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SPECIAL ISSUE: POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE PACIFIC

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PACIFIC STUDIES

SPECIAL ISSUE: POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE PACIFIC

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INTRODUCTION

Stephen Levine, Guest Editor
Victoria University of Wellington

Not so very long ago it was a commonplace for commentators to describe the contemporary Pacific as a wholly stable, indeed tranquil region, one far removed from the conflicts and collisions so characteristic of other parts of the globe. Despite the scholarly trappings that often surrounded such a view, this perspective expressed a vision as romantic in its own way as many earlier perceptions had proved to be. Repeatedly, it seems, an impulse appears to arise, among intellectuals and travelers alike, overcoming critical thought, an impulse determined to assign various social, cultural, economic, and political blessings corresponding to those gifts of scenery and climate that are the region's natural and indisputable inheritance.

Now in the late 1980s, however, there is much less talk about a "Pacific way." From the viewpoint of the international relations specialist, for instance, ample evidence exists of the region's growing salience to significant powers on its periphery and beyond. As for regional groupings, those based on affinities of ethnicity and interest are increasingly assuming roles incompatible with the inclinations of more formal, all-encompassing associations. The nation-states themselves, too, have begun to develop larger, more complex patterns of interaction, with each other, within and towards various international political institutions, and, perhaps most importantly, with larger and more powerful actors in the international arena.

This increasingly variegated international political activity makes it

more difficult, of course, for observers to offer useful generalizations about the political behavior of the region as a whole. Equally, examination of the domestic or internal politics of Pacific island entities confirms that in that sphere, too, earlier perceptions about the continuity of harmonious political arrangements were somewhat premature. From every angle, in fact, it is evident that an era in Pacific political history has drawn to a close.

Naturally these sorts of developments offer challenges to those--never many--with a professional scholarly interest in Pacific political affairs. By its very nature, the subject matter of this special issue of *Pacific Studies*--political change in the Pacific--precludes presentation of any final words on its topic. What this issue does provide, however, are several studies from experienced academics with lengthy backgrounds of involvement with their particular field of interest. Each of them, moreover, retains a commitment to original, independent inquiry, as well as a vivid sense of the limited power of earlier work fully to describe, explain, and interpret ongoing Pacific political processes.

The ways in which political change may come about are many, of course, particularly when the meaning of "politics" is taken in its largest sense. Within a more restricted or conventional approach, however, the repertoire of options is not especially vast. It encompasses elections, with emphasis on the peaceful transfer of formal power, but takes in other means as well, such as assassination and coups. Within this necessarily brief issue all of these approaches to political change make their appearance. Clark and Shuster separately analyze developments that together seem particularly grim. In each essay, bright hopes fade, and great promise goes unfulfilled, as assassination and other forms of political violence make a mockery of more soothing rhetoric about the democratic prospect. Tagupa and Lal, in turn, approach what has become a succession of coups in Fiji. Here, the rules of political engagement have altered dramatically, and perhaps irrevocably, in the very nation whose political leadership earlier sought so self-consciously to promote a distinctively "Pacific way" embodying consensual problem-solving styles of governance.

Each of the four authors explores events whose common feature is a shared predisposition to travel down extra-constitutional paths towards a deeply felt political end. In every case, at some stage in the drama, some procedure to discover public preferences about alternative outcomes has been followed, with elections or referenda or both playing conspicuous roles in Fiji, Palau, and New Caledonia. Indeed, the number and frequency of referenda in Palau, on a question whose essential

character has not altered from one electoral occasion to the next, quite probably establishes a perhaps unsurpassable record. The essay by Rogers, too, looks at elections and referenda, within the context of competing aspirations among ethnic groups. In this respect, divergent responses toward moves to redefine Guam's political status, and reshape its government's structure and capacities, reflect rivalries and struggles dissimilar in degree, but not in kind, from those found in the other political entities examined in this issue.

Thus this issue looks at elections and their aftermath in four Pacific island locations. Elsewhere in the Pacific, inherited Western forms continue the inescapable process of acquiring indigenous content, different from one place to the next, arising out of each entity's particular needs and circumstances. In virtually every setting, in fact, as in some ways befits a healthy polity, solutions to far-reaching questions about the nature of political leadership, procedures for discussion and change, and the scope of government power--the perennial issues of politics--are proving as difficult to settle, definitively, and as elusive in the Pacific as anywhere else.

**CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMIC, POLITICAL RISK:
SELF-DETERMINATION IN NEW CALEDONIA, 1986-1987**

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Introduction

On 20 March 1986 Bernard Pons was appointed minister for overseas departments and territories in the newly elected, liberal-conservative French government headed by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. One week after his appointment Minister Pons was already able to outline his policy priorities and objectives concerning New Caledonia. Within a general approach to be marked by prudence and moderation, the overriding priority was to be economic development as the means to promote social integration. A program-law (*loi-programme*) would modify the existing territorial statute in the direction of greater French state control, while leaving unchanged the regional structures introduced in September 1985. The Chirac government's commitment to hold a self-determination referendum for the territory would be honored, although not for at least a year. If voters in this referendum rejected independence from France, a new territorial statute of enhanced regionalized autonomy would be introduced.¹

By the end of 1987 it was clear that, while this initial policy platform of Pons's had been selective and too modest by half, it had, to a notably comprehensive extent, been realized--for good or ill. A degree of economic normality had been restored to the territorial economy: tourism

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was recovering the ground lost in 1984-1985, fiscal incentives had encouraged commercial and residential building in and around Noumea, even world nickel prices improved from early 1987. Promulgated in July 1986, Pons's program-law had been progressively implemented.² And, most decisively, in September 1987 a self-determination referendum had been conducted.

Yet at the beginning of 1988, by no means all sectors of territorial or wider South Pacific opinion accepted that France's New Caledonia policy was characterized by prudence and moderation. The coherence, resolution, and intrinsic effectiveness of Pons's policy dynamic had become clear. At the same time the limitations of the French authorities' unbendingly constitutional, formally democratic approach were no less evident as, in the aftermath of the 1987 referendum, informal social and political tensions intensified. In both Paris (outside government circles) and Nouméa it was widely feared that self-determination by the Caledonian electorate had been achieved at the cost of severe, possibly irreparable damage to social harmony and political dialogue within the territory.

This essay offers an initial critical account of the main stages and accomplishments of Pons's policy in New Caledonia from March 1986 to the end of 1987. It does so principally through accounts of the most important French legislative initiatives introduced during this period, and in particular by an interpretative presentation of the September 1987 self-determination referendum. The impact of this French policy strategy on a Caledonian political scene thoroughly divided on the issue of independence--constitutional dynamic at the cost of political risk--constitutes a running focus of the essay.

The Political Context, 1985-1987

Radicalization, marked by intermittent acts of violence, was an established feature of the Caledonian political scene well before March 1986. Some twenty-eight politically motivated explosive and arson attacks, usually against property, were recorded between November 1984 and February 1986; since March 1986 their frequency has diminished.³ Nevertheless political tension remained a constant undercurrent in territorial affairs throughout 1986 and 1987, spasmodically breaking out into localized confrontation and violence including land occupations and consequent expulsions and occasional shootings between police and Melanesians.⁴ Above and beyond the enduring quarrel over independence, two particular features contributed to this contextual tension:

the role of the security forces and the state of the political parties. Both features derived directly, though not wholly, from Pons's constitutionalist policy dynamic.

