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STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE ON ANUTA, S. I.

by Richard Feinberg

On July 7, 1978, the Solomon Islands became an independent nation. In contrast with some "developing" countries, the new government appears to recognize the islands' "varied and enduring culture(s) with deep roots in the past" as a positive asset while "cultural promotion and preservation" are listed among the principles of their National Development Plan (Kenilorea 1978:3). Nonetheless, leaders perceive a need to "unite as one people so that we can concentrate our efforts on the tasks ahead" (Devesi 1978:3). In the words of Prime Minister Peter Kenilorea:

> Regardless of our ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity, we can, from today onwards, attest to a single national identity. Today we are Solomon Islanders, and we can say with humility, but also with pride, that we all belong to one free and independent nation. . . . Our future prosperity, harmony and happiness, progress and stable society depend on the combined efforts of all of us. . . . Nationhood brings a common unity of purpose and, wisely used, this can be for the good of all . . . (Kenilorea 1978:3, 33).

Yet, the attempt to incorporate disparate linguistic, cultural and social groups into a smoothly ordered economic and political unit is rarely easy to achieve and inevitably poses problems for previously distinct communities as they struggle to maintain their values, symbols, social structure and a degree of autonomy while being transformed into components of a nation state.[1]

The integration of new states is one manifestation of the broader anthropological problem of culture change and acculturation. In recent years, sociocultural change has been approached primarily from either

the viewpoint of pragmatic adaptation in the face of new material conditions, or from the perspective of diffusion of particular traits. Anthropologists recognize the importance of meanings and symbols,[2] but most structural analyses of cultures as coherent symbol systems have been synchronic studies focusing on relatively small, homogeneous communities.[3] Suggestions that a structural approach may be of use in understanding largely endogenous change are found in the work of writers from Marx (1959[1869]:320, 1964:67ff, 1967[1867]:357-58) to Levi-Strauss (1966, 1967) and Sahlins (1967), and I have used this approach in my own treatment of Anuta, a small Polynesian outlier in the Solomon Islands' Eastern Province (Feinberg 1980). In the present paper, I explore the preexisting structure of symbolic elements in Anutan culture and its implications for the integration of Anuta into the larger sociopolitical unit of the Solomons.[4]

My discussion will necessarily be somewhat programmatic in nature as it is based on a field study of traditional Anutan social structure in 1972-73, limited information, derived primarily from correspondence, as to developments affecting Anuta during the past decade, and inference from data on the problems of development and integration in other parts of the world. Much of the concrete information needed to fill out my analysis is simply unavailable at the present time, Therefore, this paper should be seen as a preliminary inspection of issues to be addressed in a forthcoming field investigation tentatively planned for the 1982-83 academic year.

Symbolic Dualism and Social Change

I have argued elsewhere (Feinberg 1980) that Anutan culture is permeated by a tendency to organize reality in terms of paired oppositions. Kinship and corporate groups are defined in terms of genealogical connection and behavior manifesting *aropa* ("love") and both the concepts of *aropa* and genealogy are further subdivided.[5] The "kindred" *(kano a paito)* is divided fundamentally into the paternal kindred and the *kano a paito i te pai o te papine* ("kindred on the woman's side,") including both maternal kin and affines. For ritual purposes each side is further subdivided into opposing pairs. The *pai maatuaa* ("side of the parents" or "side of the father") and the *pai makitanga* ("side of the father's sister") make up the Paternal kindred; the *pai tuatina* ("side of the mother's brother") and *pai tupuna* ("side of the grandparent") constitute the kindred "on the woman's side."[6] Anuta has four hierarchically ordered *kainanga* ("clans"). The two senior "clans" are led by chiefs, and their men are termed *maru* ("no-

bles," "protectors"). The two junior "clans" do not have chiefs, and their members are termed *pakaaropa* ("sympathy-producing" or "commoners"). The chief of the senior "clan" is called *te Ariki i Mua* ("the Chief in Front") and counterposed to the chief of the second "clan," known as *te Ariki i Muri* ("the Chief Behind").[7] And finally, Anutans classify the peoples of the world and their relations to them in terms of an elaborate model of complementary oppositions, somewhat analogous to the segmentary lineage concept outlined most notably by Evans-Pritchard in his description off the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940). At the most specific level, Anutans counterpose themselves to Tikopians--residents of the neighboring island, with whom they share many cultural characteristics. At a higher level of inclusiveness, they identify themselves with Tikopians in opposition to *nga* Toromonu, the Melanesian peoples of the Solomons. They identify themselves with Solomon Islanders as *penua uri* ("black islands" also their generic term for Melanesians.) as opposed to Europeans *(papa-rangi),* and the world's population, including both themselves and Europeans, is termed *atangata katoa.*[8]

That the dual perspective in Anutan social structure reflects a more deep-seated binary cosmology is seen most clearly in the spatial representation of social relationships. Front is superior to back, east to west, high to low, up to down, right to left, light to dark, and seaward to inland. The first term in each opposition is *tapu* ("sacred," "masculine," "powerful," or "chiefly"); the second is profane, feminine, weak, and honorifically debased. Through various elaborately involuted combinations of these oppositions most interpersonal and structural relationships are metaphorically expressed.[9]

This binary structure not only permeates Anuta's contemporary culture, but it has helped to shape responses to historical events. Repeatedly, events have contravened structure. Yet, the binary pattern seems to be so firmly entrenched in the Anutans' thought that it has always reemerged to mold the course of social interaction and relationships. Both quasi-mythical accounts of ancient history and the better documented stories of more recent happenings illustrate the Anutans' propensity for structural replication.[10]

According to oral traditions, Anuta was originally inhabited by people known as *apukere* ("earthsprung" or "autochthones"). The autochthonous inhabitants were divided into two ranked moieties, each led by a chief.[11] After a dispute with Pu Ariki, a Tikopian chief and prominent ancestor, the latter is said to have created a typhoon, followed by a drought and famine.[12] Eventually, the *apukere* all died out and Pu Ariki assumed sovereignty over the island. Not long thereafter, however, Anuta was repopu-

Anutans Identify With:	**vs.**	**As Opposed to:**
ANUTA	**vs.**	**Tikopia**
ANUTA + TIKOPIA	**vs.**	**Tonga + Samoa + etc.**
ANUTA + TIKOPIA + TONGA + SAMOA + ETC. = KIRI TOTO 'RED SKIN'	**vs.**	**Penua Uri ("Melanesians")**
KIRI TOTO + PENUA URI 'MELANESIANS' = PENUA URI 'COLORED PEOPLE'	**vs.**	**Paparangi ("Europeans")**
PENUA URI+ PAPARANGI = ATANGATA KATOA		
ANUTA	**vs.**	**Tikopia**
ANUTA + TIKOPIA	**vs.**	**Malaita + Makira + etc. = Solomon**
ANUTA + TIKOPIA + MALAITA + MAKIRA + ETC. = SOLOMON/PENUA URI	**vs.**	**Paparangi**
SOLOMON + PAPARANGI = ATANGATA KATOA		

Figure 1. Anutan classification of themselves in relation to other peoples of the world.

SUPERIOR	**INFERIOR**
high	low
front	back
east	west
male	female
seaward	inland
right	left
sacred	profane

Figure 2. Anutan sociospatial oppositions.



Figure 3. Diagram illustrating the founders of Anuta's commoner and chiefly "clans."

lated by two groups of Polynesians: one from Tonga and the other from Uvea (presumably East Uvea or Wallis Island). The immigrants assumed effective control over the island, the Uveans, under the leadership of Pu Taupare thereby occupying a subordinate position to the Tongans. The latter are said to have been led by a man named Pu Kaurave.

After Pu Kaurave's death, he was succeeded as chief of the island by his son, Ruokimata. Ruokimata, however, had no offspring. The chieftainship passed on to Toroaki, Pu Taupare's son. The Tongan "Moiety" as a discrete culturally defined segment of Anutan society vanished, and the binary structure was superseded by a single more or less undifferentiated polity.[13]

Anuta continued as a single polity, headed by a single chief, for about two generations. But over time, factions developed. The dominant faction was led by the chief, a man named Tearakura. The opposing group consisted of a man named Pauvaka, his sons, and their supporters. The latter faction plotted against the chief, but their conspiracy was discovered, the rebellion crushed, and once again the binary structure gave way before historical events.[14] This monism, however, was short-lived as it was Tearakura, his two brothers and two sisters who are credited as founders of the four contemporary *kainanga.*

Still, there was one chief. After Tearakura's death, he was succeeded by his brother, Pu Tepuko. Pu Tepuko, in turn, was succeeded by Tearakura's son, Kavataurua. At Kavataurua's insistence, however, a second chiefly office was established for Pu Tepuko's son, Pu Matauea, and ever since that time the dual chieftainship has been a prime example of Anuta's binary predisposition.

The importance of the second chiefly line is highlighted by the installation during the 1960s of the present junior chief, also named Pu Tepuko. At the time there was no one in an appropriate position to perform the ritual for installing a junior chief, and many people said that there could no longer be an Ariki Tepuko. However, leading members of the senior "clan" took this responsibility upon themselves, and although this was agreed to be ritually improper, no one objected--such was the importance of the second chiefly office to the preservation of Anutans' sense of order in the world.[15]

The interface of history and structure also may be seen in the Anutans' view of social space. This is particularly evident in their system of identifying residential clusters. In pre-Christian times, Anuta had two *nopo-ranga* ("villages") known as Mua ("Front") to the east and Muri ("Rear") in the west. When Christianity was established (allegedly in 1916), a church house was constructed to the west of Muri, and a group of houses

soon grew up around this church. These houses came to be identified as St. John, the same name as the church, and this combined with Mua and Muri to produce a triadic structure. Before long, however, this system was superseded by a new binary mode of designation. In the new system, Mua and Muri were combined under the appellation Rotoapi and contrasted with St. John which, in this system, was renamed Vatiana. This sequence of events is summarized as follows:

Mua + Muri	Mua + Muri + St. John	Rotoapi + Vatiana[16]
(binary)	(ternary)	(binary)

Meanwhile, the structure of the religious system itself was being similarly reshaped. In olden days, the chiefs also served as high priests, mediating between the underlying population and the dieties, who were themselves the spirits of deceased human beings. Following conversion, religious and secular authority were separated. Yet, the chiefs and their families continued to feel responsibility for the island's spiritual well-being. Thus, in 1972-1973 the church was led by the senior chief's brother, who served as the island's catechist. The chief's son was one of the catechist's three assistants. And the two chiefs were leading members of a church auxiliary known as Companions of the Melanesian Brotherhood.[17] Moreover, while secular authority has been formally separated from status in the religious order, the structure of the former system has been replicated in the latter. In the temporal order, the first chief has formal honor, and it is he who has the ultimate authority to make decisions, although this is done in the name of *pono,* (the general assembly of the island's population). The second chief is given chiefly honor, but his political authority is more analogous to that of the leading *maru* ("nobles," "executive officer") than to the senior chief. The *maru* are not given formal honor, but they act as advisors to the chiefs and make sure that the *pono's* proclamations are implemented.

In the church, political authority is in the hands of the catechist, although his assistants (referred to by the same term, *pakaako*) are honored also by means of special presents on ritual occasions. The relationship between the catechist and his assistants may be described in terms of "front" and "back," just as is that between the senior and junior chief. The companions have little formal honor as a result of their position, but they advise the catechist at weekly meetings or as the need arises. It is their duty to see that the policies of the church, in whose name the catechist acts, are carried out. And there are weekly meetings of the companions and the catechists, comparable to weekly meetings of the *maru* and the chiefs. This set of relationships may be summarized as follows:

SENIOR CHIEF: junior chief: MARU: people: CATECHIST: assistant catechists: COMPANIONS: congregation[18]

Simultaneous with the development of these relationships, a binary structure came to replace a unitary one within the church itself. For about two generations, Anuta had a single church house and a single congregation. Finally, in 1972, a new church was erected to the east of Mua. In the old church at St. John, services were led in English by the catechist. In the new church, called St. James, services were led by the Companions under the direction of the senior chief who spoke in Mota, a language from the Banks Islands which served for many years as the Melanesian Mission's lingua franca. The old church was characterized as the "church of the catechist" and counterposed to the new "church of the companions." At feasts, the congregations took turns dancing for each other's entertainment, and at Christmas the two congregations caroled separately on opposite ends of the island.[19]

Implications

If the foregoing analysis has any merit, structure must have great significance for Anuta's acceptance or rejection of ideas and institutions from the outside world.[20] Christianity was readily accepted because of a detailed correspondence between the structure of concepts and values as embodied in Christianity and the traditional religion,[21] an element of historical accident,[22] the material resources of the Anglican Church and its supporters, combined with its ability to fit into Anuta's preexisting hierarchically ordered binary cosmology. From the viewpoint of national integration, the crucial question is: to what extent does the Solomon Islands government share in the advantages enjoyed by the church? The answer, it would seem, is very little.

The Church of England is a European institution, and in Anutan eyes, Europeans constitute the most esteemed form of humanity. Europeans "descended" *(ne ipo)* upon Anuta from such countries to the east (the most esteemed direction) as England and the United States. They have light skin, which is positively valued. Europeans are rich (by Anutan standards, phenomenally so), which makes it possible for them to manifest the prime value of *aropa* through acts of generosity. And European technologial capacity and military power are associated with the traditional concept of *manuu* ("mana," "efficacy," "power") which in turn derives from association with powerful deities or spirits.

By contrast, the present government is dominated by Melanesians, for whom Anutans traditionally have had little but contempt.[23] These are dark skinned people from the lands "below" or to the west. They have few material amenities which the Anutans lack. From a Polynesian point of view, they lack the aristocratic etiquette that separates barbarians from people of real worth. And in some of the more extreme statements, they are depicted as lacking entirely in culture.[24] Thus, from a structural or symbolic viewpoint, it would seem that the Anutans have little reason to desire close association with the government or the people it is seen to represent.

If this is so, the government must find a way to overcome Anuta's structural predisposition if the Anutans are to be incorporated successfully into the political and economic structure of the new nation. At this point, there are several options which deserve consideration.

The most obvious solution might be for the government simply to ignore Anuta. The island is so small and isolated that its incorporation into the national political and economic structure might well require a greater investment of resources than could be justified by the potential benefits. The stated commitment to decentralization and maintenance of local custom, creation of "Councils of Chiefs" in local areas, and the like, attest to an appreciation of such considerations.[25] However, nation states rarely permit to go unchallenged the existence of truly autonomous sociopolitical groups within their borders. A perceived need for planning and coordination on a national scale to consolidate resources and focus their utilization on promotion of what is assumed to be the common good of national development tends to militate against this option.[26] And a desire to present a united front in dealing with the outside world usually operates to a similar effect.

These factors are accentuated in the Solomons. The major cultural division is that between the Melanesian majority with over ninety percent of the population, and the Polynesian minority, with about four percent. Although there are only about 200 Anutans, these people have close ties with over 2000 Tikopians, and a somewhat more peripheral affinity with other Polynesians in the Solomons. These Polynesians occupy a strategic position far in excess of their numbers in the total population. Commercially exploitable bauxite and phosphate deposits have made Rennell and Bellona economically significant.[27] And the Tikopians' and Anutans' sense of loyalty and discipline, deriving in all likelihood from their chiefly system of political authority, has led many people from those islands to take Prominent positions in the national police force. Similarly, dependability and discipline have made people from these islands into the back-

bone of the labor force at the Levers Corporation's copra plantations in the Russell Islands.[28] That same discipline makes possible concerted action of a kind which largely compensates politically for lack of numbers.[29]

Any differences between Anutans and the central government are likely to be shared by other Polynesians. Thus, a sucessful show of independence by Anutans is likely to be viewed as a dangerous precedent by the authorities in Honiara. Any resistance to participation in the national political and economic order, if not deterred, might well be copied by the other Polynesian communities with potentially disruptive consequences. For all these reasons, it appears unlikely that the government would allow Anuta true autonomy for very long.

Assuming then that the authorities will attempt to create among Anutans a sense of identification with the wider polity and allegiance to the government's authority, a logical first step might be to provide useful services. This would not only give Anutans a practical reason for maintaining good relations with the central government, but the latter would be demonstrating *aropa,* providing for the island's welfare in a manner highly reminiscent of the indigenous chiefs, acting in their traditional capacity.[30] Should these services be accepted, that would create an obligation on the Anutans' part to honor and obey the government, very much as they cede honor and obedience to their own chiefs.

To a certain extent, the government has taken this approach. It provides medical assistance, transportation, and radio contact, all of which are appreciated. However, owing to Anuta's minute size, geographical remoteness and the government's limited resources, such assistance has been minimal. Moreover, the Anutans seem to recognize that to accept offers of aid might compromise their sovereignty. If governmental services were truly essential, Anutans would have little option but to acquiesce. However, the island is, in most respects, quite self-sufficient. In this light, one may understand Anuta's refusal of relief supplies following the major storm of February 1972.

Effective integration into the money-oriented market economy would serve to undermine Anutans' sense of independence and ability to maintain autonomy. They would become increasingly dependent upon foreign institutions for employment and as sources of commodities, and such dependence could be used as a lever to alienate Anutans from their traditional culture. In particular, participation in a competitive market economy would tend to undermine the *aropa* ethic as the mainspring of Anutan social interaction and replace it with a new value system which might be more in keeping with the goals of a new nation struggling to achieve "modernity."

To a degree, Anutans have been incorporated into the monetary economy, largely without conscious planning on anybody's part. In 1972-1973, there were Anutans working for the Honiara town council, the Solomon Islands Police Department, a Honiara taxi service, and the Levers Corporation in the Russell Islands. To use this conciously as a political weapon, however, would entail risks of promoting antagonism and even active resistance, of cultural breakdown, and anomie. Nor is it certain that it would have the desired effect. Through a process of particularization,[31] Anutans could adapt to a money economy in some aspects of life while maintaining their traditional world-view and principles of social intercourse in others. In some measure, this already has occurred, as indicated by the patterns according to which wages and European goods were distributed among Anutans in 1972-1973.[32] As long as no serious conflicts arise, such a resolution ought to be entirely acceptable to government authorities. However, if Anutans had to choose between the national political and economic order and their own traditional subsistence economic system based on principles of *aropa* and kinship, most would very likely choose the latter. Furthermore, as inflation and recession spread world-wide, the market economy looks less and less attractive while the traditional political and economic system increasingly beckons.

Anutans value their sovereignty and independence. They cede political allegiance to their chiefs and resent any acts which tend to undermine this authority structure. In recognition of this fact, the government has agreed that Anuta may be represented by its chiefs on the local council.[33] By incorporating the chiefs into the nation's political structure, the government might be credited with *manuu* and, thereby, legitimacy through its association with the chiefs. However, there is an inherent contradiction between the hereditary monarchy represented by the chiefs, and parliamentary democracy as represented by the government in Honiara.[34] Furthermore, for such a solution to work, the chiefs would have to have an interest in what is happening in the remainder of the Solomons--a sense that what transpires overseas is relevant to their situation. Again, physical isolation and lack of normal education make the development of such awareness unlikely in the foreseeable future.

One final approach which shows some promise of success is to recognize explicitly the symbolic structure of Anuta's social universe, to emphasize the dichotomy between *penua uri* and *paparangi,* and encourage Anutans to recognize their cultural and economic commonality with the rest of the Solomons in contrast with Europeans (see figure 1). The government might emphasize the international distribution of wealth and power which, for centuries has worked to the advantage of the European

countries. From this vantage point, the Anutans have far more in common with other Solomon Islanders than they do with any European power, and they might be convinced that their material self-interest lies in casting their lot with the newly independent nation of which they form a part. And if this happened, it would not be difficult to fit their sense of material self-interest in with their sense of order in the universe. Even this approach, however, is laced with obstacles.

In many respects, this would be little more than the common political ploy of focusing attention on a foreign enemy (which may be real or concocted) in order to divert people's consciousness from domestic problems. Few if any nations have abstained entirely from such practices. For newly independent territories emerging from a period of revolutionary struggle, the temptation tends to be particularly powerful. Eventually one discovers, however, that "Most Tamils, Karens, Brahmins, Malays, Sikhs, Ibos, Muslims., Chinese, Nilotes, Bengalis, or Ashantis [find] it a good deal easier to grasp the idea that they [are] not Englishmen than that they [are] Indians, Burmese, Malayans, Ghanians, Pakistanis, Nigerians, or Sudanese" (Geertz 1973b:239).

In the Solomons, all this is doubly problematic. In contrast with many of the world's new nations, independence did not result from popular sentiment and a mass movement to expel colonial invaders. This means that the islands have been spared much of the strife and bloodshed which has so often marked the road to independence, but neither have their people ever had to develop a sense of national consciousness in counterposition to a foreign adversary. And in the Solomons, even the selection of an adversary would pose difficulties.

In general, relations between the Solomon Islands and the various European powers have been amicable. The British decision to give up administration of the territory was met less with jubilance than with trepidation.[35] The islands' constitution is modeled largely on the British system. England maintains political and economic ties with the Solomons, and there remains some sense that in a crisis British advice and assistance still would be available, Thus, the most obvious target for collective animosity is a poor one both symbolically, as there is little systematic anti-British feeling, and practically, as any anti-British movement might cut off the islands from their major source of overseas support. Other countries have so little contact with the Solomons that it would be difficult to make them the focal point of strong emotions for large numbers of people.[36]

When we come to the Anutans' sense of who they are and where they fit among the peoples of the world, we find that they are somewhere in the middle, with Europeans above and Melanesians below. In some con-

texts, they begrudgingly acknowledge that they are a "colored people" *(penua uri)* like the Melanesians and that they contrast with the *paparangi* ("Europeans"). They much prefer whenever possible, however, to think of themselves in association with Europeans and look down upon their brethren to the west.

In order to counteract their powerful symbolic predilection, Anutans would almost have to develop a perception of Europeans as active oppressors and come to see such oppression as a common bond which links them to their Melanesian neighbors. Anuta's isolation, however, has led to a parochialism which tends to make the recognition of common interests more than a little difficult. Some of this parochialism may be overcome by increased exposure to the outside world through education, travel, and employment. And some Anutans who have spent time overseas are becoming critical of certain European institutions, attitudes, and practices. However, the more time one spends away from home and the more aware he becomes that his problems and experiences are shared by others, the less likely he is to return home where he can influence the thinking of his fellow Anutans.

Conclusion

In the preceeding pages, I have argued that an appreciation of symbolic structures may be a useful tool in understanding political development. I have tried to demonstrate that Anutan culture tends to organize reality in terms of highly articulated sets of hierarchically ordered binary oppositions, that this symbolic structure has helped to mold the island's history, and that an understanding of this structure may be helpful in addressing present and future problems involving the relationship between Anuta and the newly independent Solomon Islands nation. This is not to deny the salience of pragmatic adaptation to material conditions, diffusion, or historical accident. Indeed, I have examined all these sorts of factors in the foregoing analysis. Rather, I hope to have shown how symbolic structures interact with other factors to pattern the course of history and how one may use such a model to draw inferences for dealing with the present and the future.

In particular, I have examined the problem of national integration in a new state with limited resources and tremendous cultural and geographical diversity. I have considered several options available to the central government for dealing with this problem, taking both pragmatic and symbolic factors into account. It appears that every option has been fol-

lowed to a limited degree, but that there are formidable obstacles barring the attempt to see any of these strategies through to a final resolution.

I do not pretend to have considered all possible avenues for resolution. Nor have I examined every problem obstructing the attempt to forge a unified nation. The possible role of cultural and racial prejudice and discrimination directed against the Polynesian minority, for example, has not been addressed. This is in part because the present paper is intended to illustrate a method of analysis rather than to be an exhaustive study of a concrete problem. But I also lack the contemporary data I would need to be much more specific. In the coming year, I hope to fill this gap through an empirical exploration of how the Solomon Islands have attempted to deal with the problem of national unity and integration, the Anutans' reaction to these attempts and the net effects. At that point, the real test of the model I am advocating will begin.

NOTES

1. Eisenstadt (1966:118-123), Black (1967:28 and passim), Geertz (1973c) and others have addressed this issue from the viewpoint of newly established governments struggling against the sometimes overwhelming tendencies toward fragmentation. Discussion from the perspective of communities attempting, to maintain their own distinct identities have largely dealt with racial and ethnic minorities in older, established nations. Prominent in such discussions is the issue of assimilation as it has been faced by Indians of the United States (e.g., see Debo 1970; Deloria 1969; Eggan 1966) and South America (e.g.. Davis 1977), or by the inhabitants of Australia (e.g., see Tonkinson 1974 and others).

2. Schneider (1968, 1969, 1972, 1976a, 1976b), Geertz (e.g., 1960, 1973), and their followers have actually defined "culture" as a system of meanings and symbols. Other prominent anthropologists (e.g., Levi-Strauss 1966; Turner 1967, 1975, etc.; Burridge 1960, 1969; Firth 1973; et al.), while operating from a broader definition of "culture" have nonetheless made the nature and workings of symbolic systems their major concern, and rarely can an anthropologist avoid the subject entirely. Some of my own thoughts on symbolism and particularly the conceptual-symbolic view of culture are expressed in Feinberg (1979a).

3. The synchronic perspective of anthropological structuralism may be traced largely to de Saussure's distinction between *language* and *parole* (Saussure 1966[1915]). The former involves a structuralist system and is separated from particular events or sequences of events. Through use of the linguistic analogy, this dichotomy has been applied to sociocultural systerns which at times may be related but tangentially to language. The second element of this opposition (*parole,* speech. event. or history) is seen as contingent; only the first is subject to scientific or structural analysis. But more recently it has been suggested (Sahlins 1976, 1981; Feinberg 1980) that events or history, while not the same as structure, are largely shaped by symbolic structures. Since "people act upon circumstances according to their own cultural presuppositions, the socially given categories of persons and things" (Sahlins 1981:67), structures necessarily appear in history, and history in structures. The commu-

nities most typically explored by structuralists include such groups as the Bororo (Levi-Strauss 1961, 1967, 1969, etc.), Winnebago (e.g., Levi-Strauss 1966, 1967), Purum (Needham 1962), or Ndembu (e.g., Turner 1969). Rarely, however, is the focus on such units as Brazil, Canada, the United States, India or Zambia.

4. I do not mean to imply that other elements are unimportant; my point is simply to call attention to considerations which have too often been neglected, and to indicate the way in which they may be utilized in the study of sociopolitical change.

5. The meaning of *aropa*, in various contexts, may approximate the English "love," "sympathy," "pity," or "affection," but is taken to be meaningful only insofar as it is expressed in material terms through the giving or sharing of goods and services. This concept is discussed at greater length in Feinberg (1978:28-30, 1981a:134-138, 1981b:67-72 and passim). The bipartite nature of *aropa* and genealogy in Anutan culture is discussed most explicitly in Feinberg (1980:362, 1981b passim).

6. For further discussion of the Anutan kindred and its structure, see Feinberg (1979b, 1980:364-365, 1981b:109-113).

7. The "clans," in descending order of precedence, are te Kainanga i Mua, te Kainanga i Tepuko, te Kainanga i Panatau, and te Kainanga i Rotomua. The Ariki i Mua is also known as Tui Anuta; the Ariki i Muri is sometimes called te Ariki Tepuko or Tui Kainanga. For further discussion of the Anutan "clan" and chiefly systems, see Feinberg (1973:13-17, 1978, 1981b: chapters VI and VII).

8. See Feinberg (1980:373-374. 1981b:164-165) for further elaboration of this point.

9. The nature of these oppositions and the spatial representation of social relationships is spelled out in greater detail in Feinberg (1980).

10. Anutan oral history traces the island's present population back about fourteen generations. The time depth, therefore, is not great, and I would not preclude the possibility that the account which I was given may reflect actual happenings. The important issue, however, is not the historical accuracy of Anutan traditions; rather it is to demonstrate that the structure of both recent (and well documented) and remote (poorly documented or undocumented) events corresponds with the Anutans' binary thought patterns.

11. This story also is related by Firth (1954:121), Yen, Kirch, and Rosendahl (1973:6-7), and myself (Feinberg 1976, 1981b:7-9). These accounts all agree in most of their essential features.

12. Pu Ariki is sometimes known as Pu Lasi; Firth (1954:121) refers to him by the latter name. This man is said to be the founder of Tikopia's Taumako lineage.

13. Persons of Tongan ancestry remained on the island through the auspices of women, but as Anutans normally trace descent through males, the remaining Tongan "blood" is not given cultural recognition.

14. This is a highly simplified version of these events. Actually, there are said to have been two battles for the chieftainship. In the first, Pauvaka's sons sided with Tearakura to defeat a rival faction; later, Pauvaka's sons opposed the chief and were, in turn, defeated. This is described in somewhat greater detail in Feinberg (1973:13, 1981b:8-9, 129-130). A proper elaboration of these events as they appear in Anutan oral history must await a more complete discussion of the latter subject, which I hope to compile in the near future.

15. For further details, see Feinberg (1978:7, 1981b:139).

16. See Feinberg (1980:371-372, 1981b:14-17, 198-202) for further details on Anuta's "village" structure.

17. For more on the Companions, who they are, and how they are organized, see Feinberg (1978:15-17,1981b:153-155).

18. These relationships and the matter of structural replication in the new religious order are spelled out in greater detail in Feinberg (1980:369-371, 1981b:171).

19. See Feinberg (1980:373) for further details.

20. In this paper, I am using the term "institution" broadly to include both "a group of people united or organized for a purpose" (Bohannan and Glazer 1973:274; see also Malinowski 1973:281) and "established norms of conduct of a particular form of social life" (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:10). For present purposes, more precise or limited definitions are unnecessary.

21. For a detailed discussion of such correspondences in a case that closely resembles the Anutan, one cannot do better than Firth's accounts of Tikopia (see particularly Firth 1970:313-315).

22. Especially relevant here is a powerful storm which is said to have struck Anuta, decimating the food supply and undermining confidence in the traditional religion, shortly before the arrival of the first missionaries'.

23. The idea of a central government for the Solomons and the structure of the government which now exists, of course, are European in origin. That government, however, is led by Melanesians, whereas the church is still under European leadership with Solomon Islanders occupying the lower echelons of the hierarchy. It is in this sense that the church may be viewed as a European institution while the government is not.

24. One informant, for example, commented to me in 1972 that "Melanesians have no minds" because prior to European contact, they had no clothes and went naked, "just like dogs and pussy cats." Clothing for Anutans, like Tikopians (Firth 1961:96), is a distinctive characteristic of culture, setting it apart from nature.

25. Decentralization is listed among the principles of the Solomon Islands' National Development Plan (Kenilorea 1978:3). For a critical discussion of the idea of local Councils of Chiefs, at least as it was implemented during th mid 1970s, see Monberg (1976).

26. That this is a conscious consideration in the minds of Solomon Island government officials is indicated by the Devesi quote cited above (p. 1).

27. The presence of such deposits and their implications for the people of Bellona is discussed in some detail by Monberg (1976).

28. Larson (1966, 1977) has discussed at length the lives of Tikopians in the Russell Islands. Much of this discussion would also be applicable to the Anutans.

