAITE)	166

David Weisbrot, Abdul Paliwala, and Akilagpa Sawyerr, eds., <i>Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea</i> (WILLIAM E. H. TAGUPA)	167
Books Received and Book Notices	170

PACIFIC STUDIES

Vol. VIII, No. 1

Fall 1984

ALIENATED LAND AND INDEPENDENCE IN MELANESIA

by Peter Larmour

Introduction

Between 1970 and 1980 four parts of Melanesia became independent as Fiji (1970), Papua New Guinea (1975), Solomon Islands (1978), and Vanuatu (1980). Irian Jaya had been moving toward independence from Holland but was annexed by Indonesia after 1963. The only remaining European colony in Melanesia is New Caledonia.

Before and during the colonial period Europeans, and later other non-Melanesian settlers, had acquired land in Melanesia by force, agreement purchase, or grant by the colonial governments. The extent and means of land alienation differed in each country. The least alienation took place in Irian Jaya, the most--and most violent--in New Caledonia.

In the four countries that became independent in the 1970s the percentages of the total land area alienated ranged from about 20 percent (Vanuatu) to 4 percent (PNG). That this land should be returned to its Melanesian customary owners became an issue in each country at independence except in Fiji, where it was repressed in the interests of racial harmony. But demands for the return of land are likely to be expressed in the Fijian Nationalist party's challenge to the ruling Alliance party in the July 1982 general elections. And during the 1970s the issue became the focus of Melanesian opposition to continued French rule in New Caledonia.

The following paper compares the ways in which the issue became articulated and attempts to resolve it during the 1970s. It compares, particularly, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu but refers obliquely to Fiji and New Caledonia and briefly to Irian Jaya.

Non-Melanesian Settlement in Melanesia

Melanesia is a chain of islands running from Irian Jaya in the west to Fiji in the east. Ethnically and culturally the unit is less distinct, at least at the edges. Before European colonization, there were Indonesian settlements on the west coast of Irian Jaya; Polynesian settlements on the outlying islands of Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and Fiji; and Micronesian settlements in the northern islands of PNG. Fiji itself, at the eastern edge of Melanesia, does not fit easily into a Melanesian or Polynesian classification, having many connections with both.

Colonization by Holland, Britain, France, and Australia (and briefly in the north by Germany and Japan) changed the ethnic balance by settlement within Melanesia in several ways that had important consequences for land policy at independence.

There were three sources of settlers during the colonial period. First, settlers came from the metropolitan countries themselves, particularly Australians to Papua New Guinea and French to New Caledonia and Vanuatu. There were also smaller British and Australian settler groups in Fiji, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands. There were practically no Dutch settlers in Irian Jaya, but after the Indonesian takeover in 1963 thousands of people have been resettled there as part of the Indonesian government's "transmigration" policy.

Second, settlers were introduced, initially as laborers, from other distant colonies of Europe--particularly Vietnamese and Indonesians into New Caledonia and Indians into Fiji. Indian labor for Solomon Islands was also proposed but rejected soon after colonization. Small Chinese trading communities also grew up in each territory.

Third, the tendency for colonial units of administration to follow the accidents of European competition, rather than local ethnic division, opened Melanesia to migration from non-Melanesian neighbors which happened to be governed by the same colonial power. The Micronesian Gilbert Islands were, for example, administered with the Polynesian Ellice Islands as a single colony and, for some purposes, with the Melanesian Solomon Islands and Vanuatu as part of Britain's Western Pacific High Commission. Polynesian Rotuma was included in the government of Fiji. In 1945 about a thousand Micronesian people from Banaba in the Gilbert and Ellice islands colony were resettled in Fiji, and between 1955 and 1971 about twenty-three hundred Gilbertese were settled in western Solomon Islands. Similarly, within the French colonial system, Polynesian Wallisians, Futunans, and Tahitians settled in New Caledonia and Vanuatu.

There were also movements of Melanesians between territories within the British and French colonial systems: small Fijian communities grew up in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, and Solomon Islander and ni-Vanuatu communities in Fiji. By 1980 there were about a thousand ni-Vanuatu in New Caledonia.

Settlement led to marriages between Melanesians and migrants, like the parents of PNG's prime minister Sir Julius Chan or of Vanuatu's secessionist leader Jimmy Stephens. Fiji's census constructs a distinct category of "part-Europeans." However, there and elsewhere the status of children of intermarriages was a minor issue until independence when, particularly in PNG and Vanuatu and to a lesser extent in Solomon Islands, there were painful debates about their citizenship and hence land rights. Ironically, Irian Jaya had been considered by the Dutch in the 1950s as a refuge for mixed-race people from Indonesia.

By the early 1970s, with independence achieved in Fiji and on the agenda in the other territories, the population of Melanesia was about 4.5 million, of whom about 4.1 million were Melanesians. The two largest non-Melanesian groups were the Fiji Indians (250,000), followed by Europeans (100,000, of whom 50,000 were in New Caledonia and 45,000 in PNG). There were relatively large Polynesian and Micronesian minorities in Fiji (7,000), New Caledonia (16,000), and Solomon Islands (10,000). There were about 8,000 Chinese throughout Melanesia and over 2,000 Vietnamese (in New Caledonia and Vanuatu). Indonesian settlement in Irian Jaya had been going ahead for about ten years, with at least 4,000 "transmigrants," and there were also 5,000 Indonesians in New Caledonia.

Comparing the six territories, the proportion of non-Melanesians was highest in Fiji and New Caledonia, which both had non-Melanesian majorities. But compared to Irian Jaya and PNG, the proportion was also high in Solomon Islands, with its substantial Micronesian and Polynesian minorities, and in Vanuatu.

In terms of absolute numbers, a different pattern emerges. Fiji, with the Fiji Indians, had much the largest non-Melanesian population--five times larger than either of the next largest and roughly equal European populations of PNG and New Caledonia.

Relative and absolute numbers have been important in the history of land policy in Melanesia. In Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and New Caledonia misapprehensions of the amount of land needed for shifting subsistence cultivation, the social-Darwinist idea that Melanesians were a "dying race," and the evidence of population decline--at least until the 1940s--were used to justify the alienation of land for settlement by non-Melanesians or development by foreign companies.

Colonial Land Policies

The regulation of land alienation, with the dual and often contradictory purposes of protecting Melanesian owners and European purchasers, was one of the motives for the direct intervention of metropolitan governments in Melanesia. In Vanuatu, for example, it was almost the only motive. Most of the provisions of the naval convention of 1906 and the 1914 Protocol establishing the Anglo-French Condominium deal with the workings of a joint court that would adjudicate and register European land claims (Van Trease 1981, p. 28, and Scarr 1967, pp. 218-27).

There had been many land deals between Melanesians and Europeans before the establishment of colonial governments. The land rights initially granted by Melanesians tended to be personal, contingent, and indefinite. The rights increasingly assumed by Europeans were transferable, absolute, and permanent. As well as misunderstandings there were frauds and threats, and when disputes led to violence Europeans had the advantage of better weapons.

This sometimes violent interaction with Europeans changed the way in which Melanesians thought about land and the value put on it. It came to be said that every piece of land had been owned by someone; ownership was communal (with some exceptions) and the land was, in principle, inalienable; chiefs might have had the right to allocate use rights, but they had had no right to dispose of the land itself; Europeans had confused rights of ownership with rights of use, used threats to acquire land, and paid for it with inadequate compensation: axes, bottles, sticks of tobacco, etc. (see, e.g., Solomon Islands 1976, paras. 1.1-1.3).

There were several impulses, more or less common to colonial land policies in Melanesia.

To settle European claims, once and for all

Examples include the Land Claims Commission set up in Fiji in 1879, the Joint Court in the New Hebrides, the Phillips Commission in Solomon Islands in the 1920s, and the provisions for the registration of title to alienated land in Solomon Islands' 1963 Land and Titles Ordinance. Generally, the more legalistic the process of deciding the validity of European land claims, the more it tended to favor the Europeans against Melanesian counterclaims. The length of time the process took aggravated this tendency, as Europeans relied on documentary evidence while Melanesians relied on oral tradition about the original transaction.

The Joint Court did not begin work in Vanuatu until 1927, did not reach Santo until the 1950s, and was still adjudicating European claims in

Malekula in 1980 when independence overthrew all European titles (Van Trease 1981, p. 32). In Solomon Islands, adjudication and registration under the 1963 act was still not quite finished by independence in 1978. A final cutoff date for applications to register title to alienated land had been set the year before, and claims over 3 percent of the land were still being adjudicated in 1980 (Solomon Islands 1980, p. 153).

To limit further direct sales to Europeans

In Solomon Islands, for example, a 1914 land regulation prohibited the further sale of land to Europeans. Earlier sales were unaffected, and the protectorate government could continue to buy land for lease to Europeans. After the annexation of Fiji, there was a brief period between 1905-1909 when further sales were allowed, but after that they were stopped.

To assert government rights over apparently "waste and vacant" land

In New Caledonia a decree of 1868 gave the government the right to expropriate "vacant" land without compensation. In Fiji, before annexation, the chiefly government of Bua passed a Waste Lands Act in which "all lands not actually occupied or regularly under occupation shall be considered as government property" (France 1969, p. 76). The *Solomons (Waste Lands) Regulation* of 1900, modified in 1901 and 1904, gave the government the power to grant certificates of occupation over land "not owned, cultivated or occupied by any native or non-native person." A series of certificates were issued, particularly to Levers Pacific Plantations Proprietary Ltd.; but no further grants were made after 1914, and the area granted to Levers was reduced by about 22 percent after the Phillips Commission reported in 1923 (Allan 1954, p. 44 and Ruthven 1979, pp. 242-45). "Waste and vacant" declarations were also made in PNG.

Critics of wasteland declarations pointed out that they failed to recognize the land needs of a system of shifting cultivation (on a seven-year cycle of cultivation, six times the amount of land a community was using at any one moment would be needed in the future). Uncleared land was also needed for hunting and gathering. In any case, the notion of "need" was a crudely economic and racist reduction of Melanesian ideas about the relationship of communities to land.

Settlement patterns also changed after colonization, people often moving down into the valleys, or onto the coasts, and coming together to live in larger villages. Overall Melanesian populations appeared to be declining. In New Caledonia particularly, these changes were brought about by force: between 1876 and 1903 the Melanesian population of New

Caledonia was confined into an increasingly small area of reserves to make room for European settlement. From 1897 the policy of *cantonnement* also included displacement of groups onto land that was not traditionally theirs (Saussol 1977, p. 235). Elsewhere in Melanesia, new patterns of settlement were actively if less violently encouraged by missions or the colonial administration, and the decline in population had a lot to do with the introduction of new diseases and a more general demoralization.

While the principle of “wasteland” appropriation was eventually abandoned by the colonial governments in PNG and Solomon Islands and never introduced in Vanuatu, it survives in New Caledonia as *domaine* (the government’s right to the 62 percent of the land area which is deemed to be unowned) and in Irian Jaya in the Indonesian government’s principle that timber resources belong to the government. It also survives in Crown “Schedule A” and “B” land in Fiji: land found by the Native Land Commission to be unowned at the time of cession (Schedule B) or whose landowning group has since died out (Schedule A) becomes the property of the government. Fifty-eight percent of government land in Fiji has been acquired in this way (Fiji 1975, p. 108).

To standardize, codify, and record customary ownership

The classic case is the Native Land Commission in Fiji which, after a series of false starts, fixed on a particular descent group, the *mataqali*, as the standard unit of landownership and went ahead to survey and register practically all Fijian land on that basis (France 1969, pp. 165-75). The process took decades to complete; and some parts of Fiji, such as the Lau group, have still not been covered by the commission.

Saussol (1969) has described how the principle of collective ownership by tribes, rather than clans or individuals, was introduced by decree in New Caledonia in 1868. The French government research institute, ORSTOM, has recently begun a project, in some ways like Fiji’s, to reconstruct clan boundaries at the time of annexation--a process made much more difficult by the passage of time and the massive disruptions and displacements of population during *cantonnement*.

In 1952 and again in 1962, the colonial government in PNG introduced ambitious but spectacularly unsuccessful legislation to record the customary ownership of land. The Native Land Commission, set up in 1952, was supposed to record ownership both systematically and in response to applications from particular owners. It did not even try the first task and decided on only 176 of the 472 applications it received, none of which was ever registered. The 1962 act itself was less ambitious, though

in its implementation the whole country was divided into five hundred "adjudication areas" and demarcation committees appointed. However, no records ever emerged (Knetsch and Trebilcock 1981, pp. 9-10).

A year later, another PNG act provided for the conversion, by agreement, of customary land into freehold. While the aim of the earlier acts had been to record customary ownership, the aim of the *Land Tenure Conversion Act* was to transform and in particular individualize it. Only 900 titles were created in seventeen years (*ibid.*, p. 53). Similar individualizing motives lay behind the provisions for what was confusingly called "land settlement" in the Solomon Islands 1963 *Land and Titles Ordinance*. It produced 462 registered titles out of customary land over the same period as PNG's.

In practice, the distinction between recording customary ownership (as in Fiji, or PNG's 1952 and 1962 acts) and converting it into something else (as in PNG's and Solomon Islands' 1963 acts) was not great. The very act of recording and giving the record official sanction changed its objects. An often fluid and variable system of customary tenures in Fiji was "communalized" by the Native Lands Commission in much the same way as it was "individualized" by a more self-conscious process of "tenure conversion" in PNG and Solomon Islands. Peter France has described how in Fiji the chiefs were browbeaten by lands commissioners into accepting that all land was owned communally and that the *mataqali* was the unit of ownership (France 1969, pp. 165-75). And in Solomon Islands, browbeating by administrative officers had only partial success in "individualizing" the tenure of land that became registered, since only 52 percent were in the name of a single individual. Another 25 percent were owned by several individuals in common and the remainder on behalf of a group (Alamu 1979, p. 164).

To incorporate or co-opt traditional leadership

European purchasers--and, later, colonial governments--needed to find people they could deal with about land. If chiefs did not exist or would not come forward, then they would have to be created. Saussol describes the "administrative fiction" created in New Caledonia of collective ownership by the tribe represented in the person of its chief, who could then give the land up (1969, p. 232).

In a milder way, the rights of chiefs to the land were strengthened by colonial rule in Fiji. Leases of native land through the Native Land Trust Board have to be approved by a majority of the members of the *mataqali*, but chiefs still automatically get 20 percent of rentals (Nayacakalou 1971, p. 216). If customary land in Solomon Islands is to be leased, the land-

owners must choose “trustees” to receive rentals on their behalf. Only the names of the “trustees” appear on the land register, and there is often popular suspicion, justified by court cases, that officially recognized representatives will in time appropriate rights of ownership to themselves. That chiefs might have had the right to allocate use rights but no right to dispose of land has been a frequent argument against the validity of European titles acquired before the colonial period.

Outcomes of Colonial Policies

While there were many similarities in colonial policies and legislation, the outcomes of their application in each territory were very different. In Fiji and New Caledonia the outcomes were almost exactly reversed: 83 percent of the land in Fiji remained customary, while 81 percent of the land in New Caledonia was alienated. The extent to which the practice of colonial policy favored Melanesian or European interests depended on two main factors: the presence or absence of European settlers, and the administrative capacity of the government to carry out the policies it chose. The settler presence and pressure was strongest in New Caledonia but also quite strong in New Hebrides, PNG, and Fiji. It was very weak in Solomon Islands, where 63 percent of the alienated land was owned by a single multinational company, Levers. The administrative capacity of the colonial lands departments seems to have been relatively strong in New Caledonia and Fiji and weak in PNG. There was no lands department, as such, in Vanuatu.

Nevertheless, the outcome in each territory was to create two broad categories of land--“alienated” and “customary.” Rights to customary land were unwritten, personal, and dependent on membership of a particular Melanesian community, by descent or adoption. Rights to alienated land were documentary, impersonal, and dependent on the existence of a central government to sustain them. The two categories corresponded to the racial discriminations of the colonial societies and to the dual nature of the colonial economies. Export-oriented agriculture and mining, run by Europeans and worked by migrants, was to go ahead on alienated land, while Melanesians were to go ahead with subsistence agriculture on customary land.

By the mid-1970s, with independence aborted in Irian Jaya, achieved by Fiji, and coming on the agenda in PNG, Solomon Islands, and the New Hebrides, the extent of alienation was broadly as shown in Table 1.

Most of this alienation had taken place in the early colonial period. The percentages were relatively stable from the second quarter of the

twentieth century, though alienation of land in the PNG highlands did not begin until about 1947 and went on, particularly in the western highlands, into the 1960s (Howlett, pers. comm.). There was also considerable new alienation of land for forestry in Solomon Islands in the 1960s.

In Vanuatu and Solomon Islands there had been large reductions in the area of land alienated, as European claims were withdrawn or subsequently disallowed. A French company, SFNH, had at one time claimed 55 percent of the land area of Vanuatu (Van Trease 1981, p. 26). In Solomon Islands in the 1920s the Phillips Commission had reduced the area covered by waste and vacant grants by about 22 percent. Melanesian reserves in New Caledonia, having been squeezed in the policy of *cantonement*, actually grew again by 43 percent between 1890 and 1979 (Ward, forthcoming).

The gross percentage figures obscure three aspects of land alienation that became politically significant as independence approached: the unevenness of its impact, the growing Melanesian stake in alienated land, and the extent of government ownership. These may be better discussed one by one.

Uneven distribution of alienated land

The gross percentage figures tend to both understate and overstate the impact of alienation. First, the land alienated tended to be the better valley and coastal land. Its loss was the more aggravating to Melanesian claimants, since all the land alienated was rarely in fact used. In Solomon Islands, for example, the Agriculture Division reckoned that about two-thirds of the alienated land could have been developed, but only one-third was. Second, the percentages were much higher in particular places, like the Gazelle Peninsula in PNG, or the Guadalcanal Plains in Solomon Islands, or southeast Santo and Efate in Vanuatu. For example, 40 percent of Tolai land in the Gazelle Peninsula was alienated--ten times the PNG average (ToWallom 1977). Equally large areas of Melanesia, particularly outlying islands like the Loyalties, were unaffected.

To the extent that land alienation was uneven, its potential as a political issue was also uneven. When a particular region saw itself as relatively disadvantaged by alienation, the issue had a particular separatist potential.

Melanesian ownership of alienated land

Toward the end of the colonial period the categories of alienated and customary land, and related racial and economic discriminations, had begun to blur as Melanesians bought, were granted, or simply occupied

TABLE 1

Alienated Land in the Mid-1970s

Territory	Colonial Power	Independence Date	Hectares alienated ⁽¹⁾	Alienated land as percentage of total land area
New Caledonia ⁽²⁾	France	--	1,330,000	81%
Vanuatu ⁽³⁾	Britain & France	1980	240,000	20%
Fiji ⁽⁴⁾	Britain	1970	321,700	17%
Solomon Islands ⁽⁵⁾	Britain	1978	484,200	17%
PNG ⁽⁶⁾	Australia	1975	2,203,000	4%
Irian Jaya ⁽⁷⁾	Holland, then Indonesia	(1962)	n.a.	n.a.

1. Includes customary land covered by leases, alienated land owned by Melanesians, *domaine* and government land.

2. Eriau, quoted in Ward (forthcoming).

3. Registrar of Titles Vila 1980.

4. Pacific Islands Year Book 1978, p. 89.

5. Larmour P., ed. 1979. *Land in Solomon Islands*. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies. Appendix 2, p. 249.

6. Pacific Islands Year Book 1979, p. 239.

7. Alienation during the Dutch colonial period was minimal. Crocombe quotes a figure of 2,233 hectares in 1953 (1971, p. 327). Since the Indonesian takeover after 1963 land will have been alienated for migrants--the Pacific Islands Year Book (1978, p. 224) quotes figures of 170,000 hectares reserved for settlement by 1972 with 66,000 hectares settled by 1975--and the Indonesian governments rights over land for timber extraction should be included--Crocombe quotes a figure of 200,000 hectares in 1968. But the absence of a functioning title system makes the reality more like *domaine* in New Caledonia.

alienated land. In New Caledonia, for example, after World War II Melanesians became entitled to lease public land as smallholders. Saussol estimates that 249 lots, totaling 24,000 hectares, were leased to Melanesians between 1958 and 1963 (1971, p. 240). The Solomon Islands government organized similar “resettlement” schemes by subdividing public land, some of which simply legitimated squatting. Beginning in the 1960s, the French government in Vanuatu granted hundreds of hectares of land to francophone New Hebrideans. Home ownership schemes also gave Melanesians a stake in land in the towns that had hitherto been entirely European preserves (Wolfers 1975, pp. 155-56).

At the same time, leasehold systems had been introduced, turning Melanesian owners into freeholders of alienated land. On the Guadalcanal Plains in Solomon Islands the government used the device of returning freehold rights to alienated land to its custom owners in exchange for long leases over parts of it. In “joint venture” schemes like Solomon Islands Plantations Limited’s oil palm project, landowners also became minor shareholders. Finally, the small-scale tenure conversion schemes introduced in PNG and Solomon Islands in the 1960s aimed to provide customary landowners with the written, indefeasible titles formerly reserved to Europeans.

So by the 1970s, many Melanesians had a stake either as landlords or tenants in the system of alienated land. It seems at least in Vanuatu and New Caledonia to have become deliberate colonial policy to create a class of smallholders who were not the custom owners of the land and so whose interests would be against returning it. In Vanuatu at independence, one-quarter of all the alienated land was owned by Melanesians.

Public land/domaine

By the 1970s, the colonial governments themselves had become the major owners of alienated land. They had acquired the land particularly from “waste and vacant” declarations, or the equivalent *domaine* land in New Caledonia, and as a consequence of their role as intermediaries between customary owners and expatriate lessees. Very little of the land was held for strictly “public purposes” like roads and government buildings, and in Solomon Islands and PNG there was some uncertainty about how much land the government had come to own.

The political question was whether this public land would be inherited by the independent Melanesian governments or returned to its custom owners. A related question was what powers of compulsory acquisition of land the independent government should have after independence.

The extent of government and Melanesian ownership of alienated land is shown in Table 2.

The 1970s

Three new circumstances would also affect the politics of alienated land in the 1970s: there was new interest by foreign investors in alienated land; Melanesians were becoming increasingly ready to take direct action to recover land by occupying it; and there had been new and officially encouraged settlement by non-Melanesians during the 1960s.

New foreign investment

Particularly in Fiji, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands, a new wave of foreign investment in alienated land began in the late 1960s. There was a promise of diversification away from copra into tourist hotels, residential subdivisions for sale abroad, and new agribusinesses such as cattle ranching on Santo and Efate or rice and oil palm production on the Guadalcanal Plains.

A lot of the interest was speculative. Beginning in 1967, Harold Peacock, a land developer from Hawaii, bought already alienated land for subdivision at Hog Harbor, Cape Quiros, and Palikula on the east coast of Santo. There were also subdivisions around Vila, at Malapoa, and at Tassiriki. About four thousand lots were sold abroad, the buyers including Michael Oliver of the Phoenix Corporation.

These subdivisions provided the first issue for what became the ruling Vanuaaku Pati. In 1971 the New Hebrides Cultural Association, later changing its name to the National Party and then in 1977 to Vanuaaku Pati, organized a demonstration in Vila against European opposition to the controls on subdivision finally being proposed by the colonial government (Sope 1975, c. 34, and MacClancey 1980, p. 124).

Peacock's subdivisions were frustrated by the retrospective regulations passed by the two colonial governments in 1971. Peacock sued the British resident commissioner; and the senator for Hawaii, Daniel Inouye, was persuaded to intervene on behalf of his constituents who had bought land in Vanuatu. The Solomon Islands colonial government borrowed from the New Hebrides legislation a year later, particularly to prevent the sale of lots subdivided out of Doma plantation on the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. Fiji followed suit in 1973.

Sudden increases in land values and the prospect of new settlement in residential subdivisions sharpened local Melanesian discontent with land alienation. The clearance of hitherto undeveloped but legally alienated

TABLE 2

**Government and Melanesian Ownership of
Alienated Land in the Mid-1970s**

	Public Land^{(1)(h a)}	as % of total alienated land	Alienated⁽²⁾ land held by Melanesians^(h a)	as % of total alienated land
New Caledonia ⁽³⁾	950,000	71%	20,600	2%
Vanuatu ⁽⁴⁾	13,900	6%	58,900	25%
Fiji ⁽⁵⁾	172,600	53%	n.a.	n.a.
Solomon Island ⁽⁶⁾	161,800	33%	147,800	51%
PNG ⁽⁷⁾	1,944,500	88%	3,400	0.1%
Irian Jaya ⁽⁸⁾	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

1. Includes “domaine” “waste and vacant” land leased to individuals and companies. Excludes Melanesian “reserves” (PNG, New Caledonia, and Vanuatu) and land held by the Land Trust Board (6,403 hectares) in Vanuatu.

2. Held as lessors, lessees, or owner-occupiers in “tenure conversion” or resettlement schemes.

3. Eriau, quoted in Ward (forthcoming).

4. Van Trease (1981, p. 31).

5. Pacific Islands Year Book (1978, p. 89).

6. Larmour, P., ed. 1979. *Land in Solomon Islands*. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies. Appendix 2.

7. Pacific Islands Year Book 1978, p. 239.

8. See note 7 to Table 1.

land revealed how extensive the original alienation had been. Land clearance--for cattle on Santo, for rice, cattle, and oil palm on the Guadalcanal Plains, and for forestry on Kolombangara--led to the displacement of people who were legally squatters but who had hitherto been undisturbed and who protested that they were unaware that the land had ever been alienated (see Solomon Islands 1977 for Kolombangara).

Jimmy Stephens' Nagriamel movement began in the early 1960s as a squatter settlement, created to resist the clearance of "dark bush" for cattle ranching in the interior of Santo. It was centered in Vanafo, a new village in the interior established by Chief Buluk, who was joined by Jimmy Stephens, a man of mixed Tongan, European, and Melanesian descent. Stephens became his assistant and Nagriamel's spokesman, then leader. In 1970 he petitioned the United Nations for independence for the New Hebrides. He changed the name of the movement to the Nagriamel Federation and announced in December 1975 that Santo would become independent in April 1976 (later postponed to August, then indefinitely).

During the 1970s Nagriamel became a Melanesian vehicle for largely non-Melanesian interests threatened by the prospect of majority rule and national independence. These interests included European settlers and businessmen, Tahitian and Wallisian migrants, mixed-race people like Stephens himself, local French colonial officials, and land speculators like Harold Peacock. By 1975, Jimmy Stephens was writing to Senator Inouye on behalf of Peacock's companies. A movement against land alienation had come to promote it.

At the same time, Nagriamel also drew on local Melanesian sentiment (Santo for Santo people) and the fears of French-speaking Melanesians of domination by an English-educated elite, represented by the Vanuaaku Pati. From 1974 to 1975 Nagriamel also entered into electoral alliance with several of the series of small French-speaking, "custom," and regionally oriented parties that by the late 1970s, with French official sponsorship, had managed to define themselves as "moderate" (MacClancey, p. 130).

During the 1960s the French government had begun handing back large areas of undeveloped alienated land in Vanuatu, often in exchange for the renunciation of Melanesian claims over developed land. Sope describes how the French government reached a deal with Jimmy Stephens over the "dark bush" Nagriamel had occupied: the cattle rancher Laconte would use his bulldozer to clear land for Nagriamel in exchange for the right to clear more land for his own cattle: one hour of bulldozing for two acres (1975, p. 28).

Plantation occupations

While the clearance of hitherto undeveloped alienated land was creating resistance among some Melanesian groups, others were threatening to take back developed land by harassment or occupation. In PNG by 1974, about sixty properties were illegally occupied and another forty threatened with occupation (Fingleton, p. 237). Plantation occupations were widespread in Vanuatu during the 1970s, particularly between December 1977 and May 1978, after the Vanuaaku Pati boycotted the representative assembly elections and formed a Peoples Provisional Government with effective control over at least parts of many islands. In New Caledonia, parties in the Independence Front plan to occupy plantations before a unilateral of independence on September 24, 1982 (Pacific Islands Monthly, December 1981, p. 5).

Before the 1970s the colonial governments of, particularly, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands had dealt with threats of occupation on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, usually by buying out the European and subdividing the land for smallholder settlement. Examples include schemes at Boulpari (begun in 1950) and Tchamba (1960) in New Caledonia, or at Baunani (around 1960) on Malaita in Solomon Islands (Saussol 1971 and Totorea 1979, p. 82). A similar process of reacting to pressure on "hot spots" and buying out the European still seems to be taking place on a small scale with little publicity in Fiji (see reference to land purchase cooperatives in Fiji 1980, p. 39).

By the 1970s the pressure had become more widespread, and more systematic solutions were required. In 1971 the Solomon Islands colonial government started a plantation purchase program. Groups of custom owners, incorporated under cooperatives legislation, were helped to buy back plantations with money borrowed from the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board, free management assistance from the Agriculture Department, and grants for equipment needed to rehabilitate the usually run-down plantations (Bramham 1979 and Solomon Islands 1979, pp. 54-56). The groups were to repay the loans from the production of the rehabilitated plantations, and all succeeded in doing so. By 1976 twelve groups were participating in the scheme, and another eleven were expected to join.

While the French were returning "dark bush" in Vanuatu, British officials, following Solomon Islands' example, considered schemes to buy out the European owners of developed land, and one purchase did take place (Bronkovia estate on Epi) (Van Trease 1981, p. 37). But the British government was unwilling to provide money unless it could be justified in developmental rather than political terms (the plantation purchase scheme

in Solomon Islands had been dressed up as a project to redevelop alienated land and was administered by the Agriculture rather than Lands Department, both of which facts tended to disguise its political importance).

Then in 1973 the Australian government handed over title to 6,000 ha of land in Vanuatu that it had acquired from the Burns Philip Company in the early colonial period. Some of the land was undeveloped, but some was developed and covered by leases to Europeans. It was handed over to a Land Trust Board; but in the face of disputes over customary ownership and the inability to persuade the British government to fund repurchases, none of it was actually returned to customary ownership (Stober, forthcoming).

PNG's systematic plantation purchase program got underway in 1974, and seventy-five plantations were repurchased by groups of customary owners over the next five years. Melanesians also bought European-owned plantations outside the scheme. Management assistance was available, at a price, from the National Plantation Management Agency, set up in 1977, which assisted groups on twenty-seven of the plantations acquired under the scheme and twenty-three bought outside it (Eaton 1980, p. 9). Plantation output dropped over this period, and the European Planters Association blamed the repurchase program. It was reviewed by a government committee in 1979 and abandoned in 1981.

In New Caledonia in 1978, the French minister for overseas territories, Paul Dijoud, proposed a land purchase program including, if necessary, compulsory acquisition. As explained by the high commissioner, the administration's proposals rejected Melanesian claims for a wholesale return of alienated land but were designed to meet Melanesian claims over particular places like village sites from which they had been dispossessed by *cantonement* and where they were short of land today (Ward, forthcoming). According to Roux (pers. comm.), 20,000 hectares have been returned to Melanesian groups since 1978, and the plan envisages about 10,000 hectares a year be returned over the next ten years.

New non-Melanesian settlement

Between 1955 and 1971, twenty-three hundred Micronesians from the Phoenix and Southern Gilberts were resettled on alienated land in the Western District of Solomon Islands (Bobai 1979). And during the 1960s, about eleven thousand Polynesian Wallisians and Futunans came to New Caledonia, attracted particularly by the nickel boom (Roux 1980). Both groups came from small islands with poor resources and few job prospects.

The political importance of both groups lay in the way that their settlement on alienated land had been sponsored by the colonial governments. In Solomon Islands the land and citizenship rights of the Gilbertese settlers became an issue in the constitutional negotiations with Britain. In New Caledonia, the Wallisians and Futunans and other Polynesian migrants from Tahiti are seen by many Melanesian politicians as having been brought in by the French government to provide votes against independence. With probably similar motives, Jimmy Stephens advocated the resettlement of refugees from what had been South Vietnam in Santo in 1980 (Roux, pers. comm.).

Independence

The first Melanesian country to become independent was Fiji in 1970 (Irian Jaya had been moving toward independence from Holland until it was annexed by Indonesia). By 1970 Melanesians had become a minority of the population in Fiji, and the largest ethnic group were Indians, descended mainly from indentured laborers who came to Fiji between 1879 and 1916. There was also a small but politically powerful group of European settlers. The politics of alienated land were therefore very different in Fiji, compared to the three other Melanesian countries that became independent in the following decade: PNG (1975), Solomon Islands (1978), and Vanuatu (1980).

Fiji as a Special Case

While the constitutions that the other Melanesian countries adopted at independence provided for changes in colonial land legislation, Fiji's constitution was designed to make changes more difficult. It provides a permanent Melanesian veto on amendments to land legislation. Section 68 of the constitution entrenches existing land legislation by providing that it may only be amended by special absolute majorities--at least three-quarters of all the members of both houses. In addition, section 68 (2) requires that any amendment "that is a provision that affects Fijian land" also requires the support of at least six of the eight senators appointed on the advice of the Melanesian Great Council of Chiefs (Fiji 1970, and see Ali 1980 for a discussion of the constitutional negotiations).

Fijian land registered by the Native Land Commission may only be leased through the agency of a Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) set up in 1940. Some of this land is reserved for lease only to Fijians. About 345,000 hectares (22 percent) is covered by agricultural leases, mainly to

Indian tenants (Fiji 1980, p. 27). The only land reform in Fiji since independence has been a controversial 1976 amendment to the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA) to allow automatic renewals of standard ten-year leases of Fijian land for two further ten-year periods, giving tenants thirty years' security of tenure.

Nevertheless, there remain parallels and connections in land policy between Fiji and the rest of Melanesia, particularly Vanuatu. The National Federation party politician and lawyer K. C. Ramrakha had helped Jimmy Stephens to appeal a sentence for trespass on alienated land in 1967 and later helped Nagriamel to present its petition to the United Nations in 1971. The independent Fijian politician Ratu Osea Gavindi seems to have had connections with the Phoenix Corporation, which was backing Nagriamel and was declared a prohibited immigrant before independence in Vanuatu. Finally, Fiji's prime minister felt compelled to go into print in the *Fiji Times* on August 11, 1980, to explain that while Fiji supported Vanuatu's independence this did not imply endorsement of the section of its constitution that returned alienated land to its custom owners. Vanuatu's constitution provided for compensation, but in any case settler freeholds in Fiji remained secure. The Fijian Nationalist party has since taken up the issue of return of land, using the examples of PNG, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, as part of its challenge to the prime minister's Alliance party in the 1982 general election.

Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu

Demands for the return of alienated land in PNG, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu got political expression in several ways during the 1970s: in popular political movements; in newly elected territorial legislatures and the committees they established; and in the dealings of Melanesian ministers as they sought to gain control over colonial government departments and negotiated with metropolitan governments about independence.

Alienated land in popular political movements

Table 3 shows political movements active in the three countries during the 1970s. National political parties that were active only at the time of elections or within the legislatures are not included, though five of the movements did put up candidates who won in their name. National politicians in whose electorates the movements were strong also had to come to terms with them and, in five cases, leaders of the movements became members of the national government.

Two movements--the Moro movement, centered on Mataruka village in southeast Guadalcanal, and John Frumm on Tanna--had deep roots back to the 1940s. One of the sources of John Frumm support was the defense of custom against the authoritarian rule of the Presbyterian mission, and the movement also became impressed with the power, wealth, and cargo of American soldiers who came during World War II (Sope 1975, pp. 22-25). The movement was represented in the representative assembly elected in 1979 as one of the three "federal" parties in the franco-phone opposition. It also had connections with Tafea, a secessionist project encouraged in the Southern District to parallel Nagriamel's secession as Vemarana in the north. (Tafea is a name made up of the initial letters of the five islands in the Southern District.)

Though the rest of the movements tended to be centered on areas of relatively severe land alienation, the two oldest, Moro and John Frumm, did not. There was little alienated land on the south coast of Guadalcanal--though it was an issue on the north coast, where Moro got some support--and there was little alienation on Tanna (*ibid.*, p. 24). There was also relatively little alienation in Papua, though Papua Besena used its symbolism: in Papua Besena's secession declaration in Port Moresby in 1974, Josephine Abijah symbolically returned to Australia the trade goods (sticks of tobacco, axes, bottles, etc.) with which Papuan land had been bought (Premdas 1977, p. 265). The movement was particularly concerned with land taken for the capital city, Port Moresby.

The first six columns of Table 3 indicate the presence or absence of concern about particular kinds of land alienation in each movement. European plantations were an issue for six of the movements, but concern about migration and squatting by other Melanesians was also common. The Bougainville movement was particularly concerned about alienation of land, royalties, and participation in the Bougainville Copper Mine (Premdas 1977 and Hannet 1975). The Western Breakaway movement was particularly concerned with the alienation of land for forestry on Kolombangara and North New Georgia (Premdas and Larmour, forthcoming). Land alienated for the capital city was a particular issue for Papua Besena and the Vanuaaku Pati.

The next seven columns compare the activities of each movement. All but Moro organized demonstrations; five fought and won elections. Three movements occupied alienated land. Nagriamel actually succeeded in expelling migrants and settlers, with two thousand leaving after the movement occupied Luganville in May 1980. The Bougainville separatists succeeded in repatriating a planeload of migrant workers to the mainland. The other movements only threatened expulsion.

Table 3
Land Issues in Political Movements during the 1970s

	Movement	Place	Main period of activity	Land Alienation Issues							Activities							Outcomes		
				European Plantation	Cattle Ranching	Speculative Subdivisions	Migrant Settlers and Squatters	Mining	Forestry	Capital City	Demonstrations	Electoral Politics	Occupation of Land	Expulsion of Migrants	Alternative Institutions	Secession Declarations	International Assistance	Decentralization	Police/Military Action	Leaders Join National Government
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	Mataungan Association	Gazelle Peninsula	1969-73	X			X					X	X	X		X			X	X
	Bougainville Movement	Bougainville	1968-76	X			X	X				X		X	X	X		X	X	X
	Papua Besena	Central District	1972-81				X			X	X				X					X
	Western Breakaway	Western Province	1972-78	X			X		X			X					X			X
SI	Moro Movement	Guadalcanal	1970-73	X			X							X						
VANUATU	Nagriamel Vemarana	Santo and Northern District	1968-80	X	X		X					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	John Frum Tafea	Tanna and Southern District	since 1940s									X	X			X	X	X	X	
	Vanuaaku Pati	Efate and various islands	1971-80	X		X				X	X	X	X		X	X				X

Five movements set up their own alternative quasi-governmental institutions, like the Mataungan Association's alternative local government council (ToWallom 1977, pp. 25-28), VP's Peoples Provisional Government, or Vemarana's alternative cabinet of ministers. Five made explicit separatist or secessionist declarations; and a sixth, the Western Breakaway movement, threatened to do so if its six points (one of which was control of land) were not met by the government before independence. Six movements sought support overseas in neighboring Melanesian countries, from the metropolitan governments, or from the United Nations. But only Nagriamel/Vemarana and John Frumm/Tafea got active support and weapons, from European settlers in New Caledonia and the Phoenix Corporation set up by Michael Oliver, a businessman based in Carson City, Nevada.

Oliver had bought land in Vanuatu in 1971, but in the early 1970s his attentions were directed elsewhere. Having made his money, he was looking for a place to try out his political theories of minimum government that would not interfere with private foreign investment. In 1972 he tried to set up a "Republic of Minerva" on a reef south of Tonga. Two years later he tried to stir up secession among European settlers of Abaco, an island in the Bahamas. In June 1975 he set up the Phoenix Foundation to promote his ideas and turned his attention to Nagriamel (Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1980, pp. 25-30).

Beginning with Nagriamel's first declaration of its independence in December 1975, Phoenix provided the movement with funds, "a radio station and an airfield" (letter from Oliver in the *Economist* 28.6.80), and the symbols of independence: gold currency; passports; and several versions of a written constitution for Vemarana, consisting of the islands of the colonial Northern District. It also provided an ideology of "multi-racial development" (symbolized by white and black hands clasped) and hostility to government (particularly the Vanuaaku Pati government) that was sufficiently broad to include the very different interests behind Nagriamel: chiefs, settlers, and land speculators.

The demands of four of the movements were met by promises of more decentralized government after independence: provinces for Bougainville and the Western Breakaway movement, and regional councils for Vemarana and Tafea (the latter backfired when the VP got narrow majorities on the two regional councils in the November 1979 elections). Finally, four of the movements were suppressed by paramilitary police action, and in the case of Nagriamel/Vemarana by the Papua New Guinea army.

Alienated land in the legislative assemblies

In each of the three countries the last legislature--or last but one--to be elected before independence set up a committee or commission to make recommendations about land policy after independence.

PNG's Commission of Enquiry into Land Matters (CILM) was appointed in February 1973, a year after the elections for the new House of Assembly and the formation of the National Coalition Government under Michael Somare. It reported within nine months (PNG 1973).

Solomon Islands' Select Committee on Lands and Mining (SCLM) was appointed by the Governing Council in January 1974, six months after a general election. When it finally reported in May 1976, the Governing Council had been reconstituted as a legislative assembly, Solomon Mameloni had become chief minister, and a new general election was due in three months' time (Solomon Islands 1976).

Vanuatu's Ad Hoc Committee on Land Reform was appointed by the Representative Assembly elected in November 1977. It held two meetings, each lasting several days, at Luganville in November 1978, and at Norsup on Malekula in March 1979 (Vanuatu 1979). Though it had boycotted the elections and was not represented in the assembly, the Vanuaaku Pati (VP) had meanwhile agreed to join a Government of National Unity, under Fr. Gérard Leymang in December 1978. While the VP was not represented on the Ad Hoc Committee on Land Reform, there was in fact little difference between the committee's recommendations, debated in the assembly in April 1979, and the Vanuaaku Pati's platform in the elections that followed eight months later (Vanuaaku Pati 1979, pp. 15-17).

The recommendations of each of these three committees are shown in Table 4. The table also shows the recommendations of an official working party set up by the Solomon Islands government to produce counter-proposals to the SCLM report (Solomon Islands 1977). It also summarizes the first statement of land policy made by Vanuatu's new Ministry of Lands, set up by the VP government immediately after it won the 1979 elections (Vanuatu 1980). This communiqué was made at the end of April 1980, after Nagriamel/Vemarana had made its formal declaration of secession at Luganville in January but just before it occupied the town.

Members of the three committees were either Melanesians or elected politicians, generally both. They sought to avoid the influence of the colonial lands departments, in PNG by hiring outside consultants and in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands by working on their own. Their attention focused mainly on alienated land, both PNG's and Solomon Islands' committees issuing interim reports about it (the latter copying whole pas-

sages directly from the former). PNG's commission also made a number of other recommendations about customary land; Solomon Islands' did so more briefly, and Vanuatu's hardly at all.

