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RIVERS (W.H.R.) REVISITED:
MATRILINY IN SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE

PART 2: THE NASIOI, THE BUIN, DISCUSSION

Douglas L. Oliver
Honolulu

Nasioi

In 1963, when the central dialects of the four languages comprising the Southern stock of Bougainville's non-Austronesian languages were compared, that of Nasioi was judged to be the one most closely related to that of Nagovisi, with which it shared 50 percent of its test-list cognates (as compared with 27 percent shared with Siwai and 20 percent shared with Buin). At that time the Nasioi language was found to have eight subdivisions.[19] Basic reasons for the Nasioi people's greater linguistic heterogeneity probably lay in their widely scattered distribution over an extensive and exceedingly diverse terrain. During some periods of their precolonial history, more of them had resided on or near the coast, but by the beginning of this century most of the coast dwellers had moved inland--partly, no doubt, from preference and partly as refuge from the Austronesian-speaking Shortland Islanders, who were raiding and sometimes settling along the coast.

  During earlier periods it is likely that some Nasioi had retained fairly frequent contacts with some Nagovisi, as evidenced by the close similarities of their languages, but during the first third of the twentieth century the uninhabited mountainous terrain between their and the Nagovisi settlements isolated them from the latter as effectively as similar terrain isolated them from the Buin. I mention these circumstances in order to contrast the Nasioi's isolation with the closer relations that

prevailed, at least during recent periods, between Nagovisi and Siwai, and between Siwai and Buin. With that said, I must indicate the extent of the Nasioi's contacts with *non*-Bougainvillians, up to and during the era that is the focus of this study.

There is credible evidence that Austronesian-speaking indigenes from the Shortland Islands had been canoeing along, sometimes settling down upon, the Nasioi coasts for decades, even centuries, before Europeans began to trade and recruit there (Terrell and Irwin 1972; Parkinson 1907). Then, in 1902 the Catholic Society of Mary established a mission station on Bougainville near present-day Kieta; a few years later they set up another station south of there at Koromira Point (Laracy 1976). In 1905 the German Colonial Administration, headquartered at Rabaul, established a post at Kieta, and at about the same time Europeans set up coconut plantations and trade stores at several places on the island's eastern coast, including some in the Nasioi region.

Thus, by the 1930s many of the Nasioi had been in closer and more frequent contact with Europeans than had the Buin, the Siwai, and, especially, the Nagovisi. Moreover, some of the coast-dwelling Nasioi had actually been residing for several decades, and probably longer, in close proximity to settlements of Shortland Islanders, a circumstance that had given rise to an exchange not only of objects and ideas but of persons as well. Similar exchanges took place between the Buin and Alu (Shortland Islands), and between the Siwai and Mono (Treasury Island), but in more episodic, less continuous ways.

The first, and up to now only, comprehensive published accounts about Nasioi indigenous society are those of anthropologist Eugene Ogan (1966, 1971, 1972), who carried out field studies there during the period between 1962 and 1978, twenty-five years after my study of Siwai. Prior to Ogan several persons, including anthropologist Beatrice Blackwood, had visited the area and written about some Nasioi "customs" (see the bibliography for works by Blackwood, Frizzi, Rausch, Parkinson, Chinnery, and Schlagenhaufen), but none of their published accounts contains information sufficient or credible enough to suit the purposes of the present study.[20]

Ogan's field studies and his resultant reports refer specifically to one portion of the Nasioi-speaking people: four Administration-created villages situated in the Aropa Valley, about four miles from the coast and at altitudes ranging from 700 to 900 feet above sea level. At the time of Ogan's initial fieldwork, the population of those villages totaled about 2,000, which comprised about one-fifth of all Nasioi-speakers.[21] In Western terms the Aropa Valley residents were at the time more "pro-

gressive" than, say, those of southeastern and western Nasioi and less so than those to the north--that is, those nearer the commercial and administrative center, Kieta. However, in line with the general purposes of this comparative study, I shall focus on Ogan's reconstructions of the earlier, more "traditional" features of Nasioi society.[22]

Ogan distinguishes three eras--stages?--in his generalizations about the history of Nasioi society during a period that ended about 1971 and that had been in existence for a few centuries. The first of those eras, which he labels "aboriginal," existed not only before any contact with European agents and goods, but even before any Austronesian speakers (e.g., Shortland Islanders) had begun to introduce new cultural traits into their lives and before the latter had begun to make piratical forays against their coastal settlements. The second era, which Ogan labels "traditional," reached its culmination just prior to World War II, after Shortland Islander and European settlements had become well established along their coasts and after their "aboriginal" economy --and society--had become more complicated as a result of the introduction of steel tools, shell valuables, and so forth, but before the extensive practice of cash cropping and the widespread acceptance of Christian doctrines concerning marriage and supernaturalism-- that is, before the "modern" era during which his field studies took place.

In keeping with the time frames fixed on in the résumés of Nagovisi, Siwai, and Buin (see below), the focus in what follows will be on Ogan's "traditional" era and on those "traditional" forms of Nasioi institutions still prevailing in the Aropa Valley.[23]

In "traditional" times the Aropa Valley Nasioi resided in widely scattered settlements--hamlets--containing from one to no more than a "few" households each. Food getting was virtually identical to that of the Nagovisi and the Siwai: the growing of taro, plantains, and sweet potatoes (a recent introduction that seems to have superseded yams); the collection of sago, coconuts, almonds, and leafy edibles; some stream fishing; and occasional hunting (mainly feral pigs, opossums, and flying foxes). Because of a near-stationary population size (due to a high rate of morbidity and stringent restrictions on postpartum copulation), there still remained much uninhabited, even unclaimed, land. And because of the outlawing of warfare--lethal hostility having come to be expressed mainly by sorcery or murder--people did not find it necessary for self-defense to form larger, more closely knit political units. Correspondingly, it was not unusual for single households or small groups of them to move residence--to improve subsistence on

more fruitful land, to avoid stressful conflicts, to escape from sorcery-ridden settlements, and so on.

Marriage

As elsewhere in southern Bougainville, each Aropa Valley household produced its own food and was composed in most cases of a nuclear family. Moreover, marital residence was normatively uxorilocal and modally so as well--despite (?) the convention and the usual practice that the goods exchanged at marriage were about equal in value (Ogan 1972:15). Exceptions occurred when goods from the husband's side so exceeded the customary parity that he was privileged to "pull" his wife to the place of his choice, usually to his own premarital hamlet. (Such was especially the case with polygynous marriages, which although infrequent, did occur.)

Community

I referred above to "hamlets''--which, according to Ogan, rarely consisted of more than three households during the "traditional" era. From his reconstruction of that era, it seems that there may have been cooperation among the households of any hamlet in several economic and social respects (e.g., land clearing, fence building, and feast giving), but it is not clear to what extent neighboring hamlets were united into multihamlet communities. Notwithstanding, there were ideological values that encouraged and well-known practices that enabled some men to raise themselves above others in influence and perhaps also in authority over hamlets in addition to their own.

Wealth and Renown

As in Nagovisi and Siwai the principal kinds of articles that enabled adults to maintain or better their social statuses were pigs and shell valuables. Here is Ogan's statement about numbers of pigs:

> The need for abundant vegetable food implied a limitation on the size of a herd. Normally a couple could not hope to keep more than five adult pigs; a single man would be lucky to keep two. This consideration affected family organization: a man who wished to raise pigs in a big way would prefer to have

many wives but few children, since the women could thus maintain a large supply of pig fodder. (Ogan 1972:26-27)

Other than the above figures on pig-feeding limits--no more than five adult pigs per married couple and two per unmarried man--no figures are provided on the actual number of domesticated pigs extant.[24] It is clear from other passages in Ogan's monograph that the principal, indeed about the only, use made of pigs was for festive meals and exchanges culminating in such meals. In other words, pigs were rarely killed for ordinary household consumption--except, for example, when a man killed another's pig found destroying his garden. And pigs were not commonly used for barter--as were pots, weapons, coconuts, garden produce, and fish.

Turning to shell valuables, the only type mentioned by either Ogan or Frizzi is *makutu,* about which Ogan writes as follows:

> *Makutu* consisted of seashells strung in varying lengths. (The example I saw during fieldwork was composed of a single variety of shells approximately [one and a half] inches in length making up a string about two feet long.) Although Rausch [1912a:110] glosses this term 'Muschelgeld', Nasioi informants were remarkably explicit and insistent that *makutu* was not like European money. Whereas anyone might possess the latter, only older men, especially *oboring* [see below], had *makutu.* Nor was *makutu* employed in all sorts of exchanges. Those specifically described as involving *makutu* were: *makutu* for sorcery; *makutu* presented to a deceased spouse's matriclan as part of 'remarriage feasts'; and *makutu* presented to the bride's clan in 'marriage feasts'. I recorded only one case of the last-named; it is probably significant that the groom had worked outside Bougainville. Other testimony implied the use of *makutu* in 'growing-up feasts'. (Ogan 1972:39-40)

Ogan continues: "The origin of *makutu* was even less clear in present informants' minds than the details of traditional exchange involving these 'valuables', but there is general agreement that *makutu* came from islands other than Bougainville" (1972:40).

In comparison with the variety of types and functions of shell valuables in Nagovisi and Siwai (and, as we shall see, in Buin), the Nasioi parallels appear exiguous, to say the least. It is possible that they were

much more numerous, in types and function, during the "traditional" times of the 1930s and that their paucity during the times of Ogan's visits had resulted from a rate of Westernization--including monetization --that was much faster than in Nagovisi and Siwai (and Buin). I find that explanation difficult to swallow, however--which leads me to believe that shell valuables had never been as numerous or as widely functional in Nasioi as throughout the rest of southern Bougainville.[25]

In any case, although we are not told how many *pigs* were actually being kept by the Aropa Valley Nasioi in Ogan's time or how many were likely to have been kept there during "traditional" times, we *are* informed that their transactional uses were manifold, including some that were carried out with shell valuables in other societies of southern Bougainville.

In practices similar to those of the Siwai *mumi* institution, one or two male members of nearly every Aropa Valley hamlet (or community?) elevated themselves to the leadership status of *oboring*--partly with the voluntary assistance of kinfolk but principally through their own industry and managerial ability (that is, in persuading others to assist them and in planning and coordinating their assistance). The intended product of that industry and assistance was the giving of feasts, which consisted mainly of acquiring and dispersing pigs: acquiring them through the husbandry of themselves and their families, and through "loans" from other kinfolk; dispersing them on the numerous kinds of occasions on which pig feasting was required (e.g., growing-up ceremonies and funerals; and labor in clearing the host's land and in fabricating slit-gongs for his clubhouse). On most such occasions the "giving" of pigs or pork was requited by allegiance-winning renown, but for two occasions the returns were much more tangible. One of those was the mortuary feast for one's own father: if the son of a deceased man donated a much larger than usual number of pigs for the occasion, he thereby inherited his father's individually owned property (in matrilineage land rights, pigs, and shell valuables, for example), which otherwise would have devolved to the deceased's uterine kin. Thereafter the pigs and shell valuables were used by the son for his own individual purposes, but the land rights were added to his matrilineage's estate.

The second such occasion had to do with marriage. As noted earlier, the exchanges that formalized *most* marriages were about equal and the resultant residential changes usually uxorilocal. If, however, the groom's prestation was much larger than that of the kin of the bride, the groom gained the right to reside with his bride wherever he wished, which was usually in his own hamlet--an option that also facilitated his

acquisition of additional wives (which brought, among other advantages, more domestic labor to produce more pigs and more affines to increase his network of followers and allies).[26]

Matriliny

Anchoring and crosscutting the above patterns of residence, marriage. and leadership was the institution of matrilineal clanship. Every Nasioi belonged to the *mu* of his biological mother, and nothing, including adoption, could change that affiliation. According to Ogan, "I found that *mu* affiliation is one piece of kinship information every normal Nasioi over the age of approximately eight years has at his command. All persons belonging to the same *mu* are regarded as being related even though the specific [genealogical] connection [may not be] known; this relationship is sometimes symbolized by such descriptive expressions as *narung ereng* ('one blood')" (1972:95) (also, "*narung kede,* 'one belly, one womb' " [Ogan, pers. corn., 19921). The names applied to the various *mu* appear to have no other denotations.

   At the time of Ogan's fieldwork seven *mu* were represented in the Aropa Valley; there may have been more, or less, in that area in "traditional" times.[27] In the absence of a Nasioi-wide census it is not known how many *mu* there were in Nasioi as a whole during those times--nor where each one's members were numerically preponderant. Moreover, except for two tales, referred to but not recounted in Ogan's writings or elsewhere, no accounts have been published detailing the origins and "histories" of *mu* or of the foundations of their totemic connections. Correspondingly, there is no mention in the ethnographic sources of the existence of clan shrines.[28] Mention is, however, made of the existence of clan-associated heirlooms.

   According to Ogan, shell valuables were inherited, usually through uterine lines, "and may even have been, in a sense, matriclan property which one man held for all," such men having been "older men, especially *oboring*" (1972:40) Continuing Ogan's account:

   Transmission of *makutu* from father to son necessitated a return
   feast by the latter to his father's clan. While such a feast might
   have been part of a [mortuary] feast, some informants indi-
   cated that a 'big man' [i.e., *oboring*] might decorate a small
   child with *makutu* at a 'growing-up feast'. If the child were a
   uterine kinsman, such display would not have changed ulti-
   mate ownership. However, if the child were the 'big man's' son,

> or namesake from another clan, the child's clan would be obliged to 'balance the books' with a return feast. (Ogan 1972:40)

Turning now to growing-up ceremonies (that is, to the Nasioi versions of Nagovisi *mavo* and of Siwai *maru*), they did in fact exist and were labeled, generically, *bauta.* Moreover, according to Ogan, "most [of them] involved the child's [own] matriclan rather than that of the child's father" (1972:34). However, Ogan characterizes such occasions as "feasts," and neither his nor any other writing I have seen mentions any accompanying magical ritual, clan-associated or otherwise.[29]

Before considering other aspects of Nasioi clanship, it is pertinent to summarize how clans were subdivided. For this I draw on Ogan's remarks about "modern" clanship in the Aropa Valley, which, he says, has not changed much in the lifetimes of his oldest informants (1972: 14). Each of the seven clans represented in Ogan's Aropa Valley study area had members resident elsewhere in Nasioi, and each was divided into named "subclans" (also labeled *mu*). (Three of the seven clans were represented locally by one subclan, one by three subclans, one by five, one by six, and one by seven.) Moreover, most if not all of those subclans were associated with one or two totems (e.g., eel, eagle, cockatoo, bamboo, almond, ocean) in addition to the one or more associated with each one's encompassing clan. No stories are recorded concerning the process of clan subdivision, nor would it seem that subclanmates knew or displayed interest in the genealogical basis of their purportedly distinctive common descent. In fact, except for respect for their distinctive totems, the only peculiarity of subclanship lay in the widespread opinion that sexual relations with a subclanmate were even more socially reprehensible and supernaturally dangerous than sexual relations with a more "distant" clanmate.

Regarding the totemic aspect of clanship, there is little reported about it in the sources known to me.[30] Even Ogan's summary is very brief:

> Associated with each *mu* are certain natural phenomena. Some of these phenomena are alleged to be prohibited (*meeka,* 'tabu, sacred') as foodstuffs; however, only Tankorinkan *mu*'s avoidance of 'eel' was consistently observed, and many older people of other *mu* were equally scrupulous in avoiding this delicacy. Such basic foodstuffs as coconuts and canarium almonds [which are totems of one or another of the *mu*] are enjoyed by

all, regardless of *mu* membership. By relating the associated phenomena of their native kin categories or groups, immigrants of different linguistic affiliation (e.g., Nagovisi, Siwai) can adjust to the Nasioi *mu* system. (Ogan 1972:95)

Continuing Ogan's résumé of Aropa Valley clanship:

Despite the fact that every Nasioi has a lifetime clan affiliation of which he is early aware and which has significance for many of his daily activities, neither clan nor sub-clan constitutes an action group. . . . In other words, *mu* and sub-*mu* constitute categories which 'function to dispose [their] members to group formation and relationships [although their] total membership does not thereby constitute a group'. (Ogan 1972:97; the included quote is from E. Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* [Englewood, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964])

The activities that served to transform *mu* categories into *mu*-based "action groups" were as follows:

The meaningful Nasioi interaction group formed on the basis of *mu* and sub-*mu* categories consists of those members of a *mu* who are co-resident, or at least in frequent face-to-face contact, and who share rights to a given area of land. These individuals form what is called here simply, to avoid cross-cultural connotations, a *mu*-group. I was able to discover no term in the Nasioi language for the *mu*-group. When asked, for example, to clarify *niikana kantsi* ('our land'), informants might reply in Pidgin, "Graun bilong mipela Batuan bilong [the village of] Rumba." (Ogan 1972:97)

Continuing Ogan's résumé:

Some contexts in which members of a given *mu*-group were seen to co-operate are here offered as examples . . .

   --provision of food and betel for guests from distant hamlets, at the funeral of a *mu*-group-mate;
   --allotment of land on which coconuts might be planted by the husband of a *mu*-group-mate;

--collection of coconuts belonging to a *mu*-group-mate and transport to his smoke-house [i.e., for making copra--a "modern" activity];

--verbal support of a male *mu*-group-mate in a charge of slander brought against a female of another *mu.*

Thus an action group may be formed on the basis of *mu* affiliation to carry out production, life cycle rituals and settlement of disputes. However, . . . *mu* affiliation is not the only basis for formation of such groups. Insofar as I could infer from informants' replies to such hypothetical questions as 'What if a Batuan *[mu]* man comes from far away and wants to make a garden at Rumba?', the greatest potential significance of the *mu*-group lies in its control over a tract of land. (Ogan 1972:98)

The members of what Ogan labels a *mu*-group--that is, a *mu*-based action group--were drawn from a whole clan and not exclusively from one or another of a clan's subclans. This feature of Nasioi clanship differentiates it sharply from clanship in Nagovisi and Siwai, where different kinds of activities and different kinds of property were allocated to different levels of clan subdivision.

Finally, there is the question of *mu*-group leadership. As we have seen, distinctions were made in both Nagovisi and Siwai between descent-unit "elders" (*tu'mele* and *simiri,* respectively) and communitywide leaders (*momiako* and *mumi,* respectively). What was the situation in Nasioi, where *mumi*-like *oboring* had influence and perhaps authority in hamlet and communitywide affairs? We depend again upon Ogan:

Any adult member of the *mu*-group has a voice in decisions of the group--women make their opinions known indirectly--but *de facto* leadership is assumed on the basis of both ascriptive factors (age, relationship to previous leaders) and demonstrated achievements (industry, approved personality traits). Thus, all the *mu*-group leaders in Rumba were over forty-five years of age, maintained substantial gardens as well as stands of coconuts, displayed generosity, calmness and helpfulness, and were related in some way to Maura, the *oboring* of the pre-World War I period. (Ogan 1972:98)

Some resemblances as well as differences will be noted between this type of clan leadership and the types that prevailed in Siwai and

Nagovisi--where qualifications of seniority, both in age and in genealogical level, were more influential and more highly institutionalized.

We turn, finally, to the Buin, whose northwestern residents interacted quite frequently with their Siwai neighbors and resembled them closely in their beliefs and practices respecting matriliny, but whose central and eastern residents practiced a form of matrilineal clanship that was "dilute," to say the least.

Buin

The people now known as the Buin inhabit most of the southeastern corner of Bougainville throughout an area of about 200 square miles, extending from south of the crests of the Crown Prince Range almost to the sea. The Mivo River forms a natural boundary between the Buin and the Siwai on the west. Some of the Buin's western, specifically northwestern, settlements are near and easily accessible to those of northeastern Siwai, but high crests and deep gorges separate them quite effectively from their Nasioi neighbors to the northeast. In the mid-nineteenth century, when their existence was first recorded in European accounts, all Buin settlements were inland--north of the wide, crocodile-infested swamps that lie behind the island's southern coast. The sea-going, Austronesian-speaking Shortland Islanders therefore labeled them, disparagingly, "Terei" (bush people). Those same islanders were in the habit of visiting Buin--first to capture "bush people" for religious sacrifice, drudgery, or sexual use, then in the course of time to trade with them (for example, to trade shell valuables and ornaments for Buin weapons and pigs). After trading had replaced raiding, many Buin moved nearer the coast; some even adopted canoeing and themselves went to Shortland Island to trade. Through those coastal Buin, Shortland Island goods were traded farther inland, so that even the most remote of the Buin became engaged in trade. Then, beginning around 1840, European goods--metal axes and knives, cloth, and other goods in exchange for Buin-produced dried coconuts--were added to the trade.

In 1884 Germany took possession of Northeast New Guinea plus the Bismarck Archipelago and Bougainville-Buka. In 1901 the first Europeans--Roman Catholic Marist missionaries--established a station in Buin, and German colonial officials from Kieta began to visit there, first to stop feuding and protect the missionaries, then to consolidate hamlets into "villages" and to collect revenue in the form of German currency or compulsory labor (for example, to construct wider trails).

In 1908-1909 the German ethnologist Richard Thurnwald spent ten

months in south-central Buin engaged in research. By that time many Buin males were working on European plantations, on Bougainville and elsewhere, but *pax Colonialis* was not effectively established in Buin itself until the late 1920s by which time Australia had succeeded Germany as the colonial authority there. In 1929 the official anthropologist of the Australian Administration, E. W. P. Chinnery, visited southern Bougainville, including Buin, and carried out a cursory survey of demographics and social organization. In 1933-1934 Thurnwald returned to Buin, where he and his wife, Hilde, spent ten months, again mainly in the south-central area. Five years later I carried out an anthropometric survey in southern Buin and made several visits to the northwestern Buin settlements that bordered those of northeastern Siwai, the area of most of my own research. The present account, however, is based largely on data collected by Jared Keil, a Harvard-trained anthropologist, during his two-year study (1971-1973) of communities in northeastern Buin, where, he informs us, much of the "traditional" culture persisted--more so than in south-central Buin, where official administrative and private commercial influences were more prevalent, and different from northwestern Buin, where I had found many cultural similarities with nearby Siwai. The communities Keil studied between 1971 and 1973 had also undergone some Westernization (including missionization and involvement in cash cropping and wage earning--and of course adoption of European tools, cloth, and some trade-store foods) but had retained enough of the "traditional" culture of the 1930s to permit Keil to compose a reconstruction of parts of it--which I now summarize.[31]

Even after colonial officials had succeeded in requiring them to reside, at least some of the time, in line villages, the Buin lived most of the time in small, dispersed hamlets of one to six or so households, similar to those of the Nagovisi, the Siwai, and the Nasioi. And like them the Buin subsisted by growing root crops, mainly taro, raising pigs, collecting wild and semiwild food plants (e.g., sago, canarium almonds, greens), and doing a little hunting (of opossums and feral pigs, for example) and stream fishing. The residents of each of their hamlets comprised what Keil labels an "agnatic core group," typically made up of two or more adult male agnates together with their wives and unmarried sisters and offspring. (Unlike in Nagovisi and the Aropa Valley, where marital residence was normatively and statistically uxorilocal, and unlike in northeast Siwai, where choice was flexible and residential practice more varied, in northeast Buin virilocality was emphatically normative and nearly invariably so in practice.) Such "core

groups" were not individually named, having been referred to as "the men of X" (i.e., the name of the tract of land they jointly resided on and exploited). Although not expressly stated by Keil, it may be safely assumed that the head of each agnatic core group was its eldest non-senile male--the (untitled) parallel of the Nagovisi *tu'meli* (female first-born), the Siwai *simiri* (male or female firstborn), and the Nasioi *mu*-group leader--who exercised authority over joint hamlet activities (e.g., garden clearing and house building).

In Keil's 1972-1973 census of Mogoroi 1 line village, its 175 residents were divided into fourteen agnatic core groups, which ranged in size from one to six households each and which were clustered into six larger units, which Keil labels "*mumira*-groups," each under the headship of a "*mumira*-leader."

The Buin word *mumira* is cognate with the Nagovisi *momiako* and Siwai *mumi,* but what a difference in meaning it had from them during the 1930s! All three words, along with the Nasioi word *oboring,* denot-ed a measure of authority over local community affairs and a more-than-average influence in neighboring communities; and all four of those titles connoted a control over tangibles of high value--mainly shell valuables and pigs. However, as we have seen, the Nagovisi *momiako,* the Siwai *mumi,* and the Nasioi *oboring* attained their status largely by personal effort and achievement; the Buin *mumira* usually attained his by birth.

Buin society[32] was--still is--socially stratified, with an upper class of *mumira* and a lower one of *kitere.* In most cases an individual was assigned to the class of his or her presumed biological father, exceptions having occurred when a *mumira* man formally adopted a *kitere* boy. And although *mumira* parents preferred their children to marry *mumira*--especially in the case of an eldest son (and principal heir)--marriages did take place across class lines and without any apparent adverse consequences, social or supernatural. Indeed, some *kitere* par-ents aspired to mate their children with *mumira,* but few were able to do so because of the higher costs of marital prestations. In Buin society at large, *mumiras* in general commanded more respect than *kiteres,* but they did not constitute a distinctive tribewide unit, a group, for any kind of social action--not for feasting or for maintaining order (or, in precolonial times, for fighting). It was only at the level of the local com-munity--and, to a somewhat lesser degree, among neighboring com-munities--that Buin's *mumiras*--and only some of them--actually led.

Before the colonial authorities, first German and then Australian, had required them to amalgamate into villages, *mumira*-groups were

the Buin's only type of politically autonomous social units. Such units appear to have ranged in membership from about ten to three hundred. Any unit smaller than about ten would have been militarily undefensible and would either be wiped out or obliged to merge with another group. And, I am led to infer, any much larger than three hundred would have eventually split.

As mentioned earlier, in most cases each of the hamlets making up a *mumira*-group comprised a separate "agnatic core group"--one of those having been that of the *mumira*-group's *mumira*-leader and his agnates (*mumira* class), plus their wives. The other hamlets (or agnatic core groups) of a *mumira*-group were made up of *kitere.*

In precolonial times the authority enjoyed by a *mumira*-leader over all members of his *mumira*-group was, ideally, limitless; in practice, however, it was usually subject to constraints. Ideally, or metaphorically, he "owned" all of the lands identified with the several hamlets of his *mumira*-group, and this was betokened by his right to allocate use rights to them and by his receipt of firstfruits from them. In practice, however, every adult male member of a *mumira*-group--or at least the head of each of its component agnatic core groups--possessed firm and enduring use rights to particular tracts of the *mumira*-group's territory, including rights of transmission to his heirs.[33] To forbid a subject such rights would have been tantamount to expelling him--and losing thereby his services in peace and in war.

In precolonial times and in the 1930s a *mumira*-leader was also said (again, metaphorically) to "own" all of his subjects' high-value goods-- mostly his pigs and shell valuables. Evidently, this ownership did not usually include arbitrary expropriation of the latter, but it did require that the subject secure his leader's approval before giving, exchanging, or consuming such goods. Also, it was a leader's right to levy a subject's goods for "public" purposes (e.g., his pigs for a feast)--although it was expected that such goods would eventually be repaid.

Similarly, in precolonial times a *mumira* was held to "own" not only his subjects' services, but also their very lives. Regarding their services, he could require them to assist him, for example, in fighting outsiders, in clearing his garden sites, in making his fences, and in building his dwelling and clubhouse (*abaito,* cognate with Siwai *kapaso*)--for all of which services the subjects were usually compensated with food. Also, wrote R. Thurnwald, "the *kitere's* daughters will help the *mumiána* (chief's wife) in garden and house work, and they are chosen to contribute to the men's pleasures when a big feast is going on. All these services, however, including the last, are remunerated, either by meals of pig or by *ábuta* [shell valuables]" (1934a:126).

