MARGARET MEAD'S INDIVIDUAL IN CULTURE, OR CULTURES AND PERSONALITIES WITHOUT EMBARRASSMENT

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Margaret Mead is associated with the rubric "culture and personality." Mead herself preferred the formula "individual in culture." This essay traces Mead's uses of her preferred formula from 1928 through 1946. Over the course of this period, Mead developed her idea from its initial concerns with the "role" of the individual in Samoan culture in ways which came to focus on the person as the conjunction of biological, developmental (or "genetic"), and cultural processes. The essay examines both published, if now little known, materials and Ruth Benedict's notes taken during a course on "The Study of the Individual in Culture" that Mead taught in 1935. Mead emerges as a researcher well aware of cultural and individual differences, but not as a cultural determinist, much less a biological determinist. Cultures and the personalities which emerge within those cultures were related, according to Mead, but not mirror images of each other.

IT IS SOMETHING OF A COMMONPLACE among anthropologists that both Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict thought of culture as personality writ large and of personality as culture writ small. Though I shall have reason to mention Benedict from time to time, in what follows my primary interest remains focused on Mead. Such a view, assuming Mead held it, appears to conflate two orders of phenomena, which more properly are of different logical types.[1] McDowell (1991:18ff) notes that Mead first used the phrase "personality writ large" in 1959 to describe Benedict's work. Still, some scholars (e.g., Gewertz [1984:621]; Roscoe [2003:6ff]) have criticized Mead on these grounds while being largely respectful of Mead's place as an honored ancestor. Others have been more dismissive.

Edward Sapir (1994:181, brackets original), in the later versions of his

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seminar, "The Psychology of Culture", given at Yale before his death in 1939, could hold:

> The psychology of culture only arises in the relations of individuals. . . . [T]he implication of much of the social-psychological literature now being produced is a bit mischievous. . . .
> Benedict and Mead . . . confuse the individual psychology of all members of a society with the 'as-if' psychology of a few.

By "as-if psychology," Sapir (1994:181) intended to "describe the process of projection of personal values by the individual to evaluate cultural patterns." Projections were "[metaphorical identification[s],] not to be interpreted literally" (Sapir 1994:181). Hence, Mead and Benedict had not only relied on too few persons in their accounts, but also, according to Sapir's account, conflated subjective, even idiosyncratic, views with broader accounts of social processes and relations.

More recently, Robert LeVine (1982:53), contenting himself with a single broad set of citations, wrote:

> Benedict and Mead rejected the conceptual distinction between culture and personality. For them, separating the two would be equivalent of saying that personality could exist without being culturally patterned.

Levine (1982:55) continued:

> [Their] culture-is-personality view takes culture as its organizing concept while reducing personality to mere individual reflection of culture, and personality development to the intergenerational transmission of culture.

For Marcus and Fischer (1986:46; 1999:46, italics original), Sigmund Freud and Marcel Mauss produced "[i]mportant earlier work that has influenced anthropological thought" concerning persons. But "[w]hat *is* new in the current experiments" in conveying other experiences "is a much firmer grasp of how all these forms of understanding," conscious or otherwise, of being a person "are culturally variable, rather than being a part of some panhuman evolutionary sequence." For Marcus and Fischer (1986:114), Mead's ethnographic work, concerned with the variety of cultural circumstances and processes of emotional development, merits mention as a critique of American culture.

Excursus Concerning Primarily Ruth Benedict, Briefly

Similarly, in the introduction written for the Centennial editions of both *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* and *Male and Female*, Helen Fisher (2001a:xxii; 2001b:xxii) states that Mead and Benedict:

> . . . developed a new anthropological subfield, the school of 'culture and personality.' Central to its philosophy was Mead's belief that culture was like a language. It had a grammar, an underlying structure, a personality based on a few major psychological traits. As Benedict put it, 'Cultures from this point of view are individual psychology thrown large upon a screen.'

Fisher relies heavily on Marvin Harris' discussion of Benedict and Mead in his *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* (1968:407–421). She does not take the quote above directly from Benedict's (1932) "Configurations of Culture in North America," but rather from Harris. Further, she quotes only a part of the pertinent sentence that Harris (1968:398) himself provided whole from Benedict's original. Fisher, thereby, obscures both the terms of Benedict's analogy between cultures and personalities and her metaphor; "cultures . . . are individual psychology thrown large upon a screen, given gigantic proportions and a long time span" (Benedict 1932:24).