In each country, the main political battles about land policy were not so much between Melanesian politicians as between Melanesian politicians and European officials. They were often proxy battles. In PNG and Vanuatu new ministers for land brought in their own Europeans, nominally as consultants but in practice to do battle with permanent officials in the bureaucracy on their behalf (see Fingleton 1981, p. 233).

In Solomon Islands, for a while, it worked the other way. Ministers became proxies of permanent officials who persuaded them to avoid endorsing the report of the SCLM. But the alternative policies they proposed were twice rejected by the legislature. The SCLM report had briefly been debated on a noncommittal "take note" motion by the Mamaloni government two months before the general election. After the election the new government led by Peter Kenilorea accepted official advice to propose a "course of action" toward the SCLM report. A working party of officials and representatives of interest groups would go through the report and decide which of its recommendations could be enacted "in the light of" principles that the government "must continue to play a major part as a landowner" and "welcomed" foreign investment. This proposal was defeated by twenty votes to twelve in the legislative assembly, and the new minister Sethuel Kelly resigned a week later.

The government nevertheless went ahead and set up its working party but changed its composition to ensure more political control: it was chaired by a minister and consisted only of Melanesian officials. Its report, slightly modified by the Council of Ministers, became a White Paper which was again defeated fifteen to seven by the assembly in March 1977 (the proportions of the defeat were as before, but the vote was brought on suddenly by the opposition when a number of MPs, including ministers, had wandered out of the assembly).

Alienated land in the independence constitutions

At the same time as, or soon after, the three legislatures set up their land committees, they also set up committees to make recommendations about the constitution the country would acquire at independence. PNG's Constitutional Planning Committee was appointed in September 1972 and reported in June 1974 (PNG 1974); Solomon Islands', appointed in August 1975, reported in March 1976 (Solomon Islands 1976; see also Ghai, forthcoming); and Vanuatu's, appointed in April 1979, reported in September (Vanuatu 1979; see also Narokobi 1981).

TABLE 4
Recommendations about Alienated Land

		Rural		Urban	
		Undeveloped	Developed	Undeveloped	Developed
PNG	Commission of Enquiry into Land Matters, 1973	convert to government leases	if custom "owners short of land, government loans and compulsory acquisition if necessary for repurchase	convert to government leases	
	Select Committee on Lands and Mining, 1976	return to custom owners if alienated before 1963 (when improved methods of acquisition were introduced), but review terms of some government purchases since	government loans to custom owners for repurchase, but if plantations are too big for them to manage or pay for, then convert to lease from custom owners	no change to existing system of government leases	
	Working Party and White Paper, 1977	redevelop land owned by Levers Plantations as joint venture on government leasehold		no change to existing system of government leases	
		retain government ownership of land needed for • resettlement, • smallholders, • joint ventures with foreign capital, and • cases where custom ownership disputed	• establish a Land Development Authority to repurchase and redevelop other plantations with commercial potential, train custom owners, and gradually return ownership and control • return small plantations with poor potential immediately, by compulsory acquisition if necessary		
	Ad Hoc Committee on Land Reform, 1979	return to custom owners	metropolitan governments to pay compensation for work done by former freeholders	return to custom owners	no change to existing freehold system
	Communiqué, 1980	return to custom owners		redefine boundaries and declare as public land with custom owner participation in management and revenue	
		former freeholder and custom owners to negotiate lease or joint ventures. If unsuccessful former freeholder to be compensated for improvements		return some blocks to custom owners	convert to leases from management corporation

Citizenship and the protection of property rights were the two most obvious areas in which the recommendations of the land and constitutional committees had to be coordinated. Solomon Islands' and Vanuatu's constitutions both permanently discriminate between indigenous and nonindigenous citizens in relation to land rights. PNG's constitution limits the protection of nonindigenous citizens against compulsory acquisition for five years but thereafter does not discriminate between citizens. Solomon Islands' constitution retrospectively justified the conversion of nonindigenous freeholds into leases, carried out by the Land and Title Amendment Act over a year before independence. Vanuatu's constitution, by itself, returned alienated land to its custom owners: whereas PNG's and Solomon Islands' contain provisions to allow legislation to return land, Vanuatu's constitution required legislation to deal with the effects of that return.

The constitutional provisions relating to alienated land, and the legislation that preceded or followed, are set out in Table 5.

The Phoenix Corporation shadowed this process of constitution making in Vanuatu with a constitution for a "Confederation of Natakaro formerly New Hebrides Islands" and subsidiary federal versions for Tanna and the northern islands signed by Stephens on behalf of unnamed custom chiefs dating from 1978. A final federal version for Vemarana appeared in 1980 as an attachment to a prospectus to a development corporation passed in Panama (see Doorn 1979 for the thinking behind these constitutions).

The Vemarana prospectus and constitution were posted to private businessmen and arrived in Vila on the same day (28 May) as Nagriamel supporters forcibly occupied Luganville and kidnapped the (Melanesian) district commissioner and several policemen.

The Vemarana constitution differed from the earlier versions signed in 1978 by having four new sections added to Article II, the "Declaration of Rights." The new sections dealt with the rights of foreigners to do business in Vemarana, land ownership, citizenship by birth, and presumption of innocence for people charged with crimes.

The most politically significant new sections were those dealing with land ownership and citizenship. Under Vanuatu's constitution, due to come into effect on independence day, settlers, mixed-race people like Stephens, and land speculators would lose their freehold rights. Vemarana's new sections instead protected existing land rights, alienated and customary:

TABLE 5
Constitutional & Legislative Outcomes

	Constitution	Legislation
PNG 1975	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • only citizens may acquire freehold (s56) • nonautomatic citizens get less protection against compulsory acquisition for 5 years after independence (s68 (4)) • uncertain government titles made more secure (s54) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Land Ownership of Freeholds Act</i> (1976) provides for conversion of freeholds into leases for purposes of dealing • <i>Land Acquisition, Redistribution, Groups and Trespass Acts</i> (all 1974) provide for acquisition of plantations, by compulsion if necessary, for return to custom owners • <i>National Land Registration Act</i> (1977) secures government title and compensation if necessary for custom owners
SI 1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • only automatic citizens may hold or acquire freehold (s110) • parliament may convert nonautomatic and noncitizen freeholds into government leases and prescribe principles of compensation (s110) • stronger custom owner rights against compulsory acquisition (s112) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Land & Titles Amendment Ordinance</i> (1977) converts nonautomatic citizen freeholds into 75-year leases from government • Amendment in 1978 exempts Gilbertese settlers • Amendment in 1980 limits right to advertise alienated land(now leasehold) for sale abroad
VANUATU 1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • all land belongs to custom owners (s71) • only automatic citizens may own freehold (s73) • different provision for urban land (s74) • government may hold land whose custom ownership is in dispute (s78 (1)) • government may acquire land in the public interest (s78) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Land Reform Act</i> (1980) allows ‘alienators’ to remain on the land until they negotiate a lease or joint venture with the custom owners or are compensated for improvements • provides for declarations of “public” land and creation of corporations to manage it. Custom owners share in management and revenues from any land declared public. Boundaries of Vila and Luganville redefined and declared public

The right of ownership of land by any individuals or any other private entities is recognised. Such owners shall, in turn, also recognise the ownership of land by Custom Law. [Section 16]

Resistance to the return of alienated land explains the support of settlers and land speculators for the Santo rebellion; and Stephens, the son of a settler, became an instrument of these interests. But the differences between Melanesian politicians on the issue of alienated land were relatively slight: all the parties, francophone and anglophone, had agreed to the Vanuatu constitution, which was the legal instrument by which the land was returned (though the federal parties later withdrew their support); Sope describes how the VP had learned from Nagriamel how to use the land issue as a means of popular mobilization (1975, p. 33); and the francophone Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations differed from the anglophone VP's manifesto and April communiqué only over the method of handling urban land. The VP government communiqué's emphasis on development by leasehold ironically echoed a theme of Stephens: in early versions of the Vemarana constitution the federal government was to be funded by the proceeds of leases of customary land. The big difference was of course that Vemarana seemed to promise to protect existing freeholds; but it was a promise that could not be made too loudly, in case it split Nagriamel's Melanesian supporters from their settler and speculator backers.

Consequences of the Constitutions

The independent Melanesian governments then had to deal with the consequences of the coming into effect of the land provisions of the new constitutions and the new land legislation. The immediate issues seemed to be compensation, substitute leases, the status of non-European migrants and settlers, and the identification of the custom owners.

Compensation and who should pay it

The parliamentary committees, independence constitutions, and new land legislation in each country accepted the principle that the return of alienated land would involve paying compensation to former freeholders. The committees in PNG and Vanuatu also accepted the principle that custom owners of land in urban areas that would not be returned should also be compensated.

The difficult questions were how the compensation would be assessed and who should pay it. The parliamentary committees agreed that com-

pensation should only be payable for improvements to the land, not for the land itself. (Many plantations were in any case run down, though the speculative value of the “land itself,” or rather title to it, had shot up in the late 1960s until the colonial governments introduced controls on subdivision and sales overseas.

Solomon Islands’ constitution set out factors for compensation:

the purchase price, the value of improvements made between the date of purchase and the date of acquisition; the current use value of the land, and the fact of its abandonment or dereliction. (sec. 111 [c])

However, no legislation to carry out this section of the constitution was ever enacted.

PNG’s Land Acquisition Act also provided for the setting of factors to depress compensation claims when alienated land was compulsorily acquired for return to its customary owners; but compulsory acquisition was rarely used, and prices were set by negotiation.

The committees in PNG and Vanuatu looked to the colonial governments to pay compensation. PNG’s CILM recommended that

the Australian Government should be approached to provide funds additional to the grant in aid for the adjustment of outstanding land problems. (Recommendation 130)

Vanuatu’s Ad Hoc Committee recommended that

the present possessors of land which is to be returned to its custom owners must be indemnified by the tutelary power of whom the original purchaser or land grabber was a resortissant [i.e. “optant”: Europeans had had to choose under which legislative regime, British or French, they lived in New Hebrides]. (Recommendation 19)

In its section on land, Vanuatu’s constitution followed Solomon Islands’ by saying that

parliament shall prescribe such criteria for the assessment of compensation and the manner of its payment. (sec. 75)

Generally, the metropolitan powers managed to avoid accepting specific responsibility for the payment of compensation for the return of

alienated land. The British government had funded loans to custom owners to repurchase plantations under the scheme begun in 1971 but discouraged proposals for funding, there and in Vanuatu, that could not be justified in "developmental" terms. The Australian government rejected special provision for funds for plantation purchases, or compensation, arguing that it was up to the PNG government to decide if it wanted to divert funds for this purpose out of its general grant-in-aid.

The Melanesian governments were in something of a double bind: they wanted some control over the process of compensation, in order to depress claims based on the speculative values of the late 1960s--hence the constitutional provision that the Melanesian parliaments should decide on criteria for assessment. Each government would continue for some time to depend on aid from its former metropolitan power and, at least in Vanuatu, there was the almost explicit threat that if the independent government would not pay compensation the French government would do so directly, possibly at higher rates, and deduct the money at source from Vanuatu's grant-in-aid. Without special and additional funds for compensation, the Melanesian governments would be forced into difficult political decisions about taking loans or grants away from other government services to pay off Europeans on behalf of a relatively small number of custom owners who would benefit from the return of land.

Many plantations were badly run down. Coconut trees planted at the turn of the century were reaching the end of their productive life. The expatriate plantation owners blamed political uncertainty for their failure to reinvest, but there were other factors: low copra prices; bad management, particularly by owners who had inherited the land from their parents; and the unrealistic expectations aroused in the 1960s, that the land itself had sufficiently high speculative value to make agricultural redevelopment a waste of effort.

Yet the apparently urgent need to redevelop the plantations did not fit neatly with the desire to return them: the custom owners might want the land back for subsistence purposes, or just for its own sake; other Melanesians who were not custom owners might be more interested or able to redevelop the land; and landownership groups were not necessarily the most efficient units of management or labor. Finally there were doubts about whether the plantation form of agriculture, which seemed to be so specific to the colonial economy, was any longer appropriate to an independent Melanesian country. These doubts, however, tended to be overridden by the agriculture departments that the governments inherited at independence. (See Walter [1980] for a summary of discussions about the role of the plantation sector in PNG.)

Substitute leasing and automaticity

In each country the debate about compensation was partially resolved by something of sleight of hand--substitute leasing. Non-Melanesians would lose their freehold rights at independence but get a lease instead. If the lease was long enough, and negotiable enough, it was worth about as much as a freehold, and so no claims for compensation needed to be entertained. If the substitute lease contained development conditions, then the land could be taken back if these conditions were not met. Ideologically, there was something for everyone. The Europeans had justified their occupation of Melanesian land by their superior ability to develop it--now that ability would be tested. Custom owners had claimed their forefathers had only intended to lease the land and not to sell it, and now the title but not the land could be returned to them. And neither the Melanesian nor the metropolitan government need worry about compensation.

This approach had been pioneered by the Solomon Islands colonial government in the late 1960s and early 1970s, on the Guadalcanal Plains: title to about 3,000 hectares of land had been transferred to trustees on behalf of groups of custom owners, encumbered by ninety-nine-year leases over those parts of the land that were suitable for capital intensive agriculture (see Lasaqa 1972, pp. 122-27).

There were three politically contentious issues in this approach: the length of the substitute leases, government ownership, and "automaticity."

PNG's CILM recommended the conversion of noncitizen freeholds into leases from the government. The leases would last forty years, but the period could extend to sixty years if there was substantial Papua New Guinean participation in management (there had always, of course, been Papua New Guinean participation in labor). Legislation was drafted and proposals put to the cabinet in 1976 on the basis of ninety-nine-year leases, insisted upon by the agriculture department in the interests of security for investment. But it was not carried out and, since the plantation acquisition scheme was abandoned in 1981, it now seems unlikely that it ever will be. However, legislation was enacted to allow voluntary applications to convert freeholds into government leases, in order that noncitizens or non-automatic citizens could deal in the land.

In 1977, a year before independence, the Solomon Islands government had amended the Land and Titles Ordinance to convert perpetual estates owned by non-Solomon Islanders into seventy-five-year fixed-term estates (leases from the government).

In 1980, the Vanuaaku Pati government in Vanuatu adopted a policy that would encourage the negotiation of substitute leases between the custom owners and former freeholders, but it was unwilling to intervene and ensure that these leases would be granted automatically. In any case, large areas of land had already been occupied by custom owners. The minister of lands, Sethy Regenvanu, proposed a "normal" thirty-year lease period but came to accept the possibility of leases of up to seventy-five years for projects that took a long time to repay investment. The thirty-to-seventy-five formula was a product of intense debate within the government: thirty years provided a prospect that land would be returned within a lifetime, but a longer period was favored by agriculture and planning office officials, who were concerned that it was too short to encourage the kind of long-term agricultural investment that was needed to generate national revenue after independence. The seventy-five-year figure was borrowed from Solomon Islands which in turn had fixed on it as the figure agreed with the Commonwealth Development Corporation in 1971 for a joint-venture oil palm project on land leased back from custom owners on the Guadalcanal Plains.

An important issue in the land committees, and an issue in the political movements of the 1970s, had been the rights of the government to own alienated land and alienate more in the future. It was this issue in particular that caused the Solomon Islands government to resist accepting the report of the SCLM and to make counterproposals to preserve government ownership in the White Paper that was defeated in the legislative assembly in February 1977. In Vanuatu the "moderate" parties had traded on fears of "nationalization" of land by Vanuaaku Pati. And in New Caledonia, there are potential differences in the independentist movement, between advocates of nationalization rather than return of alienated land.

The recommendations of PNG's CILM and the provisions of Solomon Islands' 1977 Land and Titles Amendment Ordinance effectively nationalized most alienated land by the conversion of non-Melanesian freeholds into leases from the government. In doing so, the government stepped into a number of local disputes between custom owners and planters, taking the side of the latter, whose leases they had now undertaken to guarantee. More generally, the land issue was transformed from one between Melanesians and Europeans to one between Melanesians and their elected government. There was no guarantee that the government would ever return the land. In Vanuatu, the new government was more reluctant to intervene.

The conversion of freeholds into leases proposed in PNG was more or less automatic, qualified only by development conditions. In Solomon Islands, there was more uncertainty about whether or not the leases would be automatic: the law seemed to imply it, but Solomon Islands negotiators at the subsequent constitutional conference were reluctant to get locked in to guaranteeing a lease for every former freeholder. In practice, substitute leases were only granted over land for which development proposals were submitted. The remainder reverted to the government, and some of that remainder was returned to customary ownership.

“Automaticity” was more explicitly an issue between the Vanuatu government, settlers, and the banks that often had mortgages over the alienated land. In spite of earlier fears, there was last-minute settler interest in nationalization of alienated land, if this meant that the government would guarantee leases against the claims of custom owners (or at least tell them who the true custom owners were). But the cabinet considered and rejected automaticity and at the same time said that the government would only consider claims for compensation if and when the former freeholders and custom owners had tried and failed to negotiate a satisfactory lease or joint venture.

Non-European migrants and settlers

Apart from the Europeans, there were two other categories of migrant settlers on alienated land at independence in Melanesia. The first group were migrants within the colonial territory. They were mainly Melanesian, though, for example, there were settlers from Polynesian Tikopia on land alienated by Levers Pacific Plantations in the Russell Islands in Solomon Islands. But all of these settlers, having been in the territory before colonization, would automatically qualify for citizenship.

For the second group of migrants between colonial territories, issues of citizenship and land rights became linked. They were mostly non-Melanesian. The biggest group was, of course, the Indians in Fiji.

By independence there were about four thousand descendants of Gilbertese settlers in Solomon Islands. In 1976 there were about nine thousand Wallisians and Futunans in New Caledonia and six thousand Tahitians. Some of them had moved on to Vanuatu, particularly Santo, where there was also a small Gilbertese community. There was also movement of Melanesians between colonial territories--for example, the one thousand ni-Vanuatu in New Caledonia, small Fijian groups in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, and small groups of ni-Vanuatu and Solomon Islanders in Fiji.

Traditionally, migrants had acquired land rights by adoption into host communities, and that kind of migration probably increased during the

colonial period as communication became easier. Internal migration was an issue in most of the political movements of the 1970s, particularly of people coming looking for work on plantations, in the mines, or in the capital city. But it was a new pattern of officially encouraged migration that became an issue at independence, particularly when the migrants bought, were granted, or squatted with official acquiescence on alienated land.

The Gilbertese in Solomon Islands had been offered freehold rights in public land in Solomon Islands Western District, and Wallisians and Futunans were granted land at Dumbea, for example, outside Noumea in New Caledonia. Insofar as they settled on alienated land, there was less need for them to make their peace with Melanesian host communities. If they had nowhere else to go, there was less likelihood of the land even being returned. This pattern of settlement suited the needs and purpose of colonial government and the colonial economy, as well as the interests of Gilbertese, Wallisians, and Futunans coming from impoverished islands.

Some kinds of internal migration were also officially sponsored. The Solomon Islands government, for example, subdivided public land for resettlement schemes. Several schemes simply gave title to squatters, either custom owners or migrants; and in PNG and Solomon Islands the colonial governments' often acquiescent approach to squatters on public land was a particular source of grievance for its custom owners. Other schemes provided for people from outlying islands who were short of land. But resettlement was also an instrument of colonial agricultural policy, providing secure titles to land for "energetic farmers" away from the pressures of customary kin. The different interests of Melanesian customary owners and government-encouraged Melanesian smallholders on alienated land is one of the greatest underlying sources of tension in land reform in New Caledonia (Ward, forthcoming).

In Solomon Islands the future of the Gilbertese settlers became an issue in the independence negotiations with Britain. Colonial land legislation had treated the settlers as if they were Solomon Islanders. In practice they also had privileged access to freehold land: they were promised grants of some public land as freehold, whereas Solomon Islanders applying for public land in internal resettlement schemes were only offered leases. As "Solomon Islanders" for the purposes of land legislation, Gilbertese settlers were also not prevented from acquiring interests in customary land, by marriage or other arrangements with the custom owners.

The Land and Titles Amendment Act, passed by the legislative assembly in August 1977, excluded the Gilbertese from the definition of "Solomon Islander." Henceforth, their freehold titles would become seventy-

five-year government leases, and they would no longer be entitled to acquire interests in customary land. The Gilbertese became a bargaining counter between Solomon Islands and Britain, reluctant to accept responsibility for a colonial minority.

A kind of deal was struck. At the final constitutional conference, held in London in September 1977, the British increased the value of the “financial settlement” that would provide a guarantee of aid over the next four years, and the Solomon Islands delegation announced that the freehold titles of the Gilbertese settlers would be restored and that they could become citizens automatically on application (UK 1977, p. 29). They would have to apply, and eventually about four thousand people did (Chekana, pers. comm.). Nevertheless, as citizens, they remain discriminated against in two ways: their existing freeholds are protected, but they may only acquire more land on lease; and in theory they are still prevented from acquiring any interest in customary land.

Identification of the custom owners

One argument for government intervention between custom owners and former freeholders was the problem of identifying who the custom owners really were. Envisaging this, the Vanuatu constitution provided that

where . . . there is a dispute concerning the ownership of alienated land, the Government shall *hold* such land until the dispute is resolved. (sec. 76 [1]; emphasis added)

Solomon Islands’ official Working Party on Lands and Mining, which prepared counterproposals to the report of the SCLM, also recommended government ownership of alienated land whose custom ownership was in dispute--particularly land acquired as wasteland. They argued that Solomon Islands already had considerable experience with the problems of identifying owners to return alienated land to them. Schemes on the Guadalcanal Plains, Konga (inland of the plains), Kwa Boronasu (Malaita), Njela-Kolombaghea (New Georgia), and Varese (Guadalcanal) showed that:

- there are very often disputes about who the original owners were, and who their true descendants are;
- those disputes are complicated by migrations from neighboring tribes and islands and by religious differences since the land was first alienated;

- the boundaries of the alienated land often do not fall in line with the original customary boundaries or the boundaries required for the best agricultural use of the land;
- the groups of descendants of the original owners are sometimes too large for the land to sustain them or too small to develop it effectively;
- people have different motives for wanting their land back: to use it for cash, to use it for subsistence, to share in the development on it, or just to set right an early injustice.

In any case, whatever method of deciding the government adopted, it would take time and scarce administrative and judicial resources. Vanuatu's Ad Hoc Committee on Land Reform, in its recommended timetable for the return of land, provided a rather optimistic seven months for "search by custom people for true custom owners" (no. 20). But it took about five years, for example, finally to settle the underlying ownership of the several thousand hectares of land returned and leased back on the Guadalcanal Plains, and requests to adjust particular boundaries and rental payments between landowning groups continued sporadically thereafter.

There were, of course, political as well as administrative costs: deciding on customary ownership invariably produces a class of disappointed claimants, who have votes.

While the Vanuatu government has avoided directly intervening as title holder between former freeholders and custom owners in negotiating leases, it nevertheless is being forced into making judgments about who those custom owners are, as a consequence of the constitutional provision that the government must consent to any land transactions between indigenous citizens and nonindigenous or noncitizens and that in doing so it must make sure that the transaction "is not prejudicial to the interests of . . . the custom owner or owners of the land" (17 [2]).

Alienated Land and the National Development Plans

The recommendations of the parliamentary committees, independence constitutions, and the new land legislation were generally at cross purposes with the national development plans that each country adopted immediately before or after independence. While alienated land was being returned, there was increasing pressure for more land to be alienated.

The urgency and hence impatience with the need to negotiate with custom owners arose particularly from the need to find new sources of

revenue for governments facing a decline in metropolitan subsidy after independence. PNG has negotiated two successive aid agreements with Australia; but the second, running from 1981 to 1986, provides for a reduction in real terms of 5 percent a year. Solomon Islands' "financial settlement" with Britain was a four-year agreement running to 1981, during which grants to general government revenue were expected to taper off (UK 1977, Appendix 1). At independence in Vanuatu the government was dependent on French and British grants for two-thirds of its revenue.

The most striking feature of the references to land tenure in Fiji's development plans is their absence. The independence constitution froze the colonial pattern of legislation and alienation, and land policy remains a fulcrum of a delicate racial balance. Even basic statistics about land ownership, included in Fiji's *Seventh Development Plan 1976-80* (Fiji 1975), have been dropped from the *Eighth* (1981-85); and as a statutory corporation, the Native Land Trust Boards policies are hardly brought into the national planning process. In the *Eighth Development Plan* land is discussed in technical terms as a resource that must be made more available for economic production, public purposes, and urbanization (Fiji 1980, pp. 49-56).

Vanuatu's *Transitional Development Plan 1978-80*, produced by the Kalsakau government in June 1978 (before the formation of the Government of National Unity), is silent about land policy beyond a general reference to the need to encourage more land to be brought into production (Vanuatu 1978, para. 3.1). A Ministry of Lands was not set up until after the VP victory in the 1979 elections, when the government planning office began work on a national development plan. During the first part of 1980, there was intense interministerial conflict over land policy: the Ministry of Lands proposed the return of land and limitation of leases to no more than thirty years; the Planning Office urged the creation of a stock of government-owned land for development projects like oil palm and tourism that would provide the government with revenue to replace metropolitan grants after independence; and the Agriculture Ministry was concerned with preserving and redeveloping the plantation sector with foreign capital and expatriate management. The Ministry of Lands won in the short term; but as has occurred in PNG, national economic pressures are likely to lead to some rolling back of the return of land, and there were indications in 1981 that the Ministry of Lands might be absorbed into the Ministry of Agriculture.

The statement on land policy in Solomon Islands' first *National Development Plan*, covering the period 1975-79, was qualified as being "sub-

ject to review when the government has received and studied the report of the SCLM” (Solomon Islands 1975, vol. 2, p. 16). When the development plan itself was reviewed in June 1977, Planning Office officials concluded that:

the main issue remains the land tenure policy, and on its outcome depends the pace of the country’s future economic progress. (Solomon Islands 1978, para. IX)

By 1979, when the second national development plan, to cover the period 1980-84, was being prepared, policy toward alienated land had become clearer: freeholds owned by non-Solomon Islanders had become government leases, but the government was not planning to return public land required for “public purposes, certain joint venture projects, urban expansion or resettlement schemes” (Solomon Islands 1979, vol. 1, para. 4.156).

The draft 1980-84 plan identified what it called a “problem of misunderstanding”:

Because of its colonial heritage the government is often seen in the eyes of the people as having interests in land matters which favor foreign investors against those of the individual. (4.205)

Nevertheless

there will be cases where for the purposes of national development, the government will have to acquire and facilitate the ownership of land by groups other than the traditional owners. (4.205)

PNG’s National Planning Office produces a *National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP)*, which has been presented each year since 1978 as a supplement to the national government budget. The *NPEP* allocates increases in government expenditure over the next four years between projects ranked according to their contribution to nine strategic objectives like increasing rural welfare or environmental protection. As in Fiji, land policy and administration figure only as restraints on the availability of land for economic production, infrastructure, and urbanization. However, in 1981 the *NPEP* expressed a significant shift on policy toward alienated land when it called for the

reissue of plantation leases to non-citizens in exchange for binding commitments to redevelop run-down holdings. (PNG 1981, p. 15)

The reasons were spelled out in more detail in the finance minister's budget speech:

The plantation acquisition scheme was designed to return alienated land to its traditional owners. In its primary objective the scheme cannot be said to be successful: only a very small amount of land has been redistributed. The consequences of the scheme have, however, been very serious in promoting a feeling of insecurity among existing owners . . . and has led to an unwillingness to reinvest in all properties, which of course is the prime cause of falling production. (PNG 1981, p. 32)

In PNG, at least, the land reforms of the mid-1970s had come full circle.

Conclusions

The colonial dualism of "customary" and "alienated" land survived independence in each country except Vanuatu (and Irian Jaya). In Fiji both the system and pattern of ownership were largely frozen. In PNG, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu there were transfers of ownership between Europeans, the government, and Melanesians, but the dual system of land tenure remained and was even intensified in the drive for new foreign investment in revenue-raising projects after independence.

In Vanuatu the system itself was overthrown; all land became customary, and new legal notions like that of an alienator, or of public land had to be introduced to cope with the consequences. Both notions broke with the idea of "ownership" by Melanesians and Europeans that had become entrenched in the colonial period.

Under the 1980 Land Reform Act, an *alienator*--the person who owned alienated land before independence--has a right to remain in occupation, has the first opportunity to negotiate a lease with the custom owners, and has a right to compensation for improvements if he is unsuccessful.

Public land denotes a management regime--not government ownership but bearing some similarities to compulsory acquisition. If and

when customary land is declared “public,” the government gets the right to manage and make leases over it, but that right is qualified by the requirement that the custom owners be represented in the institutions managing the land and get a share of any revenue raised from it. The workability of these new notions is still being tested: the first lease between an alienator and custom owner was signed at Eton village on Efate on October 9, 1981; corporations to manage land declared public in Vila and Luganville were being established earlier in the year. There is likely to be considerable economic, administrative, and legal pressure to revive the dualism of the colonial period.

The independent Melanesian governments remain in a double bind that is as old as colonial history: on the one hand they are supposed to be protecting the custom owners against alienation of their land, and on the other they are supposed to be promoting alienation in the interests of national development, or at least the maintenance of government services.

Solomon Islands’ draft *National Development Plan 1980-84* exhorts the government to “appreciate the dual role it must perform” (para. 4, 208), and Vanuatu’s constitution lists the potentially highly contradictory interests that the government must take into account before consenting to a land transaction between custom owners and indigenous or non-indigenous citizens:

- (a) the custom owner or owners of the land,
- (b) the indigenous citizen where he is not the custom owner,
- (c) the community in whose locality the land is situated,
- (d) the Republic. (sec. 72 [2])

In Melanesia particularly these last two interests tend to be in permanent conflict: enclave projects like a mine, plantation, or tourist hotel may have only minor local benefits and major local costs. Yet they provide government revenue to sustain services that do have local benefits: water supplies, school aid posts, and so on. That, at least, is the theory; but a lot then depends on the geographical pattern of government expenditure both away from towns and areas with enclave projects and back to them in order to provide compensation for their local costs. In PNG this kind of delicate social contract may be breaking down (Jackson 1981).

There are, broadly, four institutional approaches that the governments have adopted as a way of reconciling their dual roles as promoters of alienation and protectors against it. The first is exemplified in Solomon Islands’ and PNG’s land purchase cooperatives and land groups, and the

second in both countries' "tenure conversion" schemes. The third and fourth are exemplified in the history of Fiji's Native Land Trust Board.

The first two approaches aim to make the custom owners themselves the developers of alienated land, either as a group or as individuals. In the first form, the institution is either a cooperative or a group incorporated under PNG's 1976 Land Groups Act. The custom owners, incorporated as a group, then replace the European owner/manager and his laborers as the developers of already alienated land. Development is ensured by indebtedness: the group must pay back the money the government loaned them to buy out the European, and they must do so by developing the land.

There were at least two problems with this approach. First, a unit of ownership may not be an effective unit of work: customary land is normally worked individually; communal work has acquired the colonial overtones of forced labor; and the success of communal working groups usually depended on the qualities of particular leaders, with government agriculture officers sometimes filling the leadership role by default. Second, the sanction for development disappeared when the loan was repaid.

The second and earlier form reversed the approach of the first. Under tenure conversion, ownership rather than working practices were changed and land was alienated from customary ownership rather than returned to it. The institution in the first approach was the cooperative or land group, whereas the institution in the second approach was the individual title. One problem in this approach was deciding which land should be individualized: if it was already developed, it was easier to identify the person who had cleared and developed it and institutionalize him as its "owner." But if he or she had already developed it, then the need to individualize ownership in order to encourage development was less than clear. A title, however, made the provision of credit easier and hence raised the possibility of further development as well as the possibility of indebtedness as a sanction for development.

Both forms--the cooperative group and individual title--were expensive in terms of administrative resources and so perhaps were more available to colonial governments where the costs of administration were frequently not taken into account. For independent governments the salaries of government officers--particularly specialist agricultural officers and surveyors--and the opportunity costs of devoting their time to a particular sector, area, or project rather than another tend to be more obvious.

The third institutional approach is to hive off the protectionist function to a separate arm of the government. The conflict between pro-

motion of alienation and protection against it becomes institutionalized and resolved case by case by competition and negotiation between different arms of the government. The earliest example, dating from 1940, is Fiji's Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), which represents custom owners in negotiation with the Lands Department as well as with third parties. A similar approach was proposed in Vanuatu in 1980 for a Custom Owners Advisory Service, relatively independent of the government and acting on the custom owners' behalf, if necessary, against government policy. It already existed in a weaker form in the decision to create a separate Ministry of Lands, which as advocate of its custom owner 'clients came into necessary conflict with ministries.

There are obvious political limits to the extent to which a government will be prepared to fund such an institution out of its own budget. The NLTB may be in danger of losing some of its autonomy by having become reliant on an annual government grant after the 25 percent of rentals it keeps to cover its running costs proved insufficient. And Vanuatu's Ministry of Lands is threatened with absorption into the Ministry of Agriculture, ostensibly in the interest of "rationalization."

But within those broad limits, and given the constitutional restrictions imposed on the governments at independence and continuing deep suspicions of the role of government in land acquisition, there seems to be scope for managing conflicts between government and custom owners by institutionalizing them in some way.

Solomon Islands' draft 1980-84 national development plan floated the notion of a trust board in 1979 (4.181). Solomon Islands had set up a land trust board in 1961. It was supposed to identify waste and vacant land and manage it in the public interest. It failed to find any, and the land that the colonial government had already identified as waste and vacant was never transferred to it (Allan 1957, pp. 298, and Larmour 1979, p. 106). Not surprisingly, it collapsed in 1964. Nor is Vanuatu's brief experience with the trust board that took over land handed back by the Australian government in 1973 particularly encouraging, perhaps because it attempted to resolve the conflict between the interests of the custom owners and the interests of the government within itself, rather than by competition and negotiation between the board and the agencies of government promoting development by alienation. Vanuatu's lasted twice as long as Solomon Islands' but was similarly ineffective. The point may be that the conflict between government and custom owners should be institutionalized, but not within a single institution.

The fourth and final institutional approach is to try to resolve the contradiction between promotion and protection, alienation and custom own-

ership, at the level of the particular project rather than the land itself. Examples include Solomon Islands' joint venture schemes, in which landowners become shareholders, or Fiji's Native Land Development Corporation, the business arm of the NLTB established in 1976 to invest in commercial and agricultural projects on behalf of landowners. The problems here include tokenism (landowners have only a 4 percent share in the Solomon Islands' Plantations Limited (SIPL) joint venture on the Guadalcanal Plains, and their effective participation in management is zero) and the distribution of risks (landowners get nothing if the project fails to distribute dividends). It also requires relatively high-value projects that generate sufficient surplus to distribute. It is doubtful, for example, if many smaller and older copra plantations are productive enough--after deduction of wages, interest, and depreciation--to provide much more than token payments, and they are only viable under freehold.

Where joint ventures also involve the government, its protectionist role is further compromised by its stake in the project. This problem was emerging very clearly on the Guadalcanal Plains in the late 1970s: SIPL management, faced with claims from landowners that boundaries were not being respected, or that rivers were becoming polluted, tended to invoke its partnership with the government, whose responsibilities and interests were getting dangerously blurred.

There were a number of connections as well as parallels between the land policies of the Melanesian governments in the 1970s. Each country, as it became independent, adopted a more radical approach than the last. The latest, Vanuatu, has set precedents for the *revendication totale* (wholesale return) of alienated land which independentists in New Caledonia propose as an alternative to the more managed and conditional *reforme foncière* (land reform) proposed by the French government in 1978 but opposed by European settlers. And there is likely to be feedback from the rest of Melanesia into the delicate politics of alienated land in Fiji, frozen since 1970.

Yet the issue is not uniquely or even distinctively Melanesian. In many ways, Melanesia is just catching up with Polynesia. Writing ten years ago, Crocombe predicted:

European landholders have been withdrawing steadily during the past decade (i.e. the 1960s) from areas where Europeans do not control the government. This withdrawal is now almost complete in the eastern Pacific (with the exception of freehold land in Fiji) and is likely to be well advanced in the Western Pacific within the next decade. (1971, p. 392)

Crocombe quotes the examples of the Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation (WESTEC), which manages alienated land returned in 1959, and the nonrenewal of leases to foreigners in Tonga since the 1950s (ibid.). WESTEC has its later Melanesian parallels in the Fiji government's takeover of CSR in 1973; in Solomon Islands' joint ventures on already alienated land with the Commonwealth Development Corporation (1971), Brewers (1975), and Levers (1980) and its aborted proposals for a Land Development Authority (1977); and in Vanuatu's Rural Land Corporations set up to manage plantations and cattle on returned alienated land in 1981. The Tongan leases have their counterparts in the debates about automaticity and the length of leases in PNG, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, as well as in the debates about the *Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act* in Fiji (1976).

Land alienation is also an issue in Micronesia in the almost interminable decolonization of the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, particularly in custom owners' demands for the renegotiation of the rental agreement for the Kwajalein base (which at one stage they briefly occupied). And the Constitution of the Republic of Palau, adopted in 1980, provides that

the national government shall, within five (5) years of the effective date of this Constitution, provide for the return to the original owners, or their heirs, of any land which became part of the public land as a result of the acquisition by previous occupying powers or their nationals through force, coercion, fraud or without just compensation or adequate consideration. (Article XIII, sec. 10)

Nor are the politics of returning land limited to the islands of the South Pacific. In the last few months several thousand hectares of South Australia have been handed back to their aboriginal owners. While this paper has compared New Caledonia with the rest of Melanesia, parallels also exist between it and the European settler societies of Australia and New Zealand.

Continued European immigration into all three countries only began to slacken in the 1960s. In New Caledonia, the Europeans failed to become a majority; but there are haunting parallels between the political styles of the new Maori, aboriginal, and Kanak (Melanesian) political movements that grew up in the 1970s and demanded the return of alienated land.

Acknowledgments

I'm very grateful to Diana Howlett, Jean-Claude Roux, Howard van Trease, Ralph Premdas, and Ron Crocombe for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, though the mistakes are of course my own.

Peter Larmour
University of Papua New Guinea

REFERENCES

- Alamu, N.
1979 Land settlement statistics. In *Land research in Solomon Islands*, ed. I. Heath. Honiara, S.I.: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands.
- Ali, A.
1980 *Plantation to politics: Studies on Fiji Indians*. Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific.
- Allan, C. H.
1954 *Customary land tenure in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate*. Honiara, S.I.: Government Printer.
- Bobai, T.
1979 Gilbertese settlement. In *Land in Solomon Islands*, ed. P. Larmour. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Bramham, J.
1979 Guguha land purchase cooperative. In *Land in Solomon Islands*, ed. P. Larmour. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Crocombe, R.
1971 New Guinea: Unity in diversity. In *Land tenure in the Pacific*, ed. R. Crocombe. London: Oxford University Press.
- Doorn, R. J.
1979 *A constitution for a new nation: The structure of the Nagriamel Federation*. Hicksville: Exposition Press.
- Eaton, P.
1980 Plantation redistribution in Papua New Guinea. University of Papua New Guinea. Mimeo.
- Fiji
1970 *The Constitution of Fiji*. Suva: Government Printer.
1975 *Seventh Development Plan 1976-80*. Suva: Central Planning Office.
1980 *Eighth Development Plan 1981-85*. 2 vols. Suva: Central Planning Office.
1980 *Ministry of Fijian affairs and rural development annual report for the years 1971-79*. Paper no. 47 of 1980. Suva: Parliament of Fiji.

- Fingleton, J.
1981 Policy making on lands. In *Policy making in a new state: Papua New Guinea 1972-77*, ed. J. Ballard. St. Lucia: Queensland University Press.
- France, P.
1969 *The charter of the land*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Ghai, Y. P.
forth- The making of the independence constitution. In *Solomon Islands politics: Independence and after*, ed. P. Larmour. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Hannett, L.
1975 The case for Bougainville. *Meanjin Quarterly* 1975 (Spring): 286-47.
- Jackson, R.
1981 Papua New Guinea *Times*, 4-10 December 1981.
- Knetsch, J. and M. Trebilcock
1981 *Land policy and economic development in Papua New Guinea*. Discussion Paper no. 6. Port Moresby, P.N.G.: Institute of National Affairs.
- Larmour, P.
1979 Forestry and ownership. In *Land in Solomon Islands*, ed. P. Larmour. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Lasaqa, I.
1972 *Melanesians choice: Tadhimboko participation in the Solomon Islands cash economy*. New Guinea Research Bulletin no. 46. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
- MacClancey, J.
1980 *To kill a bird with two stones: A short history of Vanuatu*. Vanuatu Cultural Center Publication no. 1. Vila: Vanuatu Cultural Center.
- Narokobi, B.
1981 The New Hebrides Constitution. In *Land, people and government: Public lands policy in the South Pacific*, ed. P. Larmour, A. Taugenga, and R. Crocombe. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Nayacackalou, R.
1971 Fiji: Manipulating the system. In *Land tenure in the Pacific*, ed. R. Crocombe. London: Oxford University Press.
- Papua New Guinea
1973 *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Land Matters*. Port Moresby: Government Printer.
1974 *Final report of the Constitutional Planning Committee*. 2 vols. Port Moresby: Government Printer.
1981 Budget speech 1982. Delivered 3 November 1981 by Minister of Finance John R. Kaputin.
1981 *The National Public Expenditure Plan 1982-85*. Port Moresby: National Planning Office.

- Premdas, R.
 1977 Ethnonationalism, copper and secession. *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 4, no. 2 (Spring).
 1977 Secession and political change: The case of Papua Besena. *Oceania* 1977 (June): 265-83.
- Premdas R. and P. Larmour
 forth- The Western Breakaway movement. In *Solomon Island politics: Independence coming and after*, ed. P. Larmour. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Roux, J. C.
 1980 Migration and change in Wallisian society. In *The island states of the Pacific and Indian oceans: Anatomy of development*, ed. R. T. Shand. Development Studies Centre Monograph no. 23. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
- Rathven, D. G.
 1979 Land legislation from the Protectorate to independence. In *Land in Solomon Islands*, ed. P. Larmour. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Saussol, A.
 1971 New Caledonia: Colonization and reaction. In *Land tenure in the Pacific*, ed. R. Crocombe. London: Oxford University Press.
- Scarr, D.
 1967 *Fragments of empire*. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
- Solomon Islands
 1975 *National Development Plan 1975-79*. 3 vols. Honiara: Government Printer.
 1976 *Report of the Constitutional Committee*. Honiara: Government Printer.
 1976 *Report of the Special Select Committee on Lands and Mining*. Honiara: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands.
 1977 *Kolombangara land use planning*. "Green Paper." Honiara: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands.
 1977 *Report of the Lands & Mining Working Party*. Honiara: Ministry of Natural Resources.
 1978 *A review of the Solomon Islands National Development Plan (1975 to 1979): June 1977*. Honiara: Central Planning Office and Government Printer.
 1979 *Draft, Solomon Islands National Development Plan 1980-84*. 3 vols. Honiara: Central Planning Office.
 1979 *Lands division training manual*. Honiara: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands.
 1980 *Statistical yearbook*. Government Statistician Bulletin no. 32/80. Honiara: Government Printer.
- Sope, B.
 1975 *Land and politics in the New Hebrides*. Suva, Fiji: South Pacific Social Sciences Association.
- Stober, W.
 forth- The Land Trust Board. In *Land in Vanuatu*, ed. H. Van Trease. Suva, Fiji: Incoming stitute of Pacific Studies.

