
EDITOR'S FORUM

CULTURES IN COLLISION: HAWAI'I AND ENGLAND, 1778

by Haunani-Kay Trask

Political and scholarly discourse are so often intertwined, it is difficult to tell where one begins and the other ends. In political theory, debates over the gifts of liberalism and the failings of capitalism continue to confirm this observation. And most recently, anthropology has become embroiled in disputes with larger political ramifications. Derek Freeman's new book on Margaret Mead and Samoa is an example of an old, politically-embedded debate re-emerging in new biological-cultural contexts.¹

But if politics has often invaded scholarship, it has just as often forced necessary reconsiderations and corrections. For example, it is apparent that indigenous political rumblings in the Pacific have influenced recent major revisions in Pacific scholarship.² This scholarship, in turn, has had some influence on the outlook indigenous peoples bring to their modern political situations. Virtually every aspect of Euro-American and indigenous culture in the Pacific--religion, politics, economics, and more--is now undergoing new scrutiny at the same time that Pacific Islanders have begun full-scale independence struggles.

In recent articles in *Pacific Studies*, historian I. C. Campbell has loosened the hold of two cherished, fundamental myths of early European-Polynesian contact. He argues that eighteenth-century European explorers of the Pacific did *not* carry with them a romantic image of "Noble Savagery," as previous writers have contended. Rather, these explorers held more complex and contradictory views. Even those explorers regarded as "the giddiest of a naive and romantic crew," entered the Pacific with highly ambivalent expectations. As for the Polynesians, Campbell shows that while they may have regarded European interlopers as supernatural beings on first contact, such a reaction was "an acknowledgment of [the Europeans'] power as well as their strangeness." The Polynesian view was "*not* a token of admiration," as has been commonly supposed. Supernatural beings throughout the Pacific, Campbell notes, "were often malevolent, usually mischievous, and always unreliable"--characteristics that were readily applied (with good reason) to the European adventurers.³

Campbell's historical revision of the perceptions that Europeans and Polynesians held of each other on contact has major potential consequences for future histories of the region. For example, Campbell's analysis should reinforce the historical credibility of those early Europeans who found so much to admire in the Pacific, just as it should begin to give back historical dignity to those Pacific Islanders who were the subject of that admiration.

However, Campbell concludes his second article by asserting that "there is no reason to think that Polynesians, any more than Europeans, allowed their preconceptions or reactions to racial differences to override self-interest in their dealings with foreigners. . . . Polynesian history shows unremitting calculation and determination to seize whatever advantages circumstances offered."⁴

This assertion of an undefined, universal "self-interest" as the simple motivation behind both European and Polynesian behavior runs the danger of placing both peoples in the same category. Crucial differences that distinguish two cultures in collision and that elucidate both perceptions and behaviors are minimized, if not wholly lost, in Campbell's assertion of "unremitting calculation." The essential historical problem that Campbell does not address is the source, the cultural ground from which European and Polynesian perceptions sprang.

These cultures, I will argue, were as polarized as cultures can be. The European and Polynesian worlds differed in major ways--economic organization, social and political organization, and cultural and environmental valuation. In their moral relationships and in their appreciation of the individual and the collective, these societies were worlds apart. It is these differences we must clarify before we can determine the source of cultural perceptions or judge their effects. This essay is an attempt to compare the cultures of England and Hawai'i on the eve of contact.

Although I focus upon Hawai'i, I assume that much of my analysis is relevant for other Pacific cultures. To what extent my assumption can withstand scrutiny awaits the work of other scholars.

The Characteristics of Indigenous Societies

Over eleven centuries before Columbus accidentally encountered one of the largest land masses on earth, large numbers of Polynesian sailors, employing navigational skills that still astonish students of the art, had crossed more than two thousand miles of ocean to find new lives for themselves and their families on the most isolated archipelago in the world--Hawai'i. Before there existed an England, an English language, or

an Anglo-Saxon people--Hawaiian society was already taking shape. It would continue to do so, with very little interruption from the outside world, for more than fourteen hundred years.⁵

During this time--stretching roughly from the era of the earliest barbarian attacks on Rome to that of the American Revolution--society changed a great deal in both Europe and Hawai'i. But the paths of change were very different. Through all the buffetings of war and social upheaval, trade and cultural exchange, two powerful strands in the fabric of European culture came to shape the world view of its people: the religious strand of Christianity, and the economic strand of capitalism. Spared the great tumults and dislocations of Europe's history, and growing undisturbed out of an entirely different array of primary cultural and cognitive principles, Hawai'i's people: created a society that was in many ways the antithesis of the European scheme. In several respects, however, Hawaiian society had remarkably much in common with that of other peoples in other parts of the non-European world.

In a brilliant work of scholarly synthesis, anthropologist Stanley Diamond some years ago proposed a typology of characteristics that distinguished indigenous societies from those of the modern West.⁶ As a preliminary guide to the structure! of Hawaiian society before Western contact, portions of Diamond's model are worthy of scrutiny.

1. *The Economics of indigenous societies*, Diamond argues, are generally "communal"--that is, "those material means essential to the survival of the individual or group are either actively held in common or, what is equivalent, constitute readily accessible economic goods." Even in those societies (such as that of late precontact Hawai'i) where a class structure develops, Diamond notes, "it rarely results in the economic ruination of one group or individual by another." On the contrary, since it is economically noncompetitive and "lacks a genuinely acquisitive socio-economic character," and since, even when a hierarchy develops, "production is for use or pleasure rather than for individual profit," such a society is one in which, for example, "no man need go hungry while another eats."

Money--that is, "an abstract, intrinsically valueless medium for appropriating surplus, storing value and deferring payment or delaying exchange"--does not exist in indigenous societies. Neither does the Western concept of economic private property "ownership." This latter point is crucial for understanding precontact Hawai'i, or any indigenous society, especially since it has so often been misunderstood or misconstrued by both advocates and critics of communal indigenous societies.

As Diamond points out, conventional ideas regarding “property” in indigenous societies do *not* mean (as Engels, for example, supposed) that everything in such societies, including wives and children, is owned in common. This idea, as he puts it, “conjures up a false image of an absolute, monolithic, social, economic and psychological collectivism.” Nor, in the absence of this extreme, should we suppose the opposite--as some have--that even incorporeal things such as songs, magic spells, curing rituals, or spirits are “owned” by individuals. Both of these misconceptions result from an inability or unwillingness to consider a reality beyond the parameters of the Western world view. Both fail to recognize the middle ground that is repeatedly seen in the workings of indigenous societies: ownership can and does exist, but in a way that is *independent* of basic economic functions--that is, in Diamond's words, it “does not endanger and is irrelevant to the communal functioning of the economic base.”