Introduced in April 1986, so-called nomadization missions (*missions de nomadisation*)--ranging from minor public relations exercises to local public works projects--were carried out by units of the French armed forces among the Melanesian tribes throughout the rural, bush areas of mainland New Caledonia. Pons justified the army's presence and active intervention by the paramount importance of preventing any repeat of the 1984-1985 Kanak pro-independence insurrectionary disturbances. Only when conditions of civil security and the rule of republican law had been assured, Pons repeatedly argued, could the promised self-determination referendum be organized.

From the few dispassionate accounts available it appears that reticence or distrust on the part of many Kanak tribes combined with restraint by the French armed forces involved to ensure that, if grassroots France-Kanak relations were not markedly improved by nomadization, at least order was maintained (with limited, temporary exceptions).⁵ The territory's principal independence movement saw things differently. At its sixth congress, in May 1987, the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (Front de liberation nationale kanak et socialiste, FLNKS) condemned the military presence as reinforcing "the judicial, partisan and racist repression" of the French "colonial government."⁶ Parallels were drawn by the FLNKS with the role of the French army in the Algerian war of independence of the 1950s. For the first but not the last time in the self-determination process Pons had, by his deployment of the security forces, effectively asserted the priority of republican constitutional norms at the political cost of deepening the France-Melanesian rift.

The internal state of most Caledonian political parties during this period also contributed to the radicalization of territorial debate. The FLNKS regularly exhibited signs of internal dissension over the content and tactics of independence policy and, by extension, over party leadership. Minority component parties, such as FULK and UPM,⁷ objected to the FLNKS's dual strategy of institutional participation (in the regional assemblies established at the regional elections held in September 1985) and international diplomatic promotion of the Kanak independence cause through bodies such as the South Pacific Forum, the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, and the United Nations. Claiming that regional participation had both demobilized rank-and-file FLNKS support and compromised the independence movement by association

with Caledonian banks and business interests, FULK argued instead for a return to the grass-roots militancy exhibited by the FLNKS battle committees (*comités de lutte*) of late 1984 and for the adoption of Libyan models of radical activism.⁸

While real enough, such differences of ideology and tactics were indissociable from the long struggle for power within the FLNKS between the head of the majority UC, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, and the leader of FULK, Yann Céléne Uregei. When the political bureau of the FLNKS twice removed Uregei from his post as minister for external relations in the self-styled Provisional Government of Kanaky,⁹ the decisions were arguably motivated by both policy and personal objectives. Even irrespective of the nature of the French government's self-determination policy, such internal tensions ensured that the FLNKS had only minimal scope for continued evolution in the direction of participatory moderation. Given this FLNKS party context, it was not surprising that by the end of 1987 Tjibaou was again talking the language of disruptive activism and physical struggle.

Somewhat similar forces for the radicalization of party stances operated within the RPCR, the largest party opposed to independence.¹⁰ Its leader, Jacques Lafleur, was publicly critical of the slightest perceived shift on the part of either Minister Pons or High Commissioner (*Haut-Commissaire*) Jean Montpezat toward political accommodation of what the RPCR considered to be the FLNKS "terrorists." Such resolute stances were in part adopted to reassert Lafleur's leadership in the face of dissidence among both extreme right-wing and more moderate elements of his party. As was the case with the FLNKS, tensions within the RPCR amalgamated policy disagreements with personal hostilities, ideas with ambitions.¹¹

Unlike the FLNKS, the RPCR was also vulnerable to electoral and ideological competition from minor parties and groups on the extreme Right--the FN,¹² the Patriotic Action Committees, and the Free Caledonian Forces. The combined play of these internal and external pressures largely accounted for the RPCR's needlessly energetic criticism, in November 1987, of Pons's draft statute for regionalized autonomy in the aftermath of a self-determination referendum that, as will be seen, produced a result overwhelmingly in the party's favor.

Program-Law, July 1986

The objective of normalization that lay behind the army's nomadization missions also inspired Pons's program-law, promulgated in July 1986.

This transitional modification of the New Caledonian institutional system directly anticipated the self-determination process to come in that, while its justification was formally democratic and constitutional, its impact was informal and largely political.

As a result of the regional elections held in September 1985 under the terms of the French Socialist administration's Pisani/Fabius Statute, three of the territory's four regional assemblies had come under the control of the FLNKS. This was in spite of the independence movement's attracting less than 29 percent of the total territorial vote.¹³ Both Pons and the RPCR were determined to correct the formally undemocratic imbalance thereby created, and to reassert the electoral legitimacy and political authority of the territorial majority.

Pons's program-law did maintain the regions' geographical boundaries (see Figure 1) and the institutional framework of the Pisani/Fabius Statute. It also drained that statute's regions of their administrative substance and spirit of decentralized autonomy. In particular the regions' powers over local economic and fiscal policy, land reform, and direct district development links with Paris were sharply diminished.

In essence, the 1986 program-law shifted authority from the four regions to either the high commissioner (that is, to the metropolitan French state) or to the Caledonian Congress (in other words, to the territorial electoral majority). Expressed in the less democratically high-minded terms of party politics, the shift made was one from the FLNKS back to the RPCR. The resulting ambiguous conflation of (French republican) constitutional rigor with (French government and RPCR) party interest was as prominent a feature of the program-law as it was a central figure in the self-determination process of the following year.

That such a conflation was almost certainly unavoidable did not appease the FLNKS. From late 1986 on the movement complained that, by eroding the powers of the 1985 regions, the Chirac government was both renegeing on undertakings of the previous (Socialist) administration in Paris and effectively abandoning the objective of independence-in-association for New Caledonia with France, which had underlain the Pisani/Fabius Statute.¹⁴ For Pons, such complaints were not unfounded, but were without point: the Chirac government was not bound to implement legislation passed by the Fabius government, and the constitutional route to independence lay through territorial self-determination, not through the imposition of some hybrid subindependence imposed by metropolitan France against the wishes of the Caledonian electorate.

The acutely politicized dialogue of the deaf over the program-law




FIGURE 1. New Caledonia regions (as established under the 1985 statute) and *communes*. (Source: Institut territorial de la statistique et des études économiques, 1985.)

was exemplified by an exchange of letters, early in 1987, between the presidents of the three FLNKS-controlled regional councils (*conseils de région*) and French Prime Minister Chirac. According to the three FLNKS regional presidents, by “progressively stifling the [1985] regional institutions” the French government was “marginalizing the Kanak people, even negating its identity.” Its “reactionary, vindictive and partisan policy” was “recolonizing” New Caledonia by riding roughshod over “the rights of the Kanak people.”¹⁵

Chirac and Pons replied with detailed refutations of the FLNKS's charges of budgetary stifling of the regions. In particular, contrary to the Kanak presidents' claims of deliberate financial neglect, their three regions contained 40 percent of the Caledonian population, yet were receiving between them some 65 percent of total territorial equipment funding. Chirac's and Pons's responses to the claims of governmental anti-Kanak bias were to reassert their commitment to Caledonian (that is, multiethnic and not exclusively Melanesian) social and economic development, with priority emphasis on the underprivileged rural areas of the mainland and offshore islands (that is, those areas populated largely by Melanesians).