- Totorea, D.
1979 Baunani. In *Land in Solomon Islands*, ed. P. Larmour. Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies.
- ToWallom, E.
1977 Aspects of contradictory colonial development in PNG and its effects on the Tolai conflict. B.A. Honors thesis, University of Papua New Guinea.
- United Kingdom
1977 *Report of the Solomon Islands Constitutional Conference*. London: HMSO.
- Van Trease, H.
1981 Historical background to the problem of land alienation in Vanuatu. In *Report of the Regional Conference on Land Management*. Vila, Vanuatu: USP Extension Centre and Institute of Pacific Studies.
- Vanuaaku Pati
1979 *Platform*. Vila: Information Dept., Vanuaaku Pati.
- Vanuatu
1978 *Plan de développement transitoire 1978-80* Vila: Chief Ministers Office.
1979 *Summarised recording of proceedings, first ordinary session for 1979, 24 April 1979-16 May 1976*. Vila, Vanuatu: New Hebrides Representative Assembly.
1980 Communiqué: Land policy. Vila: Ministry of Lands.
- Walter, M.
1980 *What do we do about plantations? Initial report on the IASER Conference*. Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper no. 34. Port Moresby, P.N.G.: Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research.
- Ward, A.
forth-coming Land and politics in Melanesia. Paper presented to Conference on Melanesia: Beyond diversity, Australian National University, 1980.
- Wolfers, E.
1973 *Race relations and colonial rule in Papua New Guinea*. Sydney: Australia & New Zealand Book Company.

**THE QUEST THAT FAILED:
JACK LONDON'S LAST TALES OF THE SOUTH SEAS**

by David A. Moreland

As I see him the utterly infinitesimal individual weaves among the mysteries a floss-like and wholly meaningless course--if course it be. In short I catch no meaning from all I have seen, and pass quite as I came, confused and dismayed.

--Theodore Dreiser

We . . . float like fog-wisps through glooms and darknesses and light-flashings. It is all fog and mist, and we are all foggy and misty in the thick of the mystery.

--Jack London

A thankless task God has appointed for men to be busied about.

--*Ecclesiastes*

The Jack London who stepped off the steamship *Matsonia* onto Hawaiian soil March 2, 1915, bore little resemblance to that healthy, handsome, confident author-celebrity who had sailed the *Snark* into Pearl Harbor some eight years before. Although only thirty-nine years old, he was overweight, insomnolent, rheumatic, alternately lethargic and irritable, and, most significantly, suffering from chronic uremia.

Physically, psychologically, and artistically he was in rapid decline and had turned with increasing frequency to drugs to relieve pain and to bring the relief of sleep. Today, the visitor to the Jack London Museum near Glen Ellen, California, may view London's medicine chest, the constant companion of his last years. Within it are strychnine, strontium sulfate, aconite, belladonna, heroin, morphine, and opium. According to a recent biographer, by 1915 he "was ordering six times the normal prescription of opium, hyoscyamine, and camphor capsules," while "also taking regular injections of atropine and belladonna mixed with opium and morphine to stimulate his heart and bladder muscles and to put him to sleep. In other words, he was taking the fatal 'uppers and downers' of modern pill-pushers in an age that regulated the sale of drugs extremely inefficiently."¹

Even in this condition, London maintained his career-long writing regimen--a thousand words a day. He could not slack off for he continued to pour money into his Sonoma ranch faster than he could earn it and to entertain visitors on a lavish scale. However, his close friends noticed that his mercurial temperament was now verging on paranoia. He was "domineering, ungracious, and rude," and "was unable to see, or perhaps unwilling to admit, that it was the unpleasant effect of his malady that was driving his friends away. He began to feel sorry for himself, to lament the perfidy of friends and relatives and, the same time, to become even more furiously angry and abusive with anyone who did not agree with him."² For example, when, in 1916, Spiro Ophens, a young Greek admirer, questioned the author's characterization of Mediterraneans in *The Mutiny of the Elsinore*, London accused him of treacherously turning upon the host who had opened his home to him: "At the end of it all, you have behaved toward me as any alleged modern Greek peddler has behaved toward the superior races."³

In such black moods of anger and disgust, he could write in the following fashion to his twelve-year-old daughter Joan, who had "failed" him by siding with her mother, London's first wife, against him:

[A]ll my life I have been overcome by disgust, which has led me to turn pages down, and those pages have been turned down forever. It is my weakness as I have said before. Unless I should accidentally meet you on the street, I doubt if I should ever see you again. If you should be dying, and should ask for me at your bedside, I should surely come; on the other hand, if I were dying I should not care to have you at my bedside. A ruined colt is a ruined colt, and I do not like ruined colts.⁴

Throughout his life Jack London had sought to escape from difficult situations: his youthful adventures as an oyster pirate, his voyage on the sealer *Sophia Sutherland*, his tramp across America with Coxe's army, the Klondike gold rush, his divorce from Bessie Maddern, the *Snark* cruise through the South Seas, and his retreat to the land (to his "Beauty Ranch") were all of a pattern. When problems became too great, when unpleasant decisions were in the offing, literally or figuratively he would "light out for the territory." Now, in the last years of his life, his situation was once again intolerable. His body was failing him. Popular and financial success had brought no satisfaction, for, as he had recognized early in his career, "the ephemeral flourishes and the great stories remain unwritten."⁵ He felt frustrated and isolated, and neither his socialism nor his

philosophical determinism offered him solace or direction. But this time he found most of his escape routes closed. Alcohol and drugs offered temporary respites and writing was also a partial refuge: as he implied to his editor, his exhausting writing schedule was required both to meet his debts and to keep the ultimate escape of death, "the Noseless One," away. In sum, Jack London was at the end of his tether and "was striving to discover where he had gone wrong, why success had meant failure in that it had not brought him happiness and content, what, if anything, he could find to persuade himself to stop short of the brink to which he had now come so close."⁶

This then was London's physical and psychological condition when he returned to Hawaii hoping to recapture the health, pleasures, and inspiration that had been his during a four-and-a-half month visit there in 1907. In this context, the parallels between Jack London and Harry, the hero of Ernest Hemingway's "The Snows of Kilimanjaro," are striking. Both men, looking back over their lives and questioning their values and bearings, try to recapture the past by returning to the "good place" where they had once lived and written well. London, like Harry, hopes to "work the fat off his soul," but ultimately discovers that time has run out. London's Noseless One (Harry's hyena with the stinking breath) is the victor, and the answers remain as distant as Kilimanjaro's House of God or the high plateau of Guadalcanal where London's Red One resides.

Miraculously, however, he was able to reverse briefly that creative decline that had closely paralleled the physical degeneration of his last years. The climate and relaxed atmosphere of the islands were contributing factors, yet of more significance was his return to books in search of explanations. Darwin, Spencer, and Marx had been his guides when he had sought escape from poverty and the life of a work beast; now, as he realized that materialism offered the individual scant aid in comprehending the meaning of his own life and death, he turned not toward traditional religion but to the psychoanalytical works of Freud, Prince, and especially Jung.⁷ Groping for something beyond a pessimistic materialism, he still felt it essential to find an empirical base for his beliefs. Or as James I. McClintock has characterized this stage of London's pilgrimage: "He was once again captivated by theoreticians who proffered him a scientifically defensible rationale for subscribing to humanly sustaining values as he flirted dangerously with nihilism."⁸

In the Jack London Collection of the Huntington Library is the author's copy of the 1916 English translation of C. G. Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*,⁹ well worn and with numerous passages marked. In her biography of her husband, Charmian London recalls the extraordinary ef-

fect that this new knowledge had upon him, for he saw in it an escape from the frustrations and bitter depressions that had marred his immediately preceding years. "Mate Woman," he exclaimed, "I tell you I am standing on the edge of a world so new, so terrible, so wonderful, that I am almost afraid to look over into it."¹⁰

The consequences of his discovery of depth psychology appear to have been threefold. First, it offered, in his opinion, the only scientific support for the concept of free will--a possibility which he had previously viewed as anathema to the rational mind. As evidence of this shift in the author's thinking, one must turn again to Charmian London's work, in which she quotes a lengthy passage from Beatrice Hinkle's introduction to *Psychology of the Unconscious* and then comments on London's response to it:

"The value of self-consciousness lies in the fact that man is enabled to reflect upon himself and learn to understand the true origin and significance of his actions and opinions, that he may adequately value the real level of his development and avoid being self-deceived and therefore inhibited from finding his biological adaptation. He need no longer be unconscious of the motives underlying his actions or hide himself behind a changed exterior, in other words, be merely a series of reactions to stimuli, as the mechanists have it, *but he may to a certain extent become a self-creating and self-determining being.*"

I shall never cease to remember the day when, all a tip-toe with discovery, Jack entered the dining room, slipped into his chair and repeated the foregoing italicized sentence. I, knowing his theretofore immovable position regarding free will, sat aghast at the implication upon his tongue. At length:

"Do you *realize* what you are saying? What are you implying?"

"I know how you feel --how surprised you are," he answered.

"But it almost would seem that I can grasp, from this, some sort of inkling of free will."¹¹

A few days later he was to shock her again with the comment: "For the first time in my life, . . . I see the real value to the human soul of the confessional."¹²

The second point of Jung's appeal for Jack London logically flowed from the questionings aroused by contemplation of free will, guilt, and responsibility. In the analysis that follows of key stories written in the Hawaiian summer of the writer's last year, there is a recurring issue: the pos-

sibility of a reality beyond materialistic determinism--a spiritual dimension hinted at through the pervasiveness of religious mythology, tradition, and folklore.

Finally, it was this significance of dreams and myth in the Jungian world view that opened for London a new field of exploration--his own dreams and those of whole cultures as expressed in their myths. "It may come as a surprise," writes Earle Labor, "that, several years before Eliot immortalized Miss Jessie L. Weston by poeticizing the cruelties of April, the Wonder Boy of the Naturalist Carnival had already discovered a similar key--perhaps the skeleton key--to the 'lostness' of modern man in the primitive folklore of Polynesia--and in the writings of Carl Jung."¹³

Jack London left Hawaii for the mainland in the late summer of 1915, but returned to Honolulu that December, remaining until July 26, 1916. He died November 22 of the same year. But during this last Hawaiian sojourn he played the role of writer-celebrity, "Papa London," whenever his health permitted. Dinner and card parties were frequent and he entertained by reading aloud "in the stately numbers of Ecclesiastes,"¹⁴ an ominously meaningful selection when viewed in retrospect. At such times, his friends would ask his wife, "What ails Jack? He looks well enough, but there's something about him . . . his eyes. . . ."¹⁵

In the morning hours London wrote most of the short stories later to be collected in *On the Makaloa Mat* (1919) and *The Red One* (1918). These tales, which give artistic form to the conflicts and questionings inspired by the author's physical dissolution, his spiritual gropings, and the perceptions of Jung, are among Jack London's finest achievements. The remainder of this essay is devoted to an analysis of four key stories in these collections.

Jack London completed "The Water Baby"¹⁶ on October 2, 1916, after returning to Glen Ellen, California. Like "The Bones of Kahekili" and "Shin Bones," other stories from *On the Makaloa Mat* to be discussed subsequently, it utilizes a frame story technique to convey a simple central narrative devoid of the explicit detailing of violence and suffering that is both a strength and a weakness of much of his earlier fiction.

The narrator of the frame story is John Lakana (Hawaiian for "London"), a cynical, modem *haole* (white man) who lends a weary ear to the chanting of his fishing partner, the aged Polynesian, Kohokumu. Lakana, although much younger than Kohokumu, is unable to match the energy and joie de vivre of the old man. He cites physical causes--an aching head and an upset stomach--but the reader recognizes another source of his obscure malaise: the enervating ennui of a purposeless existence.

In contrast, Kohokumu is a believer in the old pagan religion and a man who feels that he is part of a natural process in a meaningful universe. When the reader first meets him, he is "chanting of the deeds and adventures of Maui, the Promethean demigod of Polynesia who fished up dry land from ocean depths with hooks made fast to heaven, who lifted up the sky where under previously men had gone on all fours, not having space to stand erect, and who made the sun . . . stand still and agree . . . to traverse the sky more slowly" (p. 143).

After listening to Kohokumu with apparent irritation, Lakana demands: "And you believe all this?" (p. 144). In response, the old man appeals to tradition for "all our old men from all the way back tell us these things as I . . . tell them to my sons and grandsons" (p. 144). Then he startles the narrator with a perceptive comparison: "I have read the Hawaiian bible . . . and there have I read that your Big Man of the Beginning made the earth and sky . . . and all animals . . . in six days. Why Maui didn't do anything like that much. He didn't *make* anything. He just put things in order . . . and it took him a long, long time" (p. 144). Taken aback by this fair reply, the author's surrogate muses to himself that science and evolutionary theory support the Hawaiian myth of creation by asserting that man first moved on all fours, the earth's rotation on its axis is slowing down (thereby lengthening the day), and the Hawaiian Islands were raised from the sea.

Disturbed by this trend in "the profitless discussion," Lakana is relieved to find a diversion--the fish begin to bite. Ironically, however, this distraction only serves to reinforce the contrast between the two men. In amazement the narrator watches the Hawaiian, "past seventy . . . , lean as a spear, and shriveled like a mummy," do what few haole athletes "would do or could do" (p. 147). Kohokumu dives into the forty-foot depths of the coral reef, pries a nine-foot octopus from its lair, and kills it by biting "into the heart and life of the matter" (p. 148). Rising to the surface with his conquest, "the grisly clinging thing," the Polynesian bursts "into the *pule* of triumph which had been chanted by countless squid-catching generations before him" (p. 148). Looking on for the outrigger, the white man is simultaneously fascinated and repelled.

It is difficult to miss the symbolic import of this scene. In his totality of beliefs and physical abilities, old Kohokumu is a part of the natural world in which he functions. He is not--like John Lakana--a skeptical spectator, but rather a participant in his world, one who, bites "into the heart and life of the matter," experiences it to the full, and finds it good. Significantly, what for the haole is a monster, snake-like and horrifying, is for the Hawaiian "a very fine squid," a God-given delicacy.

When the narrator questions Kohokumu's remarkable stamina and longevity, the old man responds in a passage whose mythic content is indicative of London's reading of Jung:

"The Sea is my mother. I was born in a double canoe, during a Kona gale. . . . From her, the Sea, my mother, I received my strength. Whenever I return to her arms . . . , as I have returned this day, I grow strong again and immediately. She, to me, is the milk giver, the life source. . . ."

"Some day," old Kohokumu rambled on, "when I am really old, I shall be reported of men as drowned in the sea. This will be an idle thought of men. In truth, I shall have returned into the arms of my mother, there to rest under the heart of her breast until the second birth of me, when I shall emerge into the sun a flashing youth of splendor like Maui himself when he was golden young" (p. 150).

To Lakana's deprecating comment that this is a "queer" religion, the Polynesian replies that with age he has learned one thing: truth is to be found within oneself. It arises from the "deeps," and man, "if he be not blind," acknowledges it. Such an epistemology obviously runs contrary to the empiricism that London, the avowed materialist, always publically espoused. His dramatization of this concept, through the sympathetic figure of Kohokumu, suggests that in his last year Jack London was seriously questioning his philosophical positions.

Even when John Lakana challenges the old Hawaiian's beliefs with the nihilism of Mark Twain's mysterious stranger, suggesting that all might be a dream, Kohokumu is unperturbed: "There is much more in dreams than we know. . . . Dreams go deep, all the way down, maybe to before the beginning" (p. 152). Jung's theory that dreams are keys to the understanding of personality, and that myths--the dreams of peoples arising from their "collective unconscious"¹⁷--are the keys to the comprehension of racial and cultural values, is reflected in this quotation.¹⁸

"The Water Baby" concludes with the inside narrative related by Kohokumu at John Lakana's request. The tale of Keikiwai, the water baby, is a reaffirmation of the theme conveyed in the old man's confrontation with the octopus. To supply lobsters for the king, the young boy must dive to the bottom of a shark-infested lagoon. However, the water baby has one distinct advantage: as a part of the natural world, he understands and speaks the language of fishes. Like a modern con artist, he misleads the sharks, causing them to destroy each other while he safely

gathers the king's supper. Again the point is made: the unstudied, spontaneous, natural Polynesian triumphs in his environment.

At the conclusion of his story, Kohokumu silences Lakana with "I know what next you would say. You would say with my own eyes I did not see this. . . . But I do know, and I can prove it. My father's father knew the grandson of the Water Baby's father's uncle" (p. 159). The contrast between an ingenuous but life-sustaining faith and a stultifying, debilitating skepticism is clear. Jack London is poised between them, sympathetic to the former, intellectually committed to the latter.

Any discussion of Jungian influence in Jack London's fiction must acknowledge James I. McClintock's essay "Jack London's Use of Carl Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*," reprinted in revised form in his book *White Logic: Jack London's Short Stories*.¹⁹ Although McClintock is generally critical of London's short stories written after 1905, he has high praise for the *On the Makaloa Mat* collection, considering it superior to the author's earlier South Sea fiction. He believes, with justification, that this last creative outburst testifies "to the restorative influence the psychologist's [Jung's] thought had upon the quality of London's fiction."²⁰ The critic has special praise for the unity and simplicity of these tales and for London's return to his "most productive themes and subjects: death, the conflict between primitive and modern cultures, and the struggle between optimism and pessimism."²¹ As a cursory reading indicates, these motifs all function in "The Water Baby."

Regarding London's debt to specific aspects of Jungian psychology, McClintock emphasizes the concepts of logical "directed thinking" and its obverse "dream or phantasy thinking,"²² which are discussed in chapter 1 of *Psychology of the Unconscious* and dramatized by London in the Lakana-Kohokumu contrast. Also the critic notes the fictionist's utilization of Jung's libido theory, whose definition (by Dr. Hinkle) London underlined in his copy of *Psychology of the Unconscious*:

He [Jung] saw in the term libido a concept of unknown nature, comparable with Bergson's élan vital, a hypothetical energy of life, which occupies itself not only in sexuality but in various physiological and psychological manifestations . . . and all the human activities and interests. This cosmic energy or urge manifested in the human being he calls libido and compares it with the energy of physics.²³

According to McClintock, London interprets this "energy of life" as the nuclear force motivating his questing heroes of earlier tales and the source

of old Kohokumu's vitality. It is a well-spring of optimism in opposition to the grim deterministic truths of science that debilitate such later figures as John Lakana.

"The Water Baby," when interpreted from this perspective, reads as an artistically effective presentation of the previously cited "tension between civilized skepticism" and that "natural affirmation" based on "the most common . . . archetype . . . that of the sun (the hero and libido energy) setting (dying) in the sea (the womb) and rising in the morning (being reborn)." ²⁴

While McClintock's analysis suggests the extent to which Jack London gave fictive shape to Jung's theories, the important fact his research substantiates is that at the end of his career the author turned, as he had so often before, to the new sciences (in this case, psychoanalysis) in hopes of discovering truths that would explain the human predicament. However, "The Bones of Kahekili" and "Shin Bones" portray more unequivocally than does "The Water Baby" the inability of London's modern man to transcend the limitations of pessimistic materialism, strongly suggesting that their creator's final quest ended in failure.

In "The Bones of Kahekili," ²⁵ completed at Waikiki, Honolulu, June 28, 1916, the author's persona is Hardman Pool, "a source of life, a source of food, a fount of wisdom, a giver of law, a smiling beneficence, a blackness of thunder and punishment" (p. 43) to those who live and work on his vast Hawaiian ranch.

The seventy-one-year-old Pool is a haole who has gained much from Hawaii. Through marriage with Polynesian royalty, he gained land, wealth, and a deep understanding of native traditions: "He knew his Hawaiians from the outside and the in, knew them better than themselves--their Polynesian circumlocutions, faiths, customs, and mysteries" (pp. 44-45). Ironically, however, this "fount of wisdom" is, like London his creator, a skeptic, a questioner of the meaning and purpose in life who must turn to alcohol to escape thought. Gaining much that is Hawaiian, he has, nonetheless, failed to achieve that inner peace, that affirmative vision that is the Polynesian's most envied possession.

The Lakana-Kohokumu contrast of "The Water Baby" is echoed here for Hardman Pool also has his antithesis in Kumuhana, a seventy-nine-year-old Hawaiian survivor of the days when pagan rituals of human sacrifice were practiced in the islands. Kumuhana relates this tale's inside narrative in response to Pool's demand to be told where lie the bones of Kahekili, an ancestral *alii* (high chief) from whose line Pool's wife has descended. After considerable hesitation, the old Hawaiian tells how, fifty-

one year before (1829), he had been taken as a *moepuu*, a human sacrifice, "to go the way of Kahekili and his bones and to care for him afterward and forever, in the shadowy other world" (p. 64). He relates how after a night of drunken revelry he awoke to find the high priest Eoppo and numerous chiefs standing above him. The other kanakas had heard of Kahekili's death and fled, leaving Kumuhana as the only candidate for sacrifice, although tradition required two escorts for an alii into the netherworld. Kahekili, in a haole coffin, and Kumuhana, with a fearful hangover, were taken to the middle of the Molokai channel while the high priest intoned a Maori death chant:

But death is nothing new.
Death is and has been ever since old Maui died.
Then Pata-tai laughed loud
And woke the goblin god,
Who severed him in two, and shut him in,
So dusk of eve came on. (p. 72)

At the appointed site, the chiefs slipped Kahekili, in his coffin, into the sea; however, the high priest opposed the sacrificing of Kumuhana, arguing that half the required tribute was insulting to the dead alii. At that point, a cry of horror ended the debate:

"The coffin, head end up, had not sunk. . . . And the glass of it was to us, so that we could see the face and head of Kahekili through the glass; and he grinned at us . . . and seemed alive already in the other world and angry with us, and, with other-world power, about to wreak his anger upon us. Up and down he bobbed, and the canoe drifted closer upon him.

" 'Kill him!' [Kumuhana] 'Bleed him!' 'Thrust to the heart of him!' These things the chiefs were crying out to Eoppo in their fear" (p. 74-75).

As the knife was raised to strike, a chief, fending off the coffin, broke the face plate and sent Kahekili's bones to their resting place among the coral reefs of the Molokai Channel. Consequently, Kumuhana was spared. "And I, who was a moepuu," he concludes, "became a man once more. And I lived, though I died a thousand deaths from thirst before we gained back to the beach at Waikiki" (p. 75-76).

As Kumuhana ends his narrative, the white man remains in silent meditation, fascinated by the last line of the Maori death chant, " 'So dusk of

eve came on', finding in it an intense satisfaction of beauty" (p. 76) but no promise of salvation. In this instance, the Polynesian mythology offers no assurance. "We are wise," says Hardman Pool, "but the wisdom is bitter" (p. 70).

According to critic Howard Lachtman, the core meaning of this short story is found in

the implied comparison between old Kumuhana's two masters [which] suggests that this ancient Hawaiian will survive both the great lord who required his life and the lesser one who demanded his secret. Whatever knowledge Harman Pool has gained about the facts of Kahekili's bones is less important than the intimation of Kumuhana's own vitality of spirit. But it is this last knowledge which Pool, the materialistic patriarch of modern Hawaiian civilization, cannot comprehend.²⁶

Such an optimistic interpretation of this story is not, in my opinion, justified. Kumuhana's survival is a matter of luck, and his tale is littered with images of frustrated passion, pain, and death. It contains no affirmation. James McClintock is closer to the truth when he comments that in "The Bones of Kahekili" the "riddle of death and rebirth" is solved by a recognition of "the finality of death. . . . Maui the sun god of rebirth is dead. . . . The destructive 'goblin god rules."²⁷ Mankind can only face mortality with stoic acceptance. Too intellectually honest to write himself into a saving belief, the author was dramatizing the failure of Jungian insights to bring the expected answers.

Only one more story from *On the Makaloa Mat* need be cited in support of this thesis. In "Shin Bones,"²⁸ completed at Waikiki, July 16, 1916, Jack London, once more, effectively fictionalized his fruitless struggle to escape the trap of pessimistic materialism.

As in "The Water Baby" and "The Bones of Kahekili," London has constructed a frame story in which the skepticism of the modern world confronts the ancient traditions and religious beliefs of Polynesia. Yet "Shin Bones" differs from these tales in that herein the confrontation is not between cynical white man and an aged Hawaiian; instead, the modern skeptic is Prince Akuli, an Oxford-educated sophisticate, descended from "the oldest and highest aliis of Hawaii."

The setting of the outside narrative is a mountain bower on the mythical island of Lakanaii (London), "conceded by all to be the wildest, the most wildly beautiful, and . . . the richest of all the islands" (p. 108). Prince Akuli and an unnamed narrator are awaiting repair of the Prince's limousine.

In the opening pages of exposition the narrator relates the Prince's heritage, which is chanted in "interminable genealogies," all the way back to "Wakea, who is their Adam, and Papa, their Eve" (pp. 109-110). Then he abstracts his introductory material in a passage that sets up the inside narrative and introduces the thematic conflict between modern skepticism and traditional beliefs:

And so, out of all incests and lusts of the primitive cultures and beast man's gropings toward the stature of manhood, out of all red murders and brute battlings and matings with the younger brothers of the demigods, world-polished, Oxford-accented, twentieth century to the tick of the second, comes Prince Akuli . . . , pure-veined Polynesian, a living bridge across the centuries, comrade, friend and fellow traveler, out of his wrecked seven-thousand-dollar limousine, marooned with me in a begonia paradise fourteen hundred feet above the sea . . . , to tell me of his mother who reverted in her old age to ancientness of religious concept and ancestor worship and collected and surrounded herself with the charnel bones of those who had been her fore-runners back in the darkness of time. (p. 112)

The tale that the Prince relates is an initiation story rooted in the veneration of these ancestral remains. What Akuli characterizes as a "collecting fad" was assiduously practiced by both his parents--but for opposite reasons. Hiwilani, his mother, revered the bones of her progenitors as an integral part of the old faith of pre-Christian Hawaii. ("It gave me the creeps, when I was a boy," says the Prince, "to go into that big, forever-twilight room of hers, and know that . . . in all the jars were the preserved bone remnants of the shadowy dust of the ancestors whose seed had come down and been incorporated in the living, breathing me" [p. 106].) Diametrically opposed to Hiwilani's belief was the attitude of Prince Kanau, Akuli's father, "modern to his finger tips." He was a businessman, cynic, and materialist who "believed neither in the gods of the *kahunas* (priests) nor of the missionaries" (p. 113). His commitment was to the world of sugar stocks and horse breeding and to music, "which is stronger than drink and quicker than opium" (p. 117). Nonetheless, he too collected bones, but only as a philatelist collects stamps.

The inside narrative related by Prince Akuli is the story of his journey with Ahuna, an aged family retainer and adherent of the old religion, to the secret Cave of the Dead to obtain certain ancestral bones demanded by Hiwilani for her collection. This expedition, taken when Akuli was a

teenager, was the result of Hiwilani's incessant cajoling, badgering, and threatening of Ahuna to reveal the ancient burial site, for he alone knew the location of the cave. When Ahuna acquiesced to Hiwilani's demand by agreeing to make the difficult journey and to return with her mother's and her grandmother's bones, he stipulated that only akuli, sworn to secrecy, should accompany him. However, the prince was his father's son: "I refused to go on the bone-snatching expedition. I said I didn't care a whoop for the bones of all the aliis of my family and race.--You see, I had just discovered Jules Verne" (p. 119). The future, not the past, held the youth's attention. "I stood with my father," declared the prince, "when it came to modern skepticism, and I told her [Hiwilani] the whole thing was rubbish" (p. 120). Only when his mother bribed him with a promise of an Oxford education did Akuli consent to accompany Ahuna. Ironically, the prince's journey into his past is his talisman into the future. The knowledge of science, the arts, and philosophy derived from his Western education would serve to sustain his youthful unbelief.

The journey began with the prince, Ahuna, and eight aged paddlers setting out for the treacherous Iron-bound Coast, an area whose wild beauty was matched only by its danger. Its shores, edging forbidding mountains,, were without bays or anchorages, making a landing a test of courage; the trip inland was even more trying. The "great forbidding cliff walls . . . , their summits wreathed in cloud and rain squall," and the valleys, resembling fissures in a "lofty and madly vertical back country," (p. 125) help create the atmosphere of disorientation, danger, and mystery required for the fifteen-year-old cynic's perilous journey back into the history of his race and his consequent spiritual detumescence.

Prince Akuli and his mentor, Ahuna, set out alone on the final stage of their quest. This literal night journey, on a path that resembled "a Jacob's ladder to the sky," ended at a tarn in a wasteland, "a God-forsaken place of naked, eroded lava, to which only rarely could the scant vegetation find foothold" (p. 130). The two dove into the pool, swam through an underwater passage, and surfaced in a cave which they followed into the mountain's core. When the prince swore never to reveal what he was about to see, Ahuna allowed him to enter the burial chamber. In this "centuries old family attic" the youth confronted a thousand years of Hawaiian history. Among the treasures were the bones: "they were all there, the Hawaiian race from the beginning of Hawaiian time" (pp. 134-35).

As the prince moved among the remains of his ancestors, his attitude initially reflected the irreverence of youth and his father's cynicism; but his perceptions quickly changed. This experience, "in the culminating pe-

riod of [his] adolescence," (p. 142) became an epiphany when he viewed the pathetic physical remnants of the most famous love triangle of royal Polynesia and heard Ahuna relate their story.

Three hundred years earlier, the beautiful Laulani, the wife of Chief Akaiko, took Keola, a famed athlete, as her lover. When she fled with him, Akaiko pursued and, "in a forgotten battle on the sands of Kalini" (p. 137), slew Keola. Of all that passion and grief, there remained two bundles of bones (Laulani's and Akaiko's) and a spearhead made from Keola's shin bone.

As Ahuna ended his tale, the prince "could but gaze, with imagination at the one time sobered and fired." For

here were the three, I thought--Arthur and Launcelot and Guinevere. This . . . was the end of it all, of life and strife and striving and love, the weary spirits of these long-gone ones to be evoked by fat old women and mangy sorcerers, the bones of them to be esteemed of collectors and betted on horse races and ace-fulls or to be sold for cash and invested in sugar stocks.

For me it was illumination. I learned there in the burial cave the great lesson. (p. 138)

Recognizing for the first time what Hopkins termed "the blight man was born for," Akuli kept two of the bones as *memento mori*, and they served well, for as he tells the outside narrator, they changed his life and gave him "a modesty and a humility" (p. 142) that his inherited wealth could not destroy.

Like Hardman Pool, Prince Akuli is wise, but the wisdom is bitter. In an epithet foreshadowing T. S. Eliot, London's protagonist tells his friend that there are no mysteries in life, for "this is the twentieth century and we stink of gasoline" (p. 141). However, that revelation in the Cave of the Dead had given him his "religion or practice of living" (p. 142). Moderation, resignation, and stoicism in the face of time and dissolution are his meagre substitutes for the customs, folklore, and beliefs that gave meaning to old Ahuna's life. The predicament of the prince, which Jack London saw as representative of modern man's, is summarized in the African proverb: "If a man does away with his traditional way of living and throws away his good customs, he had better first make certain that he has something of value to replace them." The prince's replacement is the author's own. And as "Shin Bones" suggests, both author and his fictive surrogate perceived stoicism's inadequacy in any confrontation with the Medusa of atheism.

As this analysis and summary indicate, "Shin Bones" utilizes numerous archetypes identified by Jung--the perilous journey, the descent into water, the cave--all aspects of the story's initiation theme, itself a universal motif. Ironically, however, at the thematic heart of "Shin Bones" is modern man's alienation from that mythopoeic vision which, according to Jung, gives meaning and value to the individual life.²⁹ Like his father, Prince Akuli cannot accept the Polynesian mythic tradition.

The London biographer Andrew Sinclair has seriously misread these last stories when he states that in them Jack London identifies himself "with aged Hawaiian natives telling the tales and myths of their past to skeptical foreigners."³⁰ While in all probability he wished to so identify himself, he could not. Kohokumu and John Lakana, Kumuhana and Hardman Pool, Ahuna and Prince Akuli personify the divergent visions struggling within the writer's psyche: the "comforting mythic . . . tradition and the corruptive materialism of modern civilization," one offering "to preserve man's spiritual vitality . . . the other diminish[ing] those who reap its benefits."³¹ Yet in each story Jack London implicitly associates himself with the voices of skepticism and materialism. Lakana, Pool, and Akuli echo the author's own questionings. The Jungian insights that Jack London had discovered in *Psychology of the Unconscious*, "like the systems he had found before, had failed on the eve of his own death to give him a sure faith."³²

"The Red One,"³³ completed at Waikiki, May 22, 1916, is an appropriate short story with which to conclude this essay. Not only is it a quality narrative, ranking with his finest achievements, but it is also a compendium of the major themes and motifs that inform the entire corpus of South Pacific narratives. Nonetheless, other than a few articles of the "notes and queries" variety,³⁴ this story has been virtually ignored by London scholars. The two standard works of London criticism, Earle Labor's *Jack London* and James I. McClintock's *White Logic*, do not discuss it.

"The Red One" differs from the other stories discussed in several significant aspects. First, the setting is no longer Hawaii, the Pacific paradise, but rather its opposite: the black hell of Melanesia--specifically, Guadalcanal, the Solomon Islands. And, as in all Jack London's South Sea narratives, this brutal world elicits the worst in human nature. Graphic descriptions of violence, suffering, and death (which were muted in *On the Makaloa Mat*) once again convey the naturalist's law of life.

Also, London puts aside the frame story technique employed in the other three stories; instead, he shifts to a Jamesian third-person point of view. The narrative voice limits itself to the thought processes of the protagonist, and the action of the narrative is presented from his perspective.

As shall be shown, the author's abandonment of his favored frame story technique and the utilization instead of this more sophisticated presentation are essential to the story's successful thematic development.

The aspects of "The Red One" cited above demonstrate its divergence from the other short stories treated. However, in its archetypal quest motif, obsession with death, and thematic contrast between primitive and modern cultures, "The Red One" manifests its kinship with the Polynesian tales of Jack London's last year.

"The Red One" is the tale of Bassett, a scientist, and his search for the source of an unearthly sound emanating from the unexplored interior of Guadalcanal. While butterfly collecting on the beach at Ringmanu, he first heard the call, which he subsequently described as

that enormous peal that dominated the land far into the strongholds of the surrounding tribes. The mountain gorge which was its source rang to the rising of it until it brimmed over and flooded earth and sky and air. With the wantonness of a sick man's fancy, he likened it to the mighty cry of some Titan of the Elder World vexed with misery or wrath. Higher and higher it arose, challenging and demanding in such profoundness of volume that it seemed intended for ears beyond the narrow confines of the solar system. There was in it, too, the clamor of protest in that there were no ears to hear and comprehend its utterance. (p. 1)

Like the sirens' call heard by Odysseus, the sound could not be ignored. Bassett's scientific curiosity had to be satisfied, for he associated the sound with mystery and knowledge: "Was this, then, *his* dark tower?--Bassett pondered" (p. 3). Believing the origin to be near, he abandoned his only link with civilization, the blackbirder *Nari* (a sailing vessel used to recruit black labor), and set out into the jungle. Almost immediately headhunters attacked, slew his servant, and mutilated the scientist himself (two fingers lost, his skull slashed and deeply indented) before he repelled the savages.

Now began a nightmarish period (of indeterminate duration) during which the ever-lurking cannibals and tropical fevers drove Bassett to the verge of insanity; yet, whenever possible, he continued to move toward that sound "like a benediction to his long-suffering, pain-wracked spirit" (p. 12). To the sick man the call became a symbol of life and promise in contrast to the luxuriant jungle, ironically, a symbol of evil, death, and decay. Seldom has the naturalist's nightmare been more effectively conveyed:

But seared deepest of all in Bassett's brain, was the dank and noisome jungle. It actually stank with evil, and it was always twilight. Rarely did a shaft of sunlight penetrate its matted roof a hundred feet overhead. And beneath that roof was an aërial ooze of vegetation, a monstrous, parasitic dripping of decadent life-forms that rooted in death and lived on death. And through all this he drifted, ever pursued by the flitting shadows of the anthropophagi, themselves ghosts of evil that dared not face him in battle but that knew, soon or late, that they would feed on him.

(p. 10)

Miraculously Bassett escaped the jungle ringing the island and crossed the vast Guadalcanal savannah, arriving more dead than alive at the forest-covered foot of the inland mountains. There, in an unconscious state, he was found by Balatta; dirt-caked and with a bloody pig's tail thrust through her left earlap, she resembled something more simian than human. But he owed her his life. She brought him to the village of her mountain tribe, and he resided there in decaying health, closely watched by Balatta, who wanted him as a love object, and by Ngurn, the devil-devil or medicine man, who wanted his head. However, Bassett refused to let go of life, "for, like the genuine scientist he was, he would not be content to die until he had solved the secret of the sound" (p. 18).

Quickly mastering the native language, Bassett became a crony of Ngurn, the priest, and in the smokey darkness of the devil-devil house, with its shrunken heads hanging from the rafters, the twentieth-century man of science and the representative of man's primordial beginning discussed the ultimate questions of good and evil, life and death. Often the conversation turned to the source of the sound, identified by Ngurn as the "Red One." He was their god, "more bestial powerful than the neighbor tribal gods, ever a-thirst for the red blood of living human sacrifices." Even those gods, asserted Ngurn, "were sacrificed and tormented before him" (p. 19). For generations the Red One had ruled, but the true nature of this deity remained a mystery to Bassett. No outsider could look upon the Red One--and live. Therefore, the scientist could only question and be tantalized. Why, for example, did Ngurn refer to the Red One as the "Sun Singer" and the "Star-Born"?

Knowing that death was imminent, the scientist became so desperate for a glimpse of the "God-Voiced" that he proposed a trade with the savage:

"When I die I'll let you have my head to cure, if first, you take me to look upon the Red One."

"I will have your head anyway when you are dead," Ngurn rejected the proposition. . . . "Besides, you have not long to live. You are almost a dead man now. You will grow less strong. In not many months I shall have you here turning and turning in the smoke. It is pleasant, through the long afternoons, to turn the head of one you have known as well as I know you. And I shall talk to you and tell you the many secrets you want to know. Which will not matter, for you will be dead." (p. 24)

Seeing that this stratagem was obviously fruitless, Bassett turned to the disgusting bushwoman, feigned love for her, and demanded in return that she lead him to the Red One. "A scientist first, a humanist afterward" (p. 29), he cared little that should the tribe discover Balatta's transgression her dying would be long and excruciating.

To show her love for Bassett, Balatta acquiesced, and on a mountain mesa the scientist finally confronted the Red One. There in a deep pit he saw a red orb, "a perfect sphere, fully two hundred feet in diameter, the top of it . . . a hundred feet below the level of the rim" (pp. 31-32). Over the anguished objections of the woman, Bassett descended to the object and found

the pit bottom carpeted with human bones, among which, battered and defaced, lay village gods of wood and stone. Some, covered with obscene totemic figures and designs, were carved from solid tree trunks forty or fifty feet in length. He noted the absence of the shark and turtle gods, so common among the shore villages, and was amazed at the constant recurrence of the helmet motive. What did these jungle savages of the dark heart of Guadalcanal know of helmets? Had Mendana's men-at-arms worn helmets and penetrated here centuries before? And if not, then whence had the bush-folk caught the motive? (p. 32-33)

In this long overlooked story, Jack London apparently anticipated Erich Von Daniken's theory that space travelers visited earth in prehistoric times.

Bassett's examination showed the Red One to be of a metal scarred by intense heat and to be hollow at the core. As he touched its surface, the sphere quivered "under the fingertip caress in rhythmic vibrations that became whisperings and rustlings . . . of sound . . . like a peal from some

bell of the gods reaching earthward from across space" (p. 34). For hundreds of years this celestial traveler had called out when struck during myriad human sacrifices, and the irony of the situation was almost too much for Bassett to accept. He

laughed aloud, almost with madness, at the thought of this wonderful messenger, winged with intelligence across space, to fall into a bushman stronghold and be worshiped by ape-like, man-eating and head-hunting savages. It was as if God's Word had fallen into the muck mire of the abyss underlying the bottom of hell; as if Jehovah's Commandments had been presented on carved stone to the monkeys . . . at the Zoo; as if the Sermon on the Mount had been preached in a roaring bedlam of lunatics. (p. 37-38)

Of major thematic importance, however, is the second level of irony in Bassett's situation, which the protagonist is unable or unwilling to perceive. It lies in the conviction of this prototypical twentieth-century man that he is morally superior to the Melanesians. In reality his capacity for evil equals or exceeds that of the bushmen--but he never confronts his heart of darkness.

Bassett's moral blindness is clearly defined when, after his return from the secret visit to the Red One, he determines to let nothing stop him from discovering whatever truth is contained within the sphere. In his musings on the intelligences that sent the Red One, he wonders: "Had they won Brotherhood? Or had they learned that the law of love imposed the penalty of weakness and decay? Was strife, life? Was the rule of all the universe the pitiless rule of natural selection?" (p. 41). Regardless of the answer, to crack this code of the higher priesthood London's dubious hero is willing to wade through blood. As noted, he chose to risk a horrible death for Balatta just to view the object. Now he plots to escape and to "lead an expedition back, and, *although the entire population of Guadalcanal be destroyed*, extract from the heart of the Red One the message of the world from other worlds" (p. 42; emphasis mine). Directed by modern man's only moral guide--the end justifies the means--Bassett, a scientist, prefigures the fathers of the mushroom cloud. Howard Lachtman recognized the symbolic import of Bassett when he pointed out that in "The Red One" Jack London contrasted the South Sea primitives and civilized man "to mirror the essential savagery of even the highest representatives (scientists) of modern civilization and the western world."³⁵ Could there be a more appropriate time for the expression of this theme than 1916, the year of Verdun and the Somme?

The relationship between this theme and the author's narrative method is part of the success of "The Red One." By replacing his usual frame story technique with the limited third-person point of view, London made a propitious decision. For by viewing the action through Bassett's eyes, he created verisimilitude and, more significantly, conveyed the Jekyll and Hyde discrepancy between the protagonist's motive and method, his vision of himself and the reality, without a first-person or omniscient narrator preaching to the reader.