Regarding their lives, a *mumira*-leader was customarily empowered to kill any of his subjects without concern over revenge from the victim's close relatives and without being required to compensate them. Such killing was done either directly (e.g., as punishment) or indirectly (through giving the victim to an allied *mumira*-leader for sacrifice to the latter's guardian spirit).[34]

The Buin's supernatural universe was peopled with innumerable spirits, including the ghosts of many dead humans plus numerous never-human spirits of many kinds. It is likely (but not reported) that the ghost-ancestors of *mumira*-leaders played active roles in the magical actions of the leader, but it is recorded that the most powerful supernatural helper of a *mumira*-leader was his *oromurui,* a never-human demon that was manifested on occasion either as Thunder-and-lightning or as White-bellied Sea Eagle or a brown tree-snake *(Boiga irregularis).* No *kitere* had an *oromurui,* and only the more affluent and powerful *mumira*-leaders had one. For one who had, his *oromurui* resided mainly in his clubhouse, serving as his protector and policeman at all times and as his helper, during the precolonial era, in time of war. To acquire and maintain the services of an *oromurui,* a *mumira*-leader had to give frequent feasts to satisfy the demon's hunger for the sight and smell of pig blood. Also, in precolonial times, to insure the continuing loyalty of an *oromurui,* it was necessary to engage fairly frequently in fighting, in order to satisfy the demon's desire for the sight of fresh enemy skulls in the clubhouse. When a *mumira*-leader died, his *oromurui* customarily transferred his loyalty to the deceased's heir, but if the heir did not provide enough pig blood and (in earlier times) enemy skulls, the demon forsook him and attached itself to a more "ambitious" *mumira*-leader   elsewhere.[35]

To the best of my knowledge, there are no figures available on the number and average sizes of *mumira*-groups throughout Buin as a whole. In that part of Buin studied intensively by Keil between 1971 and 1973, there were six such units for a population of 145 (which represented about one-sixty-fourth of the total Buin population at that time). The sizes of those six groups were 48, 29, 24, 23, 13, and 8. (Two of those six units were characterized by Keil as "sub-*mumira*-groups," that is, as having been only semiautonomous.) It is possible, indeed probable, that in precolonial times the average size of Buin's fully autonomous *mumira*-groups was considerably larger than between 1971 and 1973; because of the pervasiveness of inter-*mumira*-group suspicion or active hostility, it is likely that a greater premium was placed on safety in numbers than on the satisfactions of separatism.

Returning to the class stratification of Buin society (which, as we

have seen, was the principal factor in the organization of *mumira*-groups), figures are likewise lacking concerning what proportion of the total population were members of *mumira*-groups. However, turning again to Keil's Mogoroi village sample, 83 out of the total population of 145 were unambiguously *mumira*.[3][6]

Despite its considerable weight, even in postcolonial times a *mumira*-leader's authority prevailed only within his own *mumira*-group; elsewhere he possessed influence only, and that commensurate with his feast-giving successes. However, Buin *mumira*-leaders are said not to have engaged in the kind of explicitly competitive feast giving practiced by Siwai *mumis;* perhaps because their office was hereditary; they did not need to compete in order to attain or retain it. Notwithstanding, the leadership office of a particular *mumira*-group and therefore the authority of its successive incumbents were subject to weakening and, eventually, obsolescence if the group's membership became too reduced --through emigration or death. And when that happened, the remnant usually joined some other *mumira*-group or *mumira*-groups, either individually or en masse.

Thus, Buin *mumira*-groups constituted the society's only enduring type of political unit and were also the society's only type of supra-hamlet economic unit. They might also be characterized as one of the society's most important types of religious congregation. Reference here is to the religious prominence of *oromurui;* while those powerful and universally feared demons were the personal familiars of individual *mumira*-leaders, they also functioned, as did no other kind of spirit, on behalf of the leader's *mumira*-group as a whole.

Buin *mumira*-groups had little or nothing to do with regulation of members' marriages, but they did take an interest in a member's specific choice of spouse. Nor did the *mumira*-group concern itself with the religious side of a nor-deader's personal well-being. For a résumé of these matters, we turn to Buin's matrilineal clans and *maru* rites.

As was mentioned earlier, each of Buin's *mumira*-groups consisted of two or more hamlets, and each hamlet of one or more households. Also, in most multihousehold hamlets (male) household heads were related to one another by close agnatic ties. (I write "most" and not "all" to accommodate cases in which only a household head's widow and his minor children were resident.) There is no indication that the two or more core groups of agnates that constituted any *mumira*-group were themselves invariably or even usually agnatically interrelated. In some cases they evidently were; in others evidently not. In other words (as Keil points out), Buin's *mumira*-groups cannot themselves be labeled

"descent units." Nevertheless, it may be surprising to some readers that patrifiliation was so important in this society, whose neighboring societies were so preponderantly (but not entirely) matrilineal. Matrifiliation or matriliny did prevail in at least two Buin practices, as Keil succinctly describes:

> A Buin, from birth, traces relationships to others through his mother for the purpose of defining kin ties (that is, for identifying the proper kin term to use for his or her relatives). In addition, all Buin claim an affiliation with a named matrilineal grouping, which I call a matrisib. These matrisibs are named; they are ideally exogamous; affiliation with such a named unit is ascribed at birth, a person being a member of his or her mother's matrisib; all members of a named matrisib have a certain (unclear) relationship to certain natural phenomena and to all other members of the matrisib; it is claimed that members of a matrisib can be identified (even beyond the linguistic borders of Buin) by the nature of the lines on the palm of one's hand-- the right hand is identified with one's mother, and is said to be the stronger hand.
>
> Unlike their various counterparts in Siuai, Nasioi, and Nagovisi societies, Buin matrisibs are not local or cooperating groups at any level; there are no named or acknowledged segments of a matrisib. (Keil 1975:93-94)

Regarding the first of those practices--the defining of kin ties through one's mother--that topic may be disposed of by adding the following narrowing qualification: "Whenever a man and wife use non-corresponding kin terms for any person, the offspring of that couple will always follow the usage of the mother" (Keil 1975:125). With that said, we can proceed directly to what can be gleaned from Keil and other sources about Buin matrilineal descent units (which Keil labels "matrisibs" but which I shall call matrilineal "clans," in keeping with the terminology used in earlier sections of this essay).

The Buin had specific words for "my-clanmate," "his-clanmate," "their-clanmates," and so forth, and names for each of their several clans, but no generic word for "clan." Each clan was known by the name of its primary totem, for example, Kaakata (White Cockatoo), Tourikana (Yellow-throated White-eye Bird), Maramo (a variety of eel), and Kenumau (a species of tree). In addition, some clans had secondary totems in the form of animals or plants. Normatively, a person

ought not to kill or eat his or her animal totem or pick, cut, or pass too close to his or her plant totem. Keil added that respect "may also" be accorded to the totem of the clan of one's father, but he did not specify the currency or weightiness of this practice. Apart from the above, the relationship between a clan and its totem(s) was described by Keil as "unclear." He continues:

> Often these birds or plants are prominent in Buin stories of the past, in which they are portrayed as part-animal, part-human, and part-spirit. But they are not said to be ancestresses of the peoples of the various matrisibs. In fact I could discover no stories pertaining to the actual origin of the various matrisibs. . . . There are no shrines or other sacred places identified with any matrisib. There are sacred areas in Buin, and sacred objects, such as large stones or bodies of water, but these are identified with specific culture heroes or spirit beings, not with matrisibs or matrisib ancestresses. Often such sacred stones or areas are associated with a particular man who has "rapport" with some spiritual being who resides there; this rapport is generally passed on from father to son. (Keil 1975:95)

Furthermore:

> [K]nowledge of one's mumira-group, both by the name of the mumira-leader and the name of the ground associated with its members, is at the command of every Buin except very young children. [In contrast, the name of one's matrisib] is not readily elicited from persons other than the older men and women (particularly women). Most other persons could not name their matrisib without asking other people. Often, though, a person could tell me that he or she was a member of the same matrisib as some other, specified individual. (Keil 1975:95)

The most salient aspect of Buin matrisibs (i.e., clans) was their exogamy:

> Matrisibs are ideally exogamous. If a man marries or has sexual relations with a woman of his own matrisib the Buin state that supernatural agents would cause the offending couple and their offspring to be physically maimed or impaired. In addition, the ancestral spirits of the offending couple, if they are angered and

powerful enough, might add further to their woes. In addition
to sexual affairs and marriage, the Buin state that if a member
of one's own matrisib (and of the opposite sex) even walks upon
or over one's sleeping mat, sores will appear on the body of the
offender. In the past, I was told, intra-matrisib sexual affairs or
marriage might be punished by the actual killing of the offend-
ing couple by their kinsmen, or at least by social ostracism.
(Keil 1975:96)

Moreover, "a person of one matrisib may marry a person of *any* differ-
ent matrisib; there is no evidence of any form of dual organization or
any pairing of matrisibs in marital exchanges" (Keil 1975:97).

The sources disagree concerning the number of clans in Buin. In a
report on his fieldwork of 1908-1909, Richard Thurnwald wrote that
there were only four (i.e., Manugau, Fish Hawk; Tou, a small bird;
Uau, a dove; and Ugu, Hornbill)--an assertion that he and his wife
were to repeat in reports on their field study of 1934-1935. Chinnery,
reporting on his shorter but more geographically extensive survey of
1929, listed twenty-eight "social groups" or "clans," which (according
to Keil) may have once been "totemic beings" but during Keil's visit
from 1971 to 1973 had no known connection with matrisibs: "Some of
the species [listed by Chinnery] are definitely prominent in Buin stories
and tales; perhaps they were totemic beings who are no longer recog-
nized by the Buin today, or perhaps they are merely secondary phenom-
ena associated with matrisibs" (Keil 1975:100). Finally, in his account
of his 1971-1973 study of northeast Buin, Keil listed names of eight
matrisibs--only one corresponding to any of those listed by Thurnwald
--and implied that his list was not complete for Buin as a whole.

Thus, on the basis of available published sources, it is not possible to
provide a complete listing of Buin clans--or even to state with any cer-
tainty that the society's matrilineal clans were alike throughout. My
findings in northwest Buin differed from Keil's in the northeast--and
both of them differed from Thurnwald's, which were based on his study
of the south-central part of that extensive ethnic unit.[37]

There was, however, one aspect of the matriclan institution that may
have been the same throughout Buin. Reference here is to the finding,
by Keil in northeast Buin, that matriclans were *not* class-stratified--
that each of the clans known to him contained both *mumira* and *kitere*
--not surprising inasmuch as interclass marriage was generally con-
doned and widely practiced there.

A description should now be given of the Buin institution of *maru,*

which Keil glosses as "life crisis rituals." As described earlier the Nagovisi, the Siwai, and the Nasioi performed similar kinds of rites-- labeled *mavo* by the Nagovisi, *maru* by the Siwai, and *bauta* by the Nasioi. In Nagovisi they were performed on such occasions as birth, an infant's first bathing, first entry into a garden, first eating of certain foods, first entry into a clubhouse, first marriage, and first pregnancy. In Siwai and in Nasioi the occasions for such rites were nearly the same. For Buin, Keil states, the "most important" of the ceremonies involving performance of *maru* were birth, marriage, and a woman's first pregnancy (1975:105). In addition, "There are many other occasions where parents might arrange ceremonies and feasting to 'mark' the 'first' time a child 'sees' something new, and this always involves maru ritual. A child's 'first' visit to the garden is often celebrated in this way" (Keil, pers. corn., 1992).

The rites in question were similar in all four societies with respect both to the characteristics of their practitioners--that is, older females --and to the nature of their actions and materials--anointment or bathing of the subject with "sacred" water, coconut juice or oil, and magically potent leaves; magical incantations; and the sharing of pork by subjects and other participants. They differed, however, in one very significant way. In Nagovisi and Siwai the rites were associated explicitly and exclusively with one or another of those societies' matrilineal descent units. The association is less clear in Nasioi, although, according to Ogan, "most 'growing-up feasts' involved the child's matriclan rather than that of the child's father" (1972:34). In Buin the several different sets of *maru* rites--each of which had a name--had no discernible association with clans or with any other kind of durable social unit.

Every Buin became permanently affiliated with--underwent the rites of--one or another named set of *maru.* According to Keil, the grounds for that affiliation were not entirely "clear." The only points on which most of his informants agreed were as follows: (1) an individual, male or female, became affiliated, permanently, with the set of *maru* that was performed for his parent's marriage and, consequently, for his own birth; and (2) *maru* affiliation had no effect on choice of spouse, SO that it sometimes happened that the set performed for a couple's marriage and consequently for their offsprings' births was that of *both* of them.

More often, perhaps, the couple were affiliated with different sets of *maru.* When that was the case, it was more customary, although not rigidly prescribed, for the marriage rite--and subsequently the birth rite--to be ceremonialized with the *maru* of the mother. It did some-

times occur that the parental marriage rite (and the offspring's birth rites) was ceremonialized with the father's *maru*--in which case the offspring became affiliated with the latter.

In any case, although *maru* affiliation derived from filiation, unlike clanship it appears to have had no effect on choice of spouse. Nor, as far as I can discover from the ethnographic sources, was it in any way associated with upper- and lower-class status.

The total number of Buin's *maru* sets--"denominations"-- is not recorded. According to Keil, only three of them were represented in the northeastern village of Mogoroi 1 (whose population was 149), and three entirely different ones were represented in the south-central village of Mamaromino (population unstated).

To summarize, in northeastern Buin there were three types of residentially localized and fairly durable social groups: (1) virilocally based nuclear- or extended-family households, one or more of which composed, or were combined into, (2) agnatic core groups, some made up of *mumira*-class, others of *kitere*-class, members. Furthermore, agnatic core groups were combined into (3) *mumira*-groups. The two to six agnatic core groups that made up each *mumira*-group were centered on a *mumira*-class agnatic core group whose hereditary patriarch, the *mumira*-leader, was absolute ruler of the whole *mumira*-group. In precolonial times, here and there and now and then, two or more *mumira*-groups became allied to fight against common enemies; otherwise each *mumira*-group constituted a territorially distinct and politically autonomous unit. By the 1930s the political autonomy of Buin's *mumira*-groups had been superseded by colonial rule, and the authority, especially the physically coercive authority, of the *mumira*-leader had been curtailed, but many of the other social functions of such groups and their leaders still survived.

In addition to the above social groups, each resident of northeastern Buin became permanently associated, at birth, with the clan (Keil's "matrisib") of his or her mother--which, however, possessed no jointly held property--not even localized shrines, no shared activities, and few if any shared mythical traditions. In fact, the only things shared by members of any clan were their common respect for one or more distinctive totems and their prohibition against sexual relations with one another.

And, finally, every resident of northeastern Buin was associated with one or another of the society's sets of *maru* (life-crisis, growing-up, and so on) rites--the one that had been performed at his or her parents' wedding. Because it was more usual, though not obligatory, for a wed-

ding to be formalized by the *maru* of the bride, an individual's own *maru* tended to be that of his mother. However, persons having the same *maru* did not necessarily share anything else.

Although the summary just presented refers most particularly to northeastern Buin (the area studied intensively by Jared Keil), it is not unlikely that it applies to some other parts of Buin as well--except perhaps to the northwestern area, where certain aspects of social relations once resembled more closely those of northeastern Siwai.

Discussion

Even allowing for their factual gaps and uncertainties, the foregoing reconstructions reveal some close cultural similarities along with some striking cultural differences among the four linguistically related peoples just sketched. Some similarities are noteworthy. For example:
- their subsistence tools and technologies
- their residential and social intercourse patterns (i.e., households, hamlets, and nonnucleated communities)
- the nature of their most value-laden nonland goods (i.e., pigs and strings of marine-shell beads)
- their religious beliefs and practices--including especially their growing-up rites and their funeral rites and transactions
- their Dravidian-type system of kinship terminology and their norms for choice of spouse
- their ascription of a distinctive mystical quality to matrilineal and matrilateral relationships

In other matters, all four tribes shared ideas and practices in general, but with different degrees of emphasis:
- genealogical seniority as a basis of authority by and stratification among consanguines
- the assignment of initiative and authority to adult males in most public secular affairs
- the incidence of polygyny
- quantitative differences in holdings of pigs and shell valuables

In certain other matters, there were large differences among all or some of the four tribes, namely,
- the frequencies and kinds of contacts with non-Bougainvillians
- political authority and social stratification based on factors other than consanguineal hierarchies
- postmarriage residence

• and the focus of this study--the institutionalization and cultural-societal importance of matriliny

Probably, some of the above differences were interconnected, causally or functionally. Before discussing these connections, though, it is necessary to recapitulate the more salient similarities and differences among the four peoples with respect to their institutionalization of matriliny. Common to all four tribes was the belief that relationships based on matrifiliation, and thence matriliny, differed significantly--one might say, mystically--from those based on patrifiliation, and in a way that rendered sexual intercourse between matrilineal relatives supernaturally dangerous--and therefore socially unacceptable (or, perhaps, chronologically it may have been the other way around?). Also, it was generally held by all four tribes that, other things equal, persons related matrilineally owed one another more mutual generosity in goods and services than was owed to other persons.[38] And third, in all four tribes persons who were matrilineally related were believed to be associated, more or less exclusively and "totemically," with certain animals (and, in some cases, plants).

Those complications aside, the four tribes differed, in some respects widely, in other aspects of matriliny:

• in the spans and subdivisions of the social units (groups and categories) comprising persons of supposed matrilineal relationship

• in the symbols associated with those units and in the nature of those associations

• in the "histories" of those units and their totemic associations

• in the collective functions and corporate possessions of those units

• in the part played by matriliny in each tribe's total social life

Why did these differences exist? No two separate human societies have identical institutions. Why should those of south Bougainville be exceptions to that universal circumstance? The answer to that query is contained in the assumption that most of the ancestors of the four tribes under study once shared a single kind of matriliny (i.e., single in kinds of beliefs and practices) and, furthermore, that that situation occurred relatively recently in the total time span of humankind.[39] The basis for that assumption rests on the close linguistic similarities of the four tribes. However, neither linguistic nor any other sort of evidence that I know of reveals the nature of that single "ancestral" kind of matriliny. Nevertheless, two "logical" possibilities come to mind: (1) that the kind of matriliny ancestral to all four tribes resembled that of Nagovisi of the 1930s, and all clans were categorized into two exogamous units (i.e.,

moieties), or (2) that the single ancestral tribe was divided into numer-
ous discrete exogamous units (i.e., clans). (Neither of these possibilities
assumes where on Bougainville that hypothetical ancestral tribe was
located. However, in view of the present distribution of Bougainville's
languages, I favor the likelihood of its having been in south Bougain-
ville. And because of the routes of the migrations recorded in several
Siwai and Nagovisi clan "histories''--that is, from near-coastal areas
inland--my surmise is that the present Nagovisi area did not constitute
the entire ancestral domain.)

In seeking support for possibility (1), we fulfill the promise contained
in the title of this essay to "revisit Rivers," who stated: "[I]t is possible to
infer with certainty the ancient existence of forms of marriage from the
survival of their results in the terminology of relationship" (Rivers
1968:74) and "The scheme of development formulated in the early
chapter of this volume rests on the assumption that, at the earliest stage
to which the evidence takes us, Melanesian society was organized in two
exogamous moieties with matrilineal descent" (Rivers 1914, 2:557).[40]
All four of our tribes used--still use--kin terms of the Dravidian type,
which corresponds to a two-section (or moiety, or dual organization)
social system.

We turn now to possibility (2), namely, that the ancestral form of
matriliny of our four tribes consisted of numerous discrete clans--
which, among the cultural forebears of the 1930s Nagovisi, became
combined into moieties, that is, into two multiclan, intermarrying cate-
gories of persons. There is no direct evidence regarding how or when
that process *actually* began among the Nagovisi, but there are well-
authenticated instances that suggest how it *might* have begun. I refer to
fairly recent situations in Nasioi and Siwai, in which members of two
adjacent and locally preponderant clans made a longtime practice,
almost a norm, of intermarrying (i.e., of "exchanging women"). Vari-
ous reasons were stated for the practice, especially the desideratum that
"land and valuables would stay close together" (Ogan 1972:14-15; see
also Oliver 1955:286-287, 292).[41] Moreover, as already cited, there are
equally well authenticated instances of segments of "nonmoietized"
Siwai clans having migrated into Nagovisi and become "moietized"
(Nash 1974:5).

In any case, however much nostalgic contentment one may derive
from this archaic debate, the question about the nature of south
Bougainville's "ancestral" matriliny is likely never to be answered.
More interesting, and perhaps less insoluble, is the question of how
matriliny--whatever its "ancestral" form--came to have such different

manifestations in the lives of the four tribes under study during the third decade of this century. Present among all four were social units comprising persons of known or supposed common matrilineal descent--units that were normatively exogamous and intracooperative, and that had totemic associations with distinctive species of animals and plants. But there the similarities ended. Regarding their differences, the extremes were represented by Nagovisi and northeast Buin. For example:

• In Nagovisi, on the one hand, all clans were localized but were combined, in terms of marriage prohibitions and particular myth-sanctioned spirit-ancestresses and totems, into one or another of the society's matrimoieties; furthermore, each clan was subdivided into sharply bounded, hierarchically ranked, and functionally distinctive segments. In northeast Buin, on the other hand, the clans were exogamously and "historically" discrete and morphologically unsegmented, and their respective members widely dispersed.

• In Nagovisi all land and most high-value shell valuables were owned, corporately, by matrilineal clans or clan subdivisions. In northeast Buin all land, high-value shell valuables, *and pigs* were "owned" by (at least, metaphorically) or at the disposal of the hereditary leaders of aristocratic and patrilineally aligned *mumira*-groups.

• In Nagovisi all religious loci and most public religious rites (including growing-up rites) were owned and used by and on behalf of clans or clan subdivisions. In northeast Buin clans had neither shrines nor religious rites of their own; growing-up rites were owned by and used for other, nonclan aggregates of owners.

• In Nagovisi, consonant with the prevailing mode of land ownership, postmarriage residence was normatively, and in practice most frequently, uxorilocal; moreover marital prestations were, during the thirties, mainly in the form of dowry. In Buin, postmarriage residence was normatively and statistically virilocal, and marital prestations were in the form of bride-price.

From all the above and from facts given elsewhere in this essay, it is reasonable to conclude (1) that matriliny played a much larger part in Nagovisi life, including the conduct of individual and public affairs, than in Buin; and (2) that Nagovisi women (through their leading roles in matrilineal-unit affairs) were more socially important than their counterparts in Buin.[42]

It is, I trust, unnecessary to review where the northeast Siwai and the Aropa Valley Nasioi stood with regard to matriliny, between the Nagovisi and the Buin, so I shall conclude this lengthy exercise with some thoughts, first, about the factors that might have initiated the pro-

cesses of matriliny differentiation among the four tribes, and, second about the processes themselves.[43]

Geography

The geographic environments of the four subtribes focused on in this study-- central Nagovisi, northeast Siwai, Aropa Valley Nasioi, and northeast Buin--are quite similar: gently sloping plains rising into higher but generally broad and flat interfluvial ridges; waterways ranging between tiny brooks and wide streams (which were normally knee- to waist-deep, except after heavy rains, when they became deep torrents); clumps of primary rain forest surrounded by large stretches of secondary growth and pockets of gardens; scattered patches of swamp; and fairly heavy year-round rainfall, with little or no seasonal variation in precipitation or temperature (Scott et al. 1969:62-70). If such conditions had prevailed throughout the entirety of our four tribal areas or if those tribal areas had been alike geographically in all other parts as well, it would be reasonable to discount environment as a contributing cause. Buin and Siwai were indeed topographically similar to each other throughout, having broader streams, wider valleys, flatter land surfaces, and more and larger swamps than Nagovisi and Nasioi. In contrast, parts of Nagovisi and Nasioi were very mountainous. And whereas some Nasioi settlements were located on or near the coast, all of Nagovisi's were located inland--and separated from the coast by the Siwai to the south and the Austronesian-speaking Banoni to the west.

Therefore, one cannot *logically* discount the role of physical environment when searching for causes of matriliny differentiation. Yet, I am hard put to explain how topography per se could have influenced matriliny--except perhaps in terms of communication. That is to say, for a pair of mountain settlements that were adjacent and relatively accessible to each other but relatively inaccessible to all other settlements, a long-continuing de facto practice of intermarriage between them might have led eventually to a de jure moiety pattern. Such reasoning would, however, have to contain another assumption, namely, that the Nagovisi moiety pattern originated in the mountainous part of the tribal area and diffused to all other, nonmountainous, parts--an assumption for which there is no "hard" evidence.

In contrast, Nagovisi's mountains together with the whole of that tribal area's relatively greater distance from the island's southern coast did serve to preclude direct contact with Shortland and Treasury islanders, and to reduce the number of imports from them. Also, the wide

variety of physical environments occupied by the Nasioi might well have resulted in local specialization of commodities, therefore in inter-regional barter--which, in time, *might* have reduced the acceptance of a general purpose exchange currency (i.e., in the form of shell-valuable money). (See below.)

Race

Bougainvillians are all dark brown to black in skin color but exhibit wide variations in several other genetically influenced body traits, such as stature and sitting height, and shape of head and face (Friedlaender 1975; Oliver 1954, 1955; Oliver and Howells 1957). In broadest terms, three regional extremes have been distinguished: a tall-statured north-central mountain type (best exemplified by the Rotokas), a short-sta-tured southern type (found mainly in the Nagovisi mountain area), and a tall-statured, somewhat lighter-pigmented coastal type (exemplified by the beach-dwelling, Austronesian-speaking Roruana). With respect to the tribes dealt with in this study, the nonmountaineer Nagovisi are somewhat taller than their mountaineer language mates, and both the Siwai and the Buin are taller yet. As for the Nasioi, there is and was con-siderable variation between shorter mountaineer and taller near-coastal subtypes (which may reflect recent intermarriage between some of the latter with coastal Austronesian speakers).

All very interesting, but not very surprising in view of the vast length of time that the ancestors of many twentieth-century Bougainvillians have been living on the island and the numerous relatively recent immi-grations from other islands north and south. But, in terms of intertribal variations in matriliny, the point of interest in all the above racial dif-ferences is not whether and how this or that racial feature has had any effect upon this or that aspect of matriliny. Instead, the relevant point lies in what the anthropometric evidence might reveal about breeding relations within, among, and beyond the borders of the four tribes (the assumption being that the sexual relationships involved in breeding were usually accompanied by other forms of relationships, including exchanges of objects and ideas).

Looked at from that point of view, Nagovisi as a whole had been for a very long time more isolated not only from Siwai, Nasioi, and Buin, but from other peoples as well. Moreover, within the linguistic boundaries of Nagovisi there had developed over time a number of fairly distinct inbreeding subpopulations. In contrast, within Siwai and within Buin interbreeding had evidently been less narrowly localized than in Nago-

visi--that is, the kind of marital exchange exemplified and jurally insti-
tutionalized in Nagovisi was not prevalent enough in Siwai or Buin to
encourage the institution of the moiety pattern throughout those two
tribes.

A second matter on which the above-cited anthropometric findings
throw some light concerns a hypothetical invasion of Buin by non-
Bougainvillians. Here and there in his publications Richard Thurnwald
postulated that the differences in social organization between the Buin
and other south Bougainvillians were due largely to a successful inva-
sion and colonization of Buin by Austronesian-speaking Shortland
Islanders, who--he wrote--imposed their rule over the matrilineally
organized indigenous Buin, thereby creating the agnatically biased,
class-stratified society described above.

Although some of the differences between the Buin and other south
Bougainvillians--in social structure generally and in matriliny particu-
larly--might indeed have been initiated by the Bum's more frequent
and closer interaction with Shortland Islanders, those interactions need
not have included--probably did not include--a colonizing invasion.
There is no evidence for such a colonization from archaeology (Terrell
and Irwin 1972), from history (Laracy 1976), or from anthropometry
(Oliver 1954).[44]

Demography

It is hypothetically "explorable" that a large preponderance of adult
males over adult females in any of the four tribes could have reduced
matrilineal continuities to such an extent that groupings and other link-
ages based on matriliny were thereby diminished in number, size, and
function.

Census figures for 1938 do record a preponderance of "adult" males
over "adult" females in Nagovisi as a whole (1,078 males:954 females),
in Siwai as a whole, including Baitsi (1,621:1,570), and in Buin as a
whole (2,812:2,285)--no figures being available for Nasioi[45]--but I
cannot conceive of these differences having been large enough to influ-
ence the matrilineal institutions of any of those tribes--except as will be
noted below.