29. A similar point has been made by Breitman regarding black Americans and their potential influence on politics in the United States.

30. The chiefs' responsibility for maintaining the island's welfare and the connection of this duty with concepts of *manuu* and *aropa* is discussed at greater length in Feinberg (1978:23-30, 1981b:158-163).

31. I have borrowed this term from medical anthropology, where it has been used to denote an assumption, held by many peoples, that western medicine is useful in the treatment of

certain diseases. whereas other illnesses are better treated using traditional medical procedures (e.g., see Young 1976: Feinberg 1979c:44). Here I suggest that the same process may occur in other cultural arenas. Both in the "modern" world and among the Anutans, for example, people tend to handle some types of transactions on the basis of market principles and a money economy, while traditional or nonmarket principles continue to prevail in other spheres.

32. For example, in 1972-73, every Anutan belonged to one or another elementary domestic unit or *patongia.* This was, among other things, the basic unit of ownership, so that anything belonging to one person, in principle, belonged equally to all other members of his *patongia.* Persons living overseas, after meeting their own immediate living expenses, were expected to send the remainder of their income home, either in the form of cash or European goods, to add to their *patongia's* common larder.

33. More recently, I am told (Yen, personal communication), Anuta has been "represented on the council by one of the chiefs of Tikopia, but by Nov., 1978, it appears that few meetings had been attended by chief or deputy. . . ."

34. The British solution of retaining a ritually important but politically ineffectual monarchy most likely would be unacceptable to the Anutans as much of the chiefs' symbolic significance is intimately tied to their authority and *manuu* "power."

35. This was true at least of people with whom I discussed the matter in 1972-73. Although I cannot speak definitively on the issue, my impression is that these people represented a fairly typical cross-section of Solomon Islanders both in Honiara and more rural areas.

36. Solomon Islanders have had contact with expatriates from Australia, Sew Zealand, the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and China, but this contact has been with individual people or businesses. The governments of these countries are remote, vaguely understood entities, and not considered to be particularly relevant to the Solomon Islands. Of these countries, the United States had a generally positive image in the Solomons in 1972-1973; the rest tended to be viewed in fairly neutral terms. The nation to have aroused the greatest antagonism was Japan in World War II, but this has been largely forgotten. At present, the Solomon Islands government has a fairly, lucrative contract with a Japanese fishing company, and thus it now has a vested interest in maintaining friendly relations with Japan.

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STATE SHINTO IN MICRONESIA DURING JAPANESE RULE, 1914-1945*

by Donald R. Shuster

The establishment of State Shinto in Japan's Pacific island mandate derives from the Meiji Government's (1868-1912) adoption of a secular worship that upheld the ideals of national unity and superiority. State Shinto can be dated from the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 to its disestablishment in 1945 under American occupation. During this brief half century, State Shinto helped perpetuate the notions of "a noble past rich in great traditions, a superior racial stock destined to endure as an eternal national family, and a matchless state headed by an unbroken, inviolable, divinely descended imperial dynasty."[1]

Japanese historians have reconstructed the stages by which the ancient indigenous stream of Shinto myths and practices, long coexisting with Buddhist and Confucian beliefs, were elevated by Japan's Meiji leaders in their efforts to build a "theocratic state based on the supra-religious cult of Shinto."[2] This enterprise was not entirely successful and required numerous compromises during the late nineteenth century. Because of the difficulty the Meiji government experienced in controlling the various long extant sects of Shinto, in 1882 two broad categories were established: State *(Kokka)* Shinto and Sect (*Shūha*) Shinto.[3]

The shrines of the former were given exclusive right to the name *jinja* (assembly place for the gods) and were financed and managed by national, prefectural, local, or colonial governments.[4] In contrast to the many brands of Sect Shinto, which based their faith and activities on their historical founders, State Shinto "claimed to perpetuate the authentic and traditional beliefs of the Japanese [Yamato] race and declared that it had developed spontaneously in the national life without the aid of individual historical founders."[5] This was a very important distinction for it allowed State Shinto to be elevated to a supra-religious position. Throughout the period 1868 until the disestablishment of State Shinto under American occupation in 1945, Japanese officials claimed that State Shinto was not a religion. In one sense they were right, but in another sense State Shinto, as one noted Japanese scholar put it, was "in reality nothing short of evidence of a religion interwoven into the very texture of the original beliefs

and national organization of the people, camouflaged though it may be as a mere code of national ethics and state rituals, and as such apparently entitled only to secular respect."[6]

The document which elevated State Shinto to preeminence among Japan's religions was the Imperial Rescript on Education issued in 1890. This rescript and supporting documents called for loyalty to the emperor and enjoined respect for the "way of the gods." Additionally, it prohibited religious instruction in the schools. In place of such instruction "definite techniques of reverence for the emperor and national deities, such as shrine attendance and obeisance before the imperial portrait" were introduced.[7] Thus, during the transition to the twentieth century, a time of rapid social change in Japan, Meiji leaders had found a way to create social cohesion, nationalism and social control. The traditional value system of "ancestor worship and nature worship was transformed, and partly accepted the imported Confucian morality, into the political ideology of modern Japan--national Shinto."[8]

This control was codified and further strengthened by the Religious Bodies Law promulgated in 1939 and enforced from April 1940 as part of the general escalation toward total rule that pervaded many social institutions, Shinto in particular. Hence, in Japan's Pacific colony the stage was set for construction and dedication of the Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja (government-sponsored great shrine in the South Seas) in Palau.

After Japan seized the Micronesian islands in late 1914, German officials and traders were expelled immediately while the deportation of German missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, followed a few years later. To help fill this gap, authorities allowed a Buddhist missionary, the Reverend Shinryu Kobayashi, of the East Hongwanji Temple of Shinshu Sect, Kyoto, to establish a temple on Saipan in 1919.[9] In 1920 the Protestant *Nanyo Dendo Dan* (South Seas Mission) sent out four Japanese missionaries, two to Truk and two to Ponape, while successful arrangements with the Vatican brought the-return of Spanish missionaries a year later.[10] This Jesuit mission grew rapidly to ten priests and ten brothers distributed throughout all the major administrative centers. As the *Nanyo Dendo Dan* was quite small, German Protestants of the Liebenzell mission were also allowed to resume their work in 1927. A second Buddhist mission "principally for the benefit of Japanese believers" was established on Koror, Palau, in 1926. Three years later a Tenrikyo representative, the Reverend Yoshio Shimizu, came to Palau "for the purpose of missionary work and research."[11]Tenrikyo, a branch of Shinto, had been very successful in overseas mission work as judged by thousands of Korean converts. The South Seas Government *(Nanyo-cho)* Annual Report of 1929 noted that

600 Palauans had taken up Buddhism and 120 were converts to Shinto, indicating some sympathy, no matter how superficial, for the newly introduced religions.[12] Intimately linked to the Spencerian notion of social evolution, which claimed a natural and necessary progressive moment from a savage to a barbarian to a civilized state, was the attitude that the islands were a ripe field for a civilizing mission. According to the South Seas Bureau, though, the Chamorros of the Marianas appeared earnest in their Catholic faith:

> it seemed doubtful whether many of the Kanaka converts really understand the religion they profess to believe in. In fact, there are indications that they attend church services more for recreation than for faith.[13]

In the Japanese view, the natural and necessary progress from savagery and barbarism to civilization was to be mediated by Japanese acculturation, mission work and schooling. Thus, by 1929, some seven years after the establishment of full civilian rule under a League of Nations mandate,[14] Micronesia exhibited a great diversity of religious callings--Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Shinto, Tenrikyo, and indigenous belief systems such as the *Modekngei* in Palau.[15]

While Buddhism spread to Ponape and Truk, Shinto went further afield. Sometime in the late 1920s and early 1930s at least fifteen State Shinto shrines were established throughout the mandated islands, which Japan in 1938 declared a territory following her full withdrawal from the League of Nations. Though there are very few published records concerning the development of Shinto in Micronesia, the outlines can be sketched.

Beginning in the 1930s, all Shinto shrines in Japan, as well as those in Nanyo-gunto, became active in promoting nationalistic aims. The theocratic state envisioned by the Meiji leaders came close to a reality in the hands of the ultra-nationalists and militarists of the 1930s. Shrines in the overseas territories were ordered to assist in the acculturation of indigenous peoples. This was obviously a new and more ambitious goal than ministering to the needs of Japanese government officials, immigrant farmers and town workers. As stated by a Shinto authority in 1939:

> Shinto is broad. It includes humanitarianism and righteousness. The Spirit of Shinto, which is the fundamental directive principle of our national life, must be utilized for the purpose of *elevating the races of neighboring territories* where the national relation-

ships are complicated. Indeed, by means of this spirit of Shinto *foreign peoples must also be evangelized.*[16] [emphasis added].

It was this curious mix of idealism and ethnocentrism which forged a tool of significant social control in the decade leading up to the Pacific War.

While government annual reports do not list Shinto shrines or the number of indigenous followers in island areas other than the Marianas and Palau, it is clear both existed. Jabwor Island in Jaluit Atoll, the center of Japanese activity in the Marshall Islands, boasted the easternmost Shinto shrine in the Japanese Empire. During special festivals such as the anniversary date of the founding of the Japanese nation, men danced their way from house to house carrying a *mikoshi* (sacred palanquin) and generating a contagious euphoria.[17] Even on distant Kosrae (formerly Kusaie), a Shinto shrine was constructed in the late 1930s or early 1940s after the heavy influx of Japanese military.[18]

Dublon Island in Truk Lagoon served as the command headquarters for the Imperial Navy during most of the Pacific War, and a Shinto shrine was dedicated there in the mid-1930s while Ponape also had a small but impressive shrine *(see Plate 1).* These shrines were destroyed during intensive American bombing raids in February and March 1944.

The Shinto shrine in Yap was located on a scenic rise complete with sanctuary, fence, torii, (a gateway separating the secular and sacred worlds) and lanterns. Yapese, dressed in loincloths and carrying their ubiquitous baskets, paid homage to the Shinto pantheon *(see Plate 2).* Perhaps the smallest shrine of all was located on the idyllic atoll of Lamotrek west of Truk. The tiny .24 square mile main island had, according to a 1930 Japanese census, 165 islanders. By the end of the decade the island had a small Japanese community whose members manned the meteorological station and seaplane base.[20] The shrine, complete with torii and miniature sanctuary building, was secluded in a grove of towering palms.

By 1936 there were nearly 41,000 Japanese in the Mariana Islands. Over the years, six Buddhist temples and seven Shinto shrines were established to meet the religious needs of the Japanese. There was one shrine on Rota Island, three on Tinian (home for 15,300 sugar farmers and factory workers) and three on Saipan. The largest of these was in central Garapantown *(see Plate 3).* Mountains have always been symbols of beauty and majesty for the Japanese. Thus Saipan's two other shrines were beautifully sequestered away in quite mountainous areas distant from the busy town. One of these has recently been partially restored by visiting Shintoists from Japan.



PLATE 1 The Ponape Shrine, Ponape Island, late 1930s. Source: Japan, *South Seas Bureau,* Tokyo, p. 15.



PLATE 2 Yapese in loincloths paying homage at the Yap shrine, 1930s. Source: Kosuge, Teruo. *Micronesia: Past and Present*, Japan 1978, p. 64.



PLATE 3 The impressive Saipan Shrine in Garapan Town, Saipan. Except for the concrete torii, this shrine was completely destroyed during the fight for Saipan. Source: Kosuge, Teruo. *Micronesia: Past and Present*, Japan, Shinpan, 1977, p. 70.

The grandest shrine of all, however, was in Palau. Beginning in the 1930s the Japanese population in Palau began to expand rapidly in response to the enormously successful exploitation of phosphate and the area's rich marine products industry. Palau was also the headquarters for the South Seas Government and therefore had the greatest number of government officials. As photographs and oral histories of older Palauans vividly attest, Koror at this time was a booming and outwardly attractive Japanese town. Its palm-fringed main street was clean and uncluttered, while its stores and residential areas were tidy and peaceful. Koror-town of 1940 had its more raucous side, too, with 56 liquor dealers, 42 lower class restaurants, 77 geisha (double that of Garapan, Saipan), 155 bar maids, 9 waitresses, numerous businesses, and nearly 2,000 commercial fishermen.[21]

It was on the outskirts of this bustling town that the Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja was built and officially dedicated in 1940.[22] The spirit of the times is captured well by the official Japanese publication which described the event:

> It was on February 11th in the 15th year of the Showa Era (1940) on the auspicious occasion of the 2600th anniversary of our gracious and glorious imperial era, that on the Arumizu Plateau in the Palauan Archipelago there was established the Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja. At this time the sun goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, was proclaimed to fulfill the yearning of our native countrymen resident there for already 30 years and surpassing 80,000, for a shrine in which to center their piety. Viewed as a step forward in the sacred task of constructing the New East Asian Order, with the importance of the south seas islands increasing all the more due to growing tensions in international relations in the Pacific in regard to the national policy of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the people, on receiving the imperial command that autumn, were all moved to inexpressible joy especially the officials and citizens of the locality, whereupon the Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja Support Association was formed, and work began forthwith upon the construction of the shrine hall. On November 1st of that year, in the august presence of the imperial messenger, the sacred enshrinement was held.[23]

This statement is indicative of several important developments. First, it suggests that the islands were becoming Japanese in spirit as well as

physical fact. Second, the very high ranking *(Kampei)* of the shrine was to assist in establishment of an Asian-dominated "New Order," which was a longstanding Japanese ideal and response to a half century of Western imperialism. Less obvious is the importance Japan attached to its south seas islands as part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere *(Daitoakyoeiken).* The utopian vision behind this grand design was to create an economically self-sufficient sphere and raise standards of living by excluding the predatory Western powers from Asia and South East Asia. According to the plan, Japan would serve as the industrial center to process raw materials and deliver manufactured goods. She would also take the lead in cultural and linguistic affairs. This vision of Asians cooperating for their mutual benefit received wide exposure in the Japanese press during late 1941 and early 1942. Serving as a rallying cry for the Pacific War, it captured the imagination of intellectuals and the public alike. State Shinto helped reinforce this vision by the uncritical conjunction of the ideal with the real.

Prior to the dedication of the grand Palau shrine, small shrines had been set up by Japanese farmers in the several agricultural colonies on central Babeldaob (Palau's largest island of 153 square miles). Koror-town had two small concrete shrines containing genuine portraits of the Emperor. One of these was located near the *Nanyo-cho* headquarters building and the other was near the Japanese student primary school.[24]

Teiichi Domoto, an important *Nanyo-cho* official, worked vigorously to have a high-ranking shrine established in Palau. On August 4, 1939, he attended a meeting in Tokyo with members of the Association for the Dedication of Overseas Shrines. Included were officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Colonial Affairs, Imperial Household Agency, Institute of History of the Imperial Family, and priests from five important shrines including Ise, Meiji, and Yasukuni.[25] The group decided that Palau, as headquarters of the important south seas territory, should have a high-ranking jinja and suggested that a research committee be established under the direction of Mr. Yoshida Shigeru (later Japan's first post-war prime minister) to decide what gods should be enshrined for protection of the territory. Shigeru's committee was guided in its work by the 1938 instructions which systematized procedures for establishing overseas shrines. It was ordered that Amaterasu Omikami be enshrined and worshipped as the chief diety, that the sanctuary buildings be constructed in a particular style, and that the priests *(kannushi)* be Japanese Shintoists with an understanding of national polity.[26] Concerning this last requirement, several priests destined for Palau attended a special two month school in early 1940 for overseas shrine supervision. Instruction was given

by officials of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, officers from the Navy and Hisakatsu Hijikata, an expert on Palauan culture and the Japanese living in Palau.

Yet before the establishment of the grand shrine, a 1937 statistical survey listed only 111 Shinto believers in Palau--27 Japanese and 84 Palauans. As there had been Shinto priests in Palau since 1929 "mainly engaged in preaching among the natives," these figures seem unusually low. Other than the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere *(Daitoakyoeiken)* of which the jinja was an important symbol, what justified such a splendid shrine? Prior to the Meiji government's reconceptualization of Shinto, this indigenous polythesistic faith had developed over the centuries as a community-centered belief system and thus became deeply embedded in Japanese culture. Accordingly, all residents within the area of a shrine were covered under its protection.[27] In essence then, all of Micronesia's ethnic Japanese, "yearning for a shrine in which to center their piety," were properly considered Shintoists. Presumably this applied to Palau's 6,000 indigenous residents as well, given the 1939 statement calling for elevation of the natives through Shinto evangelization.

Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja was thus seen as all important to the Japanese in Micronesia. To sanctify it, a symbol of the imperial spirit possessing the invisible force was brought from Japan by an imperial messenger, Prince *Chokushi Koshyaku* Ito Hakufei (meaning, person receiving a direct order from the Emperor). An account of this, though never published in English, speaks of the enshrinement of the imperial spirit and the related events of ceremony and celebrations.[28]

Prince Ito, sailing from Japan in the company of the symbol of the imperial spirit, was greeted by officials of the South Seas Government, civilians, and the resident Shinto priests at Malakal Harbor, Palau. As *chokushi,* the Prince was the Emperor's personal representative. A cortege of nine large, American-made black sedans transported the symbol of the imperial spirit, the imperial messenger, and the visiting dignitaries through Koror's streets where large numbers of solemn, respectful citizens lined the roads. Dogs living along Koror's main street had been exterminated by government order to prevent any disturbance during the procession.[29] Palauans who recall standing along the roadside say they saw little of the procession; their heads were bowed too low. After the cortege arrived at the shrine, the initial rites of purification, ceremonies of dedication, and other Shinto rituals were carried out by the priests in the privacy of the upper shrine sanctuary (honoden style). In the lower divine hall (haiganden style) additional rituals were performed with twenty of the most important civil and military officials in attendance. Hundreds of

other officials, including Palau's local chiefs, were waiting outside on a lower level of the shrine compound, and when the enshrinement ceremonies moved outside, a general purification rite was performed on the lower level by the officiating priests. An onlooker reported that the grandeur of the occasion was clearly written on the faces of the participants.

After this general rite, the chief priest and assistant priests moved in solemn procession back to the upper level of the shrine compound. Following them came the Minister of Colonial Affairs, the South Seas governor, civilian and military officials in order of rank. Next, in Shinto robes, came the imperial messenger escorting the symbol of the imperial spirit and other offerings which were contained in two large sacred boxes. They were followed by eight attendants (Plate 4). Reaching the-divine hall on the upper level, the *kami,*[30] associated with the imperial spirit entered the divine hall and the enshrinement events continued. The sacred boxes were opened and the South Seas Governor presented the *tamagushi,* the spirit force, to the chief priest. The final enshrinement ceremonies were conducted and the spirit force, the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami, now resided in the shrine and its grounds.

With the conclusion of the enshrinement ceremonies, the Minister of Colonial Affairs read a congratulatory message, and all the assembled dignitaries, including four island chiefs, drank a toast of celebration (*naorai,* literally "to eat together with the *kami*"). The representative of the Minister of the Navy then read a final congratulatory message and the dignitaries departed.

Throughout the remainder of the day, members of the general public and large groups of Japanese and Palauan students made their way to the upper level of the shrine. They bowed reverently and prayed before the divine hall. These visitors, it was reported, were filled with unparalleled joy. Thus ended the first day of ceremonies.

The second day of the enshrinement of the gods at Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja was devoted to ceremonies in service to the gods, solemn music, and dance. The photographic record shows only Japanese officials in attendance.

On the third day a parade of over one hundred of the faithful, in appropriate dress, escorted the sacred palanquin *(mikoshi)* which contained a symbol of the shrine *kami.* This crowd moved from the shrine over the sacred bridge and along the main road toward Koror-town. As the procession moved, it enlarged with devoted followers, some carrying smaller palanquins from each of the town's hamlets. Many onlookers stood along the roadside encouraging the procession members. Much to the delight of the island children, men masked as goblins also appeared along the road. The



PLATE 4 Imperial messenger (top of stairs) escorting the symbol of the imperial spirit and other offerings contained in two sacred boxes each carried by two men. Attendants following. Great Nan'yo Kampei Shrine, Koror, Palau, 1940. Source: Japan *Kampei Taisha Nan'yo Jinja Ho-sankai,* Tokyo, 1941, p. 12.



PLATE 5 Shrine identification beside the sacred bridge, "The Great Nanyo Kampei Shrine." And on the back side, "15th year 11th month," Koror, Palau. (Photo by Donald R. Shuster, 1976.)

photographic record shows that the procession became larger and larger and the participants more and more spirited. It was a great privilege for them to transport the divine *kami* throughout the entire community for all to be honored. Even drum and flute groups joined the procession to increase the excitement of the parade. The photographic record shows a few Palauans in the street celebration.

In addition to the street procession, there was an exhibition of local crafts and artifacts from all island groups of the territory and a more ominous photographic display of soldiers, war planes, battleships, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Japan had been immersed in an undeclared war with China for three years. Reference was made on display posters to the American military presence in the Philippines. On a map of South East Asia was superimposed information on Japanese naval strength. All this gave the impression of unmatched Japanese military might; while in another assembly hall, a demonstration of martial arts--judo, sword fighting, and archery--was held for military officials, an active complement to the photographic display of armed might.

On several sports fields in Koror there were athletic competitions for adults and entertaining events for children, the majority of participants being Japanese. At the Japanese-constructed tidal swimming pool, a swimming and spearing contest was held. Some of the participants representing their villages were young Palauan men known for their athletic prowess. Baseball, introduced by enthusiastic Japanese players in the mid 1920s had become very popular among Japanese and islanders alike. A Keio University baseball team came to Palau on an exhibition tour. However, Keio was not scheduled to play the leading Palauan team which the Japanese regarded as unbeatable. Neither the Keio team nor the Japanese rulers could afford to lose face during the important dedication ceremony for the new state jinja.[31] Instead, Keio played a team composed of local Japanese which was easily defeated 24 to 0.

The record of the Shinto shrine dedication includes photographs of some of the people who donated their time and labor to landscape the shrine compound. Included were Japanese hamlet supervisors and representatives, women of the shrine support association, primary school children and, allegedly, the Ibedul (high chief of southern Palau) leading women in hand work.[32] It is doubtful, though, that the person leading the women in hand work was in fact Ibedul Mariur, for at the time he was an elderly and frail man. The person identified as the Ibedul was probably a Palauan hamlet leader since it would have been an insult indeed to require the high chief of southern Palau to do menial hand work with women.

Elderly Palauans remember the Shinto shrine dedication and celebration as a monumental event--the greatest and grandest ever held in Palau. When it took place in 1940, the Japanese population in Palau exceeded 20,000 people. Immigrants had been flooding in since the late 1920s when the great richness of Palau's marine resources, mining, and agricultural potential was fully recognized and being exploited.

Notwithstanding the significance of these events of 1940, Japan's cultural hegemony in Palau was not without indigenous challenge. Only two years prior to the dedication of Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja, an anti-Japanese revitalization movement known as *Modekngei* (still a force in Palauan life) had reached a climax of power and prestige. *Modekngei* is a religious-political movement that originated during the late German and early Japanese Administrations. The movement's first leader was a Palauan man named Temedad who was believed to be a spokesman of the Cholll village god, Ngiromokuul.[33] In 1906 Palau's German rulers, with the aid of missionaries and a sympathetic Ibedul (high chief), attempted to crush the indigenous religion by destroying all the village god houses, and priests' temples and imprisoning the menacing *korongs* (shamans) at German headquarters on Yap. Temedad, a constable during German rule, attracted three disciples, Ongesii, Wasii, and Rnguul, who functioned as the movement's administrators and interpreters to the common people, thus acting as counterweights to Temedad's charismatic authority. It seems that *Modekngei* was originally an attempt by inspired leaders to respond to foreign cultural pressure by combining old local religio-medical beliefs and practices with new Christian ones in order to evolve a viable synthesis that would revitalize and reintegrate Palauan perceptions of the world, a cultural phenomenon more familiar in Melanesia and Polynesia than in Micronesia. In a thrust against Japanese naval rule (in force from 1914-1920) Temedad ordered the destruction of a rural government school and the dissolution of marriages in which husbands were employed by the Japanese authorities.[34] It was these men with a stake in the foreign system who alerted the Japanese naval administrator to Temedad's growing power. Using intelligence supplied by this anti-*Modekngei* faction, the government jailed Temedad, Wasii, and Ongesii for three years on the island of Angaur. In the 1930s a Shinto shrine, also enshrining Amaterasu Omikami, was established there in a grove of trees on the top of a hill just 400 meters from the large phosphate processing facility which the Japanese had inherited from the previous colonial administration.

Modekngei leaders were released in 1922 but, with Rnguul, were reimprisoned in 1924. Soon after, Temedad died. Ongesii, from the time of his release in 1925 until the second Japanese purge in 1938, worked un-

derground by rebuilding the power and prestige of the new religion. Under his leadership the movement took on a stronger anti-Japanese orientation. The Japanese authorities, with the advice and assistance of the pro-foreign Palauan faction, were making reforms in the valuation of Palauan money, land distribution and ownership, and reciprocity customs, all of which the *Modekgnei* vigorously resisted. Further, the movement opposed all Japanese institutions established to serve the islander including the school, hospital and health care, labor conscription, and subsidized religion. Ongesii proclaimed that the Palauan world and Japanese world were poles apart, "that dark-skinned Palauans were a different kind of men from the light-skinned peoples, and that their destinies must be different. . . . They each walked different roads which could never meet."[35]

By 1938 these diametrically opposed systems of social control were in direct confrontation. *Modekngei* had captured the loyalty of Palau's traditional leaders and was dedicated to overcoming foreign dominance. This activity reached its peak in late 1937 when every district and village chief in Palau was a *Modekngei* member, a fact which gave the movement "complete control of all indigenous political power in Palau."[36] At the same time Japan was fully committed to war in China and was determined to make Palau an economic asset through tight control of labor, production and consumption. Conflict was inevitable. Again members of the persistent pro-Japanese indigenous faction aided government authorities in investigating Ongesii and twenty-eight of his followers. He alone was found guilty of false prophecy and of impoverishing and demoralizing the people by directing their attention away from productive labor.[37] Ongesii was sentenced to seven years in jail and shipped off to Saipan.[38]

By the time the Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja was dedicated in 1940, the *Modekngei* had been thoroughly repressed and Japanese authority was firmly entrenched. However, throughout the Pacific War period (1941-1945), the *Modekngei* made yet another comeback under Rnguul's imaginative leadership. This exemplifies the important stabilizing role *Modekngei* had come to play in revitalizing a Palauan world view. Adjusting opportunistically to the new situation, Rnguul, with canny insight, took on the function of predicting events of the war. It is said that he predicted U.S. entry into the war, the first bombing of Palau in March 1944, and war's end in August 1945.[39] The war was a period of great crisis in Palau. Both before and after American forces took Peleliu in September 1944, bombing raids were launched on Koror and Babeldaob to neutralize these by-passed islands which held 25,000 fully equipped Japanese troops. During this terrifying time, Japanese organizational efficiency and social control broke down. *Modekngei* resumed its activities in response to deep

crisis. Positive pronouncements, accurate predictions, and magical charms designed to give individuals supernatural protection and to frighten the fighter planes away were concrete evidence of the efficacy of Palauan cultural continuities. The revitalized indigenous system provided a reassuring "psychological response to a confused and unknowable world."[40]

Today the overgrown and unrecognizable ruins of Micronesia's Shinto shrines are the only material witness to an uncertain evangelistic thrust into the Pacific. A 1938 photographic booklet on Nanyo-Gunto shows four separate groups of Yapese carrying palanquins during a Shinto festival celebration. The accompanying caption claims that Japanese "let Micronesians pay homage at shrines and gradually had them adopt their religion."[41] However, most older Palauans agree that while Tenrikyo and Buddhism actively sought converts, State Shinto remained aloof. The chiefess of Peleliu, Balang Singeo, said, "Though we were allowed to visit Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja, it was for the Japanese only."[42]

Those few shrines that survived the war were later dismantled by the Islanders for building materials, or left to decay in the humid island environment. Only in the case of the Garapan and Yap shrines have torii survived the ravages of war and the elements. Sometime soon after WW II the concrete torii and five pair of lanterns were moved from the ruins of the Garapan jinja to the Mount Carmel cemetery *(see Plage 6).* The Catholics had taken over the site of the former Japanese sugar refinery for their new cathedral and cemetery. Today, Japanese tourists have the awesome ecumenical experience of looking through a Shinto torii to Christ on the cross. The main torii of the Yap shrine was moved in the early 1950s to grace the entrance of the Yap Legislature building.

Being on the outskirts of Koror-town, Kampei Taisha Nanyo Jinja was not destroyed by American bombing raids. The shrine's *goshintai* (sacred symbols) were removed in late 1944 and transported to Japan by submarine.[43] In October 1945, Commander Byrholdt, United States Navy, established his headquarters on the shrine site. A few years later government offices were moved to the former Japanese communication station which is now the Palau National Congress building. At that time, Mrs. Emaimelei Bismark persuaded Lieutenant Stille to let the Ngaraek Women's Club remove the jinja's two handsome guardian lions to the women's new clubhouse *(Bai Raek).*[44] This building, much of which was made of materials from the grand jinja, later became the Air Micronesia office. In 1978 it burned to the ground leaving the guardian lions incongruously alone *(see Plate 7).* Thus, in terms of devoted followers and places of worship, time and circumstance were not ripe for State Shinto to take root in the soil of Micronesian culture.



PLATE 6 Lanterns on each side of the divine bridge at the entrance to the great Nanyo Kampei Shinto Shrine now in ruins, Koror, Palau. (Photo by Donald R. Shuster, 1976.)



PLATE 7 Ferns, grasses, and fallen trees cover the ruins of the once grand staircase leading up to the first level of the Nan'yo Kampei Jinja, Koror, Palau. Two guardian lions and a torii gate at the top of these stairs separated the secular and sacred worlds for a brief period in the early 1940s. (Photo by Donald R. Shuster, 1976.)

NOTES

*I am indebted to Professors John Stephan and George Akita of the History Department, University of Hawaii and to Ms. Wakako Higuchi, researcher, Tokyo, Japan, for their invaluable critiques of early drafts of this paper.

1. Sakamaki Shunzō, "Shinto: Japanese Ethnocentrism," in *The Japanese Mind,* Charles A. Moore (ed.), (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1967), p. 31.

2. William K. Bunce, *Religions in Japan,* (Tokyo: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1948), p. 27.

3. Dr. Sokyo Ono has identified numerous types of Shinto: Popular Shinto, Domestic Shinto, Sectarian Shinto, Imperial Household Shinto, Shrine Shinto, and State Shinto. See his book, *Shinto The Kami Way,* (Tokyo: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1962), 12-15. This paper deals with only one of these types, viz., State Shinto.

4. Sakamaki Shunzō, "Shinto: Japanese Ethnocentrism," in *The Japanese Mind,* edited by Charles A. Moore, (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1967), p. 30.

