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REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN POHNPEI STATE, FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

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The populations of most island groups in Micronesia changed dramatically over the past 450 years. For the area comprising modem Pohnpei State these changes took the form of early depopulation, followed during most of the present century by a steady increase in total population and a growing concentration of people on Pohnpei Island. The present study examines regional demographic change in Pohnpei State. It begins with a brief summary of colonization efforts in the area. Attention then turns towards shifts in regional population, emphasizing data from censuses conducted between 1920 and 1985. Through examining fertility, mortality, and migration data, the article explores possible causes of population change in Pohnpei State. Spatial statistics indicate a high degree of local demographic consistency maintained at the expense of increased regional cohesion. The study closes by examining sociocultural, economic, and ecological repercussions of the regional population change experienced in this portion of the eastern Caroline Islands.

Introduction

Micronesian cultures experienced several major changes throughout the past 450 years, usually as a result of interaction with more technologically advanced societies from outside Oceania. Of the many consequences of this interaction, few have had more far-reaching effects than demographic change--generating modifications in economic, political,

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social, and ecological aspects of native sociocultural systems. As was the case in many parts of the world, the demographic evolution of Micronesia typically encompassed two phases: an initial period of depopulation, usually due to diseases introduced by people from outside the area; and a subsequent period of population growth, most often attributable to improved medical technology and health care, which once again were introduced by other cultures (Taueber 1961). Though most of Micronesia experienced basic population change of the types noted, the precise nature of these changes varied between places. The islands and atolls of Pohnpei State[1] witnessed a dramatic decline in population during the mid-nineteenth century, followed throughout most of the present century by sustained, often rapid demographic growth.[2] Currently Pohnpei State contains nearly five times the population recorded for the area in 1920, with more than 90 percent of the total living on Pohnpei Island.

The present study of Pohnpei State represents one of a series that examines regional demographic development in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) (see Gorenflo and Levin 1991). It begins with a compressed review of interaction between Pohnpei State and non-Micronesian cultures, to help understand better the impact of other societies on population in the area. The study then summarizes data on Pohnpei State regional demography, focusing in particular upon ten censuses conducted between 1920 and 1985. By considering population change in light of data on fertility, mortality, migration, and population structure, the article explores possible causes of regional demographic change. It then employs selected spatial statistics to examine formal aspects of regional demographic change in Pohnpei State. Finally, the study considers ecological, economic, and sociocultural repercussions of population change in Pohnpei State--notably the challenge of incorporating growing numbers of people, many of them residing on Pohnpei Island, within a self-sustaining, regionally integrated component of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Colonization: The Impacts of Non-Micronesian Societies on Regional Demography

Pohnpei State lies between 1° and 7° north latitude, and 154° and 160° east longitude, in the eastern Caroline Islands (Bryan 1971). It comprises volcanic Pohnpei Island, and eight coralline atolls (seven of which usually are inhabited) located at varying distances from Pohnpei Island (Shinn 1984:325; Figure 1). Two of the atolls, Kapingamarangi

FIGURE 1. Pohnpei State.

and Nukuoro, are Polynesian outliers located far to the south of Pohnpei Island. Two other atolls, Pakin and Ant, are located so close to Pohnpei Island that their populations usually are recorded as part of Sokehs Municipality on the high island itself (as they are in this study).

Eastern Micronesia was settled by people from eastern Melanesia moving northward about 1000 B.C. (Hezel 1983:3; Kiste 1984:14). The state's prehistory is best documented on Pohnpei Island, where the earliest evidence for human occupation dates to roughly the time of Christ (Hanlon 1988:9). Initially inhabited by several autonomous sociopoliti-

cal groups, around A.D. 1000 Pohnpei Island came under the rule of a single polity called the Sandeleurs, their capital located off the southeast coast at the site of Nan Madol (Athens 1983). This unified rule continued until the early seventeenth century, after which organization of the island again split among several independent polities (Hanlon 1988: 18). Demographic data on the prehistoric and early historic periods presently are unavailable, though ongoing efforts to map and date all archaeological sites on Pohnpei Island (E. Esperiam, pers. com., 1990) may soon enable the estimation of prehistoric populations.

Although Spanish explorers possibly sighted Pohnpei Island between 1526 and 1528 (Riesenberg 1968:2), most researchers consider the Spaniard Quiros as the first Westerner to discover the island (in 1595; Hezel 1983:34). With the exception of Grijalvares's sighting of Kapingamarangi Atoll in 1536, and Quiros's sighting of Sapwuahfik Atoll in 1595, the remainder of Pohnpei State was discovered by Europeans either in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:17-18). Spain claimed this entire portion of the Pacific as part of its expanding empire. But Pohnpei State largely went ignored, and with the exception of Kapingamarangi Atoll was not even visited by Westerners before the early nineteenth century. The Russian Lütke finally attempted to explore part of the area systematically when he visited Pohnpei Island in 1828, though neither he nor any member of his crew actually landed (Lütke 1971, 2: 3-31; Hanlon 1988:31-36). Sporadic interaction with Westerners began following Lütke's visit, and continued until the mid-nineteenth century. Whalers occasionally stopped in the area during the 1830s to obtain water and supplies, notably at Mwoakilloa Atoll and Pohnpei Island (Hezel 1983: 122-124; Hanlon 1988:74-76). Trading vessels also visited the area, particularly following the efforts of the Englishman Cheyne in the early 1840s to develop trade with the natives (Shineberg 1971). Gradually interaction with Westerners grew: the roughly forty ships that visited Pohnpei Island between 1834 and 1840 (Hezel 1979:37-44) increased to nearly thirty ships per year in the early 1850s, and to more than a hundred annually in 1855 and 1856 (Hanlon 1988:74). As the frequency of visits by Westerners to the area increased, so too did the number of resident beachcombers--usually deserters or castaways (often convicts) from whaling and trading vessels (O'Connell 1972; see also Shineberg 1971:158; Hezel 1978). Numbering about forty in 1840, the beachcomber population on Pohnpei Island reached 150 by 1850 (Hezel 1983: 124). After a brief, unsuccessful attempt to establish a mission on Pohnpei Island during the late 1830s, missionaries began sustained work

on the island in 1852 (Hezel 1983:123-124, 142-158; Hanlon 1988: 87-112).

   Although details on the demography of any portion of Pohnpei State are elusive for the early period of interaction with Westerners, particularly dramatic impacts on population are documented. Various Skirmishes between Micronesians and non-Micronesians led to deaths on both sides. The most notable of these conflicts was the attack on Pohnpei Island in 1836 by crews from the British ships *Falcon* and *Lambton,* which left an unknown number of natives dead; and the attack on Sapwuahfik Atoll in 1837 by the crew of the latter ship, in which all (fifty or sixty) adult native males were killed (Hezel 1983:118-121; Poyer 1985; Hanlon 1988:50-58). But the most significant demographic impacts during this period were caused by a series of introduced diseases that devastated the high-island population. Venereal disease, influenza, and smallpox epidemics occurred in the area during the early 1840s, killing untold numbers (Hezel 1983: 130). A more serious smallpox epidemic occurred in 1854 on Pohnpei Island, in roughly six months killing 2,000 to 3,000 persons (Yanaihara 1967:43; Hezel 1983:140; Hanlon 1988:109-111). As a result of diseases, the population of Pohnpei Island declined from more than 10,000 persons in the 1820s to as few as 2,000 in the late 1850s (see Riesenberg 1968:6; Fischer and Fischer 1957:29). Outbreaks of influenza in 1856, 1874, and 1879, and measles in 1861, continued depopulation during the mid-to-late nineteenth century (Hanlon 1988:204). Isolated instances of depopulation on outer islands in Pohnpei State also are documented for this period, such as the killing of several individuals on Kapingamarangi Atoll in 1870 by a group of Marshallese castaways (Emory 1965:66).

   After roughly 300 years of ignoring Micronesia, Spain began to exercise its authority over the Carolines in the 1870s in an attempt to control trading in the area by other European nations (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:19; see Hanlon 1988:145-147). Striving to expand its own empire, Germany annexed Pohnpei State in October 1885, sending a warship to Pohnpei Island to take control from the resident Spanish militia. Arbitration by Pope Leo XIII reaffirmed Spain's sovereignty, though this decision also guaranteed Germany's trading and fishing rights (Hanlon 1988:145-146). The Spanish presence in the area was confined largely to Pohnpei Island, primarily in the form of a garrison in the newly established community of Santiago de la Ascención (present-day Kolonia). But overly zealous attempts to build Pohnpei Island into a Spanish colony, complicated by rivalries between native polities, quickly led to turmoil with the islanders--a condition

that characterized most of the short period of active Spanish adminis-
tration (Fischer and Fischer 1957:37-38; Hempenstall 1977:212-213).
Assorted conflicts led to deaths of a limited (unknown) number of Pohn-
peians. And a measles epidemic in 1894 caused additional deaths
(Hanlon 1988:205). Despite these losses, Pohnpei Island population
began a sustained period of growth about 1890 (Bascom 1965:6, 140).

Following Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American war, Germany
finally gained control of the Carolines when it purchased the area in
1899 (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:20; Brown 1977).
Germany's goal was to develop the Carolines economically (see Ehrlich
1978). Pohnpei State played an important role in the German economic
plans, with the colonial headquarters of the eastern Carolines located
on Pohnpei Island. But problems quickly ensued, due largely to Ger-
man efforts to reorganize the traditional social hierarchy and recruit
forced labor for construction projects. A rebellion by inhabitants of
Sokehs Municipality eventually occurred in 1910, and though brought
under control six months later ill feelings between natives and their
German administrators persisted (see Fischer and Fischer 1957:51-58).
Germany's inability to exploit Pohnpei State's population in an efficient
manner stifled its attempts to develop the area economically. Although
net demographic impacts of the fifteen-year German administration are
uncertain, particularly dramatic losses of population occurred during
the early 1900s. In 1905 a severe typhoon struck Pohnpei Island, and
Mwoakilloa and Pingelap atolls, killing an unknown number of people
and causing a subsequent famine. In addition to seventeen persons exe-
cuted at the end of the Sokehs rebellion, several natives were killed in
battles with German forces; moreover, following the reestablishment of
German control after the uprising nearly 450 persons were exiled by
German administrators to Palau to prevent future rebellions (Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:20). Although the exiles were
allowed to return several years later, the land they originally owned was
distributed to about 1,250 in-migrants from Mwoakilloa and Pingelap
atolls (who relocated to Pohnpei Island after the 1905 typhoon), Sap-
wuahfik Atoll, and the Mortlocks (who relocated to Pohnpei Island
after a typhoon in 1907; see Fischer and Fischer 1957:58).

At the onset of Germany's involvement in World War I in 1914, Japa-
nese military forces occupied German-held Micronesian territories
(Kiste 1984:43). In 1920 a Class C Mandate from the League of Nations
officially awarded to Japan all German possessions in the Pacific north
of the equator, including Pohnpei State (Clyde 1967). Administration
during the Japanese period was much more intensive than any foreign

rule that had preceded--representing part of a focused effort to develop Pohnpei State economically and incorporate the island group as a functioning component of the Japanese Pacific empire (Falgout 1989:282-285). Japanese administrators of Pohnpei State quickly imposed their own order (Fischer and Fischer 1957:59-62). Authority was placed in the hands of Japanese bureaucrats and imposed locally through the Japanese police. Traditional chiefs, in turn, became minor functionaries who served as agents of the Japanese administrators (Peattie 1988:76, 98, 326). The Japanese promoted a range of agricultural, commercial fishing, and industrial enterprises, mostly on Pohnpei Island, in the process of developing the area's economic potential (Peattie 1988: 102, 122, 137, 140, 177; Falgout 1989:283).

Due both to its size and natural resources, Pohnpei Island eventually became home to the third largest number of Japanese in-migrants in the Mandated Territory (Peattie 1988: 176-180). Kolonia grew from a scattering of shacks to the population center of the island, and the number of Japanese in Pohnpei State grew from less than 150 in 1923 to more than 13,400 by 1945 (Bascom 1965:8). As discussed in greater detail below, the Pacific Islander population in Pohnpei State increased markedly during the Japanese administration--growing by more than 1,800 persons during the years (1920-1935) documented by Japanese censuses.[3] In addition to this overall increase in population, Pacific Islander inhabitants of Pohnpei State were increasingly mobile during the Japanese administration. Isolated relocations occurred, such as the migration of several people from Kapingamarangi Atoll to Pohnpei Island in 1918 to escape the ravages of a famine (Emory 1965:20). But more frequently people were relocated to supply labor on various Japanese projects. The incidence of labor-related relocations increased as the impending war neared. The specific effects of World War II on natives throughout the state is uncertain. Despite intensive bombardment of Pohnpei Island by American forces during 1944, apparently few inhabitants of the high island died as a result of war-related activities (Bascom 1965:6; Falgout 1989:281). Interaction between outer islanders and the Japanese was limited. With the exception of the recruitment and relocation of relatively few individuals to provide labor for the war effort, the outer islands generally avoided impacts of the war (Poyer 1989:104-114).

U.S. military forces bypassed Pohnpei State in 1944, and occupied the area following the Japanese surrender in 1945 (Peattie 1988:278-279). Japanese civilians and military personnel were repatriated by December 1945; Pacific Islanders with Japanese spouses were given the

opportunity to live in Japan or remain in Pohnpei State (most choosing the latter; Fischer and Fischer 1957:65). In 1947 the island units in Pohnpei State became part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), a strategic area established by the United Nations and administered by the United States (Shinn 1984:303-305). During the first decade of its administration, the United States began returning business and government responsibilities to natives--its interest in the area being much more strategic than economic. Under successive administrations by the U.S. Navy (1945-1951) and the U.S. Department of the Interior (1952-1986), the population grew rapidly. Between the last Japanese census in 1935 and the first TTPI census in 1958, Pohnpei State population increased by more than 3,600 persons; by 1980, state population had grown by another 10,800.

Pohnpei State and three other Caroline districts of the TTPI (Chuuk, Kosrae, and Yap) approved a constitution on 10 May 1979, becoming the self-governing nation of the Federated States of Micronesia. The U.S. Congress ratified a Compact of Free Association in 1986, an agreement that defined future relations between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States. The sustained population growth that characterized the years of U.S. administration apparently continued into the 1980s; during the first five years of independence, population in Pohnpei State grew to more than 20,000 persons.

Changing Regional Demography in Pohnpei State

The demography of Pohnpei State was poorly documented before the Japanese **Nan'yō-chō** (South Seas Bureau) conducted its first systematic census of the Mandated Territory in 1920. Although limited information on population is available beginning in the early nineteenth century for certain island units, this usually entails estimates made by explorers and missionaries, often after relatively brief encounters with inhabitants (see Hambruch 1932; Eilers 1934; Riesenberg 1968:6). Particularly evident in estimates for Pohnpei Island are demographic impacts of the diseases discussed above, with population declining from as many as 15,000 in 1840 to about 1,700 by 1891 (Table 1). German administrators conducted a partial census of the area (Yanaihara 1967:29). But no single set of demographic estimates or census data is available for all of Pohnpei State at one time before the Japanese administration.

Ten systematic censuses of Pohnpei State were conducted during the twentieth century: four by the Japanese South Seas Bureau (1920, 1925, 1930, and 1935), two by the TTPI administration (1958 and 1973), one

TABLE 1. **Early Population Estimates for Pohnpei State**

Area	1840	1844	1852	1877	1878	1880	1883	1890	1891	1894	1896	1900	1903	1904	1905	1910	1912	1914
Pohnpei Island[a]	15,000	7,500		5,000		2,000			1,705			3,165		3,279				4,401
Outer Atolls																		
Kapingamarangi							150	150									150	
Mwoakilloa			8 7										214					
Nukuoro					124					150							123	
Pingelap											1,000				870			
Sapwuahfik												240				250		

Sources: Hambruch 1932; Eilers 1934; Bascom 1965.

Notes: Most population figures and dates were recorded as approximations. Middle value is presented for population figures listed as ranges. Empty cells signify unavailable data.

[a]Early demographic data for Pohnpei Island ("Central Municipalities" on other tables) were not recorded for individual municipalities, and hence are presented for the island as a whole.

by the U.S. Peace Corps in conjunction with the University of Hawaii School of Public Health (1967), two by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1970, 1980), and one by the FSM Office of Planning and Statistics (1985). The data collected indicate that Pohnpei State population grew throughout the twentieth century, the relatively modest increases preceding World War II contrasting with more rapid growth over the past forty-five years (Table 2; Figure 2).

Demographic change varied between individual island units in Pohnpei State (Table 3). In part, these differences corresponded to the major geographic division between the high island and Outer Atolls, pointing up the increased concentration of population on Pohnpei Island, particularly in the municipalities of Nett and Kolonia. Changes in population density over time document further the differences in demographic change experienced by different places in Pohnpei State, though densities on the limited land areas of the Outer Atolls continued to be much greater than any observed on the high island despite its more rapid population growth (Table 4).

We now briefly describe the demographic evolution of Pohnpei State in regional terms, organized in seven sections. The first discusses demo-


FIGURE 2. **Change in the total population of Pohnpei State over time.**

TABLE 2. **Population of Pohnpei State by Year, Showing Population Change between Census Years: Select Years**

Year	Population	Change from Previous Listed Census Yr.	Average Annual Change from Previous Listed Census Yr.	Source
1920	**5,748**	...	...	**Nan'yō-chō 1937**
1925	**6,597**	**849**	**2.8%**	**Nan'yō-chō 1927**
1930	**7,051**	**101**	**1.3%**	**Nan'yō-chō 1931**
1935	**7,596**	**545**	**1.5%**	**Nan'yō-chō 1937**
1949	8,023	...	...	U.S. Dept. of the Navy 1949
1950	8,159	...	...	U.S. Dept. of the Navy 1950
1951	8,445	...	...	U.S. Dept. of the Navy 1951
1952	9,145	...	...	U.S. Dept. of Interior 1952
1954	10,023	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1955
1956	10,338	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1957
1957	11,035	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1958
1958	**11,253**	**3,657**	**1.7%**	**Office of the High Commissioner 1959**
1959	12,050	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1960
1960	12,627	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1961
1961	13,462	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1962
1962	14,205	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1963
1963	14,647	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1964
1964	15,048	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1965
1965	15,607	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1966
1967	**15,044**	**3,791**	**3.3%**	**School of Public Health n.d.**
1968	15,335	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1969
1969	16,445	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1970
1970	**15,270**	**226**	**0.5%**	**U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972**
1971	17,569	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1972
1972	19,109	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1973
1973	**19,263**	**3,993**	**8.1%**	**Office of Census Coordinator 1975**
1975	20,030	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1978
1976	20,610	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1978
1977	21,190	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1978
1978	21,780	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1979
1979	22,420	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1980
1980	**22,081**	**2,818**	**2.0%**	**U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983a**
1984	26,922	...	...	U.S. Dept. of State 1985
1985	**28,671**	**6,590**	**5.4%**	**Office of Planning and Statistics 1988**

Notes: Census years in **boldface.** 1920-1935 data are for Pacific Islanders only. Intercensal estimates are de jure population; census data are de facto population. For all tables, "-" denotes zero or a percentage that rounds to less than 0.1; "NA" = not available; "..." = not applicable.

TABLE 3. **Population by Area: Census Years**

Area	1920	1925	1930	1935	1958	1967	1970	1973	1980	1985
Pohnpei State	5,748	6,597	7,051	7,596	11,253	15,044	15,270	19,263	22,081	28,671
Central Municipalities	4,169	4,954	5,320	5,758	9,339	12,884	13,135	17,259	20,035	26,198
Kolonia[a]	…	…	(357)	…	1,720	2,991	2,649	4,795	5,549	6,169
Kitti	1,322	1,399	1,409	1,500	1,896	2,369	2,436	2,427	3,401	3,987
Madolenihmw	763	889	1,067	1,229	1,794	2,571	2,152	2,627	3,376	4,340
Nett	779	1,016	1,044	1,201	1,068	1,368	1,662	2,357	2,226	4,067
Sokehs	623	887	1,024	1,066	1,671	2,115	2,486	3,216	3,632	5,047
U	682	763	776	762	1,190	1,470	1,750	1,837	1,851	2,588
Outer Atolls	1,579	1,643	1,731	1,838	1,914	2,160	2,135	2,004	2,046	2,473
Kapingamarangi	300	341	378	396	404	428	369	389	508	511
Mwoakilloa	246	236	269	258	338	397	387	321	290	268
Nukuoro	159	184	168	191	247	287	267	245	307	393
Oroluk	–	–	–	4	–	–	–	–	6	–
Pingelap	601	601	638	694	627	647	661	641	375	737
Sapwuahfik	273	281	278	295	298	401	451	408	560	564

Sources: **Nan'yō-chō** 1927, 1931, 1937; Office of the High Commissioner 1959; School of Public Health n.d.; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972, 1983a; Office of Census Coordinator 1975; Office of Planning and Statistics 1988.

Note: Data for 1920-1935 comprise de facto Pacific Islanders; remaining data are de facto population.

[a]Kolonia recorded as part of Nett in 1920, 1925, and 1935. Nett total for 1930 includes Kolonia population, shown parenthetically.

TABLE 4. **Population Density by Area: Census Years (Persons per Square Mile)**

Area	1920	1925	1930	1935	1958	1967	1970	1973	1980	1985
Pohnpei State	43	50	53	57	84	113	115	145	166	215
Central Municipalities	32	38	41	45	72	100	102	134	155	203
Kolonia	NA	NA	(277)	NA	1,333	2,319	2,054	3,717	4,302	4,782
Kitti	35	37	37	40	50	62	64	64	90	105
Madolenihmw	22	26	31	36	52	75	63	76	98	126
Nett	31	41	42	48	43	55	66	94	89	201
Sokehs	44	63	72	75	118	149	175	227	256	287
U	88	99	100	98	154	190	226	237	239	334
Outer Atolls	497	517	544	578	602	679	671	630	643	778
Kapingamarangi	577	656	727	762	777	823	710	748	977	983
Mwoakilloa	513	492	560	538	704	827	806	669	604	558
Nukuoro	248	288	263	298	386	448	417	383	480	614
Oroluk	–	–	21	–	–	–	–	–	32	–
Pingelap	884	884	938	1,021	922	952	972	943	552	1,084
Sapwuahfik	408	420	415	440	445	599	673	609	836	842

graphic data from the Japanese period, examining the four censuses between 1920 and 1935 when the population of Pohnpei State increased steadily. Each of the remaining six sections deals with one of the post-World War II censuses, in total encompassing a period when the population of Pohnpei State grew substantially and became more concentrated on Pohnpei Island. In the interest of brevity, we confine this discussion to a presentation of key data, drawing attention to possible causes of population change when possible.

Regional Demography during the Japanese Period: 1920, 1925, 1930, and 1935

Beginning in 1920 the Japanese **Nan'yō-chō** conducted four censuses of the area currently comprising Pohnpei State, providing valuable data on the demographic evolution of this region during the Japanese administration. Population increased throughout this period, both on Pohnpei Island and on the Outer Atolls, with statewide growth ranging from an annual average rate of 1.3 to 2.8 percent (see Table 2).

The 1920 census recorded a total of 5,748 Pacific Islanders (**Nan'yō-chō** 1937). Population was counted on each Outer Atoll and in each municipality on the high island except Kolonia (which was combined with Nett; see Table 3). In 1920, slightly less than three times as many people resided on Pohnpei Island as in the Outer Atolls. Kitti Municipality dominated the high island demographically, containing nearly twice as many persons as any other municipality. Pingelap Atoll contained roughly twice as many persons as any other Outer Atoll.

The population of Pohnpei State grew rapidly between 1920 and 1925, with an average annual increase of 2.8 percent producing a total of 6,597 Pacific Islanders by mid-decade (**Nan'yō-chō** 1927). Most of this growth occurred on Pohnpei Island (see Table 3). The increase in high-island municipalities was dominated by growth in Nett, most likely evidence of a surge in Kolonia's demographic development (in 1925 the population of Kolonia still was recorded as part of Nett). Growth on the Outer Atolls was much less pronounced, though only Mwoakilloa had a decline in population during this period. Data on the age-sex structure of Pohnpei State was available for the first time in 1925 (see Figure 3).

Vital statistics are poorly documented for the entire Mandated Territory during the early 1920s, and data for Pohnpei State are no exception. The estimated general fertility rate for the Pacific Islanders in the Pohnpei District of the Mandated Territory was at 94.5 in 1923, increas-

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1925

MALE   FEMALE

```
75 +
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
 5-9
Under 5
```

12 10 8   6   4   2   0   2   4   6   8 10 12

PERCENT

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1930

MALE   FEMALE

```
60 +
40-59
25-39
20-24
15-19
 6-14
Under 6
```

14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

PERCENT

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1935

MALE   FEMALE

```
60 +
40/45-59*
25-39/44*
20-24
15-19
 6-14
Under 6
```

14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

PERCENT

*Different ages used for males (25-39, 40-59) and females (25-44, 45-59).

FIGURE 3. **Population pyramids (Pacific Islanders only): 1925, 1930, 1935.**

ing to 102.1 in 1924 (Yanaihara 1967:35).[4,5] These values indicate that fertility in Pohnpei State was similar to that estimated for Chuuk State and the Republic of Palau in the same years, and much greater than the fertility of Yap State (see Gorenflo and Levin 1991:111). Contrasting totals of deaths in the Pohnpei District are presented on adjacent pages of the Japanese government's annual report to the League of Nations (Japan 1927:94-95); crude death rate thus may be calculated as 25.4 or 36.3 for 1925. Although age-specific deaths were recorded for 1925, they were not recorded in age groups that corresponded to census age groups, making it impossible to calculate age-specific death rates.

The 1930 Japanese census of the Mandated Territory recorded 7,051 Pacific Islanders in Pohnpei State (Nan'yo-cho 1931). Relative growth in population over the final five years of the 1920s was slightly greater on Pohnpei Island, with all municipalities gaining people (see Table 3). The population of Kolonia Municipality, recorded separately for the first time in 1930, was 357. Population increased on all Outer Atolls except Sapwuahfik and Nukuoro, each of which experienced slight declines. The age-sex structure of Pohnpei State in 1930 was similar to that documented five years earlier (see Figure 3). Data on the age composition of individual municipalities, available for the first time in 1930, indicate substantial variability between places (Table 5). In general, compared to the Outer Atolls the municipalities on Pohnpei Island contained relatively more persons of working age (in age groups 15-24 and 25-59) and fewer persons younger than 15 years and older than 59 years.

The general fertility rate for Pacific Islanders in the Pohnpei District of the Mandated Territory was estimated at 112.7 in 1926 and 101.5 in 1929, and measured at 139.1 in 1930, indicating slightly higher fertility in this area than elsewhere in the Mandated Territory for the years considered (Yanaihara 1967:35). Because mortality data are available only for the first six months of 1930 (Japan 1931:136), we did not calculate any measures of mortality for 1930. Data reflecting lifetime mobility of native inhabitants of Pohnpei State, on the other hand, are available for 1930 (Table 6). Information on residence by place of registration indicates that the majority of Pohnpei State residents in 1930 lived in the same locality where they were registered--with most of the remainder born elsewhere in the Pohnpei District. Residents on Pohnpei Island tended to be much more mobile, with 17.3 percent having migrated to Pohnpei State from another district in the Mandated Territory; this in-migration was particularly high in Sokehs Municipality, owing to the German resettlement of outer islanders there following the rebellion in

TABLE 5. **Pacific Islander Population by Age and Area: 1930**

Area	Total Persons	Age Group (Percentage)			
		<15	15-24	25-59	60+
Pohnpei State	7,051	41.6	17.1	36.5	4.8
Central Municipalities[a]	5,320	40.5	17.6	37.4	4.5
Kitti	1,409	39.6	16.1	38.8	5.5
Madolenihmw	1,067	40.0	17.3	37.3	5.3
Nett	1,044	44.3	19.9	32.1	3.7
Sokehs	1,024	39.1	17.5	40.2	3.2
U	776	39.9	17.4	38.7	4.0
outer Atolls[b]	1,731	44.7	15.9	33.8	5.7
Kapingamarangi	378	48.7	19.6	29.4	2.4
Mwoakilloa	269	46.8	13.4	34.9	4.8
Nukuoro	168	47.6	11.3	32.1	8.9
Pingelap	638	42.0	14.4	36.4	7.2
Sapwuahfik	278	41.4	19.4	33.8	5.4

Source: **Nan'yō-chō** 1931.

Note: Percentages in this and following tables may not sum precisely to 100.0% due to rounding.

[a]Kolonia contained 357 persons in 1930; relative proportions in each age group, beginning with the youngest, were 46.8%, 26.1%, 26.6%, and 0.6%.

[b]Oroluk Atoll uninhabited in 1930.

1910 and the Japanese repatriation of Sokehs residents exiled by the Germans to Palau. Residents of the Outer Atolls, in contrast, were almost all registered on the atoll where they resided in 1930.

The population of Pohnpei State continued to grow during the early 1930s, reaching 7,596 Pacific Islanders by 1935 (**Nan'yō-chō** 1937). Population on both Pohnpei Island and the Outer Atolls grew over these five years, with the most rapid growth again experienced on the former (see Table 3). All municipalities on Pohnpei Island except U gained population between 1930 and 1935, with the greatest relative growth experienced in Madolenihmw and Nett. Similarly, all of the Outer Atolls except one (Mwoakilloa) gained people during the first half of the 1930s. Data on the age-sex structure of Pohnpei State population show relative decreases in persons aged less than 15 years, and females aged 40-59 years, between 1930 and 1935 (see Figure 3). Variability in the age structures of individual places continued, with the general tendency to find relatively more persons aged 15-24 and 25-59 years on Pohnpei Island than the Outer Atolls persisting (Table 7).

TABLE 6. **Pacific Islander Population by Area, According to Place of Registration: 1930**

| | | Percentage | | | |
Area	Total Persons	Same Locality	Same District[a]	Other District[a]	Other Location[b]
Pohnpei State	7,051	68.1	18.2	13.1	0.5
Central Municipalities	5,320	58.5	23.6	17.3	0.6
Kitti	1,409	73.7	10.7	15.5	0.1
Madolenihmw	1,067	77.4	16.1	6.5	-
Nett	1,044	44.3	45.9	8.2	1.6
Sokehs	1,024	11.9	36.8	59.6	0.7
U	776	85.6	9.7	3.7	1.0
Outer Atolls[c]	1,731	97.7	1.8	0.3	0.1
Kapingamarangi	378	98.9	1.1	-	-
Mwoakilloa	269	97.0	2.2	0.7	-
Nukuoro	168	95.8	3.6	0.6	-
Pingelap	638	97.5	2.2	0.3	-
Sapwuahfik	278	98.6	0.7	0.4	0.4

Source: Nan'yo-cho 1931.

[a]Refers to major island districts within the Mandated Territory (e.g., Pohnpei District). Note that the Pohnpei District of the Mandated Territory included Kosrae State, and Enewetak and Ujelang atolls (presently contained within the Republic of the Marshall Islands); the above data will reflect this administrative geographical configuration.

[b]Refers to locations outside the Mandated Territory.

[c]Oroluk Atoll uninhabited in 1930.

Data on fertility of Pacific Islanders in the Pohnpei District of the Mandated Territory are available for 1937, the approximately 113.0 general fertility rate comparing to values recorded for the state during the 1920s. Crude death rate for the same year was 15.7, with tuberculosis and influenza identified as the most prevalent causes of death throughout the eastern Carolines (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:30). Data on mobility are unavailable for 1935.

Regional Demography in 1958

The 1958 TTPI census recorded 11,253 persons in Pohnpei State, indicating sustained population growth at an average annual rate of 1.7 percent over the preceding twenty-three years (Office of the High Commissioner 1959). The majority of this growth occurred on Pohnpei

TABLE 7.**Pacific Islander Population by Age and Area: 1935**

Area	Total Persons	Age Group (Percentage)			
		<15	15-24	25-59	60+
Pohnpei State	7,596	37.8	21.4	35.9	4.9
Central Municipalities	5,758	36.6	22.0	36.7	4.8
Kolonia	...	...	...	...	...
Kitti	1,500	39.8	18.8	35.2	6.2
Madolenihmw	1,229	30.0	25.1	39.5	5.3
Nett	1,201	40.5	23.9	32.3	3.3
Sokehs	1,066	37.2	20.5	38.8	3.5
U	762	33.7	22.0	38.7	5.5
Outer Atolls	1,838	41.8	19.5	33.6	5.1
Kapingamarangi	396	46.0	18.7	31.3	4.0
Mwoakilloa	258	42.6	20.2	32.2	5.0
Nukuoro	191	44.5	18.3	30.4	6.8
Oroluk	4	25.0	25.0	50.0	-
Pingelap	694	42.1	19.2	33.6	5.2
Sapwuahfik	295	33.2	21.7	40.0	5.1

Source: **Nan'yŏ-chŏ** 1937.

Island, where population increased by nearly 3,600 (see Table 3). Demographic growth occurred in all high-island municipalities during this period, but most rapidly in the combined Kolonia-Nett municipality. This localized surge in population corresponded to the emergence of Kolonia as the main population center on the island. Population growth on the Outer Atolls occurred at a much slower pace, gaining only 80 persons over the entire twenty-three-year period. The age-sex structure of Pohnpei State in 1958 indicates increased relative representation both among the young (particularly those aged less than 10 years) and the old (aged 60 years and older; Figure 4). Data on the age composition of individual places unfortunately are unavailable for 1958. Reliable vital statistics similarly are unavailable for 1958, though the increased representation of young persons implies increased fertility and possibly decreased infant mortality.