In sum, although possession is possible in indigenous societies, private “ownership” of economically essential goods--including, most importantly, land--is not. Such societies, as Diamond puts it, “uniformly possess a communal economic base; economic exploitation of man by man, as we know it in archaic and modern civilizations, is absent.” As a result, “the expectations of food, clothing, shelter, and work are not juridical because they are unexceptional.” As for the land, perhaps the eminent Harvard anthropologist Dorothy Lee said it best more than thirty years ago: “What is for us land tenure, or ownership, or rights of use and disposal, is for other societies an intimate belongingness,” an attitude in which people “conceive of themselves as belonging to the land in the way that flora and fauna belong to it. They cultivate the land by the grace of the immanent spirits, but they cannot dispose of it and cannot conceive of doing so.”⁷

2. *Leadership and social organization* in indigenous societies, like the economy, tend to be “communal and traditional,” Diamond observes, “not political or secular.” This is not to say that there are no leaders, but that the entire fabric of society--“all meaningful social, economic, and ideological relations”--is seen as synonymous with an integrated network of kinship. Even in relatively large-scale indigenous societies, such as those in Hawai'i at the time of Western contact, “where hundreds of people may be said to descend from a common ancestor and the actual blood relationships may either be entirely attenuated or completely fictitious, people still behave toward each other as if they were kin.” This, “the most historically significant” feature of indigenous society--the feature most commented on by anthropological observers--has no spatial or

temporal limitations: the kinship network, the "personalism" of indigenous culture, "extends from the family outward to the society at large and ultimately to nature itself." Thus, Diamond notes, the people in such societies "live in a personal, corporate world, a world that tends to be a 'thou' to the subjective 'I' rather than an 'it' impinging upon an objectively separate and divided self."⁸

The consequence of such a world view for leadership in indigenous societies is that leaders are seen more as caretakers than as ultimate and unshakable authorities. There is rarely, if ever, a "king" in an indigenous society--and indeed, the *absence* of a single, king-like, autocratic figure is often said to be part of the *definition* of an indigenous society.⁹ Leadership is divided and changeable; the various leaders' powers are limited and they have no divine claim to authority sufficient to deny the people their power to abandon or depose them. Thus, "in a profound psychological sense," Diamond concludes, such societies are "democratic; though they are not reductively 'equalitarian.'"¹⁰

3. *Cultural integration and social change* in indigenous societies are invariably *conservative*, in the root meaning of the word. Time is not marked off or measured in a mechanical, linear way; it is seen as cyclical and at one with the ecological rhythms of the natural world. There is no sharp cleavage between the physical and spiritual realms and thus no elevation of one realm to the detriment of the other. Diamond writes: "Between religion and social structure, social structure and economic organization, economic organization and technology, the magical and pragmatic, there are intricate and harmonious correlations."¹¹

Moreover, guiding this framework of correlations is a code of life that Robert Redfield, in a classic explication, has called the "moral order"--in contrast to the "technical order" that guides modern Western society. In a society guided by "moral order," behavior is organized around ideas of what is "right" (rather than "useful" or "necessary" or "expedient"--terms which characterize the "technical order") and in a morally-ordered society "sentiments, morality and conscience" determine the correctness of conduct.¹² Thus there is no sense of, or yearning for, religious or social "progress" (and, conversely., no fear of "backsliding"), no determination to pull the society out of imagined depravity, no endless debating over religious technicalities (in most indigenous societies there is no separate word for religion),¹³ and no such thing as religious war. "The preacher of conversion and the preacher of moral regeneration are creatures of civilization" Redfield writes, noting that "for two and a half centuries a community of Tewa Indians have lived among the Hopi of First Mesa,"

totally maintaining their cultural integrity and, Redfield wryly observes, leaving no evidence "that Tewa and Hopi send missionaries to each other."¹⁴

Indigenous societies are, in Diamond's words, "systems in equilibrium" that "do not manifest the internal turbulence endemic in archaic or contemporary civilizations." Thus:

Society is apprehended as a part of the natural order, as the backdrop against which the drama of individual life unfolds. It is sanctified by myth, revealed in ritual, and buttressed by tradition. The social network is perceived as a more or less permanent arrangement of human beings vis-à-vis each other. Since the basic needs of food, clothing, shelter and . . . personal participation are satisfied . . . in a socially-non-exploitative manner, revolutionary activity is, insofar as I am aware, unknown.

In a real sense, then, the individual in an indigenous society "is a conservative":

His society changes its essential form only under the impact of external circumstances or in response to drastic changes in the natural environment. Institutional disharmonies never reach the point of social destruction or, correlatively, of chronic, widespread individual disorganization.¹⁵

In short, in indigenous society the individual's world "is neither compartmentalized nor fragmented, and none of its parts is in fatal conflict with the others."¹⁶ As a result of this complex interrelationship of entities, all the products of the natural and spiritual worlds are regarded with respect and care, all are possessed of power, and none can be dispatched, abandoned, or exploited in a mood of indifference.

Diamond's model, supported by an enormous array of other anthropological findings, can be condensed to a single paragraph:

Indigenous societies tend to have communal economies. In such economies private ownership of the economic base--including the land--does not exist. Neither does the idea of profit or surplus accumulation in the Western sense, with the result that there is a remarkably even level of goods distribution: to the extent that food, clothing, shelter, and work are available to anyone, they are

available to everyone. In those indigenous societies that have relatively permanent leadership positions (there are many that do not), such leaders are viewed as part of the overall kinship network and not as independent, secular, autocratic masters. There are no "kings" in indigenous societies and those people not in leadership positions can and often do depose or abandon leaders who betray their shared trust. Embracing every institution in indigenous societies is a recognition of the essential unity of existence, a sense of the interdependence of all things, and a belief in the ultimate permanence of moral tradition. The natural world, the spiritual world, and the world of humans are equally real, equally "alive" and subjective, and equally protected from casual exploitation.

So much for the model. How did the reality of Hawaiian society before Western contact compare with it?

The Economic, Political, and Social Structures in Precontact Hawaii

Precontact Hawai'i was a society with a subsistence economy--that is, an economy without a market and without a need for surplus production. Some writers, however, load this term with bias when they read into it the idea, in Pierre Clastres' words, of an economy that "permits the society it sustains to merely subsist," an economy that "continually calls upon the totality of its productive forces to supply its members with the minimum necessary for subsistence." Used in this way (not in the simple descriptive way in which I shall use it), Western historians of indigenous peoples have often displayed a remarkable tolerance for self-contradiction: indigenous peoples, they find, live in precariously formed subsistence economies; *and*, they continue, indigenous peoples are lazy.