5. William K. Bunce, *Religions in Japan,* (Tokyo: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1948), p. 30.

6. Genchi Katō, *A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese Nation,* (Tokyo: Meiji-Japan Society, 1926), p. 2.

7. William K. Bunce, *Religions in Japan,* (Tokyo: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1948), p. 31.

8. Iwao Munakata, "Paradox of Modernization in Japan," *Peace Research in Japan,* (1969), pp. 77-93.

9. Japan. South Seas Bureau, *Annual Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the South Seas Islands Under Japanese Mandate for the Year 1925,* Tokyo, p. 22.

10. Japanese authorities established administrative centers throughout their huge Micronesian holdings at Jaluit Atoll in the Marshalls, Saipan in the Marianas, Ponape and Truk in the Eastern Carolines, and Yap and Palau in the Western Carolines.

11. Tenrikyo monument inscription (English version), Koror, Palau.

12. Japan. South Seas Bureau, *Annual Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the South Seas Islands Under Japanese Mandate for the Year 1929,* Tokyo, p. 22.

13. Japan South Seas Bureau, *Annual Report to the League of Nations,* 1924, p. 10.

14. Micronesia--along with Western Samoa, Nauru, former German New Guinea and Southwest Africa (today known as Namibia)--was designated a "C" mandate by the League of Nations. This meant that these areas were geographically isolated and regarded as economically and socially undeveloped and were therefore unable to "stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world."

15. *Modekngei* is a Palauan resistance movement of a political religious nature that originated in the early years of Japanese rule. Its roots may even stretch to 1906 when German authorities imprisoned menacing shamans.

16. Hidea Horie, "The Shinto Shrine Problem Overseas," in *Yearbook of Religion,* quoted in Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 158.

17. Jack A. Tobin with photos by Hajime Hirata, "Jabwor: Former Capitol of the Marshall Islands," *Micronesian Reporter,* 18, No. 4 (1970), p. 26.

18. John Sigrah of Kosrae via Albert Snyder, personal communication, 11 February, 1980.

19. Since State Shinto was built on a deep reservoir of traditional beliefs and practices, the elements of a shrine--torii, guardian statues, lanterns, memorial tablets--have a complex cultural history of their own. See Sokyo Ono, Shinto *The Kami Way,* (Tokyo: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1962).

20. William H. Alkire, *Lamotrek Atoll and Inter-island Socioeconomic Ties,* (Urbana: Illinois Studies in Anthropology, 1965), p. 150.

21. South Seas Government, *Nan'yo-cho tokei nankan* (South Seas Government Statistical Yearbook), Tokyo, 1938, (translated by Human Relations Area Files, Yale University, 1944), p. 152.

22. Shinto shrines were classified into seven grades. The *Jingu* or the Great Shrine of Ise was at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. The *kampei* or state shrines and the *kokuhei* or national shrines were ranked second and third respectively. The first was financed by a department within the Imperial Household and the second by the national treasury. It was a very significant fact that Palau, the headquarters for the South Seas territory, was chosen for a *kampei* level shrine. The four lesser grades of shrines supported by local communities were less elaborate and smaller in size.

23. *Kampei Taisha Nan'yō Jinja Hōsankai*, Tokyo, 1941, p. 1.

24. David Ramarui, personal communication, Koror, Palau, October 26, 1980.

25. The Grand Shrine of Ise is generally regarded as standing at the apex of all shrines. The beautiful Meiji Shrine is dedicated to the Emperor Meiji and Yasukuni Jinja was established by Imperial command in 1869 for the worship of the divine spirits of those who gave their lives in the defense of Japan.

26. D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan ad Shinto Nationalism,* (New York: Paragon Book Corp., 1963), p. 169.

27. John Hall and Richard Beardsley, *Twelve Doors to Japan* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 321.

28. *The Kampei Taisha Nan'yō Jinja Hōsankai* photograph booklet was translated privately by Charles Dewolf formerly of the Linguistics Department, University of Hawaii. Dr. Dewolfs translation served as an outline for my description and explanation of the enshrinement events.

29. Joseph Tellei, personal communication, Koror, Palau, November 16, 1980. Mr. Tellei, now 80 years old, was for many years chief of the Palauan Police branch during the Japanese Administration. He is therefore known locally as the expert on Japanese times in Palau.

30. The most common meaning of the term *"kami"* is noble and sacred local deities or spirits,. It expresses adoration for their virtue and authority. *Kami* are the objects of reverence and worship in Shinto.

31. E. J. Kahn, *A Reporter in Micronesia,* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 278.

32. *Kampei Taisha Nan'yō Jinja Hōsankai*, Tokyo, 1941, p. 30.

33. Arthur Vidich, "The Political Impact of Colonial Administration," Diss. Harvard University 1953, p. 229.

34. Arthur J. Vidich, *Political Factionalism in Palau: Its Rise and Development,* Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology, No. 23. (Washington, D.C.: Pacific Science Board, 1949), p. 86.

35. Homer Barnett, *Being A Palauan,* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 84.

36. Arthur J. Vidich, *Political Factionalism in Palau: Its Rise and Development,* (Washington, D.C.: Pacific Science Board, 1949), p. 87.

37. Homer Barnett, *Being A Palauan,* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 84.

38. Arthur J. Vidich, *Political Factionalism in Palau: Its Rise and Development,* (Washington, D.C.: Pacific Science Board, 1949), p. 91.

39. Vidich. *Political Factionalism in Palau: Its Rise and Development,* p. 91.

40. Vidich, *Political Factionalism in Palau: Its Rise and Development,* p. 92.

41. Teruo Kosuge, *Photographs of Micronesia's Yesterday,* 2nd ed., (1938: report. Japan: South Seas Government), p. 57.

42. Balang Toyomi Singao, personal communication, Koror, Palau, 28 Jan. 1981.

43. Joseph Tellei, personal communication, Koror, Palau, 19 July 1981.

44. In exchange for the lions, the Ngaraek Club planted flame trees along Koror's then barren main road. (Kloteraol Takeo Yano, personal communication, Koror, Palau, 9 February, 1981).

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VANUATU VALUES: A CHANGING SYMBIOSIS

by Robert Tonkinson

Vanuatu is no less culturally diverse than the rest of Melanesia and has in the era since European contact been subject to the same kinds of outside influence. Colonists, Christians and entrepreneurs have sought in various ways to transform traditional societies. This paper examines the changing sociopolitical significance of diversity, particularly the effects of Christianity and the dynamic nature of the resulting symbiosis of Christian and customary values in or on Vanuatu.

First, the nature of cultural differentiation in "traditional" Vanuatu societies is summarized. Despite considerable ethnocentrism and a high level of intergroup tension, there was also considerable communication and diffusion of new elements, such that trade in lore was as common as that in material goods. These were relatively mobile, flexible societies geared to cope adequately with fairly continuous diffusion via external contacts.

Secondly, some factors affecting the rapidity and success of the spread of Christianity are outlined, notably historical developments between first contacts with Europeans and Christianity's coming, the nature of the new faith and its purveyors, and certain characteristics of the traditional cultures.

Thirdly, the nature of the transformation wrought by Christianity is discussed with respect to its effects on diversity and on attitudes to cultural differentiation, and to indigenous reworkings of the new faith. The effect of Christianity on traditional values and attitudes to the past is also discussed. The major difference between Christian lore and that which was traditionally exchanged throughout the islands was the Christians' insistence that theirs was the *only* valid belief system. It was intended to replace all that preceded it, rather than be added onto existing systems. In fact, many continuities remained, but these elements were absorbed into Christianity. The new faith became a potent force in breaking down Melanesian cultural boundaries and creating new unities that went beyond the islands to parent churches overseas.

Fourthly, the revival of *kastom* (pidgin; "traditional culture, customs") and development of national identity are discussed, together with some problematic aspects of the modern symbiosis of Christian and "tradition-

al" values. The use of *kastom* to promote a sense of cultural distinctiveness has necessitated a sometimes difficult reevaluation of the pre-European past by ni-Vanuatu. The rise of *kastom* as a persuasive symbol of shared identity has involved a claiming back from Christianity some of the old cultural values it had usurped. Because of the inherent ambiguity and potential for divisiveness contained in *kastom,* its heuristic use in the development of laws, structures and policies is dangerous. For this reason, principles that are broadly Western and Christian will be paramount in the forging of the new nation and its acceptance into the world community. At the symbolic level, however, *kastom* will retain its prominent place in the national consciousness.

Cultural Differentiation Before Contact with Europeans

Vanuatu, with its eighty islands and more than one hundred languages, exhibited great diversity in sociocultural forms, with a strong underlay of elements linking it much more closely with the rest of Melanesia than with Polynesian cultures to the east. True, cultural traces of the passage of proto-Polynesians through this chain of islands some 3,500 years ago probably survived "in the form of pottery manufacture, tattooing motifs, certain forms of hereditary chieftainship, and perhaps some kinds of wood carving" (Bellwood 1978:48), but the so-called Lapita people who settled in Melanesia were absorbed by the prior settlers, and the few clearly Polynesian outlier communities in the southern islands resulted from relatively recent back-voyaging. These non-Melanesian influences have added some variety to an already highly developed diversity, but nowhere in Vanuatu does the melange approach the more even matching of Polynesian and Melanesian influences found in the Fijian Islands.

The atomistic, acephalous and small demographic scale of ni-Vanuatu communities, along with strongly held values supportive of conflict and competition among them, engendered considerable parochialism and ethnocentrism. The affirmation of ethnic boundaries over wider unities was especially noticeable in the interior regions of large islands, where outside influences were mediated, and muted, by groups that straddled the coastal and interior areas. But everywhere there was an equally strong impetus to marry out, to engage in exchange, to forge alliances and to seek equivalence as well as advantage through reciprocity. These pressures served to keep open channels to the outside world and thus counteract tendencies towards insularity and closure. The Melanesians have always looked beyond the diversity suggested by a multiplicity of cultural boundaries.

Throughout Melanesia there was, and is, a marked uniformity in indigenous notions about personal power: its inherent variability, its augmentation or diminution as subject to human action or neglect, and its close association with both esoteric knowledge and magical spells, charms, etc., that could be obtained by various means from knowledgeable others. A ubiquitous concern with the use of magic to promote socioeconomic welfare and the continuance of human, plant and animal fertility reflects basic Melanesian assumptions about the necessity for human intervention to increase power. Also, the near universality of belief in the ability of human and/or spiritual agents to cause illness and death by draining off power indicates that everywhere there was a negative side to concepts about power. Given these assumptions, it is understandable why Melanesians should have been receptive to the acquisition of alien cultural elements having the potential to affect power.

A common feature of Melanesian cultures was the high degree of geographical mobility in residential arrangements and local level interaction (Chapman 1969). Although for many people much wider movement was inhibited by rugged terrain, hostilities, fear of strangers, and language barriers, coastal peoples frequently looked to the sea as an avenue for external contact and reciprocity. A strong desire to gain advantage in local political arenas impelled men into sometimes long and risky voyages to obtain through trade exchange items, rituals and spells that promised enhancement of power and prestige. In this respect the Melanesians were pragmatists, willing to experiment with new as well as tried and tested materials and methods, ever hopeful of gaining some advantage over their equally industrious rivals. Individuals, kin-groups, communities and sometimes whole islands gained or lost reputations for the efficacy of their magic, rituals and sorcerers, on which bases they would be courted or avoided by others.

In the central islands of Vanuatu, interisland trade in specialized products was important, but even more so were exchanges of knowledge, ritual paraphernalia and wealth items (notably circle-tusked pigs) associated with the *nimanggi,* the public-graded society that was a dominant feature of the cultures: of the central and northern areas of the country (Codrington 1891; Deacon 1934). Grade-taking ceremonies, especially for the highest ranks, often attracted people from a wide area. The bonds of shared rank transcended those of kinship and coresidence as senior men journeyed to participate in ceremonials in which they had some proprietary interest (cf. Bedford 1973:17-20).

From the available literature on social organization in Vanuatu it seems that despite varying descent emphases in different regions, every-

where there was considerable recognition and utilization of both matrilineal and patrilineal pinciples in institutional structures and everyday behavior. As in New Guinea, exchange could well have been a more fundamental organizational principle than descent (cf. Forge 1972; McDowell 1980). Although most exchanges were doubtless kin-based and restricted in their social and geographical range, the demands of participation in the higher ranks of the graded society forced men to look beyond the local area to satisfy certain of their requirements. Even where the graded society was absent, the quest for power in these aggressively egalitarian societies motivated men to be receptive to potentially advantageous outside influences.

The Success of Christianity

Despite many early martyrdoms and setbacks as missionaries struggled to gain a secure foothold in Vanuatu, once these people were firmly established, the new faith spread rapidly and won over the great majority of the indigenous people. Since the beginning of this century, the only spectacular "backsliding" occurred on Tanna in the 1940s when large numbers of Christians deserted the faith in favor of the John Frum cargo cult. Since historical accounts of the process of conversion are relatively few and one-sided, it is impossible to say for certain why people became Christians. We do not know what ni-Vanuatu thought about it, except indirectly through missionaries' brief accounts.

The introduction of European diseases, trade goods, rifles and liquor via sandalwood buyers, labor recruiters and traders preceded the arrival of missionaries in most islands. The strong opposition encountered by some missionaries could well have stemmed from prior traumatic Melanesian encounters with Europeans, and the deaths of several Christians were allegedly motivated by revenge to balance earlier deaths at the hands of whites. But as Shineberg (1967:13) notes, the more numerous, mobile and affluent sandalwood traders got in first and thus raised the indigenous people's expectations concerning European wealth. Their desire for iron and other trade goods thus whetted, the Melanesians accepted the presence of missionaries as a potential source of this wealth, in the early years at least. In those areas where rifles had changed the technology of the feud and escalated the deathrate, the missionary presence may well have been welcomed with relief because of its insistence on peace.

The association in Melanesian minds of whites with superior power, which was no doubt primarily assessed on the basis of technology, and much later, on the weight of colonial authority, had much to do with

their acceptance of the Christian presence. In line with dominant traditional values, acquiescence to the superiority of European power also involved attempts by individuals and groups to gain access to it. Historical contingency, in the form of sheer luck, sometimes played a major role in early attempts by Christians to "prove" the superior power of their God. In southeast Ambrym, where I worked, the bearer of Christianity was a south Ambrymese man who had been converted while in Queensland. He met with strong initial opposition, but was quick to turn to Christianity's advantage his "miraculous" escape from death when fired on, allegedly at point-blank range, by an enraged local chief. His explanation that God's power protected him was widely accepted and gained him a solid core of devotees, and he never looked back.

Despite undoubted communication gaps, missionaries and their islander and local converts must have managed to convey to the local people some basic elements of the new faith, particularly those that were broadly congruent with indigenous values and understandings. Ideas of rewards and punishment, of reciprocity guaranteed as long as certain rules or procedures were faithfully adhered to, and of spiritual and/or human retribution. for persistent disregard of the rules, all accorded well with existing understandings. However, the notion of a reciprocation delayed until the next life was, in its reward aspect, neither traditional nor particularly satisfying (cf. Keesing 1967:96). Likewise, the notion that rewards in the afterlife depended principally on moral conduct in this world would have been nonsensical to a people who judged ritual efficacy mainly in terms of correct performance.

The possession by Christians of esoteric knowledge, and its intimate association in Melanesian cultures with power and status differentiation, did not in itself set them apart from other whites encountered by the indigenous people. The uniqueness of the Christians lay in their great willingness to impart this knowledge, and thus share with the Melanesians a considerable portion of it. The fact that the missionaries expected people to labor for the Church in return would have been perfectly acceptable. Knowledge given freely by people outside a narrow range of kin and friends would have been perceived as lacking value and therefore power. The establishment of schools and concerted attempts to bring literacy to the indigenous people so that they could read the Bible proved the sincerity of the Christians in wanting to communicate their esoteric knowledge.

In the traditional society, the mark of the "big-man" or chief was his achievement of a nodal position in local and regional information networks such that he could significantly monitor and influence the flow of

messages as well as material goods. He gained prestige by the selective use of socially usable knowledge but would never have told others all that he knew, because it was his reputed possession of unshared knowledge that differentiated him and made him "bigger" than others. As Lindstrom points out, esoteric knowledge is vital but its management is problematic: a person without secrets is without prestige, and a person with too many unshared secrets negates a fundamental imperative to exchange, so he too lacks prestige. Prestige, then, depends on the judicious husbandry of knowledge. It follows that missionaries would not have been expected to tell the whole story and that what they withheld contained the major secret of their greater wealth and power. Melanesians who in later years became involved in cargo cult activities often said as much when they accused missionaries of hiding that part of the Christian message that contained the key to the cargo. For a majority of ni-Vanuatu most of the time, however, the new faith appeared to offer sufficient promise to ensure their continuing adherence and support.

It may also be possible to account for the success of Christianity satisfactorily in terms of certain shared features of Melanesian social structures. Their receptivity to external forms undoubtedly predisposed men to view Christianity in pragmatic terms as a likely medium for increasing power and prestige. Lawrence (1964) has argued persuasively that the Melanesians' cosmic order was a predominantly physical realm, and their religion centered on reciprocal relationships conceived to exist among humans, gods and spirits. There was an undisguised materialism and anthropocentrism in the view that males had of their society's cosmic order and its utility to them in their largely individualistic strivings. The locus of power lay not in any supernatural realm but in the interaction between the environment and man, usually through the medium of spirits, with human activity as an essential ingredient of the mix that made power available; through the application of esoteric knowledge and intelligence, men could generate power while in a state of heightened receptivity to coresident spirit-beings. As Lawrence has shown, religion was for them a technology, a potent means for achieving patently secular socioeconomic ends. Individual self-interest predominated, even in many collective rituals and related activities such as food distribution (Barnes 1962; Brown 1962; Feil 1978).

While gathering data concerning what people could recall of the "traditional" religious life in southeast Ambrym, I was struck by the apparent lack of integration of the various elements and the complete absence of anything functionally analogous to the over-arching "Dreamtime" concept of the Australian Aborigines, which lends to their religion an internal

logic, consistency and strength. There was no congruency between southeast Ambrymese myths and rituals, very little among songs, and dances, and rituals, and no evidence that people saw any organic unity among the components they described. Guiart (1951) had concluded of north Ambrymese rituals that they lacked mythological validation and exhibited a high degree of secularization; I was led to the same assessment in the case of southeast Ambrym.

This lack of systematization I initially attributed to cultural loss and the effects of several decades of Christianity. But considering the openness of much of the rest of the social system, it is probable that the various components of the religious life had been quite loosely integrated. My data suggested that individual magical rites and communication with ancestral ghosts assumed far greater religious importance than collective rituals and appeals to mythic beings (cf. Deacon 1934). Individualism, pragmatism and materialism were dominant, but with the exception of certain sorcery acts, individual rituals were acts towards, and reactions to concerns of wider social groupings (Tonkinson 1968:34-35).

There was ample evidence that the southeast Ambrymese had been in prolonged contact with neighboring islands, such as Paama and Lopevi, and also that they had adopted the graded society from Malekula via west Ambrym not long before their first contact with Europeans. Their receptivity to innovations from elsewhere showed them to be typical Melanesians in this important respect. This willingness to borrow was congruent with the kind of flexibility and openness that has been reported for much of the region. Observers as far back as Codrington (1891) noted the lack of systematization in Melanesian worldviews and the willingness to borrow cultural elements. Lane (1965), discussing the religion of the people of south Pentecost, who have close links with north Ambrym, conceded that order may have existed in the religious system, but it was certainly not an explicit feature of what he observed; beliefs were not developed in precise and systematic detail, nor woven into any overall scheme. Brunton (1980:112) makes the same general points when he suggests that Melanesian religions are “weakly integrated, poorly elaborated in a number of sectors, and subject to a large degree of individual variation and a high rate of innovation and obsolescence.”

From the foregoing, it should be clear that individuals had considerable freedom to choose whether or not to try new forms, and that once the Christians had established beachheads they were usually assured of at least a few people willing to give them a hearing and dabble in the new faith--if only to see if Christianity would make a difference. In this kind of society, any initial opposition by “big-men” or chiefs would not appear

to have been a decisive factor. In southeast Ambrym, despite strong initial opposition from some of the chiefs, it took little more than two decades for the culture area to go from "pagan" to close to one hundred percent nominal Christian In many other parts of Vanuatu, Christianity enjoyed a similarly rapid success.

Christianity and Social Transformation

The missionaries and their zealous converts set out to win Melanesian hearts and minds as much by emphasizing the sinfulness and shortcomings of the old way of life as by stressing the advantages of the promised new life. Many were certainly not averse to rough, direct methods to get the message across to those who appeared incapable or unwilling to heed it. But in the early years particularly, the Christians were at times the objects of physical violence in some areas (cf. Miller 1975). In all but a few interior areas on 'large islands such as Tanna, Santo, Malekula and Ambrym, Christianity triumphed throughout the archipelago. The Presbyterians (who remain by far the largest denomination) concentrated their efforts in the southern and central islands, agreeing to leave the north to the Anglicans (who now rank third). The Roman Catholics, predominantly French-speaking, began later (1887); they ignored the earlier Protestant agreement and established missions throughout the islands. Churches of Christ, Seventh Day Adventists and Apostolics followed later, and in the last two decades there has been a proliferation of other religious groups in Vanuatu.

The processes of rapid transformation of the pre-contact societies, a major facet of which was the revolution wrought by iron tools, were set in train by the European traders and labor recruiters, but these men had specific and immediate goals in their interaction with the Melanesians. They did not see themselves as social reformers, however barbaric they may have judged (and in turn, have been judged by) the indigenous peoples. It was the missionaries and their converts who mounted the first deliberate assaults aimed at transforming "traditional cultures." Different missionaries and churches varied in their attitudes to *kastom,* but most considered much of the Melanesian culture unacceptable. Their frequent revulsion and disgust are forcefully revealed in their diaries, as is their dogged determination to triumph over the forces of evil. Their tropologies of conversion, aimed at the home congregations whose physical and financial support they sought, were rich in metaphor and made much of the "light versus darkness," "soldiers of Christ going forth into battle," "rescue of the innocents" kinds of imagery (cf. Young 1980). The word of

God was delivered as an imperative, a replacement for rather than an adjunct to existing knowledge, and it carried with it the promise of rich rewards for compliance or hellfire and damnation as certain consequences of its rejection. The Melanesians were doubtless much more attracted by the material possibilities of the former than repelled or terrified by the latter.

So much was the fusion of natural and spiritual components of their cosmic order that many ni-Vanuatu converts continued to believe in, and react to, various kinds of coresident spirits whose activities either helped or hindered them. Likewise, the belief that other people may resort to sorcery also remained powerful. Today, trade in many different kinds of magical substances (for protection, fighting, sorcery, love-magic and antidotes) continues to thrive, in convincing demonstration of the constancy of "traditional" Melanesian notions about power.

Attacks by white and black Christians on all that was ungodly in the indigenous cultures struck at the very heart of the old way of life: polygyny, pig sacrifice, kava-drinking, singing and dancing, men's secret societies, "devil-worship" (i.e. ritual communication with spirit-beings), "idolatry" (any carved anthromorphic image was deemed an "idol"), physical violence, practices that degraded women and so on came under persistent heavy fire as typifying "heathenism" and the forces of evil. But the seeds of destruction of major social institutions, such as the graded society, had already been sown by labor recruiters, traders and other Europeans who preceded the missionaries into most islands.

Traditionally, the great game of climbing the grade-ladder to socioeconomic preeminence was played with finite resources and a predictable *modus operandi,* and the older men were apparently in complete control of the moves. The introduction of valued European material goods, via traders and returning plantation workers, in effect short-circuited the grade system. The returnees were predominantly young; they reentered their home communities with wealth and, perhaps more importantly, with esoteric knowledge--that which generates power. By both retention and judicious distribution of portions of their wealth, they achieved a level of prestige quite out of proportion for men of their age and grade-rank in the pre-contact society. Many either bought their way in high up the ladder or refused to participate at all. Their skills in pidgin and assumed sophistication in the ways of the whites assured them of a useful and prestigious role in societies that were suffering drastic, unforeseen. depopulation and change. In many coastal areas, it seems, disorganization bordering on chaos prevailed, and Melanesians faced with grave threats to their very survival would have ignored the old game and

looked instead to the repatriated sophisticates, whose presumed knowledge of the ways and strategies of the whites might well have been the key to the regaining of some kind of equilibrium.

Whether the ex-Queenslanders were zealous Christians or fervently antiwhite in their attitudes and behaviors, ni-Vanuatu soon came to realize that continued resistance to the newcomers was futile in view of the great difference in power. The threat and periodic application of punishment, which took the form of bombardment of offending communities by French or British warships, did much to convince the Melanesians of the reality of "God's wrath." Besides, in view of the traumatic events that in many areas preceded Christianity, the donning of clothes and cessation of certain overt behaviors may have seemed a small price to pay for peace and the opportunity it offered for reorganizing what was left of the "old life." Any realistic appraisal of their situation would have led the indigenous people to accept the label of "convert" and acquiesce to the demands of the newcomers. It is most unlikely that people understood much of the theological content of the new faith; their interest lay in its materialistic possibilities rather than its theological detail. As Lane (1965:277) notes:

> The dissociation of Christians from aboriginal traditions does not involve rejection of aboriginal ideas as false or erroneous, but rather an acceptance of a system empirically demonstrated to be more practical in the contact situation . . . non-Christians adhere to their system not because they believe that it is more valid but because, assessing the contact situation differently, they believe that the older ways continue to offer a better solution to their problems.

The fact that at the time of the first official census in 1967 about one ni-Vanuatu in six identified themselves as following a *kastom* religion attests to a negative assessment of Christianity's exclusive claim to the truth about power. Many *kastom* believers are cargo cultists who abandoned Christianity in favor of a new "faith" more compatible with their perceptions concerning the road to wealth and self-respect.

Even among those who steadfastly remained Christian, there were significant continuities in their understandings. Behavior of some kinds can be effectively forbidden, but beliefs and values, those denizens of an individual's cosmic order, cannot. Their variability in the old society was maintained and augmented in the new. Whites inevitably occupied a major place in the new cosmic order that was fashioned from the old. The

missionaries tried to dichotomize the old and new, but they failed to negate prevailing conceptions about power.

The important point here is that in ridiculing and condemning "traditional" beliefs in spirits and ghosts as "savage superstitions" and the work of the devil, the Christians were in effect affirming that such powers indeed existed and impinged significantly on human affairs. The Melanesians would have been most interested to learn that there are ultimately superior and triumphant benevolent powers (i.e. the Holy Ghost) ranged against malevolent powers (i.e. the devil) in an uneven contest. This absolutist conception of clearly dichotomized good and evil powers flatly contradicted a fundamental Melanesian notion; namely, that power in itself is undifferentiated, but depending on the technologies applied to it by human or spiritual beings, it can have a wide range of effects, from positive to mortally negative.

The potential for people with the necessary esoteric knowledge to exploit these powers was considerable, whether or not the Christians were correct in claiming a clear demarcation between good and evil. If they could be safely tapped (a foregone conclusion in Melanesian understandings), both kinds of power would be socially useful, just like productive and destructive magic. In 1973, when southeast Ambrymese church leaders decided to mount an all-out attack on sorcery through an evangelical campaign, their strategy lay not in the denial of the reality and efficacy of sorcery power, but was instead phrased in terms of the inevitable triumph of the Holy Spirit, whose superior power, activated by prayers, confession and the destruction of magical objects, would render sorcery impotent (Tonkinson, n.d.a.). Furthermore, the wholly benevolent Holy Spirit could be indirectly destructive by turning the power of sorcery objects inwards upon their possessors, causing illness or death by backfire.

There were other important cultural continuities besides notions about power. Local languages have been maintained strongly, notwithstanding the universality in Vanuatu of pidgin, the national lingua franca. Despite the introduction of steel tools, basic subsistence strategies remained much the same, even after cash-cropping became an integral part of local economies. Shared notions about exchange and compensation persisted, however much the content and social contexts of exchanges were transformed. Kinship ideologies, and strongly supportive behaviors among kin and coresidents, have continued to figure significantly in village life and beyond. Arranged marriage, bridewealth payment, adoption and many other valued institutions have survived, some despite strong opposition from Christian leaders, and others with the blessing of the church if they were held to be compatible with Christian values.

As in the past, outward conformity to the new order masked great variability in personal beliefs. For want of understanding or inclination, many people remained nominal or "subsistence" Christians, whose emotional and spiritual commitment to the faith was marginal. Despite this, the work of the church increasingly assumed a central place in the social life of village communities, taking up the slack caused by cessation of major institutions such as the graded society and men's secret clubs. It was possible to be an "active Christian" in public life while maintaining private commitment to aspects of the past and to alternative avenues for enhancing personal power. A strong measure of at least outward conformity to Christianity was assured since in the church and mission schools the people saw obvious avenues to gain an understanding of the origins and nature of superior European power--and with understanding came the possibility of gaining access to it.

Contact with Europeans brought a sudden and unprecedented broadening of the cultural horizons of the indigenous people, which was accelerated by the Queensland labor trade and by the establishment of plantations whose demand for labor stimulated considerable local migration by able-bodied men. These experiences, plus the spread of pidgin, contributed greatly to a dramatic increase in people's awareness of cultural variation as well as shared cultural elements throughout Vanuatu. The diffusion of ideas and objects increased in momentum and geographical range, blunting the role of local parochialism while dramatizing the ethnic and socioeconomic gulf that separated Melanesians from the white masters who now dominated and exploited them.

In the case of the Christians, the missionaries privately believed in innate racial differences; their public profession was of a common humanity demonstrable in the sharing of one true faith and the attainment of unity in the body of Christ. Their active attempts to bridge the cultural gap made Christianity a very strong force in eroding ethnic boundaries and creating new bonds of "brotherhood." Not only did the new faith link ni-Vanuatu of different districts and islands and thus weaken the feared category of "stranger," it also bonded the Melanesians through their missionaries to home congregations overseas. Christianity was presented as a world faith, blind to skin color (despite the manifest "whiteness" of Jesus) and cultural difference, as long as people professed belief and behaved as Christians should. The gulf in attitudes and behaviors that separated missionaries from many other whites might have puzzled the Melanesian, especially in view of the considerable material wealth of many of the "heathen" whites. Whatever their puzzlement, however, Melanesians went to work for both categories of whites, expecting reciprocity of a material

kind from their plantation employers and hoping that rewards from the missionaries would be both material and spiritual.

One of the major consequences of Christianity was its generation of a new baseline in indigenous conceptions about time. In the pre-contact cosmic order, people recognized ecological time, the succession of the seasons; genealogical time, which spanned only a few generations and remained constant in depth; and mythological time, an era in the distant past: with no chronologically marked beginning or end (cf. Lawrence 1973:223-4). Notable events of the recent past were no longer gradually and easily absorbable into the mythological past, once a clear dichotomy between the pre- and post-Christian worlds was established in people's minds.