As a consequence of differences in the rates of population growth throughout Pohnpei State between 1935 and 1958, the relative concentration of population on the high island increased considerably. Throughout the period of Japanese administration, the relative distribution of population remained relatively constant: Pohnpei Island con-

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1958

MALE   FEMALE

75 +
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5 - 9
Under 5

12 10   8   6   4   2   0   2   4   6   8   10 12

PERCENT

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1967

MALE   FEMALE

75 +
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5 - 9
Under 5

12   10   8   6   4   2   0   2   4   6   8   10   12

PERCENT

FIGURE 4. **Population pyramids: 1958
(including Kosrae), 1967.**

tained roughly 75 percent of the state population and the Outer Atolls
the remainder. By 1958 the proportion residing on the high island had
increased to 83.0 percent, corresponding to its growing importance in
the region.

Regional Demography in 1967

The population of Pohnpei State was 15,044 by 1967, having grown at
an average annual rate of 3.3 percent over the preceding nine years
(School of Public Health n.d.). Once again, the majority of this increase

occurred on Pohnpei Island, where population grew by more than 3,500 persons (see Table 3). The population of all high-island municipalities increased, with Kolonia and Madolenihmw adding 1,271 and 777 persons, respectively. Population growth on the Outer Atolls was slower than that experienced on the high island, but similarly occurred on all places. As a result of this differential growth, the proportion of state population residing on Pohnpei Island increased to 85.6 percent. Minor shifts occurred among the persons in five-year age groups between 1958 and 1967 (see Figure 4). The age distributions at individual places also changed slightly from earlier years. The tendency that had persisted throughout the Japanese administration for proportionally more individuals younger than 15 years and 60 years or older to reside on the Outer Atolls than on the high island no longer was true in 1967 (Table 8). Age structure continued to vary between places.

Vital statistics for Pohnpei State in 1967 indicated much higher fertility than during the Japanese period (Table 9), helping to explain the rapid population growth for the nine years preceding the 1967 census.

TABLE 8. **Population by Age and Area: 1967**

Area	Total Persons	Age Group (Percentage)[a]			
		<15	15-24	25-59	60+
Pohnpei State	15,044	48.0	15.4	28.7	6.0
Central Municipalities	12,884	48.4	15.7	28.4	5.4
Kolonia	2,991	45.7	15.6	29.0	4.1
Kitti	2,369	50.8	16.6	26.7	5.3
Madolenihmw	2,571	47.6	15.1	29.6	6.9
Nett	1,368	51.5	12.7	29.1	5.3
Sokehs	2,115	47.8	16.9	28.5	5.8
U	1,470	49.8	16.4	27.3	4.8
Outer Atolls[b]	2,160	45.8	13.7	30.3	9.7
Kapingamarangi	428	42.8	13.1	34.3	8.9
Mwoakilloa	397	49.6	19.4	22.7	8.1
Nukuoro	287	42.2	19.9	29.6	8.0
Pingelap	647	50.2	9.0	30.9	9.4
Sapwuahfik	401	40.6	12.0	32.9	13.7

Source: School of Public Health n.d.

[a]Percentages may not sum to precisely 100.0%, due to exclusion of individuals whose ages were "not specified" and individuals who were "foreign born" (whose ages similarly were not specified).

[b]Oroluk Atoll uninhabited in 1967.

TABLE 9.**Measures of Fertility for Pohnpei State:
Select Years**

Year	Total Persons	Total Births	Crude Birth Rate	General Fertility Rate	Total Fertility Rate
1967[a]	18,304	616[b]	34.0	176.3	6,246
1970[a]	18,536	673	41.7	205.2	7,205
1973[a]	23,252	817	35.1	176.0	5,952
1980	22,081	932[b]	42.2	203.0	6,028
1985[c]	28,671	879	30.7	144.7	4,131

Sources: School of Public Health n.d.; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972, 1983a; U.S. Dept. of State 1981, 1983; Office of Budget, Planning, and Statistics 1987; Office of Planning and Statistics 1988.

[a]Measures for 1967, 1970, and 1973 incorporate population figures and births for Pohnpei and Kosrae states combined, as births for the latter were not recorded separately until 1976.

[b]Measures for 1967 and 1980 differ from those in Table 10 due to conflicting data. The data here are reported births in all of Pohnpei State for each year, and thus should be comparable across years. Unfortunately, these same data are not available for each municipality, forcing us to employ different sources for Table 10.

[c]Natality measures for 1985 calculated based upon data presented in Office of Budget, Planning, and Statistics 1987. These figures disagree with those presented in Office of Planning and Statistics 1988, where crude birth rate was reported as 40.1 and total fertility rate was reported as 5,150.

Natality varied between places, but generally was relatively high throughout the state (Table 10). Mortality data are available for Pohnpei State by five-year age groups (Table 11). The statewide crude death rate in 1967 was less than one-third that recorded during the Japanese period (Table 12), providing additional evidence for natural growth in Pohnpei State during the mid-to-late 1960s.

Regional Demography in 1970

The 1970 census recorded a total of 15,270 persons (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972), a number that, if accurate, would indicate population growth in the area slowed considerably during the final three years of the 1960s. However, researchers generally consider that the 1970 census featured major undercounts for most portions of the TTPI (including Pohnpei State). We discuss the 1970 census data briefly for the sake of completeness, keeping the likelihood of an undercount clearly in mind.

TABLE 10. **Fertility Measures by Area: 1967 and 1980**

Area	1967 Total Persons	1967 Total Births[a]	1967 Crude Birth Rate	1967 General Fertility Rate	1967 Total Fertility Rate	1980 Total Persons	1980 Total Births	1980 Crude Birth Rate	1980 General Fertility Rate	1980 Total Fertility Rate
Pohnpei State	15,044	511	34.0	166.6	6,071	22,081	993	45.0	216.3	7,511
Central Municipalities	12,884	435	33.8	166.7	6,089	20,035	920	45.9	220.3	7,656
Kolonia	2,991	116	38.8	177.6	5,931	5,549	250	45.1	191.7	6,405
Kitti	2,369	67	28.3	149.3	5,619	3,401	148	43.5	237.9	8,731
Madolenihmw	2,571	95	37.0	179.5	6,825	3,376	170	50.4	266.5	9,311
Nett	1,368	45	32.9	176.0	6,248	2,226	130	58.4	287.6	10,378
Sokehs	2,115	59	27.9	132.7	5,233	3,632	153	42.1	194.2	7,102
U	1,470	53	36.1	189.4	6,948	1,851	69	37.3	185.0	5,533
Outer Atolls	2,160	76	35.2	166.3	6,037	2,046	73	35.7	176.8	6,026
Kapingamarangi	428	17	39.7	178.9	6,131	508	12	23.6	108.1	3,815
Mwoakilloa	397	10	25.2	133.3	4,786	290	6	20.7	107.1	3,333
Nukuoro	287	7	24.4	85.7	4,845	307	30	97.7	416.7	13,556
Oroluk						6	-	-	-	-
Pingelap	647	30	46.4	252.2	8,383	375	5	13.3	75.8	2,718
Sapwuahfik	401	12	29.9	128.2	4,089	560	20	35.7	185.2	6,349

Sources: School of Public Health n.d.; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983b.

Note: Total births include infants born to mothers aged <15, >49, and of unknown age (used for crude fertility rate, but not for general or total fertility rates).

[a]1967 natality based upon infants 1 year old and younger, and thus excludes those who died during the first year of life.

TABLE 11. **Deaths in Pohnpei State, Percentages by Age Group: 1967, 1970, 1973, 1980, and 1985**

Age	1967	1970[a]	1973[a]	1980	1985
			Number		
Total Persons	15,044	18,536	23,252	22,081	28,671
			Percentage		
All Ages	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<1	20.9	16.7	25.3	18.1	20.0
1-4	10.4	5.3	7.7	5.8	NA
5-9	-	2.6	2.2	1.4	NA
10-14	-	5.3	1.1	2.2	NA
15-19	1.5	2.6	-	3.6	NA
20-24	1.5	2.6	5.5	1.4	NA
25-29	-	2.6	1.1	3.6	NA
30-34	6.0	1.8	5.5	1.4	NA
35-39	1.5	2.6	3.3	2.9	NA
40-44	3.0	3.5	6.6	3.6	NA
45-49	3.0	5.3	8.8	5.8	NA
50-54	3.0	3.5	7.7	5.1	NA
55-59	4.5	5.3	5.5	3.6	NA
60-64	1.5	7.0	6.6	6.5	NA
65-69	1.5	7.9	-	12.3	NA
70-74	3.0	5.3	1.1	7.2	NA
75+	23.9	20.2	12.1	15.2	NA

Sources: 1967 calculations based upon data on deaths in the 11.5 months preceding the 1967 census, as presented in School of Public Health n.d.; 1970 and 1973 calculations based upon data on deaths for each calendar year in U.S. Dept. of State 1981; 1980 calculations based upon data on deaths in calendar year in U.S. Dept. of State 1982; 1985 calculations based upon data in Office of Budget, Planning, and Statistics 1987.

[a]Calculations for 1970 and 1973 combine Pohnpei and Kosrae states, as age-specific mortality data available for those years did not distinguish between the two areas.

The 1970 census indicated that minimal population growth occurred on Pohnpei Island after 1967, the substantial decreases recorded for Kolonia and Madolenihmw countered by growth in the remaining four high-island municipalities (see Table 3). The population on the Outer Atolls in total decreased during the same time period, with all except Pingelap and Sapwuahfik experiencing depopulation. As a consequence

TABLE 12. **Age-Specific Death Rates in Pohnpei State:
1967, 1970, 1973, 1980, and 1985**

Age Group	1967	1970[a]	1973[a]	1980	1985
Total	4.45	6.15	3.91	6.25	3.50
< 1	27.56	21.84	23.21	29.48	22.50
1-4	3.34	2.40	2.11	2.49	N A
5-9	-	1.02	0.55	0.57	N A
10-14	-	2.26	0.31	1.04	NA
15-19	0.68	1.48	-	2.13	NA
20-24	1.19	2.16	2.68	1.04	NA
25-29	-	3.27	0.83	3.15	NA
30-34	5.42	2.40	5.04	1.71	NA
35-39	1.31	3.50	3.01	5.17	NA
40-44	3.21	5.18	6.39	7.20	N A
45-49	3.23	7.99	9.96	11.40	NA
50-54	4.06	6.86	8.55	10.48	NA
55-59	7.67	13.95	8.64	8.99	NA
60-64	3.56	22.79	13.42	18.40	NA
65-69	4.52	31.69	-	60.07	NA
70-74	12.74	39.74	4.26	56.18	NA
75+	66.39	96.64	43.48	83.00	N A

Sources: See Table 11.

[a]Calculations for 1970 and 1973 combine Pohnpei and Kosrae states, as age-specific mortality data available for those years did not distinguish between the two areas.

of these differences in demographic change, the proportion of the state population residing on the high island increased once more. The age-sex structure of Pohnpei State changed little between 1967 and 1970 (Figure 5). Data on the age structure of individual places are unavailable for 1970.

A range of vital statistics are available for Pohnpei State (combined with Kosrae) in 1970. All three natality measures considered in this study increased during the early 1970s (see Table 9). Overall mortality also increased, though infant mortality declined between 1967 and 1970 (see Table 12). Data on mobility in 1970 are unavailable.

Regional Demography in 1973

Because of likely problems with data from the 1970 census, the TTPI administration conducted another census in 1973 (Office of Census Coordinator 1975). This census recorded 19,263 persons living in Pohn-

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1970

MALE   FEMALE

75 +	
65-69	
60-64	
55-59	
50-54	
45-49	
40-44	
35-39	
30-24	
25-29	
20-24	
15-19	
10-14	
5-9	
Under 5	

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12

PERCENT

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1973

MALE   FEMALE

75 +	
70-74	
65-69	
60-64	
55-59	
50-54	
45-49	
40-44	
35-39	
30-34	
25-29	
20-24	
15-19	
10-14	
5-9	
Under 5	

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12

PERCENT

FIGURE 5. **Population pyramids: 1970 (including Kosrae), 1973.**

pei State and provided additional evidence that the 1970 census repre-
sented a substantial undercount. If both the 1973 and the 1970 census
data were accurate, the increase during the early 1970s represented
average annual growth of 8.1 percent, with 9.5 percent annual growth
on Pohnpei Island--both of which are impossible in the absence of sub-
stantial in-migration (which, as discussed below, was not apparent).
Although the accuracy of the 1970 census generally is challenged, the
1973 census capitalized on adequate funding and preparation to pro-
vide what generally are considered accurate data. Any discussion of
demographic change throughout Pohnpei State during the early 1970s is

weakened greatly by the dubious quality of the 1970 data. To avoid this problem, we speak of change that occurred between 1967 and 1973.

Demographic growth in Pohnpei State between 1967 and 1973 occurred exclusively on Pohnpei Island, where all municipalities registered substantial relative increases in population (see Table 3). The most rapid growth on the high island occurred in Nett, Kolonia, and Sokehs municipalities. By contrast, all Outer Atolls except Sapwuahfik lost population during this period. As a consequence of these differences in demographic change, the proportion of total population residing on Pohnpei Island exceeded 89 percent in 1973. The age-sex structure of Pohnpei State population in 1973 was similar to that recorded in 1967 (see Figure 5). However, the age composition of individual places shifted slightly between these two years (Table 13). Variability between places persisted. But as was the case during the Japanese administration, in 1973 more young (aged less than 15 years) and old (aged 60 years and older) persons resided on the Outer Atolls than on the high island.

TABLE 13. **Population by Age and Area: 1973**

Area	Total Persons	Age Group (Percentage)[a]			
		<15	15-24	25-59	60+
Pohnpei State	19,263	47.5	19.3	27.6	5.4
Central Municipalities	17,259	47.4	20.0	27.5	4.8
Kolonia	4,795	43.9	21.2	30.8	3.8
Kitti	2,427	52.6	17.3	24.8	5.2
Madolenihmw	2,627	47.6	19.8	25.7	6.8
Nett	2,357	45.7	24.1	26.3	3.6
Sokehs	3,216	49.1	17.9	27.2	5.7
U	1,837	49.2	18.7	27.3	4.6
Outer Atolls[b]	2,004	47.9	13.4	28.0	10.4
Kapingamarangi	389	41.4	14.7	30.8	12.9
Mwoakilloa	321	54.2	14.3	23.7	7.8
Nukuoro	245	44.1	15.1	33.5	7.3
Pingelap	641	50.5	12.2	27.0	10.1
Sapwuahfik	408	47.3	12.5	27.2	12.5

Source: Office of Census Coordinator 1975.

[a]Percentages may not sum to precisely 100.0 due to exclusion of 39 individuals whose ages were "not specified."

[b]Oroluk Atoll uninhabited in 1973.

TABLE 14.**TTPI-born Population by Area, According to Municipality of Usual Residence and Home District: 1973**

Area	Total Persons	Percentage			
		Same Municipality	Elsewhere in Pohnpei	Elsewhere in TTPI	Outside TTPI
Pohnpei State	18,935	73.7	24.4	1.6	0.2
Central Municipalities	16,942	71.2	26.8	1.8	0.2
Kolonia	4,633	25.9	70.2	3.1	0.8
Kitti	2,422	97.4	2.0	0.6	-
Madolenihmw	2,614	78.2	18.0	3.8	-
Nett	2,249	83.2	15.5	1.1	0.2
Sokehs	3,199	87.9	11.6	0.5	-
U	1,825	97.2	2.5	0.3	-
Outer Atolls[a]	1,993	95.1	4.7	0.1	0.1
Kapingamarangi	389	84.6	15.4	-	-
Mwoakilloa	317	93.7	6.0	-	0.3
Nukuoro	245	96.3	3.7	-	-
Pingelap	634	99.5	0.5	-	-
Sapwuahfik	408	98.8	0.7	0.5	-

Source: Office of Census Coordinator 1975.

Notes: Calculations do not include individuals whose residential affiliation was "not stated." The Pohnpei District of the TTPI included Kosrae in 1973; data reflects this administrative configuration ("Elsewhere in Pohnpei" thus includes present-day Pohnpei State as well as Kosrae State).

[a]Oroluk Atoll uninhabited in 1973.

Fertility in Pohnpei State (again combined with Kosrae) decreased between 1970 and 1973 for all three measures considered, to levels more comparable to those of 1967 (see Table 9). Statewide mortality similarly decreased from 1970, although infant mortality registered a slight increase (see Table 12). Data on mobility in 1973 indicate that the majority of TTPI-born persons in the Pohnpei District (which, in 1973, included Kosrae) resided in their home municipality and that virtually all state residents were Pohnpeian or Kosraen (Table 14). However, as was the case in 1930 internal migration apparently played an important role in the arrangement of state population. Although only 4.7 percent of the TTPI-born persons residing on Outer Atolls came from elsewhere in the Pohnpei District of the TTPI, 26.8 percent of the high-island residents moved from another municipality. In-migration was particularly important on Kapingamarangi Atoll, providing a major exception to

the trend for limited movement to Outer Atolls. Migration played an even more important role in the demography of Kolonia Municipality, for in 1973 70.2 percent of its population called some other portion of the Pohnpei District home.

Regional Demography in 1980

In 1980 the population of Pohnpei State was 22,081, indicating average annual growth of 2.0 percent over the preceding seven years (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983a). Most of this growth once again occurred on Pohnpei Island, which contained 90.7 percent of the state population in 1980 (see Table 3). All municipalities on the high island except Nett gained population between 1973 and 1980, with Kitti growing the fastest in relative terms. The Outer Atolls population grew at a more modest rate during this period, largely due to *recorded* depopulation (due to an undercount, or temporary absence) on Pingelap Atoll, which according to the 1980 census lost nearly 300 persons. The age-sex composition of Pohnpei State remained generally similar to that of 1973 (Figure 6). But the age composition of the two main components of Pohnpei State shifted once again, with relatively fewer persons aged less than 25 years residing on Outer Atolls, and relatively fewer aged 25 years and older residing on Pohnpei Island (Table 15). For only the second census year examined in this study, a population was recorded on Oroluk Atoll.

Statewide natality increased between 1973 and 1980 for all three measures considered (see Table 9). Fertility was higher on Pohnpei Island than among the Outer Atolls, and particularly high in Nett and Madolenihmw municipalities (see Table 10). Both the overall crude death rate and infant mortality increased between 1973 and 1980 (see Table 12). As in 1930 and 1973, mobility was minimal on the Outer Atolls and more pronounced on the high island (Table 16). In-migration was greatest in Kitti and Kolonia municipalities, helping to explain the population growth recorded for the former. Although the data employed to examine mobility in 1980 do not allow strict comparisons with 1930 and 1973, the role of migration apparently decreased in 1980-- particularly in the case of mobility within the state.

Regional Demography in 1985

The 1985 census of Pohnpei State recorded 28,671 persons, an increase of nearly 6,600 since 1980 (Office of Planning and Statistics 1988). The

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1980

MALE   FEMALE

75 +
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5 - 9
Under 5

12 10 8   6   4   2   0   2   4   6   8   10 12

PERCENT

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION FOR POHNPEI STATE: 1985

MALE   FEMALE

75 +
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5 - 9
Under 5

12 10 8   6   4   2   0   2   4   6   8   10 12

PERCENT

FIGURE 6. **Population pyramids: 1980, 1985.**

population of both Pohnpei Island and the Outer Atolls increased dur-
ing this five-year period, though more so on the former (see Table 3).
Demographic growth was particularly marked in Nett Municipality on
the high island and on Pingelap Atoll, with population on the latter
exceeding that recorded prior to the 1980 census undercount. The 1985
age-sex composition of Pohnpei State changed little from that of five
years previously (see Figure 6). Data on the age composition of individ-
ual places in Pohnpei State indicate relatively fewer persons aged
younger than 25 years, and relatively more persons aged 25 years and
older, resided on the Outer Atolls than on the high island (Table 17).

Available vital statistics indicate a decrease in natality between 1980

TABLE 15. **Population by Age and Area: 1980**

Area	Total Persons	Age Group (Percentage)			
		<15	15-24	25-59	60+
Pohnpei State	22,081	47.4	19.3	27.9	5.4
Central Municipalities	20,035	47.6	19.7	27.9	4.9
Kolonia	5,549	46.5	19.7	30.1	3.8
Kitti	3,401	51.8	19.4	24.1	4.7
Madolenihmw	3,376	49.4	18.9	26.2	5.6
Nett	2,226	46.9	20.3	28.3	4.5
Sokehs	3,632	44.6	19.9	29.6	5.8
U	1,851	46.2	20.2	27.1	6.5
Outer Atolls	2,046	45.4	16.0	28.1	10.6
Kapingamarangi	508	41.3	16.1	32.3	10.2
Mwoakilloa	290	45.2	17.6	26.9	10.3
Nukuoro	307	49.5	16.0	28.0	6.5
Oroluk	6	-	-	100.0	-
Pingelap	375	47.7	13.3	26.4	12.5
Sapwuahfik	560	45.7	17.1	25.2	12.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983a.

and 1985 for all three measures calculated (see Table 9). Both crude death rate and infant mortality rate decreased over this same time period (see Table 12), though annual estimates for the early 1980s indicate slight fluctuations (Office of Budget, Planning, and Statistics 1987:159). An independent analysis of the 1985 census data indicated that during the year preceding that census 123 persons migrated to Pohnpei State from outside the Federated States of Micronesia, and 92 from elsewhere within the federation. Most migration within the state between 1984 and 1985 occurred between municipalities on the high island, with fewer migrating from the Outer Atolls to Pohnpei Island (Office of Planning and Statistics 1988:54-57).

Evolving Regional Demography in Pohnpei State: Causes, Results, and Repercussions

Causes Underlying Regional Demographic Change in Pohnpei State

Available evidence indicates that Pohnpei State population grew throughout the sixty-five years covered by the ten censuses examined above. In the process of describing demographic data and vital statistics

TABLE 16.**Population by Area, According to Place of Residence in 1975: 1980**

		Percentage			
Area	Total Persons[a]	Same Municipality	Elsewhere in Pohnpei	Elsewhere in TTPI	Outside TTPI
Pohnpei State	17,073	91.9	5.2	1.8	1.1
Central Municipalities	15,583	91.2	5.7	1.9	1.2
Kolonia	4,343	86.3	6.9	4.4	2.4
Kitti	2,589	89.8	9.7	0.3	0.2
Madolenihmw	2,543	96.0	3.5	0.3	0.1
Nett	1,757	91.4	3.6	1.4	3.6
Sokehs	2,914	91.8	5.3	2.3	0.7
U	1,437	98.3	1.7	-	-
Outer Atolls	1,490	99.1	0.5	0.3	0.1
Kapingamarangi	364	98.6	1.1	-	0.3
Mwoakilloa	239	100.0	-	-	-
Nukuoro	231	100.0	-	-	-
Oroluk	6	NA	NA	NA	NA
Pingelap	299	97.3	1.3	1.3	-
Sapwuahfik	357	100.0	-	-	-

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983b.

[a]Includes only those individuals more than 5 years old. Excludes 20 persons whose 1975 place of residence was not given.

in this region, we briefly noted possible reasons for population change. We now examine the mechanisms underlying the evolution of Pohnpei State regional demography more closely, considering *both* overall population change as well as shifts in geographical distribution.

Pohnpei State experienced demographic growth among Pacific Islanders throughout the Japanese administration. Insights on the specific processes underlying this growth are uncertain due to a lack of data. Natural increase probably played the most important role: relatively high fertility persisted for several years, exceeding mortality in those years when both types of data were available (see Yanaihara 1967: 32-35). The demographic importance of natural increase during the Japanese administration suggests that health problems that could affect both natality and mortality--such as respiratory ailments, infectious diseases (especially gonorrhea and yaws), and intestinal disorders (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:93-96)--were kept under control. Migration probably also played some role in the population

TABLE 17. **Population by Age and Area: 1985**

Area	Total Persons	Age Group (Percentage)[a]			
		<15	15-24	25-59	60+
Pohnpei State	28,671	46.2	19.3	28.8	5.6
Central Municipalities	26,198	46.0	19.9	28.7	5.1
Kolonia	6,169	42.5	20.5	31.9	4.7
Kitti	3,987	52.9	18.0	24.6	4.3
Madolenihmw	4,340	47.6	20.7	25.3	6.3
Nett	4,067	44.8	19.9	30.2	4.7
Sokehs	5,047	45.7	19.6	29.5	5.2
U	2,588	43.6	20.6	29.6	6.1
Outer Atolls[b]	2,473	48.0	13.0	29.2	9.9
Kapingamarangi	511	42.7	12.7	33.5	11.2
Mwoakilloa	268	49.3	10.8	29.5	10.4
Nukuoro	393	50.6	12.7	29.3	7.4
Pingelap	737	48.4	14.2	27.7	9.6
Sapwuahfik	564	49.6	12.8	27.1	10.5

Source: Office of Planning and Statistics 1988.

[a]Percentages may not sum to precisely 100.0 due to exclusion of individuals whose ages were "not specified."

[b]Oroluk Atoll uninhabited in 1985.

growth, with nearly 14 percent of the total native population in 1930 originally registered by the Japanese administration outside the Pohnpei District (see Table 6). Minimal shifts in the relative demographic importance of the geographic components of Pohnpei State occurred during the Japanese administration, with population becoming slightly more concentrated on the high island. This increased demographic concentration on Pohnpei Island probably resulted from migration--mostly persons who relocated from other portions of Micronesia, as well as individuals recruited from the Outer Atolls by the Japanese administration to provide labor on the high island.

As indicated by the data presented in the preceding section, Pohnpei State population grew rapidly following World War II; indications of slower demographic growth probably were products of census undercounts. Available evidence suggests that most of the postwar change in state population was due to natural increase, notably the result of the changing balance between natality and mortality. The general fertility rate, a reliable indicator of natality, was reasonably constant during

both the period of Japanese administration and during the period of U.S. administration. But general fertility rates during the latter period were substantially greater than those preceding the war (see Table 9). One can offer several possible explanations for this increase in fertility, including changes in cultural behavior that led to larger families, the eradication of imposed relocation (thus decreasing the disruption of family life), and the introduction of certain types of medicine that decreased the incidence of fertility-inhibiting diseases (such as gonor-rhea and yaws; see Fischer and Fischer 1957:67). Recent data suggest a leveling off of fertility, with a slight decline in total fertility rate be-tween 1973 and 1985 (Office of Planning and Statistics 1988:37; see also Levin and Retherford 1986:17, 46, 52).

Complementing the increase in fertility evident between pre- and post-World War II years was an apparent decrease in mortality between the same periods. The limited evidence available suggests that the postwar crude death rate was between 22 and 40 percent that of the prewar rate. The reasons for this reduction are uncertain, but they almost certainly included the introduction of improved medical tech-nology, health care, and education on health-related matters. Although the Japanese administration introduced modern health care, at least on the high island, certain key improvements such as the introduction of antibiotics did not occur until the U.S. administration (Fischer and Fis-cher 1957:67). Recent data document the persistence of certain types of illness in Pohnpei State, such as venereal disease and influenza, but indicate that most are not fatal (Office of Budget, Planning, and Statis-tics 1987:163-164). Infant mortality also probably declined during the postwar years. Although the data are unavailable for Pohnpei State alone, infant mortality for the Mandated Territory ranged between 108.8 and 272.4 between 1926 and 1931 (Yanaihara 1967:35); infant mortality in Pohnpei State for the 1967-1985 census years, in turn, ranged between 21.8 and 29.5 (see Table 12).[6]

In-migration to Pohnpei State played a more important role in demo-graphic growth during the Japanese period than during the postwar years. In contrast to 1930 when nearly 14 percent of the state's Pacific Islander population was born elsewhere, by 1973 less than 2 percent of the TTPI-born population of Pohnpei State migrated from beyond the bounds of the state (see Tables 6 and 14). Data on mobility in 1980 sug-gest that this general trend continued--with the slight increases in migration from other districts in the TTPI and from outside the terri-tory possibly linked to the emergence of the Federated States of Micronesia, with its capital at the time located in Kolonia. Migration

from other portions of Pohnpei State continued to play an important role in the regional distribution of population in 1973, particularly for municipalities on the high island. As documented in the 1985 census, much of this relocation probably occurred between municipalities on Pohnpei Island itself, due to the ease of movement. This would have been supplemented by migration from the Outer Atolls to the high island (e.g., see Carroll 1975:381-390), particularly in cases where Outer Atoll populations have established places of permanent residence on Pohnpei Island (such as the Kapingamarangi neighborhood of Pora-kiet on the edge of Kolonia). Internal migration had declined substantially by 1980 (see Table 16), and further still by 1985 (Office of Planning and Statistics 1988:56).

Changes in the Regional Organization of Population in Pohnpei State: Statistical Insights

Having discussed demographic evolution in Pohnpei State and potential causes of this evolution, we now explore the nature of change in regional organization. This inquiry employs three different spatial statistics. Two of the measures, *point-to-point temporal association* and *spatiotemporal association,* provide complementary means of assessing regional change over time. The third, *spatial autocorrelation,* evaluates the nature of a spatial configuration at some particular point in time. For the sake of brevity, we present only brief discussions of the measures themselves. Additional technical details may be found elsewhere: Gale and Gorenflo (1990) discuss point-to-point temporal and spatiotemporal association; and Cliff and Ord (1973, 1981) examine the foundations of spatial autocorrelation. Less technical introductions of the measures employed below may be found in other examples of their application to regional demographic data (e.g., Gorenflo 1990; Gorenflo and Levin 1991).

Point-to-point temporal association assesses total local change in regional demographic organization, namely the degree to which the number of persons living in particular places at some time t' corresponded to the number of persons living in those same places at an earlier time $t.$ Here we employ two statistical measures of correlation, defined originally in a nonspatial context, to assess point-to-point temporal association: Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient and Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient. Coefficient values range from 1.0 (perfect positive correlation) to -1.0 (perfect negative correlation). Measures of point-to-point temporal association for patterns of

TABLE 18. **Statistical Comparisons for Pohnpei State Regional Population: Between Census Years**

| Years Compared | Point-to-Point Temporal | | Spatiotemporal |
	Pearson	Spearman	Quadratic Assignment
1920 & 1925	.981	.991	.016[a]
1925 & 1930	.992	.991	.059[a]
1930 & 1935	.996	1.000	.058[a]
1935 & 1958	.917	.964	-.013[a]
1958 & 1967	.976	.965	-.016[a]
1967 & 1970	.974	.951	.090[a]
1970 & 1973	.947	.979	.040[a]
1973 & 1980	.987	.965	-.045[a]
1980 & 1985	.944	.916	-.044[a]
1920 & 1985	.605[b]	.909	-.538

Note: Levels of significance, unless otherwise noted, are $p < .01$.

[a] $p > .10$.

[b] $.01 < p < .05$.

regional demographic arrangement in Pohnpei State indicate strong, statistically significant ($p < .01$) positive correspondence between successive census years (Table 18). High correlation values persisted even when comparing 1935 and 1958--census years separated by twenty-three years that included World War II--when values of the two measures employed exceeded .91.

In all, the results of our statistical assessment of point-to-point temporal association indicate limited local change in the arrangement of Pohnpei State population between census years. Despite constant demographic growth and an increasing concentration of people on Pohnpei Island, the spatial configuration of people in one census year largely corresponded to the spatial configuration in the following census year. It is only when one considers longer time periods that evidence for local change in the arrangement of population emerges. The comparison between 1920 and 1985 indicates such change, with the value of Pearson's coefficient decreasing to .605. Ultimately, the results of assessing point-to-point temporal association indicate that slight incremental changes in regional organization accumulated over time.

Spatiotemporal association measures of Pohnpei State regional demographic change between successive years, on the other hand, tend to be

minimal and nonsignificant statistically ($p > .10$) (see Table 18).[7] Through considering the population of places *and* the distance separating them, this statistic measures the degree to which the population of a place at some time *t'* corresponded to the population of proximal places at an earlier time *t.* Values again can range from 1.0 to -1.0--the former indicating that places at time *t'* were located close to places with similar numbers of people and far from places with dissimilar numbers of people at time *t* (and the latter measure indicating the opposite situation). Comparisons of Pohnpei State demographic data between successive census years yielded nonsignificant ($p > .10$) spatiotemporal association values close to 0.0. These results indicate neither similarities nor differences in the shifting arrangement of regional population when distance is considered explicitly. The only statistically significant measure of spatiotemporal association for regional demographic organization resulted from comparing the arrangement of population in 1920 and 1985. The result indicates a marginally significant ($.05 < p < .10$) tendency for places in 1985 to be near places with *dissimilar* populations and far from places with similar populations in 1920. As in the point-to-point case, results of the spatiotemporal association statistics indicate noteworthy change in regional demography over the sixty-five years separating the first and most recent censuses.

We calculated spatial autocorrelation values for population distributions in each census year, to augment the statistics that explore questions of change over time. Spatial autocorrelation measures the interdependence of a variable over space: in the present research setting, strong positive spatial autocorrelation signifies a situation where *in a particular year* places with similar numbers of people were proximal and places with dissimilar numbers of people were distant. As was the case with the spatiotemporal association calculations, spatial autocorrelation values indicate virtually no statistically measurable tendencies in the regional organization of Pohnpei State population (Table 19). Only in 1970, when data quality is open to question (as noted above), was spatial autocorrelation even marginally significant.

