LINKING COLONIZATION AND DECOLONIZATION: THE CASE OF MICRONESIA

Timothy J. Gaffaney
University of California, Los Angeles

Although a significant literature exists on the processes leading to colonization, little has been written on the factors relevant to decolonization. Focusing on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, I outline an argument that rests on a unilateral decision by the United States to establish an empire in the Pacific. I then entertain the hypothesis that decolonization represents a direct reversal of the factors leading to colonization, that is, another unilateral decision by the United States. I argue that such a model is empirically simplistic and incorrect. I offer evidence to suggest that local elites in the various island "states" as well as an international norm against colonization led the United States to begin to alter its relationship with the Trust Territory in the mid-1960s. This example of decolonization partially represents the effort of the United States to gain legitimacy for its presence in the Pacific and partially represents an effective constraint on its autonomy.

MUCH LIKE INDIVIDUALS in the "state of nature" as described by Hobbes, individual states face each other with no metapower to arbitrate disputes and enforce a degree of peace. Accordingly, history has witnessed sometimes brutal intrusions on the sovereignty of weaker states. In some cases these intrusions have meant complete annihilation of the weaker state's political, cultural, and economic structure and assimilation by the stronger state. Empire represents one familiar category used by political scientists and historians to describe such intrusions. An empire, according to Michael Doyle, is "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural depen-

Pacific Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2--June 1995

dence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing an empire" (Doyle 1986:45).[1] For Doyle, three criteria must be met to demonstrate that an empire indeed does exist. First, we must demonstrate the existence of control. Second, we must be able to explain why one state expands its power and establishes this control. Finally, we must explain why the other state "submits or fails to resist effectively" (p. 46). Although each of these research agendas seems intuitively and analytically relevant, the Second point has attracted the greatest amount of attention from scholars.

Linking Colonization to Decolonization

However, I believe that a fertile area for research still has not been tapped. Assuming that great powers established empires for specific reasons, with specific interests in mind, we should recognize in decolonization a reversal of those interests. Likewise, if the periphery once promised something in return for the costs of maintaining an empire, then decolonization should correspond to the periphery's inability to provide that good any longer. If, for example, a territory provided rent because of some natural resource, then exhaustion of that resource should render that territory unnecessary. Or, if acquisition of a particular territory provided a buffer against a threat by an enemy, then that acquisition might no longer be justified when that threat had dissipated. In this article I weigh the evidence for colonization in a specific region against the evidence for decolonization. I begin with a survey of competing explanations for colonization in order to determine the most appropriate framework for discussing the region I have chosen to investigate. Having established an explanation for empire construction, I weigh the evidence for decolonization in an effort to establish a link between colonization and decolonization.

Specifically, I discuss the change in U.S. policy during the 1960s toward the groups of Pacific islands collectively known as Micronesia. That is, during this period, it appeared that the United States began to dismantle its Micronesian empire. It should become clear from the initial historical discussion that Micronesia provided little promise for either the financial sector or the bureaucratic rent seekers in the United States. Clearly, strategic interest in Micronesia played a role in construction of this empire. As a particular strategic framework, then, I shall adopt Lake's explanation for empire. Based on his discussion, we would expect the United States to dismantle its empire in the Pacific when the United States could realize economies of scale in the production of security through some other means or alliance, when the costs of governing Micronesia outweighed the security benefits for the United States, and when the risk of opportunism by the local elites became strong enough to appropriate gains otherwise accruing to the United States. However, I also present evidence to suggest that moral and political pressure from the emerging elite in Micronesia and from the international community encouraged the shift in U.S. policy. That is, decolonization is not the result of a unilateral decision made by the metropole. And while not denying that a real disparity in power may exist between the parties involved, I hope to demonstrate the significance of real agency and power in the periphery during this process. Thus, I suggest that decolonization may not simply represent a reversal of the forces that lead to colonization, and I attempt to reconcile the competing views on decolonization.

The Formation of Empire

Modern Scholarship on Empire Building

Generally, the arguments put forth for explaining the origin of empire can be characterized as metrocentric, pericentric, or systemic.[2] Modern scholarship on imperialism begins with a metrocentric or dispositional view. The set of explanations falling under this rubric can be divided roughly among those emphasizing nongovernment actors, economic forces, and government actors. J. A. Hobson, for instance, argued that special economic interests within the metropole successfully manipulated Parliament as well as the general public for the purposes of expanding investment outlets abroad. Lenin, in contrast, understood imperialism as the monopoly and final stage of capitalism. Imperialism came not from the interests of specific financiers but from the invisible and seemingly uncontrollable forces of the capitalist system. Joseph Schumpeter returned to a focus on specific groups, but he countered the economic interest explanation with an emphasis on the militaristic basis of imperialism. In fact, capitalism and imperialism are antithetical to each other; imperialism represents the "objectless disposition of a state to unlimited forcible expansion" (that is, formal imperialism or territorial conquest) (Doyle 1986:23).

Alternatively, a pericentric approach suggests that the explanation for empire building lies within the colony itself. Gallagher and Robinson claim, "Imperialism may be defined as a sufficient political function of integrating new regions into the expanding economy; its character is largely decided by the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements of expansion in any particular region and time" (quoted in Doyle 1986:25). In other words, elites in the periphery who stood to gain from inclusion in the orbit of the metropole encouraged and called for the development of imperialism. Facing the metrocentric and systemic approaches head on, Gallagher and Robinson quip, "They [empires] were not the objects of serious national attention . . . It would be a gullible historiography which would see such gimcrack creations as necessary functions of the balance of power or as the highest stage of capitalism" (ibid.).

Finally, the systemic approach claims that imperialism represents the successful efforts by the metropole to secure additional resources from the periphery for the metropole's interest in an international balance of power. Waltz, for instance, suggests that while motives for specific empire building may vary, imperialism generally follows surpluses of people, goods, and capital. The constant factor in imperialism is the gross disparity in power between the metropole and the periphery. He concludes that "where gross imbalances in power exist, and where the means of transportation permit the export of goods and of the instruments of rule, the more capable people ordinarily exert a considerable influence over those less able to produce surpluses" (quoted in Doyle 1986:27). Likewise, Doyle characterizes the systemic position in the following terms: "Disparities in power provide both opportunities and motives for the establishment of empires" (1986:26).

Contemporary Scholarship on Empire Building

More recently, explanations of empire have returned to metrocentric principles, but they now focus on the behavior of the bureaucracy rather than on the financial sector or the military complex. One school, for instance, has described imperialism in terms of rent seeking. Bean, using the analogy of the firm, suggests that an optimal size exists for the state. A larger state can realize more gains from trade by providing a larger free-trade area. Furthermore, per-capita defense costs should fall, since doubling the area of territory less than doubles the distance of the border, that area most vulnerable to attack. He argues that "changes in military technology or in administrative technique can alter this range of optimum sizes of the state" (Bean 1973:205). Given these events, then, states will have the incentive to expand. Similarly, Freedman, though admitting that territory may be of value for reasons of "strategy, sentiment, politics, or economics," nevertheless fundamentally assumes that "the value to a nation of any territory is the increase in tax collections made possible by control of that territory, net of collection costs." Thus, "the size and shape of nations will be such as to maximize their joint potential net revenue and will approach from below the size which would maximize their potential gross revenue" (Freedman 1977:60).