"The Red One" draws to a conclusion with Bassett's realization that he is never to leave Guadalcanal. He grows weaker by the day and knows that soon he will be added to Ngurn's collection. Therefore, to gain a last glimpse of the "Star-Born," he offers himself as a sacrifice before it. Borne on a litter by a dozen blacks, the scientist once more journeys to the high mesa and down to the killing ground before the sphere. He is allowed to listen to its peal once more. Then the story concludes with a passage that ranks among the most powerful ever penned by Jack London:

He knew, without seeing, when the razor-edged hatchet rose in the air behind him. And for that instant, ere the end, there fell upon Bassett the shadow of the unknown, a sense of impending marvel of the rending of walls before the imaginable. Almost, when he knew the blow had started and just ere the edge of steel bit the flesh and nerves, it seemed that he gazed upon the serene face of the Medusa, Truth--And, simultaneous with the bite of the steel on the onrush of the dark, in a flashing instant of fancy, he saw the vision of his head turning slowly, always turning, in the devil-devil house beside the breadfruit tree. (p. 49-50)

Here London's archetypal quest motif blends with the images of death (Bassett's shrunken head) and life (the breadfruit tree) in a symbolic trinity of the writer's major themes.

A few years after her husband's death, Charmian London wrote: "Sometimes I wonder if it can be possible, in the ponderings of the dying scientist, Bassett, that Jack London revealed more of himself than he would have been willing to admit--or else, who knows? more of himself than he himself realized."³⁶ Her speculations are probabilities, not possibilities. Bassett's quest was the lifelong obsession of Jack London, and "The Red One" contains the major themes and motifs of the author's better fiction: graphic violence, racial conflict, irony,³⁷ the search for a scientific justification for a belief in a reality beyond pessimistic naturalism

(i.e., the message of the Red One), an obsession with death, and finally, the inability of modern man to commit himself to anything beyond materialism and the physical facts of life as he experiences them. Although Bassett seems "to gaze upon . . . Medusa, Truth," the last image in his mind, before his spinal cord is severed, is of "his head turning slowly, always turning." Death, the Noseless One, has the stage alone.

Jack London wrote a great deal on a variety of subjects during the last summer and fall of his life. Nevertheless, his own mortality, Carl Jung's theories, and visions of the South Seas dominated his thoughts and imagination. When these subjects coalesced, "The Water Baby," "The Bones of Kahekili," "Shin Bones," and "The Red One" was produced. Of a pattern, these tales are similar in setting (only "The Red One" is situated outside Hawaii); use of Jungian archetypes; and contrasts between primitive islanders--whose religious beliefs give meaning and direction to their lives--and modern skeptics, who are looking for the missing ingredient that gives purpose and meaning to life and death. However, their basic affinity lies in this last point: civilized man's questioning of his ultimate destiny. Jack London thought he had found a key to this mystery in the writings of Jung but the perplexities of John Lakana, Hardman Pool, Prince Akuli, and Bassett demonstrate that Truth still hid her face.

Eighteen years earlier, when London was just beginning his literary career, he received word that Fred Jacobs, a close friend, had died unexpectedly. Jack's terse comment was, "He solved the mystery a little sooner."³⁸ In 1916 the mystery remained. For as these last short stories indicate, Jack London needed the impossible--a scientific, rationalistic basis for belief transcending naturalistic determinism. Some years after London died, the last mentor to fail him, C. G. Jung, succinctly summarized the source of the naturalist's frustrations:

faith cannot be made: it is in the truest sense a gift of grace. We moderns are faced with the necessity of rediscovering the life of the spirit; we must experience it anew for ourselves. It is the only way in which we can break the spell that binds us to the cycle of biological events.³⁹

Jack London's last tales of the South Seas are an affecting literary record of his unsuccessful search for the means to break this spell.

David A. Moreland
Louisiana State University

NOTES

1. Andrew Sinclair, *Jack* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 218.
2. Joan London, *Jack London and His Times* (New York: Doubleday, 1939; reprinted by University of Washington Press, 1968; Washington Paperback edition, 1974), p. 371.
3. Quoted by Sinclair, p. 220.
4. "To Joan London," 24 February 1914, *Letters from Jack London*, King Hendricks and Irving Shepard, eds. (New York: Odyssey Press, 1965), p. 416.
5. Jack London, "The Terrible and Tragic in Fiction," *Critic* 42 (June 1903): 543.
6. Joan London, pp. 372-73.
7. Charmian London, *The Book of Jack London*, vol. 2 (New York: Century, 1921), p. 253.
8. James I. McClintock, *White Logic: Jack London's Short Stories* (Cedar Springs, Michigan: Wolf House Books, 1975), p. 152.
9. C. G. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, trans. by Beatrice M. Hinkle (New York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1916).
10. Charmian London, *The Book of Jack London*, vol. 2, p. 323.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 357-58
12. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
13. Earle Labor, *Jack London* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974), p. 127.
14. Charmian London, *The Book of Jack London*, vol. 2, p. 367.
15. Charmian London, *Jack London and Hawaii* (London: Mills and Boon, 1918); published as *Our Hawaii* (New York: Macmillan, 1917), p. 342.
16. Jack London, "The Water Baby," *Cosmopolitan* 65 (September 1918): 80-85, 133. Collected in *On the Makaloa Mat* (New York: Macmillan, 1919), pp. 143-59. Subsequent references will be given in parentheses within the text.
17. Anthony Storr, *C. G. Jung* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 105-6.
18. While writing these last Hawaiian stories, London was planning a historical novel about the discovery of America by the Norsemen. The following comment in his notes indicates his preoccupation with this new "science": "Get in interpretation of the genesis of their myths, etc., from their unconscious." Quoted by Charmian London, *The Book of Jack London*, vol. 2, p. 381.
19. James I. McClintock, "Jack London's Use of Carl Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*," *American Literature* 42 (November 1970): 336-47.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
21. *Ibid.*
22. McClintock, "Jack London's Use of Carl Jung's, *Psychology of the Unconscious*," p. 154.
23. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. xxvi. Quoted by Charmian London, *The Book of Jack London*, vol. 2, p. 358.

24. McClintock, *White Logic*, pp. 162-63.
25. Jack London, "The Bones of Kahekili," *Cosmopolitan* 67 (July 1919): 95-100, 102, 104. Collected in *On the Makaloa Mat*, pp. 41-77. Subsequent references will be given in parentheses within the text.
26. Howard Lachtman, "The Wide World of Jack London" (Diss., University of the Pacific, 1974), pp. 121-22.
27. McClintock, *White Logic*, p. 166.
28. Jack London, "In the Cave of the Dead," *Cosmopolitan* 65 (November 1918): 74-81, 119-21. Collected as "Shin Bones" in *On the Makaloa Mat*, pp. 106-42. Subsequent references will be given in parentheses within the text.
29. Storr, p. 36.
30. Sinclair, p. 229.
31. Lachtman, p. 119.
32. McClintock, *White Logic*, p. 167.
33. Jack London, "The Red One," *Cosmopolitan* 65 (October 1918): 34-41, 132, 135-38. Collected in *The Red One* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1918), pp. 1-50. Subsequent references will be given in parentheses within the text.
34. Of these, the best is Thomas D. Clareson's commentary in *A Spectrum of Worlds* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1972), pp. 87-90.
35. Lachtman, p. 118. See also Clareson, p. 89.
36. Charmian London, *The Book of Jack London*, vol. 2, p. 334.
37. The ultimate irony of this story is historical. When Jack London wrote "The Red One," few people in the Western world had heard of Guadalcanal. But twenty-six years later it was the site of the first great land and sea battle of the Pacific war, which London predicted in "The Yellow Peril" (1904). Between August 1942, and February 1943, eighteen hundred Americans and twenty-four thousand Japanese died in a bloodletting that dwarfed to insignificance the sacrifices to the Red One.
38. Quoted by Russ Kingman in *A Pictorial Life of Jack London* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1979), p. 274.
39. C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, trans. by W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1933), p. 122.

HUNGRY SHARKS: JAPANESE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN MELANESIA, 1960-1980

by James A. Boutilier

Introduction

One of the most significant developments in Melanesia since 1945 has been the dramatic growth in Japanese economic activity. The bitter legacy of Japanese militarism in the southwest Pacific made such activity unthinkable in the years immediately after the Pacific war. However, by the early 1960s the Japanese had begun to move into the region in a cautious, inoffensive but highly effective manner securing access to timber, minerals, agricultural produce, and sea products to supplement their resource-poor economy. This “invasion,” or “co-prosperity sphere,” as critics of the Japanese presence were quick to label it, gained momentum in the late 1960s as the Japanese began to dominate not only the extractive industries in Melanesia but important sectors of the consumer economies there. By the 1970s memories of the war had faded, a number of the Melanesian island groups had gained independence, and the Melanesians had come to see the Japanese as attractive trade, aid, and technical partners as well as convenient counterweights to Melanesia’s traditional Australasian and European trade partners.

Approach. This paper provides a historical, descriptive overview of the growth of Japanese economic activity in Fiji, French New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) in the period 1960 to 1980. I have not attempted to describe the Japanese economy or to construct economic models. Nor have I attempted to assess the effectiveness of Japanese activities in a day-by-day sense. Rather I have attempted to describe--in broad, overall terms--the nature of those activities and their contribution to the Melanesian economies.¹ I hope that this survey may serve as a point of departure for much-needed, detailed research on Japanese economic activity in the southwest Pacific. I have used the word “activity” in a portmanteau way to include investment, loans, technical aid associated with revenue generating activities, and so forth. My research has been based on an analysis of twenty

years of reporting in *Pacific Islands Monthly*, the leading news magazine for the islands, and all of the in-text references that appear in this paper are drawn from that source. *PIM*, as it was and is popularly known, not only contains a wealth of information on the growing Japanese presence in Melanesia but features editorial commentary and advertisements placed by Japanese firms. Indeed, these advertisements are an interesting barometer of that presence--growing from one, one-eighth-page black and white advertisement in the early 1960s to a dozen or more full-page color advertisements per number in the late 1970s. In a word, the Japanese came to dominate *PIM's* advertising in much the same way that they came to dominate the Melanesian economies in the same period.

Background. The Melanesian islands lie in the southwestern quadrant of the Pacific and are all "continental" islands. Continental islands have--by Pacific standards--relatively large land masses and the potential for modestly diverse economies, enjoying as they do mineral, timber, agricultural, and maritime resources. These island groups were all subject to metropolitan control in 1960: the British in Fiji, the French in New Caledonia, the Australians in Papua New Guinea, and the British and French in the New Hebrides (the Anglo-French Condominium). These powers did very little during their tenure to diversify the island economies. Instead they relied heavily on one or two extractive, labor-intensive industries (sugar and copra in Fiji, nickel and beef in New Caledonia, copra in the New Hebrides, and copra in Papua New Guinea), gearing the economies, government policies, and shipping to benefit a small number of expatriate entrepreneurs and metropolitan firms. The vast majority of their colonial subjects lived in village settings and were dependent on traditional subsistence economies.

The Pacific war, if it did not give rise to direct Japanese occupation (as was the case with parts of Papua New Guinea and the Solomons) with all of the attendant dislocation and tragedy, did give rise to a deep anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the region after 1945. As late as 1959 a Japanese vehicle sighted on the road in Papua New Guinea--where the anti-Japanese feelings of the Australians were perhaps strongest of all--was jeered at.² There was a deep reluctance on the part of postwar island administrations to countenance the residence of Japanese technicians in their islands, and in the 1960s the governor of American Samoa forbade the marriage of a local woman to a Japanese fisherman on the grounds that it was somehow inappropriate.

Slowly, however, the wounds of war healed. The British permitted a team of Japanese veterans to come to the Solomon Islands in 1971 to look for the remains of the 24,000 Japanese known to have fallen there during

the war. The team recovered the remains of 7,000 and these were interred at Tambea village at the northern end of Guadalcanal. Two years later the Japanese government spent upwards of \$A 100,000 looking for soldiers still in hiding in the Solomons and Japanese companies like Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co. and Taiyo Fishery Co., working in the group, took an active part in the search (July 73, p. 5).

At the same time that anti-Japanese feeling was diminishing the island groups were moving towards independence and seeking foreign investment and technical assistance. The Japanese were quick off the mark with both and the Melanesian micro-states, short of risk capital and skilled personnel, found the Japanese willing to make experts and money available for developing projects. Thus we find the Japanese underwriting parts of the \$A 400 million Panguna copper mine project in Bougainville, investing in timber, fisheries, and hydro-electric surveys, providing concessional loans, and offering technical assistance in telecommunications, aviation, mining, reforestation, and fishing.

While the Melanesian nations were eager to attract Japanese investment they were also acutely aware of their own economic vulnerability. "Actually," observed the Chief Minister of the Solomon Islands, Solomon Mamaloni, "I think the world is full of hungry sharks swimming around looking for nice little developing countries to swallow up" (Apr. 76, p. 11). Japan was one such shark and in order to safeguard themselves, to a degree at least, the microstates began to insist on joint-venture schemes, greater government control over Japanese operations, and guarantees of increased royalties and the localization of those operations.

To a degree far greater, I suspect, than the island nations wished, the Japanese came to dominate their economies. And in the process those nations became subject to the fluctuations in Japanese market demand. When the Japanese timber market slumped in the early 1970s, timber export revenues across Melanesia slumped as well. The same was true with the export of nickel from New Caledonia and copper from Papua New Guinea. Wittingly or unwittingly the Melanesian nations had committed themselves to a new form of colonial domination.

Variables. While it is axiomatic that economic activity is affected by a wide range of variables, it may be useful nevertheless to examine some of the factors that have effected the growth of Japanese economic activity in Melanesia during the past two decades. Probably the most significant change has been the altered political status of the Melanesian islands. With the exception of New Caledonia, all the islands in question have gained their independence since 1960: Fiji (1970), Papua New Guinea (1975), the Solomon Islands (1978), and Vanuatu (1980). Prior to inde-

pendence the Melanesians were unable to negotiate freely with the Japanese. Trade relations generally favored the metropolitan powers. Commonwealth preference (Fiji and the Solomons), Australian immigration regulations (Papua New Guinea), and direct control in the case of French regulation of New Caledonian nickel export quotas) tended to discourage Japanese economic activity in the southwest Pacific.³ This was particularly true in the case of Japanese aid programs, which were intended to assist independent nations only.⁴

With the achievement of independence the Melanesian microstates began to campaign vigorously for risk capital and foreign markets. Their long-term goal was the diversification of their fragile, narrowly-based, small-scale economies. The Japanese, themselves eager to diversify their sources of raw materials, were quick to exploit the opportunities afforded them in Melanesia. The one-time colonial powers, however, were not displaced altogether. They continued to exercise considerable influence over the Melanesian economies though their share of the market tended to decline--often dramatically--in the 1970s.

At the same time a fundamental change was taking place in the socioeconomic systems of Melanesia. More and more Melanesians were making the shift from subsistence to cash-based economies, a transition reflecting and accelerating urbanization in the southwest Pacific. This shift was fueled by Japanese investment and gave rise to an increasing demand for consumer goods like cars, radios, outboard motors, cameras, and electronic goods, all of which the Japanese were able to provide at highly competitive prices.

The Japanese ability to supply consumer goods related in part to the transport revolution that took place during that period. Shipping services, which had been disrupted or discontinued during the Pacific war, were slowly reestablished and by the late 1960s the Japanese had begun to move aggressively into the shipping business; firms like Daiwa and Nitto provided regular service to Melanesia. In some cases, for example the shipping of copper ore from Papua New Guinea, the Japanese were prepared to provide specific vessels for those services alone. Furthermore the Japanese were much closer to Melanesia than their European competitors, and they frequently managed to edge out the Australians because of the latter's very high freight rates. Indeed, in the late 1960s it cost more to ship freight from Australia to the Solomons than it did from Europe (June 1968, p. 32).

Complementing the shipping services was the general improvement in airline service in the southwest Pacific. During the period being examined Japan was linked to the area by Air Niugini, UTA, Air Nauru and its own

national carrier, Japan Airlines. Not only did improved air service stimulate Japanese investment through tourism, but it encouraged the movement of Japanese aid and technical teams to the area with an overall multiplier effect.

In addition, other Japanese-Melanesian links were forged that promoted economic activity. Several island nations established Japan friendship societies; the Japanese created their own version of the Peace Corps, with Japanese volunteers serving in the islands; and trade fairs and diplomatic visits encouraged a greater awareness of trade potential.

Two significant changes occurring during the period were the oil crisis of 1973 and the decision by the Melanesian island nations to extend their off-shore fishing limit to two hundred miles in 1978. The former led to a general sluggishness in world trade and a marked decline in Melanesian exports to Japan; the latter led to temporarily strained relations with Japan. The Japanese, obliged to seek 40 percent of their annual fish consumption of ten million tonnes outside their own territorial waters greeted the decision with dismay (Apr. 1978, p. 10). The South Pacific nations took a somewhat different view. With roughly 75 percent of the \$1,000 million worth of fish caught every year in their area being caught within the enlarged zone, it was very much in the islanders' best interests to capitalize on the new boundaries (Jan. 1978, p. 5).⁵

The countries that had previously enjoyed near monopoly positions in Melanesia--like Australia--chose, on occasion, to resist Japanese economic pressures by threatening to undercut the island economies. Thus when Fiji began to capture what the Australians deemed an unacceptably large share of the duty-free market in Japanese cameras and electronic equipment, the Australians attempted to retaliate by reducing the import privileges of Australian tourists returning from the islands (Jan. 1965, p. 10).

FIJI

"In recent years," *Pacific Islands Monthly* noted in May 1963, "there has been a spectacular invasion of the South Pacific territories by Japanese capital" (p. 133). Much of it was directed toward Fiji where the Japanese were interested in exploiting the colony's mineral and marine resources. The first in the field was the Pacific Fishing and Canning Company (Pafco), a joint-venture company involving Japanese and Fijian capital and directors. On the Japanese side Pafco was a subsidiary of the fisheries giant C. Itoh and Company of Osaka, and Nichiryō of Tokyo (Dec. 1974, p. 84). Following several years of negotiation with the British authorities, Pafco announced in February 1963 that it would build a

freezer facility (eight-hundred to one-thousand-ton capacity) and fish meal plant at a cost of £100,000 at Levuka, the old capital of Fiji on the east coast of the island of Ovalau. Thirty ninety-nine-ton catcher-boats, each capable of holding roughly fifty tons of refrigerated or ice-packed catch, were to be based at the port. Initially, these vessels, employing the so-called longline fishing method to catch yellowfin and albacore tuna, were Japanese, but after 1967 they were steadily replaced by Korean and Taiwanese boats under contract (Nov. 1966, p. 101).⁶

At the outset fears were expressed about the appropriateness of allowing Japanese fisheries technicians to live ashore in Levuka (Mar. 1963, p. 9). Pafco was anxious to secure residence permits at the rate of one family for every fishing vessel up to a maximum of 105 families. How, *PIM* enquired editorially, could the Fijian government be expected to limit the number of families to this figure, and what would Levuka be like with the addition of four or five hundred Japanese residents (Mar. 1963, p. 13)? In the end these fears proved groundless, and by 1969 the magazine was on record as applauding the “international friendship [that had] developed between the Japanese and the local Levukans” (Jan. 1969, p. 99).

While modest by international standards, Pafco came to play an increasingly important part in the Fijian economy, providing employment for upward of four hundred Fijians, generating export revenues, and reviving the moribund Levuka township. The fish-freezer facility opened in 1964, and three years later a canning factory was constructed to process top-quality fish (tuna flakes, light meat, and white meat) for sale in the United States and substandard flesh for the pet food market (Nov. 1966, p. 101).⁷ During the late 1960s the Levuka factory was supplied with between six and seven thousand tons of tuna a year by the fleet of thirty-five to fifty long-liners. A peak year was reached in 1972 when twelve thousand tons of frozen tuna worth A\$10 million were shipped out of Levuka (June 1976, p. 36).⁸ By 1974 sales to the United States alone amounted to between A\$5 and A\$7 million annually and Pafco had become one of the major industries of Fiji, standing second only to sugar and tourism as the dominion’s most important export earner. The company’s position was further enhanced by the decision to open a new A\$1 million cannery in 1976. The Fiji government was particularly interested in promoting the construction of a larger cannery. Not only would the cannery contribute from A\$10 to A\$15 million annually toward export earnings (Nov. 1977, p. 65), but its output sold in Fiji would help offset 35 to 40 percent of the canned fish imports, principally from South Africa, which were costing the dominion more than A\$5 million annually (June 1976, p. 36).⁹ In addition, the government was anxious to strike up a new relationship with

Pafco that would promote the government's policy of localization in terms of employment and fish purchases. The agreement concluded provided Pafco with the site for the cannery and a ten year monopoly on tuna processing and export in Fiji. In return the government acquired a 24 percent holding in Pafco (Itoh 60 percent, Nichiryō 10 percent, and 5 percent held by about twenty Fiji residents) and a promise that the company would progressively localize the cannery's staff and purchase skipjack and other tuna from Fijian fishermen (June 1976, p. 36).¹⁰

If Japanese fishing operations in Fiji were highly successful the same could not be said of Japanese mining ventures there. In 1963 Banno Oceania and its subsidiary Banno Mining Company took over the mangane- sian mines at Nabu, Vunimoli, and Momi in northwestern Viti Levu (May 1963, p. 133). They invested a reported £400,000 in their development and dispatched their first shipment of one thousand tons of low grade ore in December 1967 to the Japan Metal Trading Company, in the face of stiff competition from Russian producers.

At the same time Banno Mining, in conjunction with Daiwa Mining Company and Daiwa Bank, spent fifteen thousand pounds on preliminary surveys before deciding to open the first commercial copper mine in Fiji at Nukudamu, Udu Point, northern Vanua Levu in 1967 (May 1967, p. 132). The consortium hoped to export twenty-five hundred tons of ore a month to Japan from their open-cut mine and Daiwa Mining commenced work, in August of that year, on a copper processing mill to produce two hundred tons of crude copper ore a day. Shipment of ore was to be facilitated by the regular monthly service operated between Fiji and Japan by the Daiwa Line (Oct. 1967, p. 103). However, within a few months the mine closed permanently because it was discovered that the mineral deposits were far smaller than calculated (Nov. 1977, p. 65).

While Banno Mining was commencing trial operations at Nukudamu early in 1968, the Nippon Light Metal Company was seeking permission from the British authorities to begin mining bauxite on Vanua Levu. The company had undertaken a two year survey of bauxite deposits there and estimated that there were six million tons of exploitable trihydrate bauxite available, with 50 percent alumina content (Feb. 1968, p. 123). However, by 1973 Nippon was obliged to close down and sell off all its assets in Fiji because of a persistently depressed world market in bauxite (July 1973, p. 99).

The Japanese were also interested during this period in resort development in Fiji. As Nippon was winding up its operations on Vanua Levu, the enormously wealthy Toyo Ocean Development and Engineering consortium of Tokyo (consisting of thirty-one companies, including such

giants as Nippon Steel, the Sanwa Bank, and Hitachi Shipbuilding, with combined assets of U.S.\$60 billion) acquired controlling interest in Mana Island Resort off the west coast of Viti Levu. *PIM* speculated on that occasion that the takeover might very well “be the thin end of the wedge of Japanese investment in Fiji tourism” (Jan. 1973, p. 41). As the Sanwa Bank was the banker for Japan Air Lines (JAL) there was reason to believe that Toyo’s acquisition of Mana Island might presage increased Japanese tourist traffic to Fiji.¹¹

The sprawling A\$32 million Pacific Harbour resort and residential development at Deuba on the south coast of Viti Levu, fifty-five kilometers from Suva, was the other object of Japanese investor attention during the 1970s. Early in 1973 the Nomura Real Estate Company of Tokyo secured sole right to sell sites at Pacific Harbour in Japan (Mar. 1973, p. 96). Two years later South Pacific Properties Taisei, a subsidiary of the Taisei Construction Corporation of Japan and Southern Pacific Properties of Hong Kong (of which the British P & O shipping group was a major shareholder), increased the Japanese beachhead at Pacific Harbour by acquiring a twenty-four-hundred-hectare site for the construction of hotels and “village-type complexes” (Oct. 1975, p. 83 and Nov. 1977, p. 65).

The premier Japanese success story in Fiji, in percentage terms at least, related to the motor vehicle business. In 1965 Japan trailed behind Australia and Great Britain in car sales in Fiji. Four years later she had overtaken the British and by 1970 had “cornered the car market in Fiji,” selling 157 cars compared with 90 for Australia and 85 for Great Britain (Mar. 1971, p. 112). The real breakthrough occurred when the government of newly independent Fiji made the first of two decisions “that all but cleared the market of serious rivals for Japanese vehicles” (June 1976, p. 45). First, it scrapped the Commonwealth preferential system under which cars from Australia and Great Britain had been landed in Fiji at half the duty applied to Japanese cars. Second, it imposed a ban in 1975 on imports of cars with an engine capacity of over two thousand cubic centimeters in an effort to reduce gasoline consumption in the face of worldwide oil shortages. Even before the second decision Japan’s domination of the relatively small (A\$10 million a year: 1976) market was nearly total. Of the 1535 vehicles imported into Fiji in 1974, Japan supplied 1,119 (Great Britain 270 and Australia 141) while in the “vehicles under two tons” category she supplied 86 of the 90 vehicles enumerated (May 1975, p. 72). Her command of the motorcycle market was equally complete. Britain once supplied virtually all of the motorcycles sold in Fiji. By 1974, 258 of the 260 motorcycles sold in Fiji were Japanese (June 1976, p. 45).

Thus in little over a decade (1964-1974) Japan came to dominate vital areas of Fiji's import-export trade. Fisheries were Fiji's second biggest export earner by the end of 1974 (Dec. 1974, p. 84) and Japan's economic authority was reinforced by her monopoly position as supplier of the optical and electronic goods (radios, television sets, record players, cameras, watches, telescopes, and binoculars) that underpinned Fiji's duty-free tourist industry.¹²

New Caledonia

The Japanese trade relationship with French New Caledonia was almost the exact opposite of that with Fiji; fisheries were a failure and minerals were largely successful. In 1963 the Japanese fishing company Taiyo Gyogyo, in association with New Caledonian directors, formed a joint-venture company named Société l'Océan and established a tuna fishing base on the Ducos Peninsula near Noumea (Mar. 1963, p. 130). By January 1964 there were approximately forty catcher-boats operating in New Caledonian waters with two or three of them delivering up their catch each day to a refrigerated mother ship, *Eiyo Maru* (Jan. 1964, p. 39), for transshipment to Japan and the United States. Six months later Société l'Océan was in a state of dissolution. Having contributed twenty-five to thirty thousand pounds a month to the Noumean economy, Société claimed that high costs had rendered its operations unprofitable and that it had to close down.¹³

While this was happening Japanese and New Caledonian interests were negotiating for major sales of nickel ore to Japan. Until 1969 New Caledonia's nickel industry was dominated by the Rothschild-owned Société le Nickel (SLN). Prospects for the nickel industry at the time were, in *PIM's* words, "extremely bright" as the world demand was expected to substantially exceed world production (Nov. 1968, p. 122). To take advantage of this situation and to break SLN's near monopoly a consortium of companies (Pechiney and Ugine in France; Inco, Amax, and Denison Mines in Canada; and Hanna in the United States) established COFIMPAC in Paris in March 1969. COFIMPAC was not expected to be fully operational until 1974 and in the interval two things happened that threatened to destroy the Japan-New Caledonia minerals trade. The first involved SLN overtures to Japanese interests for a favorable U.S. \$200 million loan to help finance a huge new project at Poum in northern New Caledonia. In May 1970 Nippon Yakin Kogyo KK offered SLN the loan in return for a long-term contract to supply ferro-nickel ore (June 1970, p. 121). The second involved a decision by the Department of Scientific and

Industrial Development in Paris on 25 March 1970 (made public in Noumea on 20 May) to impose snap quotas on the export of nickel ore to Japan. The official justification for the quotas was Paris' desire to promote the sale of processed nickel over nickel ore, but the miners' union and independent producers in New Caledonia claimed that they were being subjected to "strangulation" (Dec. 1970, p. 101) in order to benefit CO-FIMPAC.¹⁴ The Japanese, who were then purchasing 90 percent of their nickel ore from New Caledonia and who had emerged as the territory's major trade customer in 1970 with 51 percent of New Caledonia's exports (Oct. 1970, p. 110), reacted sharply. The loan to SLN was delayed and there were fears that the Japanese would begin to look elsewhere for supplies of nickel ore. These were matters of no small moment. Nickel exports of all kinds constituted 99 percent of the territory's total exports. The former were valued at A\$72 million in 1970 (up from A\$52 million the year before) and A\$30 million of this sum consisted of nickel ore exports, almost exclusively to Japan (Oct. 1970, p. 43). Japanese nickel ore demands exceeded by almost three-quarters of a million tons the 3.8-million-ton quota set by Paris, and the director of mines in New Caledonia announced that consideration would be given to raising the quota to 4.5 million tons if Japan undertook to assist financially in the development of a nickel processing factory in New Caledonia. However, the Japan-New Caledonia trade relationship remained tense. In October 1972 the Japanese broke off price talks and the nickel ore crisis did not ease until late December when the exporters met with Japanese buyers in Sydney and accepted a lower price than they had been demanding (Feb. 1973, p. 113). There was a subsequent meeting in Sydney in 1974 at which an eleven-man delegation from Noumea met with representatives of the Gokokai Association of five Japanese smelting companies and agreed to maintain the status quo on ore prices. However, by this time the energy crisis had begun to effect Japanese industry and the Japanese decided late in 1974 to cut back their imports of New Caledonian nickel by a third, a move that heralded a long-term decline in nickel sales to Japan. Increasingly, the Japanese turned to cheaper and closer sources of supply in the Philippines and Indonesia. The trade figures reflect that decline. In 1970 New Caledonia exported 4,141,000 tonnes of nickel ore to Japan. By 1978 that figure had fallen to 1,540,000 tonnes (Sept. 1974, p. 91; Dec. 1974, p. 86; and Sept. 1979, p. 69).¹⁵

Despite interference from Paris, competition between nickel ore producers in New Caledonia, and the general uncertainty of world markets in the 1970s, Japan achieved and maintained a commanding position in the New Caledonian economy. While Japanese exports accounted for less

than 4 percent of the territory's imports, shipments of New Caledonian nickel ore to Japan produced upward of half the territory's export revenue during the 1970s (Oct. 1970, p. 110).¹⁶

Papua New Guinea

Timber, copper ore, and fish were the principal items of interest to the Japanese in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the 1960s and 1970s. Timber operations were largely confined to three areas: the Cape Hoskins area of north New Britain, Vanimo on the north coast of PNG twenty-five miles east of the border with West Irian, and McFarlane Harbour one hundred miles southeast of Port Moresby. There were only two saw mills in the territory in 1951 producing about eighteen million super feet of lumber per year. By 1964 there were more than seventy mills producing over eighty million super feet. Much of this growth and the continued development of the timber industry in PNG was directly attributable to Japanese demand. In the early 1960s the Japanese, accustomed to importing 60 percent of their timber from the Philippines and 35 percent from North Borneo, began to look for new sources of timber. They turned to PNG and in a little over a year (January 1963-March 1964) the proportion of New Guinea's timber exports to Japan rose from 5 to 70 percent.¹⁷ "Nowhere in the South Pacific," *PIM* noted, "has Japan's recent interest in islands' timber had such a startling effect as in New Guinea." After years of virtual hand-to-mouth operations in which many mills hardly earned a crust [the PNG timber industry] . . . is looking forward to a boom--thanks to guaranteed markets in Japan" (Mar. 1964, p. 120).

One of the biggest exporters of timber to Japan in the 1960s was Thompson and Wright of Cape Hoskins. They sold through contract with the New Guinea Lumber Development Company (NGLDC) of Rabaul, which was responsible for handling roughly 90 percent of New Guinea's lumber exports to Japan. NGLDC was an Australian-Japanese joint-venture firm and a subsidiary of the Southern Trade and Industry Company of Tokyo, which in turn was a subsidiary of the big Japanese Nitto Line (Mar. 1964, p. 120).

Nitto Line was responsible for shipping all of the timber from Cape Hoskins and filled a ship every four to six weeks for direct service to Japan. In December 1963 Nitto launched a specially designed freighter, the fifty-five-hundred-ton *Austral Maru*, as the first of four vessels designed to handle the anticipated timber traffic (Mar. 1964, p. 121 and May 1964, p. 99).¹⁸

There was a restructuring of the companies responsible for the Cape Hoskins timber operation early in 1965. NGLDC acquired a 55 percent interest in Thompson and Wright while Southern Trade and Industry Company became a subsidiary of the Japan Line, formed a year earlier through the consolidation of the Nitto Line and the Daida Line. NGLDC planned to export three million super feet of logs a month from Cape Hoskins, all to Japan, in three Japan Line ships calling at Hoskins at the rate of two to three per month (Apr. 1965, p. 134).¹⁹ In addition NGLDC hoped to foster PNG production in cocoa, coffee, maize, and cultured pearls as well as acting as agents for the Kanbara Ship Building Company in Rabaul (Aug. 1966, p. 142).

The Rabaul shipbuilding scheme raised an awkward issue that had application well beyond PNG, namely residence requirements for Japanese technicians. Kanbara was anxious to obtain two-year visas for some fifteen to twenty technicians required to establish the shipyard and train Papua New Guinean apprentices. It was not until early 1967 that permission was granted for the technicians to stay longer than the customary six months (July 1966, p. 19). They were the first to be admitted to the territory under a new two-year policy (Feb. 1967, p. 105).²⁰

The Vanimo timber lease did not commence operations until September 1967 when New Guinea Goldfields shipped 3,553 super feet of hardwood to Japan aboard the *Tenrin Maru* (Oct. 1967, p. 105). Early the following year government agricultural officers began negotiations with the native owners to acquire 600,000 acres of indigenously-owned land in the Vanimo area for what promised to be the largest timber project in PNG (Feb. 1968, p. 125). Two years later the Melbourne-based Savoy Corporation and the Oji Paper Company of Japan commenced a government sponsored survey of the area thought to contain some 4,500 million square feet of timber (Feb. 1970, p. 121).

Meanwhile another timber and harbor project was taking shape at McFarlane Harbour aimed at the Australian and Japanese markets for hard and softwood logs and sawn timber and for the Japanese market in wood chips (Nov. 1968, p. 121). However, the initial shipments in 1969 came at a time when Japan was overstocked with timber and the market for PNG timber had become sluggish. Producers at McFarlane and elsewhere were offered prices often lower by 20 percent than those paid the year before by Japan, the only market for logs from PNG (Nov. 1968, p. 121). The situation was not destined to improve and by 1975 there had been a collapse in the Japanese log buying market, which affected the PNG market severely (Jan. 1975, p. 80).

PNG copper ore sales were also subject to boom and bust fluctuations. In the mid-1960s Conzinc Riotino of Australia (CRA) announced that it had encountered substantial reserves of copper at the southern end of the Crown Prince Range on Bougainville Island, eastern PNG. Three years later *PIM* announced that Bougainville was on “the threshold of huge copper operations which could make [it] . . . the site of one of the world’s biggest copper mines” (July 1968, p. 81). It further reported that seven big Japanese smelting companies had formed a consortium to begin negotiating with CRA.

Panguna, as the vast open-pit copper mine came to be called, could only be developed with enormous amounts of risk capital. In the end CRA and its companion companies were to spend upward of A\$400 million carving the mine out of the rugged jungle-clad wilderness. A good deal of the risk capital came from Japan. Early in 1969 the Bank of Tokyo joined the Bank of New South Wales (Australia) and the Bank of America to form Partnership Pacific to help raise finances for the project (Mar. 1969, p. 120). Later the same year the operating company, Bougainville Copper, signed a contract with nine Japanese companies to supply 1.1 million tons of copper ore, worth an estimated A\$1.78 billion over a fifteen-year period. One of the features of the agreement was the provision by the Japanese of U.S.\$60 million in finance for Panguna, half in cash and half in equipment such as generators, crushers, ball mills, and flotation cells (Dec. 1969, p. 115). However, by the mid-1970s the combined impact of the termination of the copper-greedy Vietnam War and the energy crisis led to a sharp downturn in Japanese demand for copper ore (Mar. 1976, p. 65), Japanese smelters reducing their demand by 15 percent in early 1976. Despite the reduction in copper sales, Japan remained the biggest buyer of PNG products throughout the late 1970s, and much of the export revenue continued to come from copper.

Japanese fisheries operations in PNG waters were principally joint-venture ones involving Australian partners. In 1967 several Queensland businessmen joined the Nihon Kinkai Hogeï Company of Japan, one of the world’s largest fishing groups, to form the South Sea Fishing Company (SSF). SSF planned to use four converted Queensland prawning boats and a 146-foot Japanese mother ship to fish for barramundi, tuna, reef fish, and prawns in PNG waters (Apr. 1967, p. 101 and July 1967, p. 107). Four years later Nichimen Company (Australia-New Zealand) and Kaigai Gyogyo Kabushiki Kaisha began conducting a skipjack tuna survey from Rabaul while C. Itoh (Australia), based on Manus, undertook a similar study of skipjack stocks (Jan. 1971, p. 90).²¹

In 1972 the W. R. Carpenter group of companies in Australia joined Kaigai Gyogyo K.K. to form Carpenter Kaigai (PNG). The PNG government received 20 percent of the shares while the balance was divided 55 percent to Kaigai Gyogyo and 25 percent to W. R. Carpenter. Carpenter Kaigai planned to operate fifteen catcher-boats and three mother ships out of Rabaul on a five year trial. The company undertook to train five hundred Papua New Guineans as seamen, fishermen, and fish processors, to construct a A\$500,000 cold store and a A\$250,000 tuna smoking plant, and to process 50 percent of its anticipated eighteen-thousand-ton annual tuna catch in PNG.

Clouding the fisheries scene was the general uncertainty occasioned by Papua New Guinea's decision to extend its limit for offshore fishing to twelve miles in 1967 (Apr. 1967, p. 101) and then to two hundred miles in 1978 (July 1978, p. 63). In July 1978 *PIM* reported that three Japanese fishing syndicates had paid A\$1.21 million for the rights to fish within the two-hundred-mile limit. This arrangement, however, was only for an eight month period and in January 1979 fishing rights talks between PNG and Japan collapsed. The Japanese refused to pay the A\$1.9 million demanded by the PNG government for eleven months of unlimited access to PNG waters.

The Japanese repeated their success in Fiji by dominating the motor vehicle industry in PNG. The anti-Japanese sentiment was still so strong in PNG in 1959 that the government liaison officer working with a Japanese marine salvage team in Rabaul was obliged to hide his Japanese vehicle when he went on rounds. However, the situation had altered dramatically by 1970 and *PIM* reported that Australia was "being whipped . . . in her [own] backyard . . . by Japanese vehicle makers" (Mar. 1970, p. 121). The Japanese captured only 39 percent of the PNG car and station wagon market in 1967, but by 1975 over 90 percent of the vehicles, including motorcycles, sold in PNG were Japanese.

"If you can't lick 'em . . . join 'em" was how one store owner in Madang summed up the Japanese presence in 1966 (Aug. 1966, p. 141). His comment captured the Australians' pragmatic acceptance of Japan as a valuable, indeed increasingly invaluable, trade partner, willing to abide by the rules, enter into joint-venture arrangements, pour in vast amounts of risk capital, provide technical assistance, and negotiate for long-term guaranteed purchases of key PNG commodities.

By the time PNG achieved independence in September 1975 the nation was heavily dependent upon trade with Japan. However, it was a trade relationship characterized by a highly favorable balance of payments for PNG. The governments of independent PNG have maintained

the broad outlines of the pre-independence relationship while stressing the need for accelerated training of indigenes, greater government participation and sharing in Japanese ventures, a higher degree of PNG self-reliance, and the diversification of the economy.²² While the Japanese have been extremely important partners in PNG development, it is important to bear in mind--as always in the Pacific islands--the matter of scale. For all that Japan is the biggest buyer of products from PNG, those products represent only .02 percent of Japan's total imports (Feb. 1978, p. 19).

New Hebrides (Vanuatu)

Japanese economic activity in the New Hebrides was on a modest scale compared with the rest of Melanesia. In 1955 a consortium of companies (Deichi Busan Kaisha and Nanyo Boeki Kaisha of Japan, the Washington Fish and Oyster Corporation of America, and D. J. Gubbay and Company of the New Hebrides) established the South Pacific Fishing Company at Palekula on Santo. A freezer, ice works, a wharf, and support facilities were constructed, and the processing of fish commenced in 1958. The operation employed thirty-four Japanese ashore, assisted by thirty-five New Hebrideans and five local Europeans (Feb. 1963, p. 11).

In the early 1960s Japan was one of the principal customers for manganese ore from the Forari mine operated by the Cie. Française des Phosphates de l'Océanie on the eastern coast of Efate.²³ Phosphates expected to ship forty thousand tons to Japan in 1963, but an exchange crisis in that country in December reduced the order to twenty-four thousand tons. As a result of this cutback the mine was obliged to lay off seventy of its two hundred employees and finally, in 1969, when the Japanese offered uneconomically low prices for manganese, to cease operations altogether (Feb. 1963, p. 43 and Apr. 1969, p. 120). Later the same year Southland Mining of Fiji purchased the Forari mine and immediately entered into contract arrangements with Japan (Oct. 1969, p. 121).

The only other notable area of Japanese investment was in the New Hebridean tourist industry. In the early 1970s the large Japanese retail and tourist chain, Tokyu, purchased the Vate and Le Lagon d'Erakor hotels in Port Vila. They did so in anticipation of the establishment of scheduled air service between Tokyo and Noumea, a service that would promote Japanese tourism in the New Hebrides (Feb. 1974, p. 00). UTA established such a service in the late 1970s and Noumea and Vila became favorite spots for Japanese couples to hold their weddings and spend their honeymoons (Sept. 1979, p. 69).