Repercussions of Changing Regional Demography in Pohnpei State

The population of Pohnpei State increased steadily throughout the present century, with the total number of inhabitants recorded in the most recent census roughly five times that recorded in 1920. Accompanying this growth was an increased concentration of population on Pohnpei Island. Historically, the high island always has contained most

TABLE 19. **Spatial Autocorrelation Calculations for Pohnpei State Regional Population: Census Years**

Year	Spatial Autocorrelation	Significance
1920	.038	>.10
1925	.054	>.10
1930	.085	>.10
1935	.051	>.10
1958	.110	>.10
1967	.026	>.10
1970	.147	.10
1973	-.002	>.10
1980	-.049	>.10
1985	.039	>.10

of the region's population (see Tables 1 and 3). But the proportion grew from roughly 75 percent during the 1920s and 1930s to 91.4 percent in 1985, and is expected to remain high in the foreseeable future. In the face of the dramatic demographic growth experienced in Pohnpei State, the overall regional *organization* of state population remained relatively constant over the past seventy years--the result of generally small incremental changes between census years. These contrasts in regional evolution have important implications for the development of Pohnpei State as an integrated component of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Before European contact, the islands and atolls comprising contemporary Pohnpei State were politically and economically autonomous. As noted earlier, prior to Western intervention the high island was consolidated under the administration of a single ruling entity for only part of its history, fragmenting into several separate polities in the early seventeenth century (Hanlon 1988: 18). During both the period of centralized rule and the ensuing period of political fragmentation, societies that anthropologists would describe as ranked or chiefdoms inhabited Pohnpei Island (see Fried 1967; Service 1971). High-island chiefdoms are well known for their exceedingly complex social structures. Each Pohnpei chiefdom featured two parallel lines of authority, comprising twelve chiefs each. The head of one of these lines, the Nahnmwarki, was the paramount chief. The head of the second line, the Nahnken, technically was subordinate to the Nahnmwarki but was responsible for much of the daily leadership of the chiefdom. Socially and politi-

cally subordinate to the above two individuals were a series of lesser chiefs scattered throughout the chiefdom. Ultimately, the Nahnmwarki owned all land in his chiefdom and decided who could use it (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944: 146-147). Tribute in the form of labor and tangible goods (particularly food) flowed up the social hierarchy, from commoners ultimately to the Nahnmwarki himself.

Corresponding to the hierarchical social organization of Pohnpei Island chiefdoms was a hierarchical spatial organization (see Bascom 1965:21-27; Oliver 1989:983). The smallest spatial unit was the farmstead, each on average covering eight to ten acres and inhabited by an extended family. The next largest unit was the section, an area that usually stretched from the coast to the island's center, composed of fifteen to thirty-eight farmsteads. Each section was an administrative unit in its own right, ruled by a lesser chief. The largest spatial unit in the traditional organization of Pohnpei Island was the district. Each district contained fifteen to thirty-eight sections and represented an autonomous chiefdom that was ruled by a Nahnmwarki-Nahnken pair. Conflict and competition, both between and within districts, were common among the high-island chiefdoms. This conflict frequently caused fragmentation and reorganization of the polities, a trend that has persisted into recent times (Petersen 1982; see Bascom 1950). The number of districts on Pohnpei Island varied over the past two hundred years, with three emerging after the downfall of the Sandeleurs in the early seventeenth century (Hanlon 1988:21-22), then subsequently splitting and recombining to form the five-district political order encountered by the Spanish in the late nineteenth century. The municipalities of recent times on Pohnpei Island--Kitti, Madolenihmw, Nett, Sokehs, and U--correspond to traditional districts.

The sociopolitical organization of the Outer Atolls is not as well known as that on Pohnpei Island. The groups living on atolls within Pohnpei State apparently also were organized as chiefdoms. On each of the two Polynesian outlier atolls, Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro, authority was split between a hereditary chief and an elected leader (Emory 1965:92-95). On Mwoakilloa, Sapwuahfik, and Pingelap, authority was divided between two hereditary leaders, one secular and one sacred (Fischer and Fischer 1957:179-180). Tribute also flowed up the sociopolitical hierarchies of the Outer Atolls. But the amount of authority accompanying higher statuses on these island units, and hence the amount of tribute that could be demanded of commoners, was more limited than among the chiefdoms on the high island (Fischer and Fischer 1957:159-160).

The traditional economies of island units within Pohnpei State can best be understood in terms of the social order and environmental characteristics of the region. During traditional times, most exchange on the high island occurred within districts, oriented along lines of kinship and authority. Trade, embodied in the exchange of one tangible good for another, apparently was an unknown concept; tribute was given in exchange for food, land rights, titles, and so on as an expression of social rank, and within the social framework of the chiefdom (Hanlon 1988: 71-72). Additional impetus for exchange, particularly between chiefdoms, was absent. Pohnpei Island and its surrounding waters are rich in natural resources and environmentally quite diverse, containing a wide range of plants and animals (see Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:127-130; Bascom 1965:86-136; Oliver 1989:982). But because most sections and all districts crosscut this diversity, generally each chiefdom had access to the same things--providing little motivation to exchange items between autonomous districts. Exchange on the Outer Atolls similarly was guided by kinship and authority. Without exception, these atolls were much less productive than the high island. As the microenvironment of sections bordering a lagoon differed from those bordering the ocean, fundamental diversity was present (see Wiens 1962). Because each of the inhabited Outer Atolls contained a single chiefdom in traditional times, exchange between sociopolitical entities is not an issue. The relatively limited resources present were exploited by the human inhabitants of each Outer Atoll, in some cases exchanged along kin lines at feasts, with some ultimately flowing up the social hierarchy to the paramount chief.

If exchange within island units in Pohnpei State was limited, exchange between units was even less prevalent (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1944:22). The economic impetus for regional trade existed in the form of differential access to various resources, particularly when comparing Pohnpei Island to the Outer Atolls. Throughout the eastern Carolines researchers noted some tendency for exchange between high islands and surrounding low islands, with various types of food provided by the more fertile high islands traded for certain handicrafts (e.g., woven mats, twine) and prepared foods (e.g., dried fish; see Fischer and Fisher 1957: 166-167). But interisland trade was infrequent in Pohnpei State (Bascom 1965:140). In contrast to places with broad regional exchange systems, such as the Yap Empire (see Oliver 1989:580-584), social obligations did not exist between the high island and any of the Outer Atolls comprising present Pohnpei State. In addition to the absence of any underlying sociocultural framework to regu-

late exchange, the distance between island units also would have inhibited frequent exchange. The inhabitants of Pohnpei Island were not a seafaring people, focusing upon the exploitation of their island and its coastal waters instead. The barrier of distance was particularly severe in the cases of Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro; both atolls are located far from any other inhabited island unit, and the inhabitants of each lost their navigation skills sometime before European contact (Fischer and Fischer 1957: 165; Carroll 1975:359).

The spatial statistical analyses of regional demography in Pohnpei State failed to provide any evidence of regional cohesion, We found no statistically significant (at $p < .05$) autocorrelation in any of the census years examined. Two types of autocorrelation might indicate a region well arranged for regional interaction: strong positive autocorrelation, suggesting that similar numbers of producers and consumers were spatially proximal, thereby reducing distribution costs; and strong negative autocorrelation, indicating spatially interspersed small and large populations, as might be found in a regional system of centers surrounded by hinterlands comprising smaller settlements. Point-to-point temporal correlation statistics indicated a strong correspondence in the demographic evolution of *individual places* over time. But changes in the distribution of population throughout the twentieth century indicated no tendency for increased potential interaction, either in the form of significant positive or negative spatiotemporal association. In general one might expect such statistical results in a system that is not well integrated regionally, as was the case in Pohnpei State during traditional times. But in becoming an operating political entity for seventy years-- a district both in the Japanese Mandated Territory and the TTPI, and more recently a state in the Federated States of Micronesia--one might expect evidence of greater regional integration in the arrangement of population.

Concluding Remarks

In the preceding pages we examined regional demographic evolution in Pohnpei State, Federated States of Micronesia. We provided a foundation for the study by describing population change for the ten census years between 1920 and 1985, and attempted to explain these changes in terms of fundamental demographic processes. The demographic history of Pohnpei State during the twentieth century is one of constant population growth, with increasing proportions of the total state population residing on Pohnpei Island. The demographic growth experi-

enced was due primarily to improvements in health care; the relatively high fertility found during the Japanese administration increased even further during the forty-five years following World War II, while relatively low mortality decreased. The growing concentration of people on Pohnpei Island, in turn, was due primarily to migration--both from places outside Pohnpei State and from the Outer Atolls. In an effort to understand the demographic evolution of Pohnpei State, we examined the changing arrangements of population through the application of selected spatial statistics. The results of our statistical analyses indicated that despite the increased concentration of people on the high island, the overall regional arrangement of people in Pohnpei State changed relatively little during the twentieth century, with a strong statistical correspondence between the populations of individual places in different census years. As additional evidence of spatial consistency, our statistical analyses also indicated a persisting lack of regional integration in Pohnpei State--both within particular census years and as the area evolved over time.

The demographic changes experienced in Pohnpei State over the past seventy years are largely similar to those experienced elsewhere in Micronesia during the same period. But the challenges that these changes present to the state's future are different. Growing population and increasing concentrations of people generally characterized the Marshall Islands throughout the twentieth century (Gorenflo and Levin 1990; see also Gorenflo and Levin 1989). However, the changes experienced in the Marshalls represented a fundamental break from the traditional sociocultural system and regional organization found in that area, in addition creating a range of environmental problems by concentrating large numbers of people on ecologically fragile coralline atolls. Although population grew more slowly and became less concentrated in Yap State than in Pohnpei State over the past seven decades, the absence of change in the regional organization of each was similar (Gorenflo and Levin 1991). But Yap State was much more integrated during traditional times than was Pohnpei State and with its widely dispersed population faces greater impetus to develop a more-integrated regional system.

The growing concentration of people on Pohnpei Island in general is consistent with past regional demography in the Pohnpei State region, as well as with the island's capacity to sustain a large population. The persisting lack of regional cohesion similarly is consistent with the past; political integration rarely was achieved on the high island, let alone in

the remainder of the area, and remains elusive despite the introduction of Western political concepts (Hughes 1974). Ultimately, the vast differences in available land area and resources always will determine to a large extent the types of regional organization feasible in Pohnpei State. Although a more interactive state might be desirable, possibly as evidence of greater political and economic health, major changes in the regional organization of Pohnpei State in many ways are impractical. Development almost certainly will continue to concentrate on the high island, possibly spawning the emergence of secondary centers to complement Kolonia. The Outer Atolls, in turn, probably will remain tangential to the regional organization of the state, as they have been throughout the history of the area.

NOTES

1. In the interest of clarity and consistency, we follow modem convention when referring to the island units that form the present state of Pohnpei. We use the term *Pohnpei State* to denote the geographic area of the present state of Pohnpei within the Federated States of Micronesia--even when discussing the region prior to 1979, before the "state" as such officially existed. We refer to the six separate administrative portions of Pohnpei Island as the *Central Municipalities* and to the remaining inhabited island units as the *Outer Atolls.* For the period of Japanese administration, certain vital statistics are available for the *Pohnpei District of the Mandated Territory,* which included the area presently comprising Pohnpei State, Kosrae State, and Enewetak and Ujelang atolls (the latter two atolls currently part of the Republic of the Marshall Islands).

2. Whenever possible, we base this study upon census data and calculations made with census data. Many of the population figures available over the past seventy years for the area comprising modern Pohnpei State are de jure estimates whose accuracy can be challenged. Thus, although declines in population are indicated between 1965 and 1967, 1969 and 1970, and 1979 and 1980 (see Table 2), these *apparent* decreases probably are the result of mixing de jure intercensal estimates with de facto census data (the problem exacerbated by possible census undercounts, such as occurred in 1970). Ultimately we treat Pohnpei State as if it experienced uninterrupted population growth since 1920, and Pohnpei Island as if it experienced uninterrupted growth since the late nineteenth century.

3. Because this study seeks to examine demographic change within a functioning sociocultural system, we exclusively examine demographic data on Pacific Islanders inhabiting the Pohnpei District during the Japanese period. The number of Japanese residing within the Mandated Territory varied over the three decades of Japanese control. As noted in the text, Pohnpei Island eventually contained more than 13,000 Japanese civilian and military personnel. Because these fluctuating numbers of essentially *imposed* inmigrants would cloud our understanding of several key aspects of regional demographic

change within Pohnpei State, we consider only Pacific Islanders for the Japanese period of administration.

4. Vital statistics measures used in this article are defined as follows. Crude birth rate is the number of births in a year per 1,000 total population. General fertility rate is the number of births in a year per 1,000 women of childbearing age (ages 15-49 inclusive). Total fertility rate is the sum of age-specific fertility rates for women of childbearing age. Crude death rate is the number of deaths in a year per 1,000 total population. Finally, age-specific death rate is the number of deaths in a year per 1,000 persons in a particular age group.

With regard to vital statistics, we add a brief cautionary note concerning their accuracy. Fertility and mortality are fundamental components of demographic change and must be considered in a study such as this. However, vital statistics in Micronesia traditionally are inaccurate, particularly mortality statistics (often underreported). The vital statistics examined here probably provide accurate insights on general trends, namely increasing fertility and decreasing mortality over time. But in absolute terms these data probably should not be taken at face value.

5. Kosrae, presently a separate FSM state, was considered a portion of the Pohnpei districts of both the Japanese Mandated Territory and the TTPI. Many data from Kosrae, including vital statistics, were aggregated with data from the remainder of Pohnpei State --explaining our inclusion of information from Kosrae State in certain calculations and figures for the state of Pohnpei. Strictly speaking, comparisons are not entirely valid between these years (pre-1977) and years for which Pohnpei State data may be separated from that of Kosrae State, though Kosrae State always was a relatively small proportion (11.8 to 17.8 percent for the years considered) of the Pohnpei-Kosrae population total.

6. Research on the demography of Nukuoro Atoll indicates a slight deviation from the general scenario proposed here for the demographic evolution of Pohnpei State as a whole. According to Carroll (1975), demographic homeostasis, resulting from low fertility coupled with low mortality, apparently characterized this population prior to intensive contact with outsiders. Ensuing increases in mortality, if they occurred, were less abrupt than the dramatic changes that tended to accompany the introduction of outside diseases. Although fertility increased with Western contact, this increase was delayed due to the concurrent introduction of gonorrhea. Isolation during World War II reduced both fertility and mortality on Nukuoro Atoll. Mortality increased immediately following the war, eventually compensated for by modem medical technology (which ultimately contributed to the population growth experienced over the past four decades).

7. For the sake of consistency and comparability, we calculated spatiotemporal association and spatial autocorrelation measures via a method of matrix comparison called *quadratic assignment* (Hubert and Schultz 1976; see also Hubert, Golledge, and Constanzo 1981; Gale and Gorenflo 1999). We conducted three tests of statistical significance for the quadratic assignment calculations: comparison to an approximation of a Normal distribution; comparison to a Pearson Type III Gamma distribution; and comparison to a Monte Carlo reference distribution for each pair of matrices examined (see Cliff and Ord 1981: 63-65). Significance levels noted in this article invariably refer to the latter test. Such an approach to assessing statistical significance removes the need to make a key (and possibly incorrect) parametric assumption about the distribution underlying the statistics calculated.

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SUICIDE IN MICRONESIA AND SAMOA:
A CRITIQUE OF EXPLANATIONS

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The rapid and extraordinary increase in youth suicide rates in several Pacific countries during the past two decades has raised profound questions about social change in these societies, and the impact of these changes upon cultural integration, psychological adaptation, and mental health.[1] Suicide--and assumptions about the causes--has become a common topic in writings on Micronesia, from articles in popular magazines to papers in technical social science journals. Researchers have contributed to the growing literature on suicide in the Pacific and have proposed differing theoretical explanations for the phenomenon. Challenged by the epidemic rates of suicide, social service workers and mental health practitioners have spearheaded various community responses, preventive intervention strategies, and regional networking efforts.

Regional workshops dealing with the suicide issue have been convened nearly annually in the Pacific over the past decade, and have provided a forum for cooperative efforts by researchers and service providers. Important new insights into the causal dynamics of the problem have emerged from several of these workshops. However, theoretical writers and practical workers in the area of suicide have understandably felt some impatience with each other's problem-solving approach and style of discourse at these workshops--hone approach based upon inductive analysis and the other based upon empathetic compassion. Recently, for example, a young social worker addressed a Micronesian regional powwow on substance abuse and suicide, and advised the

audience to abandon any attempt to find explanations or reasons for suicide in such things as "family change." The individual act of suicide, the counselor told his listeners, is always too complex to understand. The counselor then led the audience in several "thought exercises" intended to dramatize the need for counselors to be empathetic with suicidal clients and to be sensitive towards others' pain.

My disagreement with this position has prompted my own critical reflection on whether, and to what degree, the various explanations proposed over the past fifteen years have succeeded in elucidating the causes of suicide in the Pacific. This article critically examines the theoretical dialogue that has been taking place among a small group of researchers who have attempted to understand the reasons for the growing suicide rates in the Pacific.

My aim here is not simply to critically review ethnographic writing on Pacific suicide, but to contribute more generally to the logical analysis of ethnographic arguments. By concentrating on differing theoretical positions and perspectives, I do not mean to imply that researchers have espoused single-cause theories of suicide. In all of the articles concerning Pacific suicide cited here, the writers have considered multiple causal factors that influence suicide and self-destructive behavior. However, we are better able to judge the logical structure and adequacy of these theoretical arguments if we extract particular lines of reasoning from their more general contexts.

The suicide phenomenon in Micronesia and Western Samoa is very nearly unique in cross-cultural comparison, owing to the extremely high incidence among adolescent men, the enormous disproportion of male suicides over female suicides, the rapid onset of high suicide rates that occurred in the 1970s, and the tight cultural patterning in method and motive and other characteristics of suicide acts and typical actors. Epidemiological characteristics and social patterns of Pacific suicides and relevant cultural particulars of Micronesian and Samoan society have been described in detail in a number of published articles, but for the sake of brevity and focus they will be reviewed here only as they bear on particular theoretical arguments.

Family Change, Version 1:
Loss of Traditional Family Functions

The relationship between family change and youth suicide in Micronesia was first suggested by Hezel (1976) in an important early paper, which was also the first article to call attention to increasingly high rates of suicide among Micronesian adolescents. Hezel summarized

information from twenty-three cases of suicide that had occurred throughout Micronesia between mid-1975 and mid-1976. Despite the small sample of cases, and the rather haphazard case-finding method (students and staff at Xavier High School compiled a list of suicide cases known to them, which was checked and corrected by informants outside the school), the suicides revealed some clear patterns. Male suicides predominated over female by a ratio of 10.5 to 1, and nearly 80 percent of the suicides were among young people, aged 16-26. Outer-island communities were not experiencing suicides at anywhere near the rate found in the communities closer to the urban centers and port towns. Chuuk had "the unenviable title of the suicide capital of Micronesia" (Hezel 1976:9). And virtually all the suicides "were precipitated by an argument or misunderstanding between the victim and someone very close to him: in some cases his wife or girlfriend, occasionally his friends or drinking companions, but more often members of his own family" (Hezel 1976:11). Although the data on Micronesian suicides have expanded from Hezel's initial sample of twenty-three in 1976 to over seven hundred in 1990, the very general patterns revealed in the initial sample have proven remarkably representative of the larger population of suicide cases (Rubinstein n.d.).[2]

Hezel suggested that the increase in suicides was a result of the loss of community cohesiveness, especially at the level of the family. His reasoning was well founded upon sociological theories of suicide first proposed in 1897 by Durkheim, who maintained that national rates of suicide are correlated with the strength and stability of social bonds linking individuals to their families and communities. In particular, Durkheim proposed one type, "egoistic suicide," that results when social integration weakens and individuals are under less control by society (1951: 208-216).

Hezel hypothesized that "over the years the Micronesian family has gradually relinquished to other agencies many of the roles that it once exercised on behalf of its members," such as providing education, enforcing community rules, punishing violators of these rules, caring for the ill, and offering recreation and entertainment (1976: 12). As a consequence, he suggested, families have become largely impotent, lacking the necessary cohesiveness to give love and affective support to the young and to exercise effective control over them. The weakening of the mutual love and respect that bonds youth to their families and communities results in their lowered self-esteem, anger at those who refuse to accept them, shame at their own feelings of worthlessness, and profound self-pity--all of which predispose them to suicide (Hezel 1976: 12-13).

Family Change, Version 2:
Structural Change towards the Nuclear Family

Since Hezel's initial, tentative explanation of Micronesian suicides in terms of changes in family function, he has substantially revised and extended his argument in two important regards. First, he modified his position that Micronesian families have suffered a global loss of traditional functions due to new governmental agencies, and instead he focused on a more specific aspect of family change: a shift from lineage structure to nuclear household structure. Indeed, the current theoretical formulation reverses the argument of the earlier one: families have not *lost* their traditional roles, but rather have *gained* new functions and responsibilities. Second, Hezel inferred that the catalyst for this structural shift "seems to have been the increasing availability of cash income to the father of the family" (1987:289). This line of reasoning is elaborated in two articles (Hezel 1987, 1989a), and incorporated into other writing (Hezel 1989b).

Starting with an analysis of social structural change and suicide in Chuuk, Hezel expanded his scope to include Palau, Yap, Pohnpei, and the Marshall Islands (1987, 1989a). He argued that there is an underlying general similarity in family organization and in the structure of parental authority over children within these five Micronesian societies, which he described as one of "delicate balances" between the maternal and paternal kin (Hezel 1989a:59). Anthropologists have used the term "complementary filiation" or "bilaterality" in describing this feature of kinship systems, in which there are balanced and complementary functions between the male and female lines (Fortes 1953; Ritchie and Ritchie 1989:104-105). In Chuuk, for example, a matrilineal society in which men traditionally resided and worked on their wife's land after marriage, the authority of a man over his sister's children acted as a counterweight to the authority of the sister's husband, that is, the children's father. The roles and authority of the maternal uncle and father were complementary (Hezel 1989a:60). This produced a system in which authority over children and adolescents was shared between two groups of kin, those of the mother and those of the father.[3]

In practice, this system provided a good deal of flexibility in parent-child relations. On the child's side the flexibility allowed multiple kin options and supports for children. As Hezel infers, "If a young man experienced what he felt was harsh treatment at the hand of one [individual], he could usually find another to plead his cause" (1989a60). The distribution of supervisory control over children tended to prevent

the abuse of authority by providing children with other kin as advocates to mediate the conflict or to offer temporary refuge. On the parent's side the system provided the advantage of multiple "fathers" and "mothers" to assume the responsibility for nurturing and disciplining the children. The full responsibility for the children did not fall upon the parents alone.

As Hezel points out, the principal rationale for this lineage system was not to control children but to control land resources. Land in Micronesian societies was traditionally the basic means of production. Social structure and family organization were grounded in the corporate ownership of land by a group of people (generally a lineage or clan), their residence on that land, and their transmission of land rights through the male or female lines. As the monetization of the Micronesian economy proceeded in the 1960s and 1970s, the primary household resource increasingly became cash rather than land. Money, especially in the form of income from salaried jobs--the main source of household capital in Micronesia--tended to weaken the land-based social system of lineages and clans.

Hezel indicates how the traditional family system in Micronesia has changed during the past two or three decades. As lineages lost their importance, the role of the lineage head declined, both in supervising food production and distribution as well as in exercising authority over adolescents. "Consequently, the father of the family has assumed the principal responsibility for feeding his own household . . . [and] has assumed final authority over his own children" (Hezel 1989a:61). According to Hezel, parents now find themselves burdened with new and unfamiliar responsibilities, which traditionally had been shared with the wife's lineage, such as disciplining their children, overseeing their children's schooling, and advising on their children's choice of companions and marriage partners. The most onerous of these new responsibilities for parents is managing their postadolescent sons. Hezel infers that the concentration of familial authority has created an unprecedented potential for serious conflict in the family circle, and that the adolescent suicides result from this conflict (1987:289-290; 1989a:67).

Hezel's argument, reduced to its logical skeleton, takes the form of the following four-step causal sequence:

(1) monetization → (2) nuclearization of family structure → (3) increased authority of parents over children → (4) parent-adolescent conflict → adolescent male suicide.

Although this diagram risks oversimplifying an explanatory model of considerable complexity, it facilitates a critical examination of each causal link in the line of reasoning.

We can begin with the immediate antecedent of suicide in this model: term (4), parent-adolescent conflict. Overall, the data strongly support the conclusion that the etiology of Micronesian suicides lies in intergenerational conflict between adolescents and their parents. This link is substantiated in a number of articles summarizing the reasons attributed to suicides by friends, family members, and suicide attempters themselves (e.g., Hezel 1984a; Rubinstein 1985). Typically, the scenario preceding suicide in Micronesia is a quarrel between a young man and his parents. The young man feels that his parents have failed in their love and support of him, usually because they have refused a request-- often for something as minor as a few dollars or a late-night plate of food--or because they are making unjustly harsh demands upon him and disciplining him unfairly. His suicide is an extreme expression of his anger and sense of acute rejection by his parents. This situation characterizes about 52 percent of the 620 Micronesian suicides between 1960 and 1989. Any explanatory model of Micronesian suicides must account for these parent-adolescent conflicts as the triggering events for suicide. The strength of the "family structural change" model under review is its attempt to locate these typical situations of intergenerational conflict in a recent historical process of social structural change that gives these events their psychological significance.

Although the majority of Micronesian suicides follow the culturally patterned scenario of parent-adolescent conflict described above, there are significant variations in the etiology of suicide from one cultural area to another in Micronesia. Parent-adolescent conflict is the predominant triggering event for suicide in Chuuk (50 percent of the cases) and Pohnpei (59 percent), but less so among Palauans (28 percent) and Marshallese (39 percent). In the Marshall Islands, scenarios of sexual jealousy or anger between spouses or lovers are the predominant occasions for suicide (42 percent). The "family structural change" model is more adequate as an explanation of the recent onset of intergenerational conflict in Micronesian families than it is in explaining an increase in gender conflict. Consequently the model has more value for understanding the increase in suicides in the central Caroline Islands than in the eastern and western peripheries of Micronesia.

We can consider terms (2) and (3) together: the nuclearization of family structure leading to an increased or concentrated authority of parents over children. Both of these terms are highly abstracted descrip-

tions of a complex shift in Micronesian family structure and function. "Nuclearization of family structure" implies a wide set of changes in behaviors, cultural norms, and values. This includes changes in the ownership of and usufruct rights to resources such as land and buildings, the distribution of goods such as food and cash, the circulation of children through adoption and fosterage, the lateral extent of kinship rights and obligations, and the corresponding attitudes and beliefs regarding kinship relations. From the earliest years of the American period in Micronesia, anthropologists have commented generally on the shift from a "cooperative" or "collective" orientation to a more "individualistic" society (e.g., Fischer 1950:17). There are also some observations of the narrowing of food redistributive networks under the impact of monetization (e.g., Dahlquist 1972:241-246). Although the "nuclearization" hypothesis seems plausible, however, the data are still anecdotal and incomplete, and there has not yet been a systematic study showing the extent to which traditional lineage and clan organization have been replaced by a nuclear family organization in Micronesia.[4]

Likewise, systematic ethnographic data are lacking on the extent to which authority over children has become concentrated increasingly in the hands of the parents, rather than being shared more diffusely among the senior individuals of the mother's as well as the father's lineage. Hezel(1989a) has summarized some of the ethnographic data that bears on parental authority. Complicating the picture of parental authority are cultural differences from one area to another in Micronesia and shifts in authority over the course of life-span stages within a single culture (Hezel 1989a:59-61).

Generally, however, the ethnographic literature points to the central role of the parents rather than the lineage head as authority figures over children, and the primary claim of the father even in so thoroughly matrilineal and matrilocal an area as Chuuk (Fischer 1950:35; Gladwin and Sarason 1953:52, 73). The prerogative of the mother's brother in preventing the father's mistreatment of his children is also well documented (e.g., Gladwin and Sarason 1953:86). But the ethnographic record is not very helpful in determining whether "complementary" kinship figures functioned mainly in times of emergency--such as when a parent died or became abusive-- or whether these people also had important everyday roles and responsibilities in supporting children and adolescents.

If the mother's brother and other extraparental figures wielded authority mainly in times of emergency--as a sort of "safety net" when parents failed or died--then their diminished importance should not be

a reason for suicide. Very few, if any, of the suicides are occasioned by a family crisis or the death of a parent. Typically the situations leading to suicide, as described briefly above, are rather minor rejections and disappointments experienced by adolescents.

Primary authority over children and adolescents generally in Micronesia is vested in the head of the household in which the child or adolescent resides (e.g., Rubinstein 1979:245). Thus a more detailed understanding of changes in family structure and residence patterns would shed considerable light on the shifts in the dynamics and distribution of authority over children. For this reason, terms (2) and (3) in the explanatory model are closely linked. It is fair to say that the ethnographic data are inadequate to verify these inferred changes, and the terms remain as conjectural links in a causal chain leading to suicide.

From a psychological standpoint, this explanatory model appears focused more upon the parents, who have assumed "new and awesome responsibilities" (Hezel 1989a:67), than upon the male adolescents, who are at the greatest risk for suicide. One might ask, therefore, whether today's generation of the parents of adolescents--and especially the fathers--are displaying symptoms of stress analogous to their sons' epidemic of suicides. If the adolescent suicides are truly a result of increased expectations and demands upon the parents, leading to sharply increased conflicts between the generations, one would expect this conflict to take some toll upon the parents as well as the adolescent children.

Finally, we can consider term (1): the monetization of the Micronesian economy. Despite some influx of trade goods in the nineteenth century, Micronesian families remained nearly entirely self-sufficient until shortly after World War I, relying upon their own subsistence gardening and fishing (Hezel 1984b). Per capita income did not begin to increase significantly until 1950. Between 1950 and 1977 real per capita income quadrupled in Micronesia, with the most rapid increase occurring in the mid-1960s (Hezel 1989a:65). This point is well substantiated. However, Hezel's inference that Micronesian social structure changed in tandem with the rise of monetization is debatable, and he has probably underestimated the extent of change in lineage and clan functions that ensued well before the postwar onset of monetization. Family structures and lineage structures serve functions other than economic, and economic changes are not necessarily in lock-step with social structural changes.

We need to distinguish two levels of social structure, one being the domestic household level or residential-commensal group (those people who regularly live and eat together) and the other, at a more inclusive

level, the lineage or village. At the beginning of the postwar period, domestic households evidently still functioned in a largely traditional manner, and "traditional family structure remained very much intact" (Hezel 1989a:64). On the other hand, the lineages and clans had already lost significant aspects of their corporate functions and political integration. The social disruption caused by the Japanese occupation and wartime conscription of male labor in Micronesia, coupled with depopulation and other cultural changes, led to the erosion of clan and lineage functions well before household economies experienced significant monetization. By the end of World War II much of the material cultural embodiments of the clans and villages--especially the large meetinghouses traditionally maintained by descent groups or villages in Palau, Yap, and Chuuk--had fallen into disrepair and had been abandoned (Barnett 1949:164-166; Lingenfelter 1975:185-186; Fischer and Fischer 1957:101-102). This loss is relevant to an understanding of adolescent male suicide, since these meetinghouses were a social focus of senior male activities and of adolescent male residence and socialization. In other island communities, such as Ulithi (Lessa 1964), the accumulation of substantial social changes at the lineage and village level has been documented well before there was significant monetization of household economies.

What can we conclude about the explanatory model under review? The typical situational precursors of suicide in Micronesia clearly require an explanation grounded in family sociology. The model of family structural change at hand is sociologically plausible and historically specific. It has an appealing logical-causal form that links macroeconomic changes to family structural changes, to authority-dependency conflicts between parents and adolescent children, and finally to suicidal outcomes. The analysis may also be useful for understanding suicides in Western Samoa and other Pacific societies (Hezel 1989a:70). However, the model is based on several assumptions for which the evidence is ambiguous or absent, especially the impact of monetization on family structure and the change in parental authority over adolescents. The model deals with family structural change on too general a level to explain why young men in particular should be at such greater risk for suicide than women or older men. On the other hand, its focus on intergenerational conflict in the family is too specific to explain other types of suicide in Micronesia, most notably the suicides committed (predominantly by Marshallese men) out of sexual jealousy and anger towards spouses and lovers.

Blocked Opportunity

A quite different explanation of suicide has been proposed in regard to Western Samoa (Macpherson 1984; Macpherson and Macpherson 1985, 1987). If valid, this explanation may be usefully applied towards understanding Micronesian suicides. Numerous parallels have been shown in the suicides in these two areas, such as the emotional underpinnings of anger and shame and the dynamics of family conflict resolution (White 1985), the recent rates of increase (Hezel 1989a:46), and the epidemic focus among young males (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987: 305-306).