During his 1929-1930 patrol in south Bougainville, E. W. P. Chin-
nery collected census data from the villages he actually visited--in
Nagovisi, in Siwai (including Baitsi), and in Buin, but not from those
visited in Nasioi. His figures also reveal a preponderance of "adult"
males over "adult" females in Nagovisi (288:222) and Buin (906:790),

but not in Siwai (880:900). Again, however, I cannot conceive of any connection between those differences and their respective tribes' differences in matriliny, except, perhaps, in the case of Buin, where the relatively larger preponderance of males might reflect that tribe's "preference" for agnation--including perhaps not deliberate female infanticide, but greater efforts to preserve the lives of infant males.

Having narrowed the search through the above circumscriptions, I shall succumb to the urgings of my Tolstoy-an soul and propose what I believe to be the principal factors--or situations, or whatever--that set in motion the events that culminated in the intercultural differences in matriliny herein described.

In a word, I propose that the most effective of those factors were trading relations with Shortland and Treasury islanders (i.e., Alu and Mono), including particularly the importation of enough shell valuables to permit their use as generalized tokens of exchange--that is, money (see also Nash 1981:110). Unlike weapons, pottery, and other objects of short life and limited utility, shell valuables were relatively indestructible, multiutilizable, and capable of limitless accumulation. Even pigs, the most highly valued indigenous Bougainvillian measures of wealth and objects of exchange, were short-lived and, beyond a certain small number, impossible to maintain--and thus to "accumulate."[46]

Some shell-valuable imports ended up in the (corporate) possession of matrilineal descent units and served mainly as heirlooms, which did not ordinarily circulate. Moreover, control over their use and disposal remained with descent-unit elders ("Firstborns"), especially female elders. In other words, large accumulations of such valuables brought prestige to corporate groups and influence to their, mostly female, leaders (as group officials and not as individuals).

The rest, perhaps most, of the shell-valuable imports ended up, however, in the possession of individuals, mostly men. It was individual men who conducted most of the original trading with the foreigners and who subsequently increased--or decreased--their takings through transactions with other Bougainvillians. Prior to the import of shell valuables, individual men had been able to achieve personal renown, social authority, or influence by raising or exchanging pigs (in the form of feasts, interest-bearing gift-loans, funeral "donations," war financing, and so forth). However, as noted above, compared with shell valuables, pig-based wealth (and renown and influence) was far less accumulable.

Thus, individual men (and in Nagovisi a few individual women) were enabled to accumulate more wealth and to achieve more (local) authority and wider (multicommunity) influence than previously--released,

as it were, from the quantitative restraints of the pig economy and from some of the moral obligations of matriliny (including, for example, exemption from customary uxorilocal residence and from the custom of bequeathing all or most of one's personal wealth to one's descent unit).

The latter exemption was especially important, inasmuch as some men--in Nasioi, Siwai, and Buin--began the practice of bequeathing all or most of their personal wealth to their sons, thereby serving in large measure to commence the processes that eventually transformed their societies from earlier more-pervasively matrilineal formats to those of the 1930s. Evidently, the numbers of such men varied from one society to another, as did the scales of their activities--and, consequently, the heights and degree of legitimation of their renown (which varied, for example, from the transient prominence achieved by a male Nagovisi *momiako* to the transmissible "chieftainship" attained by the Buin *mumira*-leader).

Such opportunities were available in each of the four tribes, but in different measure. It is my hypothesis that the most decisive determinants of those differences were, first and foremost, differences in the *quantities* of shell-valuable imports; and, second, differences in the numbers of men who possessed ambition for *personal* renown, along with the requisite financial and social skills. The first part of this hypothesis is supported--but only partly--by recorded facts (i.e., Buin and Siwai contained many more shell valuables per person than Nagovisi, the situation in Nasioi being unclear). Regrettably, I can adduce only unsubstantiable circular arguments in support of the second part of the hypothesis and shall not try the reader's patience by attempting to do so.

Several other factors could have, probably did have, some influence on the transformations studied in this essay--by undermining the pillars of matriliny directly, or indirectly by positive promotion of agnation. My contention is that those factors operated with different degrees of effectiveness in the four tribes and therefore produced different degrees of results. (The order in which these factors are listed is not intended to signify the relative force of their impacts.)

1. Wittingly or not, the Administration officials who dealt with south Bougainvillians encouraged not only agnation in general but male chieftainship in particular. Only men were taxed, required to work on government projects (such as building roads and rest houses or carrying cargo for government patrols), and penalized for violating government rules. And only men were appointed to government offices: to the line-village chieftainship *(kukerai),* to village interpreter *(tultul),* to medical

orderly *(doktaboi),* and to the higher office of regional paramount chief *(nambawan, luluai).* Although it is true that some of those appointments were made with popular backing, the very nature of those offices included an amount of coercive authority far greater than that possessed by clan elders or community leaders *(mumi, momiako, oboring)* --though not, perhaps, by Buin's more powerful *mumira-*leaders.

2. By the 1930s Christian missionaries, both Europeans and indigenes, had been active in Nasioi, Buin, and Siwai for at least three decades, and nearly every member of those tribes had been "convrerted," either to Roman Catholicism or to Methodism--or, in a very few instances, to Seventh-Day Adventism. For a handful of intensively trained youths and men (who served as village "teachers"), the conversion may have been relatively deep, but in all other cases known to me conversion served more to add to native religious beliefs and practices than to replace them. (For example, Jehovah, Jesus, and Mary were added to the native pantheons; Christian baptism was added to native birth rites.) A few native practices, such as sorcery and cremation, were censured by one or another of the missions but during the 1930s continued unabated. As for cousin marriage in general and cross-cousin marriage in particular, had the censure been effective, it would have toppled one of the principal pillars of matriliny. I do not know how effective that censure had become in Buin during the 1930s but I know for certain that it was only later that it became so in Siwai (and I suppose that to have been the case in Buin as well). As for Nasioi, Ogan writes in a 1992 letter to me: "I agree that the mission censure against cross-cousin marriage was probably not effective until after the 1930s, and probably not until after World War II."

With respect to Nagovisi, a European missionary (in this case a Roman Catholic priest) first established residence there in 1930. When I became acquainted with him, in 1938, he was continuing to practice his personal policy of proceeding slowly and forbearingly with conversion, maintaining a respectful tolerance of cross-cousin marriage and of matrilineal practices in general.

3. It is also relevant to consider whether the foreign work experiences of many south Bougainvillians affected the matriliny of their tribes.

As noted earlier, even before the turn of the century many south Bougainville males were leaving their homes for one or more years to work on distant plantations owned and managed by Europeans. The first published account known to me giving actual numbers of such "village absentees" was that of Chinnery, who recorded, in 1929-1930, the number of absentees among each village's total number of "able-bodied

males" (from those villages that were included in his census), For
Nagovisi the proportion was 30 percent: for Siwai (including Baitsi) 19
percent, and for Buin 23 percent. (Chinnery also visited several Nasioi
villages but did not record the absentee figures from them.) In 1938 the
patrol officer mentioned above made a similar but more complete cen-
sus of the Buin subdistrict (which also included Banoni, but not Nasioi).
According to his counts, the proportions of absentees (to all adult males)
were, for Nagovisi, 30 percent; for Siwai (including Baitsi), 19 percent;
and for Buin, 17.6 percent. (No comparable figures are available for
Nasioi, all patrol records for that tribe having been destroyed or lost
during World War II.) In other words, before and during the 1930s the
peoples in this study included large numbers of men who had lived and
worked for years in social-cultural settings strikingly different from
their own, Could any of those experiences have provided them with the
motives or the means to transform the matriliny of their homelands?

I am uncertain about what might have prompted any such motives--
or, indeed, what they might have been. A few of the returned workers I
talked with expressed some dissatisfaction with the "tedium" of tribal
home life--although nothing could have been as monotonous as the
daily routines of plantation living. But most of the returnees expressed
pleasure at being back home--away from the continuous hard work,
the barracks living, the strict and sometimes harsh discipline, and the
lack of women, all of which characterized plantation life. As for means,
no returned worker could have earned and brought home enough (Aus-
tralian) money or money-bought goods to have allowed him to embark
on an indigenous-type renown-achieving career (which, if achieved,
might have weakened his own commitment to some aspects of matri-
liny). During the 1930s the average wage for plantation work was about
seventy to eighty shillings a year (plus blankets, cotton loin cloths, soap,
stick tobacco, and keep). Some of those wages were spent on goods to
take home (e.g., flashlights, lanterns, storage chests, and canned meat
and fish), many of which were distributed among the workers' kin.
Moreover, much of what money remained was used to pay the Adminis-
tration head tax (of the worker himself and of his moneyless close kin).
Indeed, in the many cases I recorded, few returned workers had saved
enough money to buy more than one or two pigs--not enough to even
begin to become a *mumi, momiako,* or *oboring.*

4. Finally, during their plantation years south Bougainvillians came
into close contact with other New Guineans, including many from
societies unlike their own. Could the latter have persuaded them that
patriliny--or ambilineality, or bilineality, or nonunilineality--was su-

perior to matriliny? I think not. On the contrary, the returned workers I knew were unanimous in their disdain for other non-Bougainvillian Melanesian ways of thinking and acting, including patriliny and other ways of grouping or categorizing people.[47]

NOTES

[This is the second of two parts. Part 1 appeared in *Pacific Studies.* Volume 16, Number 3 (September 1993). --ED.]

19. Actually, the authors of this classification distinguished between "dialects" and "sub-languages," but the above characterizations are sufficient to indicate the relative homogeneity of those languages--and of the cultures of the four peoples now being compared.

20. Ogan relies on some published statements of those earlier writers, especially Frizzi, but does so on the basis of his much longer and more thorough field studies of Nasioi institutions, including what he judged, seemingly correctly, to be their "continuities."

21. As far as I know the Australian Administration's official census figures for most of Bougainville did not survive the Japanese invasion of 1942. I was fortunate in obtaining and preserving a copy of the 1938 census figures for the Buin subdistrict, but not for the subdistrict that included the Nasioi. I did. however, obtain and record an estimated head count of Nasioi speakers (including Simiku), a total of about 3,600--which, spread over an estimated "tribal" area of about 500 square miles, works out to a density of about 7 persons a square mile--the thinnest density of the four tribes included in this study. That, of course, represents a "generalized" density. In fact, those 3,600 or so persons were divided into eight dialectally distinct, spatially separated, and ecologically different subtribes.

22. Ogan adds the following, judicious, note concerning the authenticity of his reconstruction: "Clearly my definition of 'indigenous' or 'traditional' behaviour must be arbitrary. Today there are, for example, no Nasioi alive, or at any rate capable of being interviewed, who were full-fledged adult members of society before Europeans arrived in numbers on Bougainville. Yet the effort is necessary, not least because present conditions are obviously causing modern Nasioi to distort descriptions of past customs in order to achieve new political and social goals. Much of my own material was gathered at a time, and from the kind of responsible, elderly informants, which makes me confident that such distortions were minimal. . . . In this chapter I call 'traditional' those behaviours which were still current between the world wars, often clearly remembered by men living today but evincing continuity with the more distant past. This material is comparable [in degree of Westernization] to that observed at first hand by Oliver among the Siwai" (1972:12).

23. Although Ogan acknowledges some "modern-day" cultural differences between the Aropa Valley and the mountain-dwelling, southeastern Nasioi (i.e, those of the Kongara region), he uses some data on the latter in his reconstruction of "traditional" Aropa Valley culture--because of the less-Westernized state of Kongara culture and because of the availability of the earlier descriptions thereof by Frizzi and others.

24. In a 1992 letter to me Ogan wrote: "In the Aropa Valley in 1962-64, people had temporarily given up pigs in order to expand stands of coconuts. But even in Kongara in 1967-68, where people utilized rough terrain as 'natural pigpens,' I saw no large herds of pigs."

25. Ogan wrote in a letter to me: "I agree that shell valuables were likely to have been less important in Nasioi than elsewhere [in southern Bougainville]. Perhaps this is related to the importance of exchanging produce across ecological niches, or maybe just to the relative isolation of areas like Kongara from the source of supply."

26. On the basis of her two-day visit to "mountain hamlets" southwest(?) of Aropa Valley, in 1929(?), Blackwood wrote: "Certain families are recognized as being of high rank, the rest being commoners. There is an hereditary chieftainship, a man's heir is his sister's son, his own children belonging to another clan, and taking a position corresponding to the rank of their mother" (1931:430). This is the only published mention I have found of "hereditary chieftainship" or "family rank' in Nasioi--except insofar as Ogan's statement about *oboring* (big-man) succession (quoted below under Matriliny) might be so inter. preted. In this connection, Ogan also wrote in a 1992 letter to me: "Despite Frizzi's use of *Hauptling* [chief] . . . I cannot believe that hereditary chieftainship existed. As I have quoted often [in publications], the Germans were appalled at Nasioi failure to grasp the concept of chief. Again, I think the features of scattered, low density population and a lack of pressure on land play an important part here."

27. As mentioned above, some of Nash's Nagovisi informants tended to see their neighbors, the Nasioi, as having matrimoieties like themselves. That may indeed have been the case with their *nearest* Nasioi neighbors--i.e., those of western Nasioi--but there is no published mention of Nagovisi-like moieties by Ogan or any other writer on Nasioi except Chinnery, who wrote: "The Nasoi *[sic]* people appear to be divided into two clans, each of which has numerous subdivisions. My information was not very reliable, but I gathered that one of the clans is called Borapanu, and is associated in some way with Marioi, the eagle, and the other clan is Mantanu, which is associated in some way with Ungtong, water" (1924:71). However, the Nasioi were similar to the Nagovisi--and to the Siwai and Buin--in having had a kin-terminological system of the Dravidian type (i.e., one that classified all kin terms into one or another of two intermarrying categories).

28. The only type of "shrine" mentioned by Ogan (and also by Blackwood, Chinnery, and Frizzi) was that associated with households: "A small house, resembling a European birdhouse, was set on a pole behind one's dwelling, a small fire built inside, and tasty morsels of pig, opossum and other delicacies placed on the fire. This house was the *dopo* where the ancestral 'spirits' dwelt. It is unclear from informants' accounts whether ancestral 'spirits' were propitiated as individuals or groups, or how kinship alignments affected the system. Since the *dopo* was associated with the household as a social unit, it seems likely that each member made offerings to whatever spirits he thought of. [Present-day] Nasioi disinterest in such matters effectively precludes the possibility that this ritual accurately reflected a living individual's genealogy" (Ogan 1972:30-31). In a related footnote Ogan draws attention to a similar kind of shrine, a *lopo,* among the Austronesian-speaking peoples of Choiseul Island.

29. I find this omission puzzling. I cannot help but believe that such ritual once existed, given the role that magic played in growing-up ceremonies elsewhere in southern Bougainville and that it *probably* played in other domains of "aboriginal" Nasioi life. Nasioi growing-up ceremonies did differ from those of Siwai and Buin in at least one other known respect, namely, they, like those of the Nagovisi, included puberty (i.e., first menstruation) rites for girls.

30. Blackwood's description of Nasioi matriliny consists of the following brief remark: "There are five clans *(mu)*. Their names are Mara-owi (Eagle), Lingumbuto (Spring of Water), Mo (Coconuts), Toro (Eel), and Kandji (Ground). There are no subdivisions, but the Eagle clan is regarded as the most important. A man may not marry a woman of his own clan, but can marry into any of the others. The children follow the clan of their mother" (1931:430). For Chinnery's account see note 27 above. Frizzi's account (in my translated version) of Nasioi clans and clan totemism is as follows:

> What little I could learn about Nasioi clans *(mu)* and their clan-totem-related customs is as follows.
>
> A child inherits the clan totem of his mother, and a woman retains her own totemic affiliation after marriage. Persons having the same totem call one another "brother" or "sister" even though they are members of entirely separate local groups.
>
> Marriage between members of the same totemic clan is strictly forbidden. When I asked a person to tell me the name of someone who happened to be a totem-clanmate, he would ask a third person to answer; had he himself uttered the name, he would have become susceptible to some misfortune. Persons having the same totem do not enter each other's house[!: see below]. Likewise, physical contact with a clanmate's blood causes sores, and smoking a clanmate's tobacco pipe cause boils on one's forehead.
>
> During their wanderings outside their home territories, which might last for days, they informed me that they were always put up and fed by totem-mates. To my question "How do you recognize them as such?" the answer was "We just know." (However, only seldom do they go far from home, especially to places entirely unknown to them.)
>
> Almost every kind of animal serves as one or another clan's totem, including snakes, birds, bats, fish, pigs, opossums and locusts--three kinds of snakes being among the most highly respected: the *bogiago* (a very large one), the *kurure* (a small one), and the *eru* (a thick-bodied one). A person is forbidden to kill or eat his own totem. Plants also serve as clan totems and, as such, should not be eaten by their human affiliates. With respect to all such restrictions, however, the prohibition pertains only to the species or variety of animal or plant specifically affiliated--not, for example, to *all* bats or to *all* varieties of taro or bananas, but only to that species or variety associated with one's own clan. (Frizzi 1914:17-18)

31. This reconstruction is based partly on Keil's and partly on my own reading of Chinnery and the Thurnwalds. It should be noted, however, that Keil now professes some misgivings about the reconstruction offered, tentatively, in his 1975 dissertation, In a letter to me of December 1992, he writes, "any reconstruction of the past on my part--in reference to the roles of mumira, kitere, etc.--is uncertain and debatable--and throughout [my dissertation] I discuss processes whereby the neat categories of my analysis have been transformed and changed and blurred. . . . And, perhaps, parts of my [dissertation] relied too much on [the writings of the Thurnwalds and Chinnery], without noting at every part that the Buin at the time of my fieldwork could not confirm or deny every point made in those earlier writings." Therefore, let the reader beware!

32. Henceforth in this essay--unless otherwise specified--all statements concerning "Buin" beliefs and practices refer most directly to the communities studied by Keil (Mogoroi and those nearby) and indirectly to those of southern and central Buin. As mentioned

earlier, some of the northwestern communities of Buin had matrilineal clans that bore closer resemblances to those of the neighboring Siwai than to those of Mogoroi, but I do not know whether that resemblance applied to social stratification as well.

33. Two principles governed the transmission of a deceased's land use rights: (1) that they should go to the individual who had contributed preponderantly to his funeral feast (which had to be sumptuous to insure his spirit's entry into Paradise) and (2) that they should go to the deceased's eldest son--or, lacking sons, to another closely related male agnate, In most cases the recipient was the same--whether or not he had to "borrow" some of the costs from others (including, often, from his *mumira*-leader).

34. By the 1930s the time frame adopted for this study, a *mumira*-leader's power to kill had been curtailed by the colonial authorities. It is mentioned here only to indicate the authority that once rested in the status.

35. For more details about *oromurui,* including their comparison with Siwai *horomorun* and Nagovisi *paramorun,* see Oliver 1943.

36. Such a number of "upper-class" members strikes me as disproportionately large in comparison with figures for other class-stratified societies in Melanesia, but it is the only Buin-related head count known to me.

37. In 1938-1939, during my brief forays into northwest Buin (whose inhabitants were adjacent to and in frequent contact, including marriage, with those of northeast Sinai), I found their institutions to be closely similar to those of the neighboring Siwai--including the presence of the same and no other matrilineal clans and the division of those into subclans and matrilineages (Oliver 1943:62n).

38. In commenting on this statement, however, Keil writes: "I'm not sure that I would agree, for the Buin, that 'other things equal', persons related matrilineally owed one another MORE mutual generosity in goods and services than owed to other persons. I'm not sure it's MORE than what is, or was, owed to agnates, for example. or one's mumira/kitere" (pers. com., 1992).

39. It might be argued that the four tribes had different cultural origins and that their similarities in the 1930s had come about through convergence--specifically, through centuries-long contacts and mutual borrowings. Some such borrowing doubtless did occur-- for example, between residents of northeast Siwai and northwest Buin. And, as Nash reported, there are well-attested cases of Siwai individuals having moved into Nagovisi and become assimilated into the Nagovisi dual-organization "mind set." However, scattered instances do not a broad flow of history make. And--with a bow to Friar Occam and his razor--divergence requires fewer assumptions than convergence with respect to the matter at hand.

40. By adding conjecture to "evidence" in order to reach back even further into Melanesian "history," Rivers proposed that that "ancestral" social system was itself the result of fusion between "aboriginal" native peoples and later waves of immigrants from Southeast Asia--the former having been "negroid," "ignorant," "of low culture," and "divided up into small hostile bands"; the latter lighter-skinned, of "higher culture," and superior in "mental and material equipment" (1914, 2:558).

41. Even in farawsay Buka, with its numerous matrilineal exogamous clans, two of the clans were so preponderant, numerically, that there were communities in which they functioned like moieties (Blackwood 1935).

42. For a comprehensive intertribal comparison of the roles and social value of women in southern Bougainville, see Nash 1981.

43. I do so while agreeing with the caveat by Count Tolstoy that the "totality of causes of phenomena is inaccessible to human understanding." I also accept his added observation that "the necessity of finding causes is innate in the human soul" (*War and Peace,* part 13, chap. 1).

44. In one publication R. Thurnwald wrote: "Among the people of Buin . . . you may easily distinguish various physical types since the invasion of this part by the Alumono race [Alu, of Shortland Island; Mono, of Treasury Island] seems fairly recent" (1934b:2810-2811). But in another statement published that same year, he revised his opinion: "The cultural and racial distinction between the 'aristocracy" and the 'bondsmen' seems on the whole to be less pronounced here than in Africa. The chief is housed, dressed and fed exactly like his bondsman. It may be that the fusion between the two is more advanced here" (1934a:125).

45. The census figures for Nagovisi, Siwai, and Buin were collected by Patrol Officer K. W. Bilston, who generously provided me with the copy cited here--which, as far as I know, is the only copy in existence, the original along with most other pre-World War II Administration records having been lost or destroyed during World War II.

46. Pigs could, in a sense, be "accumulated" by lending them out for others to feed, or by "giving" them in terms of collectible debts, but those forms of assets had their social limits --and were much less "liquid" than shell money.

47. A comprehensive report on south Bougainvillian matriliny would include much more than is provided in this essay, such as the stereotypical characteristics of familial relationships in clan origin myths, including the role of the senior and more authoritative, but often wicked, Elder Sister--a kind of Melanesian Cinderella theme--and the overworked and jealous. even vengeful father. However, I leave that task for scholars who are more inventive or perceptive or, in any case, younger than I.

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VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL CHANGE
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

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Papua New Guinea's government faces challenges to its legitimacy and power over major issues in a number of spheres, including control over mining projects, payments of compensation, and the electoral process itself. This circumstance prompts me to raise a question similar to ones regarding rebellion and revolution posed initially in the very different context of the study of African kingdoms by Max Gluckman (1963): What are the conditions for the political legitimacy of authority in a small-scale multiethnic state such as that of Papua New Guinea? Or, to put it in a less a priori way, what contests over such legitimacy occur? Using cases from the Highlands region of Papua New Guinea I will explore this underlying issue, and in so doing will at the same time examine the place of violence in political life from the point of view of *its* legitimacy or acceptability to different parties as a part of the overall political process (cf. Riches 1986).

At stake here also is the place of "custom" *(kastom)* in contemporary politics. Keesing's study of Kwaio history shows clearly that for the Kwaio, "custom" is a way of marking out their resistance to external control (1992), and violent physical action has a place in such processes of resistance among the Kwaio as well as elsewhere in Melanesia. My argument here is that the insertion of violence into political processes that are now encapsulated within a state framework leads, whether intentionally or not, to a risk of turbulence reaching the state level itself and to the possibility that a democratic form of government may not be

able to sustain itself in future. Conversely, state-level institutions and processes, in their impingement on local communities, may themselves contribute to the growth of turbulence and to the resurgence of transformed versions of "custom." The perspectives of politicians, public servants, local leaders, and ordinary people may be sharply at variance, especially with regard to the place of violence in politics, so "legitimacy," as Riches pointed out (1986:11), is likely to be inherently contested and indeterminate. As an observer, I can only report on the contest, while also attempting to see its wider-scale implications for the future of the state.

One broad point can be made at the outset. By contrast with many African societies, the small-scale societies of Papua New Guinea tended to be politically acephalous, and in the Highlands there were no established centralized chiefdoms that could have been used to graft indigenous politics onto the introduced colonial state. Big-men were leaders of groups, coalitions, and factions in pursuit of competitive ends. When populations of this kind are introduced first to colonial and then to postcolonial power, we should not expect them to invent overnight a respect for hierarchical authority. They obeyed the colonial power out of a combination of fear and self-interest. When fear is no longer there, they will continue to pursue the self-interest part of the equation unless curbed. In short, the national government, inheriting the colonial state apparatus in 1975, was not initially equipped with any automatic legitimacy in the people's eyes. Indeed, many Highlanders had not wanted independence and were skeptical from the outset about what the new government could achieve (see Strathern 1979).

The general context into which the historical processes I am concerned with are set is, then, clear for the Highlands region. This region was first explored only in the early 1930s and effectively pacified only after 1945. Since then it has been subjected to an intense pace of change and development, driven first by cash cropping and a plantation economy and more recently by the effects of a mining boom. State institutions have been fully in place only since 1975, when Papua New Guinea was granted political independence from Australia; provincial governments began operating only at the end of the 1970s. These institutions, as I have noted, carry with them no particular legitimacy of their own at local levels. From the point of view of the people, then, new institutions have to *earn* such legitimacy or acceptance through the benefits they offer, and in practice such benefits are often channeled through personal networks of patronage that take on a local aura of influence quite separate from that of the state itself.

The Historical Context

The argument of this article is thus historical, and the focus is on the Highlands region, whose problems with violence figure prominently in contemporary debates in and on Papua New Guinea. In the immediate precontact past in the Highlands (that is, up to c. 1930) it is obvious that both violence and peacemaking were equally, and in alternation, legitimate means of raising and settling issues in intergroup contexts. The legitimacy of violence in interpersonal relationships varied by kinship, gender, and status, and breaches of the boundaries of legitimate action were marked by rules of paying compensation for harm done to others or, failing such compensation, by recourse to violent retribution. With pacification such violence at local levels became proscribed. Control over physical force was in theory concentrated into the capacity of the colonial Administration, although the people did not necessarily recognize this as a valid claim. The use of physical force to settle disputes was supposed to be replaced in the life of the Highlanders by "law," meaning the courts and the police, as well as, less explicitly, a benign expansion of indigenous custom in the sphere of making compensation payments for past killings. Indeed, without the latter process pacification could never have succeeded even for the limited period in which it did hold sway.

The colonial Australian Administration set up an array of courts prior to independence in 1975 to provide a means of litigation within the framework of the state. "Custom" was permitted to be influential only at the lowest levels of these courts, which began to be introduced widely only after 1975: the village courts. It was not recognized as a basis for law above the local level and hence could not be applied to acts that were tried in higher-level courts, such as crimes or acts of violence. Peacemaking between individuals or groups was largely left to custom, with passing interest from the formal levels of administration. (*Kiaps,* colonial officials, often introduced revised versions of compensation practices to the people, in the belief that they were following or improving local methods of dispute settlement.)

It is evident that the court system that the postindependence government inherited had a formal legitimacy within its own sphere, backed up with varying degrees of effectiveness by force in the shape of the police. This legitimacy, however, was self-accorded and primarily established in colonial times. Highlanders do not see these courts as separate from the rest of government, as enduring institutions to be

respected in their own right. If government, or the police, lose respect, so do the courts.

Customary procedures for settlement, as I have noted, had an informal legitimacy in the people's eyes, not as backed by the state but as dependent on self-regulatory mechanisms and ultimately on the sanctioning power of intergroup violence. This ultimate sanction, however, was precisely what state control disallowed. From this fundamental problem many others have subsequently stemmed. We can identify a gap here in the overall system of social control, which has grown wider over time. If, for example, compensation procedures are rejected by one party to a dispute, how could the other side claim state assistance if there was no legal framework in which to do so? Government officials tried, and indeed still try, on an ad hoc basis and using their prestige, to push through compensation claims of this sort when it suited their interests. They sponsored ceremonies of peacemaking in which weapons were broken and burned by warring sides. Thus they tried to close the gap in control. However, a conflict had been set up in the intersection between local politics and state or colonial law: Although the former necessitates the readjustment of intergroup relations at the local level, the state authorities saw killings as a matter between the state and the guilty individual (Strathern 1972).