Essentially the political exchanges concerning Pons's program-law rarely rose above this rudimentary, unconstructive level of reproach and refutation. (This is not to say that regional practice under the program-law was invariably negative: after all, the FLNKS continued to participate in regional institutions until the end of 1987.)¹⁶ On the FLNKS, pro-independence side, stress was systematically placed, within a conventional decolonization discourse, on ethnically delimited priorities (electoral, economic, political, social) that ought to be accorded the indigenous Kanak population. On the anti-independence, pro-France side occupied by the Chirac government and the RPCR, the arguments were just as exclusively anchored to juridical and quantitative concepts: constitutional fidelity, the rule of the electoral majority, and the application of rational-pragmatic, not ethnic, criteria in the allocation of development funding. Where the FLNKS refused to acknowledge the democratic imperatives of majority rule and ethnic equality, the RPCR remained deaf to the needs for social and economic equity. In a protracted and exacerbated form, this politically sterile dialogue later underlay the preparation, execution, and aftermath of the self-determination process.

Self-Determination Referendum Law, May 1987

The Chirac government's drive to pass legislation enabling a self-determination referendum to be held was characterized by coherence of policy argument, expeditiousness, and, with few and minor exceptions, obliviousness to widespread criticism--territorial, regional, French metropolitan, and indeed international.

Talks between Pons and party leaders in New Caledonia during December 1986 and February 1987 yielded a double result. On the RPCR's tactical initiative, the usual French residency qualification for electoral participation was extended from six months to three years.

This move went a long way toward eliminating from the referendum those voters--mostly metropolitan French on term employment contracts, such as technicians, teachers, or health personnel--who were only temporary Caledonian residents without permanent and direct interest in the long-term future evolution of the territory.

After initial equivocation the FLNKS rejected this concession, reasserting instead its earlier demand for an electorate composed exclusively of the "victims of colonialism." In its most comprehensive definition this formula restricted participation in the referendum to the Kanak population and to that minority of the non-Melanesian population who had both parents born in the territory. Such an ethnically restrictive qualification for electoral participation is incompatible with both French democratic practice and constitutional law.

A direct consequence of this incompatibility was the second development, namely the definitive breakdown of the merely embryonic dialogue established between Pons and the FLNKS. By early February 1987 the rupture had been consummated, each side claiming that the other was responsible. Public contact between the Chirac government and the principal Caledonian independence movement had not been restored by the end of 1987.

Following the breakdown, no further hindrance existed to the passage of Pons's self-determination referendum bill. It was approved by the Cabinet in Paris in February 1987, then debated in both houses of the French Parliament in April and May. The National Assembly adopted the bill by 325 votes to 249, with the RPR-UDF government alliance supporting the bill with the FN,¹⁷ while the opposition Socialist and Communist parties voted against it. After appeal to the Constitutional Council, it became law on 6 June 1987. Referendum day was set for the following 13 September. The rapidity and smoothness of the bill's parliamentary passage reveal nothing of the reservations and fears that it aroused, within and beyond Paris. In the first half of 1987, the undoubted advance made by Pons's constitutional dynamic was achieved in a context of intensifying political criticism and isolation. The tension between constitutional legitimacy and the risks inherent in applying that legitimacy to Caledonian political reality was central both to the passage of Pons's referendum bill and to the organization of the referendum itself.

The relevant third paragraph of Article 53 of the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth French Republic is unambiguous: "No cession, no exchange, no addition of territory shall be valid without the consent of the populations concerned."¹⁸ For the Chirac government the self-determination referendum was the legitimate means by which to ascertain the "con-

sent” of the Caledonian “populations” either to become independent or to remain part of the French Republic. Chirac himself affirmed to the French National Assembly that “this referendum is democratic, in conformity with our Constitution and aims to reaffirm the primacy of law [in New Caledonia], the source of all freedoms.”¹⁹

While impeccable in its own terms, Chirac’s position was not necessarily either as high-mindedly detached or as politically adequate a response as his declaration might suggest. Territorial and metropolitan political considerations also exercised an influence: the need to appease the RPCR, the non-Melanesian electoral majority, and the parties and groups of the Caledonian extreme Right following defeat of the Socialist administration in the French legislative elections of March 1986. Or indeed Chirac’s own need to anesthetize the political situation in New Caledonia in advance of the 1988 French presidential election may have played a role: his own presidential candidacy might have been at risk had unrest flared up again in the territory.

Criticisms of Pons’s referendum bill came from many quarters: from François Mitterrand, the socialist president of the republic; from centrist and Catholic democratic members of the majority RPR-UDF alliance supporting the Chirac government as well as from the Socialists and Communists of the parliamentary Opposition; from the U.N. Decolonization Committee and from the member states of the South Pacific Forum; and from many civil rights groups, unions, churches, and other support organizations both in France and in New Caledonia.

Diverse as the criticisms were by origin, they were broadly homogeneous in their tenor. President Mitterrand spoke for many when he expressed his disagreement with French government policy. While he did not contest the principle of democratic self-determination, Mitterrand contended that the content of the referendum and the territorial context of its organization were vital elements.²⁰ As it was, the political divide between the Melanesian pro-independence minority and the non-Melanesian majority rendered the referendum at best superfluous (since its outcome in favor of remaining French was effectively foreknown) and probably dangerous (since it could provoke the pro-independency minority to violence out of desperation). In these conditions, Mitterrand’s argument ran, responsible prudence dictated that the referendum be postponed and greater interethnic confidence cultivated, by means of expanded programs of social integration and economic reform and by the promotion of political dialogue. In more vigorous terms, the Eighteenth South Pacific Forum “completely rejected” the referendum as “divisive, futile and a recipe for disaster.”²¹

As indicated earlier, these criticisms did not deflect Pons from work-

ing toward his objective, He did, however, respond to some of the objections. He argued that to postpone the referendum, as proposed by Mitterrand and the U.N. Decolonization Committee, would be to run a still greater risk: that of provoking unrest among the frustrated non-Melanesian territorial majority, who would be precluded by such a postponement from reaffirming their determination to resist independence. Far from being futile the referendum was, according to Pons, a "necessary preliminary": only after the electoral expression of the "populations concerned" had been formally registered could positive construction begin. In the case of a referendum vote against independence, this construction would take place within the terms of a statute of expanded autonomy, the main features of which Pons foreshadowed at the time of the parliamentary debate on the referendum bill.

But in April and May 1987 Pons's principal concerns lay less with the justification of his referendum bill than with its content, and in particular with those terms intended to reinforce the security and international credibility of the poll. In addition to the three-year residency qualification mentioned earlier, the principal safeguards included special administrative commissions headed by magistrates (and not, as customarily, by local political representatives) to draw up new electoral rolls and a control commission staffed by magistrates (that is, not by politically partisan officials) to organize the election campaign and oversee the referendum and counting of votes. On polling day, each voting station was to be presided over by a judicial magistrate. Finally, to counteract any physical disruption of the vote--as occurred during the FLNKS's active boycott of the Territorial Assembly elections of November 1984--the high commissioner had discretionary authority to relocate voting stations within the boundaries of a given municipality (*commune*). As minimal disruption in fact occurred and as no substantive protests, territorial or external, at the formal conduct of the vote were registered, these exceptionally detailed measures insisted upon by Pons may be thought to have fulfilled their purpose.