A Grand Strategy Model of Empire Building

Finally, Lake offers a model for conceptualizing strategic importance as an explanation for empire (1992a, 1992b). Yet, he approaches this problem from a different angle. Rather than launching directly into an examination of empire building per se, he arrives at a discussion of imperialism only after first asking how states determine and execute a grand strategy. In this way, be concludes that nations choose to construct empires in response to specific circumstances, but that empire is not the only means for ensuring one nation's security.

He begins by arguing that states produce security for themselves, often by pooling resources with other states. At one extreme, the relationship will be one of cooperation, in which each state maintains its sovereignty. At the other extreme, one state establishes a hierarchic relationship over the other. The dominant state exercises complete control over the operations of the dominated state, and resources in the periphery are effectively controlled by the metropole. Lake identifies three variables to explain this relationship and the form it will take. Generally, one state will pool its resources when there are economies of scale to realize through this relationship. Then, a state will establish an empire when the costs of governance do not outweigh the benefits in security produced and when there is a low risk of opportunism from the periphery.

The first variable in Lake's model specifies when a relationship is likely. Drawing on microeconomic theory, Lake suggests two opportunities for a state to realize economies of scale in the production of security. In the first place, technological innovation may allow the military to replace personnel with sophisticated weaponry and project its force over a greater distance at a lower cost. Second, a division of labor between allies allows each partner to specialize in the military activity it can produce most efficiently. One ally, for instance, may produce the sophisticated weaponry while another provides the territory in which that weaponry is placed. Tying the two opportunities together, the ability to project force over greater distance may determine what territory or state would be the most valuable ally in the division of labor. Lake then accounts for the choice of empire in terms of the high risk of opportunism. He recognizes that an external strategy presents the possibility for opportunistic behavior by one or more of the partners. The probability that a partner will abandon, entrap, or exploit the state is generally a function of the relevant opportunity costs and the governance structure.

The opportunity costs to the state rise with the value of the colony. This value is measured in terms of the number of alternative territories from which the state can choose a partner. As that number decreases, the value of the specified colony increases. The value of the particular colony also rises as the number of its reasonable alternatives for alliance increase. Furthermore, opportunity costs are determined by the extent to which assets are transaction-specific. In particular, the technical nature of the asset may determine that its next best use is as scrap. The inability of the state to transfer these assets to other relationships increases opportunity costs by creating substantial "quasi-rents" (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978:297). Finally, the number of buyers in a market bears on the probability of opportunism. When there are few buyers, or alternative allies, the state cannot readily command the market, and "quasi-rents" and the risk of opportunism will increase. Lower "quasi-rents" and a decreased risk of opportunism, however, are associated with easily transferable assets and markets with increasing numbers of buyers, or partners.

The nature of the governance structure between the metropole and the periphery may also create or discourage opportunities. A more hierarchical relationship, for example, will prevent a partner from abandoning, entrapping, or exploiting the state. Conversely, in a less structured relationship, where the state enforces few constraints on the independent activities of the partner, a state will find itself increasingly vulnerable to the partner's independent interest. In sum, the lower the opportunity costs to the state and the more hierarchical the nature of the relationship, the smaller the likelihood that a state will face opportunistic behavior from its partners. In this case more efficient use is made of the pooled resources.

Any relationship between states also includes varying degrees of costs. Lake suggests that in the case of a dominant state seeking control over another, an agreement is set by contract or coercion. In either case, states do not face only (financial) startup costs. They must also contend with the costs of monitoring and maintaining the relationship, in terms of time and direct outlays. These costs will rise as the opportunity costs to the subordinate partner decrease, that is, as the number of attractive alternatives increases.

But these costs will also vary according to the nature of the relationship between the two or more states. A more hierarchical relationship generates at least three additional costs. First, as the relationship tends toward imperialism, the future provides fewer opportunities to renegotiate contracts. Therefore, greater specificity (implying additional costs) is demanded in the formulation of the initial contract. Furthermore, an empire must take greater care to insure against opportunistic behavior by the subordinate. The imperial power generally operates with a greater degree of coercion (laid over the contract and the costs associated with it), and with this coercion comes greater costs. Finally, in a hierarchical relationship, the metropole must alone bear the costs of enforcing the agreement over time, since it has the unique incentive to maintain the relationship.

In sum, Lake's grand strategy model explains when a nation will pool its resources in the production of security and predicts the nature of that relationship. A state will pool its resources with another when there are economies of scale to realize. Then a state will construct an empire out of this relationship when the risk of opportunism in the periphery is high and when the costs of governing the empire are low.

Although Lake's model provides important theoretical insight, such an orientation tends to ignore the very real disparity in power that may exist between two states. Lake's model suggests that states each take a bargaining position and maximize their preferences under circumstances of freedom and constraint. While not explicitly denying the possibility of a disparity in power, the use of terms such as the division of labor and exploitation or entrapment by the periphery tends to downplay the effect of superior bargaining positions and real gains for those positions in the process of decolonization. This essay seeks to demonstrate the gross disparity in power between the United States and Micronesia, while at the same time highlighting that the Micronesians were not completely helpless in this endeavor, that they retained a certain degree of political autonomy and agency.

Historical Background

Establishing the Trust Territory

From just east of the International Date Line to about five hundred miles short of the Philippines stretch the 2,141 islands of Micronesia. Although the islands have been grouped geographically, they represent a variety of cultures, languages, and kinship ties. Since the late fifteenth century--when the papacy granted the area to Spain--European, Japanese, and American interests have in turn influenced the culture and politics of these islands. Near the end of the nineteenth century, the Germans purchased the islands from the Spanish.[3] Still, Spanish Capuchins continued to work in the area alongside an increasing number of German Protestant missionaries. Following the defeat of Germany in World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations, Japan assumed control of the area under the League's Class "C" Mandate. Micronesia's fortune changed once again with the steady success of the U.S. campaign in the Pacific toward the end of World War II. As early as 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek had agreed at Cairo that the United States would acquire the former Japanese Mandated Islands. In 1945, this decision was confirmed by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin at Yalta (Nufer 1978:26-27).

From 1945 until 1947, the U.S. Navy Department controlled Micronesia de facto, while the departments of State and War argued over the nature of the forthcoming de jure rule. The State Department, on the one hand, focused its argument on the international trend toward decolonization and the role of the United States in encouraging this. Although it had no intention of giving the islands independence, the State Department argued for a looser and more temporary relationship. The War Department, on the other hand, stressed the strategic value of the islands and the need for strict control.