The Macphersons distinguish two different types of suicide in Western Samoa, which they label "altruistic" and "anomic" following Durkheim's (1951) proposed ideal types. "Altruistic suicides are committed by individuals discovered . . . in violation of certain moral norms, or legal proscriptions" (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:311). According to this argument, public shame over one's misconduct and distress over its effect upon one's kin group lead the individual to commit suicide. Intense shame can become intolerable in Samoa: the emotion acts as a powerful social sanction owing to the authoritarian nature of the society, the marked dependence of individuals upon their kin group or *aiga,* and the strength of external controls on individual behavior, "Death is better than shame," as one Samoan proverb states (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:311). In other Polynesian societies, such as Tikopia (Firth 1967), shame also appears to be the predominant emotional precursor to suicide. "Altruistic" suicides described in Samoa appear quite similar to "shame suicides" described in Micronesia (Hezel 1984a:202-203). In both societies, they appear to typify a traditional form of suicide, and may account for a residual rate (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:311).

"Anomic" suicide--the second type proposed by the Macphersons-- has evidently become increasingly dominant, and has taken place "against a background of change which has limited opportunities" for upward mobility and out-migration available to Samoan adolescents (1987:317). Among a number of factors, the authors first discuss demographic ones: population density and dependency ratio. Increased population density creates greater pressure on land resources, which influences the "life chances" of youth, especially in agricultural areas. However, the population density factor is complicated by significant regional variations in Western Samoa: while national population density increased in the 1970s, some rural villages actually experienced pop-

ulation decreases, as residents left the region for more urban areas. Population density alone is not a very useful indicator of the changing situation of youth (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:318).

The dependency ratio measures the burden on economically productive members of society, by relating the number of dependents (those too young or too old to work) to the number of working-age individuals. Theoretically this factor should affect the situation of Samoan youth, who play an important role in food production and village agricultural labor. An increasing dependency ratio in a nongrowth economy leads to greater pressure on the economically active, and consequently to a lower standard of living. However, dependency ratio is also complicated by regional and subregional variations, by the effect of out-migration, and by certain technical demographic assumptions about age at marriage and age at which people enter and leave the productive labor pool. Calculations of the dependency ratio normally include all individuals aged 15-64 as potentially economically productive, and very different ratios can be calculated when narrower age brackets are used, These factors limit the usefulness of the dependency ratio as an indication of the situation of youth. As the Macphersons point out, people's perception of demographic facts may be more significant than the facts themselves (1987:320). Also, the national dependency ratio in Western Samoa actually declined in the 1970s, which suggests an improvement in the situation of the economically active (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:318).

Social factors--education and the media--also contribute to suicide in Western Samoa, according to the blocked-opportunity model. Both have the effect of raising the aspirations and expectations of youth. During the 1970s in Western Samoa the number of students receiving secondary education more than doubled, and those receiving tertiary education more than tripled, while the population increased by only 6.6 percent (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:320). Radios, newspapers, television sets, cinema houses, and mobile cinemas all increased dramatically in the 1970s. Both education and the media have introduced and glamorized images of alternative life-styles, and promoted higher expectations for wage employment to support these life-styles.

The Macphersons argue that aspirations of young Samoans are being raised by these social factors while at the same time their opportunities are being eroded. The usual routes to power and privileged life-style in Samoa have been to become a chief, a pastor, a wage earner or entrepreneur, or to emigrate. Because the number of chiefly *(matai)* titles is more or less fixed and current titleholders enjoy a steadily increasing life

expectancy, the road to chiefly power for young people is long and uncertain. Likewise, pastors make up a small, privileged group; successful completion of theological college is not a goal that many young people can realistically achieve. Wage employment and entrepreneurial activity are also becoming more difficult to attain; the slow growth of the Western Samoan economy is not keeping pace with the growing numbers of school-leavers and the surplus of educated labor has depressed the wage structure (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987: 322-323).

During the 1960s and 1970s the frequency of travel to New Zealand and American Samoa led Western Samoan youth to consider out-migration as a rite of passage, part of the anticipated life cycle. Opportunities rapidly declined, however, as the New Zealand economy slowed and immigration barriers were raised against Western Samoans entering Australia, American Samoa, and the United States. The Macphersons note that "it is significant that the decline coincides with the increases in the rate of suicide among those who under normal circumstances might have been offered opportunities to live and work outside of Western Samoa" (1987: 323).

Frustrated by the limited opportunities for upward mobility and for achieving culturally desirable goals, youth respond in a culturally characteristic manner, a retreatist anger known as *musu* in Samoan. The state of *musu* is marked by a withdrawn and sullen behavior, a stubborn refusal to communicate with others, and an apparent lack of interest in social life. Normally this prompts others to try to restore the relationship. In situations perceived as especially frustrating or anger-provoking, a youth might run away to another village. If the young person's sense of injury is intense, he or she might respond with rage, lashing out and breaking things, or, in extreme situations, the individual may commit suicide during or shortly after the episode of rage (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:323).

The blocked-opportunity model may be seen in its essence as two opposed structural factors causing frustration and anger, which lead to suicide.

(1) increasing aspirations
    (education, media)
(2) decreasing opportunities
    (demographic and economic
    factors, out-migration
    restrictions)
$\left.\right\}$ → (3) frustration,
    anger → suicide

The structural factors proposed in this model apply especially to the situation of youth, and thus the model focuses more specifically on the group at risk for suicide than does the alternative model of family structural change reviewed above. However, the data do not consistently support the conclusion that demographic factors have led to decreased opportunities for youth in Western Samoa. Other Pacific countries have experienced similar combinations of social and demographic phenomena but have not experienced the same rise in youth suicide rates, The Macphersons point out that "these factors do not alone constitute a satisfactory explanation" and that "it is useful to look beyond these factors for those things which seem peculiar to Western Samoan society and might explain the unusually high rate found in Western Samoa" (1987:323).[5]

It is difficult to assess the validity of this explanatory model, because so few descriptions of actual suicide cases in Western Samoa are presented by the authors or published elsewhere. How many suicides fall into the "altruistic" type versus the "anomic" type? Of the six suicide cases presented as brief vignettes in an appendix (Macpherson and Macpherson 1985:67-68), two--a double suicide of two brothers who disputed with their *matai* father over the proceeds of their crop sale--fit the above model. Another case is the suicide of a rejected suitor. The remaining three cases seem to fit more or less closely the pattern of shame suicides. As an explanation of suicide, the blocked-opportunity model does not provide adequate linkage between the macrostructural factors (such as education and migration opportunities) and the situational patterns and particulars of the suicide cases.

Given the many parallels between the youth suicides in Western Samoa and in Micronesia, it may be instructive to assess the blocked-opportunity model against the recent changes in migration opportunities that have occurred in Micronesia. In November 1986 the United States ratified a Compact of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). Citizens of those two Micronesian countries acquired the right to freely enter the United States and its territories. Immediately after the compact was signed, Micronesian migrants, especially young men between the ages of 20 and 40, began taking advantage of the work opportunities in Guam, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast (Hezel and McGrath 1989). Owing to labor shortages and low rates of unemployment in Hawaii and especially Guam, even those Micronesian immigrants without education or skills can readily find jobs in construction, service, and visitor industries. In the three years following the signing of the compact, the

number of FSM citizens on Guam increased nearly tenfold (Rubinstein 1990), and similar increases of RMI citizens on the U.S. west coast occurred (Karen Nero, pers. com., 1990).

The compact thus provided a "natural experiment" to test the blocked-opportunity model. Although other factors are certainly operating to limit economic opportunities for youth at home, the compact radically changed the life chances of those who chose to join the growing communities of Micronesian emigrants in Guam and the United States. Based upon the blocked-opportunity model, one would predict that the suicide rate would have dropped after the compact opened the door for emigration and new economic opportunities. On the contrary, the suicide rate in Micronesia, after leveling or perhaps declining in the early 1980s, began to rise again by the mid-1980s; and this rise has not been slowed perceptibly to date by the opportunities afforded by the compact.

In sum, the blocked-opportunity model may be "useful in explaining a general disaffection . . . which happens to coincide with particular structural changes in Western Samoa" (Macpherson and Macpherson 1987:326), but it has not provided a satisfactory explanation of suicide in the Pacific. The demographic factors are ambiguous and do not correlate well with the suicide rates, the macroeconomic and structural factors are not effectively linked to actual suicide situations, and the model's predictive adequacy fails when applied to the recent Micronesian situation.

Adolescent Socialization: Changes in Structures and Goals

I have described the relationship between youth suicide and recent structural changes in the stage of adolescent socialization in Micronesia in several papers (Rubinstein 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987). The explanation I have offered is based upon a specific conceptual model of Micronesian childhood and socialization, and combines elements from the "family structural change" explanation with a sociological theory of anomie. The explanation addresses particular features of the epidemiology of suicide: the onset of the "epidemic" in the mid-1960s and the shape of the suicide trend that followed, the concentration of suicides among males aged 15-24, the geographic differences in suicide rates, and the family conflicts that typically motivate suicidal actions.

In order to review the "adolescent socialization" explanation of youth suicide, it is necessary first to consider the conceptual model of childhood and socialization upon which my explanation rests. Socialization

may be envisioned as a set of "goals" and "stages." Each society has its own socialization goals, the cultural values and behaviors that are desired and instilled in children. Societies have many ways of communicating these desired goals to children and of pushing children along the stages towards these goals. Formal ceremonies for children, formal instruction and institutions for learning, as well as the continuous informal interactions of children with their parents and caretakers, are all culturally aimed at producing "proper" behavior and attitudes.

Cultural differences among Micronesian societies make it difficult to generalize about socialization goals and stages. There may, however, be broad commonalities in patterns of childrearing and adolescence that underlie the rising suicide rates of the past two decades. Based upon research on socialization in Fais island, I concluded that a central cultural message of Micronesian socialization, which is reiterated in many social contexts, is the importance of developing and maintaining a wide circle of social ties (Rubinstein 1979). Fais parents teach their children that "it is good to have kinsfolk." A primary parental goal of socialization in Fais is to produce children who are highly affiliative, socially sensitive, and group-oriented. Many cultural practices in Micronesia reinforce this message, especially the widespread institution of child adoption and fosterage, residential shifting of children among kin, and the frequent use of multiple caretakers.

Socialization moves the child through several stages of expanding affiliations with wider social groups. Strong attachments to relatives and others outside the circle of the child's biological parents and nuclear family are encouraged (Rubinstein 1978). We can distinguish four general stages in Micronesian socialization. First is a period of infancy, from birth to weaning. In Micronesia this stage traditionally was indulgent and often prolonged, as it is generally throughout Oceania (Gussler 1985:323-324; Ritchie and Ritchie 1979). Second is childhood, from weaning to sexual maturity at the age of fifteen or so. Third is adolescence, from sexual maturity to marriage in the mid-twenties. And fourth is adulthood, the onset of which is marked by marriage and the assumption of childrearing responsibilities.

The model of socialization proposed here as an explanation of adolescent suicide includes a structural tension between child and parent, generated at each stage and resolved at the next stage by incorporating the child into a wider social circle. This structural tension first appears in late infancy, when the child's mother becomes increasingly impatient and inattentive towards the child's demands, and the period of indulgence ends rather abruptly. At this point many other relatives may

become active as the child's primary or supplementary caretakers, such as adoptive or fostering parents, grandparents, and older siblings. Often the child moves into another household. In this way the cultural solution to the strain between mother and child is to involve the child with other caretakers. The goal of socialization here is not to produce a child who is socially independent but rather one who is socially dependent upon a widening circle of kin.

In late childhood, as the child approaches puberty, another structural tension develops. Throughout Micronesia, and especially in the central Carolines, a relationship of avoidance and reserve develops between brothers and sisters at sexual maturity. Likewise, the style of interaction between parents and their sexually mature sons becomes increasingly disengaged. The cultural solution to this structural tension was different for boys and girls. Traditionally, in most Micronesian societies boys moved out of their domestic household and took up residence in bachelor clubhouses, lineage-owned meetinghouses, or with other relatives, such as grandparents or parents' siblings in whose households the boys had no classificatory sisters. Girls, on the other hand, typically remained in their own households and maintained closer domestic relations with their parents than did their adolescent brothers. Boys went through an adolescent period characterized by more social and economic insecurity than that of their sisters (Gladwin and Sarason 1953). While the young women's economic roles centered around household chores--mainly gathering and preparing food and caring for children-- the young men's roles were tied more to lineage-level labor activities, including planting and maintaining the lineage-owned gardens, harvesting food and catching fish, and building and repairing houses and canoes and other lineage property. At marriage, young men became reincorporated into a domestic household and regained a measure of domestic security and residential stability.

This model of socialization proposes that traditional Micronesian societies had ways of compensating and alleviating the structural tensions that were experienced in infancy, childhood, and adolescence. The model also implies that such compensatory mechanisms were especially important during the stage of adolescence for males. Lineage-level and wider kinship ties provided young men with residential options, social supports, and productive roles to compensate for the semidetachment from their own domestic families.

World War II marked a critical period of change for adolescent socialization in Micronesia. The disruption of island communities during the late prewar years and the wartime period had already brought

about the abandonment and destruction of most of the men's clubhouses and lineage meetinghouses in Palau, Yap, and Chuuk, and the weakening of other village-level and lineage-level functions. Consequently, there was a loss of cultural supports for male adolescent socialization in Micronesia, and the various and multiple options for young men to reside away from their domestic household narrowed considerably. After 1960, rapid increases in financial aid to Micronesia accelerated the growth of a wage economy. As described earlier in this article, the monetization of the Micronesian economy further altered lineage structure and caused a decline in subsistence activities. The productive role of young men in lineage-based subsistence activities became much less important to the village economy.

Children born after 1950 in Micronesia were thus the first generation to enter the stage of adolescence at a time when significant erosion had occurred in the cultural activities and social structures that traditionally gave support to adolescent socialization, especially for the young men. This first postwar generation reached sexual maturity and entered adolescence around the mid-1960s, at the same time that the youth suicide rates in Micronesia began to increase. During the next fifteen years, through the late 1970s, the suicide rates surged, as a swelling number of children born after the war moved into the stage of adolescence.

I earlier attributed this increase in suicide rates to the loss of traditional socialization supports for male adolescents (Rubinstein 1983, 1985). With disappearing opportunities for young men to gain independence from their parents and take a productive role in wider lineage activities, postwar youth remained dependent upon their parents to an unprecedented degree. The more traditional, prewar generation of parents, who grew up in a very different cultural environment, had quite different expectations for their adolescent sons. There was no cultural "script" in postwar Micronesia for continuing, close relations and communication between parents and their adolescent sons. Parents experienced a growing dissatisfaction over the continuing dependency of their late-adolescent sons. This tension between father and son, sharpened by the cultural differences between the two generations, found outlets in innumerable small incidents of conflict, such as a young man demanding favors of food and money from his parents, or parents demanding more obedience and housework from their son. As described above, these are the minor domestic conflicts that typically result in young men's acts of suicide.

In its basic logical form the adolescent socialization explanation appears as a four-step causal sequence:

(1) political/economic change (including monetization) → (2) weakening of lineage- and village-level organization → (3) loss of socialization supports for male adolescents → (4) authority-dependency conflicts between parents and late-adolescent sons → adolescent male suicides.

This explanation of youth suicide is generally similar to Hezel's family change explanation described above. Both are concerned with the same overall structural changes in Micronesian society, but focus on different organizational levels. While Hezel's explanation emphasizes the growing burden of responsibility on the nuclear family and the increasing authority of the father and parents, my own explanation features the diminishing lineage- and village-level supports for young men and the lengthening of adolescent dependency. The adolescent socialization explanation deals with social structural changes that specifically affect young men, during the stage from sexual maturity to marriage. The high suicide rate among young men aged 15-24 accords well with an explanation based on changes in adolescent male socialization. As discussed above, a weakness of the family change explanation is that it does not account for the concentration of suicide among young men rather than women or older men.

The initial increase in Micronesian suicide rates in the mid-1960s, and the accelerating rates over the next fifteen years, also conform to an explanation based upon the first postwar cohort of children entering an adolescent stage of increased suicide risk in their mid-teens. On the basis of the adolescent socialization model, I predicted that the suicide rates would level off and begin to decline in the early 1980s, as the first postwar generation entered adulthood (Rubinstein 1981:81). I also suggested that the suicide epidemic was a one-generation cohort effect of adolescent socialization change and the sharp intergenerational conflicts that resulted, and reasoned that the second postwar generation of children would experience less conflict with their parents than those parents as adolescents had encountered with their own, prewar generation of parents. Indeed, youth suicide rates in Micronesia peaked in the early 1980s and then fell off significantly, appearing to confirm my "cohort effect" predictions (Rubinstein 1985:107). By the mid-1980s, however, youth suicide rates in Micronesia again moved sharply upward, and by 1990 the rates reached new highs (see Figure 1). It has become apparent that the rising suicide rates among young Micronesian men is more than a single-generation transitional phase between two different styles of male adolescent socialization. Although there may be

annual rates
per 100,000

FIGURE 1. **Micronesian Suicide Rates, Males Aged 15–24 (N = 343).**

cohort effects underlying the unusual trends in Micronesian suicide rates since 1960, these effects are more complex and recurring than I originally predicted.

Another trend that requires explanation is the geographic distribution of suicide rates. In both Micronesia (Rubinstein 1987:136-137) and Western Samoa (Oliver 1985:76), suicide rates are highest in the peri-urban communities outside the town centers. The most urbanized town areas have somewhat lower rates of suicide, while the most rural areas and outer-island communities have the lowest rates. Suicides in Fiji appear to follow a similar geographic distribution; rates in the urbanized Viti Levu area are lower than rates in Vanua Levu, a more rural area (Deoki 1987:17). Thus suicide rates do not correlate in a linear way with urbanization and monetization of the economy. The highest rates are found in geographic areas of intermediate urban and economic development.

It is difficult to account for the geographic distribution of suicide rates on the basis of the family change explanation, unless one can show that the nuclearization of family structure is compensated for by alternative kinship ties that develop in the urban areas. Hezel has alluded to the geographic trends in suicide rates and has suggested that suicide is

linked to the *transition* to modernization rather than the end point of modernization in Micronesia (1989a54). However, a consideration of changes in adolescent socialization seems to provide a better explanation of the geographic trends in suicide rates than an emphasis on family structure. The development of an urban subculture for male youth--centering around pool halls, basketball courts, and drinking circles--has replaced some of the former functions of men's clubs, village gardening activities, and lineage houses, and has provided young men with specific places and pursuits with which they can identify. The reason that urban youth are at lower risk of suicide may lie in the new forms of adolescent socialization and social relations developing in urban areas.

Although an explanation for suicide based on the loss of traditional supports for male adolescent socialization corresponds more closely to the epidemiology of the phenomenon than an explanation based on the nuclearization of the family, both explanations suffer from a lack of good ethnographic supporting data. Earlier descriptions of Micronesian societies do not provide a clear picture of the sense of security and social identity that young men may have derived from their incorporation into men's house activities and lineage subsistence routines. My explanation is grounded largely on comparative observations of adolescence in two societies: Fais and Uman islands. Although these two sites typify the contrast between "traditional" and "peri-urban" communities, they are also representative of different cultural traditions--Yap Outer Islands and Chuuk Lagoon--which complicates the comparison.

The adolescent socialization explanation, like the family change explanation, fits the data from the central areas of Micronesia--Kosrae, Pohnpei, Chuuk, and to some extent Yap--better than from the peripheral areas, Palau and the Marshall Islands. In particular, the predominant pattern of Marshallese suicides triggered by conflicts with spouses and lovers is difficult to explain according to proposed changes in adolescent socialization. The Palau suicide situation is also unique in several respects that run counter to the explanatory models discussed here. Suicide rates in Palau have been moderately high and surprisingly stable since 1960, and do not follow the epidemic-like increase that other areas of Micronesia and Western Samoa experienced. The median age of Palauan suicides is significantly higher than elsewhere in Micronesia, and there is a much stronger correlation between mental illness and suicide than among other Micronesian cultural groups. Conflicts with parents in Palau are only slightly more frequent as occasioning events for suicide than conflicts with spouse or lover. By comparison with Chuuk,

Pohnpei, and the Marshall Islands, an unusual number of suicides in Palau are occasioned by conflicts with nonfamily members. These features confound attempts to fit the Palau suicide situation into explanatory models based on changes in family sociology or adolescent socialization.

Conclusion

The three explanatory models reviewed here are not the only ones that have been proposed for understanding the high rates of youth suicide in Micronesia and Samoa, but they have received a good deal more elaboration as causal factors than others that have been suggested. Writers concerned mostly with other subjects have proposed a variety of influences associated with suicides in Micronesia and Samoa, such as the increase in alcohol use among young men (Marshall 1990:91), the rapid increase in population (Connell 1991), changes in early child training (Murphy, cited in Hezel 1984a:197), or general aspects of cultural change and modernization.

Obviously, no theoretical framework can provide an explanation for all behaviors that fall under the category of "suicide," even within a single small and fairly homogeneous society such as the Micronesian islands considered in this article. Also, any particular act of suicide is the result of a complex social and psychological calculus of causes. The closer one looks at a single case, the more one becomes overwhelmed by the unique details of personal life history, At the level of the individual, suicide may appear as an unfathomable act. We need not be surprised, then, that a young social worker advises an audience against searching for general reasons for suicide. At the broader level of a social group, however, there are discernible patterns in suicidal behavior; this point was Durkheim's lasting contribution.

Suicides in central Micronesia and Western Samoa show a number of rather tightly patterned characteristics that appear quite distinctive. Researchers have sought to link these patterns to particular historical circumstances, social structures, and cultural values. Of the three models reviewed here, the more adequate are those that focus on changes in family structure from lineage to nuclear household and the loss of cultural supports for adolescent socialization, rather than on macroeconomic changes and opportunities for youth to gain high-status positions and international migration.

The search for deeper understanding of the tragic loss of young lives

in Micronesia and Samoa has focused attention on family structure and the traditional role and socialization of youth in these societies. Commonalities and differences in suicide patterns from one island society to another have stimulated closer attention to cultural comparisons among different social structures, and especially to differences in intergenerational and male-female conflicts and relations. Intensive research on the epidemiology of suicide has led to a wider appreciation of the social patterning of other mental health pathologies (Hezel 1989b) and to critical evaluations of priorities for mental health services in Micronesia (Rubinstein 1984). Because suicide is the leading cause of death for young men aged 15-29 in parts of Micronesia and Samoa, there is a continuing need for prevention efforts that are based upon a well-informed analysis of the social and cultural dynamics of this problem.

NOTES

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2. The data cited in this article were collected by Hezel and Rubinstein, and are maintained at the Micronesian Seminar in Chuuk and the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam.

3. My use of the past tense in this description of traditional Micronesian social organization is not meant to imply that all or even most aspects of this system have disappeared.

4. A three-year study (1990-1992) is currently under way, designed to describe the structure and functions of the Micronesian family c. 1950 and to chronicle the transformations that the family has undergone between then and now. The project is under the direction of Francis Hezel, with funding from a German Catholic organization. Three field sites are involved: Palau, Chuuk Lagoon, and Pohnpei. This is the first time that a multisite research project has been conducted in Micronesia in which there is a similar theoretical approach, topical focus, and methodology, and in which the fieldworkers are linked by common supervision and training.

5. It should be noted here that I am focusing on the logical structure of the blocked-opportunity model alone, and not trying to evaluate the full explanation presented by the Macphersons, which is considerably more nuanced and inclusive than the blocked-opportunity model. I am grateful to anonymous reviewers for pointing out that I appear to caricature the Macphersons' model here. I emphasize that my purpose in this article is not to evaluate various authors' writing, but to extract explanatory arguments from those writings and critique the logical structure of those explanations.

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THE EMERGENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IN TONGA

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During the late 1980s the people of Tonga became more aware of the process of politics and more open to suggestions of constitutional change. One of the stimulants of this process has been the emergence of members of parliament who have publicly criticized the government and used the language of democracy and justice to expound their views.

Background

Although there are new and revolutionary features about recent events, it would be wrong to assume that the challenge to authority and demand for change is without precedent; the apparent stability of Tongan politics is not something inherited from the distant past but merely the projection and amplification of an image that is historically shallow. This image of stability, peace, and unity was the achievement of Queen Salote during her forty-seven-year-long reign, 1918 to 1965, and it was only during the second half of her reign that the reality was faithful to the image.

Salote conducted two parallel systems of government: the formal, parliamentary system and an extra-parliamentary one. Parliament was marginalized by her, its management left to her consort while she built her own personal following by dealing directly with the people and dispensing patronage in traditional ways and through the church (Wood Ellem 1981).

Unlike other Pacific nations whose constitutions have been framed in the atmosphere of decolonization since 1960, Tonga's constitution was

granted by King Tupou I in 1875. Although amended from time to time
since, it retains the essential character of a constitutional monarchy.
Sometimes loosely described as a "Westminster" system, Tonga's form of
government is in fact based on models that predate the modern West-
minster style. The 1875 constitution was based on the Hawaiian consti-
tution of 1852, which in turn was based largely on the American consti-
tution. Tongan political practice is accordingly more like that of
eighteenth-century England than like either modern Britain or the
United States. There are no political parties and no official distinction
between "government" and "loyal opposition." Cabinet ministers are
appointed directly by the king from outside parliament, and become
members of parliament on appointment as ministers. There is thus no
requirement, either formal or informal, that the government should
have the confidence of parliament, and motions of no-confidence do not
occur. Parliament can, however, impeach a minister for maladministra-
tion or illegality. This is virtually the only way in which displeasure
with the government can be shown, short of defeating all legislation. In
practice, no motion of impeachment has ever succeeded, although min-
isters have evaded impeachment by resignation.

The legislature (called the Legislative Assembly) is a single house
made up of three parts: the ministers and governors appointed by the
king (now numbering twelve), nine representatives of the hereditary
nobles (elected by the nobles),[1] and nine representatives of the people,
elected on a universal franchise.[2] Under the original constitution, there
were four ministers, twenty nobles (all at that time), and twenty peo-
ple's representatives. Subsequently, the number of nobles was increased
to thirty, and the number of people's representatives was increased to
match them. In 1915, nobles and people were reduced to seven repre-
sentatives each. With modern economic development and a correspond-
ing expansion in the functions of government, the number of ministers
has increased to twelve.[3] The enlarged representation of nobles and
people (nine each) took effect at the 1984 election.

Since the time of Tupou I, the role of the legislature has usually been
regarded as being to endorse the actions of the government (that is, the
executive). The ministers, governors, and king together constitute the
Privy Council, which meets in the same regular fashion that the cabinet
does in parliamentary democracies. For all practical purposes, the Privy
Council is the government: its decisions become ordinances with the
force of law until they are confirmed or abrogated by the Legislative
Assembly. Any measure passing the Legislative Assembly has to be
approved by the king before it becomes law. The king therefore has

enormous power to initiate legislation and to veto proposals initiated elsewhere. Indeed, initiatives of the Legislative Assembly itself take the form of suggestions rather than bills, and the Privy Council decides whether they should be taken up to become law. There is no constitutional impediment to the Legislative Assembly initiating law or policy, but it is contrary to long-standing tradition. In 1984, a law was passed specifically enabling private member's bills to be introduced. Constitutional amendments are made in the same way as laws, except that they have to be passed in two consecutive sessions of the Legislative Assembly before being sent for royal approval.

Until 1988, the Privy Council was also the court of appeal; in that year, to avoid the dilemma presented by litigation in which the government was a respondent, a separate court of appeal was established.

A principal distinction between politics in Tonga and politics among its neighbors is that since power is still concentrated so much in the hands of the king, elections have not been issue-based until recently, Electors and their representatives have had little opportunity to influence government decisions--indeed, they have scarcely been able to reject or amend government measures. Members of parliament have not always been quiescent, but they have always been aware of their lack of real power, especially since the reduction of their numbers in 1915.

Tupou IV and Pressures for Change

When Tupou IV became king in 1965, he had the enormous advantage of the inheritance of Queen Sālote's legacy of peace, stability, and prestige; he also had the advantage of nearly twenty-three years of ministerial experience, the last sixteen as prime minister. But Tupou IV brought with him to the throne the seeds of political instability inasmuch as he was a radical modernizer, more comparable with Tupou I than with the conservative Queen Salote. Sālote believed modernization and progress should be subservient to the continued vitality of Tongan tradition. In practice, this meant that she wanted improved standards of living-- better health, better nutrition, and better elementary education-- within a conservative social, cultural, and political framework. Tupou IV, probably the driving force behind the many developmental initiatives of the last half of Salote's reign, has been dedicated to material progress and rising prosperity as the basis for improved living standards for a rapidly increasing population. His plans have implied an image of Tonga modeled on Western styles of life and consumption patterns. Implicit in this ambition has been a preference for, or at least a toler-

ance of, consequential social changes, which would necessarily bring political changes in their train.

It seems scarcely possible that the king, with his thorough education in modern history among other subjects, would not have understood, from the beginning of his political life, that increased personal prosperity and increased personal educational opportunity would be connected with a more individualistic ethos, as had proven to be the case elsewhere. It is possible that he positively favored such change together with his preference in early life for democratic reform. He is most likely to have been the author of the extension of the franchise to women in 1951.[4] In 1975, he was reported to favor increasing the size of the Legislative Assembly (*Tonga Chronicle,* June 1975), six years before it was actually approved by parliament (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* September 1981). Parliamentary sessions have also lasted longer during the reign of Tupou IV, usually five months as against two or three under his predecessor. A further suggestion of the king's political liberalism is in the contrast between his speeches on the opening and closing of the Legislative Assembly each year and those of his predecessor: they are lengthy, detailed reports on the work of government and on his plans for future development and are published in the government newspaper, the *Tonga Chronicle,* in both English and Tongan. Queen Salote's speeches on the same occasions were merely formulistic exhortations to duty and loyalty.

The king's radicalism has, of course, flowed with the tide of history: improved international communications might be thought to have inevitably brought many of the changes attributed to his policies. On the contrary, Tongan isolation could easily have been maintained by a stubborn and authoritarian regime; modernization has had to be assiduously promoted by the king, who has striven more than any other individual to break down Tonga's isolation and open it to foreign influences.[5]

These foreign influences are undoubtedly connected with the political unrest of the 1980s, but unrest was inevitable in any case. Radical modernization was the best option in a period when Tonga's population was rapidly approaching the limit that its subsistence economy could support. From 55,000 in 1956, the population increased to 76,000 by 1966 and was expected (in 1966) to reach 102,000 by 1976 (Tonga 1965: 10). This rapid growth, a projected doubling in only twenty years, threatened catastrophic pressure on resources and amenities (with probably catastrophic political consequences) unless urgent action was taken: hence the king's desperate attempts to modernize.

Growing Discontent

By the 1970s, signs of popular discontent reached the point that there were, apparently, fears of popular violence, which led to new security measures being taken (*Matangi Tonga* 2, no. 2 [March-April 1987]: 3). A visiting New Zealand journalist in 1975 wrote that such was the popular mood, only a leader was required for a serious protest to occur (*Tonga Chronicle,* 24 December 1975). Protest, in fact, never went beyond the forms permitted by law and the constitution, its leaders being moderate (even conservative) men of education and reputation in the community.

Parliament was the main forum for the expression of opposition. As early as 1968, a motion had been proposed unsuccessfully in parliament that the number of people's representatives be increased. In 1972, there was a further proposal (also unsuccessful) that the number of nobles' and people's representatives be increased to eight each from seven to catch up with the number of ministers, which had been eight since 1970 (*Tonga Chronicle,* August 1972). In an ominous portent, this session of the legislature saw the people's and nobles' representatives combine to defeat the government's budget estimates for 1974-1975 to signify their dissatisfaction with the failure of the government to increase civil-service salaries in accord with a resolution of the 1973 parliament (*Tonga Chronicle,* 20 June 1974).

For the general election of 1975, thirty candidates contested the seven people's seats, suggesting a comparatively high level of interest in politics at the time;[6] a year later, the prime minister was sued for alleged irregularities in the conduct of the election, an action that might have been what it claimed to be or might have been an expression of opposition and discontent in the only way possible without open confrontation.

The government was evidently worried about open confrontation, expecting apparently that the landless and unemployed would seek their own solutions. But despite the land shortage and the sense of social injustice, leadership of protest came from the moderate, new elite. In 1973, the government had planned to upgrade the airport at Fua'a-motu, and this involved clearing the approaches of tall coconut trees. The land users were upset at this loss of trees, but their concerns were voiced by the principal of the adjacent school (Tupou College), the Rev, Siupeli Taliai. Taliai followed this up with a frank and widely publicized sermon on the inequity of land distribution and wrote a letter to the government newspaper stating his case and alleging bribery in the

allotment of land. A vigorous debate followed for some weeks (*Tonga Chronicle,* August 1974). In 1975, this correspondence had its sequel in a seminar on land and migration convened by the leaders of the major churches in Tonga. The king opened the seminar, but parliament (dominated by large landholders) declined to send a representative to participate (*Tonga Chronicle,* 24 July and 21 August 1975). The problems of land shortage and unemployment were freely discussed, and appeals were made for reform.

No directly remedial action was taken by the government to avert the causes of dissent other than to redefine the categories of land ownership to show that the nobles did not actually own the large estates attached to their titles. Other than that, the government's response was the indirect one of pressing ahead--indeed, accelerating--hits program of economic development in the hope that diversification of employment opportunities would soak up the landless population. In the meantime, Tonga was lucky that there were countries willing to accept Tongan emigrants: in November 1974, it was estimated that thirty were obtaining American visas each month, and New Zealand was issuing about six hundred work permits a month to Tongans (*Tonga Chronicle,* 21 November 1974).