This dichotomy was both a moral and a sociological one. It solidified in a decidedly negative way Melanesian perceptions of what had been a dynamic and flexible culture. Brunton (personal communication) makes the important point that the effects of Christianity were always such as to rigidify people's notions about their pre-contact culture, and thus to develop in their minds an "uncustomary" attitude towards cultural variation. The early fundamentalist missionaries communicated their lack of tolerance for variation and a blanket condemnation of all things "traditional" to many of their local converts. With a clear baseline to work from, Christians could convey much more meaningfully dichotomies such as "light-darkness," "morality-immorality," "Christian-pagan," "civilized-savage" and "life-death." It was easier for the missionaries to adopt an absolute rather than selective view of the aboriginal past, especially since most had trouble sorting out "religious" from "secular" elements in the cultures that confronted them. While there must have been some syncretism and stress on shared values as part of the emphasis Christians placed on common humanity, the overwhelming impression gained by the Melanesians was that to look back was to peer into the darkness at their former depravity.

The Contemporary Symbiosis of Christianity and *Kastom*

As noted earlier, in a few areas of Vanuatu there were pockets of strong resistance to Christianity, and the stand-off between the two groups has continued into the present. Traditionalists in Santo, Tanna and elsewhere have maintained that Christianity contains neither the only nor the best truths, and they have continued to look to *kastom* as a road to power and material wealth. But they have also looked to the French government and to certain American capitalists, and have achieved a degree

of success through secular political maneuvering. Their claim to a monopoly on things *kastom*, as basic to their group identity and well-being, remained uncontested until the past decade when *kastom* began to gain favor in the opposing Christian camps.

The Christian majority in Vanuatu have long since come to terms with their religion and have given it a distinctive Melanesian stamp. In many cases local churchmen have turned a blind eye to practices that had been deemed un-Christian but were destined to persist: smoking, periodic drinking, premarital sex, bouts of physical marital strife, the use of magic, beliefs in non-Christian spirit-beings, observance of traditional taboos, and so on. Theirs was a fairly relaxed Christianity in most respects; it expected regular church attendance as well as physical and financial support for church-related activities, but otherwise placed few strong demands on its followers beyond observance of the Sabbath and an outward conformity to its principal values.

The granting of local autonomy to major Vanuatu churches by parent bodies overseas served to strengthen ni-Vanuatu claims to an indigenous kind of Christianity, one closely in tune with Melanesian lifestyles. The biggest church, that of the Presbyterians, became self-governing in 1948, and in the decades since there has been in most churches a steady replacement of overseas personnel with local people. Significantly, this major shift in responsibility began long before the Anglo-French colonial regimes made any similar moves. When the colonial powers finally began to demonstrate some genuine commitment to education and other forms of development, it was the British who led the way. Therefore, British educated ni-Vanuatu established the first political party, which was to develop into a nation-wide independence movement.

The founders of the New Hebrides National Party (later renamed the Vanuaaku Pati) were practising Christians who in the course of their overseas training became highly sensitized to the iniquities of colonial domination of their homeland. They saw a vital need for the development of a distinctive national identity and a raised political consciousness concerning the weight of colonial oppression and paternalism. To achieve this, they needed a powerful symbol of shared values that would appeal to all ni-Vanuatu, uniting them by evoking their uniqueness.

Despite its preeminence; Christianity clearly would not do as a dominant symbol. For one thing, a sizeable minority of ni-Vanuatu did not profess belief in it, so its appeal was not universal. For another, there was not one but several different kinds of Christianity in active competition for people’s allegiance, and the major division between Anglophone Protes-

tants and Francophone Catholics meant that the new party would probably fail in. its appeal to members of the second largest church in the country. Faced with this dilemma, the leaders chose instead the notion of *kastom,* that body of distinctive non-European "traditional" cultural elements, as the focus in their quest for a national identity--to underpin the independence movement.

Kastom would have to simultaneously represent and transcend local and regional diversity if it was to successfully symbolize ni-Vanuatu unity. Unfortunately, Christianity's effect had been not only to rigidify indigenous nations about *kastom* and the past, but also to bind *kastom* more closely and inflexibly in place--to freeze it in space and time. As a result, it gave rise to notions that important surviving *kastom* should remain unshared and thus mark local ethnic and cultural boundaries rather than transcend them. While it is true that there has been a continuing diffusion of magical knowledge throughout Vanuatu, larger complexes such as rituals have remained closely identified with particular groups and areas, as anchors of local rather than national group identity. This highlights a major problem with *kastom* as a dominant unifying symbol: it is inherently divisive if treated at any level more analytical or literal than an undifferentiated and vague symbolic one.

Lindstrom, in a recent paper on the political reevaluation of tradition on Tanna, notes, "If shared custom defines national unity, unshared custom is able to define national separation." Because of the extent of cultural loss and of Melanesians' vagueness about the content of their "traditional" past, questions concerning *kastom* are inherently political, open to different claims by rival factions. The leaders of the fledgling independence movement, while cognizant of the suitability of *kastom* as a symbol of ni-Vanuatu unity, free of the taint of colonial domination, were no doubt also aware of its dangerous ambiguity. In the face of so much cultural diversity in Vanuatu, shared *kastom* was inadequate for underpinning a nationwide political structure capable of supporting a mass movement. The party leaders hoped that the *kastom* rallying cry would bring to their side both the *kastom*-based Nagriamel and John Frum movements and the Francophone ni-Vanuatu. However, they were not surprised when no such alliance materialized, since influential European commercial interests and the French Administration had labored hard to encourage the formation of an opposition coalition of Francophones and *kastom*-followers.

The party activists decided that they had the numbers to prevail despite this opposition, so while continuing to champion *kastom* and the need to revive and maintain it, they looked to the organizational strengths

of their churches. By exploiting existing church structures, they could bridge the rural/urban and educated/uneducated gaps so as to broaden and strengthen their political power base. The fact that several prominent party leaders were also Protestant clergy helped influence the churches to lend active support to the independence movement.

Among the organizers were men and women who had studied elsewhere in the Pacific and for whom the promotion of *kastom* was much more than just a catch-cry. They had come to appreciate its vital role. It provided indigenous peoples with a strong sense of the uniqueness of their cultural heritage while as a source of identity it seemed to owe nothing to European forms. In seeking to promote *kastom*, they realized that ni-Vanuatu Christians were faced with a drastic reevaluation of their "traditional" past. After decades of internalizing essentially negative values and attitudes about the time before Christianity, the people now had to adjust to the notion that not only was "tradition" not all bad, but some of it was an essential component of their shared identity as ni-Vanuatu.

Coming to terms with a new symbiosis of values drawn from past and present, "paganism" and Christianity, proved to be problematic for many ni-Vanuatu in the 1970s. Much of the problem lay in the party leadership's need to keep the *kastom* symbol as generalized and undifferentiated as possible. They hoped that the people would undergo a consciousness-raising experience through unquestioning acceptance of the message in the ideological spirit in which it was being promulgated. On the contrary, many people tried to grapple with it pragmatically, wondering which kinds of *kastom* they would have to embrace, where it would be obtained from if long lost among them, and what Western element they would have to abandon as a result of the swing to *kastom*. The result was considerable confusion and much debate, as I have detailed elsewhere (Tonkinson n.d.b:7-12). Many people were puzzled about the composition of the new symbiosis because their leaders had failed to make clear that some kinds of *kastom* would certainly not be resurrected; for example, that *kastom* could be morally evaluated as good or bad on the basis of whether or not it was held to contradict or undermine Christian values.

Many ni-Vanuatu did not appreciate that what their party was promoting was in fact *kastom*-within-Christianity. In this period, the movement's leaders were seeking the support of the major *kastom*-based regional movements, both of which had strong anti-Christian biases. It is thus not surprising that in promoting *kastom*, the party leaders left unstated the corollary that any *kastom* which conflicts with Christian values should not be revived. Everyone was aware of Christianity's central role

in devaluing and destroying a great deal of *kastom*, so it must have been perplexing to have political leaders who were also prominent clergy extolling *kastom* in unqualified terms.

Rather than attempt to "disambiguate" *kastom*, the leaders chose instead to affirm publicly the essential compatibility of both kinds of cultural elements. By the time that independence was granted, in mid-1980, this symbiosis had become so firmly entrenched in the collective consciousness that no ni-Vanuatu could possibly have failed to get the message. In the official platform of the Vanuaaku Pati, in the new constitution, in the myriad events leading up to and surrounding independence, *kastom* and Christianity were fused in the public imagination, The new nation's anthem and flag include elements of both and affirm that the alliance is fundamental to national identity.

As the new republic takes its place in the global arena, the emphasis given by its government to *kastom* will doubtless remain predominantly symbolic. Its utility will lie mainly in the validation of a distinctive ni-Vanuatu, Melanesian or "Pacific way," some of whose major component values are held to be "traditional," even though they may well owe much to Christian morality. Father Walter Lini, the nation's first Prime Minister, says, "We believe that small is beautiful, peace is powerful, respect is honorable, and that our traditional sense of community is both wise and practical for the people of Vanuatu" (1980-290).

Certainly, in the postcolonial era more attention and respect will be paid to *kastom* in matters of land, mechanisms for dispute settlement and compensation payment, chiefly authority, life crisis rites and other ceremonial activities. But the dangers inherent in the use of *kastom* are many and real, so "traditions future will depend very much on what value it is given by the Government of Vanuatu and other bodies like the church and education" (Lini 1980-285). It is thus most probable that in the drafting of new legislation and the creation of enduring political institutions and strategies, Vanuatu's leaders will utilize principles that are broadly Western and Christian.

The newly elected government is heavily Christian in composition: seven ordained ministers are members of the Representative Assembly; the chairman and vice-chairman are pastors, while three ordained ministers and four elders hold ministerial positions. The nation's motto is *"long God yumi stanap"* ("In God we stand"), and its self-identification is as a Christian country, regardless of the presence of non-Christian minority groups within it. Church and state are likely to remain closely allied in the foreseeable future, so the dominance of Christian values seems assured.

Despite the new stress on *kastom* and its reevaluation into much more positive terms, there has been no significant shift in the dominant values of the ni-Vanuatu. In the past, many of the values and attitudes that persisted from pre-European times merged with those of Christianity and became indistinguishable from them: norms of mutual support, sharing and cooperation among close kin and friends, small group solidarity, strong affection for children, a willingness to work hard when the occasion demanded, ideals of peace, harmony and balance between individuals and groups, and *so* on. The choice of *kastom* as rallying-cry can in no way be interpreted as some cold-blooded strategy of a cynical intellectual elite; theirs was a heartfelt move to claim back for *kastom* much that had once belonged to it before Christianity usurped many of its positive aspects and claimed them as its exclusive property. This process is part and parcel of a strongly felt need among colonized peoples to claim self-respect and national pride by restoring legitimacy and moral strength to their "traditional" cultures.

People have not begun to behave much differently, but their altered perceptions of their "traditional" past are according it a much larger share of the total *kastom*-Christian symbiosis. Just as the Christianity preached to them was a set of norms and ideals that were not in fact attained in much of the everyday behavior of the Europeans with whom the Melanesians were acquainted, so is their old culture capable of a much more positive assessment than whites have given it when it also is judged in terms of its ideals. Thus, the recent statement by a prominent ni-Vanuatu woman that "'traditionally we are peacemakers," a people who settled all disputes by *kastom* (Sope 1980:53), should be accorded at least the same status as a Christian commandment, since both express ideals whose achievement everywhere and at all times is impossible. Since "tradition" is such a heavily filtered artifact of the present, it matters very little whether or not those elements now attributed to the pre-contact past were in fact part of it; as long as the reevaluation is a positive one, ni-Vanuatu can draw satisfaction and pride from it.

The continued identification and revival of elements of *kastom* will serve to further solidify the new nation's identity. If the emphasis remains on unities that transcend regional diversity, the divisive potential of *kastom* unshared could remain dampened. Following the recent successful quelling of the Santo rebellion, the government is bound to continue the heavy stress on national unity, but with assurances that regional diversity will be taken care of by decentralization. With the removal of European *agitateurs* and the allaying of fears about major losses of local autonomy, there is good reason to believe that the Melanesian members of the

kastom-based Nagriamel movement will offer no further resistance to the government. The new respect for *kastom* should help ensure this.

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EDITOR'S FORUM

POLYNESIAN PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEANS IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

by I. C. Campbell

The doctrine among Pacific historians that their goal is the creation of "island oriented history," or "'history from the islanders' point of view" is by now acquiring grey hairs. Although sometimes represented as a breakthrough in historiography it is no more than a restatement of the doctrine of the sympathetic imagination which has for long been part of the historian's stock-in-trade. For an historian to attempt to get inside the mind of his subjects, to see the world as they did, is a most essential means to understanding why they behaved as they did. The task is not unique to Pacific history, although the task becomes more difficult the more removed is the culture of study from that of the historian. Perhaps the greatest difficulty--and again one not unique to the Pacific--is the paucity of documentary sources from Pacific islanders' hands, for although literacy spread rapidly, especially in Polynesia in what Parsonson has termed the "literate revolution," the islanders generally did not make a habit of recording their present to make a more intelligible past for historians in the future. Getting inside the minds of Polynesians of the past necessitates reliance on European sources which frequently provide evidence only of an anecdotal kind. Such evidence often lacks the sympathetic imagination on which the historian relies so heavily in the effort to cross the frontier of culture and mind. In the subject of this essay, the contemporary observers needed unusual powers of perception to try to see themselves as others saw them, but that was an exercise not congenial to the culturally self-assured Europeans of their era. Consequently, while European perceptions of other peoples frequently attract attention, the reciprocal observation has usually been ignored.

It has become a commonplace to observe in studies of culture contact between European and tribal societies, that the Europeans' perceptions of the tribal population were conditioned by romantic preconceptions of primitive purity and virtue. With closer acquaintance and the passage of time, the perceptions became less romantic and reflected more the failures in the contact relationship. The emphasis passed from purity and vir-

tue to observed vices such as treachery, theft, cruelty, poverty and oppression. The changing perceptions have been described by an historian of Australian culture contacts as a sequence from noble savage to sinful savage, and successively, comic savage, degraded savage, and finally, disgusting savage.

The "savages" for their part, had certain preconceptions and reactions of their own towards the European strangers who intruded upon their lives. Generally speaking, the range of attitudes parallels that of the Europeans: from an idealized, unrealistically flattering perception in the beginning through a series of revisions, to the other extreme of outright hostility and rejection.

At first, Polynesians were overawed by the strangers who came among them in such numbers and in such strikingly majestic vessels as the tall-masted frigates and ships of the eighteenth century. Their amazement at everything they saw on board the first ships was that of a people seeing and touching the inconceivable. These strangers, they were inclined to think, must be gods. The admiration for their possessions and the awe which they felt was reflected in the names they gave the strangers: *papalangi* and its cognate forms in Western Polynesia; and *pakeha* in New Zealand. *Papalangi* literally translated means something like "heaven bursters" with the connotation that the tall ships which showed their white sails like clouds above the horizon before the ships themselves came into view, appeared' to be coming from the sky.[1] The Tahitian *popaa* or *papaa* possibly has a similar origin. Their coming was said in later years to have been prophesied: "There are coming children of the glorious princess, by a canoe without an outrigger, who are covered from head to foot."[2] The Marquesans, closely related to the Tahitians, called Europeans "Etua'," or spirits, thinking that they came from the sky. The use of the term continued long after the original error was realized.[3] The New Zealand term *pakeha* refers not to the manner or place of their coming, but to the type of creature they seemed to be; the term *pakepakeha* already existed for small imaginary beings of light color. An alternative New Zealand theory was that *pakepakeha* was the name of a god of the sea and that it seemed appropriate to transfer the name to early European visitors. Other names of sea gods were also said to be used such as Atua, Tupua, Marakihau . . . etc.[4]

The derivation of the Hawaiian word *haole* for foreigner is more obscure, but the evidence presented by Fornander suggests that both the word and its meaning are probably ancient. The traditional usages recorded by Fornander imply a considerable admiration for Europeans, amount-

ing in some cases almost to veneration. In the ancient Chant of Kuali‘i the likeness of the *haole* to gods is made quite explicitly:

> I have surely seen Kahiki,
> A land with a strange language is Kahiki.
> The men of Kahiki have ascended up
> The backbone of heaven;
> And up there they trample indeed,
> And look down below.
> Kanakas are not in Kahiki,
> One kind of men is in Kahiki--the Haole;
> He is like a god.[5]

That Cook was regarded as a god--specifically as an incarnation of the god Lono--is well known and has become a part of *haole,* legend perhaps as much as it was a reality of Hawaiian belief. Not only was Cook himself regarded as an *akua,* but that sanctity was applied also to his surroundings; the ships were regarded as *heiau;* the crew were "wonderful beings," "with white foreheads, sparkling eyes, wrinkled skins (clothing), and angular heads (hats)," "sharp noses . . . and deep-set eyes"; their speech "was like the twittering and trilling of the *‘o‘o* bird, with a prolonged cooing sound like the *lali* bird, and a high chirping note."[6]

Since they were unable to command thunder and lightning, it was, in Fornander's words:

> no wonder that the natives regarded Captain Cook as an avatar of the great Lono-noho-ika-wai of their religious creed, whose attributes may be found described in the chant of the deluge . . . their adoration was as natural as it was spontaneous . . .[7]

According to Hawaiian legend, the first sight many of the Hawaiians had of the foreigners was of them eating the exotic watermelon, and smoking tobacco. They fearfully exclaimed:

> These men are gods indeed; see them eating human flesh . . . and the fire bums in their mouths."

The legends preserved by Fornander and Kamakau contain anachronisms and errors of detail, but in the manner of legends everywhere, probably record the contemporary feeling with greater fidelity.

In Fiji also, the arrival of the first European residents--involuntarily, by shipwreck--was celebrated in song and dance and thus encapsulated and preserved for more than a century of turmoil and colonization, the perceptions of the witnesses of that first arrival. According to the chants, the Fijians "saw what appeared to be men, and they thought they must be gods, as they were biting live fire and had their ears wrapped up."[8] A generation after that first contact new arrivals were still sometimes asked if they were spirits or "real men."

> "Are you a spirit?" I told him no, that I was flesh and blood the same as himself. "Well," said he, "if you are the same as me what makes you so white?" . . . But he seemed to think I must have some supernatural aid or I could not take the [musket] locks apart and put them together so readily.[9]

The artifacts which Europeans brought with them were also considered to be of supernatural origin. William Mariner, a resident in Tonga from 1806 to 1810, reported that books and writing were believed to have supernatural powers and to be instruments of sorcery. They had good presumptive proof for this belief, arising from their experience nine years before Mariner's arrival when the London Missionary Society had landed missionaries in Tonga. These foreigners built a house, and when they shut themselves up in it with their books, the Tongans outside could hear the unmistakable sounds of ritual activity. Within sixteen days the highest chief had died; within a few months more high chiefs had died than during any similar period in legend or memory.[10] In New Zealand a travelling artist in 1827 observed, after thirteen years of unsuccessful missionary activity, that the Maoris called "gods" anything which they did not understand: compasses, windmills, muskets, and so on, until they became familiar with them.[11]

Now the mystification of the unknown is such a widespread human trait that it might be thought to be unworthy of notice. Even in this age of scientific inquiry--indeed, in which there has practically been an apotheosis of science itself--the imperfectly understood is liable to be labeled "mysterious." This idea is worth commenting upon, however, for two reasons. First, in a time of political and intellectual decolonization, it is sometimes thought to be demeaning to the "natives" to suppose that they could ever have been so gullible and naive as to mistake flawed Europeans for flawless gods; many claim that this interpretation was merely created by the appeal which it has to colonial masters accustomed to being reminded of their all-encompassing superiority. It should be

noticed, however, that the perception predates the period of colonial mastery. Moreover, the tribal Polynesians, like many other peoples all over the world, did not live in a society of open intellectual inquiry but in one in which the unfamiliar, unexpected, or the inexplicable were habitually categorized as supernatural. Their world was one in which the spirits were ubiquitous and powerful; it was practically an everyday occurrence for a god to enter into one of their number, or, for one of their number to speak or act through him.[12]

The second reason is that scepticism of the supernatural perception is often based on a common misunderstanding of the nature of the supernatural in Polynesia. The dominant characteristic of supernatural beings in. Polynesia was not their justice, charity, or protectiveness, but their power. In an intellectually closed system in which belief was self-validating, in which rituals and oracular consulations were required for many acts from planting yams to making war, one should be wary of supposing that the supernatural imputation implied respect, adoration or affection. Spirits were often malevolent, usually mischievous, and always unreliable. In. a very short time, perhaps from the beginning, that is how Europeans where regarded also. For instance, the *pakepakeha,* the New Zealand imaginary creatures of pale skin who gave their name to the Europeans, were creatures of evil influence,[13] just as in European folklore fairies often bode ill for mortals.[14]

The likeness seen between Europeans, spirits and gods was not necessarily flattering to the former even at first contact. It did not prevent the Polynesians from driving hard bargains in trade, nor did it save the strangers from assault. According to the Hawaiian traditions, the Hawaiians debated on the very day of the first arrival of Cook's expedition in 1778 whether or not to attack the strangers.[15] Cook himself, the incarnation of Lono, was struck down on the beach at Kealakekea Bay within a month of his being paid the highest honors and continued after death to be regarded as a god.[16]

Sixty years later, the Fijians made it perfectly clear to the beachcomber, William Diaper, that being a spirit was no estimable thing. The country people, he wrote,

> evinced much curiosity at seeing me, some of them scarcely believing their own senses, putting forth their hands towards me to prove whether I was tangible or not; while others would come and shake their hands before my eyes to ascertain if I was blind, and then say that I was not blind, but had eyes like a cat. Others would say I was a leper, or like one, which others would con-

> tradict, by saying that I resembled a pig with all the hair scorched off more than anything they knew of. The young girls would not come nigh at all, and if any of the young men laid hold of them to force them close to me, they would scream as though they were going into fits.[17]

It seems likely, therefore, that the comparison with the supernatural implied bewilderment and fear--that to call the foreigners gods was an acknowledgment of their power as well as their strangeness, and not a token of admiration.

Experience sometimes seemed to bear out the belief that Europeans had some evil, mystical force. On Tongareva, an atoll in the Northern Cooks, the barrenness of one islet was explained as resulting from the murder of a European castaway.[18] In Tonga there was a similar story recorded by William Mariner. Mariner was once taken to see the grave of John Norton, one of the crew of H.M.S. *Bounty* and one of those who joined Bligh in the *Bounty's* long boat after the mutiny for the epic voyage to Timor. Bligh put in at one of the Tongan islands to obtain water, and while doing so the Tongans murdered one of his men--John Norton. After the body was stripped, it was dragged some distance through the grass to a place where it was left to lie for two or three days before being buried. Ever since that time--Mariner was there eighteen to twenty years later--the track made by the dragging of the body, and the place where it had lain, had been bare of grass.[19] Norton, therefore, if he was not a supernatural being, clearly had had the patronage of a powerful god.

The Polynesians regarded the Europeans as supernatural only long enough for names like *papalangi* and *pakeha* to become fixed, but the idea was gradually modified rather than totally abandoned. For some time after realizing their humanity, they were regarded as having some special heavenly patronage which gave them immunity from the restrictions of the Polynesian *tapu* system and accounted for their marvelous material possessions.

Perhaps the earliest acknowledgment of the exemption of foreigners from *tapu* was in the experience of George Vason. Vason was one of the London Missionary Society brethren who had been sent to Tonga in 1797. After several months of uncertain and futile activity Vason gradually abandoned the supports of Christian religion and his identity as an English artisan and began to live like the Tongans. The Tongans considered him a chief. He had his own household and estate, and he learned to conduct himself with correct aristocratic courtliness. He had been living this way of life for over a year when the civil war of 1799 broke out. Vason

joined the side of his chiefly patron in a war which was fought with a degree of savagery and disregard for the correct forms of behavior which horrified the Tongans themselves. Quarter was seldom sought or given in this war; the destruction was on a scale previously unknown. A time came when a defeated group from the opposite side took refuge in a sacred place, an act which by the normal rules of warfare should have preserved their lives. Their enemies (i.e. Vason's party) were determined that they should die, but none dared break the *tapu* of a place of refuge. At length someone had the idea that since Vason had a foreign patron-diety no harm would follow if he broke the *tapu*. The idea was approved, and Vason set fire to the fence sheltering the fugitives. Their massacre was promptly accomplished.[20] The same idea was later applied in other parts of Polynesia but in less sinister contexts--usually to absolve the foreigners or the indigenous community from responsibility for some *tapu* infringement, or to explain the failure of supernatural sanctions.

With the wider application of this idea, it became clear to all that Europeans were merely human beings with extraordinary capabilities. These capabilities in turn were eventually demystified and were accepted as being within the range of Polynesian learning. The process was described by a Tongan *matapule* who, in 1822, admitted that he had at first been overawed by Europeans and their marvelous property. But, he later reflected on closer acquaintance, they too had two eyes, two feet, ten fingers. . . .[21]

The realization that Europeans were merely human had come as soon as regular, more or less continuous, contact began. At the same time it became clear that there were different classes of Europeans--chiefs and the vulgar--just as in Polynesian society. Chiefs could be identified not only by the respect they commanded among their own people and by their wealth, but also by their conducting themselves with decorum and courtesy. Polynesian attitudes thus became more complex, and accordingly, it becomes more difficult to distinguish their attitudes towards Europeans as a type from their attitudes towards particular Europeans.

A number of anecdotes show the formation of a stereotype of Europeans and also a willingness to respond according to particular circumstances. The stereotype was an unfavorable one. John Papa Ii, the Hawaiian historian, wrote that during his childhood at the beginning of the nineteenth century, *haoles* were an object of fear to small children and that the threat of calling the *haoles* was used by exasperated adults to frighten refractory children into more subdued behavior.[22] In Tahiti, the missionaries--among the earliest permanent European residents on that island--were looked upon as estimable fellows in their own way, but "as a

kind of children, or idiots, incapable of understanding the simplest facts of island politics or society."[23] The New Zealand Maoris were shocked at the missionaries' want of charity and hospitality to their disreputable countrymen who found greater warmth among the Maori people. Indeed, like other Polynesians, they were convinced that hell was a place only for "the white faces"--that any Maori could be so wicked as to deserve eternal punishment of that kind was incredible to them.[24]

The development of an unfavorable stereotype owed something to prejudice and to experience alike. When in 1806 William Mariner, an inoffensive boy of fifteen who was soon to be adopted into one of Tonga's paramount families, was stranded in Tonga, he spent his first day onshore being taunted, had stones thrown at him, was spat upon, and had his fair sunburnt skin compared with that of a hog which had been scraped of its hair. The Tongans later learned from Mariner and his stranded comrades that European ideas of hospitality did not allow a person to invite himself to any house where food was being served and share the meal, that money was a measure of value and means of exchange and accumulation, and that European notions of courage in battle meant a preparedness to fight and die rather than to fight and run to live and fight another -day. These traits, the Tongans concluded, helped to explain the stinginess and selfishness for which Europeans, by 1807, had already become famous. What Europeans called bravery, the Tongans called recklessness, a selfish display and vain quest for glory which would merely deprive a warrior's comrades of his support.[25]

Prejudice or xenophobia is perhaps also evident in the example of the whaling captain who, when shipwrecked in Tahiti in the 1790s, was informed that since he no longer had a ship, he could no longer be regarded as a chief.[26]

Disdainful tolerance was the common attitude among Polynesian chiefs. In about 1840, the famous beachcomber William Diaper found in Fiji that "tame" white men were in strong demand as chiefly pets, but that when they transgressed local norms the chief would remark contemptuously, " 'What could be expected from a *papalangi* (foreigner)?' "[27] At about the same time when another beachcomber contributed a few remarks to a conversation between a visiting trading captain and a chief, the latter

> turned to him, exhibiting in his whole bearing the utmost "hauteur" and said, "who are you?--nothing but a runaway sailor,

> who has no riches but what he earns. You are not to say your own words. When Mr. Wallis tells you to speak, then you may speak."[28]

Late in the contact phase this attitude had become firmly reinforced by experience. In the early 1860s, the acting British Consul in Samoa, John Chauner Williams, attempted to apologize to a Samoan chief for the behavior of a white man who had walked across a *malae* while some chiefs were in conference upon it. The chief replied to Williams:

> We are not angry with a man like that. When we see a white man behaving in that way we know that he was simply a common fellow (*puaa elo,* lit. stinking pig) in his own country who knew no better and has never been taught how to behave himself. We know that if he was a gentleman he would not act in that way and so we do not care to get angry with a man like that.[29]

It was not, however, merely the cultural habits of Europeans which Polynesians objected to; they found their very persons offensive, as in the insults made to Mariner and Diaper about their skin. In Samoa, Consul Williams father, the pioneer missionary John Williams, reported in 1832 that the Samoans complained of the offensive smell of Europeans and called them unclean. "This I don't wonder at," remarked Williams, "when we consider the general nature of Europeans with which they have been acquainted," But he did wonder that they said frankly the same of himself, "although I put clean clothes on every day I was there."[30]

For many years after the first contacts, traders and beachcombers were preponderant in the experience which Pacific islanders had of Europeans. It was to be many years before most of them saw much of the more redeeming features of European civilization. Ship's crews of the nineteenth century were heterogeneous but mostly representative of the criminal, the desperate, the vulgar, the ruthless, the embittered and the disadvantaged. During their short visits to the islands they frequently gave displays of drunkenness and violence, and those men whom captains intentionally left onshore were those whose antisocial behavior made them most unwelcome on board. Conditions on board most ships until late in the nineteenth century reinforced vices and instilled no virtues in their crews. The discipline on American whalers was reputed to be vicious and tyrannical in the extreme; colonial Australian vessels were no less vicious

for their equally extreme lack of discipline. The sailors were not only likely to behave badly, but many of them were probably repugnant to the personally fastidious Polynesians: washing facilities on board ships were virtually nonexistent; scurvy continued to be common; venereal diseases were common also; sailors who were left onshore were often there because they were too ill to stay on board. Tuberculosis was not uncommon; measles, influenza and other infectious diseases were introduced from time to time. These Europeans were not an attractive people.

Sailors' attitudes to Polynesians during this time were fearful. They were suspicious of Polynesians as savages, believing them to be probably cannibals and certainly the practitioners of horrifying rites and customs. These attitudes, allied to the callousness of the age, when applied to Polynesians amounted to an almost total disregard for local life and interests. Given these characteristics of the European population and the Polynesian willingness to take by force anything with even a superficial appeal--from nails, to sailors, to the ships themselves, it is remarkable that there was comparatively little violence in contact relations. It was mostly safe for sailors to go ashore unarmed in Polynesia, even spend the night onshore. Such security was probably unknown in Melanesia and was comparatively rare in Micronesia as well. There was a considerable element of calculation in this Polynesian restraint. This early lesson in contact that more could be got by trade than assault was not lost on the Polynesians, who learned not to let their own preconceptions override their material self-interests.