In addition to the implicit matters of scale, both geometric and temporal, and of shadows, cinemas and perhaps caves, Fisher's selection "ignores" what Benedict (1932:24) considered to be "the crucial point." What separated Benedict's (1932:24) "reading of cultural from individual psychology" from "[Sir James] Frazer's and [Lucien] Levy-Bruhl's" was the "selective choice of the society which is the crux of the process." Benedict indicated here how what Robert Lowie (1920[1961]:441) had termed "that thing of shreds and patches called civilization" becomes, in her view, the more or less integrated cultural configurations to which persons, given their dispositions, adjust more or less successfully.

Fisher merely implies rather than shows that Mead held the position Fisher saw in the quote from Benedict. Nonetheless, it is phrases like the one Fisher quoted which underlie the commonplace notion that Mead and Benedict thought of culture as personality writ large and of personality as culture writ small.

Mead, Benedict's friend, sometime lover, and probably closest reader, could and did distinguish her own work from Benedict's in a number of ways.[2] According to Mead (1946:481), Benedict treated a "culture over time as analogous to a personality over time" with the proviso, as noted above, that

a culture may attain greater consistency and integration than is feasible "in the life history of a single individual." Benedict's cultural "pattern [however] . . . is delineated not so much in the interpersonal relations of individuals as in the formal elements in the culture, religion, myths, formal speeches, magic" brought together through "a combination of historical accident and the selection and reinforcement of certain potentialities at the expense of others" (Mead 1946:481).

Lamenting that Benedict was not explicit about such matters in her text, Clyde Kluckhohn's (1941:117, italics original) "close study" of *Patterns of Culture* made:

> . . . it fairly plain that she [Benedict] is not so much interested in an inductive analysis of how the Zuñi, for example, do in fact behave as in suggesting a relationship between accepted standards of behavior in Zuñi (*"ideal patterns"*) and cultural *configurations* of which the Zuñi are largely unconscious.

Thus, those criticisms of Benedict which were "based upon the premise that she is talking about behavioral patterns" were inapt as Benedict presented "'selected detail[s] of behavior' . . . as a behavioral counterpart of an ideal pattern or as an exemplification of the influence of configuration," rather than as "some inductive demonstration of behavioral pattern" (Kluckhohn 1941:117).[3]

Initial Objections

One should not presume without further evidence that such descriptions apply equally to Mead. Mead's so-called popular books portray a plethora of named persons living in differing societies and social circumstances: Samoans such as Lita, who "lived for years in the pastor's house" and wanted "to find a place" in the "alien culture" of English and educational advantages enjoyed by an elder cousin (Mead [1928a] 1939:164–165); Pele Pele, "the precocious little sister of the loosest woman in the village" (Mead [1928a] 1939:139); and Lalala, whose "marital life . . . had begun with a cruel public defloration ceremony," yet who "adored her husband" and "made her choices in life with full recognition of the facts of her existence" (Mead [1928a] 1939:142); Arapesh such as Aden, who "had no relatives at all except two mother's brothers, one who was a half-wit, and one who, out of loneliness, had moved away and joined his wife's people in the next locality" (Mead [1935] 1939:85); or Ombomb, who though married to Me'elue, took up with the plains woman, Sauwedjo, causing much trouble thereby (Mead [1935]

1939:111ff); and Temos who, "twice uprooted . . . by other women" married Wabe who was also married to Welima (Mead [1935] 1939:124ff); Mundugumor such as Ombléan ". . . gentle, cooperative, easily enlisted in the causes of others" (Mead [1935] 1939:228–229), and hence deviant enough to discuss how Mundugumor society did and ought to work.

Just as Mead's so-called popular books had attended to particular people living in specific social circumstances, so too Gregory Bateson and Mead (1942:xii) contended that *Balinese Character*, published in 1942, was:

> . . . about the Balinese–about the way in which they, as living persons, moving, standing, eating, sleeping, dancing and going into trance, embody that abstraction which . . . we technically call culture.

Even this highly technical collaboration continued Mead's focus on particular people as it concerned "living persons . . . embody[ing]" customs and was "not a book about Balinese custom" per se.