The newly formed Trusteeship Program sponsored by the United Nations satisfied the goals of the Department of State. The War Department, however, wanted greater control over the islands than trusteeship allowed and thus wanted the islands exempt from this agreement. In a letter to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote,

> Acquisition of. . . [Micronesia] by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead, it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world. (Nufer 1978:27)

Truman mediated the dispute between the two departments and eventually signed House Joint Resolution 233 on 18 July 1947. This resolution rendered effective the agreement signed at the United Nations on 2 April 1947 that established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.[4]

In consideration of the importance of these islands to U.S. security, the United Nations designated the Pacific Islands as a “strategic trust” in a “brilliant attempt at compromise” (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1994). The designation distinguished this region from the other ten trusteeships established at the same time, most importantly by transferring oversight of the territory from the U.N. General Assembly to the Security Council, where the United States retained veto power. It also accorded the United States the right to fortify the islands. Finally, the strategic trust provided that only the administering authority, that is, the United States, could permit any changes in or termination of the agreement. However, article 6 of the agreement also bound the United States

> to foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and. . . promote the development of the inhabitants . . . toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to this end . . . give to the inhabitants . . . a progressively increasing share in the Administration services in the territory and . . . take other appropriate measures towards those ends. (Nufer 1978:29)

Thus, although the United States successfully steered the administration of the Trust Territory away from wider oversight, it built into the agreement the inevitability of decolonization,

The Changing Relationship

Beginning in the 1960s the United States appeared to begin to honor its promises elaborated under the U.N. Charter regarding trust territories. Once again, article 6 of the agreement had stipulated that the United States would "foster the development of. . . political institutions" in order to encourage "self-government or independence for the peoples of Micronesia" (Nufer 1978:29). Along these lines, in 1961 the United States encouraged the development of the Council of Micronesia, a local representative body. Kennedy's National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 145 (cited in Nevin 1977:111-112; McHenry 1975:15, 17; Lynch 1973:117-118), issued in April 1962, outlined the U.S. interest in realizing its obligations to Micronesia under the terms of the original agreement. However, the security interests of the United States were of primary concern; the promise of decolonization came at a price for the Micronesians. Thus the course the United States chose in 1962 began to veer from the terms of the obligation set forth in 1945.

Although the Council of Micronesia produced few identifiable gains for sovereignty, members of the indigenous populations began to organize and eventually founded the Congress of Micronesia in 1965. The United States did not resist these efforts toward autonomy. Finally, in 1969, the United States agreed to meet for a first round of negotiations concerning the future political status of Micronesia. In May 1970 the Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia met with U.S. delegates on Saipan. As a result of this meeting, the United States offered commonwealth status to Micronesia, similar to the status granted to Puerto Rico. Specifically, the United States offered financial assistance and free entry of Micronesian goods into the United States. The United States, however, would retain rights over eminent domain; the Micronesian constitution and its laws could not be inconsistent with either the U.S. code or the U.S. constitution; and Micronesia could not unilaterally change the agreement. Again, the United States did not intend to grant the islands complete independence. Indeed, the United States had an interest in furthering the Congress of Micronesia, because it provided a means of "institutionally tying" the two states. It would allow the United States to continue to influence and control events in Micronesia under a cloak of legitimacy My point here, then, is simply to posit that there was a change, at least in the formal structure, and that that change needs explanation.

The new U.S. policy toward Micronesia resembles a "quasi-empire" as defined by David Lake (1992b). This is a relationship in which the metropole determines the form of government, selects local government leaders, and controls some allocation of resources at the same time that it allows some degree of sovereignty in the periphery. By the end of the 1960s, the United States had begun to encourage democratic forms of government at lower levels of administration, But the United States, through the administration of the Trust Territory, remained active in routine affairs in Micronesia. It still assigned Micronesian bureaucrats to positions within the administration, despite the growing influence of the Congress of Micronesia as well as individual movements for autonomy. Further, the United States continued to encourage Micronesian dependence on U.S. dollars. The United States maintained broad control over Micronesia, but in a manner that allowed the latter increasing sovereignty.[5]

Factors Contributing to a Change in Policy

Alternative Explanations

The purpose of this article is to identify, if possible, a link between colonization and decolonization. Before discussing the reasons for decolonization, I need to dismiss some of the explanations for empire building. In the first place, against Hobson's theory (1902), Micronesia promised no opportunities for U.S. financiers. There was no economy left in the still-burning embers of Japanese colonialism. The islands possessed few exploitable resources. Phosphate deposits on the island of Anguar, in the Western Carolines, would be exhausted by 1955. Even so, it was a British company that extracted this natural fertilizer. Also, no effort was made to redevelop the agricultural tracts left by the Japanese in Babelthaub (Palau) or Saipan. Likewise, as the preceding discussion indicates, Micronesia could play no role in any stage of capitalism. In response to Lenin (1917), the pool of labor available in the islands was never tapped for manufacturing. This evidence also suggests, challenging Freedman's theory (1977), that the United States could expect little from Micronesia in terms of rents or tax revenue. And the small and economically distressed Micronesian population could add nothing to a larger U.S. free-trade area, against Bean's theoretical contention (1973). Furthermore, local elites in Micronesia might have gained something by soliciting the patronage of a colonial power like the United States; Gallagher and Robinson may provide some insight (1953). However, in my view there would have been no reason for the United States to offer its patronage without receiving gains in security in return. The case of Micronesia certainly illustrates a gross disparity in power between it and the United States. But Waltz's theory (1979) provides only a description of empire as such and does not provide much insight into why the United States colonized these islands. Indeed, there were many other militarily weak territories that were not colonized by the United States at this time. Finally, although I argue that colonization in Micronesia can be traced to the military and security interests of the United States, I do not suggest, challenging Schumpeter (1955), that it represents any "objectless disposition" by the United States (Doyle 1986:23). Instead, colonization in Micronesia meets specific and thoughtful criteria for U.S. grand strategy in the postwar era.

Strategic Factors

Economies of Scale in Defense. Perhaps a more useful starting point for linking the construction and disassembling of an empire is with a discussion of U.S. security interests.[6] As the remark from Henry Stimson quoted above indicates, the United States valued the strategic position of the islands. Specifically, the United States determined that it must control the Pacific in order to check the advance of communism. Although the United States could project missiles over greater distances than the enemy, a forward defense strategy dictated that the United States deflect attack on its own territory and bring the battle to the enemy. In the light of this strategy, the United States forced upon the islands a division of labor whereby it provided military technology and Micronesia provided its most valuable asset, strategic location.[7]

The islands of Micronesia allowed the implementation of a forward defense strategy that secured the entire western Pacific Rim, from the Philippines northward to Korea. Micronesia did for U.S. policy in Asia what Greenland and the Azores did for U.S. policy in the European Theater. However, aside from Guam, which is juridically outside the trusteeship, and Kwajalein, which was developed for military purposes from late in World War II, the United States did not actually develop military installations in Micronesia. In these terms, fortified Guam was the key Micronesian link in the defense chain. The other, nonfortified islands served as a security buffer for Guam.[8]

Clearly, the U.S. Navy was interested in the Pacific before the threat of communism and the doctrine of containment. Indeed, Guam and the Philippines were taken at the end of the nineteenth century, and the proximity to Japan was significant before Stalin or Truman came to power. That is, the United States might have taken the islands earlier, before the communist threat, if Japan had not stood in its way. The foregoing analysis attempts to explain the importance of Micronesia within the circumstances under which it was in fact taken by the United States, that is, as part of a cold-war policy.

Two developments during the 1960s resulted in a dramatic change in the economies of scale with regard to the role of Micronesia in U.S. defense strategies. Because of détente, the United States did not face as great a possibility of engaging the Soviet Union in these areas. More important, improved nuclear technology allowed the United States to produce and manage its security interests from a greater distance.[9] The United States could still protect a front from the Philippines up to Korea. Long-range nuclear capability, specifically the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), managed from already established military installations, could replace a physical presence in the islands.[10] Thus, during the 1960s the United States moved away from the forward defense strategy that had given Micronesia such strategic importance.[11] Although Micronesia may not have been important in terms of available technology, it continued to be of importance strategically. The drawn-out status negotiation process demonstrates that the United States did not completely give up its interest. Kwajalein, for instance, would continue to be important as a missile testing area.