Even the redeeming features of western civilization excited scorn: charity and mercy were signs of weakness and fear, The failure or refusal of foreign governments to avenge assault was viewed with contempt. For example, Finau, a usurper in Tonga in the early nineteenth century once exclaimed,

> Oh, that the gods would make me king of England! . . . The King of England does not deserve the dominion he enjoys. Possessed of so many great ships, why does he suffer such petty islands as those of Tonga continually to insult his people with acts of treachery? Were I he, would I send tamely to *ask* for yams and pigs? No, I would come with the *front of battle;* and with the *thunder of Bolotane.* I would show who ought to be chief. None but men of enterprising spirit should be in possession of guns. Let such rule the earth, and be those their vassals who can bear to submit to such insults unrevenged.[31]

A profound contempt for Europeans was the inevitable result of these experiences during those years when island societies were comparatively little changed and before European political and economic power was extended over them. This is nowhere better demonstrated than in an event, a. masquerade, which took place in Fiji in the early 1840s.

> An individual took the part of a white man, and performed it so well that he caused great mirth. He was clothed like a sailor, armed with a cutlass, and as a substitute for bad teeth (which is a proverbial characteristic of white men among these people), he had short pieces of black pipe stems placed irregularly, which answered very well. The nose on his mask was of a disproportionate length (which they also say is another prominent feature, adding nothing to the beauty of white men). His hat was cocked on three hairs, in the sailor fashion, and made from banana leaves. In his mouth was a short black pipe, which he was puffing away as he strolled about, cutting the tops of any tender herb that happened to grow on either side. This masquerade is carried on by the slaves when they bring in the first fruits and offer them to the king, and even at such times, when allowance is made for not being over-scrupulous in paying the accustomed deference to superiors', they nevertheless keep a little guard over themselves, and behave with more or less decorum. But this mimicking sailor acted his part cleverly, and paid no attention whatever to decorum, but strutted about puffing his pipe as unconcerned as though he was walking the forecastle. He detached himself from the crowd, flourishing his cutlass about and gaping alternately in all quarters, as though he was a stranger just arrived, when some of the masqueraders reminded him that he was in the presence of Tui Drekete. He immediately asked who Tui Drekete was, and could not be made to understand, till some of them looked in the direction the king was sitting, when he pointed (which is greatly against the rules), and asked if that was the "old bloke," walking up to him bolt upright and offering his hand, which the king smilingly shook. The sailor then told him he had better take a whiff or two with him, as it was the best tobacco he had smoked for many a day. The king, willing to make the best of the amusement, took the pipe, the spectators making the air ring again with their shouts and laughter, "*Vavalagi dina., dina sara*" (a real white man, a real white man).[32]

In most places the known examples of Polynesian attitudes suggest a unilinear progression from reverence, to a pragmatic reserve, to open contempt. It is unlikely that the development of attitudes is ever as neat as this, and it is certain that similar developments in different places were rarely contemporaneous. In New Zealand at least, the attitudes and changes were more subtle than has been suggested above. The initial reaction to strangers was one of suspicion and hostility. If Europeans were regarded as gods or spirits then they must have been regarded as evil beings and as creatures against whom it was possible to fight. Tasman in 1642 lost a boat's crew to the Maoris, quite unexpectedly; Furneaux--Cook's colleague in 1773--lost a boat's crew; Surville in 1769 'had a violent encounter; Marion lost his life with many of his crew in 1772. Among these early visitors Cook alone avoided serious trouble, although the threat of it was frequent. The traveling artist, Augustus Earle, remarked,

> The sight of beings so extraordinary (for thus we Europeans must have appeared to them) excited in their savage minds the greatest wonder; and they thought we were sent as a scourge and an enemy: and though Cook, one of their earliest visitors adopted every method his ingenuity could devise to conciliate them, yet, as they never could thoroughly understand his intentions they were always on the alert to attack him.[33]

Maori opinion of the *pakeha* improved with closer contact, and the various tribes of this highly competitive people vied to have a resident *pakeha* for the distinction of it--and also for his mechanical skills and his propensity to attract traders, and thus European manufactures, for which there was a vigorous and early demand. They were also much sought after as husbands, neighbors and trading partners.

Earle records two instances of the respect accorded European sensitivities in 1827. At Kororareka in the Bay of Islands the white settlers adopted a strict Sabbath observance. They slept in, wore their best clothes when they arose, attended religious worship if a missionary came to conduct a service, and refrained from working. The Maoris, though still deaf to Christian doctrine, behaved similarly out of politeness. Indeed, reported Earle, not even the most pressing necessity could induce them to work on that *tapu* day. The full extent of the respect being shown was not apparent until it was discovered that the Maoris, taking advantage of the *pakehas'* long sleeping, worked frantically from early in the morning until the first of the white men emerged. Work ceased at that moment.[34]

The second instance was one which caused Earle some embarrassment. He had interfered in the preparations for a cannibal meal in a very provocative manner, but failed to prevent it. The next day he was rebuked by his patron chief who had heard of the incident and who pointed out: that he himself now refrained from cannibalism out of respect for his white friends, but that it was a folly and impertinence on Earle's part to expect others to pay the same compliment.[35]

By the 1830s, the Maoris had revised their earlier opinions even of the missionaries and accorded them a new respect. They had powers of healing where their own *tohunga* failed. They attracted trade. They were persistent peacemakers and stopped many a battle in such a way as to allow the contending Maoris on both sides to save face. The Maoris came to rely on them to save them from the consequences of the belligerent challenges which an acute sense of honor bound them to make. By the mid-1830s the missionaries had been cast as men with solutions to the new problems wracking Maori society. Suddenly their churches were crowded with eager converts.

In the era of political intervention European prestige fell to an all time low level. In New Zealand there was disillusionment and bitterness over the failure of the Treaty of Waitangi to secure for the Maoris their land rights and internal jurisdiction. European colonists appeared to be predatory and deceitful--consummate tricksters--*pakepakeha* indeed.

Elsewhere in Polynesia Europeans with power seemed to be dedicated to embarrassing Polynesian chiefs and dispossessing their people. Naval commanders like Thomas ap Catesby Jones, La Place, and Lord Paulet seemed to relish the opportunities to impose unequal treaties on staggering island governments, and by claiming extra-territorial privileges, challenged the rights of those governments to determine their own policies. Consular representatives like Richard Charlton, Richard Blackler and John Brown Williams left no opportunity untried to embarrass and belittle the authorities to whom they had been sent. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that in 1835 the government of Tahiti enacted a law prohibiting marriage between Tahitians and foreigners, a measure aimed specifically at preventing Europeans from gaining further influence on the island.

Thus, the Tahitian chiefess, Arii Taimai could look back late in the nineteenth century over more than a hundred years of Tahitian experience of European contact and see only disease, depopulation, misgovernment, muskets, and insect pests as their endowment.[36] Gunpowder, for instance, she described as "being as great a curse as every other English thing or thought had ever been."[37] She did not mean by that that the

French were preferable to the English; they had faults of their own. For instance she wrote in reference to Bligh, "Had he been a Frenchman, he might perhaps have enjoyed discovering the mistakes of his predecessors, and trying to correct them with mistakes of his own, but when the English once saw what they took to be a fact, they saw nothing else forever."[38]

Her remarks share the same tone with those of the Hawaiian historian, Samuel Kamakau, who though professedly grateful for the benefits of Christian civilization, stressed *haole* self-interestedness and success in oppressing and dispossessing the Hawaiians. He pointed out that the Hawaiian constitution of 1840 benefited the foreigners to the disadvantage of the locals, and he marvelled that Europeans who were so lacking in practical, useful skills could be so adept at conducting the affairs of government to their own advantage. In 1845 he relayed to King Kamehameha III a petition begging him not to appoint foreigners to his government: they "devastate the land like the hordes of caterpillars the fields."[39] In addition, they are, he said, quick tempered, violent, sacreligious folk who repay Hawaiian generosity and hospitality with exploitation.[40]

It can hardly be doubted that these bitter feelings had ample justification. But little satisfaction was reported with the medicines, laws, boats, domestic animals, new food plants and metal tools which the Hawaiians had been willing to accept from across the sea. Foreigners were associated with ill rather than with good, and the operation of a stereotype may be inferred.

In the period of political destabilization--which covers more than half of the nineteenth century--those Polynesians who were politically more aware than the generality, distinguished between the actions of foreigners and the actions of foreign governments. When it came to seeking assistance or protection it was clear that not all foreigners were equally regarded. The British were preferred over all others; and the Americans were looked upon more favorably than the French or Germans. Britain received by far the most invitations to annex or establish protectorates: three times from Tahiti in about fifteen years; four offers of cession from Fiji or parts of Fiji in sixteen years, and several requests in the last twenty years or so of the nineteenth century from various small islands who feared and expected a worse fate.

Clearly, attitudes were complex in the proportion that they reflected the changing conditions of culture contact. The class of Europeans which disturbed society, leaving behind women fit only for prostitution and children who were unwanted, was usually distinguished from individuals of integrity, sincerity and worth. The range of attitudes might not have been

very different from that early in the nineteenth century immediately after the "supernatural" phase, although the elaboration and emphasis of these attitudes differed, The later range is encapsulated in the remark attributed to Cakobau, the putative king of Fiji in 1874 when with relief he finally saw Fiji pass to the British Crown: "The whites in Fiji are a bad lot. They are mere stalkers on the beach. . . . Of one thing I am assured, if we do not cede Fiji, the white stalkers on the beach, the cormorants, will open their maws and swallow us."[41]

The changing attitudes of Polynesians towards Europeans in the nineteenth century undoubtedly reflected changing contact relations, and as contact passed into colonization, changed even further. The colonization of the mind is a concept which has become widely known since Franz Fanon published his critiques of colonialism. It is the most difficult form of colonization to perpetrate; but with time and singlemindedness a people's self image might be altered. But inducing them to accept the image the colonizers had of themselves was next to impossible. In their views of the strangers the Polynesians remained authentically autonomous.

As foreigners were seen to be mysterious, useful, harmless, threatening, miscreant, and so forth, so were they mentally classified and condemned, ignored or praised. But as with attitudes to race in other communities, people's perceptions were clouded by ignorance and misinformation; in addition, it is likely that there was a good measure of simple stereotyping, deriving from features of Polynesian society itself. The tradition of Polynesian hospitality notwithstanding, there was a sizeable streak of xenophobia among Polynesians reflected, for example, in the connotations of the Maori word *pakepakeha*, in the emotional revulsion at the encounter with a pale skin and light colored eyes, as the experiences of Mariner and Diaper show, and in the term "long necks" widely applied to the first European women to come to the islands.

.A provocative overtone can be detected here. Throughout Polynesia a fair skin on a woman was especially esteemed. Women treated their skins with vegetable bleaches and kept out of the sun as much as possible; European sailors commented on their fair complexions. This Polynesian admiration for fair skin is perhaps the source of a deeply rooted but ambivalent stereotype about race analogous to the European complex about dark skins connoting good and evil.

Another characteristic much admired by Polynesians was bulk. A tall heavily boned, fleshy physique was the ideal, so much so that a chief of slight stature could command little esteem. The Polynesians could tell as soon as they looked at Cook, for instance, that he was a chief. The Polynesians early in their contact history were among the tallest people on

earth, usually some inches above the European average, with their chiefs being taller still. The pervasiveness of this notion perhaps helps to explain why the less statuesque Europeans could never command more than a grudging, qualified respect.

However powerful these sentiments might have been, there is no reason to think that Polynesians, any more than Europeans, allowed their preconceptions or reactions to racial differences to override self-interest in their dealings with foreigners. There was no Polynesian Montezuma; on the contrary, Polynesian history shows unremitting calculation and determination to seize whatever advantages circumstances offered.

NOTES

1. Rev. J. Orange, *Life of the Late George Vason of Nottingham.* (London, John Snow, 1840), p. 121.

2 Rev. George Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia,* (London, John Snow, 1861), p. 103.

3. Teuira Henry, *Ancient Tahiti,* (B. P. Bishop Museum Bulletin No. 48, Honolulu, 1928), p. 9.

4. A. J. von Krusenstern. *A Voyage Round the World,* (London, John Murray, 1813), vol. I, p. 171. See also David Porter, *A Voyage in the South Seas* . . . (London, Phillips & Co., 1823), pp. 91-92.

5. S. J. Baker, "Origins of the Words Pakeha and Maori," *Journal of the Polynesian Society,* (1945) Vol. 54, pp. 223-224.

6. Abraham Fornander, *An Account of the Polynesian Race,* (Tokyo, C. E. Tuttle, 1969) Vol. II, p. 388.

7. S. M. Kamakau, *The Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii,* (Honolulu, Kamehameha Schools Press, 1961), pp. 93,96.

8. Fornander, *op. cit.,* II, p. 179.

9. *Ibid.,* p. 169.

10. Sir Everard im Thurn and L. C. Wharton (eds.) *The Journal of William Lockerby,* (London, Hakluyt Society, 1925), p. xli. See also Samuel Patterson, *Narrative of the Adventures* . . ., (Palmer, The Press, 1817), p. 96.

11. [William S. Carey], *Wrecked on The Feejees* (Nantucket, Inquirer and Mirror Press, 1928), pp. 51-52. cf "Jackson's Narrative" in J. E. Erskine, *Journal of a Cruise Among the Islands of the Western Pacific,* (London, Dawsons, 1967), p. 434.

12. John Martin, *An Account of the Tonga Islands,* (Edinburgh, Constable, 1827), Vol. I, pp. 72-73.

13. Augustus Earle, *Narrative of a Residence in New Zealand,* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1966), p. 197.

14. e. g. Martin, *op. cit.,* I, p. 103.

14. Baker, *loc. cit.,* p. 223.

15. cf. Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound,* (London, Paladin, 1970), p. 218. Worsley quotes New Guinean opinion of German colonists as being " 'These are not men, they are merely gods.' "

16. Fornander, *op. cit.,* II, pp. 167-168, quoting David Malo. Also Kamakau, *op. cit.,* p. 94.

17. e. g. Martin, *op. cit.,* II, pp. 73-74. William Ellis, *Polynesian Researches: Hawaii,* (Rutland and Tokyo, C. E. Tuttle, 1969), pp. 132-133.

18. "Jackson's Narrative," *loc. cit.,* p. 429.

19. E. H. Lamont, *Wild Life Among the Pacific Islanders,* (London, Hurst and Blackett, 1867), p. 161.

20. Martin, *op. cit.,* I, p. 209.

21. Orange, *op. cit.,* p. 174.

22. Rev. Walter Lawry, "Diary, 1818-1825," Mitchell Library MS A1973, p. 85. (4 September, 1822).

23. John Papa Ii, *Fragments of Hawaiian History,* (Honolulu, Bishop Museum Press, 1959), p. 20.

24. H. B. Adams, *Tahiti: Memoirs of Arii Taimai,* (Ridgewood, Gregg, 1968), p. 128.

25. Earle, *op. cit.,* pp. 86-7, 133, 191.

26. Martin, *op. cit.,* I, pp. 199, 213-4.

27. Examination of Mr. Cover by the Directors, 15 September, 1800. London Missionary Society, South Seas Letters, Box 1.

28. "Jackson's Narrative," *loc. cit.,* p. 422.

29. "A Lady" [Mary D. Wallis], Life in *Feejee* (Ridgewood, Gregg, 1967), p. 226.

30. [Rev. George Brown], "Old Hands and Old Times" (TS), Mitchell Library, M.L. 1119 p. 41.

31. Martin, *op. cit.,* I, pp. 329-330. See also, Vol. II, p. 139.

32. "Jackson's Narrative," *loc. cit.,* pp. 468-469.

33. Earle, *op. cit.,* p. 186.

34. *Ibid.,* p. 129.

35. *Ibid.,* p. 116.

36. Adams, *op. cit.,* pp. 136-137.

37. *Ibid.,* p. 126.

38. *Ibid.,* p. 98.

39. Mamakau, *op. cit.,* p. 400.

40. *Ibid.,* pp. 411-412.

41. R. A. Derrick, *A History of Fiji,* (Suva, Government Printer, 1946), p. 248, quoting from C. F. Gordon-Cumming, *At Home in Fiji*).

REVIEWS

Geoffrey Bolton, *Spoils and Spoilers: Australians Make Their Environment 1788-1980.* Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. Pp. 197. Illustrations. $25.00.

Australia is well known internationally for its distinctive climate and landscape. The bush and bushmen, the dryness of the continent's center and the isolation of the outback are to many people familiar images of Australia. Indeed, to browse around any major bookstore in Australia today confirms the existence of this image; the thick, glossy picture-laden "coffee-table" books exulting Australian wildlife and landscape are seen in increasing numbers.

In the face of this picture of a people deeply appreciative and aware of their environment, Professor Geoffrey Bolton's *Spoils and Spoilers: Australians Make Their Environment 1788-1980* presents a sobering view of Australia's actual environmental record. Being deliberately polemical, Bolton sets out to describe the history of neglect of the Australian environment. In doing so, he shows not only the tragic effects of European settlement on the ecology since 1788, but probes deeper to reveal the linkage between environmental exploitation and the ingrained values of Australians toward the pursuit of economic security and the role and power of government.

Bolton begins *Spoils and Spoilers* by analyzing Aboriginal environmental practices prior to the coming of white settlers. The author maintains that the Aborigines' subtle environmental practices were unappreciated by the Europeans; for the Aborigines "the individual was subordinated to the good of the community, and the community was subordinated to the environment." By contrast, the Europeans came to Australia with firm notions about the relationship between themselves and their physical surroundings. Influenced by Biblical ideas and centuries of English feudalism, they believed they were distinct from and superior to the environment, and said that "the essential mark of an individual was ownership of property."

Bolton then sets about demonstrating that in the last two hundred years little heed has been paid to protecting and preserving the Australian environment. The white man's search for survival in the harsh conditions, settler resistance to government interference, the spirit of frontier individ-

ualism, and the pursuit of profit have been among the chief factors inhibiting environmental management in Australia. Bolton cites numerous cases of this negligence. For example, massive deforestation occurred in the nineteenth century as pastoralists sought grazing lands and miners found the need for firewood to fuel their steam engines and crushing machines. Animals, too, fell prey to the European desire to tame the land in the name of prosperity. Whales and seals, which were once plentiful off the Australian coast, were virtually extinct by the 1860s.

In urban planning, the importation of British ideas also related poorly to local conditions. In a country of great space it was paradoxical that Australian cities of the last century were cluttered with terrace-style houses which were popular in countries of high population and limited land such as England.

Bolton argues that the disregard for the national estate has continued unabated even in the post-war era. Although a few planners in the last thirty-five years have seen the need for better conservation, the unprecedented growth of populations, industry and urbanization has meant that decisions about town and country planning have been invariably piecemeal and based on crisis management.

The cutting edge of *Spoils and Spoilers* is Bolton's continual questioning of the Australian character itself, and the many assumptions Australians make about their way of life. He sharply elucidates the curious love/hate relationship that exists between Australians and their physical world; that is, the idealization and popularization of the "bush" and "outback" traditions on one hand, and the desire to conquer, exploit, tame and destroy their natural surroundings on the other. The author hints that the environmental dilemma is a symptom of a deeper Australian malady; Bolton suggests that Australians turn a blind eye to their environment because of their preoccupation with creating a secure and unassailable world upon their quarter-acre block. To Bolton, what divides Australians is the "ruling passion of ownership of a house detached from its neighbor."

Nor is the future for Australia's environment bright. In spite of the popular image to the contrary, Bolton argues that only in times of economic prosperity, such as in the 1880s and 1960s, were calls for conservation loudly heard. The economic downturn of the 1970s and 1980s leads Bolton to conclude that even if ecological concern continues, its influence on the "spoilers"--the large mining and forestry companies, the multinational corporations and the so-called urban "developers'"--will undoubtedly dissipate.

Although *Spoils and Spoilers* keenly examines a wide range of environmental issues, it is marred by a number of methodological and interpretive oversights. Curiously, Bolton does not state his aims at the outset as though he feels his readers share his many assumptions about the righteousness of the environmental cause. Also, while the book underlines the need for awareness by Australians on environmental issues, it is disappointing that *Spoils and Spoilers* ends on a pessimistic note and makes no recommendations or calls for future action.

Bolton occasionally oversimplifies to sharpen the points of his argument. To state, for instance, that the great drought of the 1890s was instrumental in the formation of the Australian Labor Party is to neglect the important role of urban trade unions dating from the 1860s. Also, to argue that "one of the marks of a colonial society is its inability to recognize its own social problems, or to set about finding remedies for them without waiting for a lead from some higher authority overseas," seems to ignore, *inter alia,* the lessons of the Asian and African nationalist struggles of the twentieth century.

In spite of these few shortcomings, *Spoils and Spoilers* does present concerned readers with an informative and disturbing survey of the neglect for Australia's environment. While the book does not espouse action, it will undoubtedly prove to be a valuable resource document in the battle against both the popular myth of "unspoilt Australia" and the reality of short-sighted economic exploitation.

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Edwin N. Ferdon, *Early Tahiti As The Explorers Saw It, 1767-1797.* Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1981. Pp. 371. Illustrations, bibliography. $24.95.

It is important that students of political and social change in the Pacific or elsewhere have accurate synchronic "base-line" studies of indigenous communities on the eve of the momentous upheavals that marked their "discovery" by the outside world. Reconstructions have to be judged on their own merits, and there are intrinsic difficulties in assembling the partial evidence left by explorers. Those difficulties are not really discussed in this text, so one must assume that a total working model has been aimed at, whatever the sources used.

The incompleteness of those sources has to be noted, therefore. An analysis of the evidence for reconstructing Tahitian society which omits any reference to the journal of James Morrison, or the documentation edited by Teuira Henry, starts with a severe disadvantage which is compounded by a strange absence of the archaeological contribution of Jose Garanger (and others) whose work has appeared in the *Journal de la Société dés Océanistes* and elsewhere.

Despite the omissions, the author has written a text solidly based on primary published sources and divided it into sections dealing with political organization, religion, daily life, material exchanges, ritual, agricultural and marine production, warfare and a brief section on the results of European importations of artifacts, crops and livestock. The organization of the material is similar to Douglas Oliver's *Ancient Tahitian Society,* without the richness of the documentation and the commentary. Many students will doubtless take refuge in the shorter text.

On the whole, they will find an honest job of condensation, particularly in those areas of material culture where observations were many and the evidence abundant. There is also a salutary section on limits to Tahitian navigational techniques and knowledge (derived from "waif voyagers" p. 248) which is certain to raise eyebrows and should provide a stimulating topic for postgraduate essays and seminars.

Where the evidence is thin or controversial, however, as in the section on political and kinship terminology, no guidelines are offered to warn readers of the difficulties of "reconstructing" a society for which elementary anthropological kinship data are lacking and whose tribal and territorial divisions are far from clear (pp. 28-30). One result of the lack of familiarity with primary sources is the erroneous definition of an *'iatoai* (p. 34) limited to the districts of the Taiarapu Peninsula. The topographical map on page twenty-nine offers no assistance to the student confronted with the tricky problem of tribal and district nomenclature, or even the location of the *marae* described from the voyagers and Kenneth Emory's *Stone Remains in the Society Islands,* and no explanation is forthcoming in the rest of the text. There is a good bibliography, however, for other island groups, especially Easter Island sites.

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Grant K. Goodman and Felix Moos, eds. *The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea.* Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 289, maps, illustrations, index. $20.00.

As the theme of this book, which was originally prepared as a report for the Sumitomo Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation, concerns the development prospects of two countries in the South Pacific, one might have expected it to provide a detailed inventory of the economic resources and deficiencies of the two polities under examination. Justifiably, however, this expectation is not met. Rather, the authors take some pains to demonstrate that the historical fact of colonialism has enormously influenced the development of Papua New Guinea and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and that current political relations, both internal and external, are continuing to affect the development outlook for these two countries. Thus, this book is essentially a study in political economy.

Central to the focus of the various authors is the notion that political autonomy does not imply in itself economic independence. Papua New Guinea, they argue, is heavily dependent on Australian aid and technical expertise, and this dependence reduces the development options of the former colony. Fortunately PNG is comparatively resource-rich, a circumstance which offers substantial opportunity for close economic relations between PNG and resource-poor Japan. Indeed, these relations are emerging--much encouraged the authors suggest--by the underlying character of PNG's political and economic systems and the nature of its resources, particularly fisheries. Further growth is predicted despite occasional political differences over the relatively minor Japanese aid to PNG. American interests are less immediate or substantial in PNG although the United States shares Australian strategic interests in a stable, friendly PNG not only for its ANZUS ties but also for PNG's proximity to the militarily important Trust Territory. With considerable perspicacity, the authors point out that both its strategic importance and its connection with Australia rest uneasily with PNG's efforts to pursue a univeralist foreign policy. Since the book went to press, Prime Minister Julius Chan has indeed moved to have this policy revised.

The unhappy colonial experience of the Trust Territory is also examined at length. Here it is American interests which predominate, and chief among these is the military requirement of strategic denial. One might quibble with the authors' assertion that American economic assistance has resulted from a troubled national conscience, but there can be little dispute with their interpretation of its disastrous social and economic effects. Their pessimism for the future has been more than amply justified by the years since the study was completed in 1978. The failure of the United

States to come to grips with Micronesian circumstances leads the authors to suggest that a greater Japanese involvement in the economy of the Trust Territory might be beneficial for all parties.

Although the bulk of the substantive content of the book is devoted to the history and development of PNG and the Trust Territory, the real purpose of the work emerges in the author's plea for greater cooperation between the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific. They argue the two Pacific rim powers have an interest in each of the island countries and that much may be gained both in terms of American and Japanese interests and in terms of the welfare of Papua New Guinea and the Trust Territory, through mutual cooperation and the avoidance of conflict between Japan and the U.S. in the Western Pacific area.

Their argument may have more than a grain of truth given the indifference of both countries to the South Pacific in the quarter century after World War II. Nevertheless, the proposal does raise questions about the other states which might be affected by any increased cooperative effort by the United States and Japan to influence affairs in the South Pacific. Indeed, the two ANZAC states would be vitally concerned as hitherto both Japan and the United States have encouraged Australia and New Zealand to regard the South Pacific as their sphere of influence. Major elements of ANZUS policy are based on this premise. The failure of the book to treat the repercussions of its proposal leads one also to question why the study was restricted to the four countries given in the title. The American interest in Papua New Guinea is relatively minor by almost any standard, a view which is only confirmed by the authors' analysis. It would appear Western Samoa (or even the territory of American Samoa) might have had greater *prima facie* grounds for inclusion.

Undoubtedly, the objective unifying thread in this book derives from the Japanese interest in PNG and the Trust Territory. Not only is this interest substantial and genuine, as the authors convincingly demonstrate, it is of increasing importance to the islands. And it is principally through this analysis of the Japanese involvement in the region that *The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific* makes an original contribution to the literature of South Pacific affairs. Japan has not received scholarly attention commensurate with its impact on the economies of the Pacific Islands. Despite its being the second most important trading partner (the former metropole is usually first) for a number of island countries, students of South Pacific affairs have tended to focus their attention on the aid, diplomatic or strategic interests of extra-regional states. Its absence from these areas has, therefore, tended to disguise the importance of Japan

in the South Pacific. This work should assist in correcting the misapprehension.

The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific is a readable and well presented general survey of both the development concerns of PNG and the Trust Territory and the range of interests which have drawn the United States and Japan into the contemporary Western Pacific. The effectiveness of the attempt to coherently integrate these diverse themes may be somewhat suspect for the book as a whole, but this misgiving does not attach to the chapters individually. They are fairly self-contained. The sections relating to Japan particularly will contribute usefully to filling a serious deficiency in the literature.

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T. Walter Herbert, Jr., *Marquesan Encounters: Melville and the Meaning of Civilization*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. 237. $15.00.

Marquesan Encounters is a powerful and provocative examination of the confrontations of three different nineteenth century Americans with the culture of the Marquesan Islands. These confrontations challenged each American's sense of identity, forcing him to reevaluate his own culture's definition of civilization and, ultimately, to reaffirm his values.

T. Walter Herbert, Jr. focuses upon three classic American types prevalent in the Pacific: the. imperialist, the missionary, and the romantic. Captain David Porter of the U.S. Navy, whose squadron sailed into Taiohae Bay during the War of 1812 and who claimed the islands for the U.S. government, was perhaps the first (but certainly not the last) American to seek to enhance his nation's power and prestige through territorial acquisition. The Reverend William Alexander, leader of the ill-fated Protestant mission to the islands in the 1830s spread the Word of Christ rather than that of his nation's government. And then there was Herman Melville, sometime sailor and beachcomber, who jumped ship while his vessel was anchored off Nukeheua Island in 1843; he later turned his island adventures into the novel *Typee.*

Fortunately, Melville was not the only one to leave a written record of his experiences. Porter published a description of his voyage and military exploits, and Alexander's reactions are preserved in his correspondence and in reports to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign

Missions. (Herbert also uses Charles Stewart's *A Visit to the South Seas* to supplement his discussion of the missionary perspective on the Marquesans.) The importance of these varied chronicles, Herbert argues, is the light they cast on social boundaries and on the interaction of cultures. Porter, Alexander, and Melville, for instance, all arrived in the islands with certain preconceptions about the host culture and especially about what constituted the civilized person and the savage. Yet civilization meant something different to each man, Herbert asserts. For Captain Porter, civilization "was that state of society in which superior practical achievements are displayed"; it could be achieved by simply mobilizing "human capabilities" to realize the "higher standards of achievement" (pp. 78-79). Things were not quite so simple for the missionaries, who did not share Porter's allegiance to the Enlightenment perspective. They came to the Pacific as "self-confessed emissaries of light and order" and dreamed of establishing a city upon a hill from which God would work his civilizing magic upon the benighted souls of the heathen (pp. 25-26). The romantic Melville offered still another viewpoint, "the vantage of a man viewing the peculiarities of both cultures from a tenuous position somewhat outside both" (p. 157). As such, his sense of what it was to be civilized did not lie within a "general design" (p. 158); unlike Porter and Alexander, Melville questioned whether civilization was in fact morally superior to savagery.

These varied perspectives shaped the way each man assessed his own actions and those of the Marquesans, shaping too the manner in which each justified his behavior on the islands. When their perceptions were challenged or confounded by events--as when the Marquesans failed to respond as predicted to the messages of the Enlightenment or of Calvinism--they usually fell back upon their original preconceptions, no matter how at odds with reality these might be. Herbert skillfully unravels these psychological tensions, and in this *Marquesan Encounters* provides a nice companion piece to Greg Dening's *Islands and Beaches.*

Melville is clearly the hero of this story, a man who sought not to advance civilization but to expose its barbarity. He found, as time passed, that the very concept of civilization was "coming to pieces in his hands" (p. 156). This disintegration, Herbert argues, led Melville to seek to alter America's sense of cultural superiority. *Typee* was thus a kind of missionary tract designed in part to stimulate a "moral reconstruction" (p. 181), a goal that twentieth century cultural relativists might applaud. But there is danger in such applause, for it drowns out discordant notes. One ought to remember, after all, that Melville came to the islands as a seaman, a role illustrative of broader American penetration and exploitation

of the Pacific (just as Tommo's sexual liaison with Fayaway in *Typee* put such things on a personal level). And Melville left the Marquesans with his (white) skin intact: not for him the full-body tattoos that would have indicated his rejection of "civilization." Nor, finally, was he any more immune to visions of American specialness and mission than were Porter and Alexander, as this passionate declaration from *White Jacket* reveals: "We Americans are the peculiar, Chosen people--the Israel of our times; we bear the ark of the Liberties of the World. . . . God has given us, for a future inheritance, the broad domains of the political pagans, that shall yet come and lie down under the shade of our ark." Herman Melville may have exposed some of the tensions within the nineteenth century concept of civilization, but he could not transcend them.