Now, as Clastres has pointed out, "one cannot have it both ways": either people in these societies do live in such subsistence economies and therefore must, by definition, spend virtually all their waking hours in search of food; or they do not live in such subsistence economies and thus have time available for leisure and other pursuits.¹⁷ In Hawai'i, as in other indigenous societies, the reality was the precise reverse of the Western prejudice: the people were neither lazy, nor did they live in a subsistence economy requiring an endless search for food. They had bounteous amounts of food available as a result of diligent and ingenious labor--and they also had a good deal of time available to pursue sporting, cultural, and artistic activities.

A number of things repeatedly impressed Westerners about Hawai'i during those first years of contact: the strong, and well-proportioned bodies of the people, with their "remarkably pleasing countenances"; the neatness and cleanliness of their homes and persons; the orderliness of the society and the affection of the people for one another; the industriousness of the people, especially as demonstrated in their intensive and astonishingly productive cultivation of the land; the facility with which the men built and maneuvered their seagoing craft; and the vigor, discipline, and complex precision with which dance and sporting events were carried out.¹⁸ None of this, of course, came about by accident. In an effort to understand this flourishing land and people, let us turn back to the social categories set forth in Stanley Diamond's typology.

1. *Economics.* The islands of Hawai'i are enormous volcanic mountains projecting up out of the ocean. The economy of precontact Hawai'i depended primarily upon a balanced use of the products of this mountainous land and the sea. This accounts for the ingenious way in which the land was divided.

Each island, or *mokupuni*, was divided into separate districts running from the mountains to the sea, known as *'okana*. Each *'okana* was then subdivided into *ahupua'a*, which themselves ran in wedge-shaped pieces from the mountains to the sea; each *ahupua'u* was then divided into *'ili*, on which resided the *'ohana* (extended families) who cultivated the land. The *'ohana* was the core economic unit in Hawaiian society. Here is how it operated, according to two of the most knowledgeable modern historians of ancient Hawai'i:

Between households within the *'ohana* there was constant sharing and exchange of foods and of utilitarian articles and also of services, not in barter but as voluntary (though decidedly obligatory) giving. *'Ohana* living inland (*ko kula uka*), raising taro, bananas, *wauke* (for *tapa*, or barkcloth, making) and *olonā* (for its fiber), and needing gourds, coconuts and marine foods, would take a gift to some *'ohana* living near the shore (*ko kula kai*) and in return would receive fish or whatever was needed. The fishermen needing *poi* or *'awa* would take fish, squid or lobster upland to a household known to have taro, and would return with his *kalo* (taro) or *pa'i 'ai* (hard *poi*, the steamed and pounded taro corm). A woman from seaward, wanting some medicinal plant, or sugarcane perhaps, growing on the land of a relative living inland would take with her a basket of shellfish or some edible seaweed

and would return with her stalks of sugarcane or her medicinal plants. In other words, it was the *'ohana* that constituted the community within which the economic life moved.¹⁹

Needless to say, there was no money (in Diamond's words, no "abstract, intrinsically valueless medium for appropriating surplus, storing value, and deferring payment or delaying exchange") in precontact Hawai'i, nor did there exist the economic concepts on which such a medium could be based. There was no idea of surplus appropriation, value storing or payment deferral in precontact Hawai'i because there was no idea of financial profit from exchange; and thus, there was also no concept of economic exploitation. There was an annual tax levied by the *ali'i* (chiefs); however, "this was not levied individually on planters, but they were assessed by the *haku* (the head of the extended family) in proportion to the land cultivated and the crop."²⁰

These various land subdivisions, in the words of one recent anthropologist, operated out of a decentralized "conical clan" social system that tolerated "competing politics" and was rooted in a tradition of economically independent *ahupua'a*.²¹ The necessities of life--food, clothing, shelter--never caused dispute because one's basic right to them was never questioned. Along with the right to work, these rights simply adhered to an individual as part of his or her membership in the *'ohana*. As anthropologist Marion Kelly has written: "Under the Hawaiian system of land-use rights the people living within each *ahupua'a* had access to all the necessities of life," thus establishing an independence founded upon the availability of "forest land, taro and sweet potato areas, and fishing grounds."²²

While these were unquestioned rights that could not be taken away, there were other "rights" (in the Western way of thinking) that, on the contrary, could not be given to or held by anyone: private land and water rights. Such notions "had no place in old Hawaiian thinking. The idea of private ownership of land was unknown" and "water . . . like sunlight, as source of life to land and man, was the possession of no man," no matter how high his social rank.²³

One particularly revealing manifestation of the Hawaiian attitude toward land and the environment in general is reflected in the Hawaiian language. The Hawaiian language has two forms of possessive: the "o" possessive, which signifies a non-acquired and therefore inalienable status--for example, one's body; and the "a" possessive, which signifies acquired and therefore alienable status--for example, most material objects. There are, however, certain material objects that take the "o" possessive, meaning they cannot be acquired or alienated: house, canoe, land, and

sometimes adzes. In the very structure of the language, then, we have confirmation of this crucial aspect of pre-contact Hawaiian life: land could not be acquired or disposed of because it was inalienable and available to everyone.

2. *Leadership and social organization.* If the *'ohana* was the center of the Hawaiians' economic universe, it was equally the heart of the political realm. As E.S.C. Handy put it: "Government in old Hawai'i was a personal or family affair centering in the *Mō'i* (the supreme male *ali'i* [the "chief", as it were]) of a *moku* (island or segment of an island)." Despite the high rank and privilege bestowed upon the *Mō'i*, he acted only in concert with other *ali'i*: "In practice, a *Mō'i* discussed in a council of *ali'i* (*aha ali'i*) the fitness of prospective heirs, who were qualified by rank for succession, and with the approval of the council, the decision was made and announced."²⁴

However, not all ruling chiefs were the bearers of the highest rank. Kamakau remarked that the "pedigrees of the chiefs in the line of succession from ancient times down to those of Kamehameha I," were not the same. He continued:

As their descendants spread out, the ranks (*'ano*) of the chiefs lessened. Sometimes the hereditary chief lost his land, and the kingdom was taken by force and snatched away by a warrior, and the name of "chief" was given to him because of his prowess. He then attached himself to the chiefly geneologies, even though his father may have been of no great rank (*noanoa*), and his mother a chiefess. Therefore the chiefs were not of like ranks, and the islands came under the rules of different chiefs who were not all of high chiefly status (*kulana*)--not from generations of chiefs.²⁵

Thus, there were competing chiefs, the most powerful of whom was assisted by an advisor known as the *kalaimoku*, an individual whose office was personal rather than formal, and the priests, who themselves possessed great authority and were independent of the powers of the *kalaimoku*.²⁶