This strategy of economic development combined with emigration would work, given time, but it would also lead to more demands for political change from an emerging, urbanized working and middle class, which owed nothing to aristocratic sentiment or tradition for its status and prosperity. In effect, development shifted the locus of discontent from the poor and landless to the educated and comparatively prosperous. This transition lies behind the events of the late 1980s, while emigration and the corresponding inflow of remittances rescued Tonga in the 1970s from potentially more radical politics.

Meanwhile, church and other community leaders (the "new elite") continued to speak out. In parliament, the people's representatives demanded and won a 300 percent salary increase for themselves, and the parliament became increasingly "pre-occupied with trivialities" (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* December 1976), which may mean that members were increasingly willing to argue with the government rather than simply endorse its policies, or it may mean that neither parliament nor government seriously confronted the short-term aspects of the growing demographic and economic crisis. However, in a trend not seen since the 1930s, the nobles gradually came to vote increasingly with the people's representatives against the government, with the result that an

attempt to impeach the acting minister of finance in 1976 was only narrowly defeated (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* December 1976).

Religious and Secular Influences on Public Dissent

This tone of criticism was continued in the next parliament (1978-1980), but in the meantime, much of the popular criticism of government had been muted. This may be due partly to the effects of emigration and the receipt of remittances, both of which did much to alleviate public distress, while the former probably removed many potential leaders of dissent from the scene. Foremost among the critics of government had been the president of the Free Wesleyan Church and king's chaplain, the Rev. Dr. 'Amanaki Havea. In 1976, he became principal of the Pacific Theological College in Fiji, and in his absence he had been replaced as royal chaplain and church president by the Rev. Dr. Huluholo Mo'ungaloa, who abstained from criticism. Mo'ungaloa presently set about removing the other leading critic and protagonist in the newspaper debate about land distribution, the Rev. Siupeli Taliai. In January 1980, Mo'ungaloa succeeded in having Taliai suspended as principal of Tupou College. He was also suspended as a minister and as secretary of the church conference. Taliai subsequently contested the position of church president in opposition to Mo'ungaloa (and, it is said, against the wishes of the king) but was unsuccessful. Taliai was subsequently reinstated as a minister and conference secretary but not as college principal, and later the same year he left Tonga to live permanently in Australia (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* May and September 1980).

It was probably because of the assuaging effect of emigration together with the loss of leadership that the general election of 1981 resulted in the election of candidates who were strongly traditionalist. Four out of seven candidates standing for reelection lost their seats and two others fell from their previous top placings. The *Pacific Islands Monthly* commented that the next three years were likely to be quieter in Tongan politics than the previous three had been (June 1981); and so it proved, despite some controversial (or potentially controversial) measures including legislation for the broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings and increasing the size of parliament (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* September 1981). On the other hand, the Tonga Protected Persons Passport legislation, which had been rejected in 1980 (*Tonga Chronicle,* 14 November 1980) and again in 1981 (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* December 1981), was passed in 1982.

Oddly enough, it was this more traditionalist parliament that voted in September 1981 to increase the numbers of people's and nobles' representatives to nine each. By this time the ministry was ten strong. A proposal gazetted in 1983 to further increase the legislature to twelve people's representatives and eleven nobles failed.

During the early 1980s, parliament may have been generally docile, but public dissent again surfaced. Havea returned from Fiji in 1982 and was reelected to the presidency of the Free Wesleyan Church,[7] which increasingly became associated with the tactful but persistent expression of criticism of social and economic inequality and criticism of corruption. Similarly, the Catholic Church became more evangelistic and more active in improving the living conditions of the people. Its leader, Bishop Patelisio Finau, like Havea, acquired a reputation for outspokenness in his criticism of the status quo.

The pressure for change not only elicited comment from the church, it also agitated the church from within, and was expressed in the emergence of new religious movements. Tongan Christians who believed that the established churches had become spiritually sedentary looked for alternative associations: the Tokaikolo Christian Fellowship was established in 1982 and soon afterwards established a school that grew rapidly; the Assembly of God appeared in 1979, a New Apostolic Church in 1980 (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* July 1980), and a branch of the Salvation Army, with its traditional commitment to social action arm in arm with spiritual revival, was established sometime in the mid-1980s. The Mormon Church, active at the community level and associated in people's minds with material prosperity and foreign educational opportunity, also increased in popularity, claiming 30 percent of the population as adherents in 1986. The Wesleyan majority church, actuated both by growing social needs and the energetic proselytism of these rival denominations, adopted a more evangelical approach, including house visits by church workers traveling in pairs in the Mormon fashion (*Tonga Chronicle,* 17 October 1986). In 1981, the Tongan National Council of Churches launched the Rural Development Programme aimed at improving the quality of housing, water, and food available to rural dwellers (*Tonga Chronicle,* 31 July 1981).

A secular counterpart to these religious movements was the foundation of 'Atenisi University by Futa Helu. Helu had established a school in 1966 devoted to the principle of inquiry as the prime instrument of education. A disciple of the rationalist, empirical school of philosophy, Helu proudly announced the "uselessness" of his style of education: he wanted his school to teach critical thinking above all else and encour-

aged his students to question authority in all things, to ask for reasons, and then to question the reasons. In 1975, Helu added a university division to his school, offering two-year programs leading to associate degrees in the arts and in science (*Tonga Chronicle,* 16 January 1975). Nothing could have been further from the educational philosophy of the king, who was understandably less interested in people's being taught to ask unanswerable questions than in their being taught the utilitarian knowledge that would increase and diversify production and improve the material lives of Tonga's growing population.[8]

Helu's initiative met both criticism and active opposition, but he gradually came to be respected as a man of knowledge and achievement. He became recognized for his erudition on Tongan history and tradition as well as Western knowledge, although many remained suspicious of his eccentricities and putative political and moral radicalism, Above all, Helu showed that the status quo did not have to be accepted.

Graduates of foreign universities were also becoming common in Tonga. In the 1960s, there was literally only a handful; in 1972, 87 out of 351 (25 percent) secondary school teachers had degrees; and by 1981, 221 out of 868 (also 25 percent) (Tonga 1972, 1981). A degree had become a basic requirement for many civil-service positions.[9] Graduates of overseas universities and associates of Helu were to play a leading role in the politics of the late 1980s, articulating criticism of the government and arguing for a more democratic process.

At the same time, economic development was creating a wealthy middle class that was independent of the old aristocracy. This group was coming to expect that its interests should be considered by government and that it should be able to express its views directly to government. The Chamber of Commerce was revived during the early 1980s, and many of the candidates offering themselves for election to parliament did so on the basis of their success in business. Economic reforms since 1982, aimed at stimulating a larger and more vigorous private sector, encouraged this class further in its various ambitions.

Thus by the mid-1980s, conditions had become established that increased the likelihood of a demand for political change. Emigration had kept the population at almost the same level for about a decade, so the problem of landlessness with its implicit threat of political radicalism did not develop much further.[10] Continuing high birthrates, however, had ensured a wide base to the population pyramid so that the numbers coming through the schools onto the labor market still exceeded the capacity of the growing, nonsubsistence sector of the economy to absorb. Accordingly, the numbers of unemployed and underem-

ployed continued to increase. The new elite marked by both education and wealth would also not be long satisfied with the restricted opportunities for participation in policy formation, and the precedents had already been reestablished for attempting to challenge or even frustrate government through parliamentary processes. All that was required now was an issue to crystallize the tentative feelings of discontent and produce a leader. These tendencies converged in 1986, focused on the activities of ʻAkilisi Pohiva.

The Pro-Democratic Challenge

Pohiva had been a schoolteacher since 1964. In 1976, he became a student at the University of the South Pacific in Suva. After graduating, he returned to Tonga and became a lecturer at the Tonga Teachers' Training College. In 1981, he launched a current affairs radio program, which he conducted regularly until 26 December 1984. From time to time the program attracted unfavorable attention from the government, and in January 1985 steps were taken to ban it. The next month, Pohiva was first promoted to a senior administrative post in the Department of Education and then summarily dismissed. He eventually sued the government for wrongful dismissal in a case that attracted much publicity by the time judgment was handed down in May 1988. By then, Pohiva had become a public figure by another means.

During 1986, the government introduced radical tax reform, reducing personal and company income taxes substantially and levying a general sales tax.[11] Members of parliament toured the country to explain the change to the people. For this they became entitled to overtime payments, some of which were large--ranging from T$1,218 to T$10,391 for work spread over a mere twelve days (*Matangi Tonga* 1, no. 2 [November-December 1986]: 13).[12] Attention was thus attracted to the MPs' substantial earnings and allowances at a time when inflation was about 35 percent yearly and the tax reforms were actually extracting more money from the poorer majority of the population.

By this time, Pohiva and a few associates (like him, with overseas university qualifications and careers in education) had launched a broadsheet called *Keleʻa,* in which they aimed to raise matters in the public interest. The second issue was exclusively occupied with the question of payments to MPs. The revelations caused widespread shock. Not long afterwards, in what were the first political court cases since the Stuart affair in 1938-1940 (Wood Ellem 1989:33-37), a private citizen, ʻIpeni Siale, had writs issued against all but three members of the Legislative

Assembly alleging breach of duty in the matter of the overtime pay-ments. At the same time, two MPs (both people's representatives) had writs issued alleging improper parliamentary procedures and the denial of their rights to speak on a bill that had been before the House (*Matangi Tonga* 1, no. 2 [November-December 1986]). This was the beginning of a persistent but uncoordinated campaign to place the government under pressure.

The purpose of applying pressure in this way has itself become an issue in Tongan politics and has raised new questions for Tonga about political principles. Those feeling the pressure and their sympathizers speak of the lack of respect; those exerting the pressure speak sometimes of justice and honesty in government and sometimes of the rights of the people to have the government of their choice. From specific issues, the debate has been enlarged to encompass the merits of democracy versus the merits of a hereditary oligarchy. At this point, the issue had not become a contest directly between rich and poor, landed and landless, but between factions among the comparatively privileged.

The next general election was due in 1987. *Kele'a* had been widely circulated and aroused much interest; Pohiva was well known because of the current affairs program, which had ceased abruptly after more than three years of broadcasting. During 1986 also, parliamentary broadcasts had begun. Initially a fifteen-minute item each evening, they were quickly extended as they proved to be popular. In October 1986, a news magazine was launched, *Matangi Tonga,* which discussed recent political events in detail and in a manner sympathetic to the crit-ics of government. Then finally, on 30 December 1986, a mass street march for peace and justice was organized--not as a political protest but more as an evangelical display. Its rhetoric, however, was appro-priate to the political debate that had begun, containing criticisms of both church and state (*Matangi Tonga* 2, no. 1 [January-February 1987]: 6-7).

On the eve of the election, *Matangi Tonga* lectured the people in an editorial on the meaning of democracy: all three groups in parliament --the king's representatives (i.e., the cabinet, often referred to in Tonga as the government), the nobles' representatives, and the people's repre-sentatives--could claim to be representing the people, but the people's own direct choices were a minority in the house and often (a separate article pointed out) found themselves in opposition to the other mem-bers. The journal did not labor the point, but described the interest in this election as unprecedented.

There were fifty-five candidates (a record number) for the nine peo-

ple's seats. Five sitting members lost their seats, and of the nine success-
ful candidates, six were elected for the first time (one MP had not stood
for reelection) and six had university degrees (*Matangi Tonga* 2, no. 2
[March-April 1987]: 6). It was later said of this election that it was the
first one in which issues took precedence over local and kinship affilia-
tions in determining people's voting and at least one member who lost
his seat said that it was because of the scandal over the overtime pay.
ments (*Times of Tonga,* 18 January 1990). Pohiva was elected by a nar-
row margin in third place for Tongatapu, not a sign of massive support,
but considering that he had not yet been vindicated by the court and
that he was a Ha'apai man, his election shows clearly that issue-ori-
ented politics had arrived.

The lesson was not lost on any of the contestants. Immediately after
the results were known, the election of the two Vava'u representatives
was challenged: Hopate Sanft's on the grounds of undue influence and
bribery, and 'Ipeni Siale's on the grounds that he had become an Ameri-
can citizen and therefore was not eligible. Both challenges were upheld
in the Tongan Supreme Court. Sanft had been one of the more persis-
tent critics of the government in the previous parliament and had
brought the court case over parliamentary procedure, and Siale was the
man who had brought the court case against MPs over the overtime
payments.

The new members lost no time in taking the part of crusaders once
the new parliament met. Issues they raised included those that would
attract public attention and others more arcane, related to technicali-
ties of government. Among the former was the matter of overtime rates
for MPs. An attempt was made to reduce them, unsuccessfully; it was
argued that ministers received two salaries--a ministerial one as well as
the basic parliamentary one--and an unsuccessful attempt was made to
deprive them of the latter. Among the more arcane issues was a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Public Finance Act of 1983, ques-
tions about the sale of Tongan passports to non-Tongan citizens as a
money-raising venture, and the continual difficulty of making the gov-
ernment conform to its own estimates of expenditure. The use of special
warrants to authorize overexpenditure was particularly attacked. Al-
though the people's representatives were allowed few victories, as
nobles and ministers closed ranks against them, they did succeed in
restraining expenditure overruns, especially on the Legislative Assembly
itself. Whereas in 1986 the estimated expenditure of T$0.7 million had
been exceeded by T$1.3 million, in 1987 expenditure was kept to the
budgeted estimate of T$0.8 million.[13]

The following year, 1988, the reformist MPs returned to issues of

moral integrity in politics: the passports issue had led to questions about the legality of actions taken by the minister of finance, and Pohiva introduced a motion (deferred in 1987) to impeach him. After it failed, Laki Niu, a young but widely respected lawyer who also had been elected for the first time in 1987, tried unsuccessfully to reintroduce the motion. Debates in the house became impassioned over many things, but particularly over parliamentary procedure, with the Speaker's impartiality and competence called into question. At length, Pohiva declared that the Legislative Assembly was a refuge of lawbreakers; the Speaker, the Hon. Malupo, threatened Pohiva with imprisonment, even calling the sergeant-at-arms to arrest him.

The people's representatives were not united in ideology, nor coordinated in action, but they were now frequently voting as a bloc, while most nobles and ministers voted en bloc against them. The consequent frustration on the part of the people's representatives, feeling that they had no power to influence government, led Pohiva at last to petition the king directly. About 7,000 signatures were obtained, and the petition was presented on 4 November 1988, Constitution Day. The petition focused mainly on the overtime payments of 1986 and on allegedly illegal actions of the minister of finance. It also reported allegations about other members of parliament (including ministers) and drew attention to the demand for increased popular representation. An accompanying sixty-page document presented evidence in support of the allegations. The petition, however, brought no immediate results.

The 1989 Walkout: Issues and Opposing Views

The 1989 parliamentary session was even more contentious than that of 1988. The passports issue arose again, and this time Pohiva took it outside parliament to the Supreme Court. The failure of the government to buy copra from farmers dependent on the crop was a major issue; so was the delay of an overdue salary increase for civil servants while a 25 percent salary increase for parliamentarians became effective immediately. Meanwhile, questions of fairness and integrity were kept before the public view by publicity given to court cases brought by government employees who, like Pohiva, had been improperly dismissed. The overriding issue of the session became one of parliamentary tactics. The people's representatives were frustrated at their inability to initiate policy, make recommendations to the king, or be able even to address the king, who was advised by his ministers and could be addressed by the nobles' representatives.

At length, Teisina Fuko (number one people's representative for

Ha'apai) proposed the establishment of a standing committee to prepare a financial statement for the Privy Council. When this proposal lost, he demanded that the government take action on the urgent issues of the civil-service salary increase, the purchase of copra from the outer-island producers, and the sealing of the vitally important Hihifo Road. As he finished speaking, he walked out of the chamber. To Fuko's surprise, the seven other people's representatives present in the house at the time followed him out of the chamber in an unpremeditated protest at their impotence. The walkout caused a furor: the nobles and ministers made their own protest by quickly passing eleven bills in the absence of the people's representatives. One of the representatives returned the next day, and another a few days later. The remaining six stayed out for fourteen days, the maximum they could absent themselves without provoking their own dismissal (*Matangi Tonga* 4, no. 4 [September-October 1989]: 12-16).

The significance of the walkout is that it attracted popular attention to the role of the people's representatives and to the issues that they were trying to pursue in parliament. Two views about the role of representatives were put forward: one, that they were in parliament to cooperate with the government and to contribute to a consensus approval for the government's actions; and two, that they were there to be a watchdog for the people and to ensure that the government conformed to acceptable standards of political morality. This also implied that they should have the power to initiate policy. The latter view obviously implied the need for constitutional change, since a minority in parliament was only a watchdog on a short leash.

It was at this point that serious public discussion began about the options for political change. The word "revolution" began to be used, but in warning rather than in advocacy.

Early in 1988, *Matangi Tonga* had published interviews with ten MPs. Three of the people's representatives expressed politically conservative views, indicating a concern mainly for economic development and for fair treatment. One of these members said that each of the three groups in parliament should have equal representation, a statement with which a noble representative agreed. From the liberal representatives came statements such as: the unbalanced representation causes frustration, the government cannot be trusted to be honest, the wishes of the majority are overlooked by the ruling minority. The word "dictatorship" was used by more than one. One advocated opening ministerial appointments to the elected members. The necessity for an official opposition was urged by Viliami Afeaki, "to balance the authority." The

three most outspoken members--Niu, Pohiva, and Fuko--gave diverse views. Pohiva said that his role in politics was not to have roads built but to improve the system of government, "the root of all our problems." For him, simply increasing popular representation was not enough--government had to be handed over to the people's representatives. Niu said that he was a Tongan traditionalist, believing in Tupou I's system, which at present just happened not to be working properly: the people's and nobles' representatives were supposed to be a check on the king. He expressed opposition to importing a foreign form of democracy, asking, perhaps with irony, "Can you imagine letting just an ordinary person rule this country?" He even recommended that coup-riven Fiji should have a monarchy as the solution to its problems. Fuko urged a new system of representation, "for the sake of this country and its development. . . . It is very dangerous to go on like this, and we should change with the times rather than be forced to change. We should not bring in tradition to hamper development. Let development flourish with tradition as an integral part of it." This view was echoed by his colleague from Ha'apai, who declared himself a royalist but nevertheless favored change: change would help to preserve tradition, not abolish it (*Matangi Tonga* 3, no. 2 [March-April 1988]: 8-11).

Much as these men were advocates for change in the composition of parliament and probably in its rules, all advocated and expected change to be peaceful and to be implemented in accordance with the present constitution. The opinion of the prime minister (the king's brother) was that Tonga was not ready for handing power over to elected members: there was a shortage of suitable talent, which in any case ran in particular families. The important thing in politics, he stressed, was the "relationship between the king and his people," implying an intimacy and mutual understanding that made democracy redundant (*Matangi Tonga* 2, no. 3 [May-June 1987]: 34-35).

After the parliamentary walkout of September 1989, these modest and moderate opinions seemed obsolete. Sanft (representative for Vava'u) declared that the episode showed parliament had become a rubber stamp; others intimated that the government was the radical body that had deviated from the principles laid down by Tupou I and was driving the people to revolution. "Revolution," said Niu, "a violent confrontation . . . is exactly what we are trying to avoid." Constitutional change was necessary only because the government was acting without regard to the constitution: "Under Section 75 [of the constitution] our responsibility is to make sure that Ministers are doing their jobs properly--if they don't then we can impeach and dismiss them.

. . . The Legislature should tell the Executive what to execute, instead of the Executive deciding for themselves what they should do" (*Matangi Tonga* 4, no. 4 [September-October 1989]: 13-14).

The conservative opinion was expressed by the Speaker of the house, denying the issues as defined by the liberals: "I have noticed during the last three years . . . that the People's Representatives have upped them. selves and they are now looking down on chiefs and Ministers" (*Matangi Tonga* 4, no. 4 [September-October 1989]: 15).

This highly publicized walkout came almost at the very end of the three-year parliamentary term and ensured a high level of tension in the approaching election. The *Tonga Chronicle* gave prominent coverage to the walkout, as did a new, independent newspaper, *The Times of Tonga.* The latter carried statements by apparently randomly selected citizens who overwhelmingly supported the walkout, and like *Matangi Tonga,* published editorials expatiating on principles of government and of the rights of the people. *Matangi Tonga* explicitly advocated "a par. liament of the people, for the people and by the people." Indeed, it may be said that the press rather than the politicians launched the election campaign: *Matangi Tonga* began publishing lengthy interviews with candidates in the December 1989 edition, the election not being due until February.

The themes stressed by the reformers in the *Matangi Tonga* interviews, however, were not proposals for radical change but merely the misuse of authority, the legitimacy of the regime, and the need to control the changes that were inevitable. The corollary of the misuse of authority was that those in authority must listen to and consult the people. Pohiva, as before, was prepared to use stronger language--suggesting that revolutions had happened before in Tonga's history and that the conditions for revolution were again being satisfied. Interviews with other candidates were also published, several of them representing extremely conservative, traditionalist views that may be summed up as "government should be left to those who know about it."

Finally, *Matangi Tonga* published an interview with the king himself. The king pointed to the dangers of democracy, citing the histories of Spain, Germany, and Russia as examples of ruthless tyrannies that had democratic origins, and warning of the dangers of coups d'état. He stressed the partnership of the three elements in parliament and finished by making an analogy with the English civil wars of the seventeenth century. In England, the people and nobles defeated the king, but in Tonga, the king and people had defeated the nobles; consequently, the king, not parliament, is the guardian of the people in Tonga. He admit-

ted that although education and travel gave people a taste for political participation, he believed that many Tongans were more concerned with their daily activities (*Matangi Tonga* 5, no. 1 [January-February 1990]: 10). If the king had been a democrat in his early life it was clear, now that there was discussion about where power should be located, that he was, on the most liberal interpretation, a believer in "guided democracy."

The 1990 Election

The election campaign of January and February 1990 was probably the first in Tongan history in which widespread bitterness became evident (for example, see *Times of Tonga,* 25 January 1990). Threats of violence were made to some candidates or their associates on a few occasions. Although deep ideological divisions were not evident in the published statements of the candidates, feelings ran high for and against the reformers (who were increasingly coming to be seen as a bloc, although no party had been formed and no declaration made of a shared "ticket" except between the two sitting members for Haʻapai) because of the walkout of September and allegations by Pohiva against the ministers of finance and police. Allegations of corruption and illegality concentrated almost entirely on these two figures in connection with several issues. The passports question was emotive because of the alleged unaccountability of the proceeds and because it suggested (falsely) to many people that large numbers of foreigners were being sold citizenship with its accompanying rights to reside and own land. The parliamentary salaries and allowances issue suggested to many people, at a time when public-service salary increases were delayed and copra growers were not being paid at all, that the government and nobles were both corrupt and inefficient. Just as these beliefs aroused indignation about the government, so too did they arouse indignation about those who had brought these things to public attention and thereby appeared to be threatening Tongan stability and traditions of respect.

Pohiva, though not in an intellectual or charismatic sense a leader of this movement, was probably the best known because of his outspokenness and the publicity surrounding the litigation over his dismissal in 1985. It was he, also, who had made the biggest noise about overtime payments in 1986 and had kept the issue alive since, even to the extent of refusing to accept overtime payments to which he was entitled. Pohiva was the man most seen as being dangerous to the regime (or as the champion of popular rights) and therefore became the target of a

smear campaign intended to discredit him. This campaign portrayed him as a revolutionary, even as a communist, and made much of his refusal to accept overtime payments. The allegation was made that his attempt first to refuse the money and then to have it allocated for scholarship purposes amounted to an electoral bribe.[14] Far from discrediting Pohiva, these allegations gave him enormous publicity and forced him to defend himself, which he did most effectively in public meetings in most of the villages of Tongatapu.

A new and final note of controversy was introduced into the campaign when *Kele'a,* the occasional paper that had become popular as an authoritative exposer of government misdeeds, brought out a new edition about a week before the election. An editorial drew parallels between the Tongan constitutional crisis of 1904 and the situation in 1990, revealed that the smear campaign against Pohiva had been directed "from above," and published a long interview with that widely known, rationalist critic of authority, Futa Helu. Helu expounded the principles of the constitution, democracy, and justice; explained the. political issues of the previous few years; and finally, in answer to a question, named the candidates whom he favored, describing them variously as honest, truth-loving, well-educated, experienced, courageous, and eloquent. He concluded with a warning that if others were elected, Tonga's future would be troubled (*Kele'a* 5, no. 2 [February 1990]).

The election was a victory for the reformers in general and for Pohiva in particular. In being elected number one representative for Tongatapu, Pohiva won almost twice the votes as the previous winner had in 1987. Three-quarters of the voters on Tongatapu voted in his favor. The electorate clearly identified Pohiva, Niu, and Viliami Fukofuka (the publisher of *Kele'a*) as a team, and voted for them solidly; Fukofuka, coming in at number three, won twice as many votes as the fourth candidate, Sione M. Lemoto, who was number one in the previous election.[15] In Ha'apai, the two previous members, Teisina Fuko and Viliami Afeaki, were reelected, each scoring about twice the vote of the next candidate, himself a former parliamentarian. In Vava'u, both sitting members had adopted a reformist stance but were rejected in favor of Havea Katoa, a copublisher of *Kele'a,* as number one, and Siale Faletau for number two.

On 'Eua, voters were cautious, rejecting the sitting member who at the time of the parliamentary walkout had dissociated himself from the reformers; the candidate who was identified with the reformers, however, was not elected. Similarly, on Niuafo'ou and Niuatoputapu, remote from the main centers of population, voters rejected both the sit-

ting member and the reformist candidate favored by Helu (one of his former students). The delay over copra purchases probably accounted for the unpopularity of the sitting member, while many voters possibly looked with rural suspicion on the "unseemly" behavior of the people in the capital and rejected the man connected with it.

Conclusions

The election outcome was clearly a vote for change, but change of a very conservative sort. The recorded public statements of the reformers repeatedly stressed particular matters of corruption or wrongdoing that they said they were trying to have redressed. This was especially convincing in the case of Pohiva, the man whom the Supreme Court judged to have been unfairly treated. *Kele'a,* moreover, had confined its allegations to matters of fact that could be verified from public documents. Neither *Kele'a* nor the politicians had attempted to attack the consensus about national goals, which generally endorsed the government's pro-development policies. Indeed, policies were not part of the debate at all, although procedures of implementation sometimes were. The reformers therefore were able to concentrate on the discrepancies between government practice and the much-revered constitution, representing themselves as defenders of the latter, of the heritage of Tupou I, as well as champions of the popular will. In this strategy, they were enormously assisted by the emergence of an independent and liberal press with the formation of *Matangi Tonga* (bimonthly) in 1986 and *The Times of Tonga* (weekly) in 1989, which not only gave the people more information than they could possibly have received before but also provided their own advocacy in favor of liberalism. The radio broadcasts of parliamentary proceedings that began in 1986 were also popular and no doubt helped to raise the level of popular awareness.

It is thus premature to regard the events of the period 1987 to 1989 as marking a radical new departure in Tonga politics. The advocates of reform are the heirs to an undercurrent of discontent that has never been far from the surface in Tongan politics, muted though that undercurrent was between 1941 and 1965. It is clear, however, that the social changes of the 1970s and 1980s, coming on top of the acute population growth of the 1950s and 1960s, have brought the sense of discontent to a culmination, which, if reform does not come, may shortly lead to a qualitative change. Events immediately following the election of 1990 suggest that the royal and noble oligarchy was disposed to resist change rather than accommodate it.

At present, there seems nothing peculiarly Polynesian or uniquely Tongan about this process. Stress and modernization alike lead to demands for participation in power; the trigger in this case was the abuse of power and the perception of government dishonesty, rather than matters of policy as such. Indeed, the leading actors in Tonga's political contest are not divided by economic issues or economic philosophy but by newly discovered political principles. However, as Futa Helu and others warned before the election, if modest appeals for justice are not met, then more extreme events will follow. Conversely, all that is necessary to avert the dire outcomes extravagantly predicted by foreign journalists is a few minor reforms that would persuade the people of the integrity and honor of their hereditary leaders.

NOTES

1. There are thirty-three noble titles, but some descent lines have failed and others have merged so that the number of titleholders was only twenty-seven at the time of the 1990 election; three titles were unallocated.

2. Seats are distributed as follows: Tongatapu, three seats as a single, multimember electorate; Ha'apai and Vava'u, two seats each on the same basis; 'Eua, one seat; and Niuafo'ou and Niuatoputapu, one seat between them. The same formula applies to both nobles' and people's representation.

3. The cabinet was enlarged to six in 1915, when the governors of Ha'apai and Vava'u were included, and was increased to nine in 1919. By 1932 it had declined to seven. The appointment of the crown prince as minister of education in 1943 made the number eight, although one position, that of the chief justice, was vacant and ceased to carry cabinet membership in 1944. Subsequent additions to the ministry took place in 1970, 1974, 1979, 1988, and 1990.

4. Women did not exercise this new right until the election of 1960, and it may be wondered how many do so even today: in the important elections of 1987 and 1990, only slightly more than half the number of registered voters voted.

5. The king's speeches on the opening and closing of parliament each year are published in the *Tonga Government Gazette.* In recent years they have also been published in the *Tonga Chronicle.*

6. I do not have detailed data on previous elections, but believe the number of candidates to have been normally lower than this. The number of candidates for nine seats in later elections was thirty-one in 1984, fifty-five in 1987, and fifty-five in 1990.

7. It had been the practice since 1885 that the president of the church was also appointed royal chaplain. When Havea went to Fiji, he was succeeded in both positions by Mo'ungaloa, but when he defeated Mo'ungaloa for the church presidency in 1983, the latter remained as chaplain, a fact widely understood as signifying regal disapproval of Havea's outspoken advocacy of reform.

3. The king's utilitarian educational philosophy is clearly indicated in his speeches opening and closing parliament over many years.

9. Of a total of 3,800 established civil-service positions in 1989, 265 were held by university graduates.

10. The population, in 1966 expected to reach 102,000 by 1976, had in fact reached only 90,000 by that date. At the 1986 census the population was only 96,000. At the end of 1989 the population was officially estimated to be 90,485.

11. Personal income tax was reduced to a flat rate of 10 percent. Companies were to pay 20 percent income tax on profits under T$100,000, and 30 percent on profits over that amount. A general retail sales tax of 5 percent was levied. This shift in the burden of taxation was widely resented and resulted in two petitions of protest, one of them with 11,000 signatures (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* January 1987; *Matangi Tonga* 1, no. 1 [September-October 1986]: 3-4).

12. The basic salary for a member of parliament at the time was T$10,000 per annum. Additional allowances increased this substantially.

13. This paragraph, and those that follow, take the political record mainly as reported in *Matangi Tonga* for 1987 to 1989, supported by information from the *Tonga Chronicle* for the same period.

14. These allegations (among others) were used after the election as the basis of a Supreme Court challenge to Pohiva's election, but the chief justice found him not guilty of all charges and duly elected. The text of the judgment is given in the *Tonga Chronicle,* 25 May 1990.

15. On Tongatapu, there were 23,796 names on the electoral roll, of whom 12,907 voted, casting up to three votes each; 9,441 voted for Pohiva, 9,402 for Niu and 7,259 for Fukofuka. Lemoto won only 2,630. The three winners among them polled more than double the votes for all other candidates combined. The detailed election results were published in the *Tonga Chronicle,* 23 February 1990.

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STATES AND SOCIETIES IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

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Recent events such as the coups in Fiji and the attempt of Bougainville to secede from Papua New Guinea have raised questions about the appropriateness of foreign-style political institutions for societies in the Pacific. Such questions are not new in the South Pacific: they lay behind, for example, the proposals for decentralization, greater recognition of customary law, and incorporation of chieftaincy in a number of countries at independence. They were repeated in a recent review of the Solomon Islands constitution.[1] They were put more stridently in the *taukei* movement's submission to the Great Council of Chiefs in Fiji: "The two principal ideas of democracy--liberty (or freedom) and equality--are foreign values, and are indeed contrary to the Fijian way of life where liberty exists only within one's social rank and equality is strictly constrained by a fully developed social hierarchy."[2]

Questions about the appropriateness of such foreign political institutions have differing political purposes, In the western Pacific the questions have had a critical quality. In Papua New Guinea, for example, they have been raised by religious leaders and intellectuals critical of the state structures inherited from colonial rule. In the eastern Pacific, where traditional structures were often more hierarchical, questions about appropriateness have had a more conservative quality, and church leaders and intellectuals make guarded appeals to liberal values when challenging them, as, for example, in Tonga.

Independence and the idea of a nation-state promised a new and closer relationship between state and society. However, concern with

appropriateness of institutions is not limited to the independent states, nor does independence seem to be a necessary, let alone a sufficient, condition for change in state-society relations. U.S. territories such as the Northern Marianas and American Samoa have rejected independence, but the voters nevertheless wish that their continuing links with the United States will allow them autonomy over matters such as land, immigration, the legal system, and the perpetuation of chieftaincy.

This article approaches the question of appropriateness through the relationship between "state" and "society" in the South Pacific. Both terms are broad and loose, but they provide a framework in which the distinctive character of political institutions in the South Pacific can be examined from several theoretical perspectives.