In *Marquesan Encounters,* Herbert boldly attempts an interdisciplinary analysis of the Americans' vivid reactions to Marquesan life. With varying degrees of success, he draws upon the insights of cultural anthropology, history, literary criticism, theology, and other scholarly disciplines. The cross-fertilization might have been more effective, however, had Herbert's prose not bordered on the opaque. His reliance upon the jargon of social science and structuralism often obscures the thrust of his argument and tends to reinforce the "territorial impulses" among scholars that Herbert would like to diminish. Interdisciplinary scholarship, in short ought to be intelligible to those in disparate disciplines. Still, this is a fascinating account of how some nineteenth century Americans who ventured into the Pacific were there forced to come to terms with their most deeply held beliefs and ideals.

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Gilbert H. Herdt, *Guardians of the Flutes: Idioms of Masculinity: A Study of Ritualized Homosexual Behavior.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981. Pp. xviii, 325, appendices, indexes. $17.95.

Anthropolgists have observed that in New Guinea the practice of male initiation, which is seen as making boys into men, is a means of establishing the cultural form of sexual differentiation and gender identity as well as the reinforcement of male group bonding. Reports of purifactory practices to remove a boy's pollution due to his birth and childhood association with women involved vomiting, bloodletting, penis cutting, and often deprivations and pain. Many such rites were abandoned, and some

field workers of the 1950s and 1960s believed that initiation rituals in their traditional forms might never be witnessed and recorded. As ethnographers have conducted research in remote areas only recently contacted, ritual practices and myths of initiation have been studied by several anthropologists.[1] The book reviewed here is concerned with the masculinization of youths through the stages of male initiation. The homosexual and ritual practices may be unique to the group Herdt refers to under the pseudonym of Sambia, but similar activities have been reported of other groups.

The study is remarkable in many ways. In fieldwork 1974-1976, Herdt gained access to the initiation ritual, including the secret myths and rites, men's idioms, interpretations and exegesis of the practices. His analysis and discussion is informed by contemporary anthropological and psychoanalytic theory and symbolic analysis: he discusses cultural, social, symbolic and psychological dimensions of these myths and rituals.

The culture, community, and social organization of this group of 2,000 people in the eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea are briefly described. Sweet potatoes and taro are cultivated, and hunting is an important male activity, providing most of the meat. In addition, wild vegetable food is gathered. They raise few domestic pigs and do not hold typically highlands ceremonial exchanges. Local and kinship groups are patrilineal and patrilocal, with the largest groups, phratries, claiming descent from a set of ancestral brothers. Settlements are hamlets; post-marital residence is in family houses, rather than separate men's and women's houses.

Boys reside in the men's house from about the age of seven; it is this separate life of youths during the long period of initiation, through adolescence to adulthood, that is the focus of Herdt's interest in the development of masculine idiom. From the largest political unit, a cluster of hamlets forming a confederacy, to the localized hamlets, the chief ritual activity which binds together this group of men is the initiation sequence. It makes the male age-mates an association with common experiences in the ritual and secret practices. The hamlet's ritual centers in the men's house which is the locale of male communal activities, myth telling, political and military affairs. Each men's house is a fortress, a defense against male enemies outside the community and pollution from women (who may not approach it) and children. Boys undergoing initiation are separated from younger boys and all women. Masculine values are developed here: the youth must identify with men whose ideal is a virile, strong and brave warrior. To become a man, to emulate the war leader and eventually the ritual elder, a boy must be rid of weakening elements which de-

rive from women; he must not become a “rubbish” man. This masculinization is achieved by initiation into the men’s secret society through a series of stages. Only a few of these are publicly marked.

Herdt makes masculinization by means of ritual initiation of males the central problem of his study. Around this theme he presents background information on the community, myth, and belief. One long chapter discusses the pandanus tree and its role as a feminine symbol. Game animals, especially possum and cassowary, have supernatural and sexual associations. The book discusses men’s views of male-female relations and attitudes in childhood and adult life.

The men’s idioms embody supernatural forces and beings which transcend the phenomenal world. Sambia distinguishes zones of garden, ham-’ let, and forest. In the division of labor, women grow tubers; men with penis cannot. Men’s activities center upon the forest and hunting. Men hunt marsupials to get meat for initiations. Birds and their plumes are used for male ornaments in ritual. The gender associations of birds, animals, and wild plants are a rich source of symbols and materials in initiation rituals. Thus, such associations as milk, semen and tree sap are explored and interpreted.

Herdt outlines the six initiation stages as marked by collective rites, individual rites, and progress towards full adult male- status as husband and father. Since infancy and early childhood (for boys as well as girls) centers upon the mother and family house, the removal of boys to the men’s house and initiation is crucial to masculinization. Initiation and residence in the men’s house is long, punctuated by rituals, defined by phases, elaborated with taboos. Forest substances, foods, and pigments, contribute to the growth and strength of initiates. The boys are subjected to ordeals such as blood-letting and made to ingest masculinizing substances of which the most important is the semen of their initiators. These homosexual practices are always private, between an unrelated man or bachelor youth and the initiate in the isolated forest lodge. Regular, frequent fellatio is essential to the attainment of manhood. The first two initiation stages when boys are seven to thirteen years old require the boy to ingest semen. When adolescence is attained at 14-16, in the next stage, the initiate’s semen is ingested by a younger youth. Infant betrothal is common. Bachelor youths of sixteen or so are married to preadolescent brides, in a group of two or more. Following marriage, the phases of initiation are individual. Then the newlywed man gives semen to his bride, first by fellatio. After she reaches menarche, the couple begins to cohabit in a family house, heterosexual intercourse is regularly practiced, and homosexual activities cease. Contamination by women continues to be dan-

gerous to men. They must avoid polluting contact with female fluids, especially menstrual blood. Menstrual and birth huts are used by women and avoided by men. Men force nosebleeds to purify themselves. In the myth of parthenogenesis, Herdt provides the key to understanding the origin of sexual differences and of sexuality. In this myth, a transsexual is made both male and female and gives birth.

This book will be of interest to anthropologists, psychologists and psychiatrists for the study of psychosexual development. Homosexual practices are prescribed and forced upon boys and youths as an essential preparation for heterosexual adulthood. Among this people, this sexual development is normal. They believe that semen ingested by a young wife practicing fellatio makes her strong. The semen is stored and later converted to milk. Thus, according to the men, life-giving and infant feeding capacities are both derived from male semen which is ingested by prepubescent youths of both sexes. Fellatio insemination, like mother's milk, induces growth. These practices are neither rare nor deviant here, and not expected to become sexual preferences beyond the growth period: adult heterosexuality is the norm. This has an important implication for the general theory of psychosexual development which claims that sexual orientations are formed early in life and are permanent.

In a good many New Guinea societies, anthropologists have recorded myths in which men, women, and their sexual differences, as we know them, did not exist. The ancestors are said to have been sexually unformed, incomplete, or possessing characteristics now exclusive to the other sex. Through the actions of an heroic ancestor, cutting, or forming sexual organs, and theft of sexual symbols, prohibited knowledge was gained and a transformation effected. Bamboo flutes in New Guinea are both secret instruments and sexual symbols. Secrecy now protects men's possession of knowledge and power. In Sambia, the cult practices themselves reinforce this exclusive male control.

We also know from many ethnographic studies that New Guinea male cults have been greatly modified--the painful and bizarre is often reduced to mimicking, or initiations are eliminated altogether. In some cases, there may have been an effort to conceal the practices believed to be condemned by Europeans; but the male cult was also devalued by the people--it did not fit into their pacified and modernizing mode. Recent events have sometimes revived such discarded initiation rites. Certainly warfare demands men who are warriors; if initiation prepares them, it may again be vital to society's continuity. By the same analysis, cannibalism in some New Guinea societies was a vital part of ritual life, warfare, mortuary, or other practices. When these practices are abandoned or con-

cealed from inquiring outsiders ethnographic studies are unable to describe them. Thus, we have only a few ethnographic studies that discuss these beliefs and practices. Herdt's study is the most complete so far on male masculinization development.

This fascinating book tells us a great deal about its subject, yet in the full elaboration of its theme it is often repetitious. But it does not provide all of the information that might elucidate some aspects of initiation and masculine identity. We are not given examples of initiation instruction; this is planned for another book. The connection between spirit familiars--acquired in youth--masculinity, hunting, and war success are not fully discussed. The link between masculinization, group relations and warfare is intriguing because a non-relative member of a potentially hostile, marriageable group is a boy's homosexual initiating partner. Semen, the prime masculine substance, is given to boys by potential enemies in order to make them strong male warriors; semen is similarly given by husbands to wives from these groups who will bear their offspring. The boys, made men, use their masculine substance to create sons who are potential enemies of the initiators. Yet the particular or continuing relations between these sexual partners and their implication for inter-community relations are not discussed.

Herdt calls the people "prudish," which I take to mean sexually modest, conducting sexual activity in private, and speaking little of sexual matters. His accomplishment in the field is highly exceptional. However, he could not work closely with women and presents essentially men's views. Anthropological method in New Guinea has usually involved a fieldworker in long-term community residence, close involvement with a local group and observation--if not participation--in local affairs. Even after a year or more, language acquisition and facility have varied from fair fluency to almost total reliance on Neo-Melanesian and interpreters. Herdt attained the former, and his field technique seems to have concentrated upon discussion and recording statements and responses to his questions. In the book he provides quotations in English, with traces of Neo-Melanesian and words of "Sambia," but the original language and context of these statements is rarely provided. While providing fictional group, local and personal names, Herdt uses many vernacular words, which would surely make a linguistic identification of Sambia possible.

The book contains little descriptive and observed material. Every section after the introductory chapters contains many statements quoted from informants, and Herdt's exegesis of metaphor, idiom, belief, and fantasy. We are not, however, given much information about his field procedure. Were these private or public conversations? Because of the secre-

cy, prudishness, and nature of the subject, we are forced to rely upon Herdt's interpretation.

The book is very heavily footnoted (up to sixty notes per chapter), with additional observations, information, and often comparative material from other writings. It seems as though these addenda occurred to Herdt after the book was completed. Some of them explain or add new interpretations to the text; the result is almost an excess of material, rarely contradictory but frequently uncoordinated. On page 173, for example, the discussion of men's views about women's adolescence and sexual organs, includes parenthetic statements and a footnote, partly repeating and adding new information. A more coherent work would result from better organization and incorporation of this material.

Many elements, idioms, and other characteristics discussed by Herdt are also mentioned by other anthropologists discussing New Guinea peoples--especially where initiation ritual was practiced. Are the differences or the emphasis due to real cultural dissimilarities, the author's interests, concealment by people of certain practices, change since contact? This is the reader's dilemma. Although more and more books are published, some questions are even farther from being resolved. For example, the belief that conception and birth are primarily due to man's semen merging with woman's blood has very often been reported. Is the way that this is stated the result of the anthropologist's mode of inquiry, the particular informants consulted, the language used, or the final phrasing of the writer?

This study and others suggest that some interesting distributional complexes are beginning to emerge in the highlands, linking rituals, concepts of growth and sexual maturity and intersexual relations. In the central and western highlands where sweet potatoes dominate, large pig feasts and ceremonial exchange flourish, initiation is a small, single ceremony introducing boys to the secrecy of the flutes (as in Chimbu and Kuma) with minor ordeals. Some men's cults (in Enga and Hagen, for example) protect men against the contaminating dangers of contact with women. Pork fat is associated with semen and fecundity. It is applied to men's skin to make it glisten, a sign of health, the opposite of the depleted shriveled skin of a rubbish man who has spent too much time with women. There are important: differences within the highlands as Meggitt (1964) pointed out. However, a great contrast is evident between these large groups and the small-scale communities of the highland "fringe" to the east, west and south of the large valleys. Among these peoples, subsistence is based upon a combination of cultivated tubers and wild food: men hunt, few pigs are kept, and the large feasts are absent. These societies have long, elaborate, graded male initiation sequences requiring game and special foods, which

stress male maturity. In this category I tentatively include with "Sambia" the Anga, Baruya, Bimin-Kuskusmin and Baktaman. Peoples of the Papua plateau, similar in some ways, evidently have less elaborate initiation cycles. The eastern highlands peoples apparently practice violent, harsh initiation and sexual antagonism (Read 1954). Yet their society seems in some ways intermediate, for they depend mainly upon cultivated sweet potatoes for sustenance and raise pigs for feasts although the scale of these feasts does not match that of the central and western highlanders. And neither do initiations occupy youths for long periods, or require extensive special game meat and food supplies.

In all of these societies, ritual and instruction prepare youths to become warriors and fathers. Men and women usually live in separate houses or quarters, and contact with childbearing and menstruating women is avoided by men. There is overall a sharp separation of the sexes in domestic and public activities, domination by men in ceremony and exchange, and occasionally ritualized expressions of sexual antagonism and anxiety by men over contamination or depletion through sexual contact with women,

There are surely important differences in initiation ceremonies, the most obvious being the phases and importance of male seclusion and secrecy as compared with the public phases where women and children observe or participate. Nevertheless, there is usually one tribe or community and one anthropologist to tell us about it. Very few studies tell of the views of both women and men. While convinced of the truth of the report, we can still never be sure that this is all there is to say, or if another observer might not show us other facets of the truth.

Is the homosexual practice the dominating experience and theme of initiation in Sambia or elsewhere? Time, place and ethnographer remain unique and untestable when such information contained in *Guardians of the Flutes* is the subject of study.

NOTES

1. The connection between initiation and male bonding in Melanesian patrilineal societies was discussed by Allen (1967) when New Guinea highland societies were still little known. Following the well-known work of Read (1965) and Strathern's review (1970) there was until recently little observation of male initiation in New Guinea. However, Herdt is editing a group of papers on male initiation. Some recent studies of New Guinea in which male initiation is discussed are also listed below.

Allen, M., 1967, *Male Cults and Secret Initiations in Melanesia.*
Barth, F., 1975, *Ritual and Knowledge Among the Baktaman of New Guinea.*

Cell, A., 1975, *Metamorphosis of the Cassowaries.*
Herdt, G., 1982 (ed.). *Rituals of Manhood* (forthcoming).
Kelly, R., 1977, *Etoro Social Structure.*
Lewis, G., 1980, *Day of Shining Red.*
Meggitt, M. J., 1964, "Male-female Relationships in the Highlands of Australian New Guinea," in *New Guinea: the Central Highlands.* Edited by J. B. Watson. *American Anthropologist* 66:204-44.
Read, K. E., 1954, "Cultures of the Central Highlands." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 10:1-43.
Read, K. E., 1965, *The High Valley.*
Schieffelin, E. L., 1976, *The Sorrow of the Lonely and the Burning of the Dancers.*
Strathern, A., 1970, *Male initiation in New Guinea Highlands Societies, Ethnology IX,* 373-79.
Tuzin, D., 1980, *The Voice of the Tambaran.*

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Brett Hilder, *The Voyage of Torres.* Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1980. Pp. xx, 194, appendices, annotated bibliography, illustrations, charts, index. A $17.95.

The bicentennial of Captain Cook's discovery of the eastern coast of Australia in 1770 and the forthcoming bicentennial of the British settlement which was to become Sydney (1788) has stimulated research in Pacific history, reviving claims that the Portuguese, the Spaniards, and others had discovered Australia. In *The Captain Cook Myth,* Jilian Robertson contends that credit should be given to William Dampier rather than to Cook and others. In *The Secret Discovery of Australia* (1977), K. G. McIntyre attempts to demonstrate that the Portuguese not only sighted the western coast of Australia before any other Europeans--which is very likely since they often came to present-day Indonesia for spices--but also its eastern coast, and this long before Captain Cook. The claim is upheld by Hilder. It is common knowledge that the Spaniards discovered Torres Strait in 1606: the Dutch missed it by a narrow margin. But there is disagreement as to the course of their vessels. Did they sight the north of the eastern coast of Australia? According to Hilder, a captain and a master very familiar with the Strait of Torres, they did.

Luis Vaéz de Torres was under the command of Pedro Fernández de Quirós whose fleet sailed from Peru in 1605. The ships reached Espíritu

Santo in the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) but they became separated on leaving the island. The flagship, with Quirós aboard, returned to the Americas while the other two units of the fleet, under the command of Torres, continued the voyage and passed through what was to become the Torres Strait. Hilder explains that because of a bank which Torres called *placel*, extending between New Guinea and Australia, there are only very few passages. It used to be assumed that Torres had taken a northern passage and sailed close to New Guinea. According to Hilder's research, he first tried to cross the *placel* in the middle of the strait, but had to turn back. He finally found the passage, now called Endeavour Strait after Cook's vessel, and sailed for two days off Cape York, the peninsula which terminates the eastern coast of Australia in the north.

Hilder, who died recently, acknowledges his debt to the late Father Celsus Kelly O.F.M. In his *Calendar of Documents* (p. 214) Kelly mentions the omission of two lines, which are in the original of Torres' letter to the king of Spain, in the text published by H. N. Stevens in *New Light on the Discovery of Australia* (1930) which up to now has been the main source for studies of Torres' voyage. Using charts from the Royal Australian Navy Captain, Hilder has followed step by step the most likely course taken by Torres. In his recently published book, *The Spanish Lake*, O. H. K. Spate writes that Hilder's careful examination of documents, in particular the maps drawn by Diego de Prado y Tovar, who was with Torres, and his navigational knowledge as a seaman, leave little doubt that Australia was sighted by the Spaniards in 1606.

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Ian Howie-Willis, *A Thousand Graduates: Conflict in University Development in Papua New Guinea, 1961-1976*. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980. Pp. xix, 362, Paperback $12.95.

Many professional men and women who gained their educations at public schools now send their children to private institutions. This fact has taught some of us about the systemic nature of formal education, particularly those of us who teach at elite, private colleges. We are aware that our progeny could neither attend nor succeed at the colleges in which we teach if they had spent their formative years studying at the same schools we attended some twenty years before they were born. We could find it

difficult to pay tuition at these private colleges and would probably find assistance in the form of scholarships difficult to come by. Moreover, our children might find themselves underprepared since elementary and secondary public schools have become less adequate than they were when we were young. Now that President Reagan has promised tax credits to those of us who send our children to private or parochial schools, it seems inevitable that the quality of public education will decline even further, allowing fewer and fewer poorer children entry into the educational elite, a process that can only eventuate, as I see it, in the rich getting progressively richer.

The systemic relationship between money, political processes, social values and education is even more complex in countries like Papua New Guinea, where an industrialized nation--in this case Australia--has been empowered to create an educational system for the colonized. In America, access to education indicates periods of socioeconomic fluidity, as the marketplace incorporates individuals into, or rejects them from, middle and upper management positions. In Papua New Guinea, the educational system imposed by Australian administrators has been responsible for creating class distinctions within a system that has been characterized by essentially impermanent differences in status and power: A big man's son did not generally follow in his father's footsteps; an educated bureaucrat's son probably will.

Ian Howie-Willis' *A Thousand Graduates* describes the formation of an indigenous elite in Papua New Guinea. He says:

> Black's economic value to white business enterprise, with prejudice, government paternalism and acquiescence, and particularistic mission attitudes--all served to inhibit the creation of a comprehensive system of education. Given the combined weight of such pressures, it is perhaps surprising that any Papua New Guineans should have received post-primary, let alone higher education. Yet a considerable number did, and with them a new social element had clearly emerged by the end of the 1930s. . . . Education, training, and general acculturation were clearly opening horizontal cleavages within the Papua New Guinean community . . . [and] many Papua New Guineans were becoming "upper class" through post-primary training (1980: 15).

Although Howie-Willis is convinced that the formation of this "upper class" was necessary for Papua New Guinea to become a self-determining and independent nation, his book, a descriptive history of university de-

velopment in Papua New Guinea between 1961 and 1976, does not sufficiently deal with the systemic implications of the process of class formation. In other words, Howie-Willis tells us everything we might ever want to know about the history of Papua New Guinea's universities, but fails to provide us with a convincing interpretation of that history.

This is not to suggest that the book is valueless. On the contrary Howie-Willis presents his data in a clear and readable manner, making it possible for us to use this information easily in creating the social analysis that is missing from the book. He describes, for example, two periods in the history of Papua New Guinean universities, the first preceding their establishment as institutions, and the second following upon their incorporation within the indigenous bureaucratic organization that they helped to create. In doing so, he provides us with a wealth of information about the personalities, programs, and policies that affected educational development. But what is more interesting to me, as someone who is not an historian of educational institutions, but who is interested in historical processes, is the difference between the consequences and the causes of change. The founders of Papua New Guinea's universities, responding to complex economic, political and social pressures, never anticipated that their successes in developing an indigenous elite would come to threaten the autonomy and independence of the universities that had made this elite possible. Says Howie-Willis:

> Cabinet Ministers and senior bureaucrats were dissatisfied with the performance of the universities. Student strikes, staff trade unionism, free-wheeling criticisms of government leaders, and periodic on-campus ructions which gained media notoriety for the universities, all helped foster a "relationship of antagonism" between them and the government. . . . These were ominous portents for the universities: increasing government surveillance of their educational effort plus a hard financial policy added up to a loss of the independence their founders had sought to guarantee and which their successive heads had struggled to retain (1980:308).

Howie-Willis documents this disjunction between consequence and cause but adopts what might best be called the theoretical equivalent of laissez-faire economics. He concludes his book by predicting that:

> Conflict would probably continue to be a part of the university system in Papua New Guinea. . . . In all probability the univer-

> sities in Papua New Guinea seemed certain to remain, like those in Africa, "a hotbed of conflicts wrapped in the deceptively serene-looking shell of a palm-shaded Oxbridge." And so, short of closing them down, government would probably never find them much less difficult to live with (1980:344).

This abdication of theoretical responsibility strikes me as having significant social implications. If an historian of educational institutions as new as those found in Papua New Guinea cannot adequately explain why conflicts plague the universities there, how can we hope to resolve similar problems of educational opportunity, faced as we are with budget cuts and an entrenched elite?

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William J. Hudson, *Australia and the League of Nations.* Sydney, New South Wales: Sydney University Press, 1980. Pp. ix, 224, bibliography, index. $20.00

A book about Australia and the League of Nations is intrinsically unlikely to be of great interest to students of either. It obviously cannot tell one much about the League, and it can hardly deal other than marginally with the evolution of Australian foreign policy. The relationship was neither close nor rewarding for either party. Australia was indeed a member of the world organization in good standing and paid its dues regularly. But: it was far too small a fish in the international ocean to have any real influence on League policy. And the League tended to be viewed by Australian decision-makers not so much as a guarantor of world order but as a positive danger to their own security, to the extent that it distracted the British from the more urgent concerns of imperial defense in the Pacific.

It must also be admitted that Dr. Hudson seems to have taken extraordinary pains to ensure that such useful information and insights as the book does undoubtedly contain should not be too easily accessible to the reader. His resolutely thematic division into separate chapters on "Peace Through Force," "Peace Through Disarmament," "Peace Through Law," etc., acts as a double deterrent in this regard. In the first place, it necessarily tends to tedious repetition, as the reader is compelled to traverse the same area over and over again, albeit from different directions. Far more seriously, it positively obscures any elements of continuity or even

discontinuity in the attitudes of either Geneva or Canberra. Nor is this the only respect in which Dr. Hudson is less than helpful to the reader. His analysis of the Manchurian imbroglio on pages 67-68 would have been even more stimulating if he had explained exactly how the parties to the dispute are supposed to relate to his categories A, B and C. His use of sources is also puzzling. It would be difficult to justify the use of Elizabeth Wiskemann as a footnote even in a more comprehensively documented study than this. And even a select bibliography ought to have included some of the more recent and comprehensively documented works in this general area, such as Carolyn A. O'Brien's writings on Australia and regional defense and D. G. Carmichael's on Australia and the Italo-Abyssinian War, rather than some of the pre-war secondary sources listed here.

It is nonetheless the fact that almost anything of Dr. Hudson's is worth reading, simply because of the intellectual integrity and downright sound sense that he brings to the study even of topics of such decidedly marginal interest as this one. It is well worth being reminded, for example, that "It is a frequent inconvenience that political events do not follow textbook models or ideological simplicities" (p. 67); that "What failed was not the League but the League idea" (p. 3); that the term "Commonwealth of Australia" is about as meaningful in any practical sense as "Commonwealth of Massachusetts" (p. 9); and that the already academic quibble over whether Australia could rightfully be said to have had a foreign policy before the establishment of independent overseas diplomatic representation in 1940 is pure pettifoggery, because "Australia engaged in international diplomacy before she achieved full sovereign national status and the usual institutional trappings of diplomacy" (p. 15). Even Dr. Hudson's half or three-quarter-truths are worth pondering, as with his assertion on page 4 that Australian international attitudes reflect a quality of "pragmatism detached to an unusual degree from ideological or moral considerations." This is embarrassingly true on the face of it, but it is clearly not the whole truth. Nobody could deny the ideological element in the attitudes toward the United States or the Labor Government of E. Gough Whitlam in 1972-73. And Dr. Hudson admits that Australians were influenced by ideological considerations in their attitudes toward the Spanish Civil War. But it would be wholly wrong to ignore the ideological foundations of Australian attitudes toward the world outside throughout the whole period reviewed in Dr. Hudson's book. Racism as embodied in the concept of "White Australia" might not be a very refreshing or intellectually respectable system of values, but it is nonetheless an ideology in any sense of the word, and it was fundamental to Australian external

and indeed internal attitudes. Nor could one really dismiss the general apparatus of British Empire patriotism as being with-out practical relevance in the 1930s. Ideologies are nonetheless influential for being unarticulated or inadequately articulated. Ostensible Australian pragmatism sometimes reflects nothing more subtle than a preoccupation with the "fast buck" and "doing things on the cheap." It can also reflect a genuine and anguished uncertainty about first principles and their appropriate application and then, as Carolyn O'Brien has pointed out, it can be very subtle and complex indeed.

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Edwin Hutchins, *Culture and Inference.* Cognitive Science Series, 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. x, 143. $14.00.

This is an intriguing little book in which Edwin Hutchins attempts to delineate how Trobriand islanders "go about knowing what they know" such that they can use their knowledge. His success depends on recognizing the importance of inference as a cognitive process and upon a parsimonious, explicit method for identifying and representing that process *in the natural setting of human interaction.* After a brief discussion of inference as a universal (but transparent) cognitive process, he demonstrates its importance using data on Trobriand land disputes. He describes the Trobriand land tenure system and then presents a model for representing the kinds of inferences that are possible within that system. Applying the model to one of three recorded land disputes, he presents the text of the dispute hearing with an analysis of each inference embedded in the text. He carefully differentiates claims based on strong inferences from those based on weak (plausible, sensible) inferences, showing how counter-argument strategies exploit these differences and effect the outcome of the hearing. In a terse conclusion, Hutchins assesses the implications of inference for issues such as reconstructing abbreviated discourse, imputing motives, expectations and their violation, for example, as inherent in thinking about culture as code.

This is an important book for Pacific scholars and for those interested in culture theory. Not only does it answer questions that Malinowski left dangling, but it is also of comparative significance for the large literature cm land tenure and dispute management in Oceania. Most of all, this is an important work for culture and cognitive theory and method, demonstrat-

ing that current work in artificial intelligence provides useful methods for discovering and representing those implicit assumptions by which people shape their perceptions and responses to them. The demonstration is accomplished clearly and with refreshing verbal economy.

The book is too short, leaving important questions unanswered. It would be useful to know how the method for representing inference was derived and the extent to which the interviews on the land disputes served to formulate the method or vice-versa. The case presented is the simplest of three cases in order to demonstrate the utility of representing the logic of inference. Do the other cases involve simply more information to process, or do they add a second logical schema and, thus, a second level of complexity? My feeling after reading the book is, "I read it, and I liked it. But you still owe me one."

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Jesse D. Jennings, ed. *The Prehistory of Polynesia.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. 399, illustrations, maps, glossary, contributors, index. $35.00.

The growth of archaeology in the South Pacific in the last 30 years can now be seen as one of the major developments in world archaeology. This is due not only to the intrinsic importance of the evidence, but also to the way archaeologists in the area deal with it. They continually stress the integral links the archaeology of this region possesses with other branches of anthropology, both empirically and at appropriate levels of interpretation. In helping to chronicle the history of human settlement in the great archipelagoes of the Southern Hemisphere, Pacific archaeologists, by their holistic approach, are also assisting to redress the long-standing North/South imbalance in the study of prehistory. A university department of archaeology which, in its teaching, ignores this development, leaves its students conceptually much the poorer.

Until 1978, however, it was very difficult to teach Pacific prehistory satisfactorily, especially at a distance, because of the lack of a good general literature. Peter Bellwood changed that with the publication in 1978 of his duet, *The Polynesians: Prehistory of an Island People* and *Man's Conquest of the Pacific.* Since then *The Prehistory of Polynesia* has appeared, to provide a third text which slots neatly in size and scope between Bellwood's works.

This is a very useful book. Jennings must be congratulated for marshalling thirteen authors, each a well-known specialist within the general field, to produce between them fifteen chapters on either the prehistory of particular islands or island groups, or wider, related topics. Some of the chapters are very good indeed. The whole, to which the editor provides introduction and epilogue, hangs together in a thematic sense rather better than such joint efforts often do. It is well produced by Harvard. My own students, accustomed to those rather dreary dry-as-dust introductory texts so beloved by some publishers these days, use the book with pleasure. Of the fifteen chapters, seven are devoted to island surveys covering Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, the Marquesas, Easter Island, Hawaii, the Society Islands, and New Zealand (as a matter of editorial policy the Outliers and islands such as the Chathams get only incidental reference). This is balanced by eight chapters on more general topics, which one can only baldly list: the Oceanic context, Lapita, Language, Physical Anthropology, Subsistence and Ecology, Settlement Patterns, and Voyaging. There is an end-piece on Melanesia. Obviously, some papers stand out from a general high standard of writing. I liked especially Green's examination of the Lapita complex, which has a detailed survey of the evidence, island by island. Equally clear is Frost's demonstration on just how much we do, and do not, know about Fijian archaeology, and how important it has now become that: the position be clarified. In a similar vein, Tuggle has presented the first clear overview of the Hawaiian evidence, which goes nicely with Finney's piece on Polynesian voyaging--the latter writing with his usual verve on the saga of the experimental voyage of the *Hokule'a* in 1976. It was an excellent idea to conclude with White writing on the prehistory of Melanesia, Australia and Indonesia in relation to current interpretations of the Polynesian evidence. His treatment is less even-handed than the one adopted by Bellwood in the latter's review of "the Oceanic context." As White puts it: "The problem we face is a constant one in Pacific prehistory: that of trying to understand how much the culture and people of any area or island derive from migration and diffusion, and how much they are the result of local developments from a similar base" (p. 373). Much of this book comprises variations, enigmatic or otherwise, on this theme.