Before these figures and the *ali'i* were the *maka'āinana*, the people of the land. Although subordinate to the *ali'i*, they supplied the *Mō'i* with his economic requirements and he in turn supplied his family, the court, and the priests. In certain crucial respects, the *Mō'i* and the *maka'āinana* were bound together in a reciprocal interdependence: "Land and people existed for the *Mō'i*, as earth and men belonged to the gods. . . . On the other

hand, the *Mō'i* existed for the sake of the people whose welfare depended upon him."²⁷ In general, "the relationship of the planter and his family to the high chief, and to the *ali'i* class in general, was a very personal one in which ardent affection was the prevailing feeling unless an *ali'i* was quite despicable, which was rare."²⁸

And rare for very good reason. Unlike feudal European economic and political arrangements, to which the ancient Hawaiian system has often been erroneously compared, the *maka'ainana* neither owed military service to the *Mō'i* nor were they bound to the land. Should any of them decide to leave one area and move to another, they were always free to do so. And should they choose a more drastic path, that too was available to them. Among a number of similar stories, it is told that an eighteenth-century chief named Koihala directed the people in his district to do what they considered excessive work. On top of that, he robbed the fishermen of their catch:

The story is that he compelled his canoe men to paddle him here and there where the fleets of fishing canoes were. The wind was bleak and his men suffered from the wet and the cold, he being snugly housed in the *pola*. (A raised shelter between the hulls of a double canoe.)

One day he had his men take his canoe out towards the south cape where there was a fleet of fishing canoes. His own canoe, being filled with the spoils of his robbery, began to sink; and he called out for help. The fishermen declined all assistance; his own men left and swam to the canoes of the fishers, leaving him entirely in the lurch. He was drowned.²⁹

As Marion Kelly notes, the *maka'ainana* labored willingly most of the time; but they also "took pride in their independence and dignity and never permitted themselves to be abused for long."³⁰ The story of the hapless chief Koihala is not unique.³¹ It is not surprising, then, that among the chiefs there existed a "wholesome fear of the people," as David Malo long ago noted.³²

Clearly, the chiefs were caretakers. Their powers were intertwined with the complex network of kinship that was the carefully nurtured center of social life, and the *maka'ainana* were a far from docile group of followers, even at the level of the *'ohana*:

The *Haku* headed the councils of the *'ohana*; he was the revered leader; but the old folk, men and women of strong character, were extremely independent in speech and action; consequently the *haku* was no dictator but was subject to the advice and opinion of householders and of all other members of his *'ohana* concerned in or affected by decisions and enterprises.³³

Thus, the genius of the mutually beneficial political system of pre-contact Hawai'i: on the one hand, the independent *maka'āinana* and their *'ohana* were free to move and live under the *Mō'i* of their choosing--while on the other hand, the individual *Mō'i* increased his status and material prosperity by having more people living within his *moku* or domain. In combination--and without the overbearing presence of a king or other ultimate, single human authority--these two parts of the system together created a powerful and permanent incentive for the society's leaders to provide for *all* their constituents' well-being and contentment. To fail to do so meant the *Mō'i*'s loss of constituents, loss of prosperity, loss of status, and--most important of all--loss of *mana*, or spiritual power.

3. *Cultural integration and social change.* "The principle of *kapu* was the keystone of the arch that supported the traditional culture of old Hawai'i."³⁴ So writes E. S. C. Handy in a well-known statement.

Kapu--a variant of *tapu* or *tabu*--meant to the ancient Hawaiians a restriction, a prohibition, sometimes because the thing in question was sacred and sometimes because it was contaminated. *Kapu* was the sacred law. To refer back to Redfield's terminology, it was the driving force of the "moral order," the code upon which determinations of "right" and "wrong" were based. It was *kapu* that determined everything from the time for building canoes to correct eating behavior. As Handy put it:

In planting, fishing, canoe-making and house-building, which were men's work, the materials used, the operatives, the actual labor involved and the place consecrated to it were sacred and hence protected by *kapu*. Thus in the making of a new canoe, the tree from the moment of its felling, the men who hewed, hauled and finished it, the shed by the shore in which it was trimmed and rigged were under a spell of consecration, which was removed by ritual at the time of the launching.³⁵

One result of the *kapu* system was that social change was relatively slow in precontact Hawai'i. The society was a system in balance, guided

by an inflexible (but readily internalized) moral code. People knew where they stood and what was expected of them; in a sense, then, the *kapu* was both liberating and confining. But it was liberating and confining for *everyone*. No one was above the law. Indeed, everyone and everything was immersed in the law. And the law was immersed in the natural world.

The gods in ancient Hawai'i were, as Handy says, "by no means a vague feeling." On the contrary: "The gods of the Polynesians were personified concepts that, on the one hand, embodied the desires and needs, the hopes and dreads of their worshippers; and, on the other hand, individualized the elements and forces that they observed in nature."³⁶ Whereas Western culture has tended to restrict the idea of consciousness to human beings (and has often bickered even about that), thus objectifying and dehumanizing everything in the nonhuman realm, Hawaiian culture did just the reverse: it animated the world at every level, granting consciousness to an extraordinarily wide sweep of reality. This view was manifested in song and dance and poetry:

The poetry of ancient Hawai'i evinces a deep and genuine love of nature, and a minute, affectionate, and untiring observation of her moods. . . . Her poets never tire of depicting nature; sometimes, indeed, their art seems heaven-born.³⁷

Hawaiians developed a great depth of sensual feeling for the non-human world and an extraordinary respect for the life of the sea, the forest, and the sky. Returning once again to Stanley Diamond: to the pre-contact Hawaiian, the world around him was "neither compartmentalized nor fragmented, and none of its parts [was] in fatal conflict with the others."

It is perhaps ironic--tragically ironic, in view of the destruction wrought upon Hawaiian culture by the coming of the West--that only in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries did Western science and philosophy begin to comprehend and to celebrate the "discovery" of concepts that had been an integral part of ancient Hawaiian life. Thus, centuries before Darwin announced his theory of evolution, Hawaiians had elucidated the heart of that idea in their great creation chant, the *Kumulipo*. And only with the philosophical writings of Alfred North Whitehead, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Edmund Husserl, and others, did the West begin to recognize what Whitehead called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness"--that is, the mistaken notion of subject-object polarization that had puzzled the West since Plato, but that had no place in the Hawaiian

perception of reality. In the wisdom of its traditional metaphysics, Hawaiian culture long knew what the West is only now (and against continued resistance) finding out.