In this situation, both court authorities and the local people saw each other's actions and attitudes as odd and basically irrelevant. Judges were concerned about punishing crimes on an individual basis. Clans were concerned about claiming compensation from each other. Neither side essentially supported the other. The result could be that the state punished criminals, while clansmen still took revenge if they could not, without outside help, obtain compensation in wealth. (For further case histories and more detailed discussion, see Strathern 1974; cf. Gordon and Meggitt 1985 on the Enga region.)

The Context of Violence

The resurgence of overt physical violence at local levels in the Highlands during the 1970s was precipitated by a large number of factors, in particular the dismantling of the powers of government patrol officers and their dissipation into a supposedly rational bureaucratic structure; land shortages in some areas, caused by cash cropping and land alienation; an overall decline in coffee prices since the mid-1970s; the failure of courts adequately to address the underlying issues in disputes; the loss of sanctions associated with the indigenous religions and the inability of

Christian missions to fill the gap; and tensions brought about by uneven development between urban and rural centers and between emergent social classes within the nation (sometimes expressed in hostile behavior stemming from the consumption of alcohol [see Iamo and Ketan 1992]). A crisis of legitimacy is implicated in all of these factors; implicated also are the severe contradictions in social life brought about by processes of change. Highlanders have both avidly sought wealth through cash cropping and business activity, and at the same time quite tenaciously held on to certain indigenous ways of behavior, particularly in the sphere of prestige-seeking and exchange but also in terms of exercising violence to resist, or *per contra* to effect, political changes. Jealousy of another's success in the competitive game of wealth may lead to murder, for example, or sorcery. (In earlier phases of history sorcery accusations and fears kept alive a historical consciousness of conflict between groups and individuals based upon tribal structures.) Criminal gangs have emerged *pari passu* with rich businessmen, either preying on these or living symbiotically with them. In intergroup contexts armed confrontations are frequent, and the deep-seated enmities that go with these can be assuaged only by lengthy and autonomous compensation ceremonies, which remain essentially outside of the sphere of government action. (These events are still occasionally endorsed or even sponsored by government officials in Hagen, but the social pressures behind them have little to do with government policy or influence; however, see Gordon and Meggitt 1985 on the Enga situation.)

So far, I have presented a "layered" picture of political action: as though government was free of violence and violence-plus-exchange operated at local levels. The picture is incomplete. First, the state has itself been faced with an internal secessionist movement in the North Solomons Province, especially on Bougainville island, which has led to bloody engagements and fierce arguments over the legitimacy of state action in these conflicts. Second, the results of this state-level conflict have further affected regions already marked by their own struggles, since the withdrawal of police and resources from these regions to the North Solomons has reduced government presence and capability and hence further diminished its legitimacy and effectiveness. Third, and this is the theme that I will pursue, in this context vertical linkages have occurred between local areas and the state that have led to a perception that local and state issues are interconnected and that matters of state, far from being imposed only from the center, can be altered through local actions.

The top-down legitimacy of government thus begins to be radically

contested, at least partly through the activities of elected politicians
who use ties with local electorates to bring to a head issues that impinge
on the national level. Along with government efforts to control violence
and restrict its sphere of legitimacy, there is actually a tendency for that
sphere to expand upwards from those local levels, where it always held
an unspoken legitimacy, into the sphere of national affairs and into
issues that affect wider sets of people. The strength of this tendency in
fact varies directly, if paradoxically, with the strength of politicians in
both their local arenas and on the national scene.

Here we see clearly a major difference between the colonial and the
postcolonial state. Government officials chosen and paid by the colonial
power represented government interests and concerns to the people but
in no way depended on them for continued employment. Postcolonial
politicians, by contrast, must try to favor their electors and are intrinsi-
cally likely to seek resources at the national level to do so, as well as to
use their local base of support as a means to raise issues at the national
level. The potential for volatility and instability in the relationship
between the state and local populations is thus greatly increased, and
the situation is exacerbated when the voting process itself becomes com-
moditized (see below).

Two contradictory activities of government are taking place. Laws
are enacted in Parliament and effected through the courts and by the
police that specifically aim at containing violence. Insofar as the agen-
cies that apply such laws at the local level use force themselves to do so,
they present a two-edged example to the local people: not just that right
is might, but the reverse, that might is right. Politicians, on the other
hand, by fostering local factions in pursuit of personal power, may actu-
ally stir up conflicts and increase their significance beyond the local
level. Tendencies in this direction were already evident in the 1980s
when funeral ceremonies for important leaders were sometimes made
the occasion for rioting and destruction of property in Mount Hagen
town, motivated by political rivalry between candidates for the provin-
cial premiership or for a seat in the national Parliament. One can see a
conflict of opinion developing here between the public service and the
politicians. Senior public servants largely see their task as the expansion
of the sphere of administration and of "law and order." They sometimes
are of the opinion that politicians can get in the way of this process both
by commoditizing, and so corrupting, politics and by attempting to
usurp the spheres of administrative work in favor of their own patron-
age networks: networks that inevitably conduce to the factionalization
of relationships between groups within local electorates since, in favor-
ing close supporters, the politicians deprive others of desired resources.

Adventitiously, the situation has been made much more precarious since the introduction of firearms into fighting and criminal actions in the Highlands (and elsewhere). The ambiguous role of politicians in this situation is made clear by the recurrent suspicion on the part of ordinary people (and some electoral officials also) that certain politicians are among the most important suppliers of guns to their constituents, largely because guns buy votes. Politicians' henchmen distribute guns to their networks and build their own influence on the putative possession of powerful weapons. At the end of 1991 in Mount Hagen (Western Highlands Province) people predicted that warfare would break out shortly after the elections, scheduled for May 1992, precisely because of these preset alignments presided over by local henchmen or bosses.

These henchmen are not outsiders. They are kin to either the politicians or the local people whom they attempt to influence, or they are linked to both. They receive money, vehicles, and business opportunities in return for promoting the politicians for reelection. A major factor in this process has been the access that both national and provincial politicians have had to discretionary ("slush") funds for stimulating local development and services. The henchmen, usually younger than the politician, are seeking avenues to become politicians later or to found businesses such as security and nightwatch services. Although henchmen possess and distribute guns, they are distinguished from the younger warriors who gain prominence by using these weapons. Typically, henchmen move often between local areas and the capital city, Port Moresby, and occupy an ambiguous status of part-influence, part-obscurity in both arenas.

The people in fact predicted that as a result of electoral violence the 1992 election would be the last one, implying that the army might take over to save the state from anarchy. If this vision were correct, it would mean the final point of the expansion of the legitimacy of violence proceeding from the local level had been reached, to be met by the counterpoint of repressive rule; and the historical link between point and counterpoint would turn out to be the previously democratically elected politicians themselves.

Elections and the Commoditization of the Vote

People were predicting, then, that the 1992 elections would bring the end of elections as such. It would be a revolution and not just a rebellion against a particular politician or political coalition of the kind that has characterized the volatile events of Papua New Guinea's national politics since 1975. It may be worth while here to trace a history of elections

over the years, showing how politics had reached the point of such a prediction being made by the end of 1991.

Elections for the National House of Assembly were arranged by the colonial Administration as early as 1964. In 1964 aspiring politicians attempted to cultivate an image of representatives who by their "strong talk" (*ik rondokl* in the Hagen language, a prerequisite for big-manship) could extract benefits for their area from the Australians. The idea that politicians are also lawmakers or that political parties might have competing ideologies was at this time entirely absent, and the politician was seen as a glorified local government councillor.

This image prevailed until not long before independence, when it became clear to Highlanders that certain parties, in particular PANGU, aimed at achieving independence, while others, such as the UNITED Party at that time, opposed it and wanted the Australians to stay. Highlands politicians soon learned the perks to be gained from switching their loyalties between factions in coalitions, and their image in the people's eyes began to shift from an idea of them strictly as "servants of the people" to a notion that they were in power chiefly to serve themselves, Notions of policy remained remote from debate. Given, then, that politicians were perceived as being rich and seemed to achieve their riches by virtue of being elected, and also that their promises to assist the people rang increasingly hollow or even ceased altogether, the next step for the electors was to ask, "What's in it for us?" This question no longer referred to collective benefits in the style of the politics of the 1960s.

By the 1980s it was understood that politicians are in power to benefit themselves and their factions, and they concentrate on consolidating their existing power bases. As a result of armed conflicts between groups these bases had become more, rather than less, rigidly defined and a process of neotribalization was well under way (see Strathern 1992). This intensified demarcation of political space coupled with the fragmenting of perception within such spaces was accompanied, then, by a sharp commoditization of the voting process that Hageners, at any rate, seemed to equate with their own ethnoperspective on modernization. One long-term friend of mine, who told me that of course now it was absolutely necessary for rival candidates to outbid each other in offers of bribes to every individual elector, added that the people were sure (from what the candidates themselves had said) that this was "the way of the white man" and had just reached Papua New Guinea. When I contested this view, he appeared shocked and begged me not to spread the point around, for fear that I might be physically attacked and silenced by politicians and their followers alike.

This brief sketch indicates, then, a historical movement from the 1960s, when the idea of the politician as a collective advocate of the people vis-à-vis the colonial power was paramount; to the emergence of party politics and assumption of indigenous control of politics around independence; further to the venalities of factions and coalitions among these parties; and finally to the intensified retribalization of electorates and the full commoditization of individual voting anticipated for 1992 (cf., for a comparable history, Standish 1992).

Provincial Politics

The national political situation is complicated by the existence, since 1970, of a separate level of provincial politics, with an elected provincial assembly and a premier who presides over a loose coalition of followers in a way that mirrors the national level. Provincial politicians make alliances with politicians at the national level and may belong to one of the national political parties. Equally, they can be opposed to parliamentarians, since province-level politicians see themselves largely in the mold of those who demand resources for their province from the national government.

Electoral contests may implicate these shifting and ambiguous relations between politicians at the two different levels. At either level the politicians tend to convert their representative role into one of patronage towards their constituents, and the same model of patronage accordingly operates among politicians themselves at succeeding levels, or is felt by the people to do so. Important, therefore, is what the politicians can offer to their people in between elections as well as at them. National parliamentarians up to 1991 both used personal allowances granted to them through the budgetary process to sponsor local schemes for development (and thus to secure support) separately from budget items funded through the public service and funneled further assistance through candidates seeking election at provincial level. The latter process, and its potential for violence, can be illustrated by a case history situated at Kuk, near Mount Hagen.

Case 1

Since elections began in 1964, the Kawelka people at Kuk have never had one of their clan members as a representative at either the national or provincial level. From 1972 to 1987 the MP for their electorate (Dei) came from a tribe allied to their own by a traditional pairing and by

historical ties forged in early colonial times by this man's father, an out-
standing big-man. The politician himself was a sister's son of the most
numerous Kawelka clan, the Membo, and a dense web of ceremonial
exchange partnerships had surrounded this individual tie over time.
The Kawelka therefore generally gave their votes to this relative and
helped him to retain power in face of the opposing bloc within the elec-
torate.

During the 1980s the strength of the alliance between the two tribes
began to falter. A less than completely successful occasion when the pol-
itician's clansmen repaid a ceremonial gift of pigs and money *(moka)* to
the Kawelka heralded this decline, which was hastened by a tragic
event in 1989. The newly adult son of a Membo leader was killed in a
brawl in the capital city of Port Moresby, struck down by a fellow clans-
man of the politician (the assailant was himself married to a Kawelka
woman of another clan). This untoward event split the alliance, and
even after a large compensation payment of hundreds of pigs and
K12,000 cash had been made, relations were still shaky. There was sus-
picion that the death was not an accident but might have been planned.

The Kawelka people at home in Mount Hagen had been involved for
some years in bitter fighting with long-established enemies within Dei,
and there was a feeling that the MP had not given them support but had
rather attempted to gain favor with their more numerous enemies as a
part of electoral maneuvering. (All this was unsubstantiated rumor, but
it affected people's attitudes.) Guns had been introduced in this war
and the enemies held the better weapons (Strathern 1992). It happened
that the Membo youth killed in Moresby was one of a new generation of
fighters with guns and his removal was regarded as giving an advantage
to the Kawelka's prime enemies. Previously, in 1987, the politician had
lost the parliamentary election to a rival from the opposing bloc within
Dei. Relationships that had held since the 1960s were now being shat-
tered in all directions.

In this context the focus of political conflict shifted to the 1990 pro-
vincial elections, which were being held between national elections.
The sitting provincial-assembly member for the Kawelka was an affine
(wife's sister's husband) of the previous MP. The assembly member was
now opposed by a Kawelka candidate, and this candidate in turn was
sponsored by the new national-level MP who had also managed to
secure a ministry for himself in the new government. The Kawelka can-
didate was popular *qua* Kawelka, and the time seemed ripe for his
success. The sitting assembly member, however, was reelected. The
Kawelka candidate accused a fellow Kawelka man of defecting to the
opposite side and of aiding and abetting many relatives of the previous

MP who had come to live with the Kawelka at Kuk to vote against him. A punitive raid was organized after the election result was announced, in which the supposed traitors lost houses and gardens through arson, women were reportedly raped, and some families were forced to flee.

Relations were only slowly returning to a friendlier footing in 1991. Discussions continued on the cause of the 1989 death in Port Moresby, and attempts were made to interrogate the previous MP on his possible knowledge about the case and his possible role in the provincial elections. The Kawelka candidate subsequently continued to act as a henchman for the new MP, opposed within his own small lineage by a younger man who decided to support for the 1992 national elections the son of the previous MP. Physical fights and brawls following drinking sessions between these two lineage mates now took the place of the wider disputes, but it was expected that conflict would reemerge and escalate during 1992, particularly since the candidates would be divided by party political allegiances and to some extent would have rival party "machines" behind them.[1]

What this case illustrates is the potential for conflict to repeat itself in different modes and at different levels of the political system over time, replicating and intensifying causes of dispute between groups. The political arena involved is not one in which we can separate out "traditional" from "introduced" spheres of activity, but rather one in which there is an enchainment of issues that all feed into the political arena, sometimes explosively, and particularly at the times of elections. Obviously, a close connection has grown up between violence and political change, to the extent that a certain level of violence is *expected* in conjunction with elections (especially after them), whether at the national or provincial level. Such expressions of violence clearly also reveal a disparity between the supposed exercise of state law with its ideal of a peaceful democratic process and the actual views of the local people. In staging attacks of this kind, the local people are not simply protesting against any particular electoral result (although this is what they think they are doing) but are also weakening the peacefulness of the political process itself--an action that has more destructive potential than they perhaps intend. Only the creation of trust between politicians and their electorates as a whole could halt this trend.

"Law and Order": The Impact of "Rascals"

Locally-based processes threatening the effectiveness and image of the state have also to be set into a general context of increasing law and

order problems in Papua New Guinea as a whole. These problems stem from many sources, of which I will mention two. The first is the rise of criminal gangs of educated or semieducated younger males, who band together either on a local clan basis or through interethnic alliances, gain access to weapons, and embark on car thefts, highway robbery, house and shop break-ins, murder, and rape. These gangs are found in all urban centers of the country, especially in Port Moresby, Lae, and the Highlands region, and some coastal provinces (Sepik, Oro, Gulf). In places they are involved in the cultivation and sale of marijuana; everywhere they trade in weapons. They stage holdups on major highways that link parts of the Highlands together, but they also assist their fellow tribesmen in intergroup fights and are given refuge in tribal areas when hunted by the police. Such gangs of *raskal* are obviously a perturbing factor in the overall processes of change, and the government is forced to expend scarce resources on strengthening police operations against them.

Early in 1991 a "crime summit" was held in Port Moresby. One outcome was an agreement to declare a state of emergency and deploy army troops, including some Australian army personnel, along with police, to bring *raskal* gangs more under control. As long as the army remained and used superior telescopes *(kampas)* and guns to those of the *raskal,* the latter were quiescent. But people predicted that when the curfews ended and the army went away, the gangs would be back. The existence of these gangs, who self-consciously maintain themselves outside of, and opposed to, the forces of the national state, constitutes another blow to the perceived legitimacy of control vested in the state as a whole. Ordinary people, of course, support the government's campaign at both national and provincial levels, except where a relative of theirs is involved, but *raskal* assistance in tribal fighting leads to just enough local support to maintain their hideouts. (The emergence of *raskal* is due to economic changes over time, with loss of revenue from coffee and insufficient job creation in the formal sector of the economy; see Hart Nibbrig 1992.)

In general the response of the national government to the *raskal* problem has been serious but episodic. When urban crime rises, the government declares a curfew or an emergency or does both, moves in extra police, and conducts searches for gang members. But the gangs are mobile and move elsewhere just ahead of the authorities. Rumors that gang members have turned up in remote rural locations frighten the local people (as well as visiting anthropologists) and make them acutely aware of the inadequate protection police can offer. Rehabilitation

schemes for *raskal* such as the Self-Help Task Force in Mount Hagen are severely underfunded, in spite of the fact that they offer one of the few genuine pathways for the reform of criminals by granting them the chance to work instead as local entrepreneurs and earn money legally.

Problems from a second source also threaten the effectiveness and image of the state, in a process that resembles a hugely enlarged version of the early political role of representatives in asking for resources from the government. I am referring here to inflated demands for compensation by local landowners and kinsfolk when their land is used for development purposes (Strathern n.d.).

Case 2

During 1991 such demands increasingly came from groups in the Southern Highlands Province, stemming from the discovery of considerable oil and gas fields in remote parts of the province (Lake Kutubu and Tari). One issue related to the construction of an access road for the Kutubu project through the territory of the Poroma people. Aware of how badly the road was needed by the developers, the local people blocked its construction and demanded huge sums of money. Meanwhile, the Kutubu people were asking for *all* royalties on the oil finds to be paid to them, without a share for the provincial government. The government was itself split in a struggle over which construction firm should get the contract to make the road. The struggle centered on the premier and his deputy, locked in competition for the premiership. The immediate issues were finally resolved, after which the incumbent premier hinted that there would be more disruption if the national government did not give his province more resources to combat law and order problems. The national prime minister replied that the premier should not engage in even apparently threatening him on this issue.

From an analytical viewpoint what is significant in this case is the preemptive resistance of people at local levels towards nationally planned development activities. Legitimacy is claimed at the bottom and only reluctantly delegated upwards. The national government does not have this legitimacy *ab initio;* it has to create it as best it can.

The implications of this case history were written even larger in two instances at the end of 1991. In the first the Koiari people, who consider themselves to be the original landowners of Port Moresby city, massed together and cut off the city's water supply, which derives from an artificial lake in their territory (Lake Sirinumu) in the hills above Moresby.

The prime minister, while strongly condemning violence, in effect had to appease the Koiari and promise them development funds as well as a new electorate of their own (a major aim of the Koiari leader). In the second instance, landowners in two different parts of the country threw the whole of Papua New Guinea in confusion in December 1991 by vandalizing and destroying telecommunications repeater stations (at Mount Ialibu and Mount Strong) in pursuit of their demand for millions of kina as compensation for the small areas of land on which the stations are housed. In this case the government acted more firmly; dispatching police to guard the stations, but clearly the landowners had no compunction about making their claims in this violent way.

Clans seem to treat the state, national, and provincial authorities as another clan and to direct their demands against all entities in the outside world in the exact way they do against their immediate neighbors. They appear to know that violent actions can be effective in changing governmental attitudes towards them, whereas more peaceful methods tend to prove futile. From their perspective, then, their behavior is highly rational, while at the same time it is deeply damaging to the fabric of state legitimacy.

My conclusion in this section is thus that government attempts to control the "lawless" activities of *raskal* and of disgruntled landowners both signal deep-seated problems for the legitimacy of government itself. Neither landowners nor *raskal* appear to recognize any superordinate right of the state to control their activities and demands, and the more "democratic" the government response to their challenge is, the more they continue to exercise their challenges and escalate their demands.

Local Modifications

The picture I have drawn here depends heavily on processes and events as seen from the Western Highlands Province, although case 2 also dealt with the Southern Highlands. It is important to note that the processes of what may be called "disintegrative integration" described here occur most strongly in areas that are central rather than peripheral to the development that is taking place in Papua New Guinea. Mount Hagen is the boomtown center both for the tea and much of the coffee industry and for the new business offices through which mining operations are administered in the Southern Highlands and Enga provinces.

In sharp contrast is the situation that holds in a peripheral area, Lake Kopiago District, in the far northwestern part of the Southern Highlands. Kopiago government station is small, staffed by one district man-

ager, one council executive officer, and one policeman, or at most, two. These officials serve a population of up to fifteen thousand people scattered over a wide area. The station is served by Mission Aviation Fellowship flights and is tenuously linked by a very rough road to Tari and thence to the provincial capital, Mendi.

It is tempting, though in some ways inaccurate, to see Kopiago as caught in a time warp, reflecting what other parts of the Highlands were like in, say, the late 1960s. The time warp, if it has existed, is on the verge of ending, though, with the advent of more road traffic, taverns for drinking beer, and money from gold mines at Porgera and Mount Kare to the east. But what is striking is the absence of severe, large-scale armed conflicts between clans, such as have been commonplace in Hagen since the early 1970s, and, concomitantly, the lack of any serious challenge to the few representatives of government at the station. It is agreed in government circles that the station is much understaffed and in the event of trouble might simply be overwhelmed. But while there is a fair amount of interpersonal conflict (as revealed in a study of police occurrence books over the last ten years), this has not broadened to include intergroup fighting or the affairs of politicians. Indeed, politicians in Kopiago are looked on as intermediaries with government in the hierarchical way that held previously in Hagen; and they are criticized for their failures in this role, not for any involvement in intrigues beyond it. There is indeed a potential "law and order" problem in Kopiago that centers on the availability of police and firearms, but it does not encompass the politicians as in Hagen.

Reasons for these differences may be hazarded as follows. First, the area is distinctly underdeveloped, and what it needs to begin a course of economic change is government input of the kind given long ago in Hagen. The politicians are accordingly judged in this light and tend to confine their actions to this sphere, as when the sitting national MP gave electoral development funds to help establish a primary school in a neglected part of the district (Hewa, where a language different from the majority language, Duna, is spoken).[2] Second, the people are at a stage where their practices of compensation for deaths and injuries are still viable enough to cope with the resolution of disputes. Inflation in the size of these compensations, however, and the threats of forceful action that at times accompany demands for them, indicate that this phase may be ending. Third, ritualizations of physical conflict in the form of verbal abuse are highly elaborated by the Duna, and they appear less ready to physically attack others (although such attacks definitely occur) than perhaps the Hagen people are. All injuries are held

potentially to result in sickness or death over time and only compensation can heal them (author's field notes, 1991). Injury is thus a very serious matter. In Hagen it is serious, too, because of the threat of physical counteraction; there appears to be a greater readiness in Hagen to inflict blows and to regard such blows as a legitimate counterresponse to annoyance.

For an array of reasons, then, violence is for the time being less a part of social interactions in Kopiago than it is in the more "advanced" parts of the Highlands, and the generalizations that I have made regarding "disintegrative integration" do not yet apply there. Kopiago does, on the other hand, have an incipient *raskal* problem, and holdups of vehicles are common on the highway linking the area to Tari, which has become something of a turbulent frontier town as a result of goldmining at Mount Kare (Ryan 1991).

Conclusion

My overall argument in this article is very simple: that violence is becoming more and more an *expected* part of political activity, the more complex and sophisticated in other respects the political process becomes. As a corollary I note that the most highly developed areas, such as Mount Hagen, are among those that have the greatest problems of violence. By violence I mean physical attacks on others as opposed to verbal haranguing or rhetorics of persuasion. It is necessary to distinguish between different contexts of violence and their different meanings here: for example, between interclan fighting, gang robbery, and attacks on private and government personnel. Yet, in the perceptions of the people at large, all of these processes and contexts become merged in an overall feeling that the government cannot keep control. One important aspect of this whole matter is the commoditization of politics; the idea, that is, that people's minds cannot be persuaded by talk. Short of physical coercion, they can only be bribed with money. Politicians, therefore, in their search for power, no longer depend on platforms or policies but rather on contexts of violence and cash payments.

Another way of looking at the process, I have suggested, is to see it as a decline in the legitimacy of government itself, a denial of a hierarchy of power in the state. The roots of this decline in the Highlands date to at least the time of independence, when many Highlanders were opposed to the departure of the Australian Administration. The indigenous politicians had therefore a hard job to replace their colonial mentors in the first place. But their attempts to set up patronage networks of

their own, mingled with their almost-inevitable embroilment in inter-group conflicts, have now created a situation in which they on the one hand make laws to control violence and crime and on the other hand are implicated in processes that escalate the overall level of violence in their areas. It is in this context that people at Kuk spoke of the possible "end of elections" and linked this in their minds with charismatic messages of Armageddon or the millennium that Christian fundamentalist preachers assured them would take place sometime in the year A.D. 2000. The loss of legitimacy by the government and the rising tide of violence were seen in this light as somehow fated, a part of a wider historical process about to produce a more catastrophic denouement in the elections of June 1992.[3]

The external forces behind this history are clear, and the conjuncture between these forces and millenarian images is also clear. One further feature may be pointed to here. At the beginning of the article I remarked on Max Gluckman's work, including his original distinction between rebellion and revolution. Such a distinction depends on a clear differentiation between an incumbent and the office occupied by the incumbent. It is precisely this distinction that is blurred in Papua New Guinea politics and to a lesser extent in the bureaucracy as well. Politicians are admired or accepted by the people as personal leaders in the style of the leaders of small-scale polities in the past. They are not judged in terms of their adherence to laws but purely in terms of what they do for their people, however they manage this. In a sense, their legitimacy in the people's eyes depends solely on this aspect of their role. But actions that are legitimate in this sense may in other ways harm the longer-term stability and legitimacy of the government. A cycle of patronage and the unmasking of patronage (and exploitation) is thus set up that makes the political future uncertain.

Finally, I return to a concept I have mentioned briefly, that of "disintegrative integration." By integration here I refer to the incorporation of local areas into district, provincial, and national political structures and processes. By disintegration I mean that the very processes that link local clans to the state also produce within and between clans a heightened potential for conflict through competition for resources and political offices. If policy is to be devised to modify the dialectics involved in this two-way traffic between the state and local groups, the approach must be to recognize from the beginning that the problems are produced through many interactions of politicians, public servants, and local leaders that have consequences beyond those intended by the individuals concerned. In this regard, reducing the immediate power of

politicians and increasing the power of public servants to direct the processes of development might have a salutary effect.

NOTES

  1. In the actual election the sitting MP in the Dei electorate won narrowly against his chief challenger, a favored son of the earlier MP. However, he later faced charges of corruption and was forced to resign and in the by-election his challenger won.

   J. Ketan (n.d.) has reported in some detail on episodes of violence that accompanied polling and postpolling events in the Hagen area generally. Postpolling violence was severe. Ketan reports one serious case, which resulted in "three brutal deaths, several hospitalized with serious injuries and massive destruction of property." A Simbu security worker for a business group based on the Welyi-Kuta tribal alliance was shot dead at the place Yan; some suspected he was murdered by Kentpi tribesmen upset that he and his coethnics at Yan may have voted for the Welyi-Kuta candidate rather than for the candidate from the Kentpi, on whose land the Simbu people were settled. While the army controlled the actual elections successfully, postpolling violence has fed intergroup warfare (see also Dinnen n.d.).

  2. In the 1992 election this MP lost his seat to a rival from his own ethnic area. The Hewa people are not numerous, and so their votes would be able to swing an election result only if the contest were a close one, which it was not. The nearest rival to the winner was not the sitting MP but a recently graduated lawyer from the Kopiago area, son of a previous president of the local government council. He proceeded to file a lawsuit against the winning candidate.