The book has some negative features which stand out the more clearly because of its many virtues. I wish that the editor had been more forthright in pointing up problems and suggesting a general strategy for future research. There is also a certain air of suavity in some of the writing which could inhibit the student from turning to the primary references for the detailed evidence. And, on the subject of references within the text--

could they not have been fuller? Time and again the reader is referred only to author and year of publication, whatever the relevance of the reference. On page 299 I was referred to the *whole* of volume 1 of Malinowski's *Coral Gardens and their Magic* (500 pages) for possible ethnographic parallels in Melanesian yam storehouses to the Vaitootia (Huahine) storage house. I had a very happy hour with Malinowski, but other readers may not have the time for such pleasures.

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R. E. Johannes, *Words of the Lagoon: Fishing and Marine Lore in the Palau District of Micronesia.* Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 245, illustrations, appendices, glossaries, bibliography, index. $24.95.

There is much to admire in this book, and you need not be a fisherman to do so. The author, a marine biologist, perceived that the most knowledgeable individuals about fish were those who sought them and whose understanding stemmed from this consuming pursuit. In particular, he was interested in the understanding of fish and fish behavior by the traditional fishermen of the Pacific who have for centuries preyed upon their quarry with spear, trap, net, hook, and poison. He knew, too, that the old men who possessed this lore--this product of scores of years of practical experience--were dying out. And their sons and grandsons were not enthusiastic about traditional fishing practices. Moreover, nobody was asking the old men to share what they knew. Johannes decided to ask.

He chose as the site of his investigation the Palau Islands of Micronesia, an archipelago of nearly 350 islands and islets that stretches roughly north and south between 7 and 8 degrees north of the equator. The reefs and lagoons that surround it possess one of the richest and most diverse marine environments in the world. Equally appealing was the fact that Palauan fishermen have long been recognized as exceptional, perhaps the most knowledgeable in all of Micronesia.

In the recent past a number of bridges have been built between disciplines so as to better understand certain phenomena. Johannes concluded that students of ethnobiology in Oceania had for the most part laid their emphasis upon terrestrial ecology, ignoring the rich potential of the study of tropical marine ecosystems. It was time, he decided, to heed the

urging of Charles Nordhoff who two generations ago made the point that the knowledge of native fishermen should be plumbed by Western investigators. Nordhoff was talking about Tahiti, but his point was equally valid for Palau where the profusion of marine organisms and environments is truly remarkable. It is estimated, for example, that there are about a thousand fish species in Palauan waters. Johannes points out that this is several hundred more than have been recorded along the entire Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific coasts of Canada.

In 1974, when Johannes arrived in Palau to conduct his research, more than sixty percent of the population of the Palau district lived in the urban center of Koror. As is true in so many other Pacific communities, people placed greater reliance on imported food than on that produced locally. Now, seven years later, the trend continues. Nearby waters are overfished, employed individuals have limited time to fish, boats are in short supply, and, more important, fishing is not thought of as a prestige occupation. Consequently, most people rely on canned mackerel from Japan. The author elaborates on this theme in a brief epilogue.

In the Pacific of today, he says, knowledge about fishing is disappearing. So is the knowledge, he adds, that is related to farming, hunting, medicine, and navigation. This is because the younger members of society are simply not interested. To them, it is no longer useful knowledge. Johannes believes this attitude could have disastrous effects on the islands and their people.

The continued and growing reliance on imported food, energy, and technology constitutes a threat to island welfare. Island market economies that are heavily dependent upon foreign investment capital, subsidies from metropolitan countries, and tourism may not be able to survive the changes in the international climate that some believe are inevitable. The islanders are not in charge of their own destiny as once was true when they were self-sufficient. To regain this state of affairs, traditional knowledge cannot be lost. Johannes does not see his book as insurance against a future in which economic depression in the world would force a return to older island values and exploitive practices. He points out that the retention of the vast body of lore connected with any significant feature of culture like fishing needs to be transmitted from generation to generation through enculturative processes. He is probably right. But what his book can do is help convince some members of the younger generation that there is a. cultural life preserver at hand if they will but grasp it before all of the knowledgeable elders are gone.

Johannes collected material for this book over a period of sixteen months. He settled in the traditional community of Ngeremlengui on the

west coast of the island of Babeldaob. There he encountered a master fisherman named Ngiraklang, a man of eighty years, who had consciously set out early in life to be what he became. The old man's knowledge was broadly recognized by others throughout Palau.

From Ngeremlengui the author traveled widely in the District, asking questions of more than sixty fishermen besides Ngiraklang. He double-checked answers, observed fish and fishermen, tried out techniques himself. He even carried out some laboratory work on certain species upon which he also reports.

At one point Johannes went to Tobi, one of several small islands southwest of Palau where the people have a language and culture different from those of Palau. They, too, have a long association with the sea and its denizens. The book includes a chapter on fishing in the South West Islands, co-authored by P. W. Black, an anthropologist who has studied fishing in Tobi. Johannes later speaks of the area again in a chapter about ocean currents and in another devoted to fishhooks. One of the two glossaries offered is of Tobian words, the other of Palauan.

Johannes' style is deliberately non-technical, a shift from his usual treatment. He wanted to reach a broader audience and recognized that the technical jargon of most scientists makes their writing "nearly incomprehensible to all but colleagues." He is correct in this. Fortunately, much of what he says will interest other professionals as well as lay readers.

In addition to those mentioned above, the book has chapters on Palauan fishing methods, the rhythms of fish and fishermen, seabirds as fish-finders, the decline of the traditional conservation ethic, improving fisheries, and native names for fishes.

After a short section of photographs of fishing scenes and paraphernalia, there is a delightful chapter entitled "The Arboreal Octopus." If you doubt that octopuses climb trees or attack sharks, you should read this section. It also explains about bleary-eyed fish, blood as a tranquilizer, vacuum-like sharks, poison-breathing sea snakes, spitting fish, fish-killing rain, eel-killing fish, acrobatic swimming as an aid to birthing, and "mobbing" by tuna who kill collectively.

There is an appendix on fish reproduction, spawning, seasonal migrations, and good fishing days. And a short one devoted to crustaceans. Still a third deals with Tobian fishhooks. It has many simple line drawings that aid the reader greatly.

This is a valuable book for marine biologists, anthropologists, and local people. It grew out of a deep conviction that a valuable source of knowl-

edge was both unnoticed and unexploited and that the time to tap it was overdue. Johannes has made his point and well.

A number of years ago Marston Bates remarked that for the most part fish do not mind being watched. Evidently neither do fishermen. And Bob Johannes is a good watcher of both.

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Roger M. Keesing and Peter Corris, *Lightning Meets the West Wind; The Malaita Massacre.* Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. xv, 219, maps, illustrations, index. $28.00.

A band of Melanesian Kwaio Warriors armed with clubs, axes, ‘spears and obsolete Victorian firearms rebelled against the British Empire at Sinalagu Harbor on Malaita Island in the southwestern Pacific in October 1927. Inspired and directed by a local war leader named Basiana, they killed the British Solomon Islands Protectorate government’s District Officer for Malaita (a colonial civil servant named William Robert Bell), his English cadet assistant, and thirteen of their Melanesian police constables and servants. Basiana was an influential clan elder--then in his mature adult prime--a successful and feared hired killer (the bounty hunter was a formally recognized leadership role in Malaitan societies), and a respected military commander. He conceived, planned, organized, and led the attack; and he used his eloquence and guile to induce his sometimes reluctant relatives and neighbors to carry out his hostile intentions. Bell was a hardy and athletic Australian stockman and rancher, a Boer War veteran who had earned a battlefield commission in South Africa, a self-educated accountant and islands trader, and a firm administrator with a fondness for the frontier conditions prevailing in the South Pacific. During the twelve years he governed Malaita and served as its magistrate, he diligently exercised British authority with a surprising degree of understanding of and sympathy for His Majesty’s Melanesian subjects. He had almost single-handedly pacified the island, using his courage, vigor, self-discipline, self-confidence, and bravado to suppress chronic feuding and warfare, arrest and punish violators, impound firearms, and collect taxes. Basiana himself struck the blow that killed Bell.

In the five months that followed the uprising, a British punitive expedition composed of a naval landing party from an Australian cruiser, a

booze-swilling militia of local white colonial expatriates, and a substantial volunteer force of northern Malaita tribesmen (eager for traditional vengeance and armed adventure) retaliated by hunting down and killing at least fifty-five of the Kwaio people. Dozens more died from the exposure, famine, and the cultural or spiritual deprivation that ensued. They arrested over two-hundred Kwaio men as suspected co-conspirators, and six (including Basiana) were eventually convicted of murder and hanged or imprisoned.

Forty years later (when the authors and the reviewer were separately doing ethnographic or ethnohistorical fieldwork in Malaita) the events of 1927-28 had become part of Solomon Islands mythology. Throughout the Solomons, both Melanesians and white expatriates remembered the "Malaita Massacre" as the most salient incident of the colonial era. There were folktales and legends about Bell and Basiana, and classic oral epics celebrated their confrontation and its consequences. Both Basiana and Bell had acquired larger-than-life dimensions; and Bell in particular was remembered in an unexpectedly favorable light in stories stressing his strength, courage, resolution, vitality, virility, fairness and wisdom. Yesterday's enemies had mellowed with age.

Anthropologist Roger Keesing and historian Peter Corris have pooled their talents and social scientific methods to write a book about the confrontation between Basiana and Bell, between Melanesia and European civilization, that culminated in the battle at Sinalagu. Like all literary and social scientific endeavors, this book has both strong and weak points; but on the whole, its virtues outweigh its defects.

Their methodological collaboration is interesting and promising. The dual approach to a single set of circumstances and events yields more insights than either discipline could provide alone. As an historian, Corris had access to (and knew how to use) the archives, correspondence files, official memoranda, and personal journals pertaining to the subject. He supplemented these sources by interviewing survivors, both white and Melanesian. As an anthropologist, Keesing could draw upon his ethnographic familiarity with the Kwaio people and their vernacular language. He supplemented this knowledge through personal acquaintances with survivors, eyewitnesses, and heirs of the principals. The result is superb ethnohistory that presents a balanced account of what happened back then, expressing the issues and the perspectives of both sides involved in the controversy.

Their book renders the particularly valuable service of presenting the Kwaio view of the incident: that the attack on District Officer Bell was a political act of rebellion or revolt, a last-ditch defiant (but nationalistic)

defense of the Kwaio way of life, rather than simply an isolated barbarous attack against British colonial rule. Keesing and Corris also examine the complexity of motives on both sides. Bell and the government wanted to collect taxes, confiscate firearms, and uphold a somewhat racist British authority, to be sure. But they also sought pacification, civil order, and justice, Similarly, Basiana and his cohorts fought to protect Kwaio customs and independence, but their proto-nationalist altruism was alloyed with elements of ambition and vengeance that grew from purely local and internal Kwaio roots. Bell quarreled with both his white administrative superiors and the Malaitans whom he governed; and he sought to increase his own influence and status, while he carried out British policy and dispensed justice. Basiana resented British rule and struggled with his Kwaio rivals; and he sought to enhance his own traditional status and reputation while he led the opposition to British imperial encroachment. The essential, noble but flawed human nature of both sides comes out clearly.

Finally, the subject matter itself (the "showdown" between strong men) and the literary craft of the authors create a tragic drama. In the Keesing and Corris book, both the Kwaio people and the British Administration move toward confrontation and disaster with the inexorable, inevitable sense of destiny that has marked classical tragedy since the days of Aeschylus and Sophocles. The motives were complex and mixed, misunderstandings were manifold and repeated, and the principals feared but respected each other; but neither side could avoid the collision of cultures and polities, and too many worthy or innocent people suffered and died. Fate had its way.

The most serious shortcomings of the Keesing and Corris book are its tendency toward cryptic (or even hermetic) allusions and its sometimes elliptical or disjointed presentation of cultural data. For a cardinal example, the names and nicknames of the protagonists, certain Malaita metaphors, and the title of the book itself all mean something but only to a specialist who is familiar with the cultures and languages of Malaita. Basiana is a variant of *basi,* a common Malaitan word for the bow and arrow (a traditional pre-contact weapon) or an archer. Bell (or more precisely the derivative form *belo*) is used in Solomon Islands pidgin; and it connotes for obvious reasons churches and schools, which are post-contact institutions attributable to missionary influences. District Officer Bell, the local exemplar and forceful agent of western civilization, the man who came from the British headquarters of Tulagi and Auki (lying to the west of the Kwaio territory), earned the Malaita nickname *Koburu;* which is the Malaitan name for the northwestern storm wind that periodically brings thunderstorms, lightning, heavy rains and high winds to Malaita. And the

rifles (the proximate cause of the struggle between Bell and Basiana) are called *kwanga,* the general Malaitan term for thunder and lightning. Keesing and Corris, however, do not discuss this highly significant play upon words or its relevance to the title they chose for their book until quite late in the story. The association of Bell with the west wind is finally mentioned on page 92, and the metaphor identifying rifles with lightning finally appears on page 117. The public that will read this book is probably sophisticated enough to follow such linguistic or literary reasoning; and if the authors had shared this information sooner, the audience might appreciate their cleverness more.

Likewise, much of the ethnographic data requires readers to read between the lines because it tacitly assumes that they already have some knowledge of the peoples and cultures of Melanesia in general and of the Solomon Islands in particular. A more concise and better organized presentation of Kwaio culture, religious beliefs, and social organization (one precisely aimed at explicating the events of 1927-28) would have helped readers comprehend and interpret Kwaio motivations and actions better. As it is, facts about Kwaio actions are not readily apparent. Then, too, the plethora of Kwaio personal and place names is confusing. Perhaps more or better maps, genealogies, and cast of' characters lists would have helped. These, however, are trivial symptoms of disorganization; and they probably result from the practical difficulties inherent in coordinating the efforts and outputs of two different co-authors, who live and work in different places.

Finally, the ubiquitous condescension toward the British colonial administration may be overly general and unduly harsh. No doubt many British officials were petty, lazy, insensitive, and poorly informed bureaucrats who had risen to their levels of incompetence in the Colonial Civil Service of the British Empire. But not all of them were tyrannical fools, and even the authoritarian and foolish ones probably had some merits and good intentions. There must have been some, who (like Bell himself) were knowledgeable about the area and its people and interested in their well-being. It is simply too easy (and probably unfair) to condemn the entire Colonial Civil Service.

In conclusion, although the Keesing and Corris book is manifestly a useful contribution to our knowledge about the ethnohistory of Melanesia, its latent contribution to our understanding of human life and human nature is perhaps even more significant. Readers obviously will learn something about events that happened in the Solomon Islands during the colonial era, about racial and cultural relationships there, about how colonialism works, and about a conquered people's reaction to it. But

those who read the book and think about it can also gain more profound and general wisdom, for it presents important messages about humanity and about how these are incorporated and transmitted in the medium of myth. It is unfortunate that *Lightning Meets the West Wind* has been written for (and will be read mostly by) social scientists specializing in Oceania, rather than by those of a more humanistic and philosophical bent.

Beyond its ethnographic and historical facades, this book is about the human mind and heart, heroism and destiny, and how the human legacy is bequeathed to subsequent generations. The futile rebellion of Basiana and the Kwaio against the superior force of the British Empire, their "mixed bag" of noble and dubious motives (public and private, traditional and modem, pragmatic and idealistic, consequential and trivial), and the focusing of their attack upon the one official person (Bell) who had otherwise done so much to earn their respect and gratitude, all recall Pascal's musings about the heart having its reasons that the mind cannot know. The practical success of men like Bell, who once upon a time seized and governed imperial domains, and the subsequent failure of more sophisticated and powerful imperialist forces to retain the colonial franchises that they inherited, give rise to speculations about Spengler's concepts of the will in the rise and decline of nations, and about Carlyle's beliefs concerning the roles of great persons in making history. And ultimately, this book is about myth: its origins, its growth, and its reasons for being. Bell and Basiana were mere men.. Their motives were mixed and ambivalent, their actions were dubious and ambiguous, their careers were in the last analysis failures, their confrontation was ineffective (in the sense that no one profited from it), and their deaths were sordid. But the two of them have become heroic figures in a genuine Solomon Islands myth; and the myth expresses certain eternal absolutes about ways of life in conflict, about cultural changes, and about the life and death of particular human heritages. The meta-truth of the myth is more "real" and more "true" than the literal historical facts themselves are.

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Hal B. Levine and Marlene Wolfzahn Levine, *Urbanization in Papua New Guinea, A Study of Ambivalent Townsmen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. 161. $29.95, Paperback $9.95.

Jean Rouch's fascinating film, *Jaguar,* concerns the adventures of three young Songhai men, who, at the request of Rouch, travel from their village in the hinterlands to Accra, the capital of Ghana. Although the three are total strangers to the urban scene, they quickly find jobs that suit them, and almost immediately, or so it seems from the film, they are taken up and into the rhythm, style, and strategies of a distinctly urban milieu. The film may be more Rouch's creation than documentary fact, but what is vividly expressed through the responses of the three men to their new situation is that the city, although perplexing, is neither foreign, isolating, nor hostile.

More than once, as I read *Urbanization in Papua New Guinea, A Study of Ambivalent Townsmen* (town dwellers?), by Hal B. Levine and Marlene Wolfzahn Levine, the memory of Rouch's camera shots crystallized differences between the West African urban experience and that of Papua New Guinea. As Levine and Levine note, such comparisons have roots in different colonial histories and pre-colonial political organizations. In visualizing Rouch's images, however, the major theme of the Levines' Papua New Guinea study became all the more dramatic. The contrast between Accra's market places and, for example, the Koki Market in Port Moresby exemplifies the Levines' position that the colonial experience in Papua New Guinea prohibited the development of a distinct urban identity and ideology.

Few will come away from Levines' study (based on the authors' own field research in Port Morseby and Mount Hagen and including research studies by others on urban Papua New Guinea) without recognizing the sharp split between a Western notion of urbanization and rural villagers' responses to town living. Examining the processes of social interaction that create the milieu in which urban dwellers find themselves, the authors "distinguish two sets" or levels of urban life in which, and through which, urban dwellers organize themselves. The two major chapters in the book, "Security: Primary Social Relationships in Towns" and "Formal Institutions in the Wider Urban Field," spell out the complexities inherent in these "two sets."

In the former, kinship ties and the Wantok system create primary links within urban situations. Such links, rooted in rural ties, have resulted in what the authors regard as the development of urban ethnicity. In this way, clan and village allegiances and connections provide an urban route through which rural villagers moving into towns find access to jobs and living quarters. The inefficacy of formal institutions—such as voluntary associations, and business and administrative networks—to grow strong enough to cross-cut these primary patterns of social interaction directly

contributes to the expansion and growing strength of rural identities. Thus, the authors conclude that while some departures from the colonial urban situation have occurred, in general, the promotion of an urban consciousness, class distinctions, occupational hierarchies, or the formation of a "national tradition" has not taken place.

The Levines' study provides an important synthesis of the problems inherent in contemporary Papua New Guinea urbanization. The issues raised in this study should become the springboard for continued urban research. Of high priority should be whether the strength of primary ties is totally the result of colonial isolation of Papua New Guineans from urban centers contributing to the subsequent lack of urban identity, or whether the urban situation presents yet one more example of the strength and resiliency of what it means to be a member of a particular local group.

Equally high on a list of priorities should be issues concerning the relationship between the national and provincial governments as this is affecting the growth of towns that are much closer, geographically and socially, to rural contacts. The Levines' study concentrates almost exclusively on the effects of colonialism and its relation to urban lifestyles. With a policy of decentralization, however, and with both the national and provincial governments' involvement in development projects that affect both rural and urban areas, the organization and the ideology of urban life is becoming more complex.

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George E. Marcus, *The Nobility and the Chiefly Tradition in the Modern Kingdom of Tonga*. The Polynesian Society Memoir No. 42, 1980. Pp. vi, 170, figures, tables, and index. $15.00.

This is a good book but it is not an excellent one. I wish that it had been available to me prior to my own research in Tonga in 1970 and 1971, for it would have been extremely useful. Marcus, who received his Ph.D. in Anthropology from Harvard University in 1975 (*The Ancient Regime in the Modern Kingdom of Tonga: Conflict and Change Among the Nobility of a Polynesian Constitutional Monarchy*), has been an extremely prolific young author in the past few years, and his articles have appeared in *Oceania*, the *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, *Anthropological Quarterly*, and the *American Ethnologist* (just to mention a few). This

42nd Memoir of the Polynesian Society was originally published in that journal in 1978 (Vol. 87, nos. 1, 2, and 4).

This book, in my opinion, is not an excellent one, for Marcus has appeared to do little updating since the original *JPS* articles, and the bibliography of the volume reveals no cited work with a date later than 1976 and that was his own article in *Oceania* (Vol. 47:220-241 and 284-299). The book also suffers from a lack of maps of the Pacific area and maps of the Tongan Islands themselves. While Tonga is clearly known to Pacific readers, mere latitude and longitude as identifying markers are not really sufficient for a wider audience.

On the one hand, the book does provide the reader with the useful and standard background information on traditional Tongan society and the role of the nobility in contemporary Tongan society. And it does have some interesting line drawings on the Tupou dynasty (p. 7), the present affiliations of the noble titles (p. 54), and an interesting diagram on the "nobility in terms of the former criteria of *'eiki* / chiefly status attribution" (namely, "body, authority, and title"), but Marcus clearly fails to point out that the first two diagrams are certainly not unique presentations by him but were clearly sketched out by Adrienne Kaeppler in her outstanding 1971 article on "Rank in Tonga" in *Ethnology* (Vol. 10, No. 2:174-193); and while he fails to cite my own 1973 article on "Tongan Adoption Before the Constitution of 1875" in *Ethnohistory* (Vol. 20:109-123), that article used a 2x2 matrix (p, 120) to dicuss the role of titled *'eiki,* titled non-*'eiki,* non-titled *'eiki,* and the bulk of the Tongan populace, namely non-titled non-*'eiki* individuals.

Briefly then, Marcus has done his research and makes extensive citations of "see, for example" and "for descriptions and analyses see so-and-so," but what is lacking is the presentation of information by an earlier researcher, Marcus' new opinion on Tonga, and the dialogue which will allow the reader of this book to state "I agree with you George Marcus! You've made a brilliant statement and you have destroyed earlier erroneous versions on information about Tonga!" This dialogue is not here. Marcus takes the reader in one giant step from the standard "background of modem Tongan society" into contemporary times, and he tells us little of nineteenth century Tonga and the early twentieth century Tonga. He fails to make reference to Scarr's exemplary *Fragments of Empire: A Histoy of the Western Pacific High Commission 1877-1914,* published in 1968, and to the role that Scarr pointed out of the High Commissioner in Tongan politics from 1876-1914 (1968:82-114). In addition, Marcus would have the reader erroneously believe that "the basic work on nineteenth century history has been Latukefu's (1974) *Church and State in*

Tonga and Rutherford's (1971) *Shirley Baker and the King of Tonga"* (1980:102), and that "as yet, no published material has appeared on the twentieth century," regardless of a 1977 volume edited by Rutherford with a chapter entitled "George Tupou II and the British Protectorate" by 'Eseta Fusitu'a and Rutherford *(Friendly Islands: A History of Tonga 1977: 173--189)* and which also had Marcus' own chapter on "Contemporary Tonga--the Background of Social and Cultural Change" (1977:210--227).

In brief, it is my opinion that when Marcus writes relatively short articles and short chapters for volumes, he does an excellent job. When he tries to weave the separate chapters into a lengthy "memoir" he does badly. He does not have the breadth of a Harry Maude (*Of Islands & Men: Studies in Pacific History* published in 1968) nor does he have the coherence of a Colin Newbury, whose 1980 publication of *Tahiti Nui: Changes and Survival in French Polynesia 1945-1967* was a true pleasure to read! In this Polynesian Society Memoir, though Marcus says correctly that "the nobility is an appropriate unit of study, but it cannot be understood apart from the total condition of change" (1980:159) he is merely repeating what Decktor-Korn states in her note in *The Journal of Pacific History* in 1978 (Vol. 13, Parts 1 & 2:107-113). And somehow I simply cannot take as "definitive" Marcus' statement that "unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of Tongans living abroad (1980:116), since I am aware of at least one 1972 M.A. thesis in Anthropology from the University of Utah, by Barbara Anne Chapman, entitled *Adaptation and Maintenance in the Extended Family of Tongan Immigrants: Salt Lake City,* which studied 250 Mormon Tongans in Salt Lake City, Utah, from November 1971 to June 1972. Marcus is clearly not aware of everything that has been done concerning Tongans, and there are some definite "gaps" in his cited references.

This 42nd Memoir of The Polynesian Society is certainly useful to have, but it: should not be viewed as the definitive work on Tongan nobility. It is merely a guidepost for future needed research in and about Tonga.

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Peter Mühlhäusler et al., Papers in Pidgin and Creole Linguistics No. 2. Pacific Linguistics, Series A, No. 57. Canberra: Australian National University, 1979. Pp. x, 290, 1974, no price available.

Pacific Linguistics has acquired a good reputation for providing a medium in which authors can communicate the findings of their research to a geographically widespread audience. Though *Papers in Pidgin and Creole Linguistics No. 2* is a collection dealing mainly with languages spoken in the Pacific area, one paper deals with Sri Lanka Portuguese. The individual papers vary greatly both in quality and in orientation. While some are purely descriptive, they are, nevertheless, important because the data presented will provide the testing grounds for the still-developing postulates of this relatively new subdiscipline. Other papers make important theoretical contributions, not only to pidgin and creole studies, but also to linguistics as a whole. Nine of the thirteen papers were originally presented at the International Conference of Pidgins and Creoles at Honolulu, Hawaii, in 1975. The other four are more recent contributions. All papers relating to the Pacific are mentioned briefly below.

Peter Mühlhäusler, who has already achieved "bigman" status in this area, discusses the problems of communication betwen speakers of rural and urban dialects of Tok Pisin in Papua New Guinea. Urbanites have tended to borrow heavily from English with the result that comprehension is often difficult for rural people. To bridge the gap, synonymous (or near-synonymous) lexical items from the two dialects are frequently paired both in speech and in writing--so that the urbanite can use the more prestigious, concise, or specific term while still making him/herself understood to speakers of rural Tok Pisin. This performs a double function: it allows the urbanite to demonstrate his/her knowledge of English and fills in lexical gaps in the rural dialect with often more specific items from English. The result is the introduction from English of new lexical items into the rural dialect with the urban dialect as intermediary. Mühlhäusler is perceptive (and, I might add, courageous) to point out the overly neglected parallels between the development of Tok Pisin that is observable right now, and the history of English itself. He suggests that the process by which Tok Pisin is being infused with borrowings from English is parallel to the process by which English became infused with lexical items from Norman French. The implications of this insight for the understanding of language change in general are enormous.

Elsa Lattey uses data from Tok Pisin to discuss the value of variable rules in explaining object deletion. Claiming that variable rules are mainly a descriptive device, she suggests working with the "strategies of inference that are used by speakers" (p. 32) to *explain* linguistic behavior. Unfortunately, the paper suffers from what appears to be anthropological ingenuousness on the part of the author who suggests qualities such as "intelligence and laziness" (p. 26) as universal attributes of language users.

In the third paper dealing with Tok Pisin, Ellen Woolford analyzes the deletion of the predicate marker /i/ according to various environments. Her detailed statistics point to the loss of /i/ from the language in discrete states according to implicational patterns. Woolford notes that "there is no reason to assume that change in pidgin, creolizing, or creole languages is any different in kind from ordinary language change" (p. 45), a point that has not yet made its impact on the general academic community which continues to view these languages as freaks with, at most, only indirect relevance for the understanding. of "natural" languages.

With the care and skill that marks a good writer, William Camden presents copious data on Bislama (Beach-la-mar) and Tangoan, both spoken in Vanuatu, to demonstrate that lexical and grammatical features of Bislama parallel the structure of Tangoan. This suggests that the structures of Bislama are more the result of typological convergence with the Oceanic languages of Vanuatu than of the direct simplification of English. Camden points out that such grammatical features as tense marking on verbs are "missing" from Bislama only in the sense that English has them, while Bislama does not. Both Bislama and Tangoan relegate the indication of tense and number to a higher level discourse. At the same time, such features as the inclusive/exclusive distinction in first person pronouns must be deduced from context in English and might, therefore, be said to be missing in English. Camden argues "that certain features of Bislama are the result of pressure from the Oceanic-type languages spoken in the New Hebrides, rather than say 'simplification' of English" (p. 111).

Margaret S. Steffensen's paper is mainly a description of reduplication in Bamyili Creole spoken in Northern Territory, Australia. She shows that reduplication in verbs, pronouns, and modifiers is semantically motivated, while in nouns, it is pragmatically motivated, marking a baby-talk register. While avoiding a definite stand, Steffensen weighs the possibilities of appealing to substrata, the monogenesis of English-based creoles, and universals in an attempt to account for reduplication in Bamyili Creole.

M. G. Clyne presents data collected from guest workers in Germany and from workers in German-Australian companies in Melbourne in a logically conceived study that follows immigrant workers whose native language is not English or German, and who have gained experience about industry in Germany or Switzerland before arriving in Australia. Among other things, the study touches on: (1) German stereotypes of foreign-talk German; (2) features of pidginized English in Australian industry; (3) differences between Germans and Australians in speaking to immigrants; (4) contact and mixing between pidginized German and English in Australia;

(5) the role of context in disambiguating pidginized utterances; (6) what might be dubbed a "pre-creole continuum" from elliptic to nonstandard speech; (7) relexification; (8) the concepts of pidginization, deep structure, and baby talk as they relate to "pidginization competence;" and (10) the influence of government migration policy on language. Clyne has managed to pack a wealth of information into a single, readable paper. By studying industrial pidgins, he captures, *in vivo,* the twentieth century equivalent of the plantation situation which has been the focus of many pidgin-creole studies.

William Peet Jr. examines data on Hawaiian Creole to evaluate a hypothesis that the shift from accusative to nominative pronoun forms in subject position is partly constrained in copular sentences. The rather novel supportive data, though scant, include utterance elicited from a hypnotized subject at various stages of regression, with the aim of retrieving data from earlier stages of the subject's life.

Ulrike Mosel investigates the sociolinguistic record to demonstrtate that Tok Pisin was virtually unknown by the Tolai until after the establishment of missions and plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula, East New Britain. He also gives the socio-historical background responsible for the disdain the Tolai have for Tok Pisin and the relative imperviousness of the Tolai language to influence from Tok Pisin. The findings presented in this informative and soundly-written paper contrast remarkably with my own observations in northwestern New Britain where Tok Pisin has a fairly high prestige value, and where the local vernaculars are usually heavily larded with borrowings from Tok Pisin.