Self-Determination Referendum, 13 September 1987

At the end of May 1987 the sixth congress of the FLNKS adopted the proposal of Tjibaou's UC to boycott, in nonviolent fashion, the self-determination referendum. Two weeks later the much smaller independence party LKS²² also decided to call on its supporters to abstain, while (unlike the FLNKS) participating in the official election campaign. Once these unsurprising stances had been adopted by the principal

Kanak independence movements, the election campaign proceeded in unruffled, almost ritualistic fashion. Substantive discussion of the territory's longer-term future, whether in independence or not, was totally subordinated to affirmation of the respective incompatible positions, for and against independence from France. Promises and polemics excluded dialogue and needed debate.

The earlier, unofficial campaign period saw Pons calling for maximum voter participation, especially among the Melanesian population, predicting the decline of the independence movement, and promising in classic fashion increased budgetary aid for New Caledonia in 1988²³-- assuming that in the referendum independence was rejected.

The FLNKS employed the same period both to test the capacity and determination of the French authorities to maintain civil order and, by systematic recourse to nonviolent methods of demonstration, to promote its cause before the international media. On balance its efforts in both directions failed. On 6 August Pons banned large-scale marches and other public demonstrations that were being organized by both the FLNKS and the RPCR. Three days later the political bureau of the FLNKS called for a "massive mobilization" of its militants and declared its intention to go ahead with a "march for independence in peace" in spite of the ban. No such march materialized. On 22 August, however, nonviolent demonstrations were organized by the FLNKS throughout much of the Caledonian mainland: estimates of the numbers involved ranged between two thousand and ten thousand. While the majority of these demonstrations took place without incident, tear gas was used to disperse some three hundred demonstrators at Thio, on the east coast, while in central Nouméa French riot police forcibly broke up an illegal sit-in by two hundred FLNKS supporters. Four days later one thousand FLNKS supporters demonstrated without incident in Nouméa. Sympathetic exposure by French metropolitan and Australasian television media could not conceal the relatively modest level of Kanak mobilization, perhaps attributable in part to the FLNKS's adoption of nonviolent tactics.²⁴ No further physical confrontations of note occurred during the election campaign.

The official television and radio campaign ran from 30 August to 11 September. The RPCR, FN, and LKS all used their allocations of broadcasting time. Consistent with its condemnation of the referendum as "a sham" and "null and void,"²⁵ the FLNKS chose not to take part in the official campaign, although it continued to broadcast on Radio Djiido, its own station. Moderation or intellectual innovation did not figure prominently in the campaign. At best, well-known positions on both

sides were reiterated in simplistic fashion, such as when the RPCR's Dick Ukeiwé identified a vote for remaining French as a vote for freedom, prosperity, and a Caledonian future characterized by multiracial participation.²⁶ On a more emotional register, Tjibaou called on Kanaks to abstain from voting in the referendum and so refuse all complicity in their "cultural genocide."²⁷

The referendum itself passed without incident. Its outcome was, in most respects, as unsurprising as the election campaign preceding it had been unremarkable (see Table 1). Application of the three-year residency qualification had resulted in the judicial control commission's eliminating from the electoral rolls approximately five thousand voters,²⁸ of whom 80 percent had been registered in greater Nouméa. The number of non-Melanesian abstentions was consequently reduced, resulting in a proportional turnout of 59.10 percent, perceptibly higher than had been expected²⁹--or, by the RPCR, feared. The vote in favor of remaining within the French Republic was not only overwhelming in terms of the votes cast (98.3 percent), but also represented the views of a comfortable absolute majority (57.17 percent) of the total electorate. Even if all those who abstained had favored independence for New Caledonia, the referendum's outcome would not have been different.

Nevertheless the abstention rate of 40.9 percent did indicate that Melanesian support for independence had been largely sustained. In the three predominately Melanesian regions controlled by the FLNKS, the abstention rate exceeded 50 percent (Center, 54.7 percent; North, 67.3 percent; Loyalty Islands, 75.1 percent), in contrast to the abstention rate of only 19.0 percent in the South region, which includes Noumea, is controlled by the RPCR, and is predominately European. Outside the South region participation rates higher than 50 percent were recorded only in those municipal districts in which the majority of the electorate

TABLE 1. Self-Determination Referendum, 13 September 1987

Registered voters	85,022	
votes cast	50,250	
Turnout	59.10%	
Valid votes	49,453	
		% of Valid
Results	Votes	Votes
In favor of remaining in the French Republic	48,611	98.3%
In favor of acceding to independence	842	1.7%

is European (that is, in the *communes* of Bouloupari, La Foa, Farino, Moindou, Bourail, Pouembout, and Koumac; see Figure 1). Beyond doubt the referendum had reconfirmed the electoral partition of New Caledonia--Melanesian against non-Melanesian, for and against independence.

At the same time extrapolation from the poll suggested that electoral support for the FLNKS was stagnant or even in regression. Subtraction of the historically low abstention rate of 19.4 percent (recorded in the 1985 regional elections, in which the FLNKS participated actively)³⁰ from the referendum's 40.9 percent abstention rate implies a territorial level of support for the independence movement of less than 22 percent. In the 1985 regional elections the FLNKS attracted 22.85 percent of the electorate's votes. If abstentions on behalf of the LKS were taken into account, the situation of the FLNKS looked still worse.

Regionalized Autonomy Statute, December 1987

Confirmed in his strategy by the outcome of the self-determination referendum, Pons pressed ahead with the promised territorial statute of broad self-management autonomy (*statut de large autonomie de gestion*), the main lines of which had been foreshadowed as early as April 1986. He presented a draft version of the new statute on 6 October to the territorial Congress in Noumea, which adopted the draft on 3 November. By the end of the same month the National Assembly in Paris had debated and adopted the bill on its first reading. Elections under the new statute were due to be held within one year of the bill's becoming law.

The draft bill differed little in essentials from versions anticipated a year or more earlier. The principle of regionalized administration was retained while the regional boundaries introduced under the Pisani/Fabius Statute were modified to reduce the number of FLNKS-controlled regions from three out of four to two.³¹ Both the new regions and the *communes* were granted expanded powers to enable them to deal more effectively with development needs in inland, rural Caledonia. A ten-member territorial Executive Council was to be composed of a president elected by an absolute majority of Congress, five members elected on a proportional basis from the Congress (itself composed of the forty-eight regional councillors), and the presidents of the four regions. To protect minority interests a two-thirds majority of the Executive Council would be required for adopting certain important policy decisions, including the territorial budget. The high commissioner retained the

right to arbitrate in the absence of an executive majority. A territorial custom chamber, composed of the fifty-two Melanesian great chiefs, was to play a consultative role on matters relating to custom law. The French state retained responsibility for New Caledonia's external relations and defense, police forces, currency, judicial system, and secondary and higher education.

During passage through its early formal stages both in Nouméa and Paris, the new autonomy statute met with wide and conflicting criticism. Political support for the Chirac government's policy strategy diminished and Pons's isolation from parties in New Caledonia deepened.