Yet, it may now surprise some that on 1 April 1935 Mead wrote John Dollard, a sociologist affiliated with the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University:

> At present the whole phasing of "Personality and Culture" seems ridiculous to me. I can't see that there is anything except biological basis, the genetic process and the culture and each individual is a temporary phenomenon of these three contributory forces? (LOC: MMP, Box C2, file 6, underlining and final question mark original).[4]

In his reply to Mead, Dollard (LOC: MMP, Box S7, file 12, letter of 2 April 1935) also underlined the "and," noting further that he had "perspired under this title for a whole year . . . with all [his] friends going round using these words as though they were epithets." He agreed not only about the phrase, itself "one of Larry [Frank]'s tautologies", but also that "we will have to get back on track on the lines you [i.e., Mead] suggest, for the provisional usefulness of the linked terms" . . . "drum[ming] some ideas into otherwise impervious heads". . . "is over." Dollard referred here to Lawrence Kelso Frank, the man charged with funding social science research at the Rockefeller Foundation.

It may further surprise some that in 1946, Mead contended:

> During the last twenty-five years there has been a strong emphasis in anthropological study and in the related fields of social psychol-

> ogy, sociology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis, upon the importance of what has been called, not very happily, the culture *and* personality approach. The *and* originally introduced to link fields, has proven to be a methodological embarrassment (Mead 1946:480, italics original).

Concerning Methodological Embarrassments

Mead had several specific forms of methodological embarrassment in mind: First, the confusion of "uniformities in behavior of those who share a common culture" with the regularities of culturally specific understandings of behavior (Mead 1946:478). Second, a too common reduction of the culturally pertinent ranges and contrasts, "even sharp contradictions," of behavior to so-called "individual differences" (Mead 1946:478–479). Third, an attributions of false concreteness, which failed to recognize that terms like "cultural", "psychological," "individual" and the like "are categories of observations" or "orders of data which [some] have found it most convenient to analyze" (Mead 1946:479). Fourth, confusions about "what types of cultural study [yield] which types of material" (Mead 1946:480). Fifth, insufficiently detailed ethnographic description of circumstances pertinent to supposed psychological forms such as the Oedipus complex. And, sixth, the failure to elicit patterns intrinsic to gathered materials due to the use of methods, notably psychological tests other than projective tests, which force a pattern onto those materials.

Mead (1946:480) preferred the "more systematic phrasing of the essential unity of the individual *in* a culture . . . while his [i.e., the individual's] behavior is studied from a variety of points of view."

In reading Mead's corpus, published and unpublished, I have found very few places where she uses the formula "culture and personality."[5] But she does so generally as a shorthand to facilitate communication and, with one prominent possible exception where the terms are reversed (see below), not methodologically.

Prefigurings

Mead had used her preferred phrasing not only as a title of a section on the "Individual in the social pattern" of her *Social Organization of Manua* (1930a:31–44), but also even earlier in her 1928 essay, "The Rôle of the Individual in Samoan Culture."

For Mead ([1928b]1931:545), the important point which "must . . . be borne in mind throughout [her] discussion" was "that social organization is the principal occupation in Samoa; industry, art and religion all are dwarfed beside it." Hawaiian, Tahitian, New Zealand Maori and Marquesan societies

may have exceeded the Samoan in other matters. But among the historically and culturally related societies of Polynesia, "Samoan culture is particularly conspicuous" "for its intricacy and complexity of social organization" (Mead [1928b] 1931:559). Thus, Mead ([1928b] 1931:545) contended "the importance of the individual as innovator and stylist" depended largely on "the particular culture into which he is born," each culture presenting persons with differing possibilities for innovation and recognition.

Mead's (1930a:83) point, further developed in *Social Organization of Manua*, was somewhat larger:

> By this emphasis upon conformity to the all important social structure, I do not mean here the attempt of a society to make all those within it conform to all its ways of thought and behavior . . . I mean to stress rather the particular implication in the lives of individuals of a particular kind of social pattern.

Samoans' characteristic preoccupation with their this-worldly social structure and their respective, changing, individual placement therein had consequences for Samoans and their lives:

> Personal relationships if allowed scope would rival the social relationships, and undermine their sanctions. . . . The weight of social scorn and disapproval is never upon those who have been unwilling to pay higher prices, but always upon those who care greatly. Their conduct is branded as *mataga* (awkward) (Mead 1930a:84, emphasis original).