Costs of Governance. Contributing to the U.S. interest in the initial formation of the Trust Territory administration was the relatively low cost of governance. Despite its hierarchical structure, the governing of Micronesia came at a bargain. Immediately following World War II, the United States was spending about $1 million per year in Micronesia (U.S. Department of the Navy 1948-1951),[12] in sharp contrast to the $1 million per day for the administration of Germany and Japan (Schaller 1985:82).[13] Not only was the foward defense considered sound strategy, it was also relatively inexpensive to realize.

However, during the first two decades of the administration of the Trust Territory, the West witnessed dramatic improvements in health care and communication technology as well as an increase in the number of consumer goods available at relatively low costs. The increased expectations for goods and services generated by these advances could not be ignored in Micronesia. The United States had not only committed itself to monitoring the relationship with Micronesia formally through the maintenance of the administration itself; it had also committed to treating Micronesian illnesses, educating Micronesian children, and providing incomes to Micronesian families so they could purchase imports from Japan and the United States. Accordingly, the theory suggests that the United States should begin to extricate itself from financial obligations by gradually reducing its program of political domination.[14]

Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 tally the appropriations from the United States to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Between 1948 and 1950, there were actual decreases in the amounts appropriated. However, in 1951 they jumped 142 percent, followed by another jump of 111 percent. The year 1951 marks the transition of the administration of Micronesia to the Department of the Interior. Accordingly, this sharp increase in appropriations may reflect a difference in reportable costs, not an increased commitment to the maintenance of or encouragement of self-determination in Micronesia. Certain costs met by the navy in the preceding three years may not have been reportable to the United Nations. Nufer suggests that the U.S. Navy may have been spending as much as $25 to $30 million annually for the administration of Micronesia (Nufer 1978:51). By 1967 sources of funding for government operational support and capital improvement programs in the Trust Territory were as follows, in order of magnitude (U.S. Department of State 1967):

1/ annual grant provided from funding appropriated to the U.S. Secretary of the Interior
2/ federal (U.S.) categorical grants provided on a matching or outright grant basis
3/ tax revenues levied by the district governments of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
4/ reimbursements earned by the government of the Trust Territory for utilities provided
5/ international organizations

TABLE 1. **Appropriations from the United States to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1948 to 1976 (000s of 1982 U.S. dollars)[a]**

Year	U.S. Appropriations	Trust Territory costs	Balance (Local revenue and funds carried forward)	Percentage of Total Met by United States	Percentage Increase in U.S. Appropriations
1948	7,739	6,120	-1,619	126.42	
1949	7,214	7,149	-65	100.89	-6.78
1950	4,916	7,676	2,760	64.00	-31.85
1951	11,918	7,921	-3,997	150.44	142.43
1952	25,158	28,228	3,070	89.11	111.09
1953	29,755	37,531	7,776	79.27	18.27
1954	28,669	30,954	2,285	92.61	-3.65
1955	24,038	29,716	5,678	80.89	-16.15
1956	25,337	35,136	9,799	72.11	5.40
1957	24,703	32,117	7,414	76.91	-2.50
1958	23,572	30,800	7,228	76.53	-4.58
1959	25,926	33,207	7,281	78.07	9.99
1960	27,377	33,028	5,561	82.89	5.60
1961	24,145	29,251	5,106	82.54	11.81
1962	23,969	30,243	6,274	79.25	0.73
1963	55,762	62,245	6,483	89.58	132.64
1964	54,347	66,054	11,707	82.27	-2.54
1965	61,403	82,480	21,077	74.44	12.98
1966	58,201	79,714	21,513	73.01	-5.21
1967	61,519	83,099	21,580	74.03	5.70
1968	91,238	106,755	15,517	85.46	48.30
1969	85,470	108,547	23,077	78.74	-6.32
1970	126,278	133,417	7,139	94.64	47.75
1971	146,009	125,343	-20,666	116.48	15.63
1972	136,940	135,815	-1,125	100.82	-6.21
1973	127,388	133,358	5,970	95.52	-7.50
1974	113,404	143,534	30,130	79.00	-10.98
1975	120,883	113,942	-6,941	106.09	6.60
1976	129,702	236,079	106,377	54.94	7.30

Sources: U.S. Department of the Navy 1948-1951; U.S. Department of State 1952-1977.

[a] According to the Compact of Free Association Act of 1985 (PL 99-239), the United States commits to annual payments to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, for the purposes of their development, a total of $2.3 billion over fifteen years. PL 99-658 provides for legislation pertaining to a compact with the Republic of Palau. It commits the United States to $450 million over a fifteen-year period beginning in FY 1994 (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1994:569).



FIGURE. 1. **Division of Trust Territory costs between U.S. appropriations and local revenue.** *(Sources:* See Table 1.)



FIGURE 2. **Total U.S. appropriations compared to total Trust Territory costs.** *(Sources:* See Table 1.)

In 1963, appropriations jumped from $23 million to $55 million (in 1982 dollars), an increase of 132 percent. In April 1962, President Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum 145, in which he wrote, “The present Administration has recognized . . . that fundamental changes have been taking place in the outlook of the peoples of the remaining dependent areas and in the attitude of the rest of the world toward these areas, bringing with it a recognition of the need for a greatly accelerated program of political, economic, and social development” (quoted in Lynch 1973:118). Furthermore, he argued that the Trust Territory must be given the real option to move into “a new and everlasting relationship with the United States within [its] political framework.” Toward this end he proposed the formation of a task force that would operate with the principles of American security clearly in the fore. In May of the same year, Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum 243, which commissioned Harvard business professor Anthony M. Solomon to tour Micronesia and report on its economic and social development. To be sure, Solomon made recommendations for increased outlays based on the appalling state in which the Micronesians had been kept. Still, interest in development was integrally tied to a continuing security interest. The report did not question the assumption that the United States should incorporate Micronesia into some sort of permanent relationship acceptable to the international community. It recommended that the United States hold a plebiscite in 1968, at which time the Micronesians would have the opportunity to choose between independence and a permanent relationship. It was expected that a significant increase in outlays up to 1968 would heighten a “sense of progress” and would persuade the Micronesians to choose a permanent relationship (Peoples 1985: 16 -17).

In the spirit with which the Solomon report was commissioned and keeping an eye on security, Kennedy set about to improve conditions with increased outlays.[15] Deviating from earlier rhetoric, Kennedy appealed to a sense of moral obligation. Accordingly, he accelerated the mechanism that led to the dramatic increase in outlays in 1963. In terms of economies of scale in the production of security, he thereby created a more glaring discrepancy between the amount spent and the security realized.

Indeed, the commitments made by the Kennedy administration in the interest of an “everlasting relationship” eventually proved too costly. After Kennedy’s death in 1963, the Johnson administration continued the increased outlays, but a greater proportion went to administrative costs and never reached the people directly in the form of education and health care (Meller 1966). It would be many years before the United States substantially cut its appropriations to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; for a few years after the 1963 jump, the outlays stabilized at the higher level. Yet, this leveling itself reflects the beginning of a shift in U.S. policy. The price of administrative and social services was rising. Technology in health care, for example, was improving, but it was also marginally more expensive. Fulfillment of the promises of 1963 would have demanded increasing appropriations at a time when the value of Micronesia to U.S. defense strategy was decreasing.