If much of this has seemed abstract, that is because the constraints of space and time required it to be. But what, beyond the abstract formulation, *did* the ancient Hawaiians' world look like? Here is Captain Cook upon meeting two Hawaiian men:

Both of these chiefs were men of strong and well-proportioned bodies, and of countenances remarkably pleasing. Kaneena especially, whose portrait Mr. Webber has drawn, was one of the finest men I ever saw. He was about six feet high, had regular and expressive features, with lively, dark eyes; his carriage was easy, firm, and graceful.³⁸

Here is Archibald Menzies describing some of these men in a mock battle staged for the white visitors:

They first fought with blunt spears which they darted from their hands at one another with amazing force and dexterity, making them pass through the air with a whirring noise and quivering motion, yet the party aimed at on either side would often catch hold of them in their rapid course and instantly turn their points with equal force and velocity on those who hove them.³⁹

Here is a surgeon with Cook's crew, a Mr. Samwell, on the sight of the Hawaiian canoes that met the *Resolution* and *Discovery*:

We counted 150 large sailing canoes. Many of which contained thirty and forty men, we reckoned that altogether there could not be less about the two ships than 1,000 canoes and 10,000 [Hawaiians].⁴⁰

Here is Archibald Campbell, one of the first Westerners actually to live in Hawai'i for an extended time, on domestic life:

It is only by size that the houses of the chiefs are distinguished from those of the lower orders, for the same barn-like shape is universal. They are, however, kept very clean, and their household utensils, consisting of wooden dishes and calabashes, are hung, neatly arranged, upon the walls. . . . In all of [the houses] the utmost attention to cleanliness prevails.⁴¹

Here is William Shaler on agriculture:

These are certainly the most industrious people I ever saw. . . . [They] have, by long and successive experiments, brought their agriculture to an incredible degree of perfection. . . . I have seen, in some places, aqueducts constructed to bring water to elevated lands, that would do honour to the ingenuity of a much more civilized people.⁴²

Archibald Menzies, a professional naturalist, was more willing to overlook the problem of "civilization":

Even the shelving cliffs of rocks were planted with esculent roots, banked in and watered by aqueducts from the rivulet with as much art as if their level had been taken by the most ingenious engineer. We could not indeed but admire the laudable ingenuity of these people in cultivating their soil with so much economy. The indefatigable labor in making these little fields in so rugged a situation, the care and industry with which they were transplanted, watered and kept in order, surpassed anything of the kind we had ever seen before.⁴³

Cook also commented on agriculture. On a trip inland he "did not observe a single spot of ground that was capable of improvement, left unplanted; and, indeed, it appeared . . . hardly possible for the country to be cultivated to a greater advantage."

And on personal relationships, here again is Cook:

It was a pleasure to observe with how much affection the women managed their infants, and how readily the men lent their assistance to such tender office.⁴⁴

Or Captain George Vancouver, noting the "fair and honest dealing in all their commercial intercourse" and the calm and orderliness of the people "although there was not a chief or any person of distinction amongst them to enforce their good behavior; neither man nor woman attempted to come on board, without first obtaining permission; and when this was refused, they remained perfectly quiet in their canoes alongside."

Again, Vancouver, this time on a performance of hula:

The entertainment consisted of three parts, and was performed by three different parties consisting of about two hundred women in each, who ranged themselves in five or six rows. . . . The whole of this numerous group was in perfect unison of voice and action, that it were impossible even to the bend of a finger, to have discerned the least variation. Their voices were melodious and their actions were as innumerable as, by me, they were indescribable; they exhibited great ease and much elegance, and the whole was executed with a degree of correctness not easily to be imagined.⁴⁵

Pages could be filled with observations of this sort, but the same point would simply be reiterated again and again.

The society of precontact Hawai'i was, in crucial respects, an exemplar of the indigenous society model devised by Stanley Diamond. And it was a far cry from the culturally impoverished "subsistence" society commonly ascribed to indigenous cultures by unfriendly Western writers. But on that January day of 1778 when Captain Cook anchored off the coast of Hawai'i, there was another society that can properly be described as "precontact." It was English society, as represented by the men on board Cook's ships, *Resolution* and *Discovery*. With regard to Hawaiian society, after all, English society was still in a precontact stage. How did that society compare or contrast with the indigenous model?

The Economic, Political, and Social Structures of Eighteenth-Century England

It has often been remarked that Captain Cook brought to Hawai'i something the Hawaiians had never before seen. Iron. But that was not all he brought. He brought vermin that would in time infest the environment. And he brought disease that would torture and destroy the people. But he also brought, in himself and the minds of his men, a view of the world that could not co-exist with that of the people who would welcome him as their guest. He brought capitalism, he brought Western political ideas, and he brought Christianity. Let us see how these match up with the relevant parallel ideas in Hawaiian society and indigenous societies generally.

1. *Economics*. In capitalism Cook brought with him (in what one economist has called a "minimal structural definition") an economic system that places the means of production in the hands of private individuals and firms. That is, those "material means essential to the survival of

the individual or the group"--material means that in indigenous societies are held in common--were, in Cook's homeland, the private property of a wealthy few. Further, as opposed to the economically noncompetitive and nonacquisitive indigenous forms of material distribution of goods (where "no man need go hungry while another eats"), in capitalism Cook brought with him the abstract notion of money, with all its ideological trappings, and the idea that the proper method of its distribution among people is through the competitive arena of the marketplace.

Whatever else can be said about capitalism, this much is beyond dispute: the notion of private ownership of land and private control of all other aspects of goods distribution is at the heart of the system. So too is the idea of labor as a commodity to be bought and sold. Under the economic system that prevailed in England and in the minds of Cook's crew, no one had a right to expect, as a matter of course, access to food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or work; all of these were articles or means of trade that each individual had to wrest from a resisting community of others that placed great value on the personal traits of ambition, self-reliance, and cunning. Individual survival rested not on *interdependence*, but on *independence*--on personal exploitation of others, rather than on communal sharing with them.

2. *Leadership and social organization.* In England, where Cook and his men came from, there was a king. Though no longer possessed of the autocratic powers of many of his predecessors (these had been lost, along with the king's head, at an earlier time) the King of England still symbolized an individual atop the pyramidal structure of the state.

Moreover, the relatively new parliamentary system of England was still nothing like the political system of indigenous societies; on the contrary, England's political system was in many ways precisely the reverse of that common to indigenous societies. Where leadership in indigenous societies tends to be "communal and traditional, not political or secular," in England leadership was now both political and secular, not communal or traditional.

Like the economic system, the political system was intensely competitive and individualistic. Notions of extended kinship relations, of naturally expected and accepted reciprocity, of temporal and mundane power as part of the web of a larger reality--these had no place in the modern world of eighteenth-century England. Power, like money, was simply to be seized by those most willing and fit to make the effort, and those without power took their lives in their hands should they attempt to resist or elude its grasp.