Solomon Islands

During the 1960s the Japanese invested in timber operations in the Solomons, and during the 1970s they developed fishing and mining concerns in the island group. At the beginning of the period copra was king. Ninety percent of the exports of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP), as it was then known, consisted of dried coconut meat. The British colonial authorities, and later the self-governing (1976) and independent (1978) Solomon Islands governments, placed a high priority on diversifying the archipelago's economy--encouraging the production of cocoa, rice, and palm oil--and developing a largely self-sufficient agricultural base.²⁴ The reasons for this policy are evident when one examines the nature of the world copra market and the demographic trends in the Solomons during the period. Copra is subject to major, not to say wild, variations in world market price. In May 1974, for example, grade A copra fetched A\$520 a ton while a year later the price averaged A\$170 a ton (Mar. 1976, p. 63). In terms of demography, the Solomons experienced a dramatic growth in population in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. Population rates exceeded 3.0 percent per annum and by the late 1970s roughly 50 percent of the population was under twenty years of age. Such population growth meant not only greater demands on the economy in terms of health, education, and welfare facilities but a larger number of nonproductive nationals and an increased number of urban dwellers largely divorced from the traditional subsistence economy.²⁵

The British Solomons Forestry Company was established in November 1962, following an agreement between the BSIP government and Nanpo Ringyo Kaisha of Tokyo. The new company acquired timber-cutting rights over Baga Island in the Western Solomons for a period of five years and within six months was negotiating to market timber in Australia and to ship logs to Japan (Mar. 1963, p. 8 and July 1963, p. 126).²⁶

"The British Solomon Islands Protectorate," *PIM* reported in January 1964, "is sharing in the growing South Pacific timber boom" (Jan. 1964, p. 121). The BSIP financial secretary, L. M. Davies, was even more hyperbolic when he described the increased interest in timber as "the most important thing which has happened to the Solomons since coconuts were first planted here" (Jan. 1964, p. 121).

The timber boom was marked by the establishment of several new timber companies in addition to the large and well-established Lever's Pacific Timbers, which had made its first shipment of logs--one million super feet--to Japan in May 1964 (June 1964, p. 114).²⁷ The Allardyce Lumber Company, a subsidiary of the Colonial Timber Corporation, started

logging operations at Allardyce Harbour on the island of Santa Ysabel in late 1964 while the Kalena Timber Company worked out an arrangement with the BSIP government to begin working sixty-eight thousand acres in the Viru Harbour-Kalena Bay area of New Georgia at the end of the same year.²⁸ Kalena began exporting timber--much of it to Japan--from New Georgia in April 1967 and early in 1968 began construction of a new sawmill at Viru Harbour capable of producing twenty-thousand super feet of sawn timber a day (May 1968, p. 120).

Another timber company established in the Western Solomons was the joint-venture, British-Japanese firm, Shortlands Development Company. Shortlands commenced operations in 1966 and, late in 1969, shipped as much as one million super feet of timber to Japan in a single month. Much of the wood shipped to Japan was hardwood for furniture making (Dec. 1969, p. 56).

The export of logs from the BSIP increased during 1968, up from 2.8 million cubic feet in 1967 to 4.4 million cubic feet. However, despite this strong market performance the industry encountered serious difficulties with its principal customer, Japan, which was offering uneconomically low prices for certain types of timber (June 1969, p. 118). The years 1970-1971 were fairly strong in terms of timber sales, but a fall in prices in Japan (which caused Shortlands Development to cease operations), coupled with Cyclone Ida, which delayed Allardyce Lumber Company's expansion plans, led to a 5.5 percent drop in timber exports in 1972 (Mar. 1973, p. 103). This was the first decline in ten years and recovery was slow as Japanese imports of tropical timber dropped off in 1974 and 1975 (Mar. 1976, p. 63).

By the end of the 1970s the timber industry had recovered from its mid-decade slump. With a share of 23 percent of total Solomon Islands' exports, timber was the nation's third most valuable export product after copra and fish (May 1979, p. 74). Lever's Pacific Timbers continued to dominate the logging scene, providing 200,000 cubic meters of timber to the national annual total of 260,000 cubic meters.²⁹ About 90 percent of all the timber cut was exported as logs, largely to Japan.³⁰

The BSIP Geological Survey Department undertook mineral surveys of the islands of Malaita, Ysabel, Bellona, and St. George in the early 1960s, but it was not until 1969 that two foreign mining companies, one of them Japanese, took a serious interest in prospecting (Mar. 1963, p. 8 and July 1969, p. 122).³¹ The Mitsui Mining and Smelting Company received a licence to prospect over ninety thousand acres of land in western Bennell for bauxite and limestone while the Utah Development Com-

pany, an Australian subsidiary of an American firm, received a license to prospect for copper on Guadalcanal (July 1969, p. 122).³²

The BSIP government signed a preliminary agreement with Mitsui early in 1971 to exploit the bauxite reserves on Rennell, which were estimated to amount to thirty million tons. Trial mining was considered essential to establish the cost of the overall operation, and it was anticipated that the bauxite would not only be dried but transformed into alumina before being shipped from Rennell to Japan.³³ The BSIP government was to receive shares in the projected company, Mitsui Smelting and Development (BSIP), as well as a 5 percent royalty on the f.o.b. price of the bauxite. The life expectancy of the mine was calculated to be ten to twelve years, and the operation was expected to provide work for about 170 nationals under the supervision of a small number of Japanese executives and engineers (July 1971, p. 51).

But Mitsui never realized its ambitions on Rennell. After years of see-saw debate the BSIP government decided that the social, economic, and political costs of the bauxite mining operation were simply too great to justify proceeding. The Mitsui scheme threatened to undermine if not destroy Rennellese society, and the government, impressed by the grave problems associated with the Panguna copper mine on neighboring Bougainville and by the painful (and costly) experience of the Banabans on phosphate-rich Ocean Island, determined to shelve the Japanese plan.

If mining ventures were not successful fishing certainly was. At the same time that a trade delegation from the Solomons was negotiating with Mitsui in Tokyo in 1971, it was also reaching an agreement with the Taiyo Fishery Cannery, one of the world's biggest fishing firms, to undertake an eighteen month survey of the protectorate's fisheries resources (June 1971, p. 18). In November 1972 the BSIP government accepted proposals from Taiyo to establish a fisheries base, freezer plant, cold storage facility, cannery, and arabushi (smoke-dried fish) installation at Tulagi, the old capital of the protectorate.³⁴ The government received a 25 percent interest in the cannery and the option to buy up to 24 percent more in shares. The Solomon Taiyo (as it came to be called) operation was scheduled to employ a staff of 150 producing between 100,000 and 150,000 cases (containing 48 x ½ pound cans of fish) a year. That amount represented about one-third of the maximum allowable annual catch of thirty thousand tons of skipjack. Almost all of the remainder was to be frozen for shipment to Japan or to the Star Kist and Van Camp canneries in American Samoa. What little was left was to be prepared as arabushi.

Solomon Taiyo began fishing operations in May 1973 and in the first six months caught five thousand tonnes of fish worth about A\$1.5 million,

a figure that placed fish exports third behind timber (A\$3.894 million) and copra (A\$3 million) for the year (Aug. 1974, p. 15). In 1974 Solomon Taiyo caught three thousand tonnes of tuna above projected landings of eight thousand tonnes and exported eighty-four hundred tonnes against the forecast of seven thousand tons (Mar. 1976, p. 63). But in 1975 the catch and the price per tonne were down and only began to recover toward the end of the year at which time Solomon Taiyo, in a new joint venture with the government, opened a second fisheries base similar to the one at Tulagi at Noru, Hathorn Sound, New Georgia (May 1978, p. 55).

Not only was the government interested in promoting Taiyo's expansion, but it was also anxious to advance national self-reliance by establishing its own fishing company, which could learn from and supply Solomon Taiyo. With a A\$3.25 million loan from the Asian Development Bank, a National Fisheries Development Company (NFD) was established in 1978 with a 75-25 percent ownership split between the government and Taiyo (July 1978, p. 17). In August of the same year NFD began to construct ten ferro-cement skipjack tuna catcher-boats at Sasapi near Tulagi. These vessels, with Japanese skippers and all Solomon islander crews, were either to act independently, selling their catches to Solomon Taiyo, or were to sail under charter to that firm (Apr. 1980, p. 61).³⁵

Japanese economic activity helped fuel a strong and continued growth in the Solomons' economy, particularly in the 1970s. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the group grew in real terms at an annual rate of more than 7 percent between 1973 and 1977 and at a satisfactory rate of 3.9 percent allowing for rapid population growth. Fish, timber, and copra--all commodities with which the Japanese were directly or indirectly concerned--contributed 92 percent of the GDP in the mid-1970s (Aug. 1974, p. 15). Development in the fishing sector was "truly spectacular" (May 1979, p. 73) and the Solomon Taiyo operations not only provided employment for roughly one thousand Solomon islanders but promoted food self-sufficiency through the elimination of virtually all fish imports.

Conclusion

In the two decades since the late 1950s, *PIM* noted in 1977, "a huge change has been wrought in the relationship between PNG and Japan" (Nov. 1977, p. 17). *PIM* might well have added that an equally momentous change had affected the rest of Melanesia.

This change was highlighted by three quotations drawn from *PIM* over the years. The magazine featured an editorial in 1963 in which it was ar-

gued that “the Japanese should never be allowed to develop a trading monopoly in the South Pacific” but that such a thing was certain to happen “if European interests continue to do nothing more constructive than complain” (Feb. 1963, p. 13). Two years later *PIM* noted that “the South Pacific is finally getting around to admitting to itself that it can’t do without the Japanese” (June 1965, p. 21). And by 1979 an expatriate cattleman on Santo in the New Hebrides summed it all up when he observed, “The Japanese have well and truly arrived in the New Hebrides, and they’re welcome because they’re seen as developing the place” (Sept. 1979, p. 69).³⁶

In 1960 the island economies of Melanesia were dominated by the traditional colonial powers, Britain, France, and Australia. The Japanese share of the island markets was minimal. Anti-Japanese feeling was still strong and long-established trade arrangements militated against the growth of Japanese economic interests in the area. However, the Japanese were persistent and in a pragmatic, sophisticated, and unobtrusive way they began to penetrate the Melanesian economies. The resource-poor Japanese economy complemented the undeveloped but resource-rich Melanesian economies, while at the same time Japanese industry met the growing demand for consumer goods in Melanesia. Furthermore, where others were unwilling or unable, the Japanese made risk capital available on highly competitive terms and buttressed their joint-venture schemes and investments with offers of expertise and training.

Central to the growth of Japanese economic activity in Melanesia was the question of scale. Relatively modest investment in the tiny economies of Melanesia was sufficient to place Japan in a commanding position. Thus by the late 1970s, 90 percent of the timber exported from the Solomons was destined for Japan; 75 percent of the capital employed in timber projects in PNG was Japanese; upward of one-half of all the export revenues of New Caledonia related to Japanese purchases; Japan was second only to Australia as a supplier of goods to PNG; more than 90 percent of the motor vehicles sold in Fiji were Japanese; Japanese-dominated fisheries were the second or third source of revenue in the Fijian export economy; and roughly 90 percent of the GDP of the Solomons came from sales of fish, timber, and copra, mainly to Japan. While these statistics are impressive in the Melanesian context, it was not uncommon for the entire timber or fish exports of an individual island group to constitute only a fraction of 1 percent of Japan’s imports in a particular sector.

It has been, *PIM* observed “a story of almost unbelievable growth” (Nov. 1977, p. 17). Generally speaking, the Melanesian microstates have profited from their economic relationship with the Japanese, finding

them tough but valuable partners in development. What the Melanesians must constantly guard against is the shark becoming too big. The statistics enumerated above suggest that that situation, if it has not already arrived, is dangerously near.

James A. Boutilier
Royal Roads Military College
British Columbia

NOTES

1. Nor have I examined Japanese economic activity elsewhere in the Pacific islands. The Japanese occupied one-time German Micronesia in 1914 and administered the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls as a Class C Mandate from 1919 until the mid-1940s. They began to forge new economic links with the area in the 1970s (*Pacific Islands Monthly*, June 1973, pp. 94-94 and Sept. 1979, pp. 61 and 65)

The Japanese have also been active in the Samoas (particularly in American Samoa with fisheries operations that supply the Star Kist and Van Camp canneries), Tonga, the Cook Islands, and Tahiti.

There are some links between Japanese economic activity in Melanesia and Japanese operations elsewhere in the Pacific. For example, as I mention in this paper, fish caught and frozen in Fiji and the Solomons were frequently shipped to American Samoa for canning.

2. A labor member in the Australian Parliament voiced a general concern about Japanese economic activity in 1965 when he asked the minister for territories (responsible for Papua New Guinea) whether the latter had forgotten "that the Australians had spent their blood to turn the Japanese out of New Guinea during the last war" (June 1965, p. 21).

3. When the firms of D. J. Gubbay (New Hebrides) and Mitsubishi (Japan) purchased the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Trading Corporation in 1962 they encountered difficulty because the British preferential tariff favored the traditional Hong Kong market (Feb. 1963, p. 11).

4. Japan did, in fact, extend financial aid to Papua New Guinea prior to that nation's independence.

5. The Japan Fisheries Association greeted the news with a full page advertisement in *PIM* entitled "An Invisible Line on the Sea is Not a Wall" (Jan. 1980, p. 60).

6. There were some predictable spin-offs from the Pafco operation. Shell Oil Company installed a sixty-five-thousand-pound bunkering system at Levuka to cater mainly to the Japanese fishing fleet (Aug. 1964, p. 95) while repair facilities and shipway space--for ships up to one thousand tons --took on business worth several hundred thousand dollars a year (June 1976, p. 36).

7. In 1972 the canning factory produced twenty-seven hundred cartons of tuna and eighteen tons of fish meal (June 1976, p. 36).

8. During the mid-1970s catches averaged seven to eight thousand tons per annum.

9. The cannery was scheduled to process twelve thousand tons of fish a year by 1980, yielding 650,000 cases of prime-quality brine pack, up to five million half-pound cans of tuna flakes, and, as a sideline, about seven hundred tons of meal a year suitable for poultry and pig feed (June 1976, p. 44).

10. Under a companion agreement the Fiji government acquired a 20 percent interest in Fiji Can Co., formed with Toyo Seikan Kaisha (TSK). A factory was built next to the cannery to produce upward of one million cans a year. TSK supplied the equipment, technicians, raw materials, and capital.

11. JAL inaugurated its service from Tokyo to Nadi (Fiji) in 1981.

12. The Japanese were also involved--during the period under review--in purchasing Fijian copra (Aug. 1964, p. 121), bananas (May 1963, p. 133; the two trial shipments to Japan were not well-received and exports were discontinued: May 1974, p. 76), ginger (Dec. 1968, p. 128), and timber (July 1972, p. 108) as well as experimenting with the production of cultured pearls. The last-mentioned operation was undertaken by Pacific Holdings, an associate company of the Japanese Banno consortium (July 1966, p. 140 and Jan. 1965, p. 132).

13. There was some talk in 1973 about basing twenty catcher-boats, producing about one thousand tons of tuna a month for sale to Japan and the United States, on Noumea, but the Japanese did not proceed with that proposal (Sept. 1973, p. 83).

14. Edouard Pentecost, producer of approximately 23 percent of the nickel ore, protested strongly when Paris imposed an 853,000-ton quota on his operations after he had received contracts to export almost twice that amount. As a consequence of the quota he was obliged to ship \$600,000 worth of prospecting equipment back to Japan (Nov. 1971, p. 108).

15. A further measure of the slump was the fact that New Caledonia's Seventh Development Plan (1976-1980) envisaged nickel metal exports running at 120,000 tons per year in 1980 as compared with the unachieved figure of 200,000 tons for 1976.

16. After mining, the second largest industry for New Caledonia is tourism. Much of the growth in that industry was predicated on the assumption that there would be a high inflow of Japanese tourists by 1980 (Sept. 1974, p. 91).

17. While the increase in timber exports appeared, and was, dramatic by PNG standards, PNG's share of the Japan market rose to only 1 percent (Mar. 1964, p. 120).

18. In mid-1964 PNG was exporting about two million super feet of timber a month to Japan worth approximately £500,000 per annum (May 1964, p. 99).

19. The company structures were even more complex than suggested. The marketing of Hoskins timber in Japan came to be handled by the South Pacific Development (SPD) Co. of Tokyo. The managing director of SPD Tokyo was Mr. Ogawa, a director of Southern Trade and Industry Co. Another major shareholder in SPD Tokyo was the fisheries firm of C. Itoh Co., of which the Pacific Fishing and Canning Co. (Pafco) of Levuka, Fiji, was a subsidiary (Aug. 1966, p. 142). The Japanese consolidated their position within the PNG timber industry still further in December 1972 when New Guinea Sohbu Adachi Co. purchased Placer Development's 65 percent share of Commonwealth New Guinea Timbers with operations at Bululu in the Morobe District and Open Bay in Sew Britain. The deal also involved Sohbu's acquisition of Territory Fisheries, previously held by a Placer holding company, Territory Development (Jan. 1973, p. 11 and May 1973, p. 93).

20. On 1 July 1973 Kanbara Ship Building Co. inaugurated a series of monthly cruises from Japan direct to Papua New Guinea. Approximately, 250 passengers were carried on each sailing of the ten-thousand-ton liner *Tropical Rainbow* (May 1973, p. 85).

21. Another Japanese fisheries company, Collin Kyokuyl Fishing Co., was operating out of Kavieng in New Ireland at this time and undertook a year long study (March 1970-March 1971) of skipjack stocks (Jan. 1971, p. 90 and Sept. 1972. p. 106).

22. The Japanese have provided markets for a wide range of PNG products including cocoa beans (Fuji Oil Co. of Osaka: Jan. 1967, p. 143), crocodile skins (Horiushi Trading Co. of Japan: Sept. 1968, p. 118), trochus shell (Aug. 1966, p. 141), and pearls (Pearls at Fairfax Harbour, PNG: Sept. 1968, p. 115) while providing assistance with natural gas surveys (twelve-man Japanese study team: Nov. 1969, p. 125), the establishment of a brewery (Asahi Breweries of Japan: Dec. 1969, p. 117), exploration for minerals (Nippon Mining Co.: Aug. 1972, p. 116), reforestation studies (at Madang: Feb. 1978, p. 20), and the planning of a hydro-electric scheme (at Purari: June 1974, p. 97).

23. Trade with Japan in the first nine months of 1962 showed imports valued at Stg. £102,700 and exports (fish and manganese) valued at Stg. £177,470 (Feb. 1963, p. 11).

24. The BSIP exported seven bags of cocoa in 1960 and twenty-one tons in 1962. Cocoa production slumped badly in the late 1960s as a result of a downturn in the world market and heavy storm damage to crops on the island of Malaita (Apr. 1963, p. 69 and Feb. 1967, p. 141).

The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) leased 115 acres of land near Ilu, to the east of Honiara, in early 1964 to use for wet and dry rice experiments and the planting of oil palms (Feb. 1964, p. 123). By November of the same year CDC had harvested about four acres of wet rice and in 1968 Guadalcanal Plains (the Solomons firm that had taken over from CDC) imported a *rice* mill, capable of processing ten tons of polished rice a day, from the Japanese firm of Sataka (June 1968, p. 33). Coincidentally (Oct. 1968) it began exporting rice and sorghum for the first time, shipping three hundred tons of the latter to Mitsui and Company in Japan (Jan. 1969, p. 123).

Like Cocoa, the rice crop was also subject to the vagaries of the weather and the Ilu operation was devastated in December 1971 and January 1972 by two cyclones that caused heavy wind damage and flooding (Jan. 1973, p. 51).

Palm oil production did not get fully underway until 1975. By 1978 Solomon Islands Plantations Limited (SIPL), a company jointly owned by the British Commonwealth Development Corporation and the Solomon Islands government, had 3,335 hectares under cultivation on the Guadalcanal plains, and palm oil and kernel sales were earning the Solomons over A\$5 million in foreign exchange annually (May 1979, p. 74).

25. A census conducted in Honiara in 1965 revealed that the population of the capital had nearly doubled since 1959, up almost 3,000 in six years to 6,431 (Jan. 1966, p. 27).

26. A number of the timbers being worked by the Solomons Forestry Company were also suitable for paper pulp production (May 1964, p. 121).

27. Lever's, an associate of the United Africa Co. (Timber) and Unilever, began extracting hardwood logs from Gizo Island in the Western Solomons in 1964 at a rate of about 500,000 cubic feet a year. It laid plans in 1967 to inaugurate a A\$1 million timber project on the island of Kolombangara nearby in anticipation of exporting upward of three million cubic feet of timber per annum (Aug. 1967, p. 125).

28. Not all the timber industry news was good, and in August 1964 the Kauri Timber Co., after upward of half a century of activity on Vanikoro in the Eastern Solomons, ceased operations. Appropriately enough, the company's last shipment of logs was to Japan on the *Fiji Maru* (Sept. 1964, p. 125).
29. By 1979 Lever's had moved to within two-and-a-half years of exhausting the timber stands on Kolombangara and was attempting--in the face of increasing opposition--to negotiate new timber rights with customary land owners in New Georgia (May 1979, p. 74).
30. Even at full production the Solomon Islands remain a small timber producer in regional terms, on account of both the quality and quantity of timber. The forests do not contain the dipterocarp, the main species logged elsewhere in the region, and at forty to fifty cubic meters of timber per hectare its yields are only half those per hectare of the Philippines.
31. There was a brief flurry of interest in bauxite deposits on Kolombangara in 1966 and in nickel deposits on St. George in 1967, but nothing seems to have come of it (Aug. 1966, p. 147 and May 1967, p. 131).
32. The Conzinc Riotinto Co. was prospecting for bauxite on the island of Ugi at the same time, but the reserves were too small to be worth exploiting (Oct 1969, p. 34).
33. The second stage of processing the alumina into aluminum required vast amounts of cheap electrical power not available on the island.
34. There are some rather interesting parallels between the Pafco operation in Levuka and the Taiyo one in Tulagi. Both fisheries schemes revived backwater townships and encouraged fresh ventures in shipbuilding and ship repair (Aug. 1969, p. 109 and Apr. 1980, p. 61).
35. In September 1978 the Solomon Islands government reached agreement with Japanese fishing companies for fishing rights within the newly-independent nation's two-hundred-mile fishing zone (Oct. 1978, p. 12). The Japanese were allowed to take up to six thousand tonnes of skipjack tuna during a one year period for a license fee of A\$350,000 (Nov. 1978, p. 16).
36. Elsewhere in the Pacific an observer summed up the oceanic experience succinctly: "Without Japan the Cook Islands would be in one hell of a mess financially" (Sept. 1979, p. 72).

SCHOOLS IN MICRONESIA PRIOR TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION

by Francis X. Hezel, S.J.

Introduction

If there is any ubiquitous Western cultural legacy to be found in colonial countries around the world, it is the school. Micronesia is no exception: schools were introduced into its islands over three centuries ago with the advent of the first Europeans. The earliest of these schools were mission-run, both Catholic and Protestant, although this fact is sometimes overlooked by historians of education. Not until the present century, in actuality only in the past sixty years, did public education develop to any appreciable degree. Whether private or public, the education systems established in island Micronesia served the purposes of their foreign founders and taught alien ways and beliefs. Just as the missionaries used education to impart a new religious code, the colonial governments used it to institute political control by transmitting their language and values to Micronesians.

Yet, for all the colonial stigma that the school bears, it has become a permanent and indispensable part of the island cultures today. The institution has taken as deep root in Micronesian soil as the churches that first carried it there and the Western legal system that sustained it in later years. To be sure, it has been transformed in recent years as Micronesians have assumed virtual self-government and increasing authority over their own policies, but it remains a recognizable legacy of colonial days.

This article is an attempt to chronicle the various shapes and forms that schools in Micronesia took, the purposes that they served, and the transformations they underwent from the earliest years of Spanish colonization through Japanese rule to the eve of the American administration in the Trust Territory. Finally, it will highlight a few common themes related to the curriculum and mechanics of the school, its rationale at different periods in history, and its impact upon students and society.

Early Spanish schools in the Marianas

The first school in Micronesia--for that matter, in all of Oceania--was founded less than a year after the arrival of the first Jesuit missionaries in

with a gift of ten thousand pesos and supported by a yearly subsidy of three thousand pesos from the Spanish crown, opened its doors to Chamorro children. The school, which the Jesuits saw as the “wellspring of their mission,” had humble origins: the missionaries enticed small boys to school with candy and holy cards and taught them little more than simple prayers.¹ The original school building was destroyed in a typhoon two years later, but it was rebuilt in 1674 within the fortified walls of the presidio in Agana and another school, Escuela de la Niñas, was added for girls.²

Although small schools for the very young soon sprang up near the Jesuit residence in every major town on Guam, the backbone of the educational system remained the colegio and, to a lesser degree, the girls school in Agana. In the 1720s the colegio had fifty boarding students and an equal number of day students, most of them full-blooded Chamorros rather than Mestizos. The students, who were mostly between seven and ten years old, wore uniforms of white linen pants and blue vests with a sash around the waist, attended mass and rosary each day, and played a conspicuous part in religious ceremonies in the community. The boys spent two hours a day studying liturgical responses and chants, religious doctrine, and penmanship--much of this in Spanish. For the rest of the day they took care of the farm animals and the gardens and learned a variety of skills such as bookbinding, tailoring, and embroidery. But the heart of the curriculum, at least for those who had the requisite talent, was music; a select choral group spent a good part of the day practising the masses sung on Sundays and holydays, while others played the violin, flute, or harp in accompaniment.³

The Jesuit educational efforts in the Marianas incorporated three different approaches. The Colegio de San Juan de letrán and the Escuela de las Niñas were first-rank institutions that offered boys and girls the opportunity to learn the essentials of their faith and its liturgical celebration in music, while acquiring some useful trade skills. There were also the village parish schools in which young boys and girls were taught a little religion and some Spanish, but with none of the frills that the two schools in Agana offered. Finally, for the instruction of adults there were the large ranches that the Jesuits ran, not only to furnish their own food but to offer villagers the opportunity to learn blacksmithing, agricultural methods, animal husbandry, and other things that might improve their standard of living.⁴

After the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Marianas in 1769, the Augustinian Recoletos who assumed pastoral responsibility for the mission did not show the same interest in the schools that their predecessors had.

The colegio was moved to a new site near the main rectory in Agana where it became yet another administrative chore for a priest who was already the pastor of Agana and the vicar of the Marianas mission. The colegio then began a slow demise through the early nineteenth century as the enrollment dropped to thirty students and the subsidy was cut to one thousand pesos a year.⁵

Meanwhile, the government established its first two free schools to boost the sagging educational program in the colony. The curriculum of these schools was reading, writing, and arithmetic, together with some music instruction.⁶ More free schools were opened as time went on, and by 1833 Governor Villalobos tried to close down the colegio altogether on the grounds that its subsidy could be put to better use as salaries for teachers in the village free schools. Furthermore, the governor argued, students were being spoiled by spending five or six years at a school where they were eating better than they would at home. The students' learning was breeding arrogance, he maintained, for many of its alumni had to be punished for causing trouble in the community. In brief, the governor was in favor of government-financed local schools, the forerunners of our public schools, that could offer education to greater numbers of young people, particularly in outlying areas.⁷

These village free schools were generally ramshackle, one-room buildings constructed of bamboo and roofed with thatch, a great contrast with the spacious stone and masonry halls of the colegio and the girls school. Teachers were usually Spanish-speaking locals recruited wherever they could be found and paid from the special government fund for lepers (evidently the only fund available). A Filipino prisoner who had been convicted of murder and exiled to the Marianas taught Carolinian children for thirteen years in one such school on Saipan.⁸ When Governor Pablo Perez toured these schools on a visit to the northern islands, he found the students attentive and eager to learn, but "like parrots that talk without understanding what they say."⁹ The governor judged that the school, for all its limitations, was truly helping the Carolinians to become civilized—"which means," one commentator wryly noted, "that they were willing to work for Spaniards."¹⁰ By 1886 there were seventeen such schools in the islands.

Meanwhile, from mid-century on, the Colegio de San Juan and its sister school entered upon a period of resurgence. The colegio's original subsidy of three thousand pesos was restored and its enrollment soared to nearly 500, while the Escuela de las Niñas educated about 150 girls. The curricula in both schools had taken a strong academic turn since the previous century: students were still learning sung masses and forming ensembles

of violin and flute, but they were devoting most of their time to the four R's (reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion) and taking such additional courses as Spanish grammar, geography, and "rudiments of good manners."¹¹ The schools survived as the Marianas' most prestigious institutions of learning until the American takeover of Guam at the end of the century. With a lifespan of more than two centuries, the colegio became the longest-lived educational institution ever founded in Micronesia.

Protestant Mission Schools in the Carolines and Marshalls

The Protestant missionaries introduced the first schools into the Caroline and Marshall Islands, just as the Catholic missionaries had in the Marianas. Within a few months of the founding of the American Board missions on Ponape and Kosrae in late 1852, the American pastors opened their first day schools. These schools were in fact informal sessions conducted on the veranda of the missionary's home or in a nearby meeting house whenever a group of islanders could be gathered, and they served as a point of contact between the missionaries and the local people. The students were largely adults, often chiefs and other influential persons in the community, and they were instructed in basic English, geography, singing, or whatever else was thought to hold any interest for them.¹²

After a while, groups of more or less constant pupils were formed, and class was held on a regular and more formal basis. Albert Sturges, one of the missionaries on Ponape, offered daily classes that were attended by two dozen people, including the Nahnken of Kiti. His colleague on Ponape, Luther Gulick, staged a year-end exhibition at which the eleven pupils of his own school, all dressed in clothes that they themselves had made, displayed their skills in reading, writing, spelling, and speaking English as well as in singing English songs.¹³ On Kosrae, Benjamin Snow conducted a school for forty-five pupils, most of them young boys and girls, with four hours of instruction daily on reading and writing English. At first the students showed enormous enthusiasm for their studies, and Snow reported that they would leave the class to practise tracing their letters with sticks on the beach.¹⁴ As time went on, however, their enthusiasm waned and the students turned to other pursuits--often enough for the more mature girls this meant visiting the whalers that were lying at anchor. Much the same was true of all the early mission schools; and when the "ardor for learning subsided," as a pastor on Ebon put it, there was nothing to do but close the school for a while.¹⁵ Hence the typical early mission school was alternately opened and closed several times in the course of its first two or three years. The results of these early schools

were far from encouraging: Gulick judged that none of his students was very successful in learning English, and he soon resorted to giving them "some oral knowledge on religious and other topics."¹⁶ In time, the American missionaries learned what Snow was forced to conclude after shutting down his school yet again for five months in 1855: "We shall never do much in English, I fear."¹⁷

Invariably the mission school changed its form after the first two or three years when the missionary had become conversant in the local language. At this point the school ceased to be merely a vehicle for gaining access to the people and winning some influence over them; it became a tool for helping the islanders to acquire literacy in their own language. Singing, needlework, and other things were taught at times, but the central concern was teaching students how to read and write the vernacular. After all, the Bible, which the missionaries were already beginning to translate into the local languages, could only be read by someone who was literate. Thus the second stage of the Protestant mission school was an attempt to provide the necessary skills so the people could become dedicated readers of the Word of God.¹⁸

At the mission school in Madolenihmw, Mrs. Gulick ran classes in Pohnapean for her nine or ten students for two hours a day, while her husband translated scripture, wrote primers for the use of the pupils, and attended to his other church duties. In the evenings, Gulick turned out copies of his instructional and devotional materials on a small, ancient handpress that had been donated to the mission.¹⁹ On Ebon, the mission headquarters in the Marshalls, the switchover to instructions in the vernacular resulted in the rapid publication of a mound of materials that included a forty-four page primer. By 1861 ten thousand pages had been printed on the mission press, a handful of people could already read, and one of the missionaries admitted to finding "an aptitude for learning which we little thought existed beneath those dark skins, and in those still darker minds."²⁰ When a Hawaiian missionary helper, himself a licensed teacher, took over the running of the school on Ebon in 1861, its enrollment doubled and two more schools were opened on other islands within a year. Pupils at the Ebon school thronged around the mission quarters busily writing on their slates long after formal classes were over, and burst into the print shop at the sign of a pressrun to grab the new broadsheets and read them before the ink was dry on the paper.²¹

Nowhere were these schools more successful than in the Marshalls. The Hawaiian and native Marshallese preachers who soon replaced the American missionaries founded schools on each island to which they carried the gospel--seven in all by 1875. Each of these schools had as its prin-

cial object the development of Marshallese literate in their own language, and the number of readers at each location was counted as carefully as church members. By 1866 there were over three hundred students in four separate classes on Ebon alone, some of whom were able to recite the entire gospel of Mark by memory.²² Within a few years Marshallese themselves were serving as pastors and teachers in most of the islands of the archipelago.

The mission school also became a regular fixture in the Mortlocks and Truk, as Ponapean teachers carried Christianity to these hitherto unevangelized island groups during the 1870s and 1880s. By 1886, when most of the major islands in the Mortlocks and Truk had a pastor in residence, there were thirteen schools and 979 students in the area.²³ With the entire eastern half of Micronesia then introduced to Christianity, the American Board could boast of a network of thirty-seven mission day schools serving 2,500 pupils altogether.²⁴

As the need for native teachers and pastors became more evident, the mission education system entered its third and final stage. Emphasis shifted in this stage from the moral and intellectual enlightenment of the congregation at large to "fitting young men for teaching and preaching the Gospel"--that is, training those few who would exercise leadership in the church.²⁵ The largest of the mission schools, that on Ebon, gradually took on this function in the late 1860s as the need increased for educated Marshallese to serve as missionaries to their own people. The Marshall Islands Training School, as it came to be called, was moved to Kosrae in 1879 because of the greater abundance of land and other resources. The twenty or thirty young men attending the school went through a four-year program very much resembling that of an American high school. The teachers were all American mission personnel, and instruction, at least in these earlier training schools, was largely in English. A similar school was begun on Ponape for promising young men from the eastern Carolines, and another was founded on Truk in 1886 for the central Carolines. Soon the need for similar schools for girls was recognized so that pastors and teachers would have good, educated wives to assist them. Accordingly, girls schools were established on Ponape in 1882, on Kosrae in 1886, and on Truk in 1889. Enrollments averaged about twenty to twenty-five at the girls school and possibly forty to seventy at the training schools.²⁶ The young adults attending the schools, almost all of whom were boarders, dressed in Western clothes and ate with knives and forks, for they were to set the high standards of personal behavior that their compatriots would seek to emulate. They were to be the exemplars of the new religious and secular ideals for the next generation.

Schools during Spanish and German Rule

The Catholic Church finally entered the educational scene in the Carolines when Spanish colonial rule was inaugurated there, in 1886 on Yap and a year later on Ponape. Indeed, the new government left all educational work to the Capuchin missionaries who accompanied the first Spanish civil authorities. As the Catholic priests founded their new mission stations, they also opened schools that provided young people with instruction in the Spanish language and religion, and sometimes also with a smattering of agriculture or carpentry as well.²⁷ Work proceeded slowly due to resistance to the new religious beliefs on Yap and open insurrection on Ponape: in 1890 there were only two Catholic schools with a total of ten students in the Carolines.²⁸ The following year the Capuchins extended their missionary work to Palau where they were encouraged at finding the children very eager to learn and surprisingly faithful in their attendance. In Yap, however, school enrollment remained poor until the Spanish governor compelled parents to send their children to the mission schools under pain of penal labor for any who failed to comply with this ordinance. At once the priests began a boarding school at one of their mission stations for more talented pupils. By 1898, the year before Spanish rule in the islands ended, there were six day schools and one boarding school, with some 540 students in Yap alone. With the establishment of German rule the following year, however, compulsory education ended and enrollment in Yap dropped to a mere nine students.²⁹

Even during the first few years of German administration in the Carolines, it was evident that Spanish missionaries would be severely limited in their effectiveness, particularly as the German government initiated its attempts to maximize German influence on the islanders. Between 1903 and 1907 German Capuchins replaced their Spanish co-religious throughout the mission field and altered their schools in accordance with the government's Germanization policy. In the mission boarding schools German language instruction was especially intensive, and all teaching was done in that language.³⁰ The Catholic schools generally offered a three-year program to boys and girls, with especially talented students being sent to the government school on Saipan to continue their education. Schools were quite evidently coming into their own during this time, for the *ibedul* in Palau built a school at his own expense for his village's high-ranking children.³¹ Even in Yap, the island group least receptive to education, school enrollment by the end of German rule was back up to 473--almost what it had reached in 1899--without government-enforced, compulsory attendance.³² German Capuchins introduced Franciscan nuns from Ger-

many in 1907 to teach in their girls schools while the priests and brothers held classes for boys. At the heart of the curriculum was the study of the German language, a project that was subsidized by the German government to the amount of four thousand marks a year.³³ The hope of the German authorities, it seems, was to rid the islands of the pidgin English that was threatening to become the universal means of communication between those who spoke different local languages. In 1914 the mission was operating twenty schools, including one in the Mortlock Islands, an area that had only recently been reached by the Catholic priests. Over twelve hundred pupils were enrolled in these schools.³⁴

Since the German government preferred to subsidize German language instruction rather than develop its own school system, direct government involvement in education was virtually nil. Only in Palau and the Marianas was any formal education provided by the government. In Palau the government initiated a program to instruct local policemen in the German language and arithmetic. This program, begun in 1902, offered two hours of class a day to twenty or thirty men and could be called the first government-run school in the Carolines.³⁵

In the Marianas, on the other hand, the government assumed almost total responsibility for the education of the young. The educational heritage of Spain in the northern Marianas furnished little to build upon ("dirty school buildings and native teachers incapable of teaching anything," according to one German³⁶) and the Spanish missionaries would not accede to the government's request to stay and open Catholic schools. As a result, the government was compelled to open two schools of its own on Saipan and another on Rota, with a total enrollment of over three hundred pupils, and education was made compulsory for all between the ages of six and thirteen. In the early years, classes were taught in Chamorro by local, government-paid teachers, although the German language was increasingly emphasized and courses in this study were taught by the district officer himself.³⁷

In time, the German administration made an attempt to upgrade the schools on Saipan, consolidate them into a single system, and utilize them for the higher education of Micronesians in other parts of the territory. In the government-run educational complex on Saipan there was an elementary school with six grades (and separate sections for Chamorro and Carolinian students because of the difference in ability) and an intermediate school with two additional grades. The elementary school curriculum, which was varied and broadly humanistic, reminiscent of the Colegio de San Juan in the mid-nineteenth century, included singing and violin playing, natural history and geography, drawing, physical training, and handi-

craft making, in addition to the inevitable German. There were two master teachers, both of whom were Germans, assisted by several Chamorros and Carolinians. The elementary school offered a far richer program than the mission schools in the Carolines could, much as the colegio had in comparison with the old parish schools. The intermediate school furnished training in vocational areas such as farming, boatbuilding, and native crafts. Exceptional students who completed both elementary and intermediate schooling were sent off to the German naval base at Tsingtao in preparation for teaching, keeping financial records, or training in carpentry, blacksmithing, or other trades.³⁸

Meanwhile, shortly before the turn of the century, Catholic missionaries made their first incursion into the Marshall Islands, a group that had for decades been strongly Protestant. The Missionaries of the Sacred Heart, who had earlier established a base in the Gilberts and surveyed prospects in the Marshalls throughout the 1890s, finally opened a mission on Jaluit in 1899. The boarding school that was founded there soon afterward had a small and exclusive clientele: half-castes, some of the high chiefs, and the children of Europeans. The curriculum was no less unabashedly elitist, for it offered intensive education in German and the usual other subjects, all given in the German language.³⁹ The twenty or so young children who greeted a visiting ecclesiastical dignitary in 1902 surprised him by welcoming him in his own language and carrying on a lengthy conversation with him in German. Later in the day the school children sang the high mass for the feast of the Assumption while young outsiders watched the spectacle with their noses pressed against the chapel windows.⁴⁰

The kind of education that the Sacred Heart missionaries offered in their school on Jaluit became all the more popular when the government implemented its Germanization policy after 1906. Pupils came from distant islands--as far away as the Gilberts and the eastern Carolines--to attend the school, and it was not long before new schools were opened on other atolls in the Marshalls. A school on Likiep, principally for half-caste children, was founded in 1902, and another was begun on Arno in 1910 in addition to the schools that had existed on Nauru for some years. The Missionary Sisters of the Most Sacred Heart were summoned into the Marshalls in 1902 to help staff the expanding school system, which by 1914 included eleven schools on five different islands serving some two hundred children. The schools remained very small, a necessity if they were to achieve the ambitious goals they had set for themselves. They were full eight-grade elementary schools, with class for five hours a day, teaching oral and written German along with Bible history, mathematics, and sing-

ing. In addition, older boys learned navigation and business math, while girls took courses in home economics and fine handwork.⁴¹

When the German administration was dismissed after the Japanese takeover of the islands in late 1914, the German-bred school system was disbanded with it. Japanese authorities allowed the Catholic religious to keep their schools open for a year or so, but as of December 1915 all German missionaries were forbidden to teach school, and the courses permitted were limited to religion, singing, and needlework. Finally, in 1919 the last of the German Catholic missionaries were expelled from the Marshalls and the Carolines, and their whole school system came to an abrupt halt. The German Liebenzell missionaries, who had arrived in 1906 at the request of the American Board to replace its personnel in the Carolines, were also sent home.

With the departure of the missionaries, of course, the extensive school systems ceased to function everywhere except in the Marshalls where the Protestant mission schools had been in the hands of local teachers for years. By 1914 the Protestant schools served about 2,100 children (1,500 in the Marshalls and over 600 in the eastern Carolines), and the Catholic schools in the Carolines and Marshalls educated another 1,500.⁴² If we add to the number of children in mission schools another 300 attending the government schools in Saipan, it appears that about 4,000, from a total population of approximately 40,000, were in school during the later years of German rule. Most of these young Micronesians were attending village schools with only three grades, but a small percentage had the opportunity for up to eight years of study and a chance to acquire a fair mastery of German as well as learn a trade. This was a considerable achievement for an administration that was staffed by only two dozen officials and that itself played such a small role in education.