The article will first consider what is meant by the state, as opposed to the government, and the historical development of states in the region. It will consider statelessness and chieftaincy, and distinguish the state from "civil society." Then it will look for some comparative statistical indicators of the role of the independent states in South Pacific societies. Finally, it will consider the way parliaments link state and society through different ideas of representation.

There are two general reasons for focusing attention on the state in the region: one to do with policy and the other, with political theory. The policy reason is what Toye has called the "counterrevolution" in development theory.[3] It is distrustful of state intervention and favors privatization of public enterprises and deregulation of private sector activity. The policy justification has been willingly adopted by many Pacific Island politicians and public servants.[4] Political theory arises from a renewed scholarly interest in the state, which behavioral political science had dissolved into a broader notion of the "political system" and which Marxism had tended to treat as simply an instrument of class rule. Having been "brought back in," the state is increasingly being written about in comparative historical context.[5]

States and Governments

Writings relevant to the state in the South Pacific have been in roughly three traditions: constitutional-legal;[6] Marxist political economy;[7] and insider accounts of the politics of particular countries.[8] There is some overlap; for example, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Yash Ghai's writing on the political economy of law.[9] Each tradition has its potential limits, which individual writers have often transcended. The constitutional-legal tradition is vulnerable to formalism: a preoccupation with what

documents say, rather than the way they are used. The tradition of Marxist political economy is vulnerable to reductionism: the explanation of political activity in exclusive terms of society or economy. Insider accounts may be uneven, and difficult to compare systematically. Instead of repeating or summarizing the existing literature, this article tries a slightly different tack: putting the state at center, but asking questions about its relationship to society.

Several traditions of thinking about the modern state are relevant to our concerns with the South Pacific: Weberian, Marxist, and a strand of neoliberalism that goes back to Adam Smith.

The Weberian tradition deals particularly with the coercive character of the state: "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[10]For our purposes, this famous definition begs and raises some questions. It neglects the question of "community." The colonial state, for example, typically governs a very heterogeneous community; and the Fijian state (for example) is organized around the idea of two or more communities. The definition treats the legitimate monopoly of physical force as an empirical question. The Papua New Guinea state, for example, often fails the test, in its persistent problems with "law and order." On the one hand, what is called "tribal fighting" is still regarded as a legitimate method of resolving certain kinds of disputes. On the other hand, in its campaign against domestic violence the state is trying to extend its control over what was considered a legitimate use of violence by men against women--until feminists called attention to it. The political maneuvering in Fiji between the two coups is particularly illuminated by Weberian categories of legitimacy: legal authority contending with Rabuka's charisma and the Great Council of Chiefs' claims to traditional authority.

Marxist traditions put the state in the context of economic development and historical change,[11] relevant to modern concerns with the economic, rather than the military, role of states and to a comparative historical understanding of states. In Marxist theory, class conflict provides the motor of historical change. The Polynesian protostates were clearly based on sharply drawn and economically antagonistic social classes. Classes in modern South Pacific societies seem more fluid and emergent, absent and awkward. Fitzpatrick sees one of the tasks of the state as "containment" of challenging class-formation by the conserving traditional institutions such as chieftaincy.[12] Class-based trades unions, however, have begun to be represented in state institutions, such as provident funds, and to intervene in electoral politics: for example, in

Kiribati in the late 1970s and in the Solomon Islands since the mid-1970s. Trade union leaders were represented in Fiji's Alliance Party cabinets, and unions were behind the formation of the Labour Party in Fiji in 1985.

The third tradition, justifying a "minimal' state, goes back to Adam Smith's "three duties of the sovereign": defense, police, and those public works that would be unprofitable for the private sector.[13] It was expressed by the libertarian right-wing Phoenix Corporation, which gave moral and material support to Jimmy Stevens's Nagriamel movement in what became Vanuatu during the late 1970s, and by the Mamaloni government in the Solomon Islands in the early 1980s. It has become more mainstream and influential through the privatization policies of the World Bank, and (in Papua New Guinea) through the publications of the business-funded Institute of National Affairs.

We need to distinguish the "state" as a permanent, largely bureaucratic apparatus from the "government" as a smaller and usually transient group of politicians and senior officials who try, with more or less success, to give state activity coherence and direction. Independent governments, for example, inherited states that sometimes proved resistant to direction. The "governing" activities of Papua New Guinea's nineteen provincial governments, for example, consist of their legislative, executive and planning functions, which consume an average of only 6 percent of their total funding.[14] The rest is spent on activities such as running schools and building roads, which persist even if the provincial legislative assemblies are abolished or--as happens increasingly--are suspended on grounds of mismanagement.

Historical Development

The relationship between "state" and "society" in the South Pacific has gone through several historical stages. First, as territorially centralized political institutions, states are quite recent introductions into much of the region. Melanesian societies, for example, were typically "stateless," in ways discussed below.

Second, what Goldman calls "proto states" were emerging in the eastern Pacific before and during the period of early contact with Europeans. Chiefly political systems were becoming increasingly stratified, specialized, centralized, and geographically extensive in Tahiti, Mangareva, Tonga, Rarotonga, and (particularly) Hawaii. Dealings with European missionaries and mercenaries influenced the latter stages of this emergence, but it had its own much longer term internal dynamic.[15]

Third, states were occasionally pieced together in the period between contact and direct colonial rule. The histories of the Cakobau government in Fiji (1871-1874) and of the federal government in the Cook Islands (1891-1899) show how states can be precarious inventions.[16] These transitional states drew on traditional and introduced forms of government, indigenous as well as foreign officials.[17] There are interesting parallels with the states that emerged from the other end of the colonial tunnel, with decolonization.

Fourth, the Tongan state is a unique combination of the second and third stages: built on a Polynesian protostate, using the forms of other transitional states in Hawaii, Tahiti, or Fiji, but surviving them to the present.

Fifth, apart from Tonga, all of the region came under colonial rule. A line of Marxist scholarship argues that the colonial state is very different from the metropolitan states of which it is an extension, The colonial state incorporates a more heterogeneous local society, it relies more on coercion or acquiescence than on consent, and it is particularly concerned with economic extraction. To the extent that these differences carry forward into independence, we can talk of a distinctively post-colonial state, compromised by its past.[18]

Sixth, the region includes "new states," created from the withdrawal of colonial rule. Eight were created in the period 1962-1980: Western Samoa, which became independent in 1962, Nauru (1968), Fiji (1970), Papua New Guinea (1975), Tuvalu (1978), the Solomon Islands (1978), Kiribati (1979), and Vanuatu (1980).[19] Decolonization was accompanied by division (of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony into Kiribati and Tuvalu) and disaggregation to provincial or regional governments.[20] Legally sovereign, they remain economically dependent. Five more states, though self-governing, have compromised sovereignty in relations of "free association" with their former colonial rulers. New Zealand remains formally responsible for the foreign affairs of the Cook Islands and Niue, whose inhabitants have the valuable right to live and work as citizens in New Zealand. The Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia have their own "foreign affairs capacity," but it is qualified by their acquiescence to the Compact of Free Association, which gives the United States continuing rights to intervene in their foreign policies. Without the compacts, however, they would not even have become self-governing. In the late 1980s minorities of voters in Palau were still resisting the terms being imposed by the United States for "free association."

All of the South Pacific is now included within a grid of modern states. It was an imposition of nineteenth-century European imperial-

ism, but penetration of the new and often arbitrary political spaces created by the partition of the South Pacific was slow and uneven. We can take two contrasting examples. In the Cook Islands there was a long period of trade and missionary contact before indigenous political institutions were reconstituted as a federal government, which was then supplanted by direct colonial rule from Wellington.[21] By contrast, people in the western Highlands of what is now Papau New Guinea had a much more recent and direct experience of colonial officialdom. As late as the 1920s the Australian government was publishing maps of Papua and New Guinea showing degrees of official control around the coasts. The Highlands were simply left blank.[22] The first contact did not occur until the 1930s. The incorporation of the region into the wider economy and society happened under close and direct state supervision without a preceding period of commercial and mission contact and indirect rule, which was characteristic of the eastern Pacific.[23]

The character of these states has been changing since they came into being. As in metropolitan countries, there has been an enormous expansion of state activity since the World War II. The PNG public service, for example, grew from 1,300 public servants in 1950 to 29,000 at independence in 1975, peaking at 51,000 in 1980 before entering a period of restraint and reductions in the 1980s.[24]

Statelessness

Writings in political science generally assume the existence of states. "Statelessness" tends to be treated as hypothetical, as part of an explanation or justification for the existence of states. While the phrase "stateless" denotes an absence or deficit, reversing the emphasis may be instructive, as Sagan suggests, to start with kinship and define states in terms of its absence or diminution.[25] This makes states the exception. It draws attention to the difficulties and reversals in their historical development, the role of chiefliness in reducing the effects of kinship, and the residues of kinship within modern states. Nationalism and ethnicity, for example, are in many ways extended forms of kinship, and often draw on identities and symbols that existed before the introduction of states. The prevalent concern with official and political "corruption," particularly in Papua New Guinea, is partly about the conflict between the obligations of kinship and public service--at least, that is the way corrupt officals defend their actions.

We can approach the analysis of "statelessness" from two directions, from anthropology and from political science. Starting from anthropol-

ogy, Southall identifies four characteristics of "stateless societies."[26] First, they are "multipolities." The largest "political" units--within which people accept an obligation to settle disputes without fighting--nest within more inclusive, but vaguely defined, wider social units. The vagueness is important: "it need not be an absolutely and uniquely bounded entity in space or time, but . . . its effective field may differ from one person to another and certainly from one family or primary settlement to another."[27] Second, these multiple political systems are brought together by broader ritual action. Third, they tend to be organized internally by principles of complementary opposition, for example, between lineage groups. Fourth, legitimacy is widely distributed, not delegated from a central place or person: "fundamental responsibility for the maintenance of society itself is much more widely dispersed throughout its varied institutions and the whole population, at least, usually, all its adult males."[28]

As Southall suggests, this picture of individual responsibility and action, adding up to a wider, and benevolent, social order is rather like the laissez-faire economics that were influential throughout the world in the 1980s. It could also be related to the idea of dispersed, nonsovereign, "capillary" power found in the writing of Michel Foucault.[29]

Starting from the political science perspective, Michael Taylor uses many examples from Melanesian anthropology to identify the means by which small communities provide themselves with law and order without a centralized, coercive state. He defines communities in terms of three characteristics: common beliefs and values; face-to-face and many-sided relationships; and reciprocity among members. Within such communities, law and order is maintained by:

(i)   the threat of "self help" retaliation
(ii)   the offer of reciprocity and the threat of its withdrawal
(iii) the use of sanctions of approval and disapproval, the latter especially via gossip, ridicule and shaming, and
(iv)   the threat of witchcraft accusations and supernatural sanctions.[30]

Chieftaincy

The classic comparison is made by Sahlins, between Melanesian "big men," achieving leadership, and Polynesian "chiefs," inheriting it. Douglas finds Sahlins's ideal types too sharply drawn and gives examples of chiefs in Melanesia and achievement in Polynesia.[31] Goldman

questions whether ascription and achievement are in practice opposed, asking of Polynesia: "when the heir apparent must meet standards of achievement to inherit the office, what do we call it?"[32]

However, we are less interested in "leadership" than in what is led: the character of the political system, particularly the presence of a state. Goldman identifies three types of chiefly political system: traditional, where chiefs had a largely religious role; open, in which there was more emphasis on the military and political role of chiefs; and stratified, which in a way combined the two in a protostate that claimed religious authority for its domination.[33]

Whereas Sahlins and Douglas focus on ascription among the chiefly line, Sagan sees a wider growing away from kinship as a principle of social organization. Headmen and clan leaders, he argues, dealt with people on a face-to-face basis, but "a chief is a political leader who rules over people with whom he does not come into contact and over people with whom he has no kinship relation."[34] Sagan's rejection of contact and kinship is too stringent to apply to most South Pacific chieftaincies, but he does draw attention to a new scale of political organization, which was being achieved in some of the Polynesian protostates by use of warfare as a means of integration and involved new--often tyrannous--relationships between chiefs and commoners.[35] Territory begins to succeed kinship as an organizing principle, and land is allocated and reallocated centrally, rather than by local custom.

The precarious and coercive character of these protostates is reminiscent of the early days of the establishment of colonial rule and contrasts with the apparently more peaceful character of late colonial rule. One change seems to be in the directness of coercion. As Sahlins describes it, chiefly systems exacted labor and produce from commoners to be consumed in ceremony and warfare and redistributed to buy support: "Redistribution of the fund of power was the supreme art of Polynesian politics."[36]

Chiefly exactions have been carried forward into state structures in Tonga, through the payments required for permission to take up entitlements to land, and in Fiji, through the 30 percent of rents for land leased through the Native Land Trust Board that goes automatically to various chiefs.[37]

Writing about the transition to capitalism in Europe, Brenner contrasts the chiefly process of accumulation (with its political dynamic) with the process of economic accumulation under capitalism, in which surpluses are reinvested to produce more funds for investment and in which surplus value is exacted from labor not through fear or respect

but through the "silent coercion" of a labor market where the unemployed may starve.[38] The transition from political to economic accumulation, suggests Brenner, is historically difficult-capitalism is a rare exception.

State and Civil Society

The revival of "the state" in political science theorizing has led to a more recent interest in a related idea: "civil society." This civil society consists of those institutions and associations that are separate from the state, yet a condition of its existence, and perhaps a counter to its potential to become arbitary and authoritarian.[39] In Europe, its place of origin, the term has been used to refer to institutions such as churches, universities, and trades unions; the revival of the idea was one of the causes and consequences of Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Where universities, schools, and trades unions are all constituted by legislation, managed by public servants and political appointees, and funded by the central government, a countervailing civil society may not prosper.

An idea of civil society seems particularly appropriate to the network of ethnic Fijian and chiefly institutions that surround Parliament and the public service in Fiji: the Fijian Administration, the Great Council of Chiefs, the Native Land Trust Board, and the Alliance Party. And its absence is particularly obvious in Papua New Guinea, where most territory-level institutions are creatures of the state, and their leaders reluctant to bite the hand that feeds them.

The Christian churches in the South Pacific might be usefully analyzed in these terms. Missionaries were deeply involved in the organization of the nineteenth-century protostates and transitional states in the eastern Pacific. They provided an ideological framework for the introduction of colonial rule--and its ending. They continue to provide educational and medical services that parallel or are a substitute for services provided by the state. And they have provided a reservoir of first-generation nationalist leadership and a continuing domestic base for criticism of parochialism and authoritarianism, for example, in church sponsorship of the *Times of Papua New Guinea,* and in the churches' support for reform in Tonga. The political role of the Christian churches may be changing. Fundamentalism is having an increasing impact on South Pacific politics, but in an authoritarian rather than liberal direction, particularly, but not only, in Fiji since the coups.[40]

In the South Pacific, however, we need a broader conception of civil

society to include associations such as clans and kinship groups that mediate between individuals and the state. Their existence sets powerful limits on state action, for example, over the acquisition of land.[41] Of Africa, Hyden has written about "societies without a state" and the state suspended "in mid-air" above the societies it purports to govern.[42] In such circumstances, territorial-level institutions, such as universities or trade unions, may be too dependent upon or intimidated by the state to exercise any countervailing power, but clan and kinship provide effective bases of resistance and protection for individuals at the local level.

That state and society can (and should) be separated is in some ways a characteristically liberal position. It contrasts with more organic views of state and society argued, for example, by the *taukei* movement in Fiji. It was part of Adam Smith's purposes, for example, to wean the state away from the economy and restrict itself to providing the domestic conditions in which the "invisible hand" of the market would enhance prosperity.[43] The withdrawal of European states from enforcement of religious belief was an earlier example of a similar process.

In these terms, colonial states have a rather contradictory quality. On the one hand, they were clearly distinct from and outside the societies they governed. On the other hand, colonial "native regulations" typically made detailed interventions into everyday social and economic life. Independence provides opportunities, and nationalism the rationale, for a whole new set of regulations governing foreign investment, foreign exchange, and immigration. Yet the capacity of the independent states to implement these regulations is variable. A National Manpower Assessment in Papua New Guinea, for example, found that 42 percent of public servants failed to meet the qualifications set down for their positions by the Public Service Commission.[44] On the one hand, the proliferation of regulations provides opportunities for corruption, as officials use their discretion to waive or apply regulations to extract what economists would call "rent" from applicants for permission. On the other hand, some kinds of corruption express the persistence of kinship values that predated the existence of the state: look after your kin.

Measures of State Presence in Society

Table 1 shows some measures of modern state activity to suggest the relationship between the states and wider society. Available averages for developing and industrial countries are shown for comparison. The figures cover only eight of the independent states; the ninth, Nauru, is secretive about its budget.

For the freely associating and nonindependent states, local and metropolitan staffing and expenditure is more difficult to disentangle. But some information becomes sporadically available. Among the freely associating states, public service employment, excluding public enterprises, in the Cook Islands is 11 percent of the population, which is considerably higher than the average on this measure for industrial countries (7 percent) and developing countries (3 percent).[45] For French Polynesia, figures from the mid-1970s indicate the predominance of metropolitan expenditure in the territory. The Territorial Assemby budget amounted to only 27 percent of total public expenditure in the mid-1970s. The rest was mostly expenditure by metropolitan departments in the territory, the largest spenders being the Defense Ministry (30 milliard francs between 1976 and 1978, including the Center for Atomic Experiments at Moruroa), followed by the Ministry of Education (9 milliard over the same period).[46] Put another way, the creation of "national" accounts is one of the characteristics of independence.

Although the figures selected are somewhat arbitrary and unreliable, measurement forces conceptualization and provides a more consistent basis for comparison.[47] The several distinctions that have to be drawn show how the boundary between state and society is far from clear, and can be drawn widely or narrowly. First, there is the distinction between central, provincial, and local government (figures for the latter are often unavailable). Second, there is the distinction between the public service and the public sector, including parastatals, public enterprises, and quasi-autonomous nongovernment organizations (QUANGOs). In Papua New Guinea, for example, the public service employs about 53,000 public servants, but another 20,000-22,000 people are employed mainly by four large public enterprises: the Harbours Board, Electricity Commission, Post and Telecommunications Corporation, and national airline.[48] Third, there is the distinction between type of employment: permanent and contract. Statistics are typically kept only for the former, but directly employed local and provincial staff may have the most direct impact on the population. Some countries include teachers among public employees, others treat them separately. Armies often account for a large percentage of public employment and expenditure, and may distort comparisons between countries that are burdened with them (such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji) and countries that are not.

As with national accounts for independent states, the statistics are part of the constitution of organizations, as well as simple reflections of them. Public service commissions, for example, were established to maintain the distinctive and separate character of "public services" and to collect statistics on their members as part of that task. Reforms in the

TABLE 1.**Public Employment, Expenditure, and Land**

	Public Sector Employment as % of Population (1987)[a]	Central Government Expenditure as % of GDP (1985)[b]	Public Land as % of Total Area (1980s)[c]
Fiji	4.5	2 8	8
Kiribati	3.6	(43)	5 1
Papua New Guinea	2.2	3 3	3
Solomon Islands	4.2	39	9
Tonga	3.4	(29)	2 2
Tuvalu	n a	(147)	3
Vanuatu	n a	(37)	< 1
Western Samoa	2.9	33	1 1
Average	3.5	33	1 3
Developing country average	3.7	2 8	
Industrial country average	9.0	3 4	

[a]Calculated from country statistics in 1988/1989 national development plans held in the National Centre for Development Studies, Canberra. Comparison averages are for 1979/1981, from P. S. Heller and A. A. Tait, *Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons,* Occasional Paper no. 24 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1983), table 1.

[b]Figures in parentheses are calculated from national plans held in the National Centre for Development Studies, Canberra. They may not be exactly comparable with the others, which are from the International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington: 1988), 162.

[c]Figures calculated from data in national development plans; P. Larmour, R. Crocombe, and A. Taungenga, eds., *Land, People, and Government: Public Lands Policy in the South Pacific* (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies in association with Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1981); R. Crocombe, ed., *Land Tenure in the Pacific,* 3d ed. (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1987).

1980s designed to decentralize hiring and firing and make public bureaucracies more business-like may mean that such centralized information on employment, expenditure, and pay will no longer be kept.

Figures in Table 1 represent the widest definition of public sector employment, including all levels of government and public enterprises. Generally, Fiji and the Solomon Islands have slightly greater percentages than the developing country average, and Papua New Guinea--in spite of regular complaints about "overgovernment''--has considerably less. The qualifications and effectiveness of these public servants, and their distribution between headquarters and the field, are of course

other matters. However, the island states, like other developing countries, average about half the number of public servants per capita of industrial countries.

The second measure includes money raised and spent by lower-level governments or public enterprises. Figures for GDP used to calculate the percentages include only production converted in cash, and so are difficult to compare with those of developed countries because Pacific Island economies rely much more on subsistence production. There are two dimensions to this problem of estimating the cash value of subsistence production. The first is making Pacific Island figures comparable with figures for more monetized economies by including production that would be counted in measures of GDP in developed countries. The second, raised particularly by feminist scholars, is recognizing and valuing subsistence production in developed countries as well (where it tends to be carried out within households, and disproportionately by women).[49]

With these limits to the data, the percentages for most of the independent states seem closer to industrial than developing country standards. This might be a consequence of relatively unmonetized economies (in which the state takes a greater slice of a smaller cake), higher standards of public services (perhaps a result of a particular type of colonial rule or rulers), or higher costs (because of isolation and small internal markets). The similarity to industrial states is nevertheless surprising, given the absence of comprehensive welfare spending. The transfer payments to the young, poor, unemployed, and elderly that are typical of modern industrial states are largely absent in the independent South Pacific, although overseas remittances perform a similar function. Nevertheless, governments spend similar proportions of their GDP. This is in contrast to the freely associating states and colonies, whose populations qualify for metropolitan levels of welfare payments. Put another way, the gap between state and society in the independent South Pacific is wider than it might be in, say, European social democracies, because of the absence of general welfare provision and the reliance in rhetoric, if not practice, on family, clan, and community to look after old people and cushion unemployment.

The final column deals with another frontier between state and society in the South Pacific: land tenure. Tonga is again exceptional, having nationalized land in the name of the Crown in the nineteenth century, giving all adult males a theoretical right to an allotment.[50] However, the "nobility" have the power to disallow registration of allotments, and so may extract high effective rents. In the other countries there is a more or

less sharp distinction made between state-owned or leased land and customary land, whose day-to-day management is regulated by community rather than formal legal norms.[51] The relatively large percentage for Kiribati is accounted for by Christmas Island, which in itself comprises half the nation's total land area, and several other uninhabited islands in the Line and Phoenix groups. Vanuatu's low figure reflects the fact that while the government owns a few sites for airfields and other public purposes, the two main urban centers are leased from landowner corporations. Of these, the suspension of the Vila Urban Land Corporation (VULCAN) in 1987 led to a riot and the eventual attempt by the president to choose a new government.

Metropolitan comparisons would not be particularly relevant or easy to make in the case of land. Issues relating to land impose perhaps the greatest strain on relations between state and society in the South Pacific. For example, government titles and mineral rights are under regular pressure from traditional claimants in Papua New Guinea. Throughout the region further acquisition of absolute title to land for government purposes is politically almost impossible, so that leases and other arrangements are increasingly made.[52]

In issues related to public employment, government expenditure, and land the line between state and society is artificially sharp: the table does not show the considerable transactions across it. Public employment and expenditure generate multiplier effects on private employment and expenditure. The state intervenes with a wide range of tax deductions or regulations that do not show up as expenditure. And, in terms of land, there is usually provision that prevents its sale abroad while allowing its lease subject to government controls.

Generally, the data in Table 1 indicate that the state as provider of public services (measured by the number of public servants) looms relatively low in South Pacific societies, but the state plays a relatively larger role in the cash economy (but no higher than in industrial countries). While capitalist relations of production may have spread widely throughout the rural areas of the South Pacific, the persistence of customary tenure shows that the state has followed slowly, and indirectly, behind the cash economy.

Representing Society to the State

Parliaments provide a formal, constitutional link between state and society. Changes in the role of a parliament have been the mechanism of decolonization and (in the absence of mass political parties) the parlia-

ment has often provided the motor. Colonies typically have parliaments (which may be chosen from a widening franchise), select their own leaders, and even employ their own officials. But the parliament's link to the state is limited or advisory: the governor or high commissioner or secretary for the interior remains responsible for what in the French colonies are called "state" rather than "territorial" services. Juggling the relationship between high commissioner and Territorial Assembly, and between state and territorial public services, has been characteristic of recent constitutional change in New Caledonia.

Independence cuts the formal link with the metropole and brings the executive into a new relationship with the legislature. The relationship may be one of responsible ministerial government along the lines of the Westminister system or of division of powers with a directly elected presidency. In the South Pacific these are points on a continuum, with a crossover point in eastern Micronesia, where the Marshall Islands has adopted a system of responsible ministerial government while Kiribati has a general election for president from a list of members of parliament. Several PNG provinces also elect their premiers directly.

In the absence of mass political parties, which in African one-party states or Eastern Europe until 1989 have been a strong link between state and society, parliaments are relatively important. The nearest equivalent to such political parties has perhaps been Vanuatu's Vanua-'aku Pati, with its grass-roots organizers and annual congresses to which government ministers have been held accountable. But its popular support has been steadily falling, from 67 percent of the vote in the 1979 election that brought it to power to 55 percent in the 1983 general election and 47 percent in 1987.[53] In 1983 the party used parliament to shore itself up, by legislation requiring that members of parliament who left their party also had to give up their seat.[54] The legislation was invoked against the party's former general secretary, Barak Sope, and four others in 1988. They were expelled, along with the entire opposition (on grounds of nonattendance), as part of the crisis that led to the governor-general's intervention and arrest.[55] The legislation itself was found by a court of appeal to be unconstitutional.

While the Vanuatu parliament looks to be becoming more like its factional neighbors, the Solomon Islands seemed to be moving the other way. In 1989 new Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni announced that he had formed the first majority-party government in the country's history; he did so by persuading members of other parties to switch to his People's Alliance Party (PAP) after the election. But the achievement was reversed a year later when he sacked most of his PAP cabinet,

announced himself to be an independent, and invited former members of the opposition to join him in a new coalition government.[56]

Papua New Guinea has constantly shifting coalition government. During the 1980s there have been several proposals to reduce the opportunity for votes of no-confidence. There is a honeymoon period of six months after the election of the prime minister in which another vote cannot be moved, while a vote close to the due date for a general election simply brings that election forward. This window could be further closed. However, the logic of collective action has so far dictated that while most members may agree that limits on votes of no-confidence are sensible, their own immediate chances of office give them an incentive to defect from any majority formed to change the constitution.

Parliament can "represent" society in various ways.[57] First, it may be a symbol, legitimating state activity. Second, it may be more or less typical, in a statistical sense, of the society, including or excluding people from particular regions, men rather than women, nobles rather than commoners, Third--and this is the most difficult--it may represent society in the sense of acting on its behalf. As Pitkin argues, representation requires representatives to have some discretion to act on their own. They are not simply the instrument of those they represent, and those granting rights of representation must accept that their representatives will sometimes act differently from the way they themselves would.

Parliaments "represent" societies in each of these ways. In the first, symbolic, sense they do so through nomenclature, architecture, ritual, and procedures. Provisions for houses of *ariki* or *iroij* (chiefs) are also representative in this symbolic sense. That is not to say that they do not also have power. (The Great Council of Chiefs in Fiji was the focus of political maneuver between Fiji's two coups.) Rather, their claim to represent the society is not based on their being typical or on carrying out a mandate.

Parliaments may be representative in the second, statistical, sense in different ways, and electoral boundaries and qualifications may be adjusted to encourage a particular outcome. The overrepresentation of Europeans was a feature of colonial legislatures. The series of French government plans for New Caledonia in the 1980s--named Lemoine, Pisani, Fabius, and Pons after the ministers proposing them--juggled provincial boundaries to ensure Melanesian or European majorities.

The constitutions of Fiji (until 1987), Tonga, and Western Samoa bias representation in particular ways. Until 1987 Fiji's constitution was intended to ensure that, whatever the population, Fijians and Indians

would be equally represented in parliament (and the third category of "General Electors" overrepresented). A proposal to relax the racial requirements for candidature in the twenty-five so-called national seats was rejected by the government in the mid-1980s. A recent draft constitution has proposed a stronger bias towards ethnic Fijian communal representation, with a guaranteed thirty-seven of seventy seats in a lower house, and a bias within that representation towards presumably more-conservative rural areas.[58]

Tonga's constitution, by contrast, reserves seats for the nobility out of proportion to their numbers: nine seats for thirty-three noble titleholders (1:4), nine for 100,000 commoners (1:11,000), and nine (or more) chosen by the king. In 1989 'Akilisi Pohiva led eight of the nine commoner members out of parliament in protest at this imbalance. Two drifted back and the remaining six eventually returned. However, their motion to reduce the number of seats reserved for nobles and to increase those reserved for commoners was defeated (though one of the king's sons voted for it).[59]

Until 1990 Western Samoa's constitution structured election outcomes at the level of voter qualification: to vote you had to have a *matai* title. Only a small proportion of titles were held by women. The number of titles, though, was growing relative to the population (to an estimated 11,000, or 7 percent of the population in the mid-1970s, and perhaps 20,000 in 1990).[60] If titles were distributed randomly, then Western Samoa's electorate would have been "representative" in the statistical sense of the whole population, even if the whole population did not vote. In October 1990, however, a majority of voters in a referendum favored universal adult suffrage (though a *matai* title would continue to be a necessary qualification for candidates). At the time of writing it was not clear if parliament would respond to the referendum result by amending the constitution,

Another type of representation is involved in questions of platforms and mandates, and whether voters and legislators feel bound together by them.

Even without constitutional biases--in totally "transparent" electoral systems--women are statistically underrepresented in all legislatures, so that some of PNG's provincial constitutions, for example, require the co-option of women members if none are elected.

The third sense of representation--the acting autonomously on behalf of voters--is best demonstrated by its opposite, the referendum. The referendum is one of the most direct links between state and society, and has been used to validate constitutional arrangements. Where ref-

erenda have been held at independence, they have tended to favor the breakup of colonial states into even smaller units: Kiribati and Tuvalu; the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas. Demands for referenda were made by secessionists throughout Melanesia but resisted by colonial authorities and national parliaments. They were made again by Francis Ona and his militants on Bougainville. MPs were once again in the difficult position of claiming to "represent" the people but being unwilling to ask them directly what they think.

Conclusions

To understand the state in the South Pacific we probably need to think of a historical continuum between "statelessness" and "statefulness," of a modern gradient between "state" and "society," of differences among states and among sectors of state activity. States are continually redeploying within societies. The historical direction is not necessarily one way. In Papua New Guinea, for example, a recent influential report on law and order recommended greater use of "the non-state option," such as community groups, rather than the police.[61] Whether the historical continuum amounts to development (as in the PNG cliché about being a "young country") or to progress (as in Whig and Marxist views of history) is less clear. The Polynesian protostates, for example, were great cultural achievements but at the cost of great military tension and of exactions from a sometimes terrorized population.[62] The early stages of colonial rule have been similarly violent and repressive. Relations between late-colonial and post-colonial states and their populations seem more contractual: an exchange of public services for political consent. During the 1980s the worldwide reaction against public expenditure put that contract under strain. In Fiji after the coups the relationship between state and society became much more fearful and suspicious, at least as far as nonethnic Fijians were concerned. The relationship between the Papua New Guinea state and Bougainvillean society has also soured.

   It may be that congruence between state and society is not completely possible in the South Pacific--or anywhere. There seems to be something about modern states that makes them inherently cosmopolitan, or exploitative, or irresponsive, or vulnerable to capture by a particular ethnic, class, or occupational group. Links between state and society in metropolitan states are also problematic, as shown by the "ethnic revivals" taking place in Europe and the Soviet Union.[63] Rather than reflect-

ing the special circumstances of the societies they govern, all states may be driven by external dynamics of international economic competition or their own internal dynamics of bureaucratic professionalism, careerism, and the need for budget revenue.

Rather than saying states should reflect the societies they govern, and vaguely criticizing institutions for their inappropriateness, we should perhaps step back and ask why the relationship between state and society continues to be problematic, despite many cases of decolonization (on the one hand) and of the renegotiation of metropolitan links (on the other). In the South Pacific the "foreignness" of colonial rule may have become mixed up with its "stateness."

NOTES

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Marilyn Strathern, *The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia.* Studies in Melanesian Anthropology, no. 6. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988. Pp. xv, 422, bibliography, index. US$47.50 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Review: PAULA BROWN
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On Melanesianism

This complex book begins with a critique of feminist and Western anthropological theory. It next develops definitions and presents the author's view of Melanesian culture, and ends with a conclusion discussing domination and comparison. So described, this work might appear to be a discussion of Melanesia; it is actually Marilyn Strathern's statement of her theory of anthropology. As a foretaste, she evaluates and responds to feminist writers, and offers a general critique of Western anthropology with its basis in Western categories and domains and Western-founded interpretations of Melanesian culture. The discussion of comparison as an epilogue further develops the charge that comparison is impossible, that the synthetic image of "Western" and "Melanesian" sociality or knowledge itself depends upon a Western construction. A special vocabulary engages the discussion; yet at the end, she insists "I have not authored 'a perspective' on Melanesian society and culture; I have hoped to show the difference that perspective makes . . . I have not presented Melanesian ideas but an analysis from the point of view of Western anthropological and feminist preoccupations of what Melanesian ideas might look like if they were to appear in the form of those pre-

occupations" (p. 309). This camouflages her position on the purpose of anthropology, as do many other disclaimers scattered throughout the book. Although it may seem to the reader that the difficulty and complexity are in her interpretations as defined by gender and gift, the vehicle carries her radical revision of anthropology.