The FLNKS, of course, refused to recognize the autonomy bill. Even before the referendum Tjibaou had declared that the FLNKS would boycott the new Pons regions and would refuse to participate in any other elections.³² After the referendum FLNKS leaders went further, committing their movement to disruption of the regional elections that would have to be held to implement the new statute. The gap between the Chirac government and the FLNKS had never been wider. The statute that Pons considered to be "an essential element in the reconciliation" of the ethnic communities in New Caledonia was denounced by Tjibaou as "the negation of our [namely, the Kanak] people."³³ An influential factor in this further radicalization by the FLNKS was the severe deterioration of the Caledonian sociopolitical climate that occurred in the weeks following the referendum.³⁴

The FN and groups on the extreme Right claimed that Pons's autonomy statute was likely to lead eventually to independence and that the modified regionalization gave unnecessary guarantees and excessive power to the pro-independence minority. Like the members of the FLNKS, the Caledonian FN councillors abstained from voting on the draft bill presented to Congress in Nouméa, while metropolitan FN deputies voted against the bill at its first reading in the National Assembly in Paris.³⁵

The RPCR shared some of the reservations of the FN but eventually supported the bill. In particular the RPCR was not disposed to make concessions to the FLNKS: it opposed the principle of a two-thirds majority for certain decisions of the proposed Executive Council and advocated increasing French state control by retaining the presidency of the Executive Council in the hands of the high commissioner, rather than in those of a locally elected member of Congress. Minor adjustments excepted, Pons overrode these reservations of the RPCR.

Prospects

The degree of success obtained by the French government's constitutional dynamic should not be underestimated. The strategy pursued with coherence and determination by Bernard Pons since April 1986 had, by the end of 1987, achieved its objective. The referendum held in September 1987 ensured that no Caledonian party or group and--perhaps more significantly--no government in France, present or future, will be able to push New Caledonia in the direction of independence without incurring the politically intolerable accusation of riding roughshod over the referendum's constitutionally impeccable outcome. Short of armed uprising, the situation frustrates not only the FLNKS but also any extreme right-wing European movement.

That said, the acute developmental dimension of the Caledonian imbroglio remains to be tackled in its entirety. At the end of 1987 interethnic dialogue, institutional or grass-roots, appeared moribund. The non-Melanesian majority parties were singularly ill-equipped to respond to the imperative demands of socioeconomic justice. The FLNKS declared itself to be committed to bringing about the failure of Pons's autonomy statute by any means. A return to armed militancy could not be excluded. In a South Pacific regional context marked by the indigenous minority coup d'état in Fiji of May 1987, the prospect of a formally democratic, firmly policed continuity of ties with France was not to be rejected out of hand. It was, however, an inadequate, merely potential basis on which to organize the territory's future evolution.

NOTES

This article is based on events through mid-December 1987.

1. Ministerial press conference, 27 March 1986; see *Le Monde*, 29 March 1986.
2. For an earlier account of the program-law, see Alan Clark, "Conflict Formal and Informal: Elections in New Caledonia, 1984-1986," *Pacific Studies* 10, no. 3 (July 1987): 103-104.
3. For details, see *Le Monde*, 9 July 1987; Clark, "Conflict Formal and Informal," 92.
4. For example: on 6 September 1986, a Melanesian was wounded by a French paratrooper at Nakéty; on 28 April 1987, near Koné, a gendarme was shot and killed by a Melanesian suspected of theft. Such incidents were invariably exploited for political advantage by both pro- and anti-independence sides.

5. Consistent figures are hard to obtain. According to Pons, in May 1986 five thousand military personnel (including gendarmes and Compagnies républicaines de sécurité [CRS] riot police) were stationed in New Caledonia, with an additional fifteen hundred men about to be installed there. General Franceschi, commander-in-chief of the armed forces in New Caledonia, reported a total of 5,877 (including 3,403 army personnel and 1,577 gendarmes) in July 1987. In the weeks preceding the referendum in September 1987 this total (military, CRS, and gendarmes combined) was increased to some 7,300 (including 3,400 army personnel). See reports in *Le Monde*, 16 May 1986, 9 July 1987, and 16-17 August 1987. Pons frequently claimed that the armed forces would on no occasion be employed to maintain civil order, and that the total number of security forces deployed in the territory under his authority would always remain below the highest levels reached during the Socialist administration, in September 1985.

6. Communiqué published by the sixth congress of the FLNKS, Ponérihouen, 28-29 May 1987.

7. The FLNKS was formed in September 1984 as a majority replacement for the FI (Front Indépendantiste, Independence Front). The principal component parties and groups of the FLNKS are: UC (Union calédonienne, Caledonian Union), PALIKA (Parti de libération kanak, Kanak Liberation Party), UPM (union progressiste multiraciale, Multiracial Progressive Union), FULK (Front uni de libération kanak, United Kanak Liberation Front), USTKE (Union des syndicats de travailleurs kanaks et exploités, Allied Unions of Kanak and Exploited Workers), and PSK (Parti socialiste kanak, Kanak Socialist Party).

8. For example, at the fifth congress of the FLNKS, held on the Loyalty Island of Lifou, 15-17 August 1986.

9. On 15 March 1986 and again on 25 August 1987, just three weeks before the self-determination referendum.

10. Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République, Rally for New Caledonia in the (French) Republic.

11. For example, in March 1987, right-winger Justin Guillemard was expelled from the RPCR for publicly attacking party policies concerning land reform and the three-year residency qualification for participation in the self-determination referendum (see p. 11). He now presides over the extreme right-wing, activist Comités d'action patriotique (Patriotic Action Committees). The much more moderate Henri Leleu was sufficiently critical of what he saw to be Lafleur's inadequate commitment to socioeconomic reform and interethnic dialogue that he left the RPCR to establish, in July 1987, a moderate anti-independence party of his own, the Association pour le renouveau calédonien (Association for Caledonian Renewal). Coming from opposing ideological wings of the RPCR, the criticisms of Guillemard and Leleu shared a common disquiet at the politico-financial hegemony of the RPCR under Lafleur's leadership. Both Guillemard and Leleu intend to run their parties against the RPCR in future regional elections.

12. Front national, National Front.

13. For an account of the Pisani/Fabius Statute, and the results and analysis of the 1985 regional elections, see Clark, "Conflict Formal and Informal," 99-103.

14. For example, in J.-M. Tjibaou's letter to President Mitterrand, 21 January 1987; reported in *Le Monde*, 30 January 1987.

15. See texts, reports, and an interview with Pons in *Le Monde*, 18 February, 20 February, and 13 March 1987.
16. For all their reduced powers and funding restrictions, the regions managed, in the year ended March 1987, to launch between them some fifteen hundred projects (small-scale agricultural and industrial initiatives, local communications and infrastructure developments, and so on), with a global investment cost of F66 million (US\$11 million). See Frédéric Bobin, "La Régionalisation adoucit les moeurs," *Le Monde*, 10 September 1987.
17. Rassemblement pour la République, Rally for the Republic (neo-Gaullist, liberal; leader, Jacques Chirac). Union pour la Démocratie française, Union for French Democracy (an alliance of liberal and center-right parties). Front national, National Front (nationalist extreme right; leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen).
18. The FLNKS interpreted the term "the populations concerned" to mean the indigenous Melanesians and other "victims of colonialism." Such an interpretation was irreconcilable with Article 2 of the Constitution: "[The French Republic] shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion."
19. Speaking during the general policy debate of the National Assembly, 7 April 1987; see *Le Monde*, 9 April 1987.
20. Speaking to the Cabinet in Paris, 18 February 1987; and to French television audiences, 29 March 1987. Under the French Constitution the prime minister, not the president of the republic, is the executive head of government: cf. Article 21, "The Prime Minister shall direct the operation of the government. . . . He shall ensure the execution of the laws."
21. Forum communiqué, 29-30 May 1987, Apia, Western Samoa.
22. Libération kanak socialiste, Kanak Socialist Liberation (leader, Nidoish Naisseline).
23. Of F137.5 million (US\$24 million). Speech at Poindimié, 3 August 1987.
24. Or so the deputy leader of the FLNKS, Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, believed a month after the referendum; see *Le Monde*, 24 October 1987. In contrast the RPCR attracted some twenty thousand supporters to its Fête de la Liberté (Festival of Freedom) held in suburban Nouméa, 9 September 1987.
25. Tjibaou speaking on the metropolitan French public service radio network, France-Inter, 1 September 1987.
26. During the official television and radio campaign, 2 September 1987. Ukeiwé is a senator for New Caledonia and a prominent Melanesian leader within the RPCR.
27. On Radio Djiido, 10 September 1987.
28. According to Pons, 15 percent of Polynesian voters were in this way eliminated, 12.5 percent of Europeans, 8 percent of Wallisians, 7.5 percent of "other ethnic origins," and 2 percent of Melanesians; see *Le Monde*, 16 September 1987.
29. In the legislative elections of 16 March 1986, when a passive boycott by the FLNKS was also in operation, the turnout had been only 50.39 percent. At that time the three-