Education under the Japanese Mandate

Barely a year after the Japanese government expelled the last German missionaries, it initiated negotiations with Protestant and Catholic groups for the assignment of new missionaries from a neutral nation to its mandated islands. The Japanese valued Christian missions for the civilizing influence they had on the islanders and wanted them to continue. Nevertheless, the Japanese government had no intention of relinquishing its educational responsibilities to the missions as the German government had done. From the day the Japanese assumed control of the islands they set up their own schools, for Japanese authorities saw in education an unparalleled means of fostering the development of the islanders. For a time

the schools were makeshift operations in which naval officers and officials from Nanyo Boeki Kaisha, one of the major businesses in the islands, taught a potpourri of Japanese language, math, and singing with whatever materials they could gather. In December 1915, however, the government established a public education system, the first ever to be founded in Micronesia, with a school in each of the six administrative divisions. Over the next few years, certain changes were made in the school system for Micronesians, and as the number of immigrants in the islands rapidly increased, a parallel system was established for Japanese children.⁴³

The Japanese-run public schools, called *kogakko*, offered three years of elementary education for Micronesians, with a supplementary program of two additional years for more advanced students. Islanders between the ages of eight and thirteen were encouraged to enroll in the elementary schools. Japanese teachers, assisted by local instructors, taught a uniform curriculum that was determined by the Bureau of Education. Half of the instructional time in the elementary schools--twelve out of twenty-four hours a week--was spent on the Japanese language, with additional courses in arithmetic, singing, and drawing.⁴⁴ Some vocational training was called for in the curriculum, but this amounted to little more than manual labor in the vegetable garden and around the school grounds.⁴⁵ Clearly the educational program put great stress on the language of the colonial power (as had the school program under the Germans), since language was thought to have moral value as well as practical usefulness for Micronesians. The supplementary two years, which were offered to some students on more populated islands, had a more varied curriculum. Japanese language, both spoken and written, continued to dominate the curriculum, consuming eleven of thirty hours of instruction, but more class time was devoted to vocational education: agriculture, housekeeping, and handicraft-making.⁴⁶

The purpose of the educational system, as stated in an official Japanese ordinance, was "the bestowal on children of moral education as well as of such knowledge and capabilities as are indispensable to the advancement and improvement of their lives."⁴⁷ The vehicle of Micronesian students' "moral education" was to be not a course in ethics but a knowledge of the Japanese language, for besides being a means of communication, Japanese was understood to be an expression of a wholly different value system. As students learned the Japanese language, they could be expected to rapidly become more "civilized" and increasingly concerned with making use of opportunities to elevate their standard of living. In the long run, the enlightenment of Micronesians through education could not help but make them more loyal to the Japanese emperor and more eco-

nomically productive members of the empire. These educational goals were similar to those endorsed by Germany during its short rule in the islands and little different from those of any colonial government elsewhere in the world.

Lofty educational goals were one thing, but the operation of the schools on a day-to-day basis was quite another. In the first place, there were no texts designed for Micronesians, and the textbooks used were ill suited to the level of the Micronesian student. Classes were large, often with eighty or more students in a single class. As for teaching methods and discipline, a high-placed Palauan who attended one of these schools has this to say:

Vernacular was completely eliminated from the curriculum. Students were punished if they spoke their native tongue. Most subjects were taught by rote-memorizing. Group reading was a common way of teaching reading. Corporal punishment was the usual way of discipline and school children were slapped or hit on the head with the fist or bamboo if they misbehaved.⁴⁸

Yet Micronesian students attended these schools in ever greater numbers as years went on. A great part of the explanation for this rests, then as now, with the obvious fact that a knowledge of the language of the ruling power was a very important asset, especially if one wanted to advance socially and economically. The typical Micronesian graduate of the public school may not, after five years of education, have been able to read a Japanese newspaper as one author asserts, but he could understand directions in Japanese, hold an ordinary conversation, and possibly qualify for one of the many salaried positions that were opening up for Micronesians with the economic boom of the late 1920s and 1930s.⁴⁹

Opportunities for education beyond the five grades of public school were extremely limited for Micronesians. The most attractive of those existing was the carpentry school--or "Woodworkers Apprentice Training School," as it was formally called--which was founded in Palau in 1926. This select school admitted only ten or fifteen pupils a year from throughout Micronesia and offered a two-year program, sometimes extended to three years, in woodworking and related skills. Each year it graduated about ten young men, more than half of whom eventually obtained jobs with the Japanese administration in the islands. In addition to the carpentry school, there were other post-elementary training programs available for Micronesians after 1926, most of them in-service programs lasting six months to a year. One of the most notable was the agriculture training

program conducted at the agriculture stations on Ponape, Saipan, and Palau; by 1932 about 120 Micronesians had gone through the year-long training. In addition, there were programs in sanitation and hygiene, post office work, handicraft training, and blacksmithing.⁵⁰

The public school system grew from the original six schools opened in 1915 to seventeen schools with a total of 2,500 pupils by 1922.⁵¹ Thereafter its growth was much more moderate: by 1937 there were twenty-four schools with over 3,000 students. It is estimated that over 50 percent of the school-age population actually attended school in the middle 1930s. In all, there were nearly 9,000 Micronesians who had finished the first three years of schooling, with about 3,500 of them also completing the additional two years.⁵² By the outbreak of World War II, roughly 20 percent of the population had received some formal education under the Japanese administration.

Mission schools, which fared less well under the Japanese than under the Germans, began a long process of rebuilding during the 1920s. The Catholic schools had vanished even before the last of the German priests was exiled, and the Protestant training schools that were once the backbone of their educational structure had also been closed. With the resumption of missionary activity in the early 1920s, Micronesia was apportioned to Liebenzell--which had been invited to take up its former work in Palau and part of Truk--and the Japanese Protestant missionary organization known as Dendo Dan. A training school was reestablished in Truk, this time on Tol, while a girls school was founded on Udot.⁵³ Two additional schools were eventually opened in Truk, two on Ponape and another on Jaluit. Catholic schools were set up in Truk, Palau, and Saipan, but the ones on Saipan were the most significant and accounted for about 85 percent of all Catholic students. In 1922 there were 400 students in all mission schools; ten years later there were 1,180; and by 1937 the total was 1,535.⁵⁴

The figures alone, however, can be misleading. Some of the mission schools, especially the Catholic ones on Palau and Saipan, functioned not more than a few hours a week, and then only to give religious instruction after the public school was finished for the day. While the rest of the mission schools were full time, their program was heavily slanted toward bible study and religion--much more so than in previous decades. Most of their pupils had already attended the government public schools and had enrolled in the mission schools to gain the religious instruction that public schools would not provide.⁵⁵ In short, the mission schools during this era served mainly as a supplement to the education given by the public system. This was a radical departure from the former pattern of education in

Micronesia, one that prevailed from Sanvitores' time through German rule, in which the mission schools bore nearly the entire burden of education. This development heralded the ascendancy of the public school, which would reach its height under the American administration following World War II.

Conclusion

As diverse as the forms of education have been throughout Micronesia's colonial past, the story of schooling in the islands yields at least a few generalizations. The first and most obvious of these is the key role of the missions, Catholic and Protestant alike, in the development and maintenance of early school systems in Micronesia. With very few exceptions (notably the early free schools in the Marianas and the German public school in Saipan) all schools were mission-run until 1915, the year in which the Japanese administration established the first public school system. The early mission schools were clearly established as the means of propagating a religious message, although the curriculum always included other subjects besides religious doctrine and Bible study. Educational strategies of those who ran mission schools reflected the usual dilemma of whether to concentrate limited resources to educate a small elite, or to utilize the resources so as to attempt to offer a little education for everyone. The response of the missions to this dilemma varied with the historical circumstances and the missions' own stage of maturity.

The last century has seen much discontinuity in educational policy in Micronesia and a large turnover of personnel, both administrative and missionary, due to the frequent changes in foreign control of the islands. Nonetheless, a surprisingly high percentage of Micronesians were offered an education, generally for three or four years, throughout these politically turbulent times. From the educational boom in the Marshalls initiated by Protestant missionaries in the 1870s through the final years of the Japanese mandate in the 1940s, roughly half of the school-age population was actually in school. This percentage compares favorably with other colonial areas during the same period.

Finally, a few observations can be made on the content of the curricula in Micronesian schools. Of central importance to the curriculum was almost always the language of the colonial power, and there were usually more than sufficient inducements for local people to wish to learn this language. The major exception to this was the nineteenth-century Protestant schools in their second phase, when they stressed literacy in the vernacular in order to make it possible for their students to read the Bible.

The rest of the curriculum was typically a melange of courses that included basic skills like arithmetic along with all manner of other subjects. Two items of special interest that recur constantly on these curricula are singing and vocational arts. Music, although also taught in European and American schools of an earlier day, was recognized as a subject that would evoke interest among Micronesians and be put to use by them. Much the same could be said for the vocational arts--especially agriculture and carpentry--that so often appeared prominently on the instructional program.

Perhaps most important of all is the fact that schools became an indispensable part of Micronesian life throughout these years, and school began to be recognized by Micronesians as an invaluable means of achieving status and other more tangible rewards. After three centuries of exposure to colonial education of various forms, Micronesia adopted the school as its own.

Francis X. Hezel, S.J.
Micronesian Seminar, Truk

NOTES

1. Luis de Ibañez y Garcia, *Historia de las Islas Marianas, Carolinas y Palaos* (Granada, 1886), 34-35.
2. Laurel Heath, "Education for Confusion: A Study of Education in the Mariana Islands 1668-1941," *Journal of Pacific History* 10 (1975): 25.
3. Larry A. Lawcock, "Luckier than Ben Franklin: Guam's Schoolboys in 1727," *Guam Recorder* 7 (1977): 12-18.
4. Paul Carano and Pedro Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Tokyo, 1964), 102.
5. Heath, 25-26. Cites Laura Thompson, *Guam and Its People* (Princeton, 1947), 217; and Francisco Olive y Garcia, *Islas Marianas* (Manila, 1887), 79-83.
6. H. Ling Roth, *Crozet's Voyage to Tasmania, New Zealand, the Ladrone Islands, and the Philippines in the Years 1771-1772* (London, 1891), 92.
7. William E. Safford, "The Mariana Islands." Unpublished notes compiled from documents in the archives at Agana and from early voyages, found in the libraries of San Francisco, 1901: 179-80.
8. Safford, 451-53.
9. Safford, 269.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Ibañez y Garcia, 121-22.

110 Schools in Micronesia Prior to American Administration

12. Francis X. Hezel, *The First Taint of Civilization* (Honolulu, 1983), 151.
13. *Missionary Herald*, January 1855, 27.
14. *Missionary Herald*, February 1854, 43.
15. *Missionary Herald*, May 1860, 132.
16. *Missionary Herald*, August 1855, Np.
17. Snow to Treat, January 1856. Letters and Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, II. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
18. Hezel, 151-52.
19. Doane to Anderson, September 1855, ABCFM Papers, I.
20. *Missionary Herald*, February 1861, 54-57.
21. *Missionary Herald*, June 1861, 165.
22. *The Friend*, January 1966, 1-4.
23. C. H. Wetmore, *Report of Visit to the Mission of the Marshall and Caroline Islands* (Honolulu, 1886), 13.
24. Theodora C. Bliss, *Micronesia: Fifty Years in the Island World* (Boston, 1906), 108.
25. Bliss, 98.
26. Bliss, 105-8, 160.
27. *Analecta Ordinis Minoris Cappuchinorum* III (1887), 367.
28. *Analecta OM Cap*, VI (1890), 216-17.
29. Deutsches Reich Kolonialamt, *Jahresberichts über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1899-1900* (Berlin, 1901), 1003.
30. Callistus Lopinot, *Die Karolinenmission der spanischen und deutschen Kapuziner: 1886-1919* (Rome, 1964), 7-9.
31. Donald Shuster, "Islands of Change in Palau: Church, School, and Elected Government, 1891-1981," Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1982), 150.
32. United States Department of the Navy, *Civil Affairs Handbook--West Caroline Islands* (Washington, D.C., 1944), 30.
33. Robert McKinney, "Micronesia under German Rule, 1885-1914," MA thesis, Stanford University (Stanford, 1947), 125.
34. Lopinot, 16-19.
35. McKinney, 83-84.
36. *German Administration in the Marianas: Selections from Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 1900-1914*, MARC Working Papers No. 28 (Guam, 1981), 18.
37. McKinney, 127.
38. *Ibid.*; Shuster, 151.

39. McKinney, 56; Deutsches Reich Kolonialamt, *Jahresbericht 1902-1903* (Berlin, 1904), 366.
40. *Annales des Missionnaires de Sacre-Coeur* (1905), 265-66.
41. McKinney, 56, 126.
42. Bliss, 166; Deutsches Reich Kolonialamt, *Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1911-1912* (Berlin, 1913), 159; *Analecta OM Cap*, XXVIII (1912), 80-81; Lopinot, 16-19, 28-29.
43. David Purcell, "Japanese Expansion in the South Pacific, 1890-1935," Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1967), 229-36; Tadao Yanaihara, *Pacific Islands under Japanese Mandate* (London, 1940), 241; Donald Shuster, "Schooling in Micronesia during Japanese Mandate Rule," *Educational Perspectives*, 18, no. 2 (1979): 20-21.
44. Yanaihara, 241-42; Purcell, 230-31.
45. John Fischer, "The Japanese Schools for the Natives of Truk, Caroline Islands," *Human Organization* 20 (1961): 85.
46. Japanese Government, *Annual Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the South Sea Islands under Japanese Mandate for 1932* (Tokyo, 1932), 70-72.
47. Japanese Government, *Annual Report to the League of Nations . . . for 1925* (Tokyo, 1925), Article I, South Seas Bureau Ordinance No. 32, 4 Jan. 1922.
48. David Ramarui, "Education in Micronesia," *Micronesian Reporter* 14, no. 1 (1977): 1-10.
49. Fischer, 85-87.
50. Purcell, 231-33; Yanaihara, 245.
51. Japanese Government, *Annual Report to the League of Nations . . . for 1922* (Tokyo, 1922), 9.
52. Yanaihara, 241.
53. Anna Zimmerman, *Sixty Years: Liebenzell Mission* (Wuerttemberg, nd), 29-30.
54. Japanese Government, *Annual Report for 1922*, 54-55; *Annual Report for 1937*, 63.
55. Yanaihara, 241-42.

EDITOR'S FORUM

PONAPE'S BODY POLITIC: ISLAND AND NATION

by Glenn Petersen

This is a paper about politics and community on Ponape, in Micronesia's Eastern Caroline Islands, and an ethnographer's perceptions of the direction and rate of political change there. The people of Ponape have regular, often daily, interactions with their chiefs. Essential concepts of government--notions of a hierarchy of legitimate authority and a division of responsibility in community organization and action--are deeply embedded in Ponapean culture. Because of the island's rugged terrain and highly dispersed settlement pattern, it is more useful to conceptualize Ponapean communities in terms of families participating in joint activities than in simple territorial terms. These communities are simultaneously political units: they are the "sections" (Ponapean *kousapw*), the numerous, small, minor chiefdoms which in turn constitute Ponape's five paramount chiefdoms (*wehi*). Ponapean politics, which permeate every aspect of life on the island, are fundamentally communal. I am, in this paper, concerned with exploring the ways in which the communal, face-to-face nature of indigenous Ponapean politics determines Ponapean responses to both the American-instituted system of bourgeois democracy on Ponape itself and the developing federal system that is intended to bind Ponape to the other islands in the Central and Eastern Carolines as the semi-autonomous Federated States of Micronesia (FSM).

My thesis is that apparent turmoil in Ponapean and Micronesian governments belies a more deeply rooted process of adaptation that will gradually reshape the structure of the electoral/bureaucratic system in a fashion that allows it to respond to the flow of Ponapean culture and politics.¹ The Ponapeans' strong sense of self-government, inherent in the communal nature of their polity, should ensure a successful adaptation of this new political structure; but this same sense of face-to-face politics may pose substantial problems for *interisland* relations. The authority of Ponapean leadership is tested continually within the community and derives its effectiveness from the well of trust that the responses to these challenges create. Where such constant interactions are impossible, as be-

tween distant islands, leadership may be perceived as imposed and therefore to be resisted.

I shall first outline the traditional Ponapean political system both in terms of its formal structure and its place in social life. Then I shall describe the American-introduced political system. An analysis of the relationships between Ponapean culture and politics, in the context of Ponapean responses to the introduced system, will follow; and, finally, the integration of Ponape into the FSM will be considered.

The Traditional Ponapean Polity

Ponape is by Micronesian standards a large island. It is roughly circular, with a diameter ranging from 10 to 12 miles and an area of about 130 square miles. Its central peaks rise to 2,500 feet and draw approximately 200 inches of rain a year. Ponape lies 7° north of the equator and about 2,500 miles west-southwest of Hawaii. It is lushly tropical and fertile. It was first settled perhaps two thousand years ago. Its population was reported as twenty-one thousand in the 1980 census, but I believe that this figure may be low by as much as 20 percent. The smaller figure was roughly the size of the island's population at first contact in the late 1820s. The introduction of new diseases, especially smallpox, reduced the population to about three thousand in 1900, by which time the decline appears to have halted.

Ponapean oral traditions suggest that the island's polity has always been in flux, oscillating between eras of centralization, when a few large paramount chiefdoms controlled the entire island, and fission, when the island was fragmented into a number of smaller, autonomous chiefdoms. A series of political struggles occurring just before and after the early contact period left the island divided into the five paramount chiefdoms that it now comprises. Each of these is in turn made up of fifteen to fifty sections--the minor chiefdoms--with populations ranging from about twenty-five to two hundred. The paramount chiefdoms are each ruled by two chiefs: the Nahmwarki, who is the paramount, and the Nahnken, who might be likened to a prime minister or, in Pacific terms, a talking chief. The paramountcies are controlled by matrilineages and matrilineal clans, and men with hereditary claims to titles work their way upward through a ranked system of titles, their progress being determined by community service; age; genealogy; political acumen; personality; and general skill in such things as cultivation of certain prestige crops (especially yams and kava), accumulation of traditional knowledge, and oratory. The several Nahnken and the men in the ranked lines of titles below them are sons of

paramount chiefs or men in the ruling matrilineages; their political ascendancy is determined by what are essentially the same criteria. Though the sacred character of paramount chieftainship has declined in the course of 150 years of culture contact and a century of Christianity, these men are still reckoned to possess mana (Ponapean *manaman*), the supernatural force attributed to almost all Pacific island chiefs.

The sections are likewise ruled by two chiefs and their respective ranked lines of titles. Section chieftainships are generally controlled by matrilineages and have their own sources of mana. Advancement within the ranks of section titles works in much the same fashion as in the paramount chiefdoms. However, section politics operate on a more personal level and advancement within them is less predictable. Sections are the fundamental Ponapean communities, and most basic Ponapean social activities that reach beyond the level of individual families are organized within and through the sections. Ponapean social life is orchestrated by an unceasing round of feasting, and it is the presence of the section chiefs and other title-holders that bestows authenticity and legitimacy upon these events. Given the rapid pace of political, economic, and social change in contemporary Micronesia, it is easy to perceive traditional Ponapean politics as anachronistic and irrelevant, but my entire experience of Ponapean culture argues that it is this complex and multilayered system that continues to integrate and charge with meaning the lives of most Ponapeans.

Colonial History

The current status of Ponapean chiefdoms is as much the product of the island's colonial history as it is of its autochthonous culture. While they appear at first glance quite unconnected to the modern political scene, the chiefdoms in fact apprise us of both the shape of Ponape's body politic and the general nature of politics in Ponapean life; the system of electoral and bureaucratic politics that has been developed during the past thirty-five years of American administration is, after all, being introduced among Ponapeans, and it is their response to it that will ultimately determine the system's success or failure.

During the course of almost half their contact history, Ponapeans dealt with Europeans as political equals. Ponapeans took an active role in trade and in their own conversion to Christianity. When the Spanish attempted to establish control over the island in 1886, the Ponapeans resisted them, with marked success. It was not until the coming of the Germans in 1899 and the ill-fated rebellion of Sokehs chiefdom against them

in 1910 that the Ponapeans found themselves no longer masters of their homeland. The Germans instituted coconut-planting schemes, *corvée* labor, and a system of land tenure that gave each adult male title to a plot of land, thereby depriving the chiefs of the single most important material manifestation of their power: their claim to land. The Japanese, who succeeded the Germans in 1914, began to develop Ponape as a plantation. Ponapeans were in a sense peripheral to this plan: most of the labor was provided by immigrant Japanese. In time the Ponapeans might have found themselves displaced (they certainly feared that this might be the case), but most Ponapean men received a Japanese education and some learned semiskilled trades. Japan's interest in its Micronesian territory was economically motivated enough to have resulted in substantial economic development of the islands even as the islanders themselves were relegated to marginal positions.

When the United States took control of what became the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, following World War II, economic development specialists urged that immediate steps be taken to revive Ponape's war-devastated economy. With a few minor exceptions, however, the islands were ignored for the next fifteen years, and the Ponapeans remained entirely subject to colonial rule. An islandwide legislature was established by the American administration in the early 1950s, ostensibly to begin the process of education for self-government specified in the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement. The quality of rule during this period depended largely on the personal qualities of the district administrators, who were able to govern quite arbitrarily. The United States wished to maintain the islands as a picket line across the Asian frontier, and its rule over them was tailored to this basic policy. While it is difficult for Americans to perceive their relations with small, foreign territories as anything but benign, it should be remembered that in 1950 there were many Ponapeans who had grown up in an essentially independent Ponape. The agonizingly slow pace of the negotiations for Micronesia's future political status and the entire tenor of America's attitude toward self-government throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s must be kept in this perspective. And the utterly inept course of economic development in the sixties and seventies can only be understood in light of the United States' reluctance to permit Micronesians to govern themselves.²

Following its 1963 decision to co-opt Micronesia into permanently binding itself to the United States, the administration initiated a program of social, political, and economic changes throughout Micronesia. This included large expenditures on public health, education, and public works. The Congress of Micronesia, with delegates from each of the territory's

six districts, was established in 1965. Large numbers of scholarships to American colleges and universities were made available to Micronesian students. A number of agricultural development programs were instituted. Most striking, however, were the budget increases, which leaped tenfold in a decade or so, pouring vast sums of cash into the territory, primarily in the form of salaries, and initiating import consumerism on a massive scale. By 1970, the United States felt that it had wrought enough changes in the Micronesian consciousness to put forward its plans for annexing the islands.

At the first round of the "Future Political Status Negotiations," held in Hawaii, a slightly rewritten version of Guam's "Organic Act"--the governance charter that spells out U.S. rule in Guam--was offered to the Micronesians. It was rejected, and the status negotiations evolved into a long-term consciousness-raising process. In 1975 the Micronesians held a constitutional convention, where they drafted a constitution for a united Micronesian nation. It was preceded by a year-long program called "Education for Self-Government," designed to provide the Micronesian people with some idea of the various status options they might pursue. A "referendum"--really an opinion poll--was held in July 1975. By this time it had become clear that it was highly unlikely that a single Micronesian nation would form. For a variety of reasons, too complex to go into here, the Trust Territory was on the brink of fragmenting into four polities, and the referendum demonstrated that there was no unified outlook on the future. Important in this context, however, is the Ponapean vote, which was overwhelmingly in favor of an independent, united Micronesian nation (Petersen 1975, 1979). Between 1975 and 1979, Ponape (and the other small islands in its vicinity) joined with Yap, Truk, and Kosrae districts to form the Federated States of Micronesia.³ Ponape State was chosen for the FSM capital. Islanders now elect their own state governors, as well as legislators, and their representatives to the Congress of the FSM in turn elect the FSM president and vice-president. The Trust Territory's high commissioner, appointed by the U.S. president, retains veto power over all legislation; and the compact of "Free Association" with the United States, painstakingly developed over the course of many years, remains in limbo while the Reagan administration dawdles over its foreign policy formulations. Free association, which provides substantial internal autonomy, permits U.S. control of foreign and defense affairs in exchange for continued U.S. funding of the FSM economy. Given the massive infrastructure of education, public health, and public works establishments created in the last two decades and the complete absence of any export economy that might sustain them, the FSM finds itself critically depen-

dent on this external source of funding. The United States has managed--thus far at least--to create the economic dependency, if not the political subservience, it set out to foster in the early 1960s.⁴

This, then, is the historical context in which contemporary Micronesian politics evolve. The Ponapeans have at present what appear to be two entirely separate, parallel political structures, surmounted by a third. These are the traditional chiefly system, the electoral/bureaucratic system introduced by the United States and adapted by the Micronesians, and the U.S. government's ultimate control of the islands. The electoral/bureaucratic system both binds together the entire island, with its independent chiefdoms, and links the many islands of the Central and Eastern Carolines into the FSM.

It has been argued that the two parallel polities on Ponape are genuinely distinct, each calling for different political skills, techniques, and ideologies (Hughes 1970). I am not sure that this is so. As John Fischer (1974) has shown, the viability of the traditional chiefly system on Ponape has to some degree been ensured by the fact that the chiefs have not been placed between their people and the colonial administration. While U.S. administrators have always shown the chiefs some degree of respect, they have never been given any official governmental status as chiefs (though several have stood for elections) and have neither been able to enhance their status nor had it eroded by serving in a system of indirect rule. But this does not mean that the two political systems are truly separate and independent of each other. Both govern--in one fashion or another--Ponapeans, and both are responsive to Ponapean sensibilities. Both, then, entail Ponapean politics, and engagement in them is perceived in similar terms.

While the electoral/bureaucratic system is destined to survive in some form, since it is the system that binds Ponape together as a state and links the island to the FSM and the United States, from whence the island's income derives, it is not merely a new system imposed upon and replacing an older one. Because Ponapeans now have control over daily operations of this system, if not long-term, decision-making powers, it is Ponapean sensibilities that shape the operation of this government. That is, the system functions within Ponapean culture, not external to it. And Ponapean culture applies fundamentally the same values and expectations to this system of rule as it does to its precursor.

The Culture of Ponapean Politics

It is my position in this paper that, for Ponapeans, politics entail a fundamentally different comprehension of the nature and exercising of

power and authority than that understood in the modern Western intellectual tradition. There is nothing original in this contention. It has roots at least as deep as the opposition of some of Greek philosophy to Platonic dualism and can be traced through what Isaiah Berlin (1976, 1980) calls the "Counter-Enlightenment" work of Vico and Herder. It certainly represents one current in the development of modern (post-eighteenth-century) anthropological thought. It is not my intention in this paper to argue this position from a philosophical or epistemological point of view, however. I am simply going to assert, on the basis of my two years' residence and participation in a Ponapean community (over the course of seven years), working as an ethnographer, that the fount of authority in a modern Ponapean community is the community itself, not a Machiavellian princeling, and that if one is to understand the operations of Ponapean politics one must understand how Ponapean culture establishes the contexts and forms in which individuals may tap and direct that power. I shall develop this theme in order to demonstrate how Ponapeans perceive and participate in the introduced electoral/bureaucratic system in their own terms, rather than in the political terms and categories of those from whom the system has been derived--that is, Americans. I am not, I should note, prepared to assert that what follows is the truth; it represents, rather, the direction in which six years of reflection on, analysis of, and continued questioning about the nature of Ponapean social life have taken me. I am aware of exceptions to what I say. Any attempt to generalize has to skip over particulars--particulars which survive and argue contrarily nonetheless.

There are two countervailing strains in Ponapean culture, as it is realized in individuals: one toward hierarchy and one toward individual autonomy. Ponapean chiefs are respected and revered; they are, as I have already pointed out, imbued with mana, which comes to them through the continuity of their matrilineages. Ponapean chiefs are also characterized by their *wahu*--their "honor." *Wahu* can be translated literally as "valley" and refers to the gulf that lies between chiefs and the other members of the community. Yet, as one section chief reminded his people at a feast held to reintegrate the community after some of its people had split away to form a new section, "Everyone has honor . . . honor inheres in one as a human and as a member of a community . . . honor is like a fair wind: if it blows for us then we shall succeed" (Petersen 1982). The chief's honor, then, is not power. As one Ponapean aphorism has it, "*Ohlmen sohte kak mihmi pahn emen*" ("A man cannot live under another"); a second one states, "*Ngehi me kin kaunda paliwarei*" ("I am master of my own self").

The entire shape of Ponapean culture and social life manifests these two interdependent pulls. Authority, though it draws upon rank, is by no means identical to it. Rather, individual authority derives from skill and ability and exists, in a sense, in its own negation. A politically effective man is characterized in most instances by humility. It is the wisdom or pragmatism of his suggestions, and not their force, that leads to action. The Ponapean language includes a complex honorific or respect form (*meing*) that is used in all formal settings. People of high rank are referred to and addressed in linguistic forms that exalt them, and all others are spoken of in humiliating forms. But in using this language, one always lowers oneself in self-reference; all speakers, even the paramount chiefs, refer to themselves in the humiliating form. In formal political situations--at feasts, for example--leaders do not assert themselves; the language does not allow for it. If orders are given, they are given by a lower ranking individual acting as the chief's representative, known as the *auwenwehi*--literally the "mouth of the chiefdom" (not "of the chief").

There is also a complex structure of secrecy woven into Ponapean social relations. Two of the cardinal virtues Ponapeans urge each other to practice are *kanengamah* and *mahk*. *Kanengamah* can be translated as "patience," but its meanings have to do with holding certain things back--in particular, emotions. *Mahk* may be translated as "reserve" or "self-containment," though it is ordinarily used in a transitive sense: "I will overlook your affront; I do not deign to have you see how this affects me" might be one way of describing how it is used. Both of these qualities concern the holding back of oneself, a major means of preserving autonomy. Because Ponapeans routinely refrain from divulging their sentiments, they have enormous individual freedom from any need to meet others' expectations of them.

Daily patterns of activity are also affected by this emphasis on secrecy. Competitive production of feast goods plays a leading role in political advancement, and an element of surprise is critical to successful participation in the feasting. Ponapeans do not ordinarily enter upon others' land (openly, at least) except along recognized trails. Nor do they inquire of others about their crops or possessions. Given that most Ponapeans spend their entire lives within small, homogenous, and highly endogamous communities and thus know a great deal about each other, there is also a remarkable lot that they do not know about each other. Again, this secrecy serves to reinforce and protect personal autonomy. While gossip plays a major social role--as it does in every society--there is an explicit notion that a man's affairs are his own. All this is reinforced by the dispersed settlement pattern, the rugged terrain, and the dense vegetation. Ponapeans

are physically as well as psychically separated from each other. Their lifestyle provides them with considerable interfamilial privacy.⁵

In response to these centrifugal forces is the ceaseless round of feasting that calls Ponapeans forth from their isolated farmsteads. Feasts are focused upon chiefs. Quantities of food and kava are brought together, possessed temporarily by the chief, prepared, and then redistributed. The symbolism of a feast has the chief at its center--sitting, ideally, on a raised platform and looking down upon the people working below him.⁶ (So central is this raised position in Ponapean political symbolism that the general term for chiefs or high ranking people is *soupeidi*--"those-who-look-down.") The highest ranking chiefs may receive at these feasts considerable quantities of tribute which are not redistributed, though much--perhaps most--of what they retain is dispersed among their families, hangers-on, and the people who help them transport the goods home. It is not unusual for section chiefs, however, to contribute more to feasts than they retain in the redistribution.

One of my clearest recollections of my early encounters with the seeming contradictions of Ponapean political culture comes from a conversation I had with the wife of a man who was one of several eligible successors to a chief thought to be on his deathbed at the time. At one point in our talk she was praising the sensibility of American democratic politics. We, unlike the Ponapeans, she argued, did not foolishly have to give all that we possessed to greedy, demanding chiefs. A few minutes later she was maintaining that most of their community wanted her husband to be the next chief because of his generosity. She complained that her husband was an exceptionally generous man, who gave away all that the family possessed, and that Ponapeans expected great generosity of their chiefs. A bit more literal in those days than I am now, I attempted to show her the contradiction in her statements: chiefs who were on the one hand greedy, on the other generous. She did not understand my objection; nowadays, neither do I. Men who acquire, on Ponape, are equally men who distribute.

Because Ponapean chieftainship rests upon both achievement and ascription, there is a clear note of hierarchy even while there is continual economic leveling. Accumulation serves only as preparation for distribution. And in the same fashion, the honor accorded to chiefs is merely a reflection of the community's esteem for itself. Feasts are the product of community effort and are in fact conducted in a surprisingly anarchic fashion. Few formal preparations or assignments are made in anticipation of a feast. Though there is a master of ceremonies, he is merely a coordinator, or conductor, who establishes the rhythm, rather than a super-

visor who assigns the tasks. At extremely large feasts, which draw hundreds of participants, many of whom are relative strangers, there may be more conscious efforts made at organization; but under ordinary circumstances feasts unfold by themselves. Each participant decides for himself or herself what to contribute and what tasks to undertake. And when, as is often the case, a family is holding a feast to mark a life crisis event--a death, a wedding, a journey, a graduation--it is the chief who must, by his obligatory attendance, serve his people as their figurehead. The chief's presence confers ritual status upon the event, though the ritual itself is not the chiefs doing but the People's.

The decision-making and -enforcing powers of the chiefs are of much the same quality as the roles they play in feasting. The near-century of colonial rule has undoubtedly affected their powers, but it is difficult to determine just what degree of control nineteenth-century chiefs had over their subjects. If one takes the divergence between what Ponapeans today say about the nature of their political institutions and what the ethnographer observes and applies it to written accounts from the past, it may well be that Ponapean chiefs never had especially centralized control of their communities, despite their enormous ritual status--or so I am inclined to believe. The authority of section chiefs seems exceptionally vulnerable today. They are continually obliged to tread a very fine line between demanding too much participation in community activities, thereby alienating their people, and calling for too little, thereby allowing the section to slip into torpor and disintegration. Sections can and do split apart as a result of population growth and disenchantment with the chiefs. In "*One Man Cannot Rule a Thousand*" (Petersen 1982) I treat this process at monograph length. Paramount chiefdoms have in recent years had their boundaries frozen by the charters that have made each a municipality within the state, the FSM, and the Trust Territory, and the paramount chiefs are less threatened by secession. In fact, they may at times actually encourage fissioning among the sections as a means of thwarting the rise of especially successful leaders or communities who might threaten their own hegemony.

Paramount chiefs in general rule through their section chiefs. There is not a great deal of ruling to be done, of course. Most aspects of Ponapean life are of a familiar and repetitive enough nature that tasks get done as part of the flow of life, rather than in response to a system of orders. Nevertheless, ritual events; celebrations, and the general structure of status are hinged upon the chiefs, and instructions and orders are sometimes given. Individuals may be told what they are expected to contribute to certain feasts or to community efforts of one sort or another. But chiefs only

occasionally make decisions on their own. Any sort of joint effort is preceded by discussions among holders of the highest titles. Some form of consensus--a reading of community opinion, in effect--is found. A formal announcement may sometimes be made: for example, each family is expected to contribute one pig, one kava plant, and one large yam to a specific feast. Or nothing formal will be said at all, since the decision is no more than a reflection of what community members sense is proper participation or a proper contribution and since a family's decision to participate is based on many factors.

Performance and participation cannot be directly enforced. Ponapean chiefs no longer have powers of coercion (if, indeed, they ever did). It is the system of titles--the formal, public manifestation of individual status--that ensures participation. In a general way, community service is rewarded by advancement in the title system; and the higher a man's title, the more that is expected of him. There are individuals who seem to have little interest in advancement and, while they generally participate in community activities, they do not contribute much. These people are, however, in a definite minority and are frequently the targets of mild teasing and derision. Failure to participate in or contribute to community events is the most frequent--in fact it is practically the only--explanation given for the removal of titles. If a man or a family does not meet the standards set by the chief or community, titles might be taken back. On occasion titles are removed as a result of personal conflicts, I know, but this is not usually acknowledged; inadequate participation or tribute is invariably given as the reason. A title, then, is to a large degree a statement of one's status within the community. There are occasional exceptions to this, as when a title is removed because of personal conflict between a chief and a community member; I know of cases where this has occurred, and the status of the man who lost his title was not seriously damaged. But this happens when an individual's status is so well founded within the community that an attack by the chief is not by itself sufficient to detract from the community's regard.

What this all means is that the true locus of authority in Ponapean communities is the community itself. An able chief is respected and listened to, but he founds his authority upon his own ability to listen. If pronouncements are made, they are liable to fall upon deaf ears or meet considerable disagreement. A generous chief can make demands and expect a degree of cooperation; having known no truly greedy chiefs, I cannot simply assert that they are inherently ineffective, but I assume that this is why they are not often encountered. Ponapeans continually complain about their chiefs, but they also admit freely that their complaints have

little significance: "*Pihl en pahn mweli*," they say--"water under the boulders" which can be heard trickling but has no impact.

Ponapeans have, I believe, an enormous sense of controlling their own lives, precisely because there is no differentiated source of authority over them. They have a clear concept of hierarchy and speak of it often, but it is extremely difficult to find it embodied as authority. Ponapeans sometimes speak of things within their lives that cannot be located by an outside observer.

Recently, A. Bartlett Giamatti, president of Yale University, wrote that "the most practical part of the American soul is its ability to assert and live by principles" (1981). This strikes me as quite likely, since I often find myself bewildered by the Ponapeans' capacity to assert principles they do not live by--a trait which seems for them eminently practical. They assert principles of hierarchy and power, yet live with a high degree of personal autonomy. I would go so far as to suggest, speculatively and tangentially, that cognitive dissonance as it is known in American social psychology would be hard to discover on Ponape. It may well occur in other forms, but not as we know it, as a struggle to resolve variance between reality and principle.

The Ponapean Electoral/Bureaucratic System

It is within this context--that is, the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of a hierarchy of authority--that the evolution of a new political structure on Ponape must be understood. The Ponapeans, and the other Micronesian peoples, have in part taken for themselves and in part had thrust upon them a political structure that reflects several millennia of cultural development in Europe and America. The functioning of western bourgeois democracy, with whatever degree of optimism or pessimism one views it, presupposes a number of cultural traits. Some of these grow out of a long and complex scholastic, philosophical tradition. Others derive from an important historical precondition: the absolute authority of the state, a hierarchy of power that is real and effective as well as apparent. With significantly varying degrees, modern democracies assume some popular control of government; but more critically, they assume governments that genuinely control the lives of the governed. Their religious, legal, economic, scientific, and artistic traditions all share this heritage in one fashion or another--a shared assumption of centralized, legitimate, and overarching authority and power. While earlier monarchy and autarchy have given way to bourgeois democracy, the quantum advances of modern technology have given contemporary governments far more con-

trol over individual lives than their predecessors ever had. It is a structure of government founded on such presuppositions that has been introduced in Micronesia, where very different cultural underpinnings have evolved.

There is today on Ponape a system of government modeled after that of the United States. Within the five paramount chiefdoms and the island's one town--the municipalities--there are elected executives (the chief magistrates), justices, and councils.⁷ There is a state legislature with representatives elected from each of the municipalities, a state court, and an elected governor. And there is the FSM Congress, the FSM president, and an FSM supreme court. The American systems of municipal, state, and federal governments and executive, legislative, and judicial branches are faithfully replicated. Constitutions and charters have been carefully deliberated upon by Ponapean and Micronesian delegations, but they have been drawn up, finally, by American (and, in a few cases, American-trained Micronesian) attorneys. The memberships of the congress and legislatures are subdivided into committees; the executive branches are composed of a multiplicity of divisions, departments, bureaus, agencies, and authorities. At almost every level of government and in almost every branch, expatriate technical advisors and administrators can be found. But in the main, the governments of Micronesia are staffed and run by Micronesians.

Ponapeans, as I have explained, have notions of authority and government that differ fundamentally from those of the people who initially devised this form of government; and their performance within the government is significantly different than that of the people who designed it. One hears on Ponape constant shrieks of rage from expatriates who are thoroughly frustrated by the Ponapean process of governing. From my perspective as ethnographer, it is easy to say, given my preceding arguments, that this is how it should be. I cannot deny the likelihood that, were I in an administrative or technical position in the Ponapean government, my own shrieks would be heard as well.

I am going to use two kinds of examples to illustrate the problems currently being encountered in Ponapean government. The first is the product of Micronesia's recent colonial history and presents immediate problems for the development of efficient, responsive government on Ponape. The second is of a much deeper nature and represents basic philosophical differences between Ponapean notions of action and American notions of principle. I will then go on to explore the wider implications these kinds of problems hold for the growth of an effective electoral/bureaucratic system of government and the ways in which I perceive the Ponapeans already at work adapting the actual functioning of their government to

their own system of politics. Finally, I address an issue that arises out of this very process--the problem of federation among far-flung islands.

Present-day Ponapean government, and apparently Micronesian government in general, is confronted with an immediate problem of organization that is directly attributable to the American administration's colonial legacy. American rule in Micronesia has been for the most part autocratic. I am not necessarily charging it with heavy-handedness but pointing, rather, to the very centralized powers held in their time by the high commissioners and their district administrators. The various island legislatures acted throughout most of their histories as forums for discussion; district administrators always held veto power over them. The Congress of Micronesia was likewise subject to the high commissioner's veto. Budgetary decisions were entirely executive functions: in the early days it was a process of allocating scarce resources, while in more recent times it was the almost frantic search for ways in which to channel the flood tide of funding. As Ponapean political consciousness grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Ponape District Legislature found itself at times functioning squarely in opposition to the administration. At other times it appears to have simply accepted its semi-impotent status and concerned itself primarily with internal matters. The legislature was in no way perceived by the administration as a partner in government.

At the same time, however, Ponapeans were entering the administration and learning executive tasks. By the early 1970s Ponape had its first Ponapean district administrator, and departments in both the Trust Territory and Ponape District governments were being headed by Ponapeans and other Micronesians. The training and experience they gained were in the administration's autocratic tradition. Governmental decisions came either from Washington, D.C., through the high commissioner's office in Saipan, or were made in the district administrator's office. These Ponapean administrators were, like their superiors, beholden to Saipan and Washington, not the legislature.

Today the Ponapean government is able to make many--perhaps most--of its own day-to-day decisions and has an important voice in long-term planning. But the government is staffed largely by men who were trained in the American colonial system and who continue to perceive government as essentially and primarily an executive operation. They have no experience in cooperating with a legislative body that is, technically, an equal partner. And the legislature, having a tradition only of opposition or irrelevance to the administration and receiving no sign or indication that the executive branch is interested in cooperation, continues to perceive itself as set against the governor's office and charged with

striking an independent course. At a time when the government has been restructured to permit the cooperative effort absolutely necessary to the achievement of the creative solutions Ponape's immediate future cries out for, it remains instead bogged down in the unfortunate struggle that is part of America's colonial legacy.

Now, such competition for preeminence is a fundamental part of any dynamic political system that is not monolithic; the traditional Ponapean polity depends on the ceaseless interplay between the two parallel lines of chiefly titles for its own vitality. But at present the Ponapean government is constrained by it. The ultimate solution to this dilemma lies, I think, not in a series of workshops to re-educate Ponapean politicians but in gradual absorption of the Ponapean *politique* into the relations among the various members of government, over the course of several elections. I shall return to this shortly.

The second example I offer is drawn from the experience of several American attorneys who have worked on Ponape in various capacities, including service as legal aid lawyers and legislative counsels. The American judicial system depends for its efficiency on several factors that lie beyond the immediate courtroom environs. Two of these are precedent and appellate procedures. In general, courts are guided in points of law by preceding decisions, as spelled out in opinions and catalogued in law libraries. When a particular decision is disagreed with, it can be appealed to a higher court. Inherent in the appeals system, however, is the notion that there is an ultimate decision and that it, like all other decisions, will be based on precedent (unless it is a rare and significant case of reversing precedent, as in the civil rights decision that "separate but equal" was an impossibility).