The 1989 meeting of the Group for Debates in Anthropological Theory, we have been told by Claudia Gross, debated Strathern's proposal that "the concept of society is theoretically obsolete." She is reported as stating that the concept of society is a "useless analytical tool," an abstract entity. The next calamity in Western thought followed society with the creation of the "concept of the self-contained, autonomous individual, the concrete entity detached from all social relationships and opposing society." She proposes to shift to the center of anthropological theory the concept "sociality, the 'relational matrix which constitutes the life of the person' " (Gross 1990).[1]

The Gender of the Gift's argument depends upon Strathern's thesis that the relationship, rather than society as an entity or the individual as autonomous, is anthropology's subject. This would transform anthropology. At the same time, this position exemplifies what might be said to be a "female" perspective on sociality. The view echoes, more eloquently perhaps, well-known observations about the importance of relationships to women, and with them interpersonal, family, and local ties, again as contrasted with the political concerns of men. The view is connected, of course, with the domestic-public characterization of female-male concerns (and in particular with the "reproduction of mothering" as put forward by Chodorow [1978]). I am not claiming that Strathern fosters a "uterocentric" view of social life to contrast with the "androcentric" bogey now repudiated. In Strathern's Melanesia, sociality *is* social life. In *The Gender of the Gift* she states that it is a defect of Western thinking to make the person an agent at the center of social relations. For Melanesia, she says, the relationship is the crux of social action.

Parts of this long-awaited book were anticipated by the series of papers and comments Strathern has written during more than the past ten years. In these she has consistently argued against the prevailing view of Hagen (and other Highlands) women as a mute underclass, and rejected the assumed universal nature-culture distinction (Ortner 1974) as not pertaining to Hagen. She completes the amendation, reluctantly referring to the domestic-public dichotomy as applying to some aspects of gender behavior in Melanesia. Her preference is particular-collective relations (p. 49). She further rejects sexual antagonism, sex-role social-

ization, domain, Western feminist concepts of male domination, and other labels as failing to perceive the true nature of Melanesian concepts or as inappropriate to her analysis, or both.

The Gender of the Gift is original and ambitious, a synthesis and culmination of many years of thought, based to large extent on works in anthropology, social science, and Melanesian ethnography of the last twenty years. Brilliant, withal the difficult arguments, which are driven by a set of categories and concepts made up of new terms, new meanings, particular phrasings. We are presented with a comprehensive personal commentary and response to contemporary anthropological and social science theory and forms of interpretation. Some of her discussion attacks both feminist theory and Western anthropology, although at one point she says that anthropology and feminist scholarship are incompatible: "Feminism and anthropological scholarship endorse different approaches to the nature of the world open to investigation"(p. 36). She also asserts "[b]oth feminist scholarship and anthropology [are located] within Western culture and its metaphysical obsessions with the relationship between the individual and society" (p. 29).

This latter point is elaborated in a critique of Leenhardt (1979):

> One relationship is always, as he adduced, a metamorphosis of another. Yet his mistake was to conceive of a center at all. The center is where twentieth-century Western imagination puts the self, the personality, the ego. For the 'person' in this latter day Western view is an agent, a subject, the author of thought and action, and thus 'at the center' of relationships. Some of the conceptual dilemmas into which this configuration leads were rehearsed in part 1. It has shaped our cultural obsession with the extent to which human subjects are actors who create relationships or act rather as the precipitation of relationships; this obsession fuels the individual/society dichotomy with which I began. (P. 269)

Strathern's Melanesian "material" or culture includes her own work at Hagen; she describes, interprets, and quotes authors of studies in Melanesia. In presenting her own view of Melanesian gender symbolism, domination, same-sex and cross-sex relations, gift economy, and so forth--reformulating the way these have been described and interpreted by anthropologists in past twenty years--she deposes the feminist-Marxist and Western anthropological uses of such terms as exploitation, oppression, control, labor, and production.

But while it is a rethinking of Melanesian anthropology, it pays little heed to other regional summaries, avoiding without discussion some trite truths about Melanesia. We are not often reminded of the multiplicity of Melanesian local cultures and languages, which have often been cited to prove the long isolation of small groups. This relieves her of the compulsion to provide a conventional "background" on the area, with a general description of ecology, technology, history, "big men," and so forth. We have had more than enough of this in the past, to be sure. But perhaps something is missing? She says little about the actual languages that are the sources of terms or concepts in the examples cited. And, deny it as she may, the argument is based upon the premise of a regional Melanesian culture, which has a common basis of point of view, cultural form or type, kind of knowledge. Shouldn't we ask how the unity of Melanesia has come about? Well into her argument, in the same paragraph she speaks of "Melanesian assumptions about the nature of social life" and repeats that "there is great variation across Melanesia" (p. 326). How is this possible? Here, I think, the cultural anthropology that has displaced the social scientist's goal of seeking to understand a reality "out there" must justify writing in English about Melanesian culture.

I see several major achievements. First, she shows how the terms and analyses of feminist scholars and Western anthropologists are grounded in Western thought and concepts, and are not appropriate or helpful in understanding Melanesia; they lead to incorrect conclusions about male-female relations. By presenting what she views as a distinctively Melanesian-based concept of person, economy, etc., the feminist and Western anthropological categories and domains are overthrown. She disowns the premises of anthropological models of the fifties, sixties, and seventies: society, structure, group, clanship, categorization of male and female, hegemony, domination, inequality, property, power --all are Western-inspired and inappropriate to Melanesia. Embedded in Melanesia, the critique applies universally.

The second main accomplishment is in outlining Melanesian premises, modes of knowledge, constructs. Her stance advances her select new vocabulary, for example, collective action, sociality, mediation, extraction, multiple and partible persons, same-sex and cross-sex relations and identities, detachable parts as exchanged, exchange economy. She explores meanings of sexual imagery and identities: phallus, flute, breast, semen, milk, blood, body substance. In detailed analysis the main examples are Massim and Highlands, and in these she is illuminating.[2] Since she has been a leading light in the field, reading and com-

menting upon the work of others, she may well have influenced the works she quotes.

The very important gift-economy concept is expanded to make things parts of or symbols of persons. In exchange and production, things are and stand for persons. This guides her understanding of personification, the place of labor in gift economy, and makes it possible to conceive of a divisible person, one who can give of him/herself.

However, I see problems in comprehension or use of her concept of Melanesia:

Strathern's style and language may discourage those who would follow the argument and accept it. She does define, summarize, or repoint the argument from time to time; for example, she defines the purpose of one section: "mine is not a cognitive analysis but an attempt to give a cultural description of Melanesian symbolism" (p. 244). These are the points that the reader may want to identify; there are many of them, but they do not form a regular sequence.[3] Yet just when the reader begins to formulate an objection to her position or assertions, there is a new section, disavowing, subsuming the field of objection to minor status in the scheme. These disclaimers, combined with the difficulties of the language and argument, can impede both critical debate and acceptance. Whatever other objections one may raise, she persists in denying any attempt at universality.

The reader must surmount difficulties of special terminology (multiple persons and dividuation, enchainment, extraction, encompassment, and more) as well as special usage of terms of Western anthropological analysis (metaphor, metonym, mediated and unmediated exchange or relations). Standard language seems to take new or differentiated meanings; for example, "take for granted," often used, is applied both to Melanesian thought and to Western authors. At this point I'm sure that Marilyn's reaction must be "she doesn't understand me at all!"

The one anthropologist given full approval is Roy Wagner. Yet one wonders how she accepts his invention-convention concept of culture; it seems to me that this depends upon the individual/society contrast that Strathern rejects. The delicate revision of conventional concepts requires a reorientation more or less, and, for example, when at the end Strathern introduces agency (ch. 10) it is not to show how individuals invent anything; they may cause an event to happen but hardly originate it. For Strathern, the proof is in the result, the events and views to follow. I don't believe this will adequately explain innovation. While appearing to support and favor Wagner, her persons do not appear to be acting as individuals, choosers, inventors, but are ideal types, perform-

ers in fixed roles and relationships, sometimes with a strategy, but forever culture- and relationship-bound. The multiple person is, it may seem, a complex of stereotyped roles, performed vis-à-vis husband, kinsman, same-sex or opposite-sex role player. Where is volition?

In some particulars she seems to be uncompromising and didactic in dealing with the elusive and changeable. An example is the assertive style of her exposition of the gift economy. Everything in Melanesia is gift-inspired, and this does not allow for the possibility of a trade or commodity concept. Yet we have ample ethnographic examples of Melanesian exchange that is not so strictly categorized; there have been forms and expectations of barter and purchase in many contexts, beginning perhaps with Malinowski (1922:177ff.), and certainly demonstrated in Filer (1985).[4] The Melanesians have often shown a dual understanding of an exchange, both as gift relationship and as a measured commodity transaction.

It will be, to be sure, impossible for anthropologists to write of Melanesian culture without reference to Strathern's *tour de force.* I look forward to future uses that will be made of this brilliant work.

NOTES

1. The summary of the debate by Gross (1990) expands this point very well.

2. For example, I now understand the songs and dances that the Chimbu perform in anticipation of a *mogenambiri* prestation between clans or tribes as spells compelling donors to bring in supporting gifts.

3. Such statements may, for example, be found on pp. 204, 207, 259, 260, 299.

4. To give another example, after a pig feast, the Chimbu offer plumes and other valuables in trade for young pigs to reconstitute their pig herd. Pigs are often named by the object (e.g., money, bird of paradise plume, kina) used to buy them or the place (e.g., Damar, Kerowagi, Goglme) from which they came. The pig carries the identity of its origin as traded.

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Review: ROGER M. KEESING
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I am dazzled by Strathern's analytical virtuosity in interpreting the
symbolic structures of gender and connected issues of bodily substance,
growth, and reproduction. I find many aspects of her interpretation
compelling, both in disclosing hidden logics of Papuan symbolism and
in connecting as transforms of one another symbolic structures that
seem superficially disparate and unrelated. Her sustained unpacking of
the conceptual baggage Western scholars have brought to New Guinea
will force us to rethink many of our assumptions. Her interpretations of
particular systems--such as her explorations of androgynous symbolism
and partible elements of personhood--will provide themes for further
exploration and debate long after the peoples and cultural practices she
examines have changed beyond recognition. I have elsewhere (e.g.,
Keesing 1989) deplored the way, year after year, new ethnographies of
New Guinea are produced, with very few attempts to analyze compara-
tively and systematically the masses of material already available.
Strathern's analytical *tour de force* shows what is possible.

All that said, there is much about the book that troubles me. I should
note that my perspectives on *The Gender of the Gift* reflect the unusual
place in which my second and more careful reading of the book was
done: in a Kwaio settlement in the mountains of Malaita, Solomon
Islands. I compared what I was reading with what I was seeing and
hearing, and this dialectical tension is reflected in my comments.

There is no reason why Strathern's interpretations of Hagen (and her
extrapolations from them to other Papuan peoples) should ring true for
the Kwaio. The Kwaio speak a language quite closely related to Samoan
and Trukese (and replete with familiar, key Oceanic concepts, such as

mana and *tabu*), and not at all related to those of mainland New Guinea. On close examination, what superficially resemble Papuan concerns with pollution are very different, and parallel the ones now being debated by Polynesian specialists. There is no plausible connection historically or archaeologically between Malaitans and mainland Papuans. But why, then, does she cling to the category of "Melanesia," and incorporate the Oceanic-speaking peoples of the Massim and of Vanuatu (the latter, close linguistic relatives of the Kwaio) into an old-fashioned category whose only basis, as far as I can see, is darkish skin pigmentation? True, "Melanesians" have been typified anthropologically in terms of exchange and big-men and all that; but the serious distortions entailed in such typifications (the hereditary chiefs liberally scattered through "seaboard Melanesia," the centrality of exchange to the west, north, and east of "Melanesia" as well as in it) have long been visible. I am impressed by Strathern's ability to find persuasive transformations of Papuan patterns in the Massim and Vanuatu, but I have no doubt that her analytical ingenuity could find equally compelling continuities in the ethnographies of eastern Indonesia or "Micronesia."

Having difficulty with the unexamined essentialism of "Melanesia" (especially from my vantage point on a Kwaio mountain), I also had difficulty with the insufficiently examined essentialism of Strathern's "gift economy." I find this to be a misleading label for the sorts of economy she is characterizing; but the problem goes beyond labels. Her use of the distinction between gift and commodity, drawn from Gregory (1982), polarizes almost to the point of caricature the differences between (say) the contemporary Australian economy and sociality and that of (say) the Kwaio: many aspects of social relations in Canberra seem to me to fit within the idealized patterns supposed to characterize "Melanesia," and many aspects of the social relations in which my Kwaio friends were engaged seem to me to fit within the idealized "commodity" economy. All empirical economies and modes of sociality are, I suspect, complex mixes of Strathern's ideal types. I intend a serious and nontrivial point here. From Marx's time onward, we have been told that a logic of commodity economy pervasively and systematically colors our mode of thought (and distorts our understanding of worlds equally pervasively and systematically colored by quite different logics). Such a claim may be rhetorically persuasive, but I believe it runs counter to so much that has been learned in phenomenology and in the study of everyday cognition and folk models in the cognitive sciences, and indeed to our own intuitions, that it can no longer be sustained.[1] In our everyday cognition, universes of expectation representing "econo-

mies" of barter and of reciprocal gift and ongoing mutual obligation happily coexist with seemingly contradictory universes of expectation representing the commoditization of the market economy. There is every reason to believe--and my Kwaio friends were enacting this before my eyes, in buying and selling everything from areca nuts to woven bags and taro crops, using strung shell beads--that tribal peoples, in "Melanesia" as elsewhere, similarly move from conceptual universe to conceptual universe, from "commodity" to "gift" economy and back, a dozen times a day, as we do. The balances and dominations are obviously different, but characterizing these as mutually unintelligible thought worlds or opposite poles of human possibility is no more than a rhetorical exercise.

My further concerns about this book have to do with the nature of anthropological "explanation." One of my major interests in tribal societies is with the processes whereby cultural symbols--cosmological notions, myths, ritual procedures, rules imputed to ancestors--are produced and reproduced. Social theorists of various persuasions have searchingly interrogated the sociology of knowledge in complex societies, the nature and force of ideology, and the relationships between class, gender, power, and meaning. These questions are systematically hidden by the conceptual systems developed in both the British social anthropology tradition and the American cultural anthropology tradition. In and around anthropology, questions about the dynamics and politics of the production of cultural symbols have belatedly been raised --sometimes well, sometimes crudely--in feminist (and Marxist) cultural critique.

Strathern seems to me to take an extremely conservative position-- however bolstered by analytical argument and rhetorical sophistication --in regard to the dynamics and politics of cultural knowledge, and therefore to the scope of anthropological analysis. Despite all her disclaimers, she ends up as a defender of and apologist for a local cultural status quo, by arguing against the philosophical admissibility of any external challenge to it. It is true that any such challenge must be culturally situated, exogenous, and hence in some sense alien. But in an era when universalist conceptions of human rights, justice, dignity, and liberation that historically derive from the European Enlightenment are being invoked all over the world, do we anthropologists really want to retreat into local cultural relativisms that legitimate Gimi mortuary practices or Sambia brutalizations by defending them against the possibility of external critique (especially when contemporary Gimi and the Sambia are so busily extricating and liberating themselves from their

own dark cultural pasts)? If feminist critiques of the exploitation entailed when Papuan women do the bulk of work in pig rearing and surplus food production and men appropriate the products (by an external standard) of women's labor (by an external standard) do violence to local conceptions of work and production, are we really to assume that these local conceptions are innocent and unmotivated, themselves philosophically impervious to cultural critique? When Kwaio men tell me that the hard work they do communicating with the ancestors and planning feasts is the counterpart of the hard work women do in gardens and households, are we to accord more cultural reverence to this than we would to characterizations of the division of labor by businessmen in Manchester?[2]

Where does the stuff of cultural meaning--rituals, myths, cosmologies, ideas about the body and reproduction, rules about men and women, rights and duties--come from? Does it simply cumulate in local traditions by thousands of minute accretions, collectively laid down, in a process I have elsewhere (Keesing n.d.) likened to the formation of a coral reef? In the small local populations that have characterized the region Strathern examines, historical accretions of ideas and practices are mainly undocumented and untraceable. But the largely hidden nature of this process is precisely what poses a challenge to anthropological analysis.

In such small-scale populations (and especially those of the size of the Gimi or Sambia or Kaluli or Umeda, in contrast to the post-Ipomoean Enga or Hageners), two mechanisms for the production of cultural symbols can operate in a more direct way than in much larger scale and more internally complex and differentiated social formations. One is the transformation of the productions of individual fantasy (in dream, trance, etc.) into collective symbols. I have discussed how, among the Kwaio (Keesing 1982a: 202-205, 212-215), interpretation of dreams is a daily occurrence; fantasy material feeds directly into plans for collective action and into ritual procedures. Among the Kwaio, and very probably among the Gimi and other Papuans, last week's dream may become this week's myth or ritual sequence: and by a very political process. A dialectic of consciousness and unconsciousness is continuously crystallizing into cultural symbols. The symbolic stuff Strathern examines for such peoples as the Gimi bears the clearest possible stamp of origin in the unconscious depths of individual fantasy (and tormented fantasy stuff it is, too; Gillison's depiction [1983] of the Gimi view of a forest filled not only with dangerous beings but with threatening, hairy vulvas strikes me as coming quite directly from the realm of psychic murk, not

the realm of intellectual gymnastics in which Strathern situates it). I place no great faith in classical Freudian psychoanalysis or recent (e.g., Lacanian) reinterpretations of the psychodynamics of the unconscious. But where better to work toward a more anthropologically enlightened depth psychology than interior New Guinea, where the stuff of the unconscious mind has come so directly to the collective surface?[3] Yet Strathern systematically dismisses (under the rubric of "sex-role socialization") attempts by anthropologists to explore the complex circuitry whereby psychological orientations are culturally shaped and reproduced, and whereby in turn they produce new cultural material. This is particularly ironic in that, according to my reading, the elaborations by Papuans of systems of initiation and theories of growth rest on their cultural theories of psychodynamics, of how gentle boys are turned into fierce men.[4]

The New Guinea with which Strathern presents us is a world filled with complex, ambiguous, multivalent and contextually shifting images --of flutes, bodily fluids, exchanges of substance and essence. But it is a world without terror, without violence, without pain, without psychic turmoil, without pleasure. (For eleven pages [210-218] we learn more than we ever wanted to know about transactions in semen, but we find nary an orgasm.)

The New Guinea with which she presents us is curiously devoid of history, and that is part of the problem. True, she touches on *wok meri* and some aspects of changing gender relations under the impact of cash economy. But the Hageners and Gimi and Sambia and others we find here, and their supposed cultural cousins in the Massim and Vanuatu, mainly live in a never-never land of the ethnographic present, outside time and the world system (cf. Fabian 1983). As I have pointed out elsewhere (Keesing 1982b), the ethnographic accounts of New Guinea produced in the colonial and postcolonial periods have almost all been carried out in a climate of externally imposed pacification; yet the cultural traditions we have described cumulated in climates of extreme violence, the threat of sudden death, and collective extermination. The populations of fringe Highlands zones, in particular (and it is in these that the symbologies at issue are most fully--wildly--developed), were competing violently for sheer survival; and hence their cultural traditions were locked into a kind of symbolic armaments race. The concerns with growth, strength, bravery and psychological toughness and brutality around which male cultism and many facets of gender relations are constructed make sense in this climate of threat, terror, and collective danger (and under circumstances where physical size and strength[5] as well

as psychological toughness were deeply problematic and where fertility of women[6] and hence the reproduction of populations was equally problematic). Producing "men''--and women, as their complement-- was, in this world, a desperate, competitive challenge, with survival as the stakes. These cultural traditions do not make sense, Strathern's interpretive virtuosity notwithstanding, in the New Guinea with which she presents us, a timeless world where killing is symbolized and talked about but not practiced,[7] the New Guinea of modern ethnographers.

Strathern's New Guinea, devoid of terror, is likewise mainly devoid of power. Another potentially fairly direct path for the production of cultural symbols is their motivated (if not necessarily entirely conscious) creation as instruments of political interest. A considerable body of social theory (in the Marxist, Mannheimean, Frankfurt, Gramscian, Foucaultian, and diverse feminist lineages, among others) has engaged the question of how ideologies are cumulatively produced that advance and reinforce the interests of particular segments of society that collectively have the power to impose them, without positing conscious conspiracies and manipulations. I do not believe that, to see the hegemonic force of cultural symbols, anthropology must take a crude and simplistic view of men in New Guinea men's houses sitting around discussing rules and cosmological schemes that would subordinate women and extract their labor. Nor do we have to imagine that it is only men who have produced the cultural traditions we record ethnographically. In much of New Guinea, men and women lead lives fairly widely separated in terms of quotidian regimens of work and other activity, in terms of experiences and perspectives. The symbolic stuff that crystallizes into cultural material is produced on both sides of this gender boundary, and material emanating from one side is reshaped through commentary and response from the other. Yet in this complex dialectical process, the cultural patterns that cumulate come (it would seem) preeminently to represent the interests (and the fears, anxieties, hostilities, envy) of the male side of the gender divide, and to serve men's political interests.

Even within the men's side, or the women's, there may be structures of political interest manifest in cultural constructions; we need not assume that each side is unitary and coherent, devoid of contradiction and interest. (Do we really want to analyze semen transactions and notions of growth among the Sambia without observing that the cultural ideologies about growth force young boys to perform fellatio, on their knees in deference and submission, to serve the orgasmic pleasures of their seniors? Young Sambia have noticed; and now that they have a choice, they go off in droves to Port Moresby instead.) In this dialectic

of culture production and reproduction, concepts of maleness and femaleness, of essential nature and genderedness, but also of work and responsibility and the products of labor, emerge; these conceptions are inescapably expressions and reinforcements of power, not simply of meaning.

Where the most basic notions about personhood and being-in-the-world are themselves products of this ongoing dialectic, no cultural critique can be internally situated. That is, any interrogation of the most basic takens-for-granted of a cultural system must be external to that system (and hence, inescapably, situated in some other one). My response to this conundrum, with which post-Marxist and feminist challenges confront us, is to try to be relentlessly self-reflective (as Strathern is) without becoming disempowered (as Strathern seems to be, especially in her penultimate chapter on "domination").

If cultural critique is to be possible vis-à-vis our own tradition, I do not believe we should abdicate the possibility of such cultural critique vis-à-vis other peoples' cumulated (and often equally patriarchal) traditions. The Enlightenment-derived concepts of universal justice, humanity, and dignity, if applied across divides of culture and sex and race, have much to recommend them, in contrast to practices of widow-strangling or gang rape or dowry murder or the stoning to death of adulterers. While I am aware of the potential imperialism entailed in their export abroad, I feel no need to apologize for their European origins, especially in an era where women all over the world are seeking to liberate themselves from cultural pasts, and where these ideals provide a flicker of hope for political prisoners, starving peasants, bonded laborers, and others desperately marginalized and threatened by local systems of power, cloaked in local cultural symbols.

Cultural critique based on Western values has often been carried on crudely without adequate appreciation either of the cultural complexities or the imperialism involved--feminist condemnations of clitoridectomy and *sati* (Spivak 1989) provide cases in point, as do Marxist critiques of exploitation. But what is needed is less crude and more culturally and politically sensitive critique, not an abandonment of the field to cultural relativism. The frame Strathern places around her book suggests that what she intended was precisely such a critique, that simultaneously interrogated and played off against one another Western takens-for-granted and those of "Melanesia." My reading is that the balance she strikes is less than balanced; there is a lot of New Guinea culture here, and very little critique.

There is much to be learned from the questions Strathern poses, and

answers, so brilliantly. There is much to be learned, as well, from the questions she leaves unasked and unexplored.

NOTES

1. In my view this is a manifestation of what James Carrier has called "Occidentalism": a caricaturing and gross oversimplification of Western modes of life and thought so as to exaggerate their contrasts with those of non-Western peoples.

2. My point, at the risk of sounding like Marvin Harris, is that we would learn more about who is working how much by measuring caloric expenditures of energy across time than by asking local ideologues, whether in England or Malaita (or New Guinea). I accept Strathern's empirical point that in New Guinea such expenditures of labor are often less imbalanced than has been surmised in characterizations of "exploitation"; moreover, the imbalance has probably grown with the use of steel tools.

3. Sadly, only Herdt, Tuzin, and a handful of other ethnographers of New Guinea have had serious grounding in depth psychology, and could be qualified to contribute to such an exploration. Strathern's reading of Herdt systematically expunges psychoanalytic interpretations in favor of symbolic ones.

4. Strathern, incidentally, misreads (p. 128) my observation (Keesing 1982b:22) that "what men produce--as women cannot--is men," I meant "men" in the sense of fierce warriors capable of enduring pain and trauma and inflicting violent death, who are created out of boys.

5. In her years at the University of Papua New Guinea, Strathern regularly saw students from nutritionally marginal fringe Highlands populations add six inches or a foot in stature at the end of the adolescent growth period with a regimen of cafeteria food.

6. Data from Buchbinder (1973, 1977) and others indicates that under traditional dietary regimes, the age of menarche in fringe Highlands populations was often upwards of eighteen years, and ovulation was apparently sporadic and limited in time span.

7. The resurgent warfare in some parts of the Highlands is quite different in character than precolonial warfare, which often had population survival (rather than clan lands) as the stakes.

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Partible Persons and Multiple Authors

In reviewing this book I cannot simply engage in linear exposition and critique, because it charts a most extraordinary course between the imagined worlds of Melanesians and of Western analysts, between the sociality of gift and commodity economies, between anthropological and feminist debates. Ultimately I criticize these binary oppositions that steer its course. But like Mary Douglas, writing in the *London Review of Books* (1989), I am stunned by the cunning of the book's design. It is not the cunning of concealment--on the contrary, this is a book that wears it scaffolding on the outside. Douglas likened it to the Centre George Pompidou in Paris--that famous building that extrudes its air conditioning in brilliant external panels, whose escalators creep like transparent caterpillars on its surface, and with as much art happening outside as is enveloped within. Surface complexity affords multiple vantage points for the reader, and in this book for the author too!

But first, what is meant by *The Gender of the Gift?* For Marilyn Strathern gender means much more than the existence of male and female as sociological categories. It is rather the rendering of persons, artifacts, events, and sequences as male and female. Thus the gender of

the gift is not simply that men exchange women, or that only men trans-
act, but the gendering of transactors, goods, and exchange events and
sequences (p. ix).

The gift for her is antithetical to the commodity. Following Gregory
(1982), she sees the gift exchange as establishing a relation between
exchanging subjects, while commodity exchange establishes a relation-
ship between the objects exchanged. In a commodity economy people
experience the desire to appropriate goods; in a gift economy the desire
is to expand social relations (p. 143). In a commodity economy persons
and things assume the social form of things: they are reified; whereas in
a gift economy things and persons assume the social form of persons:
they are personified. But while Gregory allows the coexistence of the
two forms of exchange in the real world of contemporary Melanesia,
Strathern deliberately segregates them in her analytical fictions.

> It is important to the way that I proceed that the forms so con-
> trasted are different in social origin (Melanesian/Western) even
> though the manner in which they are expressed must belong
> commensurately within a single Western discourse. Thus a cul-
> ture dominated by ideas about property ownership can only
> imagine the absence of such ideas in specific ways. . . . It sets
> up its own internal contrasts. This is especially true for the con-
> trast between commodities and gifts; the terms form a single
> cultural pair within Western political economy discourse,
> though they can be used to typify economies that are not party
> to the discourse. (P. 18)

This fiction (and others) becomes pivotal in the process of Strathern's
regional comparison. She covers an extraordinary range of Melanesian
material--from the Highlands, west and east, to the Massim and
Vanuatu--but her comparative method is rather unorthodox. Orthodox
comparisons decontextualize cultural elements from wholes, talk of
traits or institutions (the presence/absence of male initiations, pollution
beliefs, warfare) without due regard to cultural context, to their mean-
ing in an experential whole. For Strathern it is not so much decontex-
tualized elements as cultural wholes that are the problem. What passes
for comparison is often the mere juxtaposition of ethnographic materi-
als from several places (collected in one volume, but still intact).
Strathern suggests in a great backhander that this may be "because of
too much good work" in Melanesian ethnography. Brilliant ethno-
graphies convey a sense of completeness and closure, and thus resist

incorporation in a frame different to that bounding the original depiction.

Strathern's strategy is different--she wants to do a partial job. This seems to be a knowing pun--partial in the sense of analytic openness, but also partial in the sense of an interested vantage point. For her that vantage point is Mount Hagen, although she moves far beyond it into the Eastern Highlands, the Massim, and Vanuatu. But still the view of Melanesia is a view from the Western Highlands. Her analytical problem self-consciously derives from the first case, namely "how to specify the widely varying relationships between public cult activity, ceremonial exchange, and (formerly) warfare and the organization of horticultural production and domestic kinship on the other" (pp. 43-44). This has been construed by some as the relation of the male public domain versus the female domestic domain. This is not Strathern's model (as we shall see). As Strathern moves away from the Hagen center she observes a difference in how the public collective life of men is constituted. In the Western Highlands, it is ceremonial exchange; in the east, male cults. In the west, politics creates prestige as a separate value; whereas in the east, and the Massim, collective exchanges are predicated on kinship, and create more kinship values rather than detached prestige values.

This ethnographic array, though it entails brilliant comparison and reinterpretation, is not just a display of the splendid diversity of Melanesian societies. For, as she says rather cheekily in the conclusion, they are after all but variations of one Case--*Melanesian* sociality (p. 340). And perhaps more important than the comparison internal to Melanesia is the comparison with the imagined West. Here regional comparison does not compromise an extreme distinction of us/them; if anything it buttresses it by demonstrating the variety of ways in which Melanesians can be the opposite of us.

The underlying logic is one of alterity--not just gift versus commodity but a difference in sociality, which for Strathern renders inapplicable a range of Western concepts: subject, object, exploitation, domination. Strathern reflects how in the decade prior to this book she made an "easy living" through setting up negativities between Hagen and Western thinking, for example, about nature/culture and domestic/public. Her aim was not so much to demonstrate the inapplicability of these concepts, to get closer to the Hagen concepts, to suggest our English glosses were a poor translation, but rather to get closer to the exogenous constructs of anthropologists. Here she interrogates not the deep metaphysics of others but of Westerners (cf. Keesing 1985). Central to Western metaphysics is the relation posited between culture and the

individual. She demonstrates how this antimony has hindered past anthropological analysis in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. We need to think about society in the singular and the person in the plural --composite and partible.

She takes us back to that dark time in Highlands ethnography, to that prehistoric period dominated by an intense pair of debates--first about the nature of descent groups, and second about "sexual antagonism." The first is dead--no longer do ethnographers worry unduly about non-agnates and loose structure--but the second endures. Strathern shows they were an intimate couple; understandings of "descent" and "male-female" relations were complicit. The problems of Highlands men became the problems of male anthropologists--how to preserve the maleness of groups in the face of threats, intrusions and allurements from women. In talking about sexual antagonism there was a similar slippage between indigenous and exogenous constructs. Read's model of male cultural superiority achieved in the face of men's natural inferior-ity assumed that society inhered in male collectivities, culture in male creativity ([1952] 1971). Women, of course, had "nature."

Even in contemporary ethnography, Strathern detects a convergence between the interests of the ethnographer and Melanesian men. She perceives in Sillitoe's and Feil's recent work a hymn to male individual-ism. She reads Gil Herdt's ethnography of Sambia male ritual homosex-uality (1981) and finds his analysis saturated with a concern for the boundaries of the male individual. The individual "as a being that wor-ries about its boundaries and searches for a unitary entity, remains an unspoken premise in the anthropology of experience" (p. 57). The indi-vidual actor is an agonist, and expressly a male agonist plagued by self-doubt and the fears of the female within. Says Strathern, such rites are not about "making men"; they are not, to use the argot of American social psychology, "sex role socialization."

This relates to the important question of whether the sexing of male and female bodies is an innate state or is constructed only in discourse. This is a matter of intense debate among feminist philosophers (Gatens 1983; Grosz 1989). Strathern has it both ways by suggesting that some societies posit neuter subjects and others sexed subjects. But, she chal-lenges a naive theory of representation that presumes a simple corre-spondence between sexed individuals and male and female viewpoints. Gender construction in Melanesia is much more than the social con-struction of difference on the preexisting bodies of male and female. Gender difference constructs the world of things and events as well as persons, and in constructing bodies/persons, it tends to make them par-tible. Baldly put, men and women have both male and female bits.

This argument about persons and bodies is intimately related to an argument about activity--in particular the posited segregation of social life into two domains of activity, the male public and the female domestic. Many other commentators have queried the boundaries of this distinction, either by stressing the presence of men in the domestic domain and the presence of women in the public domain of ceremonial exchange or by suggesting the ideological character of the domain distinction. For Strathern it is not a question of where male and female bodies are and what they are doing, but rather of how activity is represented. For Hagen she argues that, although domain distinctions are deployed, this does not align men on the side of the public and women on the side of the private. Such a border smuggles in the Western antimony between society and the individual.