Overall, the collection points to several theoretical areas in pidgin and creole studies that remain problematic: the role of substrata and language universals; the role of sociological and cultural contexts; and the relevance of the process of pidginization and creolization to an understanding of language change in general. These are processes that are open to direct observation right now. They are almost certainly processes that have acted on the world's languages in the past and, consequently, are of great importance in reconstructing both language and social prehistory. For instance, the current hypothesis relating to the peopling of the Pacific rely heavily on the results of comparative historical linguistics, which, in turn, rest on theories of language change that no longer seem sound in light of the results of research in pidgins and creoles. *Papers in Pidgin and Creole Linguistics No. 2,* then, is a welcome contribution to the growing literature in this field.

NOTES

1. Douglas Taylor, "Grammatical and Lexical Affinities of Creoles," in Dell Hymes, ed., *Pidginization and Creolization of Languages* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 293-6.

2. Derek Bickerton, "Pidginization and Creolization: Language Acquisition and Language Universals," in Albert Valdman, ed., *Pidgin and Creole Linguistics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 49-69.

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Deryck Scarr, *Viceroy of the Pacific: The Majesty of Colour, a Life of Sir John Bates Thurston.* Canberra: Australian National University, 1980. *Pacific Research Monograph No. 4.* $9.00.

Sir John Bates Thurston has been described as *Na Kena Vai,* the spearhead or bayonet, the Grand Panjandrum, Pooh Bah, and King of the Western Pacific. These are just a few of the names attributed to the Governor of Fiji (1887 and 1897) and High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. This was a role he relished, reflecting the pinnacle of a lifetime in the Pacific. Yet he might not have gained such eminence since there was some feeling in official British circles that a governor should not be appointed from among the local population. Thurston had lived in Fiji since 1866, had acquired plantations there and had been closely involved in the local political scene before cession in the early 1870s. He had made enemies among European settlers and missionaries; he had made friends among many of the Fijians. The crowded life of this person has been recorded in two volumes by Deryck Scarr, senior fellow in Pacific history at the Australian National University. The first volume, covering Thurston's years until 1875, was published in 1973; there has been an unfortunate delay in the appearance of the continuing volume--a delay arising primarily from problems that have currently overtaken publishers around the world. The second volume covers the years from 1875, with the arrival of Governor Gordon, until Thurston's death in 1897.

Unfortunately, I found the first dozen chapters somewhat unsatisfactory. The story seemed to drag; the events often seemed inconsequential; details seemed to be recorded almost solely because the evidence had been unearthed. This arose partly from the author's style. He has relied upon a wide variety of manuscript sources, private and public, and he has

let the story unfold through quotations, sometimes longish, from private letters. In one sense this is commendable; but in another it confounds the object of presenting Thurston in a clear and living light. Indeed, seldom does Thurston's character or personality come through whether in his own correspondence or in the biographer's analysis. Rather, the reader is inclined to become lost in the plethora of detail that surrounded Thurston in the routines of his life as a politician, citizen, settler, administrator and family man. This problem seems to arise more epecially in the early part of this volume partly because Thurston's role in the years before 1886 was somewhat subdued, and the reader might well be pardoned for asking of what consequence is some of the narrative as revealed in the biography.

Thurston's significance in the sphere of race relations was well established in Volume 1. In the present volume there is a continuance of this theme which emphasizes his desire to create an atmosphere of trust to protect the Fijian people. To Thurston this meant working through the great chiefs, using them in government and creating a basis of trust between the British as overlords, the Fijian chiefs as effective rulers, and the people who had traditionally occupied the land. This approach received reinforcement through the policies and rhetoric of the first governor of this new British colony. The Fijians needed to be given time to adjust, using their own agencies and talents. To Thurston this meant insulating them from the exploitation of their labor; they should not have to work for Europeans. So a local tax system was devised whereby they would have to rely upon their own labor rather than turn to wage-labor. This was to have long-term implications for the history of Fiji and its people. Indian laborers needed to be imported to help production upon the sugar plantations of the European growers while the Fijians worked for their chiefs, and themselves. This system was a source of continuing criticism by most local Europeans who argued that a form of slavery had been instituted with the Fijian chief in an all-powerful position,

From 1886 Thurston was occupying a more central place in Fijian and Pacific affairs. He was an observer and adviser on problems in Samoa and Tonga; he was involved in the expansion of British imperialism, at least indirectly, in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and the Solomon Islands; he was trying to regulate relations between Europeans in the New Hebrides. He seems to have enjoyed this position of eminence and was pleased that he could make his stamp in establishing British protectorates which allowed, again, a considerable local authority. Imperial rule should not be too heavy.

Yet, in Fijian affairs, he developed a reputation as a hard-liner. This particularly affected policy towards the Indians and also colored relations

with the Colonial Sugar Refining Company from Australia. He ran a tight administration and relieved British officialdom greatly by curbing financial extravagance. Personally he was happy that the imperial ambitions of New Zealand were kept at bay; he was succeeding in his goal of preserving Fiji for the Fijians. But his rule was not unalloyed success; there was some Fijian resentment; there were occasional resistances; the death rate problem was not solved and various criticisms of the tax system continued.

He was a strong personal ruler tempered by kindness and consideration--"velvet lay over his iron hand." This book helps fill in the details of Fijian history, through European eyes, in the second half of the nineteenth century. This is a large gap that needs to be filled, and here a start has been made. But my doubts remain as to whether a person such as Thurston, as citizen and governor, deserves two volumes to record his life. Some condensation of events is desirable--such as in chapters 18 and 21; more analysis and summarization would help in estimating the worth of this person--he is, after all, presented in the format of "the hero in history"; and a greater Fijian corrective, one can only hope, will one day emerge so that the full story of this imperial age can be understood.

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Wilbur Schramm, Lyle M. Nelson and Mere Betham, *Bold Experiment: The Story of Educational Television in American Samoa*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981. Pp. ix, 244, bibliography; index. $17.50.

Late in 1964, American Samoa found itself with a full-blown television system designed to be the main instructional element in the schools. Within two years "four of every five school age children were spending one-fourth to one-third of their class time watching a television picture." This is all in a country that had not even had electricity two years earlier.

This ambitious, even audacious, undertaking was born in the mind of H. Rex Lee, who become Governor of American Samoa in May, 1961. It was supported by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior when the idea was presented to him three weeks later. It was then studied for three months by a team from the National Association for Educational Broadcasters who recommended a complete crash program. By mid-1962 Congress had

appropriated funds for the system itself and for the construction of thirty consolidated elementary schools with a total school age population of 6.5 thousand. Why the speed? “There was no time for waiting, no time for armchair patience, there had been too much of that for 60 years,” Governor Lee said in 1965.

Nearly twenty years later, however, readers of this book are going to wish, with the authors, that someone had taken the time to at least collect baseline data so some relatively precise judgments could be made about the effectiveness of instant instructional television. Sadly, the authors were reduced to scraping and scratching for any little bit of data that might possibly be interpreted as being valid pre-TV assessment. Partial Standford Achievement Test scores were available from 1932, 1935, and 1950, and scores apparently copied from records that had disappeared offered tantalizing hints about conditions in 1962, 1963 and 1964. That is about the extent of pre-TV educational data.

At the same time, it would appear that controversy and political changes began nibbling away at the system before it could develop and hit a stride that would give a useful view of its realistic potential. A change of governors in 1967 was the beginning of a dismantling process that ultimately turned American Samoan TV into today’s primarily entertainment medium.

For a scientist, an experiment implies controls, measurements and assessments. In these terms, the “Bold Experiment” of the book’s title was no experiment at all, but a bold, headlong, heedless rush into some form of modernity. The authors pay the price but make a game effort at “assessing” an “experiment” without controls or measurement. (Even during the TV years measurements were apparently so erratic, spotty and undisciplined that few substantive evaluations are possible.)

Nevertheless, the book is a valuable, excellent-under-the-circumstances evaluative effort to explore effects of instant television on a typical, even extreme, traditional culture. The single most valuable contribution is the comparison among samples of teenagers in American Samoa (in 1972 and 1977), Western Samoan teens who were within viewing range, and Western Samoan teenagers who were not TV viewers. These groups were tested for value differences, using home television viewing as the independent variable. Conclusion: Television contributes as an agent and a reinforcer of broader cultural values. Translation: Significant changes were TV-traceable, but they were not dramatic.

A regrettable deletion which one hopes will be corrected in the future by one of the authors is the lack of extensive subjective assessment from Mere Betham. She was educated in the pre-TV system and later became

the director of education in American Samoa. With the exception of a couple of brief references, there is little direct evidence of her thoughts. Surely in a volume with such scanty empirical data her observations would have lent a rich dimension, coming as they would from deep within the affected culture. The book needed to be written. It is easily read and difficult to lay aside. Charitably, it leaves unscathed debators' favorite positions on the effectiveness of ETV, and there is ample room for the definitive analysis yet to come.

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Alex Steensberg, *New Guinea Gardens: A Study of Husbandry with Parallels in Prehistoric Europe.* London: Academic Press, 1980. Pp. xxiii, 222, maps, illustrations, bibliography, subject index. $25.00.

By necessity archeological data are always incomplete. The function and use of material culture often cannot be gleaned unequivocally from the available artifacts, structures, skeletal remains, and stratigraphy. To obtain this information archeologists have resorted to experiments by using replicas of stone, wooden, or bone archeological tools for working on wood, bone for carving meat, or they have observed contemporary neolithic or paleolithic people as they chopped down trees, butchered animals., built shelters, tilled soil, or hunted with their primitive implements. The author of this book made use of both of these methods. In Europe he pioneered experiments with stone tools, and in the New Guinea Highlands he studied the people's use of tools and techniques associated with the construction of houses, cooking, clearing of land, gardening, and the digging of drainage ditches. Findings from both of these endeavors--the experiments and ethnological data--are used to explain the archeological records of his research in Europe. The similarities of tools from both places (e.g. stone axe and adze blades, double spades, earth oven, and architectural features such as roof-thatch, roof-slope, and shelves inside of the house) and the limited possibilities for the use of them in the mentioned activities are regarded as justifications for comparisons for what the *Kulturkreislehre* people used to call *Fern interpretation*. Similar problems of food acquisition and building shelters with equipment of the same technology are assumed to elicit similar responses.

This book on ethnoarchaeology--the use of ethnographic data to explain archaeological remains--tries to show what can be gained by a European prehistorian's observation of tribal life of neolithic people of New Guinea. Thus, this account's purpose is not a systematic survey of the New Guinea Highlands material culture, neither is it an exhaustive review of the literature. Rather, it tries to demonstrate how observation of the actual use of tools gives clues to understanding the size and shape, hafting, and choice of material for tools in the past. The ethnographic material is recorded not only in the notebook of the author but also in photography, drawings, and films that function not only as illustrations, but also as analytical tools and explanations of the text. They portray in detail not only the work technique but also the body posture and movement of the worker. Timing of the individual tasks adds another dimension to the analysis. By means of all this detail and precision the author attempts to place himself into the situation of the manufacturer and user, and he wants to learn and understand their skills. Thus, he can explain the function and necessity of a particular feature of hafting of a stone ax that prevents splitting of the handle and provides elasticity.

The research which supplied the data for this book shows a great disparity between its European and New Guinea components. Whereas the author spent most of his professional life on "archeological, historical and ethnographic study of the material conditions of life and work among temperate Europeans, particularly Danish peasants," his New Guinea fieldwork, as a contrast, was indeed brief. It was accomplished in three separate installments: in 1968 two weeks were spent in viewing contemporary settlements and archeological sites in the upper Wahgi Valley and Alipo village, in 1971 five days were reserved for "visiting villages around Wewak and Maprik and along the Sepik River," and in 1975 twelve days were used for collecting data on tree-felling, house construction, fencing, and gardening of the Duna (pp. vii-viii), and a subsequent twenty days were devoted to the study of gardening tools and the felling of trees east of Mt. Hagen. The brevity of this investigation accounts for the fact that most of the New Guinea data deal only with technological aspects of the material culture and quest, presenting these of necessity out of ethnographical context.

The brevity of the research, the non-holistic approach of the interpretation of the data, and the fact that many of the localities had been "pacified" and exposed to a prolonged contact with, and control by agents of Western Civilization are primarily responsible for the following criticism. First, some of the work was done with steel tools, and generalizations about neolithic cultures were made on the basis of adjusting these

to presumed stone age conditions (p. 13). Second, some described activities are of necessity incomplete and supplemented by guesses (p. 81). Third, experiments with wooden tools were made in areas where these went out of use long before the arrival of the author, so that the indigeous peoples had to be instructed how to use these artifacts while conducting the experiment (p, 89). It would have been better to rely on literature in which the behavior of actual neolithic peoples was precisely recorded. Fourth, the examples of land-clearing, house building, and cultivation techniques are relatively few, taken from places scattered throughout New Guinea and presented out of their agricultural and socio-politial context. As a consequence, some of the generalizations are not quite correct, as, for example, the contention that "in New Guinea the cultivation of sweet potatoes is normally women's work." Kapauku Papuans hold this statement to be true because planting, weeding, and harvesting of sweet potatoes should and is usually done by women. But what about clearing the grounds, cutting the trees, and preparing the sweet potato garden for planting the crop? What about the laborious digging of the drainage ditches, building fences, and construction of the mounds, not to mention the fertilization of the fields, guarding the crops, and disassembling the fences after the crop has been harvested, or don't these activities exerted on the sweet potato gardens deserve to be included in an account of the plant's cultivation?

There are a few factual mistakes. A handle of an axe is treated with fire not to make it flexible but to make it harder (p. 6). Neolithic people (contrary to the statement on page 59) could cut grass either with a stone tool or tear it off with their hands as the Kapauku used to do during my first investigation in 1954. Furthermore, the use of the word "spade" should be limited to tools that are stepped on and applied to leaf-shaped wooden broad blades driven into the soft ground by the swing of arms and used for caving out blocks of dirt lifted out by both hands (esp. pp. 83-4, 99-100). A better word seems to be earth-knife (like the Eskimo snow knife, which is used in similar fashion). Although pigs may be housed under the same roof as man, they usually stay on the ground underneath the sleeping platforms or even under the elevated house floor; thus, they actually are outside of the house. In Europe one does not have to go back to the Iron Age to find cattle housed in the same building with the farmer's family. In modem Tyrol the cow shed is an integral part of the farmhouse (p. 126).

My last criticism pertains to the description of the people that I studied--the Kapauku Papuans. The author makes reference to my work, but

in his analysis he seems to have ignored it. He claims that domesticated pigs are shot with arrows only on ceremonial occasions. Kamu Kapauku usually killed pigs by shooting them unceremonially (as my monograph as well as photographs and films document, p. 111). Furthermore, in describing Kapauku house plans (Fig. 30) he shows a dwelling with three fireplaces in three rooms (p. 161). In actuality, Kapauku houses may have eight rooms and even more with an equal amount of fireplaces depending on how many married women reside in the particular household. What is even more remarkable is that the author treats the Kapauku and Ekari as if they were two different peoples (pp. 86, 160, 161, 206) in spite of the fact that in my monographs and case study I state, usually right on the first page, that Kapauku is the name given to Papuans of the Wissel Lakes by the Mimika Papuans, and the Moni Papuans, their neighbors to the east, call them Ekari, while the Kapauku Papuans call themselves Me--The People. Finally, the bibliographical reference to my work is a hybrid of two books put into one. Whereas, *Kapauku Papuan Economy* is a monograph of Yale University Publications in Anthropology, it certainly has not been published by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, the company responsible for publishing another book of mine: *The Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea.*

Despite these particular criticisms, the book is valuable for several reasons. Those descriptions of parallels between pre-historic Europe and Stone Age New Guinea that are used are meticulously detailed and precise, and they are accompanied by helpful photographs and drawings. The parallels are not regarded as related due to diffusion, no matter how intriguing the resemblance, but as similar responses of different peoples to similar ecological conditions (p. 208). No speculative theories and no "isms" mar the matter-of-fact presentation. Aside from the ecological implications and conclusions the book is also important for archaeologists because it shows clearly and empirically the limits of archeological reconstruction.

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Andrew C. Theophanous, *Australian Democracy in Crisis: A Radical Approach to Australian Politics.* Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. 224. $16.95.

Though *Australian Democracy in Crisis* is not an easy book to categorize, it is specifically concerned with an analysis of those seemingly paradoxical and aberrant events and actions in Australian society and politics such as the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975. There have been a series of books specifically concerned with the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, and his unprecedented dismissal of a democratically elected government, namely G. Freudenberg's *A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics,* D. Home's *The Death of the Lucky Country,* Paul Kelly's *The Unmaking of Gough* as well as those by the participants, Kerr's *Matters for Judgment* and Whitlam's *The Truth of the Matter.* All these authors are deeply and unequivocally polemical and concerned with the particular events which lead to the November 11 coup. In this regard, Theophanous' approach differs substantially; for though one of his central preoccupations is to analyze this specific crisis in Australian democracy, his aims are far more ambitious--an explanation of the total crisis which contemporary Australia is experiencing.

He has been influenced notably by Jurgen Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis,* published in English in 1973. He also includes an extended summary of his other major influences--Rousseau's notions on democracy, Durkheim's views on anomie and Marx's analysis of alienation. Since this is not intended as a textbook for undergraduates, it is not necessary to retain these eclectic appraisals. Rather, these theoretical aspects should have been more concise and integrated with his empirical data. Nowhere is there a clear examination of the central argument, for this is lost amidst a plethora of different theories and approaches and sections of the empirical data., For instance, the chapter on social identity, culture and the family is not at all integrated with his primary focus upon economic and political crisis. Other areas like the crucial role of transitional capital in Australia need expansion and more emphasis.

Overall, however, *Australian Democracy in Crisis* is a very worthwhile analysis, and its main problems stem from its ambitious scope and complexity. It is, moreover, challenging and controversial, particularly in its discussion of the 1975 coup. Undoubtedly, readers will be divided on the whole question of the proprietry and constitutional basis of Whitlam's dismissal.

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Napoleone A. Tuiteleleapaga, *Samoa, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.* New York: Todd and Honeywell Inc., 1980. Pp. xx, 165. $9.95.

Tuiteleleapaga set himself a formidable task when he set out to sketch the story of the Samoas in 165 pages. The history and anthropology of the Samoas have been the subject of countless discourses and of much debate ever since Europeans became interested in the islands, and those looking to a resolution of some of these debates will be disappointed. Tuiteleleapaga does not set out to review and synthesize academic debates but to outline and describe certain events and institutions which he holds to be significant. In fact, he specifically states that "This book contains no scientific arguments or dissertations" and is frank about the sources of published materials which comes from "reading school geography books, magazines and newspapers" (p, viii). The most valuable resource on which the author draws is his own personal experience first as a talking chief and later as a chief, which he notes, "conferred upon me the power and privilege to mingle with all categories of chiefs, and to go through the labyrinth of the well and jealously-guarded archives of the unwritten history, traditions, folklore, and cultural customs of the Samoan people" (p. ix). The result is a short sketch of events and institutions associated with the Samoans.

The first four chapters contain basic facts on the geography and contact history; some observations on the possible origins of place names incorrectly assigned by the French to various parts of the Samoas; and Samoan impressions of the first European visitors. These chapters are brief and contain little which is new, but those seeking a short introduction to these matters may find the section useful. The fifth and sixth chapters are entitled respectively, "Whence Came the Samoan People?" and, "Who and What Kind of People Are the Samoans?" These are attempts to summarize theories of the origins of the Samoan people, and to outline certain central cultural traits, and are perhaps the weakest sections of the book. The matter of the origins of the Samoans is complex and even an accurate summary of the current state of knowledge would be difficult in ten pages. Tuiteleleapaga's discussion on the prehistoric record draws on the writings of Churchill, Tregear and Percy Smith and omits more recent archaeological and linguistic evidence, which has moved the debate forward considerably. The discussion of the "historic times" is scarcely more helpful and depends heavily on an account "found by the author twenty years ago in a book written in French and English, but, unfortunately, the title and the author have been forgotten" (p. 13). This account suggests that the ancestors of the Samoans may have peopled the Samoas after they were forced from their homeland, Papatea, in an act of retribution by a Mesopotamian king named Elo. In support of this theory, Tuiteleleapaga cites a number of coincidences in Samoan and Hebrew personal

names and customs. The four parallels between Samoan and Hebrew customs are brief, conisting in one case of five inconclusive lines. Readers wishing to pursue these leads may find the missionary Turner's more exhaustive list instructive. (1861). The chapter on the origins of the Samoans is rounded out with four brief Samoan accounts of the cosmology which are literal translations without commentary on the allusions contained therein. The sixth chapter, "Who and What Kind of People Are Samoans?" is a series of assertions about the Samoan character contained in ten pages which depend on very broad generalizations supported by evidence of somewhat uneven strength. Tuiteleleapaga's observations on the role of music and the themes of song are very valuable, as are his very perceptive observations on the nature of indebtedness and reciprocity. Both might usefully have been expanded. Others, such as his assertion that "there is no desire to amass wealth," and that Samoan life is "carefree and happy," are rather less valuable and would be difficult to sustain on available evidence. The chapters on the origins and character of the Samoans are the weakest parts of the work because they are attempts to tackle complex issues without the material necessary to provide a complete and accurate summary, much less a resolution, of the issues. The contents of the chapters are in the armchair anthropology tradition, one long since set aside in favor of more rigorous attention to evidence. Tuiteleleapaga's access to the labyrinths of Samoan tradition can lend little to these arguments, which are likely, ultimately, to be resolved elsewhere and with rather more complex evidence. Overall, his excursions into these areas detract from, rather than lend to, the text.

The author moves on to a discussion of various legends, including the origins of the terms Samoan and Papalagi respectively, and finally, to fourteen short chapters on various social, economic and legal institutions. These chapters might most appropriately be described as collections of observations on the various institutions, many of which are anecdotal and support the author's contentions about their nature and operation. Tuiteleleapaga avoids theorizing in these chapters, and this is both their strength and their weakness. The chapters are Samoan accounts of Samoan institutions and provide an interesting insight into Samoan "world view" and the nature, and quality, of proof which supports it. The outlines are free of the theoretical perspectives which inform, and often unreasonably dominate academic discussions of Samoan institutions--and consist essentially of personal and unselfconscious accounts of the institutions and of the author's experience with them. The author's very considerable experience and his academic training combine to provide

some very valuable insights more epecially in those areas, such as the legal system, in which he has special expertise. Academic readers may be confused by the organization of the accounts of the institutions, but there is a wealth of information scattered through them which may well provide valuable evidence and insights for academics' own arguments.

While these fourteen chapters on institutions are not intended to be academic and should not be judged by "academic standards," they have certain shortcomings which might usefully be made clear to the reader unfamiliar with Samoa. The first is that the author tends to generalize about Samoa in ways which might lead the reader to believe that there is rather more homogeneity than is in fact the case. The Samoas have been subject to rather divergent sets of social, economic and demographic forces which have produced a range of responses among Samoans to their various situations. Samoans themselves are patently aware of the very significant differences in the lifestyles of say the urban Tutuilan and the rural Savai'ian and distinguish between degrees of "Samoanness." This is not to suggest that some generalizations are not possible but rather that the author has not distinguished between various "levels" of generalization and has prevented the reader from appreciating the extent of variation and adaptation which Samoan society has exhibited in the face of external forces for change. The second caveat is related to the first and to the fact that although the book's title suggests that the work will cover past, present and future, the text does not always give clear indications of the periods to which generalizations refer. The result is that the reader may be led to believe that certain customs which have been extensively modified, and in some cases are defunct, are still extensively practiced. It would, admittedly, be difficult to impose a time frame on each chapter and run mechanically through the past, present and future of each topic, but this need not have precluded some passing indication of the period to which certain assertions refer.

The academic reader may also be alarmed at Tuiteleleapaga's habit of inserting very considerable pieces of other authors' work (notably Turner) without acknowledging their source. Thus, very considerable sections of Tuiteleleapaga's work are in fact sections of the works of early missionaries' accounts of the operation of institutions, and these sections frequently receive little or no paraphrasing. Thus, accounts of tattooing, polygamy, childbirth, divorce, and widows are frequently identical in both Turner and Tuiteleleapaga as are some of the accounts of Samoan legends, including the origin of the term Samoan and the story of the original settlement of Samoa by the former residents of Papatea. But those who

are alarmed will also be well placed to estimate the value of Tuiteleleapaga's contribution to the matters under discussion.

The production of *Samoa, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow* might also have been improved with more conscientious editing and proofreading. The dedication contains the statement that "Dr. Margaret Mead . . . who after reading the whole manuscript in her office in New York shortly after her death, wrote a lengthy introduction to the book." There are many misspellings of varying importance scattered throughout the text in both Samoan *(fa'ama seiau/fa'amasei'au* for example) and English *(USS Vandalia/USS Vandolia;* Roggewein/Eroggewein); and an inconsistent use of italicization of Samoan terms in the text, all of which detract from the work.

Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings Tuiteleleapaga's, *Samoa Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,* is as Margaret Mead notes "a treasury of astute comments on Samoan customs and culture" and deserves attention from those interested in the Samoans. Its value will be greatest to those familiar with the literature and to Samoans who can take from the work the insights contained therein and set aside material which seems to require further evidence. It will undoubtedly generate interest and controversy among Samoan readers and may well lead to further accounts of Samoa and the Samoans.

NOTES

1. Turner, G. A., 1861, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia, Missionary Life: Travels and Researchers in the Islands of the Pacific.* John Snow, London.

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E. Gough Whitlam, *A Pacific Community.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xii, 122. Bibliography, index. $12.50.

This small book consists of four addresses given by former Australian Labor Party Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, in 1979. Three addresses were delivered at Harvard University where Mr. Whitlam was visiting professor in Australian studies, and the fourth to an Australia-Japan symposium in Canberra. Whitlam's theme is that given the increased inter-

dependence of the Pacific region since 1945, the time is now appropriate for governments to formalize their economic and political relations and construct a genuine Pacific community. The basis for such a community, he asserts, lies in the tremendous recent economic growth and the emergence of a clear economic identity in the Western Pacific, and in the relative predictability of political change in the region. His organizational model is not that of an integrated regional economic system, but one similar to the Commonwealth of Nations which embraces a diverse range of developed and developing countries. His vision is of a Pacific community based on growth, equity and political harmony.

In Chapters One and Two, which deal with resources and trade, Whitlam proposes a number of progressive measures on resource development support for the Law of the Sea Convention, revision of the Antarctica Treaty, on the liberalization of trade and aid, and on the responsibilities of foreign investment. Unlike some of the economists and others engaged in formulating a "Pacific Rim" strategy, Whitlam is particularly concerned that the small developing nations obtain an equitable deal and are not "ripped-off" in the process. In Chapter Three dealing with the politics of the Western Pacific, he is sharply critical of earlier United States' interventionist and divisive policies in the region, and of current American strategy in isolating Vietnam; but he believes that despite the uncertainties surrounding the future of Indo-China, the political orientations of the Pacific states are sufficiently predictable for a satisfactory accord to be reached.

In Chapter Four Whitlam explores the relationships between Japan and Australia, and, apart from criticizing conservative Australian governments for their alleged failure to develop an appropriate economic and regional strategy, he exhorts both countries to look beyond purely economic relations in their dealings with other states of the region.

As Prime Minister of Australia from 1972 to 1975, Whitlam's record on decolonization, to the normalization of Australia's relations with Asia, and on the general promotion of Pacific cooperation, was outstanding. In these addresses, however, he seriously understates the intraregional contradictions and political constraints which are bound to inhibit the emergence of the type of community he has in mind. The book, nevertheless, is lucidly written, insightful, and will serve as a useful introduction to the study of the Pacific's political economy.

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William M. Worden, *Cargoes: Matson's First Century in the Pacific.* Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981. Pp. xii, 192, illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. $12.95.

As a youth, William Matson went to sea from his native Sweden. Arriving in San Francisco in 1867, he continued to work on ships belonging to others until 1882, when he bought a one-fourth interest in his first vessel, the schooner *Emma Claudina,* which he entered in the San Francisco-Hilo trade. Established lines were already serving Honolulu, but service to Hilo was inadequate despite the rapidly expanding sugar plantations in its hinterlands. From these beginnings the Matson Navigation Company grew. In 1919 Matson vessels carried the entire Hawaiian sugar output to market for the first time. In 1926, the Oceanic Steamship Company, originally owned by the Spreckels interests, became a Matson subsidiary. Eventually Matson's operations came to include not only cargo and passenger vessels, but also airlines, hotels (including the famous Royal Hawaiian), and the immensely profitable Honolulu Oil Company.

Over the years, the Matson Navigation Company became intertwined in the complex web of Hawaiian business relationships. The result is a history that often reveals as much about the islands as it does about the firm. Beginning in 1907 Castle & Cooke served as Matson's agents and in time came to control the line; in 1964 Alexander & Baldwin gained a controlling interest. American Factors and the Dillingham Corporation also played important roles in the Matson story. Still, the rise of pineapple production, the dislocations of World War II, the growth in power of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, and changes in tourism each affected the firm at least as much as did corporate changes and rivalries.

The Matson company grew and prospered not only because of the network of ties it cultivated in the islands and favorable economic developments there and on the mainland, but also because of its balanced combination off fiscal caution and readiness to adopt maritime innovations. Matson introduced the first oil-burning steamship to the Pacific in 1901 and pioneered in the use of shipboard refrigeration and the wireless. The design of the liner *Malolo,* built to Matson specifications, was such that she survived a ramming in 1927 that might well have sunk any other vessel afloat at the time. Following World War II, Matson developed cost-effective methods of transporting sugar in bulk, and in 1958 inaugurated equally pathbreaking containership service.

Maritime history buffs and collectors of Hawaiiana will enjoy William M. Worden's *Cargoes: Matson's First Century in the Pacific.* The author

has an important topic and tells his story well. The book is handsomely produced and copiously illustrated. But scholars will find the book disappointing. Worden's approach is anecdotal and superficial. While part of this may stem from the paucity of sources dealing with Captain Matson and the early years of the firm he founded, more seems to spring from Worden's greater interest in spinning a good yarn than in probing beneath the surface to uncover the interplay of forces that shaped events and decisions. He is uncritical in his use of reminiscences and similar sources and, insofar as one can tell from his inadequate endnotes and bibliography, unimaginative in his quest for archival evidence. Worden has done extensive interviewing in connection with the events of recent decades. As a result, the last half of the book is stronger than the first half, but even here the product is none too satisfactory. Despite interviews with labor leaders and workers, the reader cannot escape the feeling that he is getting a simplified, sanitized view of events as seen from the corporate board room. Failure to more than mention the Congressional investigation that led to cancellation of the South Seas mail contract, or a government loan of $11.7 million to aid in the construction of new vessels, an inadequate and distorted description of the LaFollette Seaman's Law, and the almost complete ignoring of the Dollar Line also mar the book.

We may yet have a solid business history dealing with Matson Navigation Company. This volume is not it.

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