Attorneys who represent Ponapeans in litigation report that, while the judiciary is frequently employed to resolve disputes, neither precedent nor an ultimate appellate decision are generally understood. I believe that this is so for many of the same reasons that I used in explaining the communal nature of the Ponapean polity. Perceiving no specific locus for authority but seeing it instead as existing embedded among actual relations between people, Ponapeans view decisions as being conditional and temporary, subject to changes in the individuals concerned or the relations between them. While Ponapeans rely heavily on precedent in the conduct of traditional politics, there are so very many possible precedents for every situation that they are not seen as guides *to* action so much as explanations and justifications *for* it, after the fact. A decision is made on pragmatic grounds, then rationalized in terms of precedent. A legal decision that accepts the precedent as the *determining* factor does not make good

sense to Ponapeans. Similarly, because decisions are arrived at on pragmatic grounds that reflect the relations between the parties and between them and the adjudicator, there can really be no ultimate decision. As relations among the various parties and the conditions in which they exist shift, it is expected that the decision making itself must vary. Thus, losing a case on any given occasion does not logically imply that it might not be won on another occasion; and some Ponapeans return again and again to counsel, requesting that previously unsuccessful cases be taken up again. Law, like life, is expected to be flexible, to respond to immediate conditions, needs, and opportunities. A system of law, and of government, that asserts timeless principles is understood, but one that expects them to be lived by is not. Because authority is not alien, separate, or distinct but lies within the fabric of community life itself, Ponapeans at some level perceive themselves as being in control of their own lives; it is, I think, a sociocultural system that confers many individual freedoms yet works with great efficacy because this freedom depends on the well-being of the community.

It is for these reasons that Ponapeans can operate within the introduced electoral/bureaucratic system with the same notions of hierarchy and autonomy that characterize the traditional system. While the dynamics of Ponapean politics frequently entail intense competition and continual jockeying for position, so thoroughly communal is the Ponapean polity that individual success is understood in terms of the community's benefit. Unlike true peasants, who have known generations of subservience to feudal powers and understand gain as ultimately benefiting someone else (a lord, a landlord, a tax collector), Ponapeans do not share in what George Foster (1967) has described as "the image of limited good," in which one man's gain necessarily implies another's loss; this is known in game theory as a zero-sum game. Cross-cultural research on fear of success among students, though not conducted on Ponape, provides me with some verification of this perception.

Susan Locke (1981), a psychologist, has compared students' responses on projective tests that asked them to complete stories about young people who have been extremely successful in their schoolwork. Among students at a large, urban, public university, many of whom are immigrants and the majority of whom are the first of their families to attend college, she found a consistent pattern of fear. These students perceived that in American society academic and business success implies a frightening degree of alienation from family and community. To be successful, they believe, is also to be alone; career success comes only at tremendous personal cost. The same test applied to Senegalese students from mostly

rural backgrounds in Dakar, the capital city, provided strikingly different results. These students spoke instead of how their families and communities would celebrate their successes and imagined themselves as remaining well integrated in their societies. Locke's work expresses exactly the cultural context of competition and success that I perceive on Ponape. The communal nature of their political economy will in time, I think, shape the operation of the electoral/bureaucratic system and make it, eventually, a truly Ponapean system.

In the absence of an alienated or truly differentiated locus of authority, individual success does not come at the expense of other community members but rather includes them. Ponapeans perceive their chiefs as greedy because they are the focal points for the continual presentation of feast goods. But chiefs are, in general, men whose political advancement is in large measure determined by their contributions and who are expected, ultimately, to redistribute significant portions of what they have been given. In the traditional Ponapean political economy the items that confer prestige--yams, kava, pigs, and general community service--are not in scarce supply. Authority, then, does not come about by controlling access to these things but by producing and distributing them. Power cannot be obtained by cornering the market, as it were, because a leadership role exists only when members of the community see in it their own direct benefit. Status is accrued through skill and labor put to use for the community.

This is not meant to sound utopian. There are both important differences in status and in personal and family wealth in Ponapean communities. But the two exist in tandem in a fashion that differs fundamentally from the relation between the two in capitalist society. As Max Weber showed in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1952), and as is clearly demonstrated by the philosophy and policies of the Reagan administration, there is in capitalism a notion that worldly success and wealth are in themselves manifestations of underlying virtue, that affluence in and of itself confers status. (The older the wealth and the less obvious the earning of it, the greater the status it confers; see Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class* [1953]). On Ponape, accumulation that is unaccompanied by distribution is not understood. 'Kaidehn kowe mehn wai' ("You're not an American") is a common retort to instances of stinginess. The notion that status implies generosity has profound effects upon the process of government on Ponape today, as does the understanding that personal relations determine principle rather than the reverse.

The Evolution of Ponapean Politics

As I have already stressed, most Ponapean social and political interaction takes place within the sections, the island's basic communities. Within the sections, the entire political process takes place on a face-to-face basis and authority is to be found within the group as a whole, represented but not controlled by the section chief. The sections are in turn bound together by the paramount chiefdoms. Prominent individuals within the chiefdoms--men with high titles--are well known not because of their titles but because of their participation in numerous feasts and other social activities. Their titles, though partly dependent on hereditary status, are more directly the product of political acumen and activity. Ponapean leaders occupy intensely public positions and they channel, rather than possess, the authority of the community.

Because political communities are genuine communities on Ponape, political actions are based on interpersonal relations rather than abstract principles. This is possible--indeed, highly effective--because members of the community are acutely aware of who benefits from any given action and how they benefit. Members can choose to participate in or refrain from the community's activities. Politicians in the electoral/bureaucratic system understand this, and their own actions are informed by and predicated on their membership in Ponapean communities and not on the principles that underlie the original formation of the system. The faceless "equality-before-the-law" character of bourgeois democracy allows the individual neither any control over his or her own participation in society nor access to the benefits accrued by others. The outrage of expatriates at what they perceive as inefficiency, irresponsibility, and misallocation of funds is certainly justified from the point of view of principle. Ponapeans concur in these judgments. But for anyone for whom politics are communal, these are not shortcomings but necessary, efficacious, and beneficial political acts. I am keenly aware of the likelihood that this will be construed as criticism; it is intended as praise. The faceless, principled quality of bourgeois democracy lends itself readily to manipulation, legalistic maneuvering, and irresponsibility on a scale so vast as to threaten the existence of society itself. Because the lacework of authority in Ponapean communities cannot be accumulated and converted into power, the system is not a threat to itself. The apparent administrative failures portend, I think, a government that will be in no way as efficient as those of industrial societies; but for precisely that reason it will be far more responsive to the needs of the entire community. I preach. Ponapeans, unlike Americans, perceive their existence as primarily social and behave accordingly.

They do not suppose that some invisible hand shall magically make things right and they are, consequently, an eminently more pragmatic people than we who, living in vast and faceless societies, cast our fates to the wind.

This unwillingness to have abstract principle determine the quality of one's relations with others, even as a political system that assumes it is being implemented, is paralleled by the issue of force--the use of force--in Ponapean society. While there have been occasional and apparently isolated incidents of violence on Ponape, there does not seem to have been organized use of force by Ponapeans since the end of the ill-fated Sokehs rebellion in 1910. The Ponapeans warred among themselves and against the Spanish as late as 1898, but the technology and discipline of the Germans seem to have intimidated them. The Japanese are invariably spoken of as harsh disciplinarians, and, though I have heard tales of minor harassment, I know of no organized resistance to them. The American period has seen the use of jail sentences and the development of an armed Ponapean police force. But for the last seventy years or so, there has been little or no application of legitimate force by Ponapeans against Ponapeans to implement government policy. Given the Ponapeans' emphasis on consensus and their enormous tolerance for deviance, this is not especially remarkable. One wonders, however, about the future. I am not prepared to attend fully to this issue in this context, but it is certainly relevant to the present discussion and demands some consideration.

There are a number of firearms in Ponapean hands today, despite gun-control laws. A few of these are light rifles used for deer hunting, but there are also handguns. I have no idea of their numbers or of the availability of ammunition for them. This is reminiscent of conditions early in the German administration. The Ponapeans in those days were heavily armed and the Germans were understandably concerned. Following a devastating typhoon in 1905 the island suffered a food shortage (one of the very few noted in Ponapean traditions) and the Germans offered to trade food for guns--a striking reversal of the dominant trade patterns on Ponape in the preceding century. The people of Sokehs chiefdom did not join the rest of the island in this exchange, and this in part explains the singularity of their revolt against the Germans five years later (Ehrlich 1978). Placed in this context, a gradual rearmament does not represent a departure from Ponapean tradition. If some Ponapean community or chiefdom or region were to object strongly to a government policy and refuse to comply, it is not at all clear how a Ponapean government would respond. In the long absence of a tradition of centrally implemented force, and given the strong pulls toward autonomy of individuals and

communities, one perceives the low-key operation of Ponapean government as a politically as well as culturally determined course.

There are at present two Ponapean polities (along with that of the United States). I have argued that they are both responsive to a Ponapean *politique*, a set of cultural assumptions about the nature of the body politic and proper political conduct. While they function at present as different spheres, they are neither entirely distinct nor separate and are gradually becoming less so. The differences between the two are important, and each is partly responsible for the shape and effectiveness of the other. Though neither imposes a great deal upon the other, there is a form of symbiosis between them.

The great continuity of the traditional system of chiefly and communal politics is in some measure possible because chiefs and communities have not been responsible for modernization. They have not had to shoulder the burden of developing public health, education, and works programs, nor have they been charged with creating an export economy to produce foreign exchange. The most striking discontinuities and disruptions of life have been instigated by foreigners; and while Ponapeans and Micronesians have begun seriously to consider the roles that they themselves play in social disturbances, their communities, at least beyond the borders of the town, remain well integrated.

The electoral/bureaucratic system has functioned rather smoothly thus far because it is funded externally and has not had to make demands directly on Ponapean communities. There has been no *corvée*, no conscription, no pillaging; and all but excise taxes are insignificant. The high level of wage employment has meant that young Ponapeans have had little reason to emigrate in search of work. The government has encountered little opposition not only because of its aura of colonial authority but because it has had to do little that has been construed as offensive.

Life in Ponapean communities has been significantly affected by changes in health care, education, communications, transportation, and economics. The same could be said, of course, of nineteenth-century Ponape. Ponapeans long ago became dependent on steel tools, machine-made cloth, kerosene lamps, and a host of other simple necessities of daily life and have lost none of their Ponapean-ness for it. I would argue that these newer changes will likewise see the Ponapeans retaining their own distinctive culture. As they continue to take over local government, and as funding for that government continues to decrease, substantial adaptations must be expected. These changes will reflect the matrix of Ponapean culture in which they take place and will be responsive to the communal nature of Ponapean politics. Status and resources will be allocated in

much the same fashion as they always have, or so I believe. But the very factors that hint at the strength and success of a Ponapean polity--that is, the face-to-face, communal quality of the island's politics--suggest problems for the federation of islands of which it is part.

The FSM's Body Politic

In July of 1981 the FSM Congress held a special session on Moen, an island in the eastern part of Truk lagoon and seat of the Truk state government. It is worth noting that one of the reasons congress left its usual quarters on Ponape was the thoroughly unreliable power supply on Ponape, where the electric generators were continually breaking down (and were thus serving as a major target of expatriate invective against the local administration). Without the use of typewriters, copying machines, and air conditioners, government was frequently brought to a halt. During the congressional session in Truk a delegation from the islands in the western half of Truk lagoon, an area known as Faichuk, asked the legislators to establish a new and separate Faichuk State within the FSM. Congress acceded, voting unanimously in favor of creating a new state; and Toshiwo Nakayama, the FSM president, was faced with his first major dilemma. Elected as a representative from Truk (and thence by the congress to the presidency), Nakayama had to decide, in simplest terms, between alienating a large portion of his own constituency by vetoing the bill and presiding over what portended to be the first stage in the ensuing fragmentation of the Federation into a host of tiny island entities. Several regions, including the Mortlock Islands southeast of Truk, and the Central Carolines between Yap and Truk, had already indicated that they would demand similar status should Faichuk achieve statehood. Ponapeans, fearing that a second Trukese state within the Federation would give the Trukese a plurality in FSM politics, objected vociferously. Ponapeans were also quick to point out the direct economic consequences of such a political reorganization--consequences which were clearly at the root of the Faichuk move for regional autonomy. The FSM budget is divided, essentially, into four parts, to be spent in each of the four federated states, Kosrae, Ponape, Truk, and Yap. Each state is thus ensured funding for major capital projects such as hospitals, airports, power plants, water systems, harbor facilities, and roads. The Faichuk people saw the great bulk of Truk State's funding being directed to the state capital in Moen, in the eastern lagoon, and reasoned that statehood would obtain for them the development funding they felt themselves deprived of. The FSM legislation establishing Faichuk's statehood did not decide whether funding for the

new state would simply be one-half of that currently received by Truk State or one-fifth of the entire FSM budget, an alternative that would substantially reduce the level of funding in the other states. The Faichuk statehood issue, then, was unpopular almost everywhere in the FSM; and the congress was widely perceived as having shirked its responsibility, sending a most critical and delicate matter on to a man for whom the decision would be even more awkward. Nakayama deliberated at length and consulted extensively with leaders throughout the FSM. In October he vetoed the Faichuk statehood bill, arguing that Faichuk lacked the economic and political infrastructure necessary to support statehood. In November he announced that Faichuk was to become "a showcase and an economic development model for the FSM" (*National Union*, Nov. 15, 1981).

The people of Ponape viewed these events with great interest. In discussing the looming crisis, during the months of July-September 1981, the Ponapeans repeatedly asserted two positions on which most seemed to agree. The first was that Ponapeans had no right to impose their own will on the Trukese: if the Trukese wished to divide their state in half, that was their concern. The second was that the consequences of such a move would be grave enough to force Ponape to seriously consider seceding from the FSM. In Awak, a large, formerly independent community in northeastern Ponape, now a part of the Uh paramount chiefdom, the matter was given a distinctly local interpretation. Since 1900, when the depopulation trend reversed itself, the Awak population has grown steadily and the local sections have twice subdivided, creating three Awak sections. In 1979 one of these sections again split and the entire community was thrown into turmoil that was still being settled in 1981. (My "*One Man Cannot Rule a Thousand*": *Fission in a Ponapean Chiefdom* is a case study of this event.) The Awak people interpreted the Faichuk events in terms of their own local political processes. They recognized, on the one hand, the understandable drive for autonomy that characterizes communal politics such as theirs. "One man cannot rule a thousand" is how a section chief explained to me the fissioning process among Awak sections. Acutely conscious of their own colonial heritage, however, these people asserted on the other hand that this fissioning, the repeated breaking down of larger political bodies, would weaken the unity and hence the strength of the FSM in just the same way that fragmentation among the Awak sections has prevented Awak from reasserting its traditional independence from the Uh paramount chiefdom.

It is not unusual--in fact, it is quite common--to hear Ponapeans speak critically of themselves. They are, I think, far more conscious of the work-

ings of their own polity than Americans are of theirs. This is not coincidence, of course, since Ponapeans are far more in control of theirs. But along with this wisdom comes a certain quality--I am not sure if it is skepticism or resignation or pessimism or realism--that recognizes what may be political shortcomings, given the modern world context. Entirely dependent on external funding at present, the Ponapeans, I believe, have an understanding of how federation holds out for them a better bargaining position in their negotiations with the United States. Their notions about hierarchy inform them that a central government, representing many people and regions, has more status and more clout than a series of tiny island entities. But their simultaneous insistence on autonomy makes the discipline and authority necessary to an even marginally effective central government hard to bear. As long as politics are conducted in a face-to-face, communal arena, leaders can be closely watched and the benefits of participation carefully adjudged. Decisions that must apply equally across hundreds or thousands of miles, however, are inherently abstract. How can one determine the equity of their implementation if it cannot be observed? How does one maintain a sense, at least, of control over a leader who lives on a distant island? Under such circumstances authority becomes of necessity differentiated and to some degree alienated--a separation, as it were, of mind and body. Ponapeans have grown ambivalent about federation. They have been criticized within the FSM for this, and they are themselves critical of their own attitudes. I cannot pretend to know the future, though I am hopeful that the Ponapeans will retain a strong enough sense of the long view to continue their early strong support for Micronesian unity. If, however, they do not, they should not be chastised, as they sometimes are, for not being politically generous enough to work with others. Ponape's body politic requires intense cooperation--authority exists for them only within a functioning community; it is the communal nature of Ponapeans' politics that makes them wary of governments of which they are not each equally a part.

Glenn Petersen
City University of New York

NOTES

1. This paper is offered as an initial exploration of the topic, not as a set of final conclusions. I perceive it as part of a much larger work that seeks to encompass and describe Ponapean culture in its historical and social contexts in the late twentieth century; though

the work at hand is intended to stand on its own, it should be understood that a great deal of research and analysis not presented here underlies what does appear.

I wish to acknowledge support from the National Institute of Mental Health, the City University of New York's PSC-BHE Faculty Research Program, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, all of which have helped fund this research. My fieldwork on Ponape (February 1974-August 1975, June-August 1979, and July-August 1981) has been possible and successful only because of my Ponapean friends' great kindness and interest in my work. I believe that all I write is in some sense a repayment of my obligations to them, and I am always hopeful that my admiration for them shows through the scholarly detachment that I try to assume.

2. An economic and political discussion of Ponapean contact history in general and of the early American period in particular can be found in Petersen (1976).
3. The United States permitted (and, I believe, encouraged) the Mariana, Belau (Palau), and Marshall Islands each to break away from the rest of Micronesia and negotiate independently with it. Belau and the Marshalls are forming republics, while the Marianas voted to become a commonwealth of--that is, to be annexed by--the United States.
4. The history of U.S. rule in Micronesia is described by a Micronesian in Heine (1974), a former member of the U.S. government in McHenry (1975), and an American dissident in Gale (1979).
5. A full description of Ponapean secrecy and a discussion of the role it plays in Ponapean social organization is in Petersen (1978).
6. The strains toward autonomy and humility in Ponapean culture occasionally lead chiefs to abandon their stations and take seats for themselves among those actually preparing the feast goods.
7. Ponape State also includes a number of smaller outlying islands, with autonomous traditions, that are also chartered as municipalities.

REFERENCES CITED

- Berlin, Isaiah
 1976 *Vico and Herder*. New York: Viking.
 1980 *Against the current*. New York: Viking.
- Ehrlich, Paul
 1978 *The clothes of men*. Ph.D. diss., SUNY Stony Brook.
- Fischer, John L.
 1974 The role of the traditional chiefs on Ponape in the American period. In *Political development in Micronesia*, D. Hughes and S. Lingenfelter, eds. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Foster, George
 1967 *Tzintzuntzan*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Gale, Roger
 1979 *The Americanization of Micronesia*. Washington: University Press of America.

Giamatti, A. Bartlett

1981 *The University and the public interest*. New York: Atheneum.

Heine, Carl

1974 *Micronesia at the crossroads*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

Hughes, Daniel T.

1970 *Political conflict and harmony on Ponape*. New Haven: HRAFlex Books.

Locke, Susan

1981 Personal communication.

McHenry, Donald F.

1975 *Micronesia: Trust betrayed*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The National Union

Ponape: Federated States of Micronesia.

Petersen, Glenn

1975 What do we do now that we have voted to be independent? *Micronesian Independent*, 1 August 1975.

1976 Ponapean agriculture and economy: Politics, prestige, and problems of commercialization in the Eastern Caroline Islands. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University.

1978 Full disclosure: Knowledge, secrecy, and social distance in Ponapean society. Paper presented at the meetings of the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania, Feb. 1978, Asilomar, California.

1979 Breadfruit or rice?: The political economics of a vote in Micronesia. *Science & Society* 43:472-85.

1982 "One man cannot rule a thousand": *Fission in a Ponapean chiefdom*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Veblen, Thorstein

1953 *The theory of the leisure class*. New York: New American Library.

Weber, Max

1952 *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. New York: Scribners.

REVIEWS

Bruce Carrad, David A. M. Lea, and Kundapen K. Talyaga, eds., *Enga: Foundations for Development*. Volume 3 of *Enga Yaaka Lasemana*. Armidale, N.S.W.: University of New England, Department of Geography, for the Enga Provincial Government and the National Planning Office, Papua New Guinea, 1982. Pp. xii, 381, figures, tables, references, appendixes.

Papua New Guinea became an independent nation little more than a century after its effective colonization by Europeans. Obviously, change has been rapid in "the land that time forgot," and nowhere is this more evident than in the far western highlands, where people who only learned of the existence of the modern world in the 1930s are now a part of it as residents of Enga Province, established as an administrative unit in 1974.

Development has not kept pace with change, however, as is clear from this volume, a collection of "background papers" prepared to assist the planners and implementers of the Enga Provincial Development Programme, 1982-1985 and now published for the use of a wider audience. The twenty-six authors of seventeen chapters and four appendixes are mainly concerned with either surveying development efforts since the late 1930s or assessing the region's potential and the obstacles that constrain options for the future. The result is an uneven mix of papers: some display careful scholarship and are likely to be of lasting value to students of Papua New Guinea societies as well as to those individuals who will help shape their futures; others, however, are little more than superficial surveys that, by and large, leave a gloomy impression regarding both accomplishments and prospects.

In the first category are original contributions on the history of the province and its administration (by R. Lacey, N. Scott & K. Pitzz, and M. J. Meggitt), demography (D. Lea & N. Gray), the physical environment (C. Pain, J. Smith & D. Lea), subsistence horticulture and land potential (M. Bourke & D. Lea, G. Scott & C. Pain, and B. Allen), and the resurgence of tribal warfare (B. Allen & R. Giddings, and R. Gordon & A. Kipilan).

Less satisfying are the surveys of various aspects of "modern day Enga society" (e.g., the economy, infrastructure, education, and health). These chapters are replete with tables and statistics, but cautionary notes scat-

tered throughout the volume make one question the significance of these tabulations when the admitted inadequacies and incompleteness of the data bases are taken into account. Most of the surveys rely on information obtained from only a few well-studied or administratively-prominent locations, but generalizations are framed in terms of much larger units. Perhaps this presentation strategy is preferred by administrators and planners, but it obscures the striking diversity--environmental, social, cultural, and linguistic--that characterizes the province and that emerges so clearly from the first group of papers referred to above.

Enga Province, after all, encompasses a wide range of physical environments and climates in over twelve thousand square kilometers of land, and a population of nearly two hundred thousand people who speak a total of nine dialects of Enga and six other vernacular languages as well, with considerable accompanying social and cultural variation. "Up to only seven years ago [i.e., 1974] the people had never thought of themselves as a political or administrative entity. Nor for that matter had the government staff" (Scott & Pitzz, pp. 276-77). Given this state of affairs, it is at least misleading for Enga Province to be "the only province of the nation in which the provincial title is synonymous with a particular culture" (Brennan, p. 199).

A fairly comprehensive bibliography (pp. 369-81) provides assurance that those who guide the ambitious Enga Provincial Development Programme have far more, and better, resources available than are contained in this limited collection of papers. Moreover, this volume is only one of four in a series; the others, available only as limited circulation documents, may provide much of the detail that the survey chapters miss. One hopes, then, that the rich cultural diversity of the province will be appreciated and that the Programme will not perpetuate the problem of generating "services . . . planned to a national [or provincial] design, often with a minimum of local content" (Carrad, p. 7).

Terence E. Hays
Rhode Island College

Stewart Firth, *New Guinea under the Germans*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982. Pp. xiii, 216, maps, photographs, tables, bibliography, index. \$25.00.

Germany in the early 1880s was an empire without experience of empire. German missionaries and traders had been active for decades in

several parts of the world--in the western Pacific in quite a big way. Yet Bismarck's decision in 1884 to annex a number of overseas territories still took many observers by surprise. It presented the imperial government with the extraordinary problem of devising appropriate systems of cross-cultural administration. In German New Guinea, inexperience was a major factor in determining what was done (or not done) and how it was done--as with the Australians south of the border. Confusion, blunders, and poor control were to be expected.

Stewart Firth provides us with an excellent overview of German thinking and policies. His book complements that of Peter Hempenstall (*Pacific Islanders Under German Rule*, Canberra, 1978), so that we now have carefully researched accounts of German activities throughout the Pacific. It is one of the principal merits of Firth's book (as of Hempenstall's) that he does not confine himself to German policies or to the mechanics of administration. He gives major emphasis to an assessment of indigenous responses to white intrusion. A further plus is the fact that his history is mercifully free of the determinist preconceptions that have marred so many recent studies of colonial history. The Germans were not all bad. Their administration was not all bad. It was not all nasty exploitation.

The writing of both books has been made possible by the opening to researchers of the imperial archives in Potsdam. Firth has made full use of the opportunity. He has also consulted state and central archives in the Federal Republic, in addition to company and mission records. His work is founded on these primary sources, although the Germans also published a great deal on their Pacific possessions. For that reason his book, as a general history, is unlikely to be superseded for many years.

Where his account is likely to be modified fairly quickly is in the area of indigenous reaction to German pacification and economic development. Here he had to rely largely on the German archival material, which is bound to be skewed. His analysis presents a challenge to regional indigenous historians in New Guinea to correct the Western viewpoint through the techniques and resources of ethnohistory. Firth himself might well have made more extensive use of nonofficial sources, such as modern anthropological studies with a historical component; on the Talai of New Britain, for example, he makes brief reference to Salisbury's work, but ignores altogether the seminal research of A. L. and T. S. Epstein.

Firth makes no claim to originality in the principal questions he asks. His themes are the processes of German involvement, the failure of the chartered company that initially ran the colony (1884-1898), and the development of imperial policies on land, labor, finances, and relations with

the New Guineans. It is his emphasis on the last theme, on seeing the New Guineans as active participants rather than passive victims in the processes of interaction, that gives his writing a special interest. As he rightly notes, the small-scale nature of indigenous societies' meant that, as the frontier of control expanded, the Germans and their local agents became "an extra factor in local politics." While the Germans tried to use village leaders and factions to impose control, they were more often than not used by those leaders and factions to extend their own authority.

Firth raises a number of interesting questions in describing the very different responses of various peoples to German intrusion. While violent, often prolonged, resistance was common, some people welcomed the Germans from the beginning; some groups were overawed; others treated the German presence with something approaching indifference. The reasons for these responses are not always clear. It is obvious that the Tolai fought when German land acquisition became excessive; and the Bougainvilleans reacted against the methods of labor recruitment. But just why did the Manus islanders treat German punitive action against them with the casualness, almost tolerance, indicated by Firth?

His initial chapter on imperial expansion sets the tone for the whole book: it is moderate, balanced, judicious. He properly eschews the simplistic one-shot explanations that still seem to find their way into many historical texts. The process leading to annexation was multifactorial and multicausal (though Firth does quote with approval the view of Wehler that it was Bismarck's intention to whip up nationalist sentiment over imperialism in order to outflank the liberals and socialists in domestic politics, and so entrench Prussian values). New Guinea was a kind of afterthought: it had come into imperial calculations as a labor source for Samoa.

The Neu Guinea Compagnie, which administered the colony for the first fifteen years, was in every respect as disastrous as most of the other chartered companies. Firth might have clarified the fatal, basic flaw in the whole chartered company concept: woefully undercapitalized institutions with commercial personnel and objectives were expected to take new possessions through the difficult, unproductive phase of pacification before they could even begin economic activities. It was financially impossible, and it led to precipitate attempts to bring areas under control and to acquire land and labor. In New Guinea, as Firth notes, rather than introducing the New Guineans to Western notions of justice, the Compagnie adopted from the New Guineans the Melanesian practices of warfare and retribution.

The Compagnie unwisely concentrated on plantation development on the mainland, which was costly and long-term. The reason, according to Firth, was that the Germans were impressed by Java and adopted it as a model, instead of relying on immediate returns from trade with villagers (as was the established practice in the islands). I doubt that the Compagnie was sufficiently significant to warrant Firth's judgement that it represented "one of the great disasters of late nineteenth century colonialism." But it certainly set several unfortunate administrative precedents, including the arbitrary recruitment and brutal treatment of laborers, and the frequent use of ill-controlled punitive expeditions.

Firth rightly sees a change beginning with the arrival of the young Albert Hahl in 1896. He was the imperial governor from 1902 to 1914. Hahl had such an immediate effect (initially in the islands) because he recognized the crucial importance of improving and systematizing relations with the New Guineans. It is true that he saw them as economic assets (possibly dying out, and therefore dwindling assets), but he was also able to approach them as people. So, he gave major attention to what used to be called "native administration." The New Guineans were reassured over their possession of land, and they were given a formal role in government.

While there is no doubt that Hahl continued to put economic development through white plantations first--the imperial government would have tolerated nothing less--he regulated its impact on indigenous societies so as to minimize dislocation. As he told a gathering of settlers at a farewell function in 1914, "all progress depends on our relationship with the natives."

There will probably always be arguments about Hahl. Though Firth is not unsympathetic, by relying heavily on the official dispatches rather than on Hahl's personal writings he tends toward the cynical interpretation that Hahl regarded the New Guineans as units in the task of development, even if he appreciated a need for humaneness that was deprecated by most German settlers. But it must be remembered that Hahl had to defend himself in Berlin against regular charges that he was delaying development and his dispatches must be read in that light. His autobiography reveals a man interested in indigenous peoples and cultures for their own sake, anxious to consult with them rather than fight them, concerned that they should have wider opportunities. His long service in New Guinea made the German record much better than it would otherwise have been.

It may be carping to charge a general history with a lack of a central focus. Nevertheless it can well be argued that the writing of colonial history should concentrate on the central problem (as hindsight allows us to

see it) of colonial administration: regulating the processes of acculturation. In this light, the points of intersection of the administrative culture and indigenous cultures become the prime foci. At that level Hahl appointed headmen, or *luluais*, to bridge indigenous authority and German officialdom. Firth views these men essentially as policemen, as coercive German agents. That is a longstanding Australian interpretation, but it is debatable. Hahl certainly wanted things done, and the *luluais* were given duties that involved them in serious role conflict; but the position also meant formal recognition by the Germans of a range of traditional prerogatives of the *luluais*, who were thus intended to serve a dual function.

Hahl acknowledged the *luluais*' difficulties, and it was for that reason after 1906 that he began promoting the formation of councils (especially among the Tolai) which brought together a number of customary polities and offered an expanded role for New Guineans, in consultation with German officials, in local decision-making. This system had a good deal in common with the embryonic Native Authorities in contemporary British dependencies, and Hahl appears to have introduced it for similar, sound reasons. It was a significant and progressive innovation, offering the prospect that the New Guineans would play an increasing part in administration and development, from their own cultural bases. Yet the councils are ignored by Firth altogether. This is puzzling.

Firth does not gloss over the brutality and callousness of the Germans; but at the same time he does not give those aspects the almost exclusive prominence to which earlier Australian studies seemed addicted. Peace and order were brought to many areas; medical services were introduced (by both government and missions); a little government education (including technical education) was promoted; a surprising amount of research was encouraged. As with other modern colonies, there were entries on both sides of the ledger. Overall, it is hard to fault the balance of Firth's study.

Allan M. Healy
University of Wollongong

Francis X. Hezel, S. J., *The First Taint of Civilization: A History of the Caroline and Marshall Islands in Pre-Colonial Days, 1521-1885*. Pacific Islands Monograph Series No. 1. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983. Pp. 365, maps, bibliography. \$25.00.

An early European observer once likened the island groups of Micronesia to "a handful of chick-peas flung on a table." In addition to its de-

scriptive power, the analogy made a statement about the area's significance that survived the centuries and carried over into contemporary scholarly research. As tiny specks in a two-million-square-mile expanse of ocean, the islands received little more than a footnote in historians' attempts to tell the story of Western nations' involvement in the Pacific. Among academic communities, only anthropologists found the islands to be of particular interest. While Australian scholars in the 1950s began to write the histories of the islands around them, Micronesia remained a virtual backwater in terms of historical scholarship. Francis X. Hezel, S. J., of the Micronesian Seminar on Truk, has changed that. In writing a history of two of the major Micronesian island groups, the Carolines and the Marshalls, Hezel has filled a major gap in the study of Pacific islands history.

A frequent contributor to scholarly journals, Hezel, in writing this book, expanded on his initial interest in the early contact history of the area. His work took him to all the major research collections from Sydney to Salem. Assistance from a network of colleagues in such places as London, Zürich, Berlin, and Madrid complemented his own prodigious efforts. In 1979 came the forerunner of the present work, *Foreign Ships in Micronesia*, an annotated compendium of ships' contacts with the Caroline and Marshall Islands from 1521 to 1885. The publication of *The First Taint of Civilization* thus marks the culmination of more than ten years of intensive historical investigation.

Hezel focuses on the Europeans and Americans who found their way into Micronesian waters. Magellan's sighting of Guam on March 6, 1521 begins the story. Other Spanish explorers followed, all in search of a Pacific trade route to the fabled, Portuguese-controlled Spice Islands. This early Spanish activity in the Pacific, and Portugal's efforts to thwart it, led to numerous sightings and at least one period of prolonged contact between Europeans and islanders. The Spanish search for *Terra Australis incognita* in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries added more Micronesian islands to the crude, already overcrowded navigation maps.

Other actors entered. The establishment of a British penal colony in Australia and the development of the China trade brought British and American interests into the Pacific. By the end of the eighteenth century three different trade routes intersected Micronesia. The increase in shipping traffic led to the rediscovery of many islands in the Carolines and Marshalls. French and Russian naval expeditions conducted between 1815 and 1840 refined the early Pacific maps and fixed the islands in place. The Carolines and Marshalls were now "known."

The descriptions of d'Urville, von Kotzebue, Duperry, Lütke, and others revealed island cultures on the threshold of change. The tools, clothing, plants, animals, weapons, and other items left by the ships sowed the seeds of that change. After experiencing a less than hospitable reception at Woleai, Lütke, in 1827, wrote: "One could say that the more contact natives have with civilized men, the more corrupt they become." By this measure, argues Hezel, the worst was yet to come.

During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the Caroline and Marshall Islands experienced the increased visits of American whale-ships, the creation of beachcomber communities, and the arrival of formal trading companies. Violence, social disruption, and disease resulted as Euro-Americans sought to assert their interests against increasingly suspicious, sometimes hostile island worlds. Hezel believes the West offered the solution to the problems it created in the islands. American Protestant missionaries converted many of the islanders to Christianity, protected them against greedy traders and rowdy seamen, offered vaccines against epidemic diseases, and opened schools. British and American men-of-war also promoted stability, first checking the abuses caused by their fellow nationals in the islands and later protecting trading interests against chiefly machinations and local warfare.

Despite the heavy emphasis on Euro-American activities, glimpses of Micronesian islanders do come through. Fr. Juan Cantova, the Jesuit missionary who spearheaded the second major attempt to convert the "Palaos" islands in the 1720s, asked an enraged group of islanders on Ulithi what he had done to incur their anger. "You have come to change our customs," the assembled throng cried out as they prepared to strike him down. Hezel convincingly depicts the Palauans, over a one-hundred-year period, successfully luring foreigners into the complex web of local political rivalries. Similarly adept, by the 1840s Kosraeans evidenced a marked capacity to handle their own trade negotiations with visiting ships. Faced with this assertiveness, the resident whites left the island in 1844, thus bringing a quick end to the beachcombers' days on the island. Finally, the role of Ponapean native teachers, more than any other single factor, accounted for the spread of Christianity west from Ponape to the Mortlocks and the Truk Lagoon.

While the overall contribution of this book to the study of Pacific islands history is indisputable, a number of reservations do arise over certain aspects of the work. The author shows a strong inclination throughout to accept without qualification Western observers' accounts and interpretations of island societies. Given the ethnocentric biases, the limited period of exposure, and the linguistic and cultural barriers involved in

these accounts, the picture of the Caroline and Marshall islanders that emerges is, at best, fuzzy and incomplete. The rich cultural contexts against which islanders framed their responses to Western intrusion are left largely unexamined. The exact nature of change brought to the islands by the West also needs more careful scrutiny. While Hezel is certainly correct in describing the substantial impact the West had on these island cultures, Micronesians themselves played a greater role than mere acculturation and survival. Recent work by some anthropologists suggests the creative incorporation of Western material goods and institutions into resilient, flexible, and very different cultural systems. Finally, later unrest on Ponape and in the Western Carolines hurts the author's assertions that colonialism was an "acquired taste" and that, by 1885, the white man's law ruled supreme.

There is also a flaw in the book's physical format. The book's extensive bibliography attests to Hezel's thoroughness as a scholar, but the system of footnoting, devised by his working editor, is awkward, confusing, and sometimes inconsistent. In the end, however, the merits of this very important, pioneering work shine through. The author has taken a wealth of complex, often disparate material and woven it into a coherent, intelligible, and extremely well-written history of the Caroline and Marshall Islands. The book is required reading for anyone with an interest in the Pacific islands; its publication also heralds a very promising start for the Pacific Islands Monograph Series, a joint effort of the University of Hawaii Press and the Pacific Islands Studies Program at the University of Hawaii.

David Hanlon
University of Hawaii

Michael E. Hoare, ed., *The Resolution Journal of Johann Reinhold Forster, 1772-1775*. London: Hakluyt Society, 1982. Pp. xvii, 831.

Four slim volumes of the journal of Johann Reinhold Forster, beautifully produced and published by the Hakluyt Society, now add to the important original material from the second Pacific voyage of Captain James Cook. The editor, Michael E. Hoare, has written a persuasive introductory essay that does much to reestablish the scholarly reputation of Forster. Hoare's work is also a fine example of the editor's art at its best.

Two aspects of this work stand out most significantly. The first is the discovery and publication of a previously unknown journal of one of the

principals of Cook's voyage. Forster, a naturalist, brought both intelligence and scientific expertise to his observations. His identifications of plant and animal life were thorough and excellent, and his collection of samples was comprehensive and systematically organized. But Forster was also a linguist, anthropologist, and philosopher. He was called by a contemporary "the first polyhistor" of their century. Thus, his descriptions of the cultures of many islands in Polynesia and newly discovered islands of Melanesia are penetrating, objective, and extensive.

This fact directs attention to a second important aspect of the present volumes: the restoration of Forster's reputation. Forster and his young son George, who also sailed on the voyage as an assistant to his father, have suffered from a negative image almost from the moment the *Resolution* returned to England. The father was particularly identified as a difficult, contentious, and disagreeable person. Even recently, Cook biographer and editor, J. C. Beaglehole, has written in the second volume of Cook's journal, "Let us admit at once . . . the virtues of Forester. . . . Yet there is nothing that can make him other than one of the Admiralty's vast mistakes."

The qualities of personality--even Dr. Hoare has titled his Forster biography *Tactless Philosopher*--have apparently obscured his brilliance as a scientist. Today modern interpreters take him first as creative thinker and second as unpleasant traveling companion. And the reader must agree. Here is a remarkable observer who wrote about the religion, language, artifacts, dance, and agriculture of several Polynesian societies. He was sensitive to these cultures, asking for their native names of things and places and then pausing to write an intelligent, comparative discourse. His discussion of society in the New Hebrides is noted for its comprehension and depth.

In sum, this is a valuable and exciting addition to one's library: to Cook lore, to scholarly information about the Pacific, and to good reading on fascinating topics.

Pauline N. King
University of Hawaii

Amirah Inglis, *Karo: The Life and Fate of a Papuan*. Canberra: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies in association with Australian National University Press, 1982. Pp. xviii, 143, illustrated. A\$10.95.

Klaus-Friedrich Koch, ed., *Logs in the Current of the Sea: Neli Lifuka's Story of Kioa and the Vaitupu Colonists*. Cambridge, Mass: Press of

the Langdon Associates; Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978. Pp. xviii, 110, illustrated. A\$9.90.

A decade or more ago Pacific historians aspired to write "island-oriented history" and placed the balance of interest on "the Islanders themselves." To do this properly was easier said than done, and no doubt for this reason such terms are bandied about much less these days. More recently, however, a small number of "self accounts" by islanders have become available: that is, edited transcripts of taped interviews between an anthropologist and the islander concerned. One of these autobiographies of sorts is the book subtitled *Neli Lifuka's Story of Kioa and the Vaitupu Colonists*.

Most of the book actually deals with the first fifty-six years of Neli's life, before he ever set foot on Kioa. Born in 1905, Neli was typical of twentieth-century Tuvaluans in that he spent many years of his life working overseas, though the range of his experiences is perhaps out of the ordinary. During his adult life he worked at the phosphate diggings at Ocean Island, in the government school at Vaitupu (his home island), for the Americans during World War II, and after the war as native magistrate at Vaitupu, then for the Colonial Wholesale Society throughout the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Finally in 1962 he assumed the position of headman at faction-tom Kioa, the small island off Cakadrove Province in Fiji, which had been purchased by the people of Vaitupu in 1947 from their wartime savings and then settled piecemeal as a commercial venture.

Neli emerges from his own account as a man of uncommon ability, yet flawed by fundamental failings and contradictions. He was one of those turbulent spirits, born to lead but incapable of following, at odds with himself as well as with others. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than during his tenure as the energetic and reforming native magistrate at Vaitupu during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Taking advantage of his position of authority he became a law unto himself, dispensing justice high-handedly on many occasions ("I was the boss of my community"), holding illegal drinking parties ("I had a little celebration with my staff in the courthouse"), and even committing adultery in the church with the elderly pastor's wife ("Well, I do know that she started it"), until eventually he was fired by the colonial government (under duress from Vaitupu's traditional leadership) as an example to the rest of the community. This is the most valuable section of the book, a striking example of the tendency of native

magistrates in the then Ellice Islands to confound the authority of their office with personal power for its own sake. It also brings out Neli in his true colors: too much of an individualist, too intransigent, and too arrogant to care about maintaining the community support so necessary to leadership in a Tuvaluan context where the social contract prevails.

Neli's "self account" could have turned into a worthwhile and informative book had the material been handled more rigorously and with greater discretion. Instead the book is beset with problems. First, Neli's outline of his life is too sketchy to provide a framework for the narrative. Even if Koch did not always possess detailed knowledge of the events and range of situations encompassed by Neli's career, there was still scope to apply interview techniques to flesh out his story. This raises an associated problem: Koch claims to have collected forty-eight hours of testimony on tape, yet the lightly-edited narrative can be read in one not-too-strenuous sitting. It is also disturbing to see that Neli was allowed to blatantly use the final chapter as a vehicle to criticize his opponents on Kioa, many of whom are still alive. He verbally smites them hip and thigh, yet they are given no right of reply. This does give an indication of the strength of feeling that existed between rival individuals and groups on Kioa, but other, less hurtful, ways could have been found to let Neli make his point. Given the history of factionalism on the island, Neli Lifuka's published apologia is unlikely to contribute toward community well-being, and in the circumstances it is fortunate that few, if any, copies have found their way to Kioa.