Significantly, however, the appropriations took another leap (48.30 percent) in 1968 and (47.75 percent) in 1970 (see Table 1). In 1968 the Congress of Micronesia's Commission on Future Status submitted an interim report in which it defined four political alternatives for Micronesia. In July 1969, the commission submitted its second report, which called for self-government, but in free association with the United States. Finally, in October 1969, the United States and Micronesia met for the first round of future-status negotiations. The coincidence of the increase in appropriations and the activities by the Congress of Micronesia and its Future Status Commission suggests that, although maintenance of a colonial administration may have temporarily proved too costly, the United States was still deeply concerned about the implications of independence in Micronesia. And it demonstrates that the United States was willing to continue to up its ante to ensure a resolution of the negotiations that was favorable to its interests.

Dependency and the Low Risk of Opportunism. To continue the discussion of Lake's model, the risk of opportunism may be a function of the number of alternative alliances available to the periphery. By implication, this risk is a function of the ability of a local elite to organize resistance to one state and propose an alliance with another. In the early years of the Trust Territory, the Micronesians seemed too scattered and disorganized to challenge the United States successfully and court the patronage of another power. Yet there were other reasons why the United States feared that Micronesia would appropriate the gains in security intended for the United States. Specifically because it could identify no one institution with whom to ally, the United States feared that the islands might easily drift apart politically The anarchic nature of the islands would prevent the United States from effectively controlling the area and would quickly swallow up the gains the United States sought. By treating them as one unit, the United States reversed the principle of divide and conquer and forced Micronesia into a single bargaining unit with whom it would be more convenient to negotiate. Thus, it was imperative that the United States treat this diverse group of islands as one unit. Coincidentally, the United Nations also expressed a clear interest in maintaining the integrity of Micronesia as a whole. Later attempts by the United States to deal with the Marianas separately, in a reversal of that tactic, would be met with stiff resistance by the United Nations. And individual Micronesian islands themselves, namely, the Marianas, the Marshalls, and Palau, would eventually take advantage of this tactic.

In the mid-1960s the development of a local ruling elite may have precluded the dissolution of cooperation among the islands against which the United States had once guarded. However, once an elite began to emerge, the United States might have cause to fear an active appropriation of their security gains by the Micronesians. The risk of opportunism may have been the highest at this time, and the principles of grand strategy would have dictated that the United States not shift its influence away from formal control. While not entirely eliminating this challenge, the United States managed to mitigate its effect. The United States had created a relationship of dependency through its financial outlays such that the Micronesians could not afford to extricate themselves completely from the influence of the United States. In other words, even though there was now theoretically a set of actors capable of exploiting the United States, these actors were constrained by another set of variables, those of financial dependence.[16]

Table 2 and Figure 3 display estimated figures for Micronesian imports and exports from 1949 to 1976. Until phosphate mining on Anguar ceased in 1955, Micronesia often ran a trade surplus. After 1955, however, the trade deficit grew at an alarming rate. The opportunity costs of the political relationship with the United States had risen for Micronesia. Increasing numbers of Micronesians no longer learned the art of fishing, which had sustained older generations. Their time was spent in school or in territorial administration. They had shifted from a subsistence economy based on barter to a money economy based on imports from Japan, Australia, and the United States. Furthermore, they had not developed a viable commercial fishing industry that might have helped to sustain them. In short, they could not afford to move forward without the continued support of the United States, nor could they afford to go back to a traditional way of life.[17] Indeed, I would suggest that this economic reality was not simply an unintended consequence of U.S. policies. The principles explicitly stated in the Solomon report were taken up by the Nixon administration, even if the United States had failed in executing a plebiscite in 1968. In the next section I will argue for the role of the Micronesians in furthering the cause for their own self-government. But it must be kept in mind that their efforts were constrained by their own willingness to accept and to come to expect payments from the United States.[18]

Despite this dependence on the United States, it might be suspected that Micronesia could have broken ties and forged an alliance with some other patron. The effects of détente in the 1960s notwithstanding, Micronesia might have opted for a relationship with the Soviet Union. Micronesians probably recognized, however, that the Soviet Union could not offer anything above that offered by the United States.[19] And since Micronesians were not hostile toward the United States, there was no incentive to shift alliances. Furthermore, the United Nations, despite its complaints against the U.S. administration of the Trust Territory, was still clearly in favor of the United States' managing the path to self-government in Micronesia. Finally, the Soviet Union would have realistically judged the impossibility of replacing the United States as a hegemon in the Pacific, in the same sense that the United States did not realistically hope to replace the Soviet Union in the Eastern Bloc. A line had been drawn, and the two superpowers knew on which side each stood. McHenry goes so far as to suggest that both China and the Soviet Union wanted the United States in Micronesia as a deterrent to the other communist power (1975:79).[20]

For another reason, however, the United States should not have feared opportunistic behavior from the new elite in Micronesia. The discussion of the development of nuclear capability above suggests that Micronesia would have few security gains to appropriate from the United States. The United States was realizing its economies of scale elsewhere. Thus, even if Micronesia was not financially dependent on the United States, there was no room to exploit the United States, because there was now nothing of value invested by the United States in Micronesia.[21] Thus, the state of dependency successfully, though not necessarily intentionally, set in motion over many years reinforced the decisions made by the United States in the light of technological and political change. National security was still of paramount importance, but dependency provided extra insurance against abandonment or exploitation by Micronesia.[22] It was a convenient way to substitute a more costly formal relationship with a less costly informal relationship while meeting the same objective, security.[23]

To sum up the security argument, the United States identified Micronesia as a resource for the production of security because the strategic location of Micronesia provided an opportunity for the United States to realize economies of scale in the production of security. The United States chose empire over cooperation with Micronesia for two reasons. First, the costs of maintenance did not surpass the benefits derived from that empire, Second, because of the disorganized nature of the Micronesian islands, the risk of opportunism to the United States was high. Beginning in the 1960s however, the United States could realize economies of scale through deployment of the ICBM. The costs of maintaining the empire were no longer justified in the light of new economies of scale. And the risk of opportunism

TABLE 2. Estimated Total Value of Imports and Exports for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1949 to 1976 (000s of 1982 U.S. dollars)

Year	Imports	Exports
1949	5,835	11,280[a]
1950	6,974	8,507
1951	10,780	10,730
1952	8,768	8,300
1953	10,200	5,807
1954	10,460	15,480
1955	11,960	20,680
1956	14,500	7,911
1957	18,160	7,201
1958	18,000	6,859
1959	16,300	5,045
1960	15,050	7,596
1961	17,950	8,387
1962	15,740	8,081
1963	18,700	8,035
1964	20,600	9,580
1965	24,880	11,060
1966	29,920	10,090
1967	31,470	7,441
1968	41,000	9,141
1969	39,720	8,139
1970	54,910	10,960
1971	63,820	7,319
1972	60,120	6,020
1973	55,260	4,003
1974	56,030	15,400
1975	66,220	11,830
1976	62,430	7,832

Sources: U.S. Department of the Navy 1948-1951; U.S. Department of State 1952-1977.

[a] Primary exports are phosphates (until 1955), copra, trochus, handicrafts and shells, vegetables, fish and crab, and charcoal.

was either very low because of Micronesian dependence on U.S. dollars or irrelevant because there was nothing for the Micronesians to appropriate from the United States.