3. *Cultural integration and social change.* Finally, there was Christianity, the belief system that enveloped and nurtured the social world. Such a religion could not have been more different from the spiritual beliefs of the Hawaiians, or of indigenous peoples in general. In the Christian view time was linear, proceeding from a specific beginning to an imminent and apocalyptic end. The earthly world and the spiritual world were separated by an immense gulf; compared to the spiritual world the earthly world was a pit of ghastly depravity.

The chasm between the earthly and spiritual realms was repeated in the other subdivisions of reality. Paramount among these subdivisions were those separating God, man, and nature. God was transcendent and man, as Henri Frankfort has noted, "remained outside nature, exploiting it for a livelihood . . . but never sharing its mysterious life."⁴⁶ "Nature," as the Christian theologian Charles Davis accurately puts it, "is not sacred for the Christian."⁴⁷ Thus, speaking as a Christian--though not uncritically--the distinguished twentieth-century historian Lynn White could observe:

We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim. . . . To a Christian a tree can be no more than a physical fact. The whole concept of the sacred grove is alien to Christianity and to the ethos of the West. For nearly two millennia Christian missionaries have been chopping down sacred groves, which are idolatrous because they assume spirit in nature.⁴⁸

But Christian missionaries did much more than level sacred groves. Relentlessly driven to wipe from the face of the earth every religious faith but their own, Christian missionaries became not only the front line of Western incursion into the rest of the world, they were also revolutionaries at the heart of political turbulence at home.⁴⁹ In short, far from functioning in the way that belief systems do among indigenous peoples--that is, as an integrative force, uniting the varied realms of reality and providing equilibrium to the social process--Christianity strove to segregate and hierarchically rank the realms of reality while endlessly disrupting the social order. This was particularly so among England's Protestants from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries--the period of that nation's initial forays into the Pacific.

Moreover, embedded in the Western consciousness of this time--religious and secular alike--was an attitude toward non-Western people that

was racist in the extreme. Eighteenth-century English society was obsessed with a sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority and the complementary inferiority of people of color throughout the world. This obsession was so remarkable that one recent analyst of pseudoscientific racism calls England "the logical site" in which that dogma "was to be born."⁵⁰ During the past fifteen years or so a host of historical and psychological literature has documented and analyzed this pathological conceit, perhaps best epitomized by David Hume thirty years before the Western invasion of Hawai'i: "There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white," he wrote, "nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation."⁵¹

In sum, then, on every measure that we have examined--the economic, the political and the religious--the world views and ideology carried by European adventurers into the Pacific were directly at odds with that of the people who were to become their hosts. What Stanley Diamond has said of the differences between Western and indigenous world views in general--that they "are as antithetical as it is possible for cultural attributes to become within the limits of the human condition"--was true as well in the specific case of Hawai'i and its encounter with Captain Cook.⁵²

But again, as in the earlier discussion of precontact Hawaiian society, much of what I have just said has been cast in fairly abstract terms. What we have asked of the Hawaiians we should also ask of the English sailors who encountered the Hawaiians in 1778: What did England look like at that time? What had Cook and his crew left behind when they began their fateful voyage to the Pacific?

England in the middle of the eighteenth century was a world in which a third of the population, in historian Lawrence Stone's words, lived "on the bare margin of subsistence." Malnutrition made rickets common among children, broke the bodies of many adults, and starved not a few of both--a condition only temporarily relieved by the famous food riots that occurred from time to time, whenever utter desperation set in. England at this time was populated by a people afflicted with, among other scourges, the "all but universal disease" of smallpox, a disease that killed, blinded, or disfigured for life its countless victims. Indeed, as Stone notes, among the English "only a relatively small proportion . . . at any given time was healthy and attractive, quite apart from the normal features of smell and dirt." What was wrong with them? Many things:

Both sexes suffered long periods of crippling illness, which incapacitated them for months or years. Even when relatively well, they often suffered from disorders which made sex painful to them or unpleasant to their partners. Women suffered from a whole series of gynaecological disorders, particularly leucorrhoea, but also vaginal ulcers, tumours, inflammations and haemorrhages which often made sexual intercourse disagreeable, painful, or impossible. Both sexes must very often have had bad breath from the rotting teeth and constant stomach disorders which can be documented from many sources, while suppurating ulcers, eczema, scabs, running sores and other nauseating skin diseases were extremely common, and often lasted for years.⁵³

Finally, there was "the ever-present risk of venereal disease." The great Boswell, for one, contracted gonorrhoea at least seventeen different times.⁵⁴

In addition to the stench of disease and simple bodily filth (in England, as in France up to the end of the nineteenth century, it was common for women "to die without ever once having taken a bath"--unlike men who had to bathe occasionally while in military service) there were the pervasive odors of death and excrement. "In towns of the eighteenth century," Stone writes, "the city ditches, now often filled with stagnant water, were commonly used as latrines; butchers killed animals in their shops and threw the offal of the carcasses into the streets; dead animals were left to decay and fester where they lay." Human excrement was dumped in the streets each night. A "special problem" was the phenomenon of "poor's holes." These were "large, deep, open pits in which were laid the bodies of the poor, side by side, row upon row." These huge pits were left uncovered until entirely filled with corpses, causing one contemporary to complain: "How noisome the stench is that arises from these holes so stowed with dead bodies, especially in sultry seasons and after rain."⁵⁵

This was English civilization. A far remove from Hawai'i. And then there were the children. Infanticide was common--not, as in most indigenous societies, because of infant malformation, but because of financial desperation. Such desperation led to the abandonment of thousands of infants each year, almost all of whom died. Babies left "lying in the gutters and rotting in the dung-heaps" had little room for hope.⁵⁶ Those who didn't die immediately were sent off to parish workhouses where they soon did--sometimes because of neglect, other times because of murder; Poisoning with gin was a favorite technique used by some nurses. There was, of course, always someone ready to make a profit out of this kind of misery. For example, "the Overseers of the Poor, who extracted a lump

sum from the father, or the putative father if the infant was a bastard, and made a clear profit from the early death of the child."⁵⁷

The capitalist ethos could do better than prey on the deaths of children, however; it could prey even more profitably on their lives. Some were "virtually enslaved" for prostitution or to serve as pickpockets' apprentices. Others suffered crueller fates:

Some had their teeth torn out to serve as artificial teeth for the rich; others were deliberately maimed by beggars to arouse compassion and extract alms. Even this latter crime was one upon which the law looked with a remarkably tolerant eye. In 1761 a beggar woman, convicted of deliberately "putting out the eyes of children with whom she went about the country" in order to attract pity and alms, was sentenced to no more than two years' imprisonment.⁵⁸

Thus the home country of Captain Cook. The would-be saviours of the Hawaiians left a homeland littered with hungry, deprived, sick, and viciously exploited men, women, and children (the poorest of whom, philosopher John Locke had recently suggested, might best be virtually enslaved)⁵⁹ to bring the beacon of civilization to a healthy, strong, happy, and well-nourished people. They left a nation where avarice was accepted and where vast concentrations of wealth and political power were held by a tiny handful of men, to bring enlightenment to a land where the economy was communal and where such oligarchic wealth and power was nonexistent. They sailed in ships manned by conscript crews to liberate a people who did not know the meaning of conscription.