  3. In the event, a Mount Hagen politician, Paias Wingti, was elected by the new Parliament as prime minister, with the narrow majority of one vote, cast by the new Speaker of the Parliament--himself elected only by the same margin! The example shows how evenly matched major factions tend to become in a competitive arena where no side holds a

monopoly over resources, whether material or ideological; and also how such an extreme form of democracy may prove very difficult to translate into effective government, thus conducing to further long-term instability. But such predictions cannot be made with any certainty. Economic factors will also have an effect, for example, the viability and revenue from mining projects. Cultural factors also have to be assessed. for example, the influence of the churches in promoting "Christian" patterns of nonviolent behavior or otherwise. Earlier phases of missionization, with the destruction of local practices, have contributed to the overall situation of confusion regarding authority and power today. It is also interesting in this context to note that one of the new prime minister's actions during 1992 has been to suspend the Southern Highlands provincial government and also to propose the abolition of the provincial government structure altogether. This plan can be seen both as a cost-saving exercise and as an attempt to refocus legitimacy within the state at the national-government level by dissociating himself from corruption and inefficiency. at provincial levels. For overviews of the aftermath of the election results, see Ketan n.d. and Standish 1993. Standish (pers. corn., 1992) points out to me that in some provinces the provincial governments see themselves as stronger than the national government and are prepared to demand secession rather than submit to being abolished.

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NATIONALISM AND SEXUALITY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

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This article attempts to answer the question of why confining women's sexuality within the imagined nation-community of a "thousand villages" is a feature of nationalist rhetoric in Papua New Guinea. I begin with a brief history of women and nationalism in Papua New Guinea, showing that postcolonial elites have, as elsewhere in the Third World, failed to deliver on their promises to women. One such promise was to improve the lives of rural women. Another was to emancipate women by promoting their equal participation in the development of Papua New Guinea society. I then narrow my focus to look at three aspects of women's involvement in Papua New Guinea nationalism. The first is how the country's nationalist male elite condemn women for striking out in the modern directions (sexual choice, fashion, lifestyle) that many have permitted themselves. The second and third are sharp divisions in the experiences and aspirations of both educated women and men and of rural women and urban elite women.

A premise of this article is that today's conservative sexual politics reflect a desire of nationalist leaders to connect with a "grass-roots majority" and a "respected past" in which, supposedly, men were superior to women and women's primary role was to support male interests. Ironically, it is the elite who have created the idea of a unitary grass roots as Papua New Guinea continues to be characterized by extreme cultural diversity, a diversity compounded by the effects of history and uneven development. Nevertheless, this diversity assumes a gendered political importance in the composition of the elite class, for most educated women are from matrilineal societies on the coast and islands

and from families with long involvement in Western education and urban employment. The opposite is true of many educated men, who come from the less developed and more recently contacted patrilineal societies in the interior highlands. By publicly supporting a myth of chaste and selfless village women contrasting with sexually promiscuous Westernized women living in selfish abundance in town, Papua New Guinea's male leadership has contributed to the marginalization of the national women's movement. Playing on the gulf between rural women and urban elite women and appealing to the larger proportion of Papua New Guinea's populace, male leaders have contained the aspirations of women in their own class while at the same time diverting attention away from the needs and interests of all women.

Women and Nationalism

In much of the Third World, the struggle for women's emancipation began as women fought alongside men for decolonization (see Jayawardena 1986; Parker et al. 1992). In India, women hoped for equality in return for their help in bringing down the colonial government (Katrak 1992). In 1980, the year Vanuatu achieved independence, female leader Grace Mera Molisa argued that independence would be only a half-victory if Vanuatu's women did not achieve political equality with their men (Jolly n.d.:11). And in New Zealand, Maori women's long involvement in the struggle against white domination has from the beginning included a quest for equality in the face of traditional male dominance (Dominy 1990:248).

   In the postcolonial era, women are disappointed with the pace of change and setbacks in their economic and political situations. The process of women's economic marginalization, begun during colonialism (see Boserup 1970; Etienne and Leacock 1980), has intensified as men fill vacancies left by departing expatriates and monopolize new technologies and economic opportunities (Leacock and Safa 1986). Deprived of former productive functions or forced to accept low wages for their labor, women lose status as well as subsidize development for others' benefit (Eviota 1986; Hammam 1986). Cases of women's marginalization abound in the South Pacific, where women make indispensable contributions to subsistence and yet are excluded from direct participation in the development of commercial farming and fishing because of official perceptions--held by Westerners and Pacific Islanders alike--that women's work is not "real farming" or "real fishing" (Hughes 1985; Schoeffel 1985:163).

In the political arena, Third World women suffer a less-than-hoped-for participation. This is especially apparent in African societies where traditionally there were male and female leaders and each sex managed its own affairs (Hafkin and Bay 1976; Potash 1989) but where colonial sex biases marked the end of such equality. Among the Igbo, for example, the British filled colonial government posts with men, gave only the male monarch a monthly stipend, replaced women's religious functions with Christianity, and destroyed the market-women's system of price-fixing by introducing imported goods into the market. In a paper on the 1929 Igbo "women's war," Van Allen describes how the colonials' shock over the extent of the resistance led to reforms, but not for women (1976:71-75). More native courts were introduced, but only Igbo men were in charge of them. Throughout the "war," Igbo men expressed little concern with what was to them "a women's affair." Afterwards, they accepted women's dependency as befitting a Victorian view of women that Igbo men--but not many women--eventually adopted. Since Nigerian independence and a resurgence of interest in traditional values, Igbo women have tried to recapture their lost power, but at the national level single-sex rule continues (Okonjo 1976:57-58).

In many countries, the disappointment women feel over their lack of progress is sharpened by the fact that during the fight for independence men encouraged women to return to their traditional roles (real or imagined) in order to advance the cause, promised them equality, and then reneged on their promises. In India, Gandhi's nationalist movement conformed to this "familiar pattern of mobilizing and then subordinating women" (Katrak 1992:395). Espousing a nonviolent philosophy, Gandhi called for men and women to engage in acts of passive resistance as a means of bringing down the colonial government. Essentializing Indian women's sexuality, Gandhi appealed to men and women to assume the "female" virtues of chastity, purity, self-sacrifice, and suffering (Katrak 1992:398). The legacy of Gandhi's representations of female sexuality for the Indian women's movement is complex. The more negative aspects, however, include that a view of women as passive does not challenge Indian society's patriarchal order and that it places educated women in the bind of appearing to be aggressive harlots when they attempt to enter the public world of work and politics. Gandhi's advice for the educated woman (but not the educated man) was "to remain unmarried, and to abnegate her sexuality so that she could dedicate herself 'to work with her rural sisters' " (Katrak 1992:399).

Where women's roles are more restricted, reformers striving to modernize their societies or enlist women's aid in nationalist movements

may promote ideas of "new women" or idealize past civilizations in which women held high positions and enjoyed untold freedoms (Hale 1989; Jayawardena 1986). Thus, Iranian reformers seeking to promote capitalist development and a bourgeois society of "monogamous nuclear families with educated and employable women" recalled early Zoroastrian traditions that accorded women a high status and many of the same freedoms as men (Jayawardena 1986:15). Such allusions, however, do not guarantee women's emancipation. In 1979, in spite of women's active participation in the Islamic populist movement and the Left's promise of continued equality and support, Iranian women were rendered dependent minors by legislation enacted to make gender relations as "different as possible from gender norms in the West" (Moghadam 1992:427-430). With the formation of the revolutionary government, men physically attacked women seen in public without the veil, calling them "whores, bourgeois degenerates, un-Islamic, and deculturated." These women, seen as having "lost their modesty" and become intoxicated with the West, were considered a threat to men's honor that must be obliterated along with Western capitalism.

Slandering elite women's sexuality and using them as scapegoats for religious, class, or racial tensions have also been common practice in many African nations. Ghanaian women traders are "regularly accused by government officials and in the press of hoarding and profiteering. Nigerians call successful women 'cash madams'. Nigerian businesswomen who do not come from prominent families with influential connections are widely thought to use 'bottom power' to obtain lucrative contracts" and in Kenya, in addition to "sugar daddies" there are thought to be "sugar mommies" who use their wealth to attract young lovers (Potash 1989: 199).

As the above examples suggest, women are rarely a single mass; and in contexts of unequal opportunities for women, playing up and contrasting women's sexuality in appeals to rural women or women in the underclasses is often politically expedient, however destructive it may be to certain or even all women. The same is true in Papua New Guinea but this theme will be developed later, after first reviewing some of the history of women's political involvement and situation there. In the years leading up to independence in 1975, women--particularly women in the urban elite--believed that they would share in the benefits of national liberation and development, that past inequities (colonial or traditional) would be done away with, and that they would help form and lead the nation. Women's suffrage was a part of Papua New Guinea's Constitution. The cabinet included the intention to promote wom-

en's equal participation in all forms of political, economic, social, and religious activities in the Eight Point Improvement Plan (1972) and National Goals and Directive Principles (1975). In 1974, the first prime minister, Michael Somare, appointed an advisor on women's affairs. At a meeting of the Port Moresby YWCA, Papua New Guinea women leaders called for and helped organize the first Pacific Women's Conference, timed to coincide with International Women's Year (1975) and Papua New Guinea's independence. And in 1975, a national group of women established the National Council of Women and convened the country's first National Convention for Women.

From the mid-1960s on, education programs and women's clubs for rural women were encouraged by church and colonial government officials. Thousands of women participated, learning better hygiene, nutrition, and child care or training for leadership positions in local church organizations or business cooperatives (Baker 1975; Temu 1975). Small but increasing numbers of women were prepared for the public service and other professions by being given a Western education. By 1970, 12 percent of the University of Papua New Guinea's first graduating class were women, rising to 17 percent in 1978 (Murphy 1985: 147).

The first woman to be elected to national office was Papuan separatist leader Josephine Abaijah. Elected to the Third House of Assembly in 1972, Abaijah represented the Central District of the Australian Territory of Papua. Unofficially, she represented Papua Besena, an anticolonial movement she helped form in 1973 (Abaijah 1991:284-304). A primary objective of Papua Besena was to fight the forced political union of Papua with New Guinea, but both Papuan women and women from the United Nations Trust Territory of New Guinea saw her as a political role model (Daro 1975a:12; Loko 1974:7; Rooney 1985:40; Taylor 1970).

Women's high expectations were captured in a special issue of *Point* in 1975. In the words of Lady Kiki, women's activist and the wife of a famous politician, "I have no doubt that women will dominate men in politics in the villages . . . [and] that I as a politician's wife have an important role to play in my husband's career" (1975:66-67). Or as Bess Daro, then a research assistant with the New Guinea Research Unit, put it, "there has been a great acceptance in this country of many NON-Papua New Guinea values . . . [including] an international awareness of women as liberated and liberating agents" (1975b:41). Rose Kekedo, then principal of Port Moresby Teacher's College, spoke plainly: "The ambitious woman is looking forward to the day when she can be given the opportunities her male counterparts take for granted. She would

like these opportunities because she has proved herself qualified and capable; because she is NOT JUST WINDOW DRESSIN̈G (1975:21).

Women were soon aware, however, that change would not come easily given the overwhelming dominance of men in the government and in their own societies. In 1974, Margarete Loko pointed out that there was no mention Of women's political activity in Point Seven of the Eight Point Improvement Plan and that without women's involvement in politics they would not be positively integrated into the development process (1974:4). This point was later included in the National Goals and Directive Principles (1975)--the preamble to the Constitution--but seems to have made little difference. At the most only three women have served in the national Parliament at the same time (from 1977 to 1982) and since 1987 there have been none. Few hold senior positions in the public service, private enterprise, or church organizations (Crossley 1988:2). And at the level of government and public service closest to village life, only 2 percent of agricultural extension workers are female (Crossley 1988:6), and in 1978 only seven local government councillors of 4,313 were female (Nakikus 1985b:41).

Educational gains have been significant at lower levels. But by the time girls are of an age to enter high school and college, the numbers of females enrolled drops sharply. Fifty percent of Papua New Guinea's young female population were enrolled in Grade 1 in 1971-1972 (compared to 77 percent of the same-age male population). By the mid-eighties the same figures were 75 percent for girls and 90 percent for boys (Weeks 1985a:95). At the tertiary level, however, female enrollment has remained below 15 percent at the University of Papua New Guinea and the University of Technology since shortly after independence (Crossley 1988:9).

Even more than might be expected from women's lesser participation in education is women's low participation in the work force. By 1981, Papua New Guinea's tertiary institutions had produced only nine female lawyers and ten female doctors (Crossley 1988:9). By the late 1980s only a little over 10 percent of women living in town were wage earners, with most female workers concentrated in clerical and lower-level public service jobs (Crossley 1988:4-5). Urban women's unemployment is troublesome in Papua New Guinea, where traditionally women are expected to contribute to household subsistence and ceremonial exchange (Chowning 1985; Strathern 197213). Urban husbands are often resentful when their wives do not help them financially, a resentment fueled by endless pressures on urban couples to give generously to rural or unemployed kin and to repay expensive bride-prices (Filer

1985; Rosi and Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993; Toft 1985, 1986; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993, n.d.*a*).

In the villages, where 85 percent of Papua New Guinea's population lives, women struggle to support their families with older forms of food production *and* help their husbands with introduced cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, and cardamom. In a study in East New Britain, Epstein found that Tolai women were spending more time tending their husbands' cash crops than the men were (1968: 100). While men's work has been lightened by the use of steel axes (Salisbury 1962), women have received little practical training or improved technology (Cox 1987; Nakikus 1985a). Women's heavier work load is often exacerbated by male labor migration, more frequent childbearing as old sexual mores break down, and demands for greater production of ceremonial wealth such as pigs, leaving women less time to participate in politics or women's clubs (Meleisea 1983). Overwork and more frequent pregnancies also contribute to women's (and children's) ill-health and malnutrition (Jenkins n.d.; *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* 1992a:29; Townsend 1985).

Other areas of concern to both rural and urban women are men's drinking and high levels of domestic violence and rape (Kivung, Doiwa, and Cox 1985). Studies by the Papua New Guinea Law Commission have revealed the extent and causes of violence against women (Toft 1985, 1986; Toft and Bonnell 1985). A campaign is currently under way to make the findings more general (Waram 1992a). Women leaders in Port Moresby chose the theme "Violence Against Women" for their May 1993 International Women's Day Celebration (*The Times of Papua New Guinea* 1993b). And in East New Britain, provincial women's leaders have embarked on a campaign against violence, hoping to open a women's crisis center by 1994 (*The Times of Papua New Guinea* 1993a). Nonetheless, the sex bias in Papua New Guinea society makes it difficult for women to combat the problem. Having less access to cash than men do, women have less access to lawyers who will press for women's right to live in safety from physical assault (Slarke 1992). With few women to represent them in the political arena, women suffer men's disregard, as happened when the Law Reform Commission presented its interim report on domestic violence to an all-male Parliament in 1987 and was booed from the floor (*The Times of Papua New Guinea* 1992).

As women have articulated their separate concerns from men (see King, Lee, and Warakai 1985; Stratigos and Hughes 1987), there has not been a corresponding drawing together to form an effective na-

tional women's movement. Rather, cleavages exist everywhere, be-
tween village women and urban elite women, between women in dif-
ferent regions of the country, and among village women as they align
themselves in competing church and local women's groups. Although
well-meaning members of the bureaucratic elite and such prestigious
groups as the Port Moresby-based Women in Politics see their role as
providing communication links among women and educating village
women to use the various women's councils to further their special
interests (Kekedo 1985; Mandie 1985:53), such suggestions are rejected
by women who feel that urban elite women are too far removed from
village women's concerns to be of much help. As one rural women's
leader put it, "Village women await the help of trained sisters with
open arms but they are very wary of young sophisticates who do not
wish to get their hands dirty" (Ogi 1985: 150).

   The disunity among Papua New Guinea's female national leadership
has been apparent for years (see Johnson 1984; Macintyre n.d.; Wor-
mald 1992), but never more so than in 1992. In March 1992, efforts to
coordinate celebrations on International Women's Day failed, with pro-
vincial and local women's groups organizing their own celebrations
without the promised help of the National Women's Council (Bunpalau
1992; *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* 1992b). In Port Moresby the
president of the National Council of Women, Maria Kopkop, and the
invited guest speaker (a male) were not on hand on the big day (Waram
1992b). And in East New Britain, neither provincial leaders nor other
invited guests showed up to head the festivities (*Papua New Guinea
Post-Courier* 1992b).

   The strongest indications of a lack of unity, however, are statistics
showing that few women stand for election or vote for other women.
Only 41 women have ever run in national elections. In the 1987 elec-
tions, a year in which no women were elected or reelected, there were
18 women out of a total of 1,464 candidates. In 1992, another year of
defeat for women, there were only 12 women among 1,653 candidates.
In the 1987 elections, women made up 1.2 percent of the field of candi-
dates and received only 1.4 percent of the vote, demonstrating that
women-- with half the vote--do not have a bias for female candidates
or women's issues (Wormald 1992:23-24). Fragmentation at the nation-
al level has accelerated following female candidates' defeat, as there is a
florescence of new women's groups and nationally known women
realign themselves with the newly organized regional councils (Bengi
1992; Waram 1992c, 1992d, 1992e).

   The failure of women to fight for and to achieve significant numbers

of leadership positions in Papua New Guinea can be attributed to sexism and unequal opportunities (in education, the workplace, and the home), to regionalism, to the double workday many women contend with, and to women's fear of rape or being beaten by their husbands should they venture too far out into the public domain and bend local conceptions of appropriate women's behavior. The disabling lack of unity among women's groups, however, demands additional explanations since men too are divided along economic and regional lines and yet elite males continue to be elected in larger numbers and to go beyond their home regions for support.

   In the remainder of this article, I will look at several other reasons why I believe women are unable to put together a strong women's movement in Papua New Guinea. The first is that Papua New Guinea's male leaders have consistently slandered the sexuality of women in their own class, thereby stigmatizing them and hurting women candidates' chances in rural electorates. The second is the alienating distance between most elite men's and elite women's goals and experiences. And the third is the politics of difference among Papua New Guinea women that makes it easy for leaders to scapegoat elite women.

The Brotherhood of PNG Nationalism

On the eve of independence and on appropriate (but rare) occasions since, male nationalist leaders have called for women's "full" involvement in the development of Papua New Guinea society. Quoting from the Eight Point Improvement Plan of 1972, former Prime Minister Michael Somare called for a "rapid increase in the equal and active participation of women in all forms of economic and social activity." In his newspaper series, "The Melanesian Voice," lawyer and Supreme Court Judge Bernard Narokobi declared that both men and women "are needed to meet the changing needs [of Papua New Guinea], and both must be paid according to their merits" (1983:38). In 1982, at a seminar on the successes and failures of the Eight Point Plan and National Goals after a decade of performance, the then (and now) prime minister, Paias Wingti, opined that the government "is not happy with the fact that this total [of girls in grades 7 to 10] is only 33 per cent now when it was 31.8 percent at the time of independence. In universities, only 15 per cent of enrolments are women, the same as in 1975" (1985: 17). And in 1992, a year in which few politicians felt compelled to comment on women's issues, former Morobe premier and now member of national Parliament Jerry Nalau publicly invited a Morobe women's group to

work for the development of Morobe Province and the nation (Bunpa-lau 1992).

Male leaders have also said and done things, however, that demonstrate their insincerity or opposition to women's "full" involvement in the development of Papua New Guinea society. In his 1975 autobiography, Michael Somare said little about women other than to express irritation with politician Josephine Abaijah for supporting a demonstration of church women seeking higher pay (from his administration) for their husbands and the end of inflation (1975: 132). And in spite of his avowed commitment to women's equality, there was no section on women in the 1976 National Development Strategy (Turner 1990:87). It is worth remembering, of course, that both the Eight Point Plan and the Constitution were drafted by committees that included non-Papua New Guinea members and derived many of their liberal democratic ideas from non-Papua New Guinea sources. Thus, it was inevitable in the years subsequent to independence, as Papua New Guineans came to dominate their own country, that their own ideas about women's appropriate roles would come to the fore.

These more traditional ideas are reflected in Narokobi's struggle with the idea of giving women too much latitude for fear that like "Westernized woman" they will reject traditional values of family and marriage (1983:34-38, 51-57, 74-78). In a pre-independence statement, Kaibelt Diria, then minister for posts and telegraphs, put it more forcefully: "Women should never be allowed to become equal because it would be against the social culture and tradition of the people" (quoted in Turner 1990:87). A similiar sentiment is apparent in the words of Paul Langro, a former member for West Sepik: "As far as Papua New Guinea is concerned, women are always regarded as the lowest in the family. I do not want the concept of Western civilisation to give equal rights to women as are given to men. Men must get first priority in the society and not women" (quoted in Turner 1990:87). In 1992, women were still far from being given first priority as severe cuts in government funding to women's activities (Miria 1992) made it difficult for women groups to carry out their operations, much less "work for the development of the nation" as Jerry Nalau and others thought they should.

A rich source of elite males' ideas on modernity and women's emancipation can be found in their literary creations. In the poems and stories of male students at the University of Papua New Guinea and the National Arts School, valued roles for women are wife and mother, upholding tradition and carrying out their duties to husbands and children in the village or urban household. Mathew Sil, in the poem "The

Village That My Grandmother Knew" (1986), mourns a way of life that is "fading under a modern sun" as men are determined to have "lots of paper money," "hard shiny cars," and roads "right through the centre" of villages that were once places of calm and pride, "jealousy guarded" and "loved" by women who never knew the modern-day horrors of "wife-beatings" and children afraid of their fathers "like dogs in a stranger's way." Francis Nii's poem "Peaceful Village" paints a more idyllic picture of a world both he and Sil have left behind (1985): "Birds sing unchanged jungle melodies, while country kids dance free for joy. . . . Kids hide and seek, and mum and dad have endless honeymoon."

   The idealization of village life and village women is further elaborated in Benjamin Umba's novel *The Fires of Dawn* (1976), in which he portrays village women as uncomplaining and always looking after the needs of their husbands and sons. In Vincent Eri's *The Crocodile* (1970) and Ignatius Kilage's *My Mother Calls Me Yaltep* (1980), village women are portrayed variously as hard-working, sympathetic mothers or young, submissive sex partners. In Russell Soaba's *Maiba* (1979), the female lead is wise enough to hold her village together in the face of the conflicting forces of tradition and modernization.

   By comparison, images of urban women are often negative, especially men's depictions of women students. In numerous poems in *The PNG Writer,* the male authors accuse female university students of participating in wanton drinking parties with wealthy politicians (Dondoli 1985b), engaging in promiscuous sex (Kilburn 1985; Yatu 1985:72), and being the dupes of untrustworthy, white boyfriends (Yatu 1986:48). When such behavior results in pregnancy, the blame is placed on the woman, as in Dondoli's unsympathetic "Blame Yourself"--quoted here in full--and in other poems (Kilburn 1985; Yatu 1986:48):

Blame Yourself

Out of the Darkness, Unwanted,
An insect attracted by bright lights,
You enjoyed what came your way.
Distrustful of tribal values,
You sucked the sugar-cane.
Now with swollen belly,
And a fatherless piglet,
You twist the truth,
But cannot blame the Stone Age.
Sophisticated, overeducated, westernized

> You scream, shout, yell:
> Women's Lib, Women's Council, Women's Rights.
> Granma is entertained by your comedy.
> You've got your rights.
> You've got your piglet.
>
>   B. M. Dondoli (1985a)

More generally, women and girls from all segments of urban society are stigmatized as promiscuous carriers of venereal disease, prostitutes, or potential rape victims, as in the poems "Hohola in the Night" (Kerpi 1987) and "Yupela Meri i Senis Hariap Pinis" (Umetrifo 1987).

From their writings, young men are clearly ambivalent about modernization. Less obvious is their hypocrisy in depicting village women as morally superior to educated women, while often they themselves desire the pleasures of urban life and the freedom to experiment in love and sex with more "liberated women" (see Houbein 1982; Sharrad 1984:2). In Kama Kerpi's "Kulpu's Daughter" (1974), however, two young men consider the pros and cons of educated girlfriends, with such girls being associated with sex appeal and free sex while village girls are credited with affirming a man's manhood and giving him more mental security:

> Well, there is more to say than merely having secret lovers. I have taken advantage of several educated girls and discovered that they all put up an act in bed. They make believe they are innocent . . . that they knew no other men before. . . . It becomes rather an act of retaining their boyfriend's love. A village girl is fair to you and to herself. (Quoted in Houbein 1982:16)

Setting aside, for the moment, the question of whether or not the hostilities and ambivalence of the educated male writers are justified, their sense that women are less likely than men to prosper in modern circumstances is grounded in reality. I have already mentioned sexism in education and economic opportunities, and the dangers women contend with in Papua New Guinea's towns. A part of women's failure to prosper, however, is attributable to the same men who have publicized their anxieties or contempt for women of their own class. From the start, Papua New Guinea's leaders and their expatriate mentors and teachers have done little to include women in such important nation-building

institutions as the Administrative College in Port Moresby and an early political training ground and association called the Bully Beef Club.

In her dissertation on Papua New Guinea's government women, Dianne Johnson describes how women's early education was designed to make them better housewives and models of Christian womanhood (1984: chap. 4). Even after education became a priority in the 1960s, the stress was less on sexual equality than hurriedly building a local elite to lead the country through independence. According to Johnson:

> Given the roles of women in both traditional Papua New Guin-
> ean societies and in the country of colonial power, Australia,
> and the totally male-dominated colonial administration . . .
> the obvious but unstated intention and the directions taken for
> leadership training were in order to create a *male* leadership. It
> is not surprising then that western colonial education at all lev-
> els, despite the massive expansion, was much more accessible to
> males. (Johnson 1984: 124)

The mission of the Administrative College, opened in 1963, was to train an indigenous administrative leadership. Female students have been few. This male bias in formal leadership training was matched informally in the organization of the Bully Beef Club, a forerunner to the political party that became known as Pangu Pati and about which Michael Somare writes extensively in his autobiography. Formed in 1964 at the Administrative College, the club began with a membership of seven men and one woman. The woman was subjected to teasing and sexual harassment (Johnson 1984: 124); by the time Michael Somare joined in 1965 and began his maturation as a politician, she was gone.

The political motivations for prejudice against women politicians are easy to discern. The issue of women's liberation is an inflammatory one in Papua New Guinea, where most men and women associate it with white society and resent women who compete with men for political and economic power. In the 1970s, as some urban elite women sought to create new images for themselves and to exercise freedom of choice over family planning, work, and involvement in public life, elite males were seeking to rid the country of the vestiges of colonialism (or at least those elements that conflicted with their own interests) and to assert a Melanesian cultural identity consisting mostly of recreated myths of what life had been like before colonization (Hogan 1985:54). As Papua New Guinea neared independence, women who wore makeup and

miniskirts were subjected to public harassment, denounced by church leaders, and even fined. In the minds of many, miniskirts were associated with white women and white women's alleged (and sometimes real) promiscuity. From 1971 to 1981, the issue was fought in the letters to the editor column in the *Post-Courier.*

Analyzed by Evelyn Hogan, this debate is revealing of the polities of men's almost complete unity against women's right to determine their own lives. A few selections from Hogan's article capture the emotions the debate aroused:

> In February 1973 a circular . . . signed by Tolai politicians, community and church leaders, was distributed throughout East New Britain [Province]. It suggested a campaign in school against immodest dress. The rapid rise in gonorrhoea, syphilis and other diseases . . . was attributed to immodest dress . . . men claimed that women who dressed immodestly were looking for carnal pleasures (*Post-Courier* 27 February 1973). (Quoted in Hogan 1985:55)

> In response to the circular condemning the wearing of mini-skirts there were three letters from women (*Post-Courier* 7 March 1973, 28 May 1973, 13 June 1973). One signed "Four Tolai Girls" (13 June 1973) had no doubts that the banning of mini-skirts would have wider implications. For its writers, wearing mini-skirts signified that they wanted greater control over their lives. They accused the initiators of the circular of having political motivations--of using the issue of public morality for their own political purposes . . . and [of knowing] that with education women would be able to judge the decisions of men. (Quoted in Hogan 1985:56-57)

Three male Tolai students from the University of Papua New Guinea added their opinions to the debate by arguing that the "women were not freely determining their own lives, but were blindly following the dictates of Western culture: 'They want to keep on "pleasing" and "praising" the colonial administration without stopping and asking themselves a single question' (*Post-Courier* 28 June 1973)" (quoted in Hogan 1985:57).