Although a grand strategic analysis of U.S. behavior in Micronesia may claim to demonstrate that decolonization entails a reversal of the process of colonization, the foregoing discussion should begin to point to the complex-



FIGURE 3. Comparison of Trust Territory imports and exports. *(Sources:* See Table 2.)

ity of the issue. Thus, I would like to consider some other evidence to highlight the inadequacy of this analysis and to demonstrate that the process of decolonization is not so simple. Whereas constructing an empire has often been the result of specific interests, emanating from the metropole, whether financial or militaristic, dismantling an empire often involves the influence of actors from the periphery and the international community.

External Constraints on the Metropole

A Threat from the Local Elite. Despite the dependency on the United States, local Micronesian elites did begin to pose a political challenge to U.S. dominance. As I indicated above, the United States did not eliminate all movements toward autonomy. In 1961, in fact, it encouraged the development of the Council of Micronesia, although the movement never gained much momentum. However, by 1965 the indigenous population had established the Congress of Micronesia. Four years later, the Congress of Micronesia and representatives of the United States formally met for the first round of negotiations concerning the future political status of Micronesia. Eighteen years had passed since Truman transferred the administration of the Trust Territory to the Department of the Interior. Now it looked as though the United States was finally moving toward realization of its original commitment, though still apparently constrained by strategic interests.

Ironically, the development of the Congress of Micronesia was indirectly facilitated by the programs committed to by the United States, even before the Americans intended or expected to change their posture in the Pacific. Although older Micronesians may have communicated among different island groups in Japanese, the younger, increasingly political, Micronesians benefited from the outlays for education, in particular the teaching of the English language. Indeed, Heine goes so far as to suggest that the "English language is the only vehicle of political unity in Micronesia" (1970: 202).[24] Furthermore, an increasing number of Micronesians attended the universities of Guam and Hawai'i. Students from throughout the territory met, interacted, and exchanged ideas. Consistent with the increasing number of Western-educated Micronesians, the Trust Territory administration hired more Micronesians to fill positions at both the federal and district levels. In particular, the dramatic increases in appropriations in 1963 allowed the administration to follow this hiring pattern (Nufer 1978:76).

Although the U.S. government and senior representatives in the Trust Territory continued to determine policy, Micronesians increasingly oversaw the implementation of these programs (Goodman and Moos 1981:76). Micronesians began to develop the political acumen that would enable them to effectively organize and displace the territorial government. Even as early as 1961, the ***United Nations Review*** reported, "The people of the territory . . . felt much closer to their government now that their own compatriots took part, and Micronesians realized that administration was their responsibility and that to discharge it they must educate themselves" (Aug. 1961, p. 16). The needs of the local bureaucracy began to create the space in which the Micronesians developed the skills and identity necessary for independence.

With this education also came a heightened awareness among the islanders of a unifying Micronesian culture. Whereas they may have formerly emphasized their individual identities as a Palauan or a Trukese, for example, increased education and participation in the territorial administration brought an appreciation of shared conditions and treatment by an outside power. Robert Trumball reported, "Peace Corpsmen who came to the Trust Territory from stations in the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia were astonished to find the Micronesians almost totally lacking in the fervent [island] nationalism seen in other peoples brought under colonization" ***(New York Times,*** 30 Oct. 1967, p. 1, col. 7). This finding indicates the degree to which the Micronesians began to assume an identity imposed on them from outside, that is, as a group rather than as individual entities. And this identity was apparently integral to their growing political activism. In a position paper preparatory to a round of status negotiations, one author reports, "It can be stated that [the] Congress of Micronesia has a united front; a false sense of unity only because it has a common foe--the presence of the American Administering Authority" (Nufer 1978:71).

As the United States increasingly inculcated Western ways of thinking upon the Micronesians, the latter came to adopt a view of themselves understood by the Westerners. If they were to speak English and work in a Western form of government, they could only successfully articulate themselves in the terms provided for them. For over fifteen years, the colonial power had treated them essentially as one group, denying fundamental differences in culture, language, and kinship. But this emphasis also provided the foundation for a movement toward self-government and a local ruling elite. As Doyle suggests, "imperial development, just as it created collaboration, also created the basis for resistance and revolt: it spread technical and organization skills, it widened political horizons as it built larger national political units, and it recruited new strata into political participation" (1986:363).

Heine takes issue with the contention that Micronesia in general and its congress in particular expressed a strong sense of unity (1970). He points to significant linguistic cleavages and particular island identities as well as a clear dissension on issues within the Congress of Micronesia. Indeed, the Northern Marianas increasingly vocalized its claim for separate status talks with the United States, and eventually Palau and the Marshall Islands would stake the same claim. Beyond the linguistic and cultural issues, the Northern Marianas probably recognized the potential for a better bargaining position with the United States if it was not constrained by its linkage with the rest of Micronesia; that is, the Northern Marianas comprised the most strategic of the Trust Territory islands, and it did not fancy the idea of seeing its tax revenue dissipated among the other, more populous areas of Micronesia. The United States was willing to treat the islands separately, reversing its earlier policy, even against the wishes of the United Nations.[25]

My point is that, despite these cleavages, Micronesians began to demand a place at the negotiating table. Even if Nufer is correct that Micronesia shows a united front "only because it has a common foe," it shows a front nonetheless. And it was a front with which the United States had to reckon. Even if eventually successful in capitalizing on the cultural or political cleavages, the United States still contended with calls for self-government and eventual independence from Micronesia--whether from one unified body or the four separate bodies that eventually formed.

International Pressure. One of the first challenges to the United States from the international community came with the passage of the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" on 14 December 1961. Among its provisions, the document provided that "[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence" ***(United Nations Review,*** Jan. 1961, p. 7). Yet, these were just the sorts of arguments produced by the United States in defending its position in the Pacific. Ironically, the Soviet Union had been particularly vocal in the debate leading to the document's passage. The Soviets vigorously attacked the United States for its hypocrisy, as indeed the United States seemed particularly interested in Europe's divestment of its colonies.[26] Valerian Zorin, the Soviet delegate, lambasted the United States as the most powerful colonial power, one that operated with "a more dangerous and sinister aspect" ***(United Nations Review,*** Jan. 1961, p. 9). Although the United States may not have felt directly threatened by the Soviet Union, this criticism did bring the situation in Micronesia to the attention of the world community.[27]

I have mentioned that with National Security Action Memorandum 145, issued in April 1962, Kennedy first articulated the need to accelerate development in the "remaining dependent areas," and on the heels of this memorandum came the Solomon report. The action came just five months after the passage of the U.N. document on decolonization. The timing is significant and suggests that external moral pressures may have begun to influence the policy of the United States and the form that its colony in the Pacific would take.

The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, as well as the Decolonization Committee, with no authority over the Security Council, also became increasingly critical of the U.S. presence in Micronesia. Although oversight for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands fell within the Security Council, where the United States retained veto power, the Trusteeship Council sent a series of visiting missions in 1951, 1953, 1956, and 1957 to observe and report on conditions in Micronesia. Presumably under U.S. pressure, they generally reported favorably on conditions. These missions appear to have been mostly a formality, generating little reaction. In the 1960s though still of a generally optimistic tone, the reports became more critical; and recommendations for setting specific dates to terminate the trusteeship agreement came more frequently.[28] Following a 1961 visit, for example, the Trusteeship Council commended the United States for progress but urged "realistic target dates for the rapid and planned advance of the territory" ***(United Nations Review,*** Aug. 1962, p. 27). Dr. Carlos Salamanca, the Bolivian delegate to the Trusteeship Council, quipped that "the United States is administering its Pacific Trust islands with a minimum of economic resources in a shoestring empire" ***(New York Times,*** 5 June 1962, p. 11, col. 1). Indeed, the most vocal opposition to the continued role of the United States in Micronesia came from members of the United Nations who had recently been liberated themselves and who hoped to see this liberation applied to all countries.