By this view women are conflated with the domestic (as in Rosaldo and Lamphere's model of 1974) and men with the public and, by a further slippage, the social. Strathern dislodges this equation between the collective public activity of men and the social (cf. Yeatman 1984). She stresses the sociality of domestic life, the collective character of kinship. In the fourth chapter she uses many examples of women standing for society or collective interest--although interestingly these examples are all drawn from a more historically situated ethnography, dealing not just with timeless Melanesians but with the world of postcolonial politics, migrant labor, and business. Her own work with Hagen migrants in town suggests that absent young men represent society back home in terms of female ties (pp. 77-79). Second, my own ethnography of the Sa speakers of Vanuatu discusses the historical emergence of the opposition between male mobility and migrant labor versus immobile women and rooted tradition *(womanples)* (pp. 79-82). Finally, Sexton's work on *wok meri* groups in the Highlands examines new female collectivities concerned with the ritual regeneration of money and society (pp. 82-86).

Strathern suggests that these novel contexts do not imply a redrawing of the boundaries. Women are not moving into collective male rituals; they are still primarily associated with domestic, kinship relations. But domesticity in Melanesia does not diminish women, it does not render them closer to nature, as socially incomplete. It is only Western models of the individual that require that the individual break with the domestic circle to become a full adult. Indeed, the Melanesian household is rather the locus within which full personhood is most apparent--in the conjugation of male and female persons as husbands and wives.

She suggests both in Hagen and beyond that there are two kinds of sociality: domestic and collective, associated with cross-sex and same-

sex transactions. This contrast between cross-sex and same-sex transactions is analyzed through an enormous corpus of ethnographic materials --from Hagen, Enga, Paiela, Gimi, Orokaiva, the Muyuw and Sabarl, the Trobriands. I will focus on two examples, her reanalyses of Hagen and of the Sambia (described by Herdt). These two examples I consider in the context of her dispute with Marxist and feminist accounts of Melanesian gender relations--that these relations are not relations of exploitation or of male domination. Such analyses she dismisses on the basis that they alike depend on Western models of the possessive individual--Western models of active subjects owning passive objects.

In Mount Hagen both males and females are involved in conjugal relations making children and making wealth, but the conjoint products of their bodies and minds are used exclusively by men in ceremonial exchange, in *moka* transactions of pigs and shells, which "make" a "name." Strathern has described these conjugal relations in idioms of reciprocity, mutual "looking after," rather than in terms of a relation of exploitation whereby men appropriate the joint products of their labor from their wives and use them in transaction.

Josephides has presented the argument about exploitation and appropriation in a most forceful way. She sees idioms of "looking after," of reciprocity, as masking hierarchical relations between men and women in domestic relations. She also points to the way in which value is accrued in transaction itself, the increment of value in the pig as wealth, and the incremental value accrued to male transactors as prestige. This is, she says, a "smokescreen" that hides the real origin of pigs in home production (Josephides 1983:306; p. 150).

Strathern offers what she calls "a gentle deconstruction," which in fact proves quite devastating. She asks, How can people conceal what they do not know themselves? At the core of Marxist analysis she finds Western presumptions of property, namely, that an individual should own and control what he or she does. That is, the work of a person is presumed to be naturally attached to that person (a necessary premise in the theory of alienated labor and of surplus value). Strathern argues that in the Hagen case, labor is not alienated, nor are women exploited by the appropriation of their products. The value conversion does not rely on erasing the work women do (as in Western domestic labor). Pigs, for instance, are seen as conjoint products--multiply authored by men and women. Thus, when men transact pigs in *moka* they eclipse their own production, as well as that of their wives, in the process of transacting. The creative work of making gardens and rearing pigs is fully acknowledged; work is not obliterated but becomes wealth in the process

of male-male transaction. The value conversion is in the sphere of male agency: men eclipse the domain of domestic sociality, and in the process eclipse their own persons. The metaphor of an eclipse is crucial for "as in a lunar eclipse, for the effects to be registered, there can only be partial concealment not obliteration" (p. 157).

This value conversion involves a transformation from a cross-sex to a same-sex transaction. Wealth in domestic kinship has a multiple identity; in ceremonial exchange it takes on a singular, male identity in transactions with other males. In relation to his wife, the male person is several and his products are shared creations; in relation to other men, he is a singular male. Exchange between husband and wife is unmediated--they have a direct effect on the disposition of each other, they do not detach parts of their bodies and give personified things to each other. Exchange between male partners is mediated--they transact gifts by attaching and detaching wealth that is seen to lie on the skin. At this point, Strathern does not deny male domination (as she does later) but rather finds it in the domaining of social life--in the rearrangement of relations between male and female persons.

But does the multiple authorship of things and the partibility of persons render the language of exploitation and alienation, or that of hierarchical encompassment, inadmissible? The mutuality of work in making things may be acknowledged, but is such work necessarily of equal value, and is "work" irrelevant in representing the product in exchange? In other ethnographic contexts multiple authorship does not imply equivalent authorship. For South Pentecost, Vanuatu, I have suggested that although conjoint labor is involved in producing yams and pigs, male and female labor is not accorded equal value. Female labor, though acknowledged, *is* ultimately of lesser value, for in the context of exchange these goods are represented as "male," embodying not only male labor but transformations of male bodies. The value of women's work is *not* erased, but it is *encompassed,* rendered inferior to the superior value of male work. It may be said that men also eclipse (encompass) the "domestic" parts of themselves, in the new context of transaction, but women are more thoroughly encompassed, since they are not transactors. Transaction is here male-male (as distinct from other parts of Melanesia where women do transact in cross-sex and same-sex relations).

Second, I consider Strathern's reanalysis of Sambia male cults, a collective male activity that involves not the transacting of pigs and shells but the transacting of semen between men, Young men receive semen from ritual seniors. The ingestion of semen by young men and the asso-

ciated expunging of maternal blood, Herdt suggests, makes Sambia boys into men, renders them full adults who can marry and procreate. Thus ritual homosexuality is the necessary precursor of adult heterosexuality. The link between male initiation and marriage is clear: the junior is "wife" to the senior "husband"; the boy's sister ultimately marries this man, that is, he becomes his sister's husband (p. 216).

The symbology of these cults, like those of many initiatory cults in Melanesia, has long been analyzed in terms of male mimicry of female procreativity, of men doing culturally what they cannot do naturally, or of men appropriating the powers of female fertility. Strathern suggests that these analyses rely on the assumption that women are mothers by nature and men, fathers by culture.

Strathern demonstrates how our own procreative beliefs encode certainty about "real" versus "imagined bodies." Maternity to us seems real and visible and paternity, because less visible, less real. The baby thus seems to us to belong to the mother, as the natural extension of her proprietorial body (pp. 314-318). The procreation and gestation beliefs of the Sambia and a congeries of related Eastern Highlands peoples, however, suggest that it is men, not women, who make babies--they are coagulations of semen within the mother's body (which is itself largely composed of male substance, and is thus arguably a paternal and not a maternal body). The baby is fed through the mother's ingesting semen, in acts of intercourse and fellatio with her husband while in the womb and then by suckling milk, which is transformed semen.

In reanalyzing the dramaturgy of Sambia male cults, Strathern focuses on the ritual artifact of the flute--which stands both for penis and for breast--a vessel filled with nurturing fluid. Rather than this flute symbolizing penis and by another substitution the flute standing for the breast, Strathern suggests that both male and female nurture is encoded in the one ritual object. The gender of human sexual organs, like the flute, is not fixed. Persons are male and female not because of their appendages and orifices but because of their social relations. In the relation of initiation the young Sambia boy is female to the initiating husband, but by ingesting the procreative substance (both semen and milk), he becomes male. He is not rendered male through ingesting a male substance, but his person masculinizes the semen. He is thus filled up and can grow as a male person. Hence it is not that fathers directly produce sons through ingestion of an all-male substance. Reproductive masculinity instead relies on a cross-sex transaction, and the one who inseminates is canonically not only his but also his sister's husband. Brothers and sisters are thereby linked through ingesting the semen of

one husband. Such semen constitutes the nonpartible part of the body of both male and female. Men have partible semen as well, which can be detached and transmitted to other men or to women as wives.

For Strathern the gendering of partible products--shell valuables, pigs, semen--marks transitions between two modes of sociality: conjugal cross-sex relations contrasted with male same-sex transactions. This process is expounded in great detail and complexity in the second part of *The Gender of the Gift.* The gendered movement of objects has to do with agency. In the cross-sex state, agents are completed and passive. In the same-sex state, they are incomplete and active. As active agents men can separate objects from their source, in order to signify a new singular male identity. But, importantly, the way in which this is done differs significantly between those places where ceremonial exchange is the dominant form of male collective life and those where the dominant forms are initiatory cults or kinship-based transactions. The transactions of ceremonial exchange define the relation in terms of the transaction itself--in terms of a history of debts and credits. These transactions are incremental; they propagate more transactions, with an increased velocity of the flow of objects down exchange paths. In transactions based on kinship connections, be these matrilineal or patrilineal, there is a preexisting debt, a debt prior to the transaction. These relations, moreover, are nonincremental. They are everlasting cycles of cross-sex substitutions, rather than the vortex of increment in male-male exchange.

Gift exchange seems to us endlessly recursive--objects circulate in relations in order to make those relations. Thus, objects appear both as the cause and the effect of social relations. In contrast to Bourdieu's view of the temporality of the gift (1977:6), Strathern views the gift as predicated on time's flowing backwards, since gifts are given in terms of their anticipated outcomes (pp. 303-305). The Sambia boy is imagined as his future wife, the result of the transaction of semen anticipated before it is given. For Strathern gender thus becomes a code of temporality, of sequencing in action. Melanesian aesthetics creates male and female as timeless analogues of each other--time not only flows backwards but is in fact denied (p. 344).

There is a close fit between this espousal of eternity and the thoroughgoing alterity that characterizes this book. Strathern embraces alterity as an analytical fiction necessary for her narrative. She sets up a number of compelling dichotomies: us and them, the gift and the commodity, anthropological and feminist analysis. These are all persuasive fictions necessary to emplot her story, she claims, to undo that "meta-narrative"

of Western thought, the relation between society and the individual, What emerges is not realist fiction but a compelling series of picaresque stories that seem in search of an author. Just as the individual is expunged in the analysis of Melanesian personhood, so the author eludes us. We think we find her in one analytical posture, but then she has skipped to another. The reader needs to be very nimble to follow her (cf. Gell 1989). Ultimately, however, the brilliance of this authorial evasion generates an anthropology that exoticizes and eternalizes "the other" and denies the relation between "us" and "them" in real historical time.

Cell suggested that the opposition of gift and commodity was the one most likely to draw criticism and so it has. Thomas (1991) has argued that the commodity/gift dichotomy should not be conflated with the opposition between "us" and "them," between Western and Melanesian societies. Commodities, as detachable, alienable entities, preexisted Western colonization in the Pacific, and indeed contemporary Melanesian economy and sociality must be seen in terms of a coexistence of the two types of exchange (as must contemporary Western societies). The very categories of Melanesian and Western sociality not only essentialize and eternalize two dubious labels for culture areas, but deny the historical relation between Europeans and Melanesians. This relation is one of mutual interpenetration rather than the mere subordination of "Melanesia" to the domination of a monolithic capitalist culture. This historical relation has generated novel creolized cultures, which defy analytic segregations into their "Melanesian" and "Western" bits (cf. Keesing and Jolly n.d.). The segregation of "Melanesia" and the West is defended as an analytic fiction. But such a fiction leaves out some of the most interesting chapters in the recent history of the region, unwritten chapters replete with gendered personae and processes that constitute exchanges with the "West."

There is also a problem with the extreme differentiation Strathern draws between Western ideas of the possessive individual and Melanesian notions of the person. In much of the recent anthropology of the person, the character of the Western person as canonically the isolated individual, as against the person who is a nexus of social relations, has been overdrawn (cf. Errington and Gewertz 1987). If we look not just at liberal political philosophies of the individual, and the normative structures of American psychology but at the ethnography of our daily practice as persons in relation to each other, the individual seems more permeable and partible. Do we never see persons as composites of relations? Do we not recognize agency elicited by others rather than always as the action of a motivated individual? And what of the alternative

grand political philosophies of Foucault, Nietzsche, and Derrida pro-
claiming the death of the Western subject, the fragmentation of the soul
atom, or the end of the author?

Finally, I feel unhappiest with the way Strathern has portrayed the
relation between anthropology and feminism. Ultimately, anthropology
is her "we" in relation to the "them" of feminism. Despite her continu-
ing brilliant contributions to feminist anthropology, Strathern has per-
sistently described the two terms as an awkward relation, full of tension
or even mutual subversion (e.g., 1985, 1987).

She contrasts the philosophies of knowledge implicit in anthropology
and feminism. Both deal in difference and diversity (pp. 22-29). Femi-
nism, though it might appear to some outsiders as unitary, is in fact a
plurality of competing positions, a polyphony of theoretical voices. But
this theoretical plurality ultimately relates to decisions based in our life
and practice. In anthropology, by contrast, plurality pertains to rela-
tions sustained with other lives. Thus, she suggests a tension between
feminist scholarship and politics--academic radicalism tends to be
politically conservative, and radical politics conceptually conservative
(a paradox I find as unpersuasive as Lévi-Strauss's declarations about
radicals at home and conservatives abroad).

Her ambivalence about feminism has been rather harshly chided by
Vicki Kirby in the pages of *Australian Feminist Studies* (1989). I sympa-
thize with Strathern's response that there is doubtful benefit in the
transformation from being a dutiful daughter to being a dutiful sister
(1989:27). But I do lament the paralysis in her final theoretical posture
about gender and power. She denies the existence of male domination in
the New Guinea Highlands (pp. 325-328). Strathern argues that
because men and women are not unitary sociological entities, because
they are multiple persons with male and female parts, we cannot speak
the language of domination, for "[d]omination is a consequence of tak-
ing action, and in this sense I have suggested that all acts are excessive"
(p. 337). I disagree. Although it is crucial to see both men and women as
actors, and not to render women as victims to male free will, I think we
must also acknowledge how women in some contexts are not just
eclipsed by men but dominated by them, often by persuasion and some-
times by violence. Whereas both men and women may initiate action, a
man has an advantage because of "other men at his back" (p. 328). The
political enlargement of male interest, the potential of men to be "big
men," is the precondition of violent acts on women. "Such asymmetry
turns rules into penalties, the enclosure of domestic life into confine-
ment, and the cause of men's own activity into the wounds of someone

who is beaten and given pain for it" (p. 328). But such as oppressive aesthetic is not just a male creation, maintains Strathern.

But can we agree that because domination is partial, contextual, and jointly created it therefore does not exist? There are theories of domination that see power not as all-encompassing or hegemonic but as a dialectic in which the collaboration/resistance of the less powerful is as crucial as the persuasion/force of the powerful.

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There is no easy way to thank the three reviewers for their attention to my book. I shall try to attend in turn to what I see as the major and most interesting of their criticisms, including those they share among them. These are principally the false concreteness of "Melanesia," along with the absence of such concreteness as far as history is concerned; and my underplaying of power, domination, terror and the "dark" side.

* * * * *

The GDAT debate to which Paula Brown alludes was a debate in the strict sense of the term; I was technically the proposer of a motion. Obviously I made out as extreme a case as I could! That is not my position in *The Gender of the Gift,* which seeks rather to exemplify the proposition that "however useful the concept of society may be to analysis, we are not going to justify its use by appealing to indigenous counterparts" (p. 3).

Two points follow. First, I regard as a misplaced intellectualism the way in which Western anthropologists have read the concept of "society" into Melanesians' understandings of practices reported in the book. I set myself the task of imagining what the intellectual counterpart to such a concept could plausibly be. My evidence is drawn from artifacts, symbols, and acts that might yield clues as to the nature of the perceived and reproduced world. If I give the impression, as Brown indicates, that I think Melanesians are cultural puppets, it was a wrong impression--though I can see how it could arise. This book is not a sociological analysis (in the manner of Strathern 1972), was never meant to be, and consequently does not mobilize conventional social science understandings of agency and action, and does not equate agents with persons. Rather, it is an attempt to imagine what an indigenous "analysis" might look like (p. 309) ifwe took seriously the idea that these islanders might be endorsing their own theory of social action. It pushes to extremes, then, and makes explicit, an ethnographic enterprise that uncovers counterparts to the observer's concerns.

Second, I try to make it clear that I have not left the company of those observers whose works I criticize or deploy, for they are the reason (Melanesian: "base") for the enterprise in the first place. I seek to extend, not obliterate, necessarily so since my own earlier work is part of that base; I also appropriate and exploit their writings. Most principal assertions about Western "thought" are illustrated at some point in the words of fellow anthropologists-- the propositional language that gives us clues as to the nature of the world as these Melanesianists have perceived and reproduced it. In lieu of a survey (saving Brown), I have thus systematically tried to give evidence for my assertions about Western knowledge practices.

Proposition, assertion: Where the book falls down in my view is in its failure to be explicit about its interpretive methods. Here, of course, I join a throng of fellow Melanesianists. Their descriptive language is suffused with taken-for-granted assertions that appeal to the readers' common sense, most notably what might be understood by the terms "male" and "female." That pair I scrutinize at some length, but for the most part demonstrate the assertive nature of language by simple counterassertion. This is not at all satisfactory, and remains a shortcoming.

However, it is irrelevant that the language in which I describe Melanesian practices could also be used of Western, including Australian, ones (indeed where else could my own language have come from?). It is sufficient to have shown that a body of anthropologists/eth-

nographers (including myself) have developed for their own purposes a set of ideas that, in Roger Keesing's words, form a "conceptual system." But this they did not simply invent--it was drawn from among the many and diverse habits of thought that exist around them, and it is such a cultural background or horizon that I call "Western." The ideas anthropologists use are examples of Western thought in this sense. That does not mean such ideas are exhaustive of it, nor that they cannot be contradicted by other ideas. But I would argue that the set I have dwelt upon has been hegemonic in the manner in which we have been accustomed to think about Melanesia. Indeed, Keesing eloquently points out the questions that have been concealed by the conceptual systems of British and American anthropology--it is these and their strategies of concealment that I investigate.

The same is true of the term "Melanesia." If the depiction of Western habits of thinking comes from my reading of anthropologists, so the depiction of Melanesian practices comes from Hagen in the Western Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Margaret Jolly makes the point for me. This orientation is not concealed (see pp. 45, 280), On the contrary, I go to some pains to make it clear that one of the problematics of the book--collective life constituted as the affairs of men--is given by my understanding of Hagen. Of course, it is not necessarily a Kwaio-centric problematic. Nor is it one that belongs to Irian Jaya or Australia for that matter (pp. 46-47). Nor at the same time is it simply a Hagen invention. Hagen ideas are examples or versions of others found elsewhere.

I do not wish to trivialize the critique of my apparent regionalism. Rather, I would endorse the point that one could with equal analytical ingenuity (Keesing) find continuities elsewhere. But how often do we bother to bring this fact to surface view? I take the liberty of referring to a recent attempt (Strathern 1991) to address exactly the questions of analytical ingenuity, the production of knowledge, and the comparative units we create for ourselves--a problem that is not to be settled by simply pointing out the arbitrariness of any one unit of reference. In the meanwhile, I shall keep to "Melanesia" to indicate a horizon of cognate cultural and social data that has one crucial characteristic: that it is larger than and extends away from the society/culture that I made the center of my problematic.

Opening up a Highlands-based vision to a broader horizon does not imply, then, that I have charted a natural region, nor a culture with a unified common basis as quite properly worries Brown. "Melanesia" is in part, of course, constituted in the directions in which scholars have

communicated their findings with one another, and there were theoretical and analytical precedents for taking on board some of the rich literature from the Massim, as I was intrigued by Jolly's work in Vanuatu. If I have crossed a too radical divide between "mainland" and Oceanic language areas (Keesing's designation), it is more, not less, interesting that some of the transformations appear persuasive. In this ever-innovative part of the world, where the borrowing and importing of practices, cults, paraphernalia, and the sources of power is done so freely, I see no natural boundaries. I do see peoples insisting on certain (interested) interpretations of themselves, to draw an analogy Barth (1987) draws between schools of scholars and the exegetical exercises of different ritual experts from the Mountain Ok area in Papua New Guinea.

Most of the points about history are well taken. However, like feminism, historicism is not simply to be "added," and I would turn the caution back on itself. (1) There is a great temptation to use "history" to invest anthropological accounts with the narrative realism of events. (2) One frequently finds that what purports to be a description of a specific point in time turns out to be rendered in a generic language of timeless concepts. (3) The great trap of historical analysis is its presentism--the assumption that what goes on in the postwar, pacified Highlands, for example, can be put down to the fact that it is a period of postwar pacification. (4) Finally, the arrival of Westerners and the imposition of colonialism tends to overdetermine any understanding of local formations. My categories Melanesian and Western do not deny historical relations between "Europeans" and "Melanesians"; but they are more real as a fiction than is the fantasy that "Europeans" and "Melanesians" ever exchanged anything with one another. At least, Melanesians make exchanges with persons, not with "cultures" or regions or categories. 'Us" and "them" could never interact in "real historical time."[1] Meanwhile, there are other interesting problems, such as the accounts earlier anthropologists have given of the societies they studied. It is these that are my data, and this is the point at which I introduce historical specificity: the periods at which they were written, along with an (admittedly sketchy) attempt at a historical sequencing of anthropological concepts.

But dates aside, what about gifts and commodities and the mixing of regimes? Perhaps gift "economy" was too much of a concretivity on my part. It was not meant as an ideal type *of economy,* of which we might then find empirical and inevitably "mixed" examples on the ground (Keesing). It was intended (as Jolly notes) as a shorthand, or indeed a

caricature (Keesing's phrase), like the difference between "Eastern" and "Western" Highlands (p. 260), for organizing the description of a conceptual universe across a whole range of phenomena. It was, precisely, a rhetorical exercise.

Jolly and Keesing are probably right to imply that the exercise is locked within already-passé debates. My fiction of the gift economy is a reflex of a claim--that the logic of commodity economy colors our mode of thought--that Keesing exposes as old-fashioned. If it is old-fashioned (but see Webster 1990), I am thus responding to a conceptualization of the world that is already bypassed by other approaches in the philosophy of social sciences. But I would have the reader ponder on this. First, I hope to have demonstrated that much ethnographic/anthropological work--especially of the period with which I am concerned in the Highlands--is plausibly interpreted as itself a systematic application of commodity-logic thinking. The logic exists there if nowhere else! That is an issue that cannot be bypassed in any attempt to understand these societies through the medium of the anthropological analyses done on them. Second, the point is not to avoid coloring, but to make coloring evident. Does Keesing seriously think that one branch of social science can come to the rescue of another? It will inevitably displace it, substituting its own rhetoric. Now, it is in the shift from one place to another that we reveal ourselves to ourselves, but only if we are aware of what we are doing. Hence the transparency of my own *as if* shift to the language of "gift economy." The concept of gift economy does not pretend to have left its origin in commodity thinking: it is a device for subjecting that thinking to scrutiny and, saving Keesing, for presenting an internal cultural critique.

The real question is whether the exercise has enlarged on previous understandings-- whether it has brought one to a more adequate comprehension of the conundrum that objects circulate in relations to make relations in which objects can circulate (p. 221), or of the dovetailing of cause and effect, or of the significance of revelation and display, or of the manner in which people endure apparently impossible regimes. Or whether it has indeed illuminated what I take to be a Melanesian blind spot. I do, *pace* Keesing, have an external critique to make of Melanesian practices, namely "their" failure to do what "we" do so thoroughly, which is to present to our/themselves the symbolic nature of our/their constructions as constructions (reifications) (pp. 167, 189). (I sketch some of the "illusions" to which the Melanesian blind spot gives rise [e.g., p. 218].) Keesing claims that the production of symbols, along

with cultural critique, is a major concern of his. It also has to be mine, or there would have been no motivation to write the book. To the Enlightenment ideas of justice, humanity and dignity, however, I would add understanding. Like the other three, it entails an innocence of a kind.[2] But I neither attack *nor* defend what I am trying to understand. How undramatic! The problem, and I suspect Keesing knows it, is that Sambia initiation practices and such were never just, though they may also have been, "brutalizations."

I offer the above observations to elucidate the perspectives from which *The Gender of the Gift* was written. One always has reasons! That does not mean that one could not find different reasons for different projects. Indeed, I hope that some of my elucidations of how anthropologists have dealt with the societies of Melanesia will help other projects, such as the writing of history or the analysis of economics. The reviewers have enlarged the horizon so to speak. And, of course, the reality is out there. The issue is how Westerners empirically know it: I was tremendously encouraged by Brown's note 2 and its suggestion of knowledge gained afresh.

*   *   *   *   *

My view of the final set of comments is of a different order. The following are verbatim quotations from chapter 11.

> How then are we to understand all those contexts . . . in which men are reported as asserting dominance over women? They demand obedience, roughride women's concerns, strike and beat their bodies. Frequently this is quite explicit as to gender: it is by virtue of men being men that women must listen to them. Yet everything that has been argued to this point suggests that domination cannot rest on the familiar (to Western eyes) structures of hierarchy, control, the organization of relations, or on the idea that at stake is the creation of society or the exploitation of a natural realm, and that in the process certain persons lose their right to self-expression. More accurately, men's acts of domination cannot symbolize such a structure, for it is not an object of Melanesian attention. (Pp. 325-326)
>
> . . . I want to suggest a way in which we might both take into account Melanesian assumptions about the nature of social life and unpack those assumptions to indicate a form of domination that people do 'know'. . . . [A]cts of dominance consist

in taking advantage of those relations created in the circulation of objects and [in] overriding the exchange of perspectives on which exchange as such rests. . . . [T]here [seems] a systemic inevitability about domination and a particular advantage afforded men. But, by the same token, acts of domination are tantamount to no more than taking advantage of this advantage. (Pp. 326-327)

The inevitability lies in the conventions governing the form which social action takes. Acts are innovative, for they are always constituted in the capacity of the agent to act 'for oneself'. It is only in acting thus as oneself that others are in turn constituted in one's regard. . . . Indeed, the agent is also the object of another's coercion in so acting, and an act is only evident in being impressed upon further persons. On this cultural premise, action is inherently forceful in its effects, for every act is a usurpation of a kind, substituting one relationship for another. To act from a vantage point is thus also in a sense to take advantage. This entails a behavioral ethos of assertiveness, and one which applies equally well to women as men. But beyond this, men often find themselves having an advantage women lack. To show this advantage it will be necessary to dismantle certain Melanesian concepts. . . . (P. 327)

My critique follows. Thus:

Single men can take refuge in the body of men; a man sees his acts replicated and multiplied in the acts of like others. This is the basis of those situations in which men appear to dominate women. *But the domination does not stand for anything else--* for culture over nature or whatever--and does not have to engage our sympathy on that score. It is itself. It inheres in all the small personal encounters in which one man finds himself at an advantage because of the men at his back. Among the substitutions available to him, as it were, is the replication of all-male relations in the plural form which enlarges the capacity of each individual. This becomes its own reason for forcefulness. In a sense, the forcefulness always has to appear larger than the persons who register its effect. Such asymmetry turns rules into penalties; the enclosure of domestic life into confinement, and the cause of men's own activity into the wounds of someone who is beaten and given pain for it. (Pp. 327-328)

I am puzzled that Jolly, whose reading is otherwise most acute, should think I have denied that male domination exists. I could not agree more with her conclusion.

> In so far as they stand active and passive in relation to each other, the acts of men and women do not in themselves evince permanent domination. That one agent behaves with another in mind is what defines his/her agency. But a different way of putting this would be to suggest that every act is an act of domination. . . . (P. 334)
>
> . . . [E]xcess provoked by the inherent asymmetry between an agent and the outcome registers the effects of that agency. We must remember that a cause may be equated with an effect, that is, the same persons who compel an agent to act may also be the registers of that action. Apart from the formal asymmetry of the agent and the cause/effect of his/her acts, a quantitative inequality can arise. The person who registers those acts may be too 'small'. There ceases to be a match between the agent and the aesthetic capacity of another to show the effects of that agency. That is, the exchange of perspectives is thrown out of balance. Consequently, the person/relationship that is the outcome of the acts is perceived as an insufficient medium. And that perception of diminution is, of course, in turn a consequence of the exaggeration itself. (P. 335)
>
> Such loss of balance may affect relations between men. In relations between men and women it may well be perceived as inevitable and to be most acute under those very conditions of male growth which men perform 'for' women. Women appear insufficient by the very acts that make men's growth something they accomplish for themselves but also for the women they have in mind. Their insufficiency is thus anticipated in the enlarged sphere of all-male relations, where each individual man becomes in himself a register of the replication of men: in this enlarged form, as a 'big' man, he is confronted by 'small' women and children who carry the burden of registering his size. He is dependent on them; his strength can only take the form of their weakness. This I believe is a precondition for acts of male excess. (P. 336)

This was an attempt to avoid the gender symbolism inherent in the Western contrast between passive (objects) and active (subjects), which

itself rests on suppositions about the individual and society I did not feel were warranted. I was doomed to fail:

> Men's advantage does not of itself lie in the constitution of action; men and women may act with equal assertion. At once I encounter the literary problem. Going against the grain of a language is going against its own aesthetic conventions: how one makes certain forms appear. . . .
>
> It was argued . . . [that] men's collective endeavors are directed towards the same reproduction of relations of domestic kinship as concern women. And here lies the intractable Western aesthetic. It conjures a quite inappropriate gender symbolism. If I say that men's exchanges are oriented towards their wives' domestic concerns, then the statement will be read as men appropriating those concerns and turning them into their own use. If I say that women's domestic work is oriented towards their husbands' exchanges, then this will be read conversely, not as their appropriating men's activities, but as being subservient to them. I know of no narrative device that will overcome this skewing, because it inheres in the very form of the ideas in which we imagine men's and women's powers. (Pp. 328-329)

I anticipated my failure in order to make a point about the power of (Western) gender symbolism. It was also a feminist attempt to simultaneously recognize the conditions of oppression in Melanesia *and* not invest that oppression with more significance than it has. Here I take a perspective that is not just Hagen-centric, but Hagen-woman-centric (see *Women in Between,* Strathern 1972:152, top), It is one that would diminish claims to hegemony. But perhaps, as Jolly implies, this dissipates the focus of challenge, is too anarchic a view.

And to return to Keesing's objections, is it also too radical a theory of domination that would see domination everywhere, and not just in those brutalizing acts that we do not practice ourselves but seemingly (take pleasure from?) talk(ing) about? There is a new racism abroad in Britain today, born of the most charitable and Enlightened impulse: to think of Third World populations only in terms of the pinched faces of famine that occupy the television screen. It is an old sexism to reproduce descriptions of male domination through the unexamined gender stereotypes that endorse our evaluations as to what is and what is not significant. His disclaimers aside, the cumulative effect, the accretions, of

Keesing's own rhetoric is, of course, to portray Melanesian men as *un*dominated. What dream is this?

I shall no doubt be accused of being less than serious if I record the wryness, if not actual amusement, with which I realize that my "little" account is insufficient for the "big" words he would prefer to use. I do address the nature of claims to power (ch. 5). But I obviously do not provide enough darkness with which to depict these Melanesians, nor enough terror, nor other things that excite. I do not evoke the world stage of political prisoners and starving peasants. It is too petty, it would seem, to show men's interests in the life and death moments of child-birth, literal and figurative, or their violence in domestic relations. I can only take a measure of comfort from the fact that at least I am hung by my own conclusion apropos Hagen: "If we are to look for domina-tion in interaction between the sexes, it is in the manner in which indi-vidual men . . . override the particular interests of others by reference to categorical, collective imperatives. Women [in Hagen] have no such recourse" (p. 337).

For the outsider, that is a significant condition of both women's and men's lives in the Highlands; perhaps I could recast one of the intentions of the book and say that it tries to encompass the perspectives of both. The first step, of course, was to unlatch Highlanders' categorical imper-atives from those we might otherwise take for granted in social science discourse. It does not matter that I have simply substituted an intellec-tual interest in "theories of social action" for that of "society." As per-formers of rituals and planters of gardens will tell you, the significant issue is the shift of perception that comes with the dislocation, the fresh growth that contains its own element of surprise. Shape-changing, elu-sive, self-transforming: These are also the conditions of cultural life as outsiders have encountered it in many parts of Melanesia.

NOTES

1. Thomas may say commodity/gift *should not* be conflated with an opposition between us/them. But what essentialism is this? I *choose* to use the former as a way of symbolizing the latter.

2. Webster (1990:297) gives the following list of fundamental Enlightenment values, after Marx: freedom, equality, justice, private property, individualism.

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BOOKS NOTED

RECENT PACIFIC ISLANDS PUBLICATIONS: SELECTED ACQUISITIONS, APRIL-AUGUST 1991

This list of significant new publications relating to the Pacific Islands was selected from new acquisition lists received from the libraries of Brigham Young University-Hawaii, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Bernice P. Bishop Museum, University of Auckland, East-West Center, and University of the South Pacific. Other libraries are invited to send contributions to the Books Noted Editor for future issues. Listings reflect the extent of information provided by each institution; some entries may be arranged by title in cases of an edited or compiled work and may include only primary author in cases of multiple authorship.

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