Not everyone, of course, lived under such conditions in eighteenth-century England. But vast multitudes did--and long had, and long would. The entire social system dictated as much. Captain Cook himself had struggled up from this vast slough of degradation, while his men were still deeply mired in it.

Clearly, the English were a people with extraordinary pretensions of racial superiority who treated their own people with callous disregard. They were a people whose entire social engine of money, politics, and religion was roaring toward empire. Only other aspirants to imperialist dominance--Germany, France, America--would dare cross England's path.

Cultures in Collision

And so, on January 18, 1778, England and Hawai'i confronted one another. For a short time, Cook's ships bobbed in the waters off Kaua'i.

Then contact was made. Flesh touched flesh. And instantly the tragedy had begun.

Bacteria that Cook carried in his ship and on his person, bacteria for which the Hawaiians had no natural immunities, started their invisible invasion. In less than seventy years, the Hawaiian population would be cut in half and well on its way to being halved again.⁶⁰ The invisible killer that medical historian Alfred W. Crosby has called *conquistador y pestilencia*, the killer that had slain over 90 percent of the indigenous population of South and North America was now loose in Hawai'i.⁶¹ As in the Americas, so in the Pacific: 90 percent of the Hawaiian population would perish before the pestilence had subsided.⁶²

This bacteriological invasion, horrible as it was, needs to be seen as but one part of a larger onslaught. In this regard, the words of Greg Denning, although written about the Marquesas, are applicable to the effects of Western contact in Hawai'i as well:

The violence of contact was universal in its carelessness: difference was insufferable. There was violence in the Outsiders' presumed right to possess the Land; there was violence in the assumption of cultural superiority; violence in the prejudices, violence in the goodwill to make savages civilized and Christian; violence in the *real politik* of empire and progress.⁶³

Hawaiian society had been a classic example 'of what anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has called "the original affluent society." Long, slow centuries of cultural evolution had produced a society with "an unparalleled material plenty" *without* the endless work necessary to close what in modern society is the never-ending gap between means and desires.⁶⁴ Unto itself, such a social order was strong and resilient. It was a unified, integrated, and communal society that had drawn together as if in a fine web the multiple layers of human and natural and supernatural existence. But like many complex and finely-tuned institutions, this kind of world was vulnerable to gross and barbaric assault.

Eighteenth-century England was the opposite of an affluent society, if we accept Sahlins' definition of an affluent society as one "in which all the people's material wants are easily satisfied."⁶⁵ It was a society of great economic disparity, a society on the brink of modern capitalism's enshrinement of *artificial* need fulfillment as the measure of success. It was a driven society that left in its wake enormous amounts of human flotsam as the price of "progress" for a privileged few. It was a rapacious society, at the time deeply involved in the African slave trade, that segregated the

human and natural and supernatural orders. In the words of political theorist C. B. MacPherson, eighteenth-century English society was characterized by "possessive individualism" and was beginning to fetishize and objectify that idea.⁶⁶ The Hawaiians were to be among its victims.

Without the ravages of disease from Western voyagers, the post-contact history of Hawai'i might have been different. We shall never know. Disease has always been the Europeans' first friend in his colonizing efforts, his most valuable weapon in breaking the back of the indigenous society he has chosen to invade.⁶⁷

But more than disease, the West brought to Hawai'i--as to the rest of the Pacific--an amoral and opportunistic self-righteousness that preyed on the weakened survivors of the bacteriological assault. Hawai'i was to become a client state of the West. Toward that end it was necessary for the West to remake Hawaiian society in its own image. Thus the English helped generously in the creation of a Hawaiian royalty that could be dominated, manipulated, and controlled.⁶⁸

That, however, is another story for another time. In these pages all I have attempted to demonstrate is the cultural reality--and some of the consequences--behind the polarized world views that the European and Hawaiian encountered in each other the day their paths first happened to cross. The revision of Pacific history has already begun. This is but one small chapter in that revision.

It is well to remember that politics and scholarship are rarely separated with success. Nor should they be. For generations a self-serving Western bias has been part and parcel of the colonized history of the Pacific. That is changing now, as is the response to colonization itself.

"We must realize," writes historian Wilbur Jacobs, "that modern nationalist activism has its basis in a real disagreement with a white man's culture that has taken so much and given so little."⁶⁹ So too does native *scholarship* have its basis in a real disagreement with a white man's culture.

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NOTES

1. Derek Freeman, *Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

2. Noel Kent's new book, *Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), is only the most recent example. The relevant literature is far too

extensive for citation here, but some of the more important works on various topics are discussed in Wilbur R. Jacobs, "The Fatal Confrontation: Early Native-White Relations on the Frontiers of Australia, New Guinea, and America--A Comparative Study," *Pacific Historical Review* 40 (1971), 283-309; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Missionary Enterprise and Theories of Imperialism," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); and Greg Denning's brilliant study, *Islands and Beaches* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980). This somewhat random selection does not include the burgeoning work that has not yet seen publication. For two recent examples specifically concerned with Hawaii, see Barry S. Nakamura, "The Story of Waikiki and the 'Reclamation' Project," M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Hawaii, 1979; and Myra Jean Tuggle, "The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana: Cultural Revitalization in a Contemporary Hawaiian Movement," M.A. Thesis, Pacific Islands Studies, University of Hawaii, 1982.

3. I. C. Campbell, "Savages Noble and Ignoble: The Preconceptions of Early European Voyagers in Polynesia," *Pacific Studies* (Fall 1980), 45-59; and *ibid.*, "Polynesian Perceptions of Europeans in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Pacific Studies* (Spring 1982), 64-80. Italics added.

4. *Ibid.*, "Polynesian Perceptions," 79.

5. The earliest settlement discovered to date has been traced to around 350-375 A.D., using radiocarbon analyses of artifacts, and research continues that may establish even earlier settlements. See H. David Tuggle's summary of recent research in the chapter on Hawaii in Jesse D. Jennings, ed., *The Prehistory of Polynesia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). It is worth noting that these latest scientific findings only prove what the Hawaiians themselves have always said, basing their calculations on genealogies passed on orally from generation to generation. See Abraham Fornander, *An Account of the Polynesian Race*, Vol. I (London: Trubner & Co., 1878). pp. 166-68.