year residency qualification had not applied and the territorial electorate had been larger, at 90,578.

30. See Clark, "Conflict Formal and Informal," 101-103.

31. The new South Region was to be expanded to include the *communes* of Yaté and Ile des Pins (see Figure 1). The *communes* of Dumbéa and Paita were included in a West Region (which replaced the North Region of the 1985 statute). The Center Region (minus Yaté and Ile des Pins) became a new East Region. The Loyalty Islands Region was unchanged.

32. Except in an independence referendum acceptable to the FLNKS. Speaking at Hienghène, 2 September 1987.

33. Both speaking on 4 November; see *Le Monde*, 6 November 1987.

34. Three incidents in particular contributed to this deterioration. On 30 September, near Koné, two gendarmes were shot and killed by Melanesians. A month later, on 29 October, a European jury at the Assize Court in Nouméa acquitted on grounds of self-defense seven mixed-race (*métis*) farmers accused of murdering ten FLNKS militants (including two brothers of Tjibaou) at Hienghène on 5 December 1984. The verdict was widely criticized in New Caledonia and in France. On 6 November, a Kanak youth was shot and killed by gendarmes on Saint-Louis tribal land north of Noumea. The exchange of fire between Kanak militants and gendarmes was the most serious confrontation since the insurrectionary disturbances of late 1984.

35. On 25 November 1987. The bill was passed by the narrow majority of 289 votes (RPR and UDF) to 283 (FN, Socialists, and Communists).

ELECTIONS, COMPACT, AND ASSASSINATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU


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Introduction

When Charlie Gibbons and Joseph Tellei, native policemen during Japanese rule of Palau (1914-1944), returned from Guam in 1947 after a U.S. Navy-sponsored workshop on Western-style government, they became the local experts in the new institution of elected government.¹ Some months earlier, thirty-one Palauans had been elected as members of the Palau Congress, which in 1955 rewrote its charter to form the Olbiil Era Kelulau Era Belau (Palau's Congress of Whispered Decisions). In 1963 this body reorganized itself as the Palau Legislature. At the same time, the leading members of the legislature formed the Liberal and Progressive parties, which provided candidates for the seven Congress of Micronesia elections (1965-1976). These parties, based more on personalities than platforms, disintegrated in 1978 during debate on a unified Micronesia.

On the issue of Micronesian unity, Roman Tmetuchl and his faction opposed it and urged Palauan separation. On the other hand, Lazarus Salii and his group supported political federation with the other ethnic areas of Micronesia--Truk, Pohnpei, Kosrae, Yap, and the Marshall Islands--under a constitution drafted by islanders in 1975. The Palau separatists won in a close vote, 55 percent *no* to 45 percent *yes*. This

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STATES OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU

dramatic event set the stage for the Palauans to draft their own constitution, which was finally ratified in 1980 (Shuster 1980). This document has become widely known throughout the Pacific for its nuclear-free clause.²

The Constitution of the Republic of Palau established a presidential form of government, which was legally installed on 1 January 1981. The government consists of separately elected offices of president and vice president; a sixteen-member Council of Chiefs to “advise the President on matters concerning traditional laws, customs and their relationship to the Constitution and the laws of Palau”; and an appointed five-member Cabinet, whose members head the five executive branch ministries--social services, natural resources, justice, administration, and state.

The Olbiil Era Kelulau (Palau National Congress) consists of a fourteen-member Senate³ with representation based on population size and a sixteen-member House of Delegates with one delegate for each of Palau’s small states.⁴ Both the executive and legislative branches are elected for four-year terms. The Palau judiciary consists of a Supreme Court headed by a chief justice with three to six associate justices and a National Court of Common Pleas. The former consists of both trial and appellate divisions.

Palau’s First Constitutional Government

A decision made by the Palau Constitutional Convention in 1979 and codified into law by the Seventh Palau Legislature in 1980 called for the election of the nation’s chief executives by a plurality vote. This decision, in hindsight probably a mistake, had a major impact on the first government. In Palau’s first general election, held in 1980, both Haruo Remeliik and Alfonso Oiterong emerged from five-men presidential and vice presidential fields as winners, but with only 31 percent and 32 percent margins respectively.⁵ Roman Tmetuchl and Lazarus Salii, two very politically ambitious men, trailed Remeliik with 25.6 percent and 23 percent of votes cast. A few hundred votes more would have won either of them the much coveted office of president.⁶

The Remeliik-Oiterong administration had a very tenuous beginning. On 8 September 1981, after just eight months, the executive office building adjacent to the National Congress Chambers was firebombed by a mob of angry government workers demanding higher salaries. Remeliik was overwhelmed by the contemptuous aggressiveness of the workers and granted them fifty-dollar biweekly increases with addi-

tional adjustments scheduled for the future. But these did not materialize and two further strikes broke out in 1982. During the last strike one striker was shot and killed and three others were wounded by policemen. President Remeliik declared a ten-day state of emergency, ordered the workers back to their work sites, and reached an agreement with the strikers' spokesman, Roman Tmetuchl. The workers were given a salary increase and charges against their leaders were dropped.

While these strikes were serious, explosive situations, they were not the only problems the Remeliik administration faced during its first term. Some of the major ones included deficit spending, reduction of the work week from forty to thirty-two hours, confrontation with the Senate of the Palau National Congress that included several court suits that Remeliik lost, failures in 1983 and 1984 to have the Compact of Free Association approved by 75 percent of the Palau electorate, and pressure by the U.S. Department of the Interior to persuade the Palau government to increase tax collections, reduce operating costs, and enact revenue-generating legislation.⁷

Candidates and Campaigning, 1984

Given what appeared to be a rather dismal first-term record, it seemed unlikely that President Remeliik and Vice President Oiterong could be reelected. Early in 1984 Remeliik experienced a crisis of self-confidence and was uncertain whether he would run for reelection. He was perceived by some observers as ineffectual, indecisive, and weak. Nevertheless, both men ran and were reelected by clear margins. What gave Remeliik and Oiterong an advantage was their dogged support for the Compact of Free Association. During their first term, both men had recognized a need for technical expertise in dealing with the complexities of the compact document and its many subsidiary agreements and for this purpose they chose Lazarus Salii, who had been Micronesia's chief political status negotiator (1969-1975) prior to his departure from the Senate of the Congress of Micronesia in 1975.⁸ Salii served as Palau's ambassador for status negotiations and trade relations. He was given wide-ranging authority to negotiate with U.S. President Reagan's personal representative, Ambassador Fred Zeder.