Similar debates have set young and especially educated women apart as a separate category from the majority of women in Papua New Guinea.

Attending to the sensitivities of the rural majority is a feature of not only men's political campaigns, however. At one time or another, the few women who have attained national political positions have publicly disavowed feminist leanings and extolled the virtues of women playing supportive versus independent roles in the development of Papua New Guinea society. Describing her first major political campaign in a semifictional account, the nation's first female member of Parliament--Josephine Abaijah--repeatedly portrayed herself in public and in the book as "a modest Papuan girl supporting traditional Papuan values in the new era" (1991: 178). Asked by a reporter if she supported women's liberation, Abaijah replied, "I don't really know what women's liberation means. . . . Personally, I am as liberated as I want to be. It might be unhealthy to be any more liberated than I am now. I don't want to be a man. I don't think women's liberation means anything to Papuans. It is not relevant . . . to us" (1991: 216-217).

More recently, however, after Abaijah's defeat and the defeat of all other women candidates in the 1992 national elections, she has become more feminist, arguing publicly that "women are half the population in PNG. . . . However, the women population is saddened and highly demoralized by the lack of government's insight into the women's plight as the women continue to be victims of rape, abuse, molestation and break-enter and stealing activities in our communities" (*Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* 1992c).

New Men for New Women

Elite women's views on "ancestral ways," the future of Papua New Guinea, and their role in that future differ in telling ways from men's views of the same things. Writing on "The Changing Role of Women in Society," women's advocate Margarete Loko early on contested the view that traditionally women did not play politically important roles within the family, clan, and tribe: "Women, throughout the years, have been the backbone to development and expansion in the above three groups" (1974:6). In contrast to the sexist content of PNG schoolbooks (Gough 1984:97) and their male schoolmates' idealizations of village women, educated women's claims for greater autonomy in the new order are based on a more earthy and less submissive view of women. Contrast, for example, Loujaya Kouza's energetic and daring poem "Teenage World" with men's condemning tone in the above-mentioned miniskirt debate.

Teenage   World

The pulsating beat
at a discotheque,
sweaty palms and smelly
feet,
fried chicken, fish n' chips,
tight fitting sneakers and a
swinging hip.
Comic books, the latest
gag,
choosing cheap junk
and the best looking rag.
                Loujaya Kouza (1987)

Or the realism in Joyce Kumbeli's and May Paipaira's poetry (Kumbeli
1985a, 1985b; Paipaira 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, 1986e) contrasted
with the dreamlike quality of such male authors as Francis Nii and Ben-
jamin Umba (see above):

Mother   Stands

From dawn to dusk, mother stands
Amid clattering dishes and undug gardens.
Sweat is her shower; the sun her energy.

By the evening table she stands: Has everyone eaten?
Her duty comes first. Tiredness is her satisfaction.
Last to bed. First up to prepare breakfast.

How have I rewarded her life-time's work?
An illegitimate child; another burden.
When all she wanted was my love.
                        May Paipara (1986e)

On the subjects of development and nation building, women like poet
May Paipara (1986d) and filmmaker Maggie Wilson decry men's drink-
ing and violence and challenge them to share both authority and
responsibility for family matters and the work of nation building with
women. In Wilson's words, village women are the "backbone of Papua
New Guinea society" while educated women are in "business and poli-
tics and many other well-paid and important positions where they . . .
give much to society" (1987: 174). In the first stanza of her poem "Beer

and Shotguns--Is This Development?" Wilson turns the table on poet Justin Yatu, who has accused female university students of being the dupes of white lovers (Yatu 1986:48) and falling prey to the seductions of Western civilization (Yatu 1985:72), by accusing the male elite of chasing after the chimera of Western civilization:

> This is the 20th century
> The age of high technology.
> They lead us into television.
> Have we enough money for a TV studio?
> It's only 50 million.
> The boys are into communication,
> Too busy communicating.
> The problems at home don't matter,
> Even if people are murdered in cold blood.
> Eager to copy the so-called civilised countries,
> Where are the boys leading us?
> Where are the women in this?
> Beer and shotguns-- IS THIS DEVELOPMENT?
>   Maggie Wilson (1987: 175-176)

In numerous other matters, elite women are identifying themselves as being more concerned than elite men with the well-being and health of individuals, the family, and the larger society. In the pages of the *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier's* new series "Women Today," articles focus on topics ranging from health and law-and-order problems (1992a, 1992c; Waram 1992a) to the benefits of exercise and the right way to dress (1992d; also S.M.R. 1992).

Although there are many other differences in elite men's and women's self-definitions and representations of the opposite sex, objective differences also divide them. These differences go far in explaining the alienation elite men have from women of their class. They also go far in explaining why it is women more often than men in Papua New Guinea who call for new kinds of relationships--an ethnographic twist contradicting the usual pattern in which it is men who call for "new women" to fit the new or desired social order (see Jayawardena 1986; Little 1973).

An important set of differences in the lives and experiences of many of Papua New Guinea's male and female elite are differences in their educational, social, economic, and regional backgrounds. In Papua New Guinea, early missionaries promoted the education of women by refus-

ing to teach boys unless girls were also sent to school (Smith 1987). In part this was related to a widespread belief among missionaries that educated Christian men (and the children of these men) needed educated Christian wives and mothers if they were to remain true to the new faith. In part it was related to the fact that at the turn of the century, at least in Papua, one-third of the missionary force was female and most of these women were committed to raising local women's status and quality of life (Langmore 1989: chap. 7).

In spite of this potentially equalizing force, fewer women than men have received a high school or college education in Papua New Guinea. And those women who have are distinctive in that a majority come from the coastal and island areas, where mission education has been in place the longest and where matrilineality and its greater stress on women's active involvement in society are common. In studies of PNG university students, researchers have also discovered that female students are much more likely than male students to have educated and employed fathers (Weeks 1985b), fathers who by virtue of their own education are aware of the benefits of education for women and thus more likely to be supportive of their daughters' aspirations (see Wormald and Crossley 1988).

Dianne Johnson found similar factors in the backgrounds of the government women she studied. The effects of individual missionary zeal and feminism were most apparent in the students and intellectual and biological descendants of students taught at the Kwato school in Milne Bay by Charles Abel and his wife, Beatrice (Johnson 1984:111). At Kwato, established by the Abels in the 1890s, girls were accorded high status, considered as capable of leadership as boys, and taught nursing and teaching skills as well as homecraft skills and Western etiquette (Johnson 1984:112). According to Papua New Guinean historian Anne Kaniku (now Waiko), Kwato-influenced women have an attitude of Kwato elitism and a willingness to compete that is consonant with political aspirations and other ambitions (1981:190).

In the Highlands, where mission activity and Western-style education are more recent, among the educated Simbu women interviewed by anthropologist Paula Brown, most grew up "near schools at missions or in towns, often because their father was employed" (1988:135). According to Brown, these unusual women live unusual lives that require a greater break with traditional roles than is the case for elite men:

> Urban men's roles are continuations and adaptations of traditional men's competition and dominance. Rural support groups

are essential to political ambition and election to national or
provincial office. . . . Urban women discard many aspects of
the traditional wife/mother role in exchange for wage-earning,
household management rather than housework, and indepen-
dence. They maintain close family ties with visits and often
incorporate rural relatives into their urban households . . .
[but they do so] without the domestic role of wife. (Brown
1988: 138; see also Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1990, n.d.*a*)

Reflecting differences in their socioeconomic backgrounds, many
male and female members of the educated elite hold opposing expecta-
tions regarding male-female relationships, marriage, and women's
proper station and work. There are also lifestyle differences, particu-
larly in the family backgrounds of educated men and women, that fur-
ther alienate educated men and women from one another. In a paper
written on love and marriage among the educated elite in Port Moresby,
Rosi and Zimmer-Tamakoshi (1993) document the conflicting view-
points of many students at the University of Papua New Guinea and the
National Arts School. In a survey of more than 200 first-year students at
UPNG, Zimmer-Tamakoshi found important gender differences among
her students on the questions of conjugal relations and women's careers.
Although attitudes of both males and females toward interethnic mar-
riage and having the right to choose their own marriage partner became
more liberal between first entering and the time they were in their sec-
ond semester, young women were much more adamant that marriages
should be monogamous, that women's careers were as important as
men's, and that spouses should spend significant amounts of time
together both at home and in the company of friends and relatives.

In a study at the National Arts School, Rosi discovered similar trends.
Both young men and women thought that good looks and sexual attrac-
tiveness were important features of a potential spouse and that mutual
love should be the basis for marriage. Young men, however, wanted
wives who would both work and be good homemakers and who would
subordinate their careers to their husbands', while young women
wanted husbands who would be supportive of their careers and consid-
erate of whatever arrangements the women made to see that their
homes and children were taken care of.

Growing up in different social environments is also a potential source
of conflict between male and female members of the educated elite.
Whereas many educated men in Papua New Guinea spent at least some
of their childhood in villages, many educated women grew up on gov-

ernment stations or in urban areas as a result of their fathers' level of education and work. Such women often lack traditional skills and have personal expectations about dress, social life, and marriage that tend to alienate them from village in-laws and, in some cases, from their husbands, Young wives, for example, may resent the interference of village in-laws who expect them to help their husbands pay back large bride-prices or to make way for village co-wives who will raise pigs for the husband while the first wife works at a job (for examples, see Rosi and Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993).

One aspect of the sophistication and opportunities that educated women have that is especially galling to many of Papua New Guinea's men is the possibility of their meeting and marrying non-Papua New Guineans. A recurring element in the writings of poets like Justin Yatu is the theme of female university students falling prey to the seductions of Western civilization and of being white men's clowns (1986; see also Yatu 1985). Although many women agree with men that interracial marriages are wrong--see, for example, Susan Balen's story "A Date with Danger" (1985) and Frances Deklin's negative reflections on mixed marriages involving Papua New Guinean women and Australian men (1987)--a surprising number disagree and, in some cases, actively seek partnerships with foreign men. Air Niugini stewardesses are notorious in this regard, many of them being outspoken about their preference for white men whom they believe are more supportive of their ambitions and less likely to use physical force to control their behavior (see Rosi and Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1990). Even more visible are women like former parliamentarians Josephine Abaijah and Nahau Rooney (now widowed) and the president of the National Council of Women, Maria Kopkop, who are only three of many government women and women's leaders to have long-standing relations or marriages with white men. These women have been harassed for having non-Papua New Guinean men in their lives. The same is not often true for those Papua New Guinean men who have white wives and lovers.

An interesting and relevant link between interracial sexual relations and most Papua New Guineans' aversion to "women's liberation" was pointed out to me by Penelope Schoeffel (pers. com., 1993):

> When I was a student at UPNG in the early seventies (1971-1973) there was a "Black Power" group and "Women's Liberation" group. The former comprised PNG men and the latter mainly expatriate women. The two groups were quite close to one another and several of the white women in the latter had

relationships with men in the former. Perhaps because of this, most PNG men and women at UPNG interpreted "women's liberation" as being concerned with women's sexual freedom, which they generally considered an alarming idea. Some PNG male students enjoyed or hoped to enjoy relationships with liberated white women, but would have been shocked to see PNG women openly espouse women's sexual freedom. Few PNG women students wished to be linked to "Women's Liberation" because of their ambivalence about what they thought its agenda was, and because of the strong disapproval among the student elite directed to anything seen as being "white dominated." . . . The few outspoken PNG women on Campus (such as Margarete Loko and Paula Paliau) would have nothing to do with the group.

A Divided Sisterhood

It is less easy to characterize the views of Papua New Guinea's village women given so many cultural and historical differences in their experiences. Nevertheless, in common with women in town, village women have spoken out on several issues. Two of these are the high levels of domestic violence and rape. Marital violence is widespread in rural areas, with 67 percent of rural women (compared with 56 percent of low-income urban women and 62 percent of elite urban women) admitting to being hit on occasion by their husbands (Ranck and Toft 1986:22-23). Although villagers say they accept wife-beating as normal (see Chowning 1985), severe or undeserved beatings are *not* accepted by women, and today abused wives regularly take their husbands to court (see Scaglion and Whittingham 1985; Westermark 1985). Women began taking their domestic complaints outside the village to get a fairer hearing during the colonial period, bringing their complaints before foreign *kiaps* and church and welfare officers (Strathern 1972a, 1972b).

The high incidence of rape in Papua New Guinea (see Kivung, Doiwa, and Cox 1985; Zimmer 1990) has brought out women of every level of society to condemn rapists and a male-dominated court system that many women feel leaves rapists free to prey on women and girls in both town and country, During a much reported-on rape and murder case in Lae, thousands of women--including nearby village women--turned out in Port Moresby and Lae to call for longer sentences and castration for the rapist-murderers. Fear of rape and sexual harassment keeps many women and girls from attending school (in rural and urban

areas), from asserting themselves in gatherings where men are also present, and from experimenting with new lifestyles (see Crossley 1988, Meek 1982; Oliver 1987; Rosi and Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993).

A third issue of importance to women is the willingness of many husbands to engage in adulterous liaisons with prostitutes and women who try to steal them away from their wives and families. In response to this many village women go to town with their husbands to keep a watchful eye over them and their husbands' incomes (Zimmer-Tamakoshi n.d.*a*); women who work frequently rely on children and other kin to accompany husbands on outings and to report on any wrongdoing or suspicious actions. In 1988, highly placed women in the Law Reform Commission and other government bodies pushed into law the Adultery and Enticement Act. This act makes it possible for a husband or wife to bring suit against an adulterous spouse, and to forestall an adulterous affair by allowing them to sue anyone who attempts to entice their spouses to have sex with them. Designed to give women control over their husbands' sexuality, the law is--ironically--potentially detrimental to the very women who framed it, women whose jobs as lawmakers and politicians require them to spend time alone with male co-workers. Proof of adultery, for example, can be as simple as having a witness testify that the alleged adulterers went into a room, shut the door behind them, and stayed in the room long enough to have sex! However, in the context of some men's efforts to discredit educated women and in a country where 85 percent of the population lives in rural villages, the promotion of the act by educated women can only be seen as politically motivated. In the words of one member of the elite women's group Women in Politics, "Their needs must come first. Without their support there will be few women elected to higher office and all women's interests will suffer" (Angela Mandie, pers. corn., 1988; see also Mandie 1985).

Regardless of the potential of these issues to unite women, almost insurmountable differences keep them apart. Although village women and women living in urban squatter settlements share elite women's desire for greater autonomy in the new social order, they do SO for quite different reasons. On the one hand are women like my former students at UPNG, who will travel overseas for purposes of education, business, or pleasure, and who expect to one day be working in positions of authority over both men and women. For such women, freedom to travel around the country without fear of sexual harassment and to share the same job opportunities and respect as their male co-workers are fundamental. On the other hand are village women who are over-

burdened with traditional and new forms of work at the same time as their men are receiving (or appropriating) most of the available government services and most of the income from cash crops and other lucrative enterprises (see Cox 1987; Hughes 1985; Zimmer 1988). For these women, gaining control over money means spending it on things they believe to be more important than the things men spend money on. The situation at Hoskins Oil Palm Settlement in West New Britain Province is fairly typical of the household division of labor and finances throughout rural Papua New Guinea:

> . . . while most women were given some money by their husbands for food and household needs, these expenses were met predominantly from income earned by the women selling garden produce at market. On the other hand, 78 per cent of women interviewed shared their market-earned income with their husbands. . . . [Even though nearly all women worked on their husbands' oil palm plots, the men retained] control over their "own" oil palm income and also control the income earned independently by their wives. (Nakikus 1985a:125)

In Sexton's study of the *wok meri* movement in Eastern Highlands Province, she found that members of the market-women's savings association felt that men wasted money on cards and alcohol and spent too little on household consumption. Pooling their earnings from vegetable sales, women from diverse language groups took turns investing their savings in what they felt were worthwhile, profitable businesses. Since the money was kept separate from the women's take-home pay, most men could do little but admire their wives' ingenuity, thereby fulfilling at least one of the women's stated aims, which was to teach by example (Sexton 1982, 1986).

More commonly, however, it is men who have the access to cash, resulting in a shift in the balance of power between genders, as men can earn cash independently of women and men's cash contributions to ceremonial exchange payments can outweigh women's contributions of pigs and vegetables (Zimmer 1985; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993). Women chafe at the loss of status that goes along with their not having access to cash. Mirroring men's complaints against independent career women and schoolgirls, village women I have met in different parts of Papua New Guinea deplore town men's excessive drinking and womanizing and openly mock men who return to the village dressed like colonial *mastas* in white knee socks, shorts, white shirt, polished boots, and Aus-

sie hat. Keeping fit and forgoing expensive Western-style clothing, town women of modest means pride themselves on their economy and on their ability to return to the village and take up gardening at a moment's notice (see Zimmer-Tamakoshi n.d.*a*). Having learned to expect little from the few agricultural extension officers and others (academics included) who make their way out to the villages, more and more women are involved in organizations like the East Sepik Women's Development Documentation and Communication Project that are dedicated to putting village women in control of development and non-formal education projects, as well as creating opportunities for village women to travel and to meet with leaders elsewhere in the country (Samuel, Goro, and Kimbange 1987; see also Aarnink and Blydorp 1986).

In a context in which most women have inadequate access to cash for essentials, the more frivolous elements of wealthier women's lifestyles are offensive and easily conjured up as reasons to reject them or their ideas out of hand. While the women's pages in the *Post-Courier* and the *Times of Papua New Guinea* include many articles on practical issues concerning rural and urban women (see *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* 1992a, 1992d; Waram 1992a), they are also crowded with advertisements for things most women can't afford, like ladies' swimwear fashions and expensive hotels and restaurants, as well as many articles on fashion, beauty salons, and ways to "Decorate Your Bathroom" (*Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* 1992e).

Intended as satire of the "Miss Papua New Guinea" contest and playful mockery of the male judges (one of whom was Bernard Narokobi), in 1984 female students at the University of Papua New Guinea staged a "Miss Traditional UPNG" contest to which some participants came bare-breasted (Tannos 1984). By going topless for a few hours, female university students may have "honored tradition" and made the point that traditional women's dress could be as provocative as miniskirts and lipstick, but their intended message was undoubtedly lost on other young women. Influenced by mission teaching against "lewd and improper dress" but less financially able to try different lifestyles, many village and town girls wear the modest (and cheap) *meri* blouses and only dream about what it would be like to wear the expensive Western clothing sold in Port Moresby's boutiques and shopping centers.

The ways in which villagers react to modernity as they variously link into the national economy and become part of larger identities and new interest groups can be quite surprising and, at first glance, contradictory. Long-contacted and more prosperous groups living in the vicinity

of large towns--the very groups one might expect to be more tolerant--
may support their daughters' higher education but resist their wearing
miniskirts and high heels in attempts to maintain group solidarity by
curbing women's independence and preventing them from marrying
outsiders (see the Tolai miniskirt debate above; also Hogan 1985). On
the other hand, more distant and less privileged groups may tolerate
new dress codes and women's liaisons with strangers in order to gain a
foothold in the urban economy. Gende villagers, for example, regularly
send their mostly uneducated teenage daughters to live in town with
migrant relatives in the hope that these daughters will attract prosper-
ous husbands, whether Gende or not (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993). When
successful, some of these girls find themselves in situations where they
have little in common with either their village sisters or the educated
elite. Dependent on their husbands' wages, they are often abused by
them, and little respected by squatter settlement women who have to
clean other women's houses, village women who have to tend babies,
pigs, gardens, and family, and working women who see them as poach-
ing on their men. For such women, hoped-for emancipation may mean
no more than finding a husband who is appreciative of their housekeep-
ing skills and being recognized as contributing to the development of
Papua New Guinea by being conduits of wealth from urban to rural
areas in the form of bride-price payments and other investments of cash
in the women's relatives (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993, n.d.*a*).

Conclusion

In this article I have illustrated some of the various perspectives of
Papua New Guinea men and women concerning women's role in
today's society. In the section on men's views, I used men's writings--
both literary and political--to reveal their opposition to women's free-
dom to forge new relations and to actively participate in the building of
the nation. I also argued (as others have already suggested; see Hogan
1985; Johnson 1984; Lindstrom 1992; Macintyre n.d.) that at least some
men and a few highly placed women have exploited differences and
antagonisms among women for political ends, condemning the privi-
leges and actions of elite women in order to appeal to the majority.
   What is at stake is more than simply achieving high political office,
however. In a review of Papua New Guinea nationalists' attempts to
create a sense of national unity in a nation riven by differences of cul-
ture, language, history, ecology, and more, Lindstrom (1992) demon-
strates how politicians and others have used the idea of a shared set of

"core traditions," or what is termed the "Melanesian Way," to try to lessen disunity. Similar agendas are apparent elsewhere in the Pacific-- for example, in Fijian nationalism (Rutz n.d.). And in the construction of Papua New Guinea's new national Parliament building, we have seen how the planners of a central national institution purposefully incorporated traditional designs from all over Papua New Guinea-- such as designing the outer structure of the building in the shape of a Sepik men's house--in an attempt to embody Papua New Guineans' shared village origins (Rosi 1991).

Another "tradition" that Papua New Guinea nationalists play up is the notion that women, especially young women, should be under the control of parents and spouse. In spite of constitutional rights granting women full participation in the social, economic, and political develop- ment of their country, statements such as the following by "Melanesian Way" spokesman and creator Bernard Narokobi stand firmly on the side of male dominance and parental control of young women:

> Women are not inferior to men but different. . . . Within the family, the woman's authority is as important as the man's. . . . However, at the clan and village level, the woman cannot be head. . . .
>
> [Directing his words to "Westernised girl"] As for sex, only the West of today has achieved sexual heights of excitement in which the human body is thoroughly depraved, perverted, cor- rupted, debased. . . . Forced marriages, I will readily agree with you are a scandal. But . . . [t]here are important sociolog- ical reasons too, for arranged marriages and for payment of bride and groom wealth. Marriage brings families and tribes together. . . . Marriage in Melanesia still is a collective com- munal relationship of a public nature, not a one to one private affair. (Narokobi 1983:35-36, 52-53)

Playing up to villagers' fears that their educated daughters will run wild and contract marriages for which no bride-price is paid and portraying independent women as Jezebels who threaten the stability of both soci- ety and the family, male nationalists divert attention from differences (particularly economic and political) that divide them from other Papua New Guineans while blaming at least some of the nation's prob- lems on a very small minority of women.

As with other facets in the construction of a national culture, how- ever, elite males' portrayal of women is contested ground. In the section

on new women, I have shown how elite women are dissatisfied with men's actions in the development of Papua New Guinea and how women are calling for new relations with men. At the national level and in Papua New Guinea's towns and cities, this dissatisfaction is expressed in the campaign rhetoric and increasingly women-centered demands of female leaders and politicians (*Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* 1992c; Wormald 1992), in the aspirations of female students (Rosi and Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993), and in the refusal of some women to even consider marriage to Papua New Guineans (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1990).

The campaign strategies and efforts of such women to "improve" the lives of all women have thus far, however, made little impression on the majority of Papua New Guinea's women. Most of the latter continue to support male over female candidates for public office and to envy (or spurn) the real or imagined privileges of educated and elite women. This division has been detrimental to creating a united women's movement and has generated a multiplicity of local and regional movements. Rural women are making themselves heard and what they are saying is that they do not trust elite women (or elite men, for that matter) to help them improve their situations. In organizing themselves, rural women are seeking greater recognition and rewards for being the "economic and social backbone of Papua New Guinea society," an expression that is more and more being adopted by women leaders at all levels of Papua New Guinea society to describe and appeal to rural women (e.g., Wilson 1987:174).

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SEA TENURE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF LIVING MARINE RESOURCES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

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Customary Marine Tenure

Use of coastal waters in Papua New Guinea takes place under a great diversity of locally defined, informal, exclusive, communal, relatively closed, or even private tenure arrangements in what has come to be labeled "sea tenure" or customary marine tenure (CMT) (Anell 1955; Baines 1989; Balfour 1913; Cranstone 1972; Kearney 1975, 1977; Moore 1977; Narokobi 1984; Quinn, Kojis, and Warpeha n.d.; Spring 1982; Tenakanai 1986). CMT in Papua New Guinea includes mixtures of exclusive individual and public-access traditions with ownership tied to specific environments, species, or technology--or to some combination of all three (Carrier 1981, 1982a, 1982b; Carrier and Carrier 1983, 1989). CMT community membership is small, interrelated and bound by cultural rules that specify who has access to resources (Akimichi 1981; Bergin 1983; Chapman 1987; Cordell 1984; Couper 1973; Johannes 1978b, 1982a, 1989a, 1989b; Johannes and MacFarlane 1986, 1991; Rodman 1989; Ruddle and Akimichi 1984; Schoeffel 1985; South Pacific Commission 1988).

Although sea tenure is vital to over 400,000 ethnically diverse coastal peoples of Papua New Guinea, the fate of these CMT resource-management systems, especially in the transboundary Torres Strait region, are increasingly threatened by commoditized fisheries and contentious mining and oil projects. Advocacy expressed in this article for maintaining tradition-based sea tenure in Papua New Guinea stems from my own

long-standing anthropological research association with the Wopkaimin
landowners around the Ok Tedi mining project, located in the Fly River
headwaters (Hyndman 1991b). Environmental disaster from the Ok
Tedi project ramifies throughout the Fly River socioecological region
(Hyndman 1991a). Refugees from pollution there are migrating to
Daru, the Western Province administrative center situated below the
Fly estuary; and coastal fisheries are threatened. Moreover, the need for
a baseline appraisal of sea tenure in contemporary Papua New Guinea
became apparent at a 1990 conference, "Sustainable Development for
the Traditional Inhabitants of the Torres Strait Region," sponsored by
the Australian Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (Lawrence
and Cansfield-Smith 1991). This article, then, is intended for CMT
researchers and policymakers. Versions have been presented to a World
Wildlife Fund review for Papua New Guinea (Hyndman 1992); to John
Cordell, director of the Torres Strait transboundary indigenous conflict,
resolution project; and to the Fourth Annual Common Property Con-
ference held in Manila in June 1993.

Issues of conservation, common property, and identity inform the fol-
lowing analysis of CMT in Papua New Guinea and the Melanesian
transboundary Torres Strait Islands. The existing ethnographic record
on sea tenure in Papua New Guinea is shown to clearly include systems
of informal, closed, communal, collectively-held coastal marine prop-
erty. These customs carry special legitimacy that can only be imposed
from within by a group on its members. Sea-tenure estates are not bro-
ken-down traditions but living customs, which have always trans-
formed and related to basic resource-management tasks. They are
diverse, flexible, dynamic, and capable of regulating many kinds of
subsistence and commercial activities associated with marine fishing,
hunting, and gathering. The article concludes that CMT systems are
viable, if fragile and still incompletely understood, limited-entry solu-
tions to managing living marine resources.

Customary Sea Tenure in the Tomes Strait Islands

Subsistence, trade, politics, and identity in the Torres Strait flow from
the sea (Cordell 1991a, 1991b; Cordell and Fitzpatrick 1987; Harris
1977; Marsh 1986; Marsh and Saafeld 1991; Miller and Limpus 1991;
Nietschmann 1989; Olewale and Sebu 1982). A century ago the Cam-
bridge Anthropological Expedition noted the Islanders' intricate system
of marine natural history knowledge and use. Islanders assert exclusive
ownership of islands, waters, and reefs between Cape York Peninsula

and the sea territories of the Kiwai and other southwest coastal Papuan peoples (Nietschmann and Nietschmann 1981; Nietschmann 1989). In addition to Islanders' regard for the Strait as a whole being their territory, each group holds exclusive rights over fringing and adjacent reefs and intervening waters. These are home-island claims that are partitioned into areas controlled by specific clans and then further subdivided into individually owned zones. Today, named marine-tenure boundaries are still resilient and held in place through culturally defined cognitive maps, even though in some places occupation and resource use beyond the home reefs may be attenuated (Fitzpatrick 1991a, 1991b; Johannes and MacFarlane 1990).