The Soviet criticism continued beyond the debate on the declaration on colonialism. In 1965, the Soviet delegation to the Trusteeship Council charged the United States with negligence with respect to the objectives of article 6 of the U.N. Charter ***(New York Times,*** 10 June 1965, p. 6, col. 3). The following year, the Soviet delegation called on the United States to set a deadline for the termination of its administration of the Trust Territory, claiming that "the United States was treating the islands as a colonial military base and doing little for the people" ***(New York Times,*** 1 July 1966, p. 14, col. 8).[29]

It is interesting to note that the ***United Nations Review*** for the decade under consideration never reported any action on the part of the Security council pertaining to Micronesia. All of the activity reported took place within the Trusteeship Council and its visiting missions. Strikingly, there are no reports in the ***Review*** of the United States defending its position against the accusations of the Trusteeship Council or the Soviet Union. Whether this absence reflects a bias in reporting against the United States is difficult to ascertain. But if the silence from the United States is accurate, it may reflect a recognition by the United States that no argument it could offer for its management of Micronesia. would satisfy its critics.

Another source of criticism in the 1960s came, ironically, from a program initiated by the United States itself, namely, the Peace Corps. In 1966, the United States began sending young women and men to the islands as elementary school teachers. Some of these volunteers actively encouraged the Micronesians to seek autonomy. A particular group of volunteers, dubbed the "media specialists" by Robert Trumbull ***(New York Times,*** 11 May 1969, p. 2, col. 3), established newspapers in most districts, criticizing the administration in weekly mimeographed publications. These activities did not go unnoticed stateside, as "American officials . . . blamed young activists in the Peace Corps [particularly some attorneys] for a. . . surge in Micronesian sentiment for independence." The U.S. government cut the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Micronesia from a high of 665 in 1968 to 411 in 1969 (ibid.). That the government bothered to respond in this manner suggests that the United States considered this criticism to be a potential threat.

The number of references from the ***New York Times*** in the preceding paragraphs indicates yet another source of pressure on the United States.[30] The ***New York Times Index*** for each of the years of the 1950s contains few references to Micronesia. Those that do exist are concerned primarily with administrative issues such as the transfer of authority to the Department of the Interior. However, the number of articles and their length increased significantly in the 1960s. Many Americans no doubt were previously unaware of the islands' existence, much less of the nature of the agreement between the United States and Micronesia. Robert Trumbull, residing in Saipan, wrote a series of articles for the ***New York Times,*** often candid and critical of the U.S. administration. He reported the comment of Lazarus E. Salii (Palau), chairman of the Joint Committee on Future Status and the first president of the Republic of Palau: "Public Opinion has been so opposed to the American administration of the Trust Territory that the United States cannot take the Micronesians for granted" ***(New York Times,*** 7 May 1969, p. 15, col. 1).

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, the United States began to alter its relationship with Micronesia beginning in the 1960s. Following Lake's model, changes in technology and a world balance of power created the opportunity for the United States to realize economies of scale in the production of security elsewhere. Along with this opportunity, the costs of governing Micronesia began to outweigh the benefits of security for the United States. Furthermore, dependency on the United States provided insurance against abandonment, entrapment, or exploitation by Micronesians. At the same time, however, a viable local elite began to emerge in Micronesia and to challenge U.S. domination. Finally, pressure from the international community mounted against the United States and encouraged it to retreat from total political control of the islands.

A comparison of the variables that contributed to the change in U.S. policy toward Micronesia with those variables that led to the formation of the empire requires a comparative analysis of the relative importance of each variable. The question to be addressed is whether the motives that led to decolonization represent a reversal of those that contributed to colonization. As discussed in this article, strategic concerns appeared to be the principal motivation for acquiring Micronesia. A change in the forward defense strategy during the 1960s because of a changing balance of power and technological innovation, suggests that the strategic importance of Micronesia, as originally conceived, had changed. Since this strategy appears to be the only motivation for establishing the empire, we might conclude that removal of this factor was the key event leading to decolonization. Nevertheless, when we consider the retrenchment from Okinawa and the Philippines, and if we consider that communism continued to gain ground in Southeast Asia, perhaps the United States could not, in its eyes, afford to lose control of

Micronesia. Indeed, the military value of the islands is not limited strictly to the possibility of missile deployment. Logistics are equally important (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1994). Furthermore, a purely strategic evaluation presents a one-sided analysis that ignores the very real power of the local Micronesians as well as the international community. Indeed, their position of agency in this matter should not be underestimated. In this case, then, the importance of alternative explanations for decolonization become all the more important.

Admittedly, the importance, if not the fact, of local and international pressure may be undermined by the considerable control the United States continues, even to today, to enjoy in Micronesia. Indeed, the record of U.S. management of Micronesia suggests that if a moral obligation did play a role in decolonization, it was only after a period of extended (moral) neglect. Clearly, adherence to the U.N. agreement does not fully explain U.S. policy in Micronesia. Throughout the 1950s for instance, U.S. appropriations never rose to the annual $7.5-million cap allowed by Congress. For years, the United States did not interfere in the daily lives of the majority of Micronesians and allowed many of them to subsist in squalid conditions. Further isolating the islands from international contact, the United States forbade civilian travel to the islands, ostensibly for security reasons.

Perhaps of greatest significance, the United States transferred the Trust Territory administration from the navy to the Department of the Interior in 1951. In keeping with the spirit of the U.N. resolution, transferring the administration to the State Department would have been much more appropriate. However, despite the U.N. resolution, some members of the U.S. Congress wanted to annex Micronesia formally and permanently. They believed that if Micronesia could play a role in containment, it might be less expensive and involve fewer problems in the long run if Micronesia was legally a part of the United States. Many in Congress really did not believe that what the United States was doing in Micronesia looked anything like what the French and British had been involved with in Africa or Asia. Indeed, at the time, few complained about U.S. control of Guam or Hawai‘i.

Certain evidence needs to be highlighted, however, to suggest that, although security interest is an important variable, external moral pressure cannot be ignored. For instance, it is significant that the United States, despite creating a special designation for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, still bound itself to the principles of independent development of Micronesia in article 6 of the U.N. Charter, even if it then took fifteen years to realize these commitments. The United States also bound itself to some monitoring of development in Micronesia. Furthermore, by couching his policy toward Micronesia in moral terms, Kennedy suggested that the United States should be prepared to relinquish this colony, even if that would contradict U.S. security interests. If the application of Lake's model presented in this article provides an accurate account of Micronesian development, then relinquishing the colony did not contradict the security interests. But this article has demonstrated that Lake's model, though not without merit, cannot provide a complete description of the case of Micronesia.

If Micronesia no longer provides a means for producing security for the United States, then why didn't the United States completely abandon Micronesia with the development of détente and the ICBM? Although the appropriations for Micronesia stopped escalating after an increase of 132 percent in 1963, why did the United States maintain appropriations, especially at a higher level? Why did the United States continue to monitor the Congress of Micronesia? And why did the United States continue to meet for status negotiations? The answers to these questions lie with moral and political pressure from Micronesia and the international community. I suggest that this pressure not only played a role in decolonization, but that it also mitigated the effects of that decolonization on Micronesia. The coincidence of international pressure and a continued interest in Micronesia subsequently provided the incentive for the United States to incorporate Micronesia into some sort of permanent relationship with the United States. By executing this relationship with the consent of the Micronesians themselves, then the international pressure would surely wane. This, then, explained the interest of the United States in the status negotiations (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1984).