Salii had run third in the 1980 presidential race and worked for a short time as an advisor to the mayor of Koror, Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons. Following his ambassadorial appointment in late 1982, he and Polycarp Basilius, a successful businessman and leader of the east-coast Babeldaob elite clan, became key advisors to and even controllers of President

Remeliik. Salii along with four or five others--the so-called "Saipan Mafia"--took over directing the campaign strategy for Remeliik's 1984 race. This group knew it had a strong candidate and that a well-run campaign would assure continued control of the executive for another four years.

The Basilius-Salii group marketed Remeliik as the people's candidate, a common man with no high title or great wealth. Remeliik, they claimed, had guided Palau through the turmoil and turbulence of workers' strikes in 1981 and 1982 and was perceived as Palau's strongest compact advocate. In his April 1984 State of the Nation address, Remeliik made it clear that he would call for a second compact referendum before the end of the summer.⁹ He and his advisors also realized that the compact issue provided significant political leverage: "Some people, both here and elsewhere, have made the suggestion that we put a complete stop to the [compact] negotiations until after the elections this year. It seems that the only reason given for this unusual suggestion is that some people may be afraid to take a position on this all important issue and would try to avoid being accountable to the voters in November for their opposition to the compact" (Remeliik 1984:9).

Despite enormous resistance from the Senate of the Palau National Congress, President Remeliik issued Executive Order Number 25, setting 4 September 1984 as the date for Palau's second compact referendum. In response, the Senate and its supporters requested the Palau Supreme Court to grant temporary restraining orders. Both requests, however, were dismissed in August. The first was dismissed on the ground that the Senate did not have legal standing and the second on the ground "that the issue was purely political and one in which the Court could not be involved" (Shuster 1984b).

The efforts by the Remeliik administration in July and August to promote the Compact of Free Association were, in retrospect, a well-crafted precampaign for the November 30 general election. The Remeliik group successfully polarized the Palau political situation into pro-compact and anti-compact factions. Polycarp Basilius, chairman of the Presidential Task Force on the Compact, characterized the majority group in the Senate as "afraid to have the people approve the compact prior to November because they think this would give too much credit to President Remeliik and Ambassador Salii" (Ulechong 1984).

During August 1984, Basilius's task force promoting the compact visited each of the Babeldaob rural villages, brought in Ambassador Zeder to answer villagers' questions, and used his considerable stature as President Reagan's personal representative for a double purpose: to improve

the compact's chances of gaining a 75 percent approval margin and to improve the Remeliik administration's credibility. The task force visits to the rural villages were the first major efforts at winning voter approval since Remeliik's first general election campaign in 1980. That unexpectedly successful campaign, which had put Remeliik into the presidency, had been engineered by Moses Uludong, Moses Ramarui, and Tony Bells (Shuster 1983: 126). Early in the Remeliik administration, Uludong and Ramarui had become disenchanted with what they perceived as the president's lack of leadership. By election time 1984, Bells remained a reluctant supporter but was not part of the inner circle dominated by Basilius and Salii.

The two other presidential candidates, Roman Tmetuchl and Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons, were more anti-Remeliik administration than anti-compact. Despite attempts they and their supporters made to persuade voters that they supported the principle of free association with the U.S., the Remeliik campaign strategists successfully portrayed Tmetuchl, the Ibedul, and the Senate as anti-compact.

In an attempt to clarify their position, Tmetuchl and the Ibedul sponsored a compact rally just two days before the September 4 referendum. A dozen chiefs, governors, and some 350 people attended the event. Speakers claimed that the Compact of Free Association with the U.S. was a highly desirable goal, but that traditional leaders had not been consulted on the latest version of the document, that the nuclear and land issues remained unclear, and that compact funding was inadequate (Quimby 1984).

Tmetuchl had been Palau's chief compact negotiator since the time of Palau's separation from the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands in 1978 and had authored some of the basic tenets of the free association relationship. His political ambitions, however, had been damaged by the 347-vote loss to Remeliik in the 1980 general election. Soon after the election results were announced, Tmetuchl predicted trouble and confusion for Palau.

Tmetuchl had officially announced on 2 November 1984 that he would run again for the presidency. Since 1981 he had served as governor of Airai, the state adjacent to Koror-town. The first campaign billboard to be erected in Koror for the 1984 election urged passersby to vote for Tmetuchl, while his campaign headquarters sign proclaimed that a "vote for Roman Tmetuchl is a vote for a fair and just island society" (Shuster 1984c). Tmetuchl made a campaign trip overseas to Guam, Saipan, and Hawaii, and he visited the rural villages on Babeldaob and Peleliu. During his campaign gatherings he told voters that if

elected he would assemble all the chiefs, state governors, and the elected and business leaders to consider the various compact options and then make recommendations, which he would put before the public. Only after such citizen input would he open new political status negotiations with Washington. In his talks, Tmetuchl claimed that Palau's budget crisis was more a matter of waste and inefficient management than a lack of funds. Such statements were the closest Tmetuchl came to public criticism of President Remeliik, since Palau political etiquette does not permit public attacks on political opponents.

Tmetuchl's assertive and bold approach to issues was frightening to some Palauans. Throughout the campaign Tmetuchl managers attempted to moderate this impression. For example, in his meetings with government employees, Tmetuchl assured them that his election would not mean any reduction in employment. He reminded a group of teachers that Palau Public Law 1-37 protected all government employees and prohibited removal except for cause. Governor Tmetuchl also campaigned on his record of infrastructure and social development that he had sponsored in his home state of Airai. The Remeliik campaign group perceived Tmetuchl as a fiercely competitive, even feared, opponent who wanted passionately to win the 1984 election.

Yutaka Gibbons, the Ibedul or high chief of the southwestern half of Palau (the Reklai, the paramount chief of northern Palau, being his counterbalance), was the third presidential candidate. He had been successful in several Koror-town elections in the 1970s but was inexperienced on the national scene. In 1980 the Ibedul supported Lazarus Salii for president. Now, the situation appeared to be reversed. As early as April 1984, Salii urged the Ibedul to run for the presidency because he recognized that the chief and Tmetuchl would take votes from each other, thereby improving significantly the chances of a Remeliik reelection.

The Ibedul's campaign was run by Toshiwo Nakamura and Moses Uludong. They projected the Ibedul as a unifier, a bridge between tradition and modernity, a peacemaker who had brought the strikers and President Remeliik together during Palau's civil unrest of 1981 and 1982. The high chief supported the principle of free association with the U.S., but felt the Remeliik administration had not consulted with the traditional leaders on the substance of the new compact that went to referendum two months before the nation's second general election. The land issue, military impact monies, and the continuation of student scholarships and federal programs were the major areas where the Ibedul believed the compact needed improvement.

As early as August 1984, the Ibedul released his platform statement, the only one to appear during the campaign. It was mainly the work of Uludong. Strange as it might seem, the platform statement did not mention either the Compact of Free Association or the United States as Palau's political partner. The statement consisted of six points: (1) preservation of tradition and culture; (2) an open, organized, and responsive government; (3) setting of a development plan; (4) enhancement of national-state relations; (5) respect for the national Constitution; and (6) active external affairs.