6. Stanley Diamond, *In Search of the Primitive* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974), pp. 116-75.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-34; Dorothy Lee, "The Religious Dimension of Human Experience," (originally published in 1952), in her *Freedom and Culture* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 169.

8. Diamond, pp. 135, 145.

9. See, for example, Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State* (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), especially pp. 169-74.

10. Diamond. p. 136.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

12. Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and its Transformations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953), pp. 20-21.

13. Lee, p. 165.

14. Redfield, p. 55.

15. Diamond, p. 138.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
17. Clastres, pp. 162-63; cf. Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (New York: Aldine, 1972), pp. 1-39.
18. Such observations fill the pages of the writings of all the early Western explorers. See especially the following: James Cook, *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean . . .*, 3 vols. (London, 1784); George Vancouver, *A Voyage of Discovery to the South Pacific Ocean . . .*, 6 vols. (London, 1801); Archibald Campbell, *A Voyage Round the world . . .* (New York, 1817); William Shaler, *Journal of a Voyage Between China and the Northwestern Coast of America* (Philadelphia, 1808); and Archibald Menzies, *Hawaii Nei 128 Years Ago*, William F. Wilson, ed. (Honolulu, 1920).
19. E. S. Craighill Handy and Mary Kawena Pukui, *The Polynesian Family System in Ka'u Hawai'i* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1972), pp. 5-6. This is a reprint of the 1958 edition published by the Polynesian Society, Inc.
20. E. S. Craighill Handy and Elizabeth Green Handy, with the collaboration of Mary Kawena Pukui, *Native Planters in Old Hawai'i* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1972), p. 20.
21. Tuttle, "Hawai'i" in Jennings, ed., *The Prehistory of Polynesia*, p. 195; cf. R. J. Hommon, "The Formation of Primitive States in Pre-Contact Hawai'i," doctoral dissertation, University of Arizona, 1976.
22. Marion Kelly, *Majestic Ka'u* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1980), p. vii.
23. Handy, Handy, and Pukui, *Native Planters*, p. 63.
24. E. S. Craighill Handy, *Cultural Revolution in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: Intitute of Pacific Relations, 1931), p. 10.
25. Samuel Kamakau, *Ka Po'e Kahiko* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1964), p. 4.
26. Handy, *Cultural Revolution*, pp. 11-12.
27. *Ibid.*, p.14.
28. Handy, Handy, and Pukui, *Native Planters*, p. 326.
29. David Malo, *Hawaiian Antiquities* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1951), p. 201, n. 15. Originally published in 1898.
30. Kelly, *Majestic Ka'u*, p. 1.
31. For other examples, see Marion Kelly, "Changes in Land Tenure in Hawai'i, 1778-1850," M.A. Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Hawai'i, 1956, p. 37; and Malo, *Hawaiian Antiquities*, pp. 202-3.
32. Malo, p. 195.
33. Handy and Pukui, *The Polynesian Family System*, p. 7.
34. Handy, *Cultural Revolution*, p. 3. Italics added.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
36. E. S. Craighill Handy, *Polynesian Religion* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1927), p. 88.
37. Nathaniel B. Emerson, *Unwritten Literature of Hawai'i* (Washington: Bureau of American Ethnology, 1909), p. 263.
38. Cook, *A Voyage*, vol. 3, p. 4.
39. Menzies, *Hawai'i Nei*, p. 91.
40. David Samwell, *Journal of Cook's Third Voyage . . .* (Manuscript copy in Bishop Museum, Honolulu.)
41. Campbell, *A Voyage Round the World*, p. 126.
42. Shaler, *Journal of a Voyage*, pp. 112, 163.
43. Menzies, *Hawai'i Nei*, p. 105.
44. Cook, *A Voyage*, vol. 3, p. 112; Volume 2, p. 230.
45. Vancouver, *A Voyage of Discovery*, vol. 5, p. 99; vol. 1, p. 361; vol. 5, p. 128.
46. Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 344.
47. Charles Davis, *God's Grace in History* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 25.
48. Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Science* 155 (March 10, 1967), 1203-7.
49. On Calvinism in England as the intellectual and psychological source of the world's first full-scale revolution, see Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (New York: Atheneum, 1972).
50. Allan Chase, *The Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), p. 72. The literature on this subject is enormous, but no one should ignore the classic work. Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968). See also, Ronald Sanders, *Lost Tribes and Promised Lands: The Origins of American Racism* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), especially Part One. "European and Colonial Origins"; and, for a penetrating psychological analysis, see Joel Kovel, *White Racism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).
51. David Hume, *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary* (London, 1875), vol. 1, p. 252.
52. Diamond, p. 129.
53. Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England. 1500-1800* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 486-87. Previous quotations on pp. 64, 76.
54. *Ibid.*, 486-87.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

56. Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 172.
57. Stone, p. 475.
58. Ibid. Although Stone's massive work, based on an astonishingly large body of primary sources, is commonly regarded as the most thorough and sophisticated treatment of England's social world during this period, supporting data can be found in numerous other studies. See, for example, Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family*; J. Clifford, "Some Aspects of London Life in the Mid-Eighteenth Century," in P. Fritz and D. Williams, eds., *City and Society in the Eighteenth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); and the classic work of M. D. George, *London Life in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1925).
59. Locke's proposal, affecting (children from the age of three, "stopped a little short of enslavement," notes historian Edmund S. Morgan, "though it may require a certain refinement of mind to discern the difference." Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp. 322, 381.
60. For historical population statistics on Hawai'i, see Robert C. Schmitt, *Demographic Statistics of Hawai'i, 1778-1965* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1968).
61. Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972), chap. 2.
62. For some comparisons between America and the Pacific on this matter, see Woodrow Borah, "America as Model," *Actas y Memorias XXXV Congreso Internacional de Americanistas* (Mexico City, 1962), 384-88; cf. some passing qualifications in Rudolph A. Zambardino, "Mexico's Population in the Sixteenth Century," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 11(1980), 5.
63. Denning, *Islands and Beaches*, p. 4.
64. Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, chap. 1.
65. Ibid.
66. C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).
67. A now almost classic study of the impact of disease, followed by cultural assault, in the destruction of a people and their world view is Calvin Martin's *Keepers of the Came* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
68. See Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1938), vol. 1, p. 65; cf. Kent, *Hawai'i: Islands Under the Influence*, pp. 15-16.
69. Jacobs, "The Fatal Confrontation," p. 309.