There is no doubt, whatever the counterclaims of his critics, that Neli finally got the development program on Kioa underway. But to offset this achievement was Neli's typically abrasive and unaccommodating style of leadership and his tendency (not brought out by Koch) to work behind other Kioans' back in implementing the development program. This was mentioned to me with some feeling by members of a delegation of Kioans visiting Vaitupu when I was doing fieldwork on the island in 1978.

Logs in the Current of the Sea would have been a more useful book had Neli's testimony of 1969 been published promptly rather than nine years later, only two years before his death. This delay underscores the continuing need for another full-scale study of Kioa, and I hope it is not too long in coming because the ongoing, if perplexing, saga of this unique, resettled community badly needs updating: it has received little mention in the scholarly literature since G. M. White presented his findings almost twenty years ago (White 1965). I also hope that Neli's story will encour-

age the publication of further “self accounts” of Pacific islanders--not necessarily those of leaders--but better presented than this one.

Unlike *Logs in the Current of the Sea*, Amirah Inglis's account of the legendary Papuan, Karo Araua, is not a “self account” but a conventional biography. It is an engaging little book, somewhat overpriced in terms of size and production but well worth the money when it comes to the more important consideration of quality. It is more an extended essay than a book: the text proceeds at a leisurely pace yet can be read at a single sitting. ‘Because the book is both entertaining and instructive, it is hoped that its price won't deter buyers and readers in Papua New Guinea.

Karo, born a year or so before Neli Lifuka, came from the gulf area of Papua. In a society that placed a premium on tough male virtues he had a reputation of being *ivora rovaea* (very savage), eventually becoming village constable (and a much feared one) and later a member of the Armed Constabulary. In a fit of rage he committed his first murder, shooting a fellow constable in an argument over who should carry a mailbag. Out of jail, he soon found himself having further brushes with the white man's law, which culminated in a second jail sentence for the audacious robbery of a safe from a government station. He then committed the crime that sent him to the gallows: the murder of his jailer and the man's wife and child. It is the singular way in which Karo went through life, and to his death, that assumes significance in this biography, which details his defiant stance towards the extraordinarily repressive native legislation of the interwar Australian administration. That Karo is now enshrined in legend and song indirectly speaks volumes about Papuans' perceptions of Australian rule. Karo died but in death gained a victory. As Mrs. Inglis observes, “though Papuans are now Papua New Guineans and the government is no longer a colonial one, they still sing and enjoy to hear the story of ‘white foreigners’ brought down or at least made to sit up and take notice of a Papuans man with traditional strengths” (p. 120).

Karo is the type of book that so easily could have fallen flat on its face. Instead, Karo himself emerges convincingly, and this is partly so because Mrs. Inglis succeeds in integrating the details of her subject's extraordinary life with both his cultural milieu and the colonial context. She has also largely overcome the relative dearth of written sources on Karo by interviewing people who either knew the man or participated at one point or another in the train of events. This alone makes the whole effort of writing the book worthwhile because these informants are likely to have passed away by the time another biography of Karo appears, if indeed another one is ever attempted. Unlike Neli Lifuka's account, which

is of passing interest except to a few specialists, Mrs. Inglis's *Karo* will be of lasting value and deserves a wide and varied readership.

Doug Munro
Port Author Conservation Project
Tasmania, Australia

REFERENCE

White, G. M. 1965. *Kioa: An Ellice Community in Fiji*. Eugene: Department of Anthropology, University of Oregon.

Roger M. Keesing, *Kwaio Religion: The Living and the Dead in a Solomon Island Community*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Pp. xi, 257, figures, illustrations, glossary, references. \$28.00. Paper \$14.00

In island Melanesia and Polynesia there are few societies in which a traditional religion survived into the twentieth century, available for investigation, description, and analysis by anthropologists. As a result, our knowledge of oceanic Austronesian religious beliefs and their practice, either among the various individual societies or in a more general comparative sense, is not very extensive. In the Solomon Islands, missionaries such as Fox and Ivens provided fairly detailed accounts of traditional religion among those Melanesian societies they were in the process of Christianizing, while the anthropologist Firth produced his now classic study of the Polynesian religion of Tikopia just prior to total conversion. Thus an intensive, long-term, and highly analytical study of religion among the bush or inland Kwaio of the central part of the island of Malaita--one of the few societies to retain its indigenous beliefs--is a welcome addition to an otherwise meager literature.

Kwaio Religion is not an extensive descriptive account of the magical procedures and formulas, the rites and ritual performances, or their symbolic meanings as they are still carried out by this one remaining non-Christian society in the rapidly Westernizing and now independent Solomon Islands. Rather the book is a short and incisive interpretative summary, deriving from copious data obtained by Keesing during seven stays with the Kwaio, and totalling some five years of fieldwork over the course of the last seventeen years. In fact, Keesing explicitly states that "it would

take volumes to describe the complicated sequences and procedures of Kwaio ritual in full detail." Moreover, religion is not a category the bush Kwaio would themselves distinguish from other kinds of knowledge and procedures; it is part of and central to every aspect of their lives. Its separation in this book is imposed by the author for analytical purposes. Moreover, it includes magic, a category the Kwaio do distinguish from other kinds of knowledge about the sacred because it constitutes property, can be bought and sold, and is supposed to achieve its ends even when the performer is not related to the ancestor from whom it comes. Thus under the rubric religion, Keesing includes the whole array of magico-religious acts and beliefs, a category that Gilbert Lewis and many others now refer to as ritual, where ritual not only has its primary meaning--a mode of action or collective work for social ends--but also its symbolic sense of a system of communication associated with various implicit or explicit cosmological structures.

Keesing's account opens with an introduction to and elaboration on the spirit world of Kwaio: their encounters with the *adalo* or ancestors who permeate every aspect of their lives, from their social structure and economics to their customary law and politics. We perceive *adalo* as the young child comes to learn about them. We learn of the powers, nature, and origin of the *adalo* and their relation to "mana" (*nanama*) as a process or state (and not, as is so often supposed, a supernatural force or substance). We are instructed in the ways that Kwaio descent groups and their shrines are tied together in complex genealogical networks that link the living closely with the dead and to the land. Shrines and the rites propitiating the ancient ancestors with sacrifices of pigs in Keesing's view "provide a kind of mapping of the history of social relationships, an enactment of the past as it continues in the present." In the same way, the layout and structure of each settlement may be an expression of a subtle conceptual scheme of sacred (*abu*) and profane (*mola*), realm of men and realm of women, up and down, right and left, and so on. Keesing carefully elucidates this while noting that the Kwaio themselves appear to have one of the least fully developed cosmological and mythic systems of Malaita. Thus here and elsewhere throughout the book he is constantly torn between the more coherent and integrated structural and symbolic systems that he is able to impose on the data, and the fact that such systemization often goes un verbalized by even the most sophisticated and knowledgeable of his informants. At one point this leads him to make a most interesting general observation:

Kwaio have a self-centric perspective such that they are interested not in a global view of the total universe, but rather in ancestral interventions that affect *them*. (Indeed, a fundamental contrast between religions of classless tribal societies and religions of class-stratified societies seems to lie in this perspectival, as opposed to universal, view. The latter view has characteristically been a product of priestly classes devoted to systematizing a cosmology into a theology).

Later chapters in the book expand on kinds of adalo and the different powers they possess, how a few adalo rise to long-term prominence, and how one interacts with ancestors through divination, in curing, and by sacrifice, especially of pigs. Death has its own chapter, as the associated rituals vary greatly: those very limited in their sociological and religious consequences are for young children; rituals for adults are far more complex, especially as they gain in age and status; and the most elaborate ones are reserved for the death of a descent group's priest. It is the ceremony for the last, and the associated concept of *mamu*, the power to attract wealth, that is the most fully described of the rituals in the book.

In the more analytical chapters that end the book, the sociology of Kwaio ritual is again touched on briefly, and the symbolism associated with it is more fully developed. In this latter area Keesing urges caution because ritual is not seen just as a system of communication, with some meanings that are transparent and commonly perceived by all, and others that are consciously formulated only by a few or not at all; rather, and more importantly in Kwaio eyes, ritual is also seen as a mode of performance for achieving particular social outcomes. For their ability to explicate ritual meaning he assigns Kwaio a middle position in the Melanesian continuum. This is in line with an important following chapter, which explores the sociology of knowledge in their society: who knows what; how they achieve access to that knowledge; the different roles of men and women, young and old in religious acts; and the ability of the few ritual experts, men and women, not only to interpret but to preserve and modify that knowledge and so create new symbolic structures to accompany changes in the rites. Keesing is thus warning us against those anthropologists who would create a composite, coherent, and intellectually tidy scheme of symbols and meanings labeled as the religious system of the culture.

These chapters lead to the final theme of the book, that of change. Here Keesing applies his theory of the "political economy of knowledge," arguing that to fully understand change in human communities one must

approach culture from two well known anthropological points of view--ambiguous though each may be in respect to the other. One view stresses culture as a public and shared symbolic system independent of individuals; the other sees it situated in individuals' minds and knowledge, and, in a political context, as a generalization of what individuals themselves know that enables them to live successfully in a human community. Here Keesing examines closely the divergent and potentially conflicting interests of men and women, and of young and old, where senior Melanesian men use both the structures of kinship and their control of sacred knowledge to maintain their control of earthly politics, especially their power over female labor and younger men. Kwaio sexual politics, male and female roles therein, and the transformation that took place during the colonial period--when young men increasingly went off to stints of plantation labor, and warfare and revenge killing were quelled as a major cultural institution--are all explored as the means by which the ancestors' rules remain. Yet their practice has changed, often dramatically. It is in this context that Keesing attempts to determine why the bush Kwaio have remained religious traditionalists, while their coastal one-talks and all their neighbors have become Christian. It is, he finds, not just a matter of their environmental location, isolation, and lack of development and education; it is also because of the satisfaction of the traditional system itself, and a part of the political struggle to retain their cultural identity and autonomy. It is a means of avoiding the alienation from their past, their cultural heritage, so evident among their Malaitan neighbors, and so prevalent among many of those communities that now make up the newly independent Solomon Islands.

Kwaio Religion is an important book for several reasons. First, it greatly extends our knowledge of religion in an eastern oceanic Austronesian society where modern accounts are few. Second, the analysis draws on recent anthropological concepts and theories in the field of religion to illuminate and organize this data in an economical and lucid fashion. Finally, the book succeeds because it explicitly attempts a delicate balancing act between two schools of thought: those who would treat the study of tribal religion mainly as the exposition of a coherent, collective symbol system; and those who would either turn it into its diverse empirical components residing in individuals, or portray it as some sort of ideological veil of illusion disguising the nature and ensuring the perpetuation of the social and political order. The balancing act may not always seem successful in the compass of this short book (one continuously wants to know more), but this reviewer is satisfied that the rich corpus of data gathered

by Keesing has been treated with more sympathy, circumspection, and subtlety than might otherwise have been the case had he pursued a more singular analytical paradigm.

Roger C. Green
University of Auckland

Barry Macdonald, *Cinderellas of the Empire: Towards a History of Kiribati and Tuvalu*. Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1982. Pp. xii, 335, maps, bibliography, subject index. A\$19.50.

To write a book on two distinct island groups, one Micronesian and the other Polynesian, from precontact times to the present, is a daunting task. Yet this book goes a long way toward accomplishing this. It is well researched and, though a general history, is committed to minute detail and includes individual interpretation.

Dr. Macdonald's major theme is that despite the contact with European whalers, beachcombers, and traders, the encroachment of Christian missionaries (English, American, Hawaiian, and French), the accommodation of British government officials and their policies, and the impact of World War II, both Kiribati (Gilbert Islands) and Tuvalu (Ellice Islands) have retained their distinctive cultural identity. Both island groups have adapted to Western innovations and ideas in their own way and at their own pace.

Each phase of the exposure to the Western world is presented. First came the traders from the mid-1830s onward, who generally dealt with the Gilbertese (I Kiribati) according to the values of the host culture. In 1857 came the first white missionary, Hiram Bingham Jr., son of the famed missionary to Hawaii of the 1820s. The mission representing Boston Puritanism did not prosper, primarily, according to Macdonald, because the islanders lacked extensive contact with whites. The I Kiribati had not begun to question their own mores nor could they perceive any value in the Christian message. The London Missionary Society, which set up missionary bases in the Ellice Islands, fared much better. With greater exposure to traders and their goods, these islanders had already begun to examine their traditional beliefs. A vacuum of receptivity existed as it had in Hawaii in the 1820s. But whether the missions were a success or failure is only one issue. The other is the effects, subtle or otherwise, that the

missions generated. Macdonald neglects to note the important pre-conditions the missions fostered that so eased the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1892.

The first resident commissioner for the Protectorate was Charles Swayne. This book would have benefited from a table of all resident commissioners and their respective dates of service. Swayne collected all the island laws, many of which had been modified by Christian teaching, and devised a common code. He recognized high chiefs in the northern section of the Gilbert Islands and so froze a fluid situation, for no one high chief maintained "office" for an extended period of time, except in Butaritari and Abemama where hereditary chieftainships prevailed. In the southern and Ellice Islands, the office of magistrate was established, which bypassed the authority of the old men of *the maneaba* or *maneapa* (community houses) of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands respectively. Swayne also "created" the village style of habitation for hitherto the Gilbertese had lived in scattered hamlets.

It was Telfer Campbell, however, a fiery Orangeman, who from 1895 to 1908 left the deepest imprint on Gilbert and Ellice Island society for many a decade. Campbell desired model communities and established an administrative hierarchy to bring this into effect. He repudiated the policy of maintaining the power of high chiefs and island governments. Instead, he wanted law and order in the British style. Nor did he have much regard for religion, whether Protestant or Catholic (the French Catholics had arrived on Butaritari in 1889), and instead proclaimed work as "a good religion for the natives." A public works campaign was set up involving all adults.

Yet adherence to the old values persisted. High chiefs and their families remained a potent political force, although not every island had such figures. The chiefly elites often undermined the authority of native governments. The *unimane* of old men of the Gilberts remained aloof from native governments but presided in informal councils that continued to settle land disputes, organize village social life, and act as a check on the native governments.

The Ten Year Plan of Reconstruction and Development and Welfare, approved by the British after World War II, emphasized rehabilitation, the provision of new land to relieve the atoll overpopulation, and the improvement of social services. These services consisted of the high school, a teacher training college, a new hospital, a small-ship harbor at Betio, and an administrative center. All these developments took place on South Ta-

rawa, Gilbert Islands, in the 1950s. And SO began the exodus to South Tarawa that continues today. By the 1970s one-quarter of the Gilbertese population lived on South Tarawa.

On South Tarawa traditional values were modified to adapt to the new system of the cash economy; but they did not evaporate. The I Kiribati believe it is shameful to either exploit or be exploited by a fellow islander. Translated into practical terms, this means that excess fish cannot be sold but must be given away. It is, however, acceptable to sell one's goods to a cooperative where face-to-face transactions are avoided. Even on the outer islands, the *mronron*, a form of cooperative, exists. They have been organized because they represent a multiplicity of sharing. Also, a Gilbertese would be loath to work for another person since independence is highly valued. Similarly, however, it is permissible to work for a seemingly anonymous institution such as the government.

Meanwhile, the colony drew closer to separation and independence for the two distinct island groups. In 1975 separation was completed and Ellice islanders left South Tarawa. Three years later the Ellice Islands became the independent Tuvalu, and the following year Kiribati became an independent nation.

Cinderellas of the Empire concentrates far more on Kiribati than Tuvalu, limiting discussion of the latter to the beginning and conclusion of the book. However, the book more than succeeds in its goal of being "towards a history of Kiribati and Tuvalu" and is essential reading for any who wish to know more of these two new nations, whether it be their past origins or their present political situation.

Sandra J. Rennie
Australian National University

Sterling Robbins, *Auyana: Those Who Held onto Home*. Anthropological Studies in the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea, No. 6. Washington: University of Washington Press, 1982. Pp. 274, illustrations \$35.00.

This volume is an ethnographic monograph, albeit a very unusual one. The people described are the Auyana, one of the four Eastern Highlands groups studied in the New Guinea Microevolution Project. Using social organization as a focus, the volume examines the interrelationships among Auyana social structure, warfare, wealth, and marriage.

Ethnographic studies generally concentrate on the results of a researcher's analysis rather than the process by which these results were

reached. This volume, in contrast, takes the reader through Robbins' field experiences and learning processes, explaining in detail the manner in which classifications were made, and providing the "raw" quantitative data concerning Auyana attributes and activities on which Robbins' analysis is based. In working "from scratch," Robbins has rejected conventional terms of social organization in favor of three social units central to Auyana society: sovereignties, pooling units, and subpooling units. Although this nomenclature will be unfamiliar to the anthropological reader, Robbins does a creditable job of defining and describing each of these units, which proves to be useful in understanding the fluidity of social groupings in New Guinea.

The volume is the sixth to be published in the series "Anthropological studies in the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea," and the second ethnography. As such, it is an integral part of what promises to be a detailed, controlled comparison of four related groups living to the south and east of Kainantu. This linkage with a broader project has resulted in an unexpected positive feature in the current volume. The four project ethnographers were asked to gather comparable data using Murdock et al., *Outline of Cultural Materials* (1950). Such basic ethnographic data is presented in Robbins' second chapter, "A Framework," and is exactly the sort of valuable comparative material that other researchers frequently seek but rarely find in most problem-oriented anthropological monographs. Unfortunately, however, the potential usefulness of this body of data is reduced by the book's rather superficial two-page index.

While the rejection of conventional modes of analysis has its benefits, there are certain drawbacks that are apparent in this volume. Unconventional units of analysis make a scan reading of the volume difficult if not impossible. Tables are very complicated, sometimes unnecessarily so. Many contain alphanumeric designations for various categories where a gloss would be more comprehensible. Titles are not always informative. Table 30, for example, is entitled "Fights between Sovereignties: Much Interaction." Without reading the associated text, it is not apparent that the numbers in the table represent homicide deaths rather than skirmishes, fights, and so on.

Furthermore, it is not always obvious to the reader how the categories in tables were collapsed for statistical testing. This is of particular concern since at least part of the analysis is incorrect. For example, on page 129 Robbins states, "Table 11 affirms this and the difference is significant, at $^{\wedge}.05$ level in the Chi square test for significance." Yet, by inspection, Table 11 did not look significant, and indeed my own calculations show that it is not (Chi square = 1.58, d.f. = 1, $p > .05$).

The ethnographic present for the volume is the early 1960s, and the monograph is a reworking of the author's 1970 Ph.D. thesis. Unfortunately, when the 1970 manuscript was revised, current literature was not considered and the theoretical present for the volume is still 1970. Sixty percent of the sources cited in the bibliography are from the 1960s, and some 84 percent are from the 1950s and 1960s. Of the six sources more recent than 1970, five are largely courtesy references to the other volumes in the series.

In general, the lack of concern with contemporary literature does little damage to the basic ethnography, which is excellent. In a few places, however, inaccuracies have crept in. For example, on page 182 Robbins states, "Although fighting in the Highlands of New Guinea has often been described as 'intense' no authors have provided systematic quantitative data on the intensity." While this may have been true in 1970, it is certainly not true now. Meggitt's excellent monograph, *Blood Is Their Argument* (1977), immediately comes to mind as a counterexample.

Despite all these criticisms, the book is, in balance, an excellent ethnography and a valuable contribution. It was researched at a time when precontact patterns came readily to the minds of informants, and these basic data are timeless. A twenty-five year history of Auyana warfare is particularly useful. The volume provides some interesting insights into the nature and fluidity of social organization in New Guinea and suggests some testable propositions about the relationship between warfare and other social phenomena.

Richard Scaglion
University of Pittsburgh

Melford E. Spiro, *Oedipus in the Trobriands*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. 224. \$26.00. Paper \$12.95.

From its inception, psychoanalysis has fostered an intimate relationship with anthropological inquiry. At times, this relationship has seemed to be mutually satisfying. Close work with human beings, the willingness to suspend and question the observer's judgments, and the belief in underlying dynamics have, after all, been the hallmarks of both fields. The borrowing of concepts and cooperative investigation have characterized this relationship at its best. At other moments, however, intimacy has given way to strife. Like contending siblings, the two disciplines have vied for theoretical supremacy.

One of the first illustrations of this latter pattern occurred in the debate of the 1920s between Malinowski and Jones over the nature of the Oedipus complex. Based on his research in the Trobriand Islands, Malinowski posited a pattern of psychosexual development for children that was substantially different than its Western counterpart. At the age when Western boys were struggling to repress their incestuous desires for their mother, Trobriand boys were engaging in unrestrained sexual play with other children that gradually and “naturally” dissipated the sexual aspect of their maternal ties. The Trobriand father was portrayed as a friendly and nurturant figure who played no role in the child’s conception, rather than as a sexual rival whom the son wished to eliminate. Feelings focused on the mother and father in the familiar Oedipal triangle were, in the Trobriands, directed toward a boy’s sister and mother’s brother. Malinowski attributed these differences to the matrilineal family structure of Trobriand society.

In his response to Malinowski’s limited assertion of cultural relativism, Ernest Jones (1924) vigorously upheld the tenets of classical psychoanalysis. He characterized the Trobriand “ignorance” of physiological paternity as an attempt to “deflect the hostility felt by the growing boy for his father.” Mirroring the evolutionary perspective of Freud’s *Totem and Taboo*, Jones saw matrilineal society itself as an attempt to displace these feelings. The development of patriarchal society enabled man to “face his real father and live with him.” Malinowski’s rejoinder to Jones in *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* extended his more general critique of social evolutionism and reaffirmed his view of the relativity of psychoanalytic constructs.

In his recent book, Spiro returns to this debate. His stated aim is to throw doubt on what he sees as a general acceptance among anthropologists of Malinowski’s claims. Unlike earlier attempts to bridge these perspectives (e.g. Parsons 1964), Spiro’s account does not represent a theoretical compromise. He sees the Oedipus complex as a universal phenomenon in which cultural variation plays an extremely limited role. From beginning to end, Spiro’s argument is structured in a clear and logical form that is easily followed by the reader. The content of his argument, however, reflects many of the difficulties encountered when theories are transposed in entirety from one culture to another.

Spiro is at his most convincing when criticizing Malinowski’s findings. His careful review of the evidence points out some contradictions, but much more frequently finds the data to be irrelevant or ambiguous. Often these examples underline Malinowski’s misunderstandings about the nature of the unconscious, repression, and Oedipal theory in general. Thus,

Spiro notes that data on children aged three or four for whom Oedipal dynamics are most relevant is all but absent from Malinowski's account. Instead of concentrating on this period when the father is still the main authority in the nuclear family, Malinowski focused on the mother's brother who does not become important until adolescence. Similarly, Malinowski underestimates the role of repression when he accepts the vigorous denial of his adult informants as evidence for a lack of fantasies dealing with maternal incest. As Spiro observes, we would expect no less in any society. If Freud's patients had walked in discussing these things, there would have been no need for psychoanalysis.

In successive chapters, Spiro presents evidence that the Oedipus complex not only exists in the Trobriands, but is in fact "unusually strong." The initial support for this contention is taken primarily from myths and cultural beliefs. He then attempts to validate his hypothesis by locating developmental processes and psychological repercussions that are predictable from Oedipal theory.

The major impediment to judging the arguments of either Spiro or Malinowski is the absence of pertinent data. Ultimately, the proof of either contention lies in the fantasies of young children as they are expressed, dreamt, or performed in play. Lacking this material, both observers are forced to rely on myth and other cultural ideology. This procedure raises important methodological questions about the relationship between these phenomena and the unconscious conflicts experienced by individuals. Spiro sees this relationship as direct and causal. Using Kardinerian terms, he suggests that these belief systems represent projections of the unconscious material of individuals. Given common childrearing patterns, he claims, the members of small-scale societies "develop common fears, wishes, and fantasies" that are repressed and then expressed in commonly held myths and beliefs. Myths reflect fantasies.

Subsumed within this general process of projection, claims Spiro, are various other transformations that take the form of psychoanalytic defense mechanisms. Like Jones, he sees the omission of the father from reproductive theory and myth as a process of denial. Hostility for the mother's brother is seen as a feeling that has been displaced from the father. Spiro's facile movement from the unconscious to culture is in fact highly problematic. In theoretical systems where both theory and structural transformations are in the eye of the observer, one is sometimes left wondering, like Leach (1970:3) in his review of Levi-Strauss, if one is "being treated to a confidence trick." This feeling tends to depend on how closely explanation adheres to the data in question.

In this regard, Spiro is inconsistent. I found his analysis of various myths to be eloquent if somewhat incomplete. At other moments, however, Spiro's explanations are attenuated and tautological. To explain Malinowski's observation that dreams are not often recalled, Spiro suggests that a high percentage of these dreams concern the father, that these dreams are hostile, that they arouse guilt, and are repressed. He is prone to interject theoretical deductions and data from other cultures to bridge lacunae in the ethnographic material. This is especially true in his assertion that the Trobriand mother is overly seductive, and that the emphasis placed on the sister as an incestuous object represents a displacement from the mother. To his credit, Spiro is sometimes aware that his conclusions have become speculative.

A second problem inherent in Spiro's methodology is its minimization of culture. For Spiro (1982:49-51), cultural phenomena can be analyzed in two distinct modes. The first approach concerns itself with establishing systematic interrelationships within a culture and emphasizes conscious and shared meanings. In the second mode, cultural phenomena are explained with reference to "deep meanings" that have their bases in pan-human characteristics. Spiro's psychoanalytic approach falls within this second mode of inquiry and concerns itself with unconscious and individualized meaning. In fact, Spiro is not terribly impressed with the first approach. Cultural relativism is referred to as "that fatuous theory" and characterized as having little explanatory power. With cultural systematicity de-emphasized, Spiro's approach in *Oedipus in the Trobriands* can be described as deductive and analytic. Particular cultural components are isolated and then associated with specific ontogenetic sequences and their unconscious correlates.

It is clear that Spiro's approach privileges the process of child-rearing. He begins his theoretical premises with the phrase, "given common childhood experiences. . .," but this is a lot to concede. It is precisely at this point that culture makes its entrance into the child's life. How parents react to a child's developmental achievements and separations is guided by concepts that are embedded in a cultural framework. Can we then afford to ignore the cultural logic made manifest in child-rearing when exploring its impact on myths and other beliefs? It is certainly possible that we are witnessing an intracultural correlation rather than a process of causation when linking these variables together.

We must also wonder whether it is correct to associate cultural phenomena and psychodynamic development simply on the basis of logical similarity. Spiro is often careful in this regard, but when he attempts to validate his hypothesis by locating predicted psychological concomitants

in Trobriand culture, his evidence seems circumstantial. Perhaps Singer's critique of attempts to "psychoanalyze a culture" on the basis of ethnographic observation and the study of myth is relevant here:

Inferences from such data to unconscious psychological processes in individuals must remain highly indirect and precarious. If we know that one culture has a characteristic anxiety about disease, is it possible with the criteria now available to establish that this anxiety is wholly or in part a "projection" or "displacement" of unconscious guilt? I do not believe so. Neither the intensity of the anxiety, nor its inappropriateness in relation to the objective facts, nor its having been acquired in childhood would be sufficient criteria for this purpose. For if the anxiety had developed in the culture as a consequence of historical experience with epidemics or as a consequence of a world view which interprets disease as a punishment for misconduct, it might well be intense, objectively inappropriate, and taught to children. In that case we would still relate such anxiety to guilt feelings but these would not be unconscious; they would be conscious guilt feelings which can be explained in terms of the beliefs and values of the culture. (Singer [1953] 1971:90-91).

The absence of cultural material in a case like this might at worst distort a psychodynamic explanation and at best impoverish it. These lines of criticism can be brought to bear on Spiro's explanation of what he calls the "absent-father pattern." Spiro claims that the father is excluded from dreams, myth, and reproduction theory and that this reflects the desire of a growing boy to deny the wish to eliminate his father. But is the father actually absent from these cultural domains? Spiro notes that Malinowski merely emphasizes the presence of sisters and mothers in dreams and does not actually deny dreams of the father. With regard to myths, Spiro perceptively notes that Malinowski's classification of oral narratives into myths that exclude fathers and legends that do not is questionable.

Spiro goes on to review the famous debate about the "ignorance" of physiological paternity in Trobriand reproduction. He sees the exclusion of the father in this domain as an active denial rather than as sexual ignorance. But is the father actually excluded? An observation made by Malinowski (1929, 207-8) and expanded by Weiner (1976: 122-25) suggests that the father molds the external form of the fetus by repeated acts of sexual intercourse with the mother. This process is continued when the father later feeds the infant and massages its head to shape it. The magic

performed to make a child beautiful is given by the father's sister as are the decorations that in adolescence attract prospective lovers.

This structuring of parental contributions to the child according to an opposition of internal versus external characteristics is certainly consistent with the matrilineal emphasis in the Trobriands. The core of a person, based on his or her mother's blood and milk as well as a reincarnated matrilineal spirit, is what gives the child its enduring social identity. Paternal input is important for the physical and social development of the individual, but is at the same time relatively ephemeral (Ibid.:225-26). Transposed to concrete social relationships, this opposition is enacted in the relationships between a man and his sister and wife (McDougall 1975:94). With the sister, sexuality is strictly forbidden, but an enduring tie is created with her and her children. With a wife, sexuality is condoned, but the tie to her children is more tenuous. Childhood sexuality may not be repressed in Trobriand culture, but it is certainly divorced from a sense of generativity.

I believe that a cultural analysis of this type must precede our attempts to analyze the reactions of parents to their children's Oedipal expressions. Concepts of male and female as well as unilineal notions of procreation are instrumental in this process. The Oedipus complex--even an "unusually strong" Oedipus complex--is not sufficient to explain this cultural logic. Western children with Oedipal problems do not develop ideologies of this kind. Rather than attempting to prove a specific sequence of development using bits and pieces of Trobriand culture, our account can only be enriched by conducting our analysis at the level of systems.

A final aspect of Spiro's analysis that I wish to criticize is his negative view of Trobriand mechanisms for resolving Oedipal tensions. Spiro tells us that the Oedipus complex can eventually be extinguished, repressed, or incompletely repressed. One of these outcomes, he claims, can be said to characterize the "dominant form" taken by the Oedipus complex in one or another society. The Trobriand practice of "extruding" the adolescent son from his parental home is classified with the practice of painful initiations as customs that indicate an incomplete repression. According to Spiro, the function of this process is to remove the physically mature boy lest he act out his weakly repressed sexual and aggressive impulses. He goes on to suggest that in societies marked by the incomplete repression of the Oedipus complex, so much emotional and social energy is focused on dealing with these issues that "more productive" allocations of resources are obviated.

This conclusion must be questioned on several counts. Although Freud did suggest that the Oedipus complex could be extinguished, there is little

evidence that this actually occurs. To one degree or another, repression is used in all societies to resolve Oedipal conflict. The suggestion that the Trobriand adolescent's residential shift is indicative of incomplete repression and that this is somehow diagnostic does not stand up to examination. Spiro implies that the survival of Oedipal feelings in puberty is only characteristic of some societies, but not so Freud. Freud ([1923] 1955:246) posited a "diphasic" pattern of sexual development in which Oedipal feelings are repressed at a young age, but then are "revivified" at puberty:

We learn that at puberty, when the sexual instinct first makes its demands in full strength, the old familiar incestuous objects are taken up again and freshly cathected with libido. . . . From this time onwards, the human individual has to devote himself to the great task of detaching himself from his parents, and not until that task is achieved can he cease to be a child and become a member of the social community. For the son this task consists in detaching his libidinal wishes from his mother and employing them for the choice of a real outside love-object, and in reconciling himself with his father. . . . These tasks are set to everyone; and it is remarkable how seldom they are dealt with in an ideal manner. (Freud [1916-1917] 1963:336-37)

Seen in this light, the Trobriand adolescent's shift to the bachelor's house seems less a matter of extrusion and more a social mechanism to reinforce healthy development. Soon after his move, a boy begins cultivating yam gardens for a father, elder brother, or elder male kinsman to establish rights to land in a particular hamlet. He also begins to receive sexual partners in a process that will culminate in marriage. Leaving the parents' house is the first step in transforming a dependent boy into an autonomous man (Weiner 1976:146, 169, 177). While the child is indeed separated from his parents, the adaptive results of this transition are undeniable.

Despite my criticisms of *Oedipus in the Trobriands*, I believe that Spiro's attempt to disprove Malinowski's contention is largely successful. There is sufficient evidence advanced to suggest the existence of an Oedipus complex. The form taken by this complex in its interface with Trobriand culture, however, remains unclear.

Steven Zuckerman
University of Chicago

REFERENCES

- Freud, Sigmund
 [1912-1913] 1955
Totem and Taboo. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 13. London: Hogarth Press.
- [1916-1917] 1963
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. Standard Edition, vol. 16. London: Hogarth Press.
- [1923] 1955
Two Encyclopaedia Articles. Standard Edition, vol. 18. London: Hogarth Press.
- Jones, Ernest
 1924 "Mother-Right and the Sexual Ignorance of Savages." *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. 6.
- Leach, Edmund
 1970 *Claude Levi-Strauss*. New York: Viking Press.
- McDougall, Lorna
 1975 "The Quest of the Argonauts." In *Psychological Anthropology*. Thomas R. Williams, ed. The Hague: Mouton.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw
 1927 *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- 1929 *The Sexual Life of Savages*. New York: Horace Liveright.
- Parsons, Anne
 1964 "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal? The Jones-Malinowski Debate Revisited and a South Italian "Nuclear Complex." *Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, vol. 3.
- Singer, Milton B.
 [1953] 1971
 "Shame Cultures and Guilt Cultures." In *Shame and Guilt*. Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
- Spiro, Melford E.
 1982 "Collective Representations and Mental Representations in Religious Symbol Systems." In *On Symbols in Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Harry Hoijer*. Jacques Maquet, ed. Malibu: Undena Publications.
- Weiner, Annette B.
 1976 *Women of Value, Men of Renown*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Jehane Teilhe-Fisk, *Paradise Reviewed: An Interpretation of Gauguin's Polynesian Symbolism*. Studies in the Fine Arts: The Avant-Garde, o. 31. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Research Press, 1983. Pp. 315. \$44.95.

Paradise Reviewed, in the words of its author, "intends to show that Gauguin's works during the ten years he lived in French Polynesia . . . are . . . not only reliable but at the same time beautiful documents of sensitivity and insight into the culture of French Polynesia." This monograph also is a document of sensitivity and insight.

Teilhet-Fisk first examines selectively those aspects of Gauguin's background, such as his initial childhood exposure to the local peoples of Peru, that planted in him the first seeds of receptivity to Polynesian (and other non-European) cultures. In successive chapters, she recounts details of his life in Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands, as well as the ways in which Polynesian culture--most particularly, life in Tahiti--enabled him to synthesize his diverse interests in non-European art and religions into his own unique art style.

Previous authors have noted the existence of Polynesian design motifs in Gauguin's art, but perhaps none have so successfully shown the multi-dimensional way in which Gauguin's interests in Tahitians and a Tahitian awareness of life enhanced his own theosophical interests and made his art so much more than one that merely borrowed designs. Gauguin did not just borrow, he absorbed and amalgamated designs, ideas, and concepts from the art and the people around him. It is the integration of Polynesian phenomena with Javanese figure types, images of the Buddha, and Christian iconography (together with various aspects of Buddhism and Christianity) that makes his art, and the effects of his Polynesian exposure, unique.

The art works examined in this book include many familiar paintings as well as numerous wood carvings that are less well known. Of particular value is the inclusion of photographs of pertinent Polynesian art objects from Tahiti, the Marquesas, Austral Islands, Easter Island, and New Zealand, as well as photos of Tahitian people and *maraes*. The immediate juxtaposition of these photos with reproductions of Gauguin's works makes the nature of their relationship all the more obvious.

The book, which is a revision of Teilhet-Fisk's doctoral thesis for the University of California at Los Angeles, is thoroughly documented with extensive footnotes and bibliography and is fully illustrated. The only possible criticisms are the lack of color plates and the absence of references in the text to specific plate numbers--more than likely not the fault of the author. Her careful observations of Gauguin's personal and artistic devel-

opment, as well as her own familiarity with Polynesia and Polynesian art, lend a perspective and a perceptivity to this monograph that make it outstanding and well worth reading.

Deborah Waite
University of Hawaii

David Weisbrot, Abdul Paliwala, and Akilagpa Sawyerr, eds., *Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea*. Sydney: Butterworths, 1982. Pp. 319, bibliography, index.

Among the major issues confronting newly independent nations is the problem of creating an appropriate and well-functioning legal system. For Papua New Guinea, the question was considerably more complex, especially in light of the decolonial context in which just such an undertaking was initiated. The contributors to this much needed work have accomplished what they intended by capturing "the flavour of the exciting legal developments in Papua New Guinea of the past decade."

Broadly speaking, a formalized legal system serves two major purposes. First, to resolve public and private disputes according to established social principles. Second, to mete out justice for offences against society. In effecting both purposes, the legal system assumes the role of an agent of social control, acquiring profound political significance in the process.

The debate over the role of customary law in the national *corpus juris* of Papua New Guinea reflected the underlying ambivalence of the political decision-makers. In the opinion of nationalists John Kaputin and Father John Momis, law was "no longer to be a colonial fraud, but a genuine expression of the felt needs and aspirations of our Melanesian people." Bernard Narokobi advanced similar ideas as a member of the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), arguing that if independence was "to mean anything, we must free ourselves from the imposed web of laws, built up over the years, based upon special conditions in England and Australia." Legal conservatives, on the other hand, resisted the recognition of custom as the underlying principle of law, advocating instead that common law and equity would better promote economic development, particularly in the "state's promotion and the self-advancement of the big peasantry." Though the CPC urged the recognition of customary law as

the principal source of legal authority and the relegation of Anglo-Australian law to a secondary role, the administration of the constitutional plan resulted in the reverse.

The integration of customary law and the criminal justice system proved to be a "major problem area." In practice, customary law made few inroads in the constitutional and judicial system, being considered in limited situations where the "reasonable man" test was applicable in provocation issues, and in sentencing procedures. The Law Reform Commission, established to "develop a new Melanesian jurisprudence," proposed that the courts be required to "ascertain and apply customary law whenever possible." While it was forthrightly assumed that the village court magistrates would be well acquainted with local custom, the public legal service had "little training in or feeling for customary law." However the complexities of not only interpreting but also incorporating custom into the national legal system may be mitigated through the "expansion of the role and jurisdiction of officially recognized customary dispute settlement agencies."

The policy that a nation follows in the administration of land is of central significance, both as an indication and a determinant of its social and economic development strategy. The inherited national land administration system reflected the aims and attitudes of the preceding colonial administration. The report of the 1973 Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters "stressed the fundamental importance of land as the basis of social, political and economic relations." The report also "strongly challenged the established system of land administration, and asserted priorities which threatened the privileges of dominant commercial entities in the country which that system had protected." Subsequent legislation, particularly the Land Disputes Settlement Act, were attempts to "balance traditional flexibility with the increasing need in some areas for greater certainty in land rights."

One of the more provocative legal issues involved family law. Perhaps in no other matter did the conflict between custom and common law become more apparent. Under the European system, marriage is a contract between individuals, while native custom considers marriage to be essentially an alliance between kin groups. Under European law, the interests of the children are the primary concern of the courts, while custom looks to the concerns of the kin group in child custody disputes. The reconciliation of these two divergent systems of jurisprudence will require more reflective consideration and more decisive action.

This well-edited volume describes and discusses the "significant legal events of the period both as to the initiation and development of reform

proposals and their ultimate fate.” The essays thus reveal the issues raised in a new nation attempting to cope with change while still committed to the traditions of the past. The inherent ambivalence in constitutional debates and policy-making reveals the problems of modernization itself and the need to fashion a new order with the allocation of power and authority set in a familiar context of customary institutions.

William E. H. Tagupa
Office of Hawaiian Affairs
State of Hawaii

BOOKS RECEIVED AND BOOK NOTICES

- W. Ambrose and P. Duerden, eds., *Archaeometry: An Australian Perspective*. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982. Pp. 391, illustrations, index, maps. \$24.95.
- Ronald M. Berndt, ed., *Aboriginal Sites, Rights and Resource Development*. Beaverton, OR: International Scholarly Book Services, 1983. Pp. 253. \$12.95.
- Nevill Drury, *Healing Power: A Handbook of Alternative Medicine and Natural Health*. London: Frederick Mellerd, 1981. Pp. 231, illustrations. \$12.95.
- Derek Freeman, *Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. 379, illustrations, index. \$25.00.
- Doreen, S. Goyer and Eliane Domschke, *Handbook of National Population Censuses: Latin American and the Caribbean, North America and Oceania*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. 711, index, maps. \$75.00.
- Norman A. Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion*. Santa Barbara, CA.: ABC-CLIO, 1983. Pp. 278. index. Reprint. \$22.50.
- F. Allan Hanson and Louise Hanson, *Counterpoint in Maori Culture*. Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. 240, illustrations.
- Noel H. Hilliard, *Maori Girl*. London: Heinemann, 1983. Pp. 263. \$9.95.
- Witi Ihimaera, *Pounamu, Pounamu: Short Stories*. Auckland, NZ.: Heinemann, 1972. Pp. 132. \$4.95.
- Witi Ihimaera and D. S. Long, eds., *Into the World of Light: An Anthology of Maori Writing*. Auckland, NZ.: Heinemann, 1982. Pp. 312. \$9.95.
- Phillis Mary Kaberry, *Aboriginal Woman: Sacred and Profane*. New York: Gordon Press, 1973. Pp. 294, illustrations. \$75.00.
- J. R. McAlpine and Gael Keig, *Climate of Papua New Guinea*. Canberra: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization and ANU Press, 1983. Pp. 200, illustrations, index, maps. \$24.95.
- W. S. Mollah, *Humpty Doo: Rice in the Northern Territory*. Darwin: ANU, North Australia Research Unit, 1983. Pp. 29. bibliography \$7.95.
- B. Murphy, *Dictionary of Australian History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982. Pp. 304, illustrations, index. \$19.00.
- Margaret Orbell, ed., *Maori Poetry: An Introductory Anthology*. Auckland, NZ.: Heinemann, 1978. Pp. 104, illustrations. \$6.95.
- Michael Paul Rogin, *Subversive Genealogy: Politics and Art of Herman Melville*. New York: Knopf, 1983. Pp. 354, index. \$18.95.
- P. M. Ryan, ed., *New Dictionary of Modern Maori*. Auckland, NZ.: Heinemann, 1974. Pp. 104. \$4.95.
- Ronald T. Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983. Pp. 213, illustrations. \$14.95.
- Mifflin Thomas, *Schooner from Windward: Two Centuries of Hawaiian Interisland Shipping*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983. Pp. 252, illustrations. \$21.95.
- Michael W. Young, *Manumanua: Living Myth in Kalauna*. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. 288, illustrations, index. \$24.95.