Customary Sea Tenure in Papua New Guinea

Well-developed ownership of marine ecosystems exist along the south coast of Papua New Guinea (Frusher and Subam 1981; Gaigo 1977, 1982; Haines 1978/1979; Hudson 1986a, 1986b; Kwan 1991; Pulseford 1975; Swadling 1977). Papuan maritime geography is best documented among the Kiwai (Ely 1987; Landtman 1927; Lawrence 1991). Kiwai clans own land, mangrove systems, and reefs. Dugong and turtle hunting are preeminent in subsistence and identity construction among the Kiwai.

Sea tenure is also well documented among peoples along the north coast and the islands off the mainland of Papua New Guinea. From the archipelagic waters surrounding the island groups are reports for the Massim area of Milne Bay (Malinowski 1918, 1922; Lauer 1970; Williamson 1989), for New Ireland and New Britain in the Bismarck Sea (Bell 1953-1954; Panoff 1969-1970), and for Ponam Island off Manus (Carrier 1981; MacLean 1978). From the mainland are reports for the Siassi people (Pomponio 1992), the seafaring Sepiks (Lipset 1985), and other peoples of the north coast (Cragg 1981, 1982; Keurs 1989).

Complex CMT systems are found among Ponam Islanders and the Siassi. Various Ponam Islander patrilineages own different areas of marine space, resources, and exploitative technology (Carrier and Carrier 1983). Under the Ponam system of overlapping rights, a patrilineage owning a particular technology can use it in another patrilineage's domain if permission for the target species is obtained and the various right holders are each allocated a portion of the catch. A particularly intricate system of tradition and place characterizes Siassi sea tenure (Pomponio 1992). CMT among the Ponam Islanders and the Siassi is embedded in gift economies and kinship-ordered modes of production.

Since Malinowski's classic *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922), CMT among Trobriand Islanders has been shown to conclusively exist and to be embedded in factors other than biological resources. When Trobriand Islanders fought over sea tenure, it was not for scarce resources but for the status of participation in the gift economy (Malinowski 1918). Among the Trobriand Islanders, CMT is both resource and territory based. Coastal village CMT considers coastal areas to be connected to the land, and maritime ownership includes beachs, estuaries, coastal waters, and fisheries resources. Living and nonliving resource exploitation, whether subsistence or commercial, is exclusive to the village community (Williamson 1989). Labai villagers, moreover, claim exclusive reef ownership when mullet schools and Kevatariya fishermen own distinct portions of reef claimed as "our gardens" (Williamson 1989). The importance of fishing in the Trobriand economy with various right holders each allocated a portion of the catch has long been noted (Malinowski 1918); and Massim peoples generally spend 17 percent of their work time fishing (Moulik 1973).

The ethnographic record has generally undervalued the use of marine resources by coastal maritime peoples (Pernetta and Hill 1983). Along the western Papuan coast the average daily subsistence catch per person is around 80 grams of fish and 80 grams of crabs and prawns (Haines 1982). Exploitation of marine resources is also extensive in coastal New Ireland (Wright 1990) and New Britain (Epstein 1963; Harding 1967). On New Ireland, Tigak Islanders eat on average 23.4 grams whole weight per day of locally caught fish (Wright 1990), while along the West New Britain coast 11.4 grams of fresh fish is consumed per person per day (Green and Sanders 1978). Fish accounts for 2 percent by weight of subsistence production among Karkar Islanders on the north coast (Norgan and Durnin 1974).

Legal Ownership of the Sea and Living Resources

A process of dispossession and disruption of indigenous fishing cultures is a matter of historic record in many parts of Melanesia. Legislating commons status for inshore fisheries was a convenient maneuver by colonists seeking to displace or nullify marine-tenure claims of indigenous peoples. Johannes points out that "the value of marine tenure [in Oceania] was not generally appreciated by Western colonisers. It not only ran counter to the tradition of freedom of the seas which they assumed to have a universal validity, but it also interfered with their desire to exploit the islands' marine resources--a right they tended to

take for granted as soon as they planted their flags. Colonial governments often passed laws that weakened or abolished marine tenure" (1978b:358-359).

In Papua New Guinea, however, colonial administrations implicitly recognized customary maritime rights. German and British colonial administrators acknowledged customary fishing rights (McCubbery 1969). The commodity trade for pearls, trochus shells and bêche-de-mer was covered by the Colonial Ordinances of British New Guinea from 1891. The Fisheries Ordinance of the Territory of New Guinea enacted by the British further recognized customary sea tenure with the provision, "this Ordinance shall not apply to any native fishing in waters in which by native custom he has any rights of fishing" (Williamson 1989:40). Later, the colonial Australian Pearl-Shell and Bêche-de-mer Ordinance of 1952-1953 provided coastal peoples with the exclusive right to all marine animals, except whales, to a distance of 800 meters offshore (Williamson 1989).

After independence Papua New Guinea signed the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which allows claim for a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, an archipelagic sea with exclusive ownership of all marine resources, and a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In addition to the Law of the Sea Convention, Papua New Guinea has signed other international treaties. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) controls the taking and export of certain maritime species customarily acquired for subsistence and exchange by coastal peoples (Williamson 1989). Australia and Papua New Guinea cater for the Torres Strait Islanders and the Kiwai and other southwest-coast Papuans in a unique international treaty signed in 1978. Article 10 of this treaty establishes a Protected Zone in which the fishing practices of Islanders, the Kiwai, and other traditional owners are protected. Implementing the treaty is intended to accommodate indigenous sea tenure and provide for continuity of the subsistence fishery.

Papua New Guinea also enacted, in 1977, domestic ocean-resources and marine-territory laws collectively known as the National Seas Legislation. According to Williamson (1989), however, nothing in the act establishes the division of rights to Papua New Guinea waters within the state. Neither sovereignty under Section 2(2) of the Constitution nor regulation rights within internal waters through the Fisheries Act expressly confer state ownership rights to coastal waters. Beach areas belong to the state through the Mining Act. The Fisheries Act regulates the commercial fishery but does not reserve to the state fisheries owner-

ship. It is Section 5 of the Customs Recognition Act that implicitly rec-ognizes the preexistence of customary rights to coastal-water fisheries according to the customs of the different indigenous peoples. These cus-tomary coastal-waters and fisheries rights can be interpreted to protect property from unjust deprivation by Section 53(1) of the Constitution (Williamson 1989).

At present there are three statutes that may be used to establish pro-tected areas in Papua New Guinea. These are the National Parks, Con-servation Areas, and Fauna (Protection and Control) Acts (Eaton 1985). The objectives of the National Parks Act (1982) is "to provide for the preservation of the environment and of the national cultural inheri-tance by . . . the conservation of sites and areas having particular bio-logical, topographical, geographical, historical, scientific or social importance." The Conservation Areas Act (1978) has similar objectives; however, conservation areas established under this legislation do not have to be on public land but can be developed on land or marine space that is privately owned or held under customary tenure. Moreover, it includes provisions for a National Conservation Council to advise on the selection and management of conservation areas and "to encourage public interest in and knowledge of conservation areas and conservation generally," The Fauna (Protection and Control) Act (1966) is mainly concerned with protection through sanctuaries, protected areas, and wildlife-management areas of certain species of wildlife considered to be endangered. In sanctuaries all wildlife is protected except for certain specified animals that may be hunted. In protected areas certain speci-fied fauna is protected and hunting of other types of wildlife is allowed. Wildlife-management areas represent an attempt to involve customary land and marine owners in the control of living-resource exploitation (Eaton 1985).

About 97 percent of Papua New Guinea is still held under customary land tenure (Eaton 1985; Pulea 1985; Williamson 1989). Only 1.4 mil-lion hectares of land, 3 percent of the total area, has been alienated from customary tenure. Most of this is held by the government, but 160,000 hectares are freehold and 340,000 hectares are leased to private interests (Eaton 1985). During the past decade it was estimated that there were 390,000 coastal people, or 13 percent of the total population, who exercised customary rights and use of marine resources (Frielink 1983). As previously discussed, land and sea tenure and ownership of resources are vested in kinship groups and use rights are inherited from a common ancestor. Land and sea tenure provides people with more than subsistence; it gives them their identity and constitutes the basis of their social relationships.

The relationship of indigenous CMT systems to the national government is analogous to the Law of the Sea Convention with respect to the EEZ (Nietschmann and Ely 1987; Williamson 1989). Jurisdiction over navigation, criminal activities, pollution, and environmental matters lies with the government, but as in the EEZ of the coastal state, ownership rights to living resources lie with the indigenous owners of use rights over the reefs. The granting of fishing licenses by the government without the consent of the indigenous owners of the reef would represent uncompensated expropriation (Williamson 1989). CMT ownership of marine space and species provides a strong cultural and historical base for present-day EEZ claims. When almost all of the tuna fishing grounds in the Pacific were transferred to EEZs, the U.S. fishermen became resource pirates until negotiating an appropriate fisheries treaty with the Forum Fishing Agency in 1986 (Nietschmann and Ely 1987).

The Future for CMT Management of Living Resources

In analyzing the potential and desirability of integrating Melanesian CMT into contemporary fisheries- and marine-management frameworks in the transboundary Torres Strait region, Cordell suggests that the following three questions stand out (1992:122): (1) What happens to CMT patterns during the transition from subsistence to commercial economies? (2) What are the resource-management and biological-conservation impacts of CMT? (3) What uses, if any, can be made of CMT systems that work to define user and access rights--in essence, to preserve the social order--rather than the balance of nature? These questions raise the critical ethical issues in CMT research: To what extent, if at all, do outsiders (anthropologists included) have the right to speak about and represent indigenous peoples' sea-tenure systems? The highest standards of professional accountability must apply and CMT studies should proceed only with the consent and active collaboration of the indigenous peoples involved. The peoples themselves should have the final say about what constitutes their CMT systems.

On the first question, Haines (1982), Carrier (1987), Johannes and MacFarlane (1992), and Polunin (1990) have concluded that CMT offers little potential to mitigate change and resolve conflict. Such a contentious conclusion appears premature given that these Melanesian sea-tenure estates, including the Marovo *puava* in the adjacent Solomons (Hviding 1988), remain some of the most extensive and sophisticated traditional knowledge systems in Oceania for spatially managing and socially regulating coral-reef fisheries (Clarke 1990). Wright (1990) takes the opposite position and describes CMT systems in Papua New

Guinea that have allowed the successful negotiation of the transition to modernity through commercial fishing ventures and has suggested that directions for utilizing CMT in the development of marine resources in Papua New Guinea may be found in the judicial system used at present to resolve village disputes over land rights.

On the second question, Johannes (1982b), Clarke (1990), and Nietschmann (1989) have already shown that through closed areas and seasons, food taboos, and game restrictions, Melanesian CMT systems in Papua New Guinea and the Torres Strait have enhanced species conservation. Carrier (1987), on the other hand, cautions that Ponam Islander limited-entry sea-tenure systems did not necessarily conserve resources and that it is dangerous to presume intended or Unintended conservation when one finds a limited-entry CMT system in Papua New Guinea. Indigenous peoples' choices in aquatic-resource use in Papua New Guinea and the transboundary Torres Strait Islands cannot he explained by open-access, common-property models and the terminology itself is misleading and inappropriate (Carrier 1987; Nietschmann 1989). Open-access common property assumes a model of optimization, that people act out of self-interest alone without regard for community. Lack of community designates the open-access commons but under CMT, sea-tenure holders in Papua New Guinea are well-defined peoples who do not lack use rights.

On the last question, what these CMT systems really do is consolidate a people's control over fishing grounds and defend against encroachment. Management utility of CMT systems should not stand or fall merely on the basis of a conservation test. Although it is doubtful that sea-tenure systems were designed purely with conservation in mind (Carrier 1987; Polunin 1990), they do represent important attempts by indigenous peoples to deal with problems of managing resources by controlling and restricting access (Cordell 1989, 1992). As Carrier points out, "because of the way repute was generated, however, the scarce resource was not fish but ownership itself, for this is what made it possible to be generous" (1987: 164). Melanesian CMT systems preserve the social order by embedding aquatic resources in the gift economy and the kinship mode of production.

More research will enable policymakers to go beyond documenting general features of CMTs to specifying how they can be integrated with contemporary systems of marine use. In Papua New Guinea indigenous owners of CMT systems can become involved in the protection of their living land and marine resources through wildlife-management areas. Of the eleven wildlife-management areas established, the first and larg-

est is Tonda, with 5,900 square kilometers in southwest Papua. The management committee regulates outsider hunting and fishing with licenses and royalties paid on deer, duck, and fish. Maza is the only completely marine management area and covers 184,230 hectares in the transboundary Torres Strait Islands region. Indigenous peoples, while having to contend with impositions on their commoditization of turtle, dugong, and fish catches, have expressed concerns over exploitation by commercial fishermen from outside the protected area. The great advantage of wildlife-management areas is that sea-tenure and land-tenure rights are retained by indigenous owners and CMT management is encouraged. The aim is sustainable utilization of renewable living resources.

Government policies and CMT systems need to accommodate one another. What seems the imperative is the principle and obligation of the Papua New Guinea government to uphold indigenous peoples' rights and controls over their ancestral marine domains. It is impossible to isolate the sea from the total fabric of maritime economy and culture. It is through customary sea tenure that Papua New Guinea's maritime peoples are progressing with past customs to forge their cultural identity in the modern world.

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PREDICAMENTS IN POLYNESIA: CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONS IN WESTERN SAMOA AND TONGA

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Both Western Samoa and Tonga have adopted unique constitutions, each reached by very different recent histories. Yet two hundred years ago these societies appeared similar, at least to foreigners. This essay briefly compares and contrasts the histories of Western Samoa and Tonga, whose formal constitutions were devised with necessary compromises between tradition and modernity in order to cope with modern legislative needs. The Western Samoan and Tongan constitutions have recently faced challenges to the systems of representation originally devised in them. These challenges are described and the advantages and disadvantages faced by each country in adapting to change are briefly discussed in terms of its attitudes to history, tradition, and contemporary politics.

Samoa and Tonga lie in the southwest extremity of Polynesia, which spreads to Hawaii far to the northeast and to beyond French Polynesia to the southeast. Tonga and Western Samoa are two of the geographically closest Polynesian countries: Their nearest islands are a mere 300 kilometers apart. The people and their ways of life were and are more similar to each other than to those of the Melanesian countries to the northwest. For centuries there was both friendly and warlike contact between them. There was chiefly intermarriage, and each nation figures in the traditional stories and legends of the other.

Starting with similar Polynesian social systems, Samoa and Tonga

were in contact with European and American influences from the earliest part of the nineteenth century. By the close of that century the government of Samoa was fragmented in the face of colonization while Tonga had developed a centralized government.

Eventually, both nations established national independence with constitutional compromises between the need for modernity and a desire to maintain Polynesian custom and tradition. Recently, in both Tonga and Western Samoa, some of these compromises have been threatened, and political reforms are either under way or will have to be considered to maintain domestic stability. A 1990 referendum in Western Samoa showed a majority of those who voted to be in favor of universal suffrage in place of voting by *matai* (titled chiefs, the heads of extended families); in Tonga pressure is growing for more-accountable government and better-balanced representation through a redistribution of seats in the Legislative Assembly. In each case, the changes would undermine traditional allegiances to chiefs in favor of a more-representative political system.

The Precontact Period: Constitutional Foundations

Precontact life is summarized here, on the basis of accounts by Meleisea et al. (1987b) for Samoa and Latukefu (1974) for Tonga.

There is little evidence of major differences between the lifestyles in Samoa and Tonga when they were first observed by foreigners. Kinship structures were almost identical. Families, and particularly orators, studied and memorized genealogies that affirmed the position and rank of individuals and family groups. The position and status of women were particularly important, with the eldest sister in each family carrying the highest social rank. Differences among ranks were enforced by social rules.

Both societies had layers of chiefs, some of whose functions were real while those of others were more spiritual, and society placed taboos on the interaction of chiefs with others. Punishments for breaking taboos were strict and sometimes brutal. Both Samoa and Tonga had language structures in which respect and status were implicit and indirectness was important. Although chiefly rank was, to some extent, expected to be inherited, the real situation was fluid. Ascendancy relied as much on having the support of an influential constituency as on inheritance. Both Samoa and Tonga had mechanisms by which an incompetent successor with claims through inheritance could be debarred from holding a position of authority.

Both societies had reciprocal obligation systems to which both the highest and lowest members contributed. The contributions could take many forms. The resulting chiefly authority was finely balanced with community decision making through consensus. People and land were closely linked, strengthening other kin relationships. While on one level a person would have a strong spiritual relation to a particular place, on another level there could be claims of wide-ranging relationships of varying importance to other families and places. These would be brought into play according to the political needs of particular circumstances. In both countries the management and distribution of land was a responsibility of local chiefs. Tenure was given in return for services and could be withdrawn.

Some evidence suggests Tonga was more inclined to centralized authority than Samoa. For example, in Samoa the fono (a meeting or council) was a mechanism for discussion of village policies; meetings would go on for days until agreement evolved. In Tonga, the *fono* seems to have been a meeting at which chiefly decisions were conveyed to village members without discussion (Martin 1817). Latukefu (1975) notes that offenders in Tonga were not brought before the *fono* for public trial as in Samoa. Offenses were dealt with directly by *'eiki* (nobles): There was no appeal against punishment.

Centralization of authority was more evident in Tonga also in the early emergence of a supreme spiritual ruler who was revered by the population at large but appeared to exercise little practical power. A quite different pattern emerged in Samoa, where there remained four paramount chiefs with similar status to each other, none of whom even today is able to claim a superior role--at least in traditional terms.

Constitutional Development: Foreign Influences

Both Samoa and Tonga experienced precolonial settlement led by traders and missionaries. Early visitors to both countries found Polynesians remarkably hospitable, indeed welcoming. Beachcombers were able to settle and eke out relatively comfortable lifestyles in harmony with Polynesian populations. But hospitality expressed a formal obligation, unrelated to personal attitudes and emotions. As a result of these early foreign settlements, protection of foreign nationals was to become a significant issue in the external relations of both countries. Samoa was subject to more intensive economic exploitation than Tonga because it offered extensive yet compact fertile land better suited to agriculture, and it had an excellent harbor close to busy marine trade routes. As a

result Samoa experienced greater competition between the great rivals for power in the Pacific.

In the mid-nineteenth century the United States of America, Britain, and Germany were involved. Rivalry between Britain and the United States resulted in Samoa's having a premier who was an American in 1875. But German interests became paramount following the Berlin General Act of 1889 and its revision in 1899, which formalized the spheres of interest of Great Britain and Germany in the Treaty of Berlin. Eastern Samoa came under American influence with the agreed establishment of a coaling station there in 1878, leading eventually to its annexation. There was German settlement in Tonga, particularly in Vava'u in the north, but arrangements between the powers after 1889 precluded German colonization. In addition, Tonga's 1875 constitution stated that land could not be sold to foreigners, only leased for restricted periods following cabinet approval. As a result, the foreign pressures on land that dominated the political process in Samoa never appeared in Tonga.

Both countries adopted with enthusiasm different forms of Christianity purveyed by the first missionaries and both accorded high rank to church pastors. In each case missionaries were to find that they were cleverly used by the local populations within preexisting political structures (Garrett 1982). Samoa was a base for the Congregational Church while Tonga became a stronghold of the Wesleyan Methodists. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the leaders of the Methodist Church in Tonga became closely involved in Tongan politics. This had no parallel in Samoa. Tonga's King George Tupou I sought advice from many church advisors, but the key player became the Reverend Shirley Waldemar Baker (Garrett 1982; Rutherford 1971), culminating in the 1875 Tongan Constitution by which the State of Tonga was formally centralized as a kingdom. This process is described in Latukefu (1974, 1975). Minority churches were later established in both countries.

In Tonga the Catholic Church was adopted by the Ha'a Havea chiefs and became entangled in their local political rivalries. Their defeat by the Methodist chiefs in 1852 left a political legacy that festered for years. In both countries the Mormon Church has made significant gains, supported by extensive foreign funding during the twentieth century.

Internally Tonga underwent a bloody unification during the period from 1830 to 1852. George Tupou I was able to unify Tonga through his own political ambition, an ability to undertake mobile marine warfare, and access to captured guns and a few foreigners who could use them. Although there were competing claims to his formal position as the Tu'i

Kanokupolu, his conquests were of such effectiveness that his position was never again formally questioned. In turn he had no difficulty obtaining recognition as "King" from Europeans and others who were comfortable with that concept and who wished to obtain his protection.

George Tupou I embarked on preconstitutional reform through a series of edicts that reformed and codified traditional practice in 1839, 1850, and 1862. Then, in cooperation and collaboration with the church and foreign advisers, he announced the 1875 constitution. Debate continues about why there was such an innovative constitutional outcome: whether it was the influence of the king, or his entrepreneurial adviser; or a convenient and far-sighted marriage of the two forceful personalities involved; or a response to a domestic need, or to international pressures.

Whatever the cause, the development of a constitution in Tonga was presented as a *fait accompli* by the king, who won necessary noble, or chiefly, support for a more positive and active role for himself. He accomplished this by trading off the weakened power of many minor chiefs against the political dominance of a small number of important ones who became entrenched by obtaining hereditary titles under the new constitution. It would seem that the Tongan predisposition to authority made the country as a whole more receptive to accepting the foreign advice that led to this centralization.

It was also in the interest of the Methodist Church to promote unity through a leader who had adopted their denomination. This was achieved through a constitutional structure based on the Western principles of the Hawaiian model, which most easily fitted Tonga's rather authoritarian version of Polynesian culture. Had the Reverend Shirley Baker interacted with Tongan leaders fifty years earlier, when regional chiefs were stronger and more independent, a different and less centralized Tongan state might have emerged.

Tongans often claim that the triumph of the Tongan Constitution was that it allowed Tonga to fend off foreign interests and influences throughout the colonial period. As a result the Tongan way of life was protected. This argument ignores the fact that Tonga had already absorbed many aspects of a modern (or at least foreign) state in the new constitution. Among the most important of these aspects were: a legally adopted written constitution, the introduction of universal suffrage, hereditary estates and titles, an independent legal structure, a parliament, a national currency, restricted immigration, and land protection. The Tongan claim ignores also the fact that Tonga was forced to accept protectorate status under Britain from 1900 to 1970.

Tonga has been relatively tranquil from 1860 to the present. But this

was arguably a period of parochial introspection that left Tonga's governments with limited international experience. This characterization is particularly true following ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Protection with Britain that Tonga was forced to accept in 1900. The treaty allowed a sometimes-intrusive British influence in foreign relations, defense, and economic matters, although the basis for this is unclear (Latukefu 1975).

In contrast to Tonga, Western Samoa suffered wars between competing chiefs until 1900, and no single chief became ascendant. Power in Western Samoa remained dissipated among four titles, the holders of which were basically content to live in competitive harmony. The titles were Malietoa (a title derived from the defeat of the invading Tongans), Tamasese, Tuimaleali'ifano and Mata'afa. Foreign settlers, however, were so uncomfortable with this arrangement that they constantly, tried either to impose or invent a "king" (So'o 1988). This foreign preference, coupled with sympathetic Samoan attitudes toward joint ownership of titles, resulted in a joint "kingship" in 1874 between Malietoa Laupepa and Tupua Pulepule.

Then, either unable to withstand or indifferent to the jockeying among groups of foreign residents from the 1830s to 1962, Western Samoa found itself with colonial status. Colonial pressure grew out of commercial interests, particularly the desire to protect land that had been developed for copra plantations by German companies. A need to protect nationals flowed from this investment. The western portion of the Samoan Islands group was under German rule (1900-1914), then was governed by New Zealand (1914-1944), followed by a United Nations mandate (1945-1961). Finally, Western Samoa became independent in 1962. So while Tonga maintained its unity and regarded itself as independent, Western Samoa was fragmented internally and the only central authority was a colonial one.

In Western Samoa the church was much less influential in domestic politics. Whatever its predisposition elsewhere, the Congregational Church in Western Samoa devolved authority more than the Methodist Church in Tonga, and it did not intervene on behalf of a central government and did not encourage the adoption of foreign concepts of government that were introduced by the colonizing powers. In Western Samoa, the political system did not provide a central authority with which a church could align itself.

Village life in Western Samoa continued to be resilient in the face of changes introduced by central government. Local communities remained the source of authority for Western Samoans through to and

beyond the time when a written constitution was adopted. So, in Western Samoa to the present, villagers still meet in the *fono* to discuss the selection of their leaders. Except in the parliamentary arena, where universal suffrage has been introduced, the process remains relatively fluid. The multitude of nuances that make a leadership choice appropriate or otherwise can be brought into play. These procedures have not been codified and some argue that the introduction of formal processes, including the Land and Titles Court, has made it more difficult to resolve disputes because positions are argued more formally and go on the public record (Meleisea 1987a).

Undoubtedly, pressure for centralization was present in both countries from the 1830s onward. But in Western Samoa centralization never took root. It was probably in the commercial settlers' and half-castes' interests to support a strong centralized government in the hands of Samoans if they could depend on it for support; otherwise they would prefer a rather diffuse and powerless one that fostered continuity of Samoa's village-based consultative government system. It seems the Samoans thought so too. As a result, during the colonial period Western Samoa experienced much stronger foreign political and commercial influences than Tonga. These included: the growth of a much larger, influential half-caste community that developed from relations among Samoans, merchants, and contract laborers; the emergence and demise of an independence movement (the Mau); and negotiations with both the New Zealand administration and the United Nations over a constitution for independence.

During this active period, when society and government was changing and evolving in Western Samoa, Tonga's foreign affairs and some aspects of internal administration were managed by Britain. Latukefu's accounts of Tongan history describe a period of introversion (1974, 1975), when effort was consumed in domestic disputes over finance, church management, and title succession.

The Tongan and Western Samoan Constitutions

Tonga's constitution was handed down in 1875, Western Samoa's adopted in 1962. Over the space of ninety years, two constitutions emerged in quite different historical circumstances. Both bridged the gap between a need for representative constitutional government and a traditional system where social rank carried authority. The two constitutions work out compromises in different ways.

Tonga's constitution introduced a hereditary head of state of the kind

associated with established constitutional monarchies (although based on Hawaiian precedents), so Tonga's is one of the most recently established constitutional monarchies in the world, despite claims that the chiefly line can be traced much further back. Headship of state in Tonga is determined by hereditary claim on the male side. Paradoxically, it came into being at a time of emerging and spreading republicanism in the world as a whole.

In contrast, Western Samoa's 1962 constitution set up a headship of state with no clear succession rules, largely because conference delegates could not agree on a succession mechanism. Headship was first held by the *fautua* (advisers), Tupua Tamasese and Malietoa. Tupua died in 1963, and the Head of State is now Malietoa. In the future the Western Samoan constitution allows the Head of State to be selected by an undefined procedure of the Legislative Assembly. This would allow the election of a paramount chief by a "traditional" process in the parliament, which would mirror the older process of the village *fono.* Meleisea notes that the Samoan constitution was "written in a spirit which assumed that all the contradictions . . . would be solved by the the next generation" (1987a:211).

Tonga and Western Samoa each adopted a unicameral legislature, reflecting the smallness of the countries and a relatively simple approach to representation. However, the procedure in each for choosing a prime minister and cabinet is quite different. In Tonga these choices are in the hands of the monarch, while in Western Samoa the prime minister is appointed by the Head of State from among members of the legislature. The member who commands the support of the *fono* is chosen. Perhaps as a result of a need for support within the legislature, and a complex of other factors (So'o 1988), Western Samoa developed aspects of a party system that now complement other processes in the selection of the prime minister. This never developed in Tonga where the king still chooses the prime minister, who need not be from among elected parliamentarians. In Tonga today the prerogative of the king in both parliamentary and traditional senses is being questioned by a more educated electorate. In Western Samoa the opposite problem is emerging, that of how to find suitable positions and responsibilities for paramount chiefs who may be denied either traditional or formal roles by a more democratic process.