In a broader sense, the case of Micronesia illustrates that even great powers in the international "state of nature" become bound to commitments and may change their policies toward their dependencies for reasons other than the great powers' own interests. It suggests that superpowers may not be completely autonomous agents, but have become involved in a complex web of international norms and standards for the treatment of nonthreatening states. Furthermore, this case argues that power does not always come from the barrel of a gun. The change in policy toward Micronesia did not require rebellion in the periphery; much less did it require external support for rebellion.[31]

Decolonization in Micronesia illustrates that independence may come from an appeal to the rights of groups to govern themselves and from the peaceful transference of those structures of governance. But more important, this all suggests that the process of decolonization is a much more complex process than colonization and that a one-to-one linking of colonization with decolonization is a dubious project.

NOTES

I would like to thank David Lake for encouraging me to pursue my interest in Micronesia and for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. I would also like to thank Arthur A. Stein, Francis X. Hezel, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful substantive comments.

I. I will use the terms *empire* and *colony* somewhat interchangeably throughout.

2. The organization of the following three paragraphs was guided by Doyle (1986: 22-30).

3. In 1886, after Pope Leo XIII resolved the dispute between Germany and Spain over the title to the islands, Spain had two governors in the islands. This situation ended with the sale to the Germans in 1899 (see Hezel 1983).

4. For a description of metropolitan internationalists versus nationalists, see Snyder 1991: chap. 7.

5. There are certainly competing labels for this sort of arrangement. For consistency's sake, I will preserve Lake's term.

6. That these represent a general law of empire building might be challenged by the reasons Spain and Germany had for colonizing the same islands. Hezel suggests that the Caroline Islands were a "token of national prestige . . . a national adornment and little more to both these European countries" (pers. com., 1994).

7. For a discussion of the Pentagon's "East Asian Base Structure," see Snyder 1991: 268-270.

8. The U.S. Navy does have SeaBee camps scattered throughout the islands, and the CIA is reported to have trained Chinese guerrillas on Saipan.

9. In the late 1960s and early 1970s appropriations seem to indicate a renewed interest in Micronesia. In the wake of the Vietnam War, with the threat of expulsion from the Philippines and the return of Okinawa to Japan, the military began to turn its eyes to Micronesia. B-52 bombing missions to Vietnam flew over thirty hours round-trip from Guam because the Philippines would not allow bombers from Subic or Clark to fly on these missions. But at least from the early to mid-1960s the military interest seemed to wane.

10. The United States did not withdraw its forces from the Philippines, Guam, and so forth. But it had committed itself more heavily in those places in terms of military hardware and personnel. The costs of withdrawing those assets would have been much greater than withdrawing a small bureaucracy from Saipan. In other words, not only could the United States realize economies of scale elsewhere, but the cost of making that shift was minimal in the case of Micronesia. For a discussion of the U.S. Republican Party (led by Senator Robert Taft) preference for atomic power over troop deployment, see Snyder 1991:266-268.

11. Nevertheless, U.S. strategy may still have been conducted in the terms of World War II. That is, despite the introduction of the ICBMs, the United States still saw the importance of planning for conventional wars. Indeed, by the 1960s the United States was involved in one in Vietnam. This involvement, coupled with the reality of retrenchment from Okinawa and the Philippines in the late 1960s explains the continued strategic importance of the islands and the security interest in Micronesia when negotiations between it and the United States did begin in 1969 (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1994). These facts will lend support to the need for an alternative explanation for decolonization to be broached later in the article.

12. Hezel thinks the figure is closer to $2 million per year (pers. com., 1994).

13. The figures for Micronesia may not include substantial sums spent by the navy (perhaps as high as $25-$30 million annually) in the early years of the administration that were not reported (Nufer 1978:51).

14. See Snyder's discussion of imperial overextension (1991:8-9).

15. As Hezel notes, Kennedy never had a chance to study the Solomon report carefully. He died six weeks after the report reached his desk (pers. com., 1994).

16. See Doyle 1986:43-44 for a distinction between dependency and imperialistic control.

17. My intention here is not to develop thoroughly or test a model of dependency. I only want to pay due attention to some relevant information. For the classic discussion of Dependency Theory, see Hirschman 1945.

18. In the 1970s the United States began to speak of money, at least in the cases of Palau, the Marshalls, and the Marianas, in terms of rents for specific pieces of land, rather than as direct appropriations. In either case, the incentive to allow continued U.S. control is evident.

19. For a similar argument on the inability of the Soviet Union to offer anything to Third World nations, see Walt 1987:280-281. Firth suggests that "the Islanders' best hope seem[ed] to lie in mild flirtations with non-western powers, which ha[d] the effect of encouraging a rush of Western assistance" (1989:93).

20. However, a 1979 Interior Department "Interagency Policy Review" noted the increase of Soviet military activity and its contributions to tensions in Asia (quoted in Lutz 1984:103).

21. In an ironic development, the nuclear issue would later constrain the bargaining position of the United States vis-à-vis the Republic of Palau. In the 1980s the United States encouraged ratification of the Compact of Free Association by asserting that the United States would recognize Palau as a sovereign nation and continue to provide grants, though in exchange for certain rights. On numerous occasions, the compact was rejected by the voters because the United States refused to guarantee that it would not navigate nuclear submarines through Palauan waters.

22. Of course, the United States never actually went elsewhere. But surely the threat of abandonment was far more credible from the United States than from Micronesia.

23. If Micronesia was no longer necessary for the security of the United States, then this argument is moot. Still, the United States did keep an eye on emerging nations at this time, hoping that none would opt for communism over democracy.

24. He also states that "the only language that can unite the people of the Trust Territory is spoken by a very small proportion of the population" (Heine 1970:202-203). I discuss Heine's taking issue with the contention of unity below.

25. It should be noted that those groups that eventually did go their separate ways, that is, the Northern Marianas, Palau, and the Marshall Islands, each had something of more strategic value to offer the United States compared to those states that formed the Federated States of Micronesia.

26. During the debates leading up to the Trusteeship Agreement in 1946-1947, the Soviet Union had expressed concern over the U.S. position, but it backed down and eventually voted in favor of the agreement. Goodman and Moos suggest that the Soviet Union may have acquiesced in the light of its interest in securing Eritrea after the departure of the Italians (1981:69).

27. In the final vote for the "Declaration on Independence," the Soviet Union's proposed amendments were rejected. The final draft was accepted unanimously (eighty-nine votes), with nine abstentions: Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

28. The Trusteeship Council also sent visiting missions in 1961, 1964, and 1967.

29. The *New York Times* reported twelve days later, "An amendment put forward by the Soviet Union that would have set a deadline for a vote by the islanders on self-determination was defeated" (13 July 1966, p. 19, col. 6).

30. I do not purport to offer here an extensive discussion of the role of the media in influencing foreign policy or the influence, by implication, of the public over foreign policy The tools and data I have here only allow me to indicate a strong correlation and to hypothesize a causative relation, the test of which must be conducted elsewhere (see Kegley and Wittkopf 1991; Risse-Kappen 1991).

31. I thank Arthur Stein for articulating this last point.

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