By "personal" Mead indicated felt emotion of whatever sort; by "social" she meant relative position within the wider Samoan hierarchical system. For Mead, Samoan preoccupations were pertinent to other anthropological issues of the day:

> Chiefly concerned with their social pattern, the Samoans have time for little else. Pondering the exigencies of ordered society, they take small interest in the world of the supernatural. . . . [t]heir all inclusive social formula gives them no acceptable basis of interest in the mysterious properties of material things or natural phenomena (Mead 1930a:85).

Mead captured a consequence of this Samoan situation in the title of another work, "A Lapse of Animism in a Primitive People," published in 1928.

Much later, Mead (1972:166) wrote that in this latter essay she "discussed the fact that the kind of prelogical thinking that Lévy-Bruhl and Freud were talking about did not occur among the Samoans [she] had studied." Many anthropologists and psychologists, Freud and Lévy-Bruhl prominently among them, considered that the thought of so-called primitive people displayed a characteristic animism; that is, such thought was concerned with those forces which inhere within important features of the natural world or inhabit some powerful yet invisible realm from which these forces or spirits could affect significant changes in the lives of human beings.

Additionally, many of these theorists held that the thought of women, children and neurotics was similar to that of primitives and, thereby, was different in varying degrees from the rationality characteristic of modern men toward which human mentality generally tended. By insisting that Samoan concerns with their this-worldly social system effectively kept Samoan thought from developing an animist cast, Mead differentiated herself, no matter how respectfully, from Freud, Lévy-Bruhl and other theorists who argued for what Marcus and Fischer (1986:46, 1999:46) refer to as "some panhuman evolutionary sequence."[6]

In "The Ethnological Approach to Social Psychology," the first appendix to *Growing Up in New Guinea* of 1930, Mead ([1930b] 1939:279) envisioned a role for the anthropologist as someone who "never seeks to invalidate the observations of the psychologist" but rather "submits the findings of the psychologist who works in our society to the test of observation within other societies." She assumed not only that "[t]he repetition of such observations will in time give us a far better basis of generalization than can be obtained by the observation of individuals within the confining walls of one type of social environment" but also that studying "original nature . . . as modified by different environmental conditions" is "the only way to arrive at any conception of . . . it" (Mead [1930b] 1939:279)

By "original nature," Mead referred in part to what she called temperament, or those innate, constitutional dispositions inherited from one's immediate forebears, as well as to "the potentialities of man" (Mead [1930b] 1939:283).[7] Through social interaction and the accidents of life, given what she would later refer to as "an adaptive body chemistry" in her unpublished "Summary Statement of the Problem of Personality and Culture" of 1933 (LOC: MMP, Box N102, file 2; see also Sullivan [2004]), a person becomes more or less molded to those generally collective purposes we identify as cultural. Put differently, persons are temporary phenomena arising through the conjunction of biology, developmental processes, and cultural environs.

Mead (LOC: MMP, Box S11, file 8) contended that the "basic temperamental orientations with which people are born . . . react to cultural condi-

tions in different ways." Concomitantly, in Mead's view deviance came to refer not just to behavior at odds with wider cultural preference, as Benedict had it, but arises when a person's temperament is either significantly at odds with the temperament which most influenced a given society's ethos (LOC: MMP, Box S11, file 8). Mead was still developing this view in the spring semester of 1935 when she both published *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* and taught an extension course at Columbia University on the "Study of the Individual in Culture" (LOC: MMP, Box J8, file 11; cf. Box O40, file 7).

The Study of the Individual in Culture

Mead, a long time employee of the American Museum of Natural History, had not taught a course before, nor would she again until the mid- to late 1950s. Unlike Sapir, Mead did not have the opportunity to develop her course over more than a decade. Neither did she then have the chance, as Sapir did, to groom a substantial number of her own students who would go on as a group to become leading teachers of the subject. Nonetheless, Mead's course drew nearly thirty students. They were a mix of graduates and undergraduates. They included eight psychologists, three of whom had studied with Otto Klineberg; seven sociologists, including one who had studied with Robert Lynd; and, by Mead's count, ten anthropologists, several of whom would be among Mead's co-authors of the 1937 volume, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*.[8] By far the most prominent attendee was Benedict.

Mead's lecture notes are incomplete and schematic. To my knowledge, Benedict's handwritten notes, replete with abbreviations, are the fullest record of the course. I know of no body of student notes comparable to those which has allowed patient scholars to recreate a text for the series as has been done with Sapir's (1994) *The Psychology of Culture*.