The two constitutions confronted the issues of representation and respect for chiefly rank in different ways. In the Tongan model the Legislative Assembly has two sets of members other than the cabinet members chosen by the king. One set is the peoples' representatives elected

by the commoners on the basis of universal suffrage. The second set is the nobles' representatives elected by the thirty-three hereditary title-holders. The numbers in each group have varied throughout Tonga's constitutional period and are currently equal. Thus both electors and their representatives are stratified by rank. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach have been discussed elsewhere (Hills 1991b). In Western Samoa the only voters under the original constitution were the *matai.* The fact that the franchise was restricted has to be seen in context, especially that *matai* were elected after wide-ranging debate in the *aiga* (an extended kinship group). So the choice itself was a two-stage process, each stage allowing a different rank to play a role in selection, with the *aiga* delegating responsibility to its *matai.* The Tongan structure with its basis in universal suffrage may seem more modern than the Samoan model, but it is less fluid: Half the representatives are elected by only thirty-three nobles who, combined with government ministers, control the majority in the Legislative Assembly. This control has recently become an issue (Hills 1991a).

In other aspects the constitutions are similar. Both set the modern state within a framework of Christian principles, and their general constitutional framework is similar to that of many other countries that obtained independence in the 1960s (Levine 1983). Perhaps because Western Samoa was governed under a United Nations mandate, which followed a turbulent colonial history, it became the first Pacific island country to obtain full independence, in 1962.

Although Tonga and Western Samoa obtained their constitutions eighty-seven years apart, following quite different colonial histories and separated by a time span during which attitudes to colonialism changed dramatically, the two constitutions were fundamentally similar in that the structure of the legislature and representation within it was a compromise between chiefly leadership and representational democracy.

Contemporary Constitutional Challenges

The constitutional compromises in both Western Samoa and Tonga have been tested during the last ten years in the face of increased public concern for even greater participation in government, combined with evidence suggesting the abuse of power by vested interests.

In Western Samoa, challenges arose during the period when only *matai* could vote after new *matai* titles were created with no function other than to create additional votes for candidates in parliamentary elections (the *matai palota*). The abuse of the *matai* system was the

basis of demands for universal suffrage that developed in the late 1980s. In Tonga, the issue of representation arose from the inability of the peoples' representatives in parliament to bring ministers to account for what were seen as unreasonable claims on public funds for overtime and overseas travel allowances.

In both cases the demands of a few individuals quickly gained sympathy from an emerging well-educated middle class, frequently with overseas education and experience, who wanted to participate more fully in the processes of government. These critics of Polynesian politics saw traditional processes as slow and inefficient, and were concerned about their personal and economic future in countries where they perceived the majority of policy decisions lay with a relatively less-educated, elderly chiefly group who appeared to have a vested interest in holding onto the power vested in them by the early constitutions.

Reform of the Tongan constitution can be effected only through parliamentary amendment. But this is only possible with the king's acquiesence. In Western Samoa, reform can be obtained through general referendum. The country has shown itself to be more adaptable than Tonga: Its 1990 referendum on universal suffrage changed the voting system radically when it became clear that *matai* titles were being abused. Meleisea (1987a) and So'o (1988) have noted that this abuse was a threat to Samoan tradition as well as to the political system, and the situation is now rectified. There is, paradoxically, evidence that reform took place because conservative voters, who did not want change, abstained from voting in the referendum.

Meanwhile, Tonga has a continuing problem over the balance of representation between commoners and nobles in its parliament and the role of the monarchy, Reform of Tonga's parliamentary structure is almost impossible because a combination of government ministers and nobles' representatives can always outvote the nine peoples' representatives who have been seeking change. A solution can take several forms; although one is parliamentary reform through constitutional amendment, attitudes among many current members seem to make this relatively easy route quite impossible (Hills 1991a). In addition, the inequality of representation can only get worse as the overall population grows while the number of hereditary titles is fixed. In the interim, in the face of a clearly unsatisfactory situation, Tonga is undergoing a period of social tension that unhappily is undermining its reputation for social justice and stability. Tongan observers who support reform are divided between those who would prefer to use the parliamentary system and those who feel that they must appeal directly to the king. Cer-

tain of the current parliamentarians and ministers are perceived to have vested interests, and the reformers in the parliament have little real power (*Matangi Tonga* 1992).

Tonga also faces the possible introduction of political parties. It is said that Tonga is too small to need parties and that the reciprocity of the social system makes them unnecessary. However, since the 1990 Tonga general election and most recently under pressure from increasingly active pressure groups, parliamentarians, government ministers, and the churches have discussed forming political parties both for and against the government. Interestingly, in the Tongan case, if any parties were formed now they would more likely be based on a platform (either of constitutional reform or opposition to it) than as a reflection of kin relationships. However, the most radical reformist proposals of 'Akilisi Pohiva, Vili Fukofuka, and Futa Helu seem more likely to split reformist parliamentarians than unite them.

The churches, which have commoner leadership, have always played a significant role in domestic Tongan politics and both sides are seeking their support. Although outspoken churchmen have supported calls for reform of parliamentary representation, the government has been looking for a conservative alliance with the churches under the traditional Tongan banner of "Church and State," perhaps with a view to initiating a pro-government party.

Western Samoa had no political parties in its early years of independence. They emerged in the 1970s and 1980s under the leadership of first Va'ai Kolone, then Tupuola Efi, then Tofilau Eti. However, while labels as "parties" convey an air of modernity, they have not been platforms for the presentation of coherent policies (although this may be changing). Rather they have been a mechanism for welding together, in a more formal and modern way, the kinship and interest groups related to a particular leader.

Tonga's capacity to live comfortably with a centralized government remains strong, but the other face of centralization is a tendency to turn to oppression, as illustrated by comments from Tonga's police minister about reintroducing capital punishment for treason (*Matangi Tonga* 1991). This facet of political activity has happily been absent from Western Samoa. So Tonga has been uncomfortable adjusting to pressures for change, in contrast to the response in Western Samoa in 1990.

Despite the absence of political parties, popular domestic movements, both organized and spontaneous, have grown in Tonga since 1975. There are embryonic unionlike organizations in Tonga among teachers and nurses. For example, in 1988 science teachers were able to

organize strong public protest against an American group that proposed building a toxic-waste incinerator. Similarly, in 1991 the peoples' representatives in the parliament, together with church leaders, led an unprecedented public demonstration against the sale of Tongan passports to foreigners. Tonga has not experienced anything of the kind Western Samoa saw in the Mau between 1926 and 1930. The Mau was a political independence movement, of a kind unnecessary in Tonga where the British presence was low-key: More recently in Western Samoa, unions have been able to create disruption through organized strike activity, such as by the public service in 1981 and by nurses in 1989. These activities in both Western Samoa and Tonga show that there is growing awareness of the value and use of public pressure out.. side traditional consultation processes when those processes have not responded appropriately to new challenges.

Both Western Samoa and Tonga now have economies of the kind described as "migration, remittance, aid, and bureaucracy" based (MIRAB) (Bertram and Watters 1985; Watters 1987). Their terms of trade in agricultural products have become depressed and their range of alternative exports is limited. Accurate figures are hard to come by, but both countries have 40 to 50 percent of their populations living overseas and remitting what amounts to some 30 percent of their gross domestic product (Ahlburg 1991). Depressed economic conditions caused by chronically low growth rates lead to ever greater pressure for out-migration, which in turn leads to foreign experience and overseas education. Returned migrants are the base for much political dissatisfaction, so challenges to tradition will continue as long as economic conditions lead to the out-migration of citizens who hope to return home eventually.

In both countries aid has become an important source of public finance, and governments are becoming increasingly dependent on it, Western Samoa and Tonga both have to find ways of adjusting to growing consumer expectations. Neither is being forced to make difficult economic choices about long-term public investment because there is no shortage of investment capital, now largely provided through international aid arrangements. However, national financial management will become more and more critical as each country integrates into the international economy, particularly if migration regulations are tightened or if aid flows decrease as the Pacific competes with growing needs in Eastern Europe.

In these circumstances government will have to be efficient and honest if it is to receive the endorsement of those governed. The mix of tra-

ditional and parliamentary arrangements, which delegates authority to a chiefly group, may not be able to withstand the demands for transparency and accountability the contemporary world expects.

Conclusions

Samoa and Tonga began the early nineteenth century with similar social and political conditions. Since 1852 Tonga has been relatively stable and isolated, while Western Samoa has been buffeted by colonialism. In constitutional arrangements, each tried to adapt representational government to its own traditions and has found that the compromise with chiefly authority has worked only partially. In the late 1980s both began to face strains that will require adaptive responses. So far, by introducing universal suffrage, Samoa has tackled the challenges more successfully than Tonga.

Tonga accepted the features of the modern state earlier, absorbing the central tenets of representational parliamentary government in 1875. Tonga adopted a centralized and relatively authoritarian government easily, both because the nation was united militarily and because Tongan chiefs were more authoritarian than Samoan *matai.* This form of government laid the foundation for one hundred years of stability but was a distortion of Polynesian traditions that Tongans themselves now seem unwilling to accept.

Both Samoan and Tongan societies show respect for social rank, but in Western Samoa rank has not become as central to government as in Tonga. Tonga grasped an early opportunity to integrate rank into a nineteenth-century constitution. Some aspects of that constitution, including hereditary titles and the land-holding system, have dated rapidly and today appear to be anachronisms. Tonga's early adoption of these foreign elements is now causing difficulty in reforming them to meet new political challenges.

In Tonga Polynesian adaptability disappeared with the introduction of hereditary titles. The system lost its fluidity, and an important political dimension disappeared from local life. More recently, as the central government in Tonga has taken over the judicial and welfare functions that were once in the hands of chiefs, the chiefs have become even more distanced from their traditional roles. In modern Tonga nobles have to make an explicit effort to maintain a traditional relationship to their people. A few have succeeded: An example is the king's son, 'Ulukalala Lavaka-'Ata, who has returned to live in one of his estates.

In Western Samoa problems of maintaining the traditional chiefly

functions appeared when new *matai* titles were created for parliamentary purposes. This difficulty has now been overcome with the change to universal suffrage. So Western Samoa, with its more varied colonial history and diffuse leadership pattern, has emerged as more adaptable than Tonga in the face of modern political challenges.

Meleisea (1987a) makes an interesting point about Samoan government, that Euro-American thinking assumes that centralization of government is synonymous with "modern" government. As a result, many occidental writers have assumed that Tongan government is more modern than Samoan. In addition, the Tongan system of government is popularly seen as classically Polynesian, because it emphasizes authority and rank relationships in a way foreigners can understand. In contrast, So'o (1988) claims that in the 1940s Western Samoans were unconvinced of any need to change their village-based form of government. This comparative study suggests that the Western Samoan decentralized system has maintained Polynesian principles more truly and now demonstrates greater capacity to adapt constitutionally.

Each nation now faces challenges that flow from its history. In Western Samoa there remains a need to identify organization and authority, in Tonga the reverse--the need is to to allow the expression and adoption of dissenting views.

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REVIEWS

Nancy McDowell, *The Mundugumor: From the Field Notes of Margaret Mead and Reo Fortune.* Smithsonian Series in Ethnographic Inquiry. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. Pp. 337, figures, tables, genealogies, diagrams, bibliography, index. US$45.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Michael W. Young, Australian National University

Few New Guinea peoples have received such a bad ethnographic press as the Mundugumor of the Yuat River. Picture a "fierce group of cannibals," "gay, hard, arrogant," "proud, harsh, and violent," "competitive, aggressively sexed, jealous and ready to see and avenge insult, delighting in display, in action, in fighting." Reluctant, rejecting mothers, the women were as tough and assertive as the men. Thus Margaret Mead presented a bleakly savage portrait of Mundugumor ethos in her popular classic on male and female socialization, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (London, 1935). In that book, the Mundugumor formed the centerpiece of a triptych of contrasting Sepik cultures, set between the Mountain Arapesh and the Tchambuli (modern Chambri).

In late 1932, Mead and her second husband, Reo Fortune, sailed up the Yuat just three years after the river region had been pacified by the Australian Administration. The Mundugumor were to be the third culture they had studied together. They had planned for eight months, but stayed for less than three. Both, apparently, found the Mundugumor difficult and disagreeable. Working conditions were also unusually tough. It was the hot and steamy rainy season, the village was flooded, the mosquitoes were at their worst. Not least among the irritants, their professional marriage was beginning to founder. Small wonder that

Mead's brilliant ethnographic eye was becoming jaundiced: In *Black-berry Winter* (New York, 1972) she admits she "loathed" Mundugumor culture. Fortune kept his feelings to himself and published nothing substantial on Mundugumor.

Mead's practical and personal difficulties aside, sixty years later we can clearly see that she was ensnared by simplistic constructs--Benedictine rather than Boasian--of culture and personality. This is nowhere more obvious than in her paradoxical assertion that it was the misfits and "deviants" who kept Mundugumor culture going. It was a degenerate, disorganized, and dysfunctional society, she believed, whose increasing complexity had made it unworkable. Mundugumor culture was "broken," Mead declared, and had "stopped like a clock" (a view she confirmed during a brief return visit in 1971).

Prompted by Nancy McDowell (who had worked upriver in Bun) and the theoretical interests of Lévi-Strauss, Mead began in the early seventies to draft a more comprehensive ethnography of the Mundugumor. She did not live to complete it but McDowell had promised to do so, and the result is this fascinating book based largely on Mead's manuscript and field notes. Characteristically, Mead's notes were clear and methodically organized, Fortune's scrambled and "practically unreadable."

One of the virtues of McDowell's book is that it rehabilitates the Mundugumor (nowadays called the Biwat) and dislodges them from their unenviable position near the top of the Least-Likeable League of world cultures. By dint of a careful and dispassionate reading of the field notes, McDowell finds they allow a more charitable interpretation of the Mundugumor of sixty years ago. During a two-week visit of her own in 1981, she interrogated them afresh. Now Christian and comparatively affluent, she found them "warm, open and generous . . . as well as assertive and volatile." In contrast to Mead, McDowell "liked them very much" (p. 298). The portrait of the Mundugumor that emerges from these pages is a believable one.

Not the least interesting theme of the book is the activity of fieldwork itself as conducted by two legendary ethnographers, the most dynamic duo in the history of Melanesian anthropology. Fortune set the agenda for their division of labor in Mundugumor: Mead was to do "the language, the children and the technology while he would specialize on the social organization, kinship, warfare and religion" (p. 10). The absurdity of this arrangement will be obvious, even if we did not happen to know that Fortune's linguistic abilities were far superior to Mead's. Moreover, their collaboration was becoming strained and at times they

worked at cross-purposes, though they worked alternately with the best informant, "There are indications," McDowell says with more than a hint of understatement, "that they were not fully sharing data with each other" (p. 289).

Thanks partly to this historical depth of field, this is a rich and fascinating book. The ethnographic materials (on economy, trade, warfare, religion, initiation, and so forth, as well as on kinship and marriage) are remarkable enough to warrant a straightforward narrative, and to this end McDowell writes clearly and well. Notwithstanding her obligation to Mead, the temptation to adopt a postmodernist stance must have been considerable. The ingredients are almost irresistible: the field notes of two extraordinarily gifted and experienced ethnographers; a "fierce cannibal tribe" on the cusp of colonial transformation; the author's own visit to their Christian descendants half a century. later, and the possibility for multivocality and contrasting representations that all these factors allow. Yet the author has wisely eschewed stylistic tricks and resisted making extravagant theoretical claims. Her tone is considerate of the people and respectful of her sources; indeed, she leans over backward to be fair to Mead, concluding the book with a tribute to her "special talents as an observer and ethnographer" (p. 303).

For kinship specialists, the most interesting third of the book will be McDowell's retrieval of the full data on Mundugumor kinship and marriage, followed by her reinterpretation of the controversial "rope." Mead had deduced that the "rope" *(geun)* was a descent line or group recruited through alternating sexes in adjacent generations (such that mother and son belong to a different line than father and daughter). This gave rise to an anomalous "system" of which many anthropologists have been understandably skeptical.

McDowell skillfully disentangles Mead's and Fortune's evidence on social organization and reassembles it in the form of an elegant transactional model. She distinguishes between two contrasting modes of exchange (of valuables and ritual services) that operate within and between generations. The "rope" unites them into a single complex. Thus, in a detailed technical argument, McDowell shows that the marriage system and its intricate obligatory exchanges makes perfect sense if predicated on brother-sister exchange. The ideal marriage system entailed third bilateral cross-cousin marriage with brother-sister exchange, such that the descendants of a brother-sister pair reunite in marriage in the fourth generation (p. 278).

In this scheme, a "rope" is neither a descent line nor a kin group, but a comprehensive metaphor for "the complex interweaving of relation-

ships and ties between classificatory brother-sister pairs and their chil-dren over time, ties that began and ended with brother-sister exchange marriage" (p. 269). In other words, the alternating female-male-female line of relatives was not, as Mead supposed, the "rope" itself, nor a line of descent, least of all a "lineage" (as Mead herself had begun to call it in *Male and Female* [London, 1949]), but one of the two strands of alter-nating sex links that comprised each "rope."

So far as I can judge, McDowell's model is utterly convincing. If any-thing, she is too modest about her own analytical achievement and per-haps too generous in excusing Mead her patent errors. In essence, "rope" refers to a system of exchange, not to a system of descent. One reason Mead got it wrong (Fortune, too, though his notes show that he twigged the "rope" metaphor) was that she lacked a rigorous concept of descent. Another, of course, was that neither of them spoke the Biwat language; they worked entirely in pidgin. Though a few minor prob-lems remain with McDowell's model, there is no denying its cogency and elegance. The Mundugumor, alias Biwat, are finally compre-hensible.

In brief, this is an ethnography with unusual appeal to anthropolo-gists (and anyone else) interested in the Sepik region, in complex exchange and exotic kinship systems, in Margaret Mead's energetic career, or in the history and anthropology of ethnography in Papua New Guinea. The book is handsomely produced by the Smithsonian in its excellent Ethnographic Inquiry series. The omission of maps, however, is a sorry one; I cannot imagine why anyone should think that the pre-cise location of Mundugumor villages is unimportant.

Terry Crowley, *Beach-la-Mar to Bislama: The Emergence of a National Language in Vanuatu.* Oxford Studies in Language Contact. Ox-ford: At the Clarendon Press, 1990. Pp. xxii, 422, maps, tables, bib-liography, index. US$98.00 cloth.

Reviewed by John Lynch, University of the South Pacific

The Vanuatu Constitution declares Bislama to be the national language of the republic, and one of the three official languages (alongside English and French).[1] As Crowley notes (p. 1), this means that Vanuatu is the only Pacific state or territory "in which a non-European language has a constitutional status higher than" a metropolitan or excolonial language, and one of the few countries in the world where a pidgin or

creole has this status. In a country with one hundred or more indigenous languages (Tryon 1976), which was jointly administered by Britain and France before independence in 1980, and with political tensions (then and now) between anglophone and francophone citizens, the choice of Bislama as a politically and regionally neutral language was a good one.

Crowley's aims are to "chart the history of Bislama" over the last 150 years, examining the role of ni-Vanuatu in the development of the language, and to "look at some of the changes that are taking place so rapidly in the language today." His "credentials" for writing on the history and development of Bislama are impeccable. He has conducted extensive descriptive research on one Vanuatu language (Paamese) and comparative research on Oceanic languages within and outside Vanuatu; he lived in Vanuatu for a decade or more, speaking Bislama on a daily basis; and he has published what has become the authoritative dictionary of that language (Crowley 1990), as well as the only grammar (Crowley 1987, which is written in Bislama).

After an initial introductory chapter, Crowley devotes three chapters to various aspects of language contact. Chapters 2 and 3 divide the period of contact into a preplantation period and a plantation-cum-colonial period, with 1865 the watershed year. Chapter 4 focuses specifically on the Bislama lexicon, outlining the various source languages for Bislama vocabulary and the nature and extent of their contributions. The next two chapters are devoted to the grammar of the language, chapter 5 dealing with earlier stages of the language and chapter 6 with more recent developments. The final chapter is retrospective, covering a number of recurrent themes: the nature of Beach-la-Mar (the name given to the earlier, perhaps less stable, variety of the language), the role of women in the development of the language, and the way in which the language, even though not originally a "native Melanesian" one, functions as an expression of Melanesian identity.

Crowley is at pains "to stress the Melanesian side of the development of the language," stating clearly in his introduction that "Bislama is undeniably a Melanesians' language--and a Melanesian language--and it is certainly no mere broken English, despite the claims of its detractors in the past" (p. ix). This thread, which runs through the whole book, is an extremely important one. Too often, accounts of pidgin or creole languages emphasize the contribution that (usually European) lexifier languages have made and underplay the contribution of the substrate languages. Too often also, the role of the speakers of those substrate languages in the maintenance, development, expansion, and enrichment of creole languages has been ignored. One of Crowley's

achievements is to place in proper perspective these contributions to the development of one such language.

Crowley's discussion of the origin of Bislama vocabulary (chapter 4) is of particular interest in this regard. He gives the proportion of Bislama words derived from various languages as follows:[2] English-derived, 84-90 percent: Melanesian-derived, 3.75 percent: French-derived, 6-12 percent; and other, 0.25 percent. A couple of comments are necessary. First, most Bislama words that are ultimately, of Portuguese origin (like *pikinini* 'child' or *kalabus* 'jail') were not derived through contact with Portuguese, since these words were already in the South Seas Jargon--the variety of pidginized English spoken in the early nineteenth century. (A similar comment can be made about words of Polynesian origin, like *kava* 'kava' and *taro* 'taro'). Second, Crowley goes to considerable lengths to track down the source (or, in many cases, possible sources) of the Melanesian-derived items. He shows that the languages of Efate and the Shepherds, and also those spoken in the Pentecost-Ambae-Maewo region, have been the main contributors to the vocabulary of Bislama, with some input also coming from Santo, Malakula, and the Banks; the languages of the extreme north and the extreme south, however, as well as those of Epi, Ambrym, and Paama have made negligible contributions.

Another feature of the book is the detailed attention to the development of the language--both lexically and grammatically--over the decades. Of particular interest in this regard is the attention Crowley gives to the influence of vernacular substrates on the grammar of Bislama. To give one example only: he shows that there are a number of transitive verbs in Bislama that also have a prepositional function when used in serial constructions. The Bislama verb *kasem* 'get; reach, arrive at', for example, may be used prepositionally with the meaning 'as far as, until', as in:

> *Sip ia i ron kasem Santo*
> *'This ship went/goes as far as Santo'*

Crowley points to exact parallels in Vanuatu languages like Paamese (p. 328):

> *Sīv koanik muloh rokol   out Santo*
> ship this   it-ran it-touch place Santo
> 'This ship went as far as Santo'

The book is well presented, with examples clearly set out and with footnotes at the bottom of each page rather than tucked away at the back. One criticism, though, concerns the lists of French-derived vocabulary (pp. 113-128), where comments on individual items occur as normal text in the middle of the lists: these might perhaps have been better treated as footnotes, or moved to the end of each list.

Despite its relatively high cost--but what good books are cheap these days?--this is an extremely valuable addition to the literature on Melanesian Pidgin and on pidgin/creole studies generally. But it is more than that: Because of the attention paid to the effects on the language of interethnic contact and social and political developments in Vanuatu, it is also a valuable contribution to the social history of the Pacific.

NOTES

1. Vanuatu was known as the New Hebrides before independence; its citizens are referred to as ni-Vanuatu. Bislama is probably the most generally accepted name of the language today, though other names have been used in the past (see pp. 26-33, for example): it is often spelled Bichelamar in French, and many people pronounce the *s* of *Bislama* as *sh.*

2. The rather large range given for English- and French-derived vocabulary is due to the fact that quite a number of Bislama words--like *bang* 'bank', *sigaret* 'cigarette', or *futbol* 'football'--might have come from either English or French (or, indeed, from both simultaneously).

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Ingjerd Hoëm, Even Hovdhaugen, and Arnfinn Muruvik Vonen, *Kupu Mai Te Tutolu: Tokelau Oral Literature.* Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, Scandinavian University Press; distributed outside Scandinavia by Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. ii, 196, music notations, bibliography, index. US$39.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Richard Moyle, University of Auckland

This volume presents the detailed findings of research collectively con-
ducted in Tokelau over an eight-year period by a trio of academics;
Hoëm and Vonen were students of Hovdhaugen at the University of
Oslo.

Hoëm's essay on songs and cultural identity is a welcome addition to
earlier, more generalized and tentative publications on the subject,
combining field material given verbally and in writing in both English
and Tokelauan. Despite occasional infelicities of writing style, she
presents a wide-ranging analysis of music's functions as they reflect on
Tokelauan self-identity: the resolution of interisland rivalries into a sin-
gle pan-Tokelau dance form--the *fatele;* the textual emphasis on pre-
senting a Tokelauan world view; and the synthesis of perceived old and
new sets of values.

By contrast, Hoëm's next essay, on Tokelau speeches, uses copious
footnotes to accompany verbatim presentations of three speeches,
together with parallel English translations that form the basis of her
generalizations about the art form as a whole. This material, with lin-
guistic minutiae carefully detailed, is clearly intended for a different
readership.

Hovdhaugen's contribution begins with an innocuous, nonannotated
account of the work areas of Tokelauan women as told by one woman,
followed by a translation and a list of terms associated with mat-
weaving, a subject touched on in the account. His subsequent essay on
fishing stories is more substantial. Curiously, however, many of the
copious footnotes accompanying the stories in Tokelauan relate to
details of translation and specialized meanings, but the reader cannot
make sense of this material until reaching the English translation some
pages later. Clearly, a parallel translation format is called for here.

By contrast, Vonen's analysis of the story of Alo is in parallel text for-
mat. This essay represents the most detailed study to date of any Toke-
lauan *kakai* (fables), and illustrates well the extent of cultural knowl-
edge embodied in these tales. As with the other authors, Vonen provides
a great many (290 no less!) footnotes detailing aspects of linguistic, pre-
sentational, and cultural usage. With better planning, however, the
longer footnotes (some of which occupy more page space than the text
itself) could have been transferred elsewhere in the essay. The compari-
sons with Samoan and other Tokelauan versions of the same story are
illuminating, but, in the absence of any thematic analysis or conclusion,
the reader is left somewhat stranded. Vonen's rudimentary analysis of

the melodies of the sung *tagi* in the story reveals the use of two stereotypes; had the musical notations appeared with the analysis instead of separately at the end of the book, these and other details would be more apparent. The stereotypes appear to be different from those in Samoa (Moyle 1988:64-65) and Tonga (Moyle 1987:179), the only other west Polynesian areas where comparable research has occurred.

Overall, the book's impact and usefulness is somewhat uneven. In seeking to combine the oil of "traditional philological analysis" with the water of "empirically oriented, modern linguistic and anthropological approaches" (jacket notes), the authors rather unrealistically assume a readership skilled in many fields. And, although the authors sought help in polishing the English language content of their publication, the book suffers constantly from lack of editing. On the very first page ("Guide to the Transcription"), two of the words illustrating the use of macrons to denote long vowels contain acute accents instead of macrons, and in the section on linguistic orthography on the same page, the ellipsis is described naively as "a sequence of three full stops." Typographic errors abound in both English and Tokelauan. A more unified goal, consistency of format for presenting linguistic material, and careful editing-- all relatively straightforward matters--would have greatly enhanced the value of this book for both Tokelau scholars and Tokelauans themselves.

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　　　　with The Institute for Polynesian Studies.

BOOKS NOTED

RECENT PACIFIC ISLANDS PUBLICATIONS:
SELECTED ACQUISITIONS, MAY-AUGUST 1993

This list of significant new publications relating to the Pacific Islands was selected from new acquisition lists received from Brigham Young University-Hawaii, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Bernice P. Bishop Museum, University of Auckland, East-West Center, University of the South Pacific, National Library of Australia, and the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau's Centre for Pacific Development and Training. Other libraries are invited to send contributions to the Books Noted Editor for future issues. Listings reflect the extent of information provided by each institution.

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