Even a cursory examination of the extant materials reveals that compared with Mead's course, Sapir's was ethnographically thin at best, David Mandelbaum's (1941:219) praise for Sapir's course notwithstanding. For all Sapir's emphasis upon the individual, as well as his opposition to Alfred Kroeber's idea of the superorganic (see Sapir 1917), Sapir's lectures contain no persons living real lives and no cultures. Put another way, as Anthony Wallace (quoted in Darnell 1986:179) apparently said of Sapir's essays, the course contains no "'data, or testable hypotheses, or examples of method'."

Mead began her course with what she termed an eclectic statement on the individual in culture. By this time, she did not mean the "play of ind[ividual] in culture" but rather wished to attend to the "cultural data carried by each

ind[ividual]" allowing for the facts of individual lives. Then, utilizing the first of many comparisons, Mead turned to Samoa and America to contrast relevant "concepts of self, [the] social, [the] physical, thinking etc. . . ." (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 7 February 1935). She would return to this comparison three lectures hence, adding a discussion of Manus, to take up questions of the individual's variable relations to societies which presented an already extant "*structure* of titles, not of p[eople]" (Samoa), societies where the individual "makes the pattern" of relations for him or herself (America), as well as societies whose inhabitants lacked a vision of a "structure of [the societal] whole" (Manus) (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 28 February 1935, emphasis original).

Mead turned to several relevant approaches to her broader problem, notably what Benedict's notes call the "*Growth of the Child in his society*" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 7 February 1935, emphasis and capitalization original). Mead indicated that for her then present purposes what was important was not so much "the sequence in the life of a given individual" as the larger cultural setting. "[E]verything in the life of 50 [or] 40 year olds impinges on the life of the child" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 7 February 1935).

She used a detailed lecture on the Arapesh, with asides concerning the Mundugumor and the Samoans, to talk about: (1) a nexus of social relationships, both kin locally conceived and trade partnerships; (2) the remembrance of trauma; and (3) ideas of growing life along with differential responsibilities attending thereto, to initiate a discussion of various bodily bases of symbolism. Over the course of this lecture, Mead advanced towards the first of many methodological points; a fieldworker needs to "know everything about" the "group [the ethnographer] will control" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 21 February 1935).

Mead extended her various ethnographic analyses, mentioning as well Dobuan, Dakota, Ontong Javanese, Cheyenne, Ojibwa, Pima, Tchambuli, Bathonga, Eskimo, Plains Arapesh, and Trobriand practices. She attended to patterns for reckoning kinship and understanding marriage, hence to families and affinity. She took up age and age grades or the lack thereof. She discussed the sexes, their roles and local expectations concerning the tenor of their behavior (this being the subject of two lectures under her original plan), as well as matters of social status. Mead then concluded over the last several lectures by examining the socially integrative and dissonant nexus the aforementioned matters provide a developing personality.

On 26 March 1935, Benedict's course notes show Mead emphasized "the importance of the social structure as contributory to the child weltanschauung."[9] A society's "categories may match . . . emotion [and] in certain degrees

creates them [i.e., emotions]" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, emphasis original). But, as Mead put it in a discussion of four differing sorts of "Abnormals," "some societies are more consistent than others" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, undated lecture). Further, one "[c]an't predict that . . . bathing etc. [i.e., local techniques of child rearing] will have adult repercussions" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 19 March 1935). Thus, one cannot conclude from Mead's phrase "in certain degrees" that she thought of culture as determining emotion.

Nor do emotions have solely bodily bases. Anthropological studies should look to the child in his or her cultural framework, and not merely as a body which develops in accord with a single biological norm with which the culture interferes. Rather, such studies should treat the "Body [as] a potential which is unfolded in the particular climate of each culture" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 19 March 1935). Any newborn may be a perfect example of a newborn member of its culture, but a "child of 6 no longer has all of the potentialities" of an infant (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 7 February 1935). The "[p]lan of research" she suggested during the course was intended "[t]o find out what need[ed] to [be] know[n] about [the] individual" (LOC: MMP, Box O40, file 7, lecture of 28 February 1935).

Not Quite a Conclusion

While still engaged in teaching this course, on 21 March 1935 Mead wrote Herbert Shenton, of the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, proposing "a detailed case study project [to] establish the range of individual differences against a cultural pattern" (LOC: MMP, Box N5, file 1). She continued:

> The result which I should expect to obtain would fall into two main categories: (1) material upon the relation between individual differences and the impact of the culture pattern in infancy upon the formation of adult character, and (2) research leads for the further study of the problem of old age, its character manifestations and adjustments.

Mead's letter to Shenton is the earliest proposal pertaining to the field trip she and Bateson took to Bali between March 1936 and March 1938 and again in January and February of 1939. Mead wrote the most significant of the proposals written in anticipation of the first trip for Nolan Lewis of the Committee for Research in Dementia Praecox, contending that "The total personality of an individual is the result of his original constitution, the conditioning which he has received as a member of a given culture, and the

accidents of his own particular upbringing." She wished to take ". . . the next step in the understanding of the individual's relationship to his culture . . ." (LOC: MMP, Box N5, file 1). This Balinese field study would culminate in Bateson and Mead's (1942:xii) study of how "living [Balinese] persons . . . embody that abstraction which (after we have abstracted it) we technically call [Balinese] culture."

It should, therefore, not have been surprising then or be surprising now that Mead would prefer the phrasing "the individual in a culture" to the more conventional "culture and personality." The particular individual in his or her particular culture, had, after all been at the center of Mead's professional life and writing for at least eighteen years. It should not be surprising, either, that Mead thought that a cultural approach to the study of personality could proceed in either of two directions. First:

> We may emphasize those aspects of personality which can be systematically referred to the regularities of behavior in the society in which an individual is born and reared, or to which he or she is exposed for appreciable periods of time . . . (Mead 1946:477).

Second, one can attend to "the types and varieties of personality within a culture when emphasis is laid . . . upon the way in which the institutions and formulations of the culture provide for such varieties" rather than focusing upon "innate individual gift[s]" or "upon individual histor[ies]" per se (Mead 1946:477). In either case, a detailed ethnographic account, of the sort Mead had advocated repeatedly in her course of 1935, would be a prerequisite for meaningful commentary.

Similarly, a reassessment of Mead as a person in culture, especially in the culture of anthropology, has as its prerequisite a detailed, careful examination and account of her work, published and unpublished. The Sapirian critique of Mead was scurrilous, Sapir's work having about itself none of the qualities Sapir supposedly advocated when Mead's work so obviously returned again and again to real people interacting with one another. More recent critiques have often not returned to the sources or have taken later interpretations uncritically as authoritative. Such critiques have too often proved ways to dismiss Mead as understood, rather than to understand her, her work, and her legacy.

We can not know what is new if we do not have a firmer sense of what has been. Without a useable past, we can not tell the differences between the important and the merely novel. For an anthropology which still looks to understand real persons living real lives in real worlds, Mead's ethnographies may or may not be in various ways erroneous, but her theoretical concern with the individual in culture and the processes of embodiment which shaped

those ethnographies ought to remain a potent source for the discipline and its progress.

NOTES

All quotations from the Mead Papers archived at the Library of Congress appear courtesy of Mary Catherine Bateson and the Institute for Intercultural Studies. Mead never prepared these documents for publication. I follow the practices of a prudent editor, making minor corrections as long as these corrections do not change the plain meaning of Mead's text.

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1. On logical typing, see Bateson (1979:114–28).

2. On their rhetorical similarities, see Guddemi (this volume, 106–127); on their differences, see Sullivan (2004:200–202).

3. Kluckhohn (1941) takes the phrase "selected detail of behavior" from Benedict (1934:49).

4. For an extended analysis of Mead's thinking on these matters, see Sullivan (2004). I am indebted to Patricia A. Francis for this piece of Mead's correspondence with Dollard and Dollard's reply.

5. In 1936, Mead published a three-page article entitled "Culture and Personality" in the American Journal of Sociology. I learned of this publication too late to include discussion of it here.

6. On Mead's psychological education, see Francis (this volume, 74–90).

7. On the sources of Mead's notions of temperament and character, see Sullivan (2004).

8. Mead's co-authors were Irving Goldman, Jeannette Mirsky, Ruth Landes, and May Mandelbaum Edel. Others in attendance included Jules Henry, Ashley Montagu, and Ruth Bunzel.

9. World view or philosophy of life.

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