While the Ibedul and his supporters attempted to use title and tradition as avenues to the presidency, their campaign was also the glossiest of the three. Besides the attractive platform statement, bumper stickers, T-shirts, calendars, flags, picture posters, and slogan posters were distributed throughout Palau. A day before the election the Ibedul's Northern Mariana Islands Presidential Committee ran a full-page advertisement in the *Pacific Daily News*. The main item of the advertisement was a congratulatory letter to the then newly reelected President Reagan in which the Ibedul stated that, if elected, he would do all in his power to negotiate and resolve all the remaining issues in the Compact of Free Association (*Pacific Daily News* 1984).

The November 30 vice presidential race also had three candidates: incumbent Alfonso Oiterong, Sadang Silmai, and John Tarkong. Despite a problem-filled first term, Oiterong was perceived as an honest, capable, and dedicated civil servant. As minister of state he was responsible for free association negotiations with the United States, and relied on Salii to carry out these duties in his capacity as Palau's ambassador for status negotiations.

Roth Remeliik and Oiterong tended to be quiet, nonaggressive, and unassuming individuals. Oiterong often stood in for Remeliik at public gatherings and meetings with the National Congress. Throughout the first term, Oiterong reported on the status of the territory to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, and his many overseas trips provided opportunities for fresh insights and new channels of communication. Through such contacts, Oiterong was able to launch two projects, one highly successful, the other a financial disaster.

Palau assumed postal independence in November 1982 and this event was marked with the issuance of the republic's unique stamps depicting cultural, political, natural, and historical themes. After just eighteen months Palau's stamps were turning a profit, which Oiterong predicted could possibly reach as much as \$1 million annually. The vice president served as the chairman of the nation's Task Force on Power and, fortu-

nately for him, Palau's default on a \$32.5-million loan for a sixteen-megawatt power plant built in Oiterong's home state of Aimeliik did not occur until seven or eight months after the 1984 general election.

Sadang Silmai was, covertly, the running mate of Roman Tmetuchl. Silmai had served as speaker of the Sixth Palau Legislature, which was turned out of office in 1979 by the People's Committee for the Constitution (Shuster 1980:81). He had run for a congressional seat in 1980 but his political colors had proved unacceptable. For the 1984 campaign, Silmai literally walked his way across Palau, visiting every hamlet and village on Koror and Babeldaob. This is possible in Palau because rural villages are relatively small, varying in size from twelve to 123 households. In his campaigning, Silmai often talked of the problems plaguing Palau and asked for the people's help in solving them.

The third vice presidential candidate, John Tarkong, a lawyer, gave up his Senate seat to run. He viewed the vice president's role as that of a mediator for the various groups and factions that make up the dynamic Palau body politic. The Remeliik campaign strategists possibly persuaded Tarkong to run because his roots, as were Silmai's, were in northern Babeldaob and the two would divide the area's votes, making a victory for either unlikely.

The Race for Congressional Seats

Politics is "big business" in Palau and always generates enthusiastic dialogue and debate. At least one anthropologist has claimed that Palau's social structure "both takes into account and tends to support or encourage competitive expression" (McKnight 1960:20). In no aspect of contemporary Palauan society is this clearer than in the striving for elected office.

The 1984 race for congressional seats was considerably tighter than four years earlier. The work of a five-member Reapportionment Commission had reduced the Olbiil Era Kelulau Senate from eighteen seats to fourteen and, as noted above, activities and psychologies had polarized the Palau political arena into pro-compact and anti-compact groups.

Many of the congressional candidates produced campaign literature of two general sorts: announcements and platforms. The former were handbills, invitations, or premarked sample ballots. The platforms ranged from essays on the pros and cons of the compact, like that produced by incumbent Senator Kaleb Udoi, to one-page letters designed for mailing to overseas voters. Both Dr. Minoru Ueki and Victor Rehu-

her made mention in their overseas letters of Palau's first four years of self-government as a period of "troubles and unprecedented financial crisis" and of "difficult problems and pressing issues."

As in 1980, the congressional candidates went from house to house talking politics, giving gifts, and asking for support. Younger candidates, especially, had to "sell" themselves in culturally acceptable ways. According to Palauan social mores, a candidate never boasts of accomplishments or qualifications. Good campaign style follows social mores of self-effacing behavior, self-sacrifice, and concern for community.

Results

On 30 November 1984, forty-three polling stations opened all over Palau at seven A.M. Most of the voter action, however, occurred in Koror-town, where the main road was jammed most of the day with bumper-to-bumper traffic that included candidates' campaign cars carrying voters to and from the polls. The two major polling stations, at Palau High School and Palau Civic Center, were surrounded by colorful campaign tents where supporters were serving food, waving posters, and watching the flow of voters. Many of the campaign groups, especially the presidential and vice presidential ones, had tally-keepers. These individuals, armed with long voter registration lists of people in their hamlets, had been dispatching cars since early morning to transport voters. In a small-scale society where quite literally everyone knows everyone, it is easy to keep tally of who has and has not voted. When the tally-keepers noticed that someone sharing their political persuasion from their clan or hamlet had failed to arrive, a car was sent to collect the person in question. This technique has always ensured a very high voter turnout in Palau.

Every incumbent in the House and Senate ran for reelection with the exception of Senators Abel Suzuki, Moses Uludong, and John Tarkong. Suzuki dropped out and threw his support to Salii. Salii's joining the Senate race was an important development because it signaled that the Remeliik group aimed to infiltrate and perhaps take over a previously uncooperative Senate. Uludong, who had left a significant mark on Senate legislation, withdrew for personal and family reasons, while Tarkong was pursuing the vice presidency.

The most heated Senate race was for the three seats for the district of east-coast Babeldaob. Incumbents Baules Sechelong, Kaleb Udui, George Ngirarsaol, Seit Andres, Victor Rehuher, and David Ngirmidol ran the political race of their lives against eleven hungry opponents.

Only Ngirarsaol and Andres survived. Young Thomas Remengesau, Jr., emerged from near-obscure to become the top vote-getter.

In a portion of Koror-town making up the Second Senatorial District, Johnson Toribiong lost to a Congress of Micronesia veteran, Isidoro Rudimch, and to two dark horses--Nicholas Rechebei and Sam Masang. Toribiong, overconfident, had not done his campaign homework and lost to Rechebei by just twenty-eight votes. Isabella Sumang, a high-ranking Koror woman, finished fifth in a field of seven. In Koror's Third Senatorial District, incumbent Joshua Koshiba emerged as the top vote-winner followed by old-timer Itelbang Luii, speaker in the Fourth and Fifth Palau Legislatures, and John Sugiyama. Incumbent Edobo Temengil, a complete dark horse in 1980, did not campaign as vigorously as he had four years earlier and lost his seat. In Koror's Fourth Senatorial District, Kuniwo Nakamura regained his seat with newcomers Etibek Sadang and Hokkons Baules emerging as winners from a field of nine. Katherine Kesolei, the second of two women in the 1984 Senate race, trailed most of the men, finishing ahead of only three in the ten-person field. The Palauans, it seems, were not yet prepared to elect a female senator.

In the west-coast Babeldaob district, Lucius Malsol beat Masami Siksei. Both were incumbents but their district had been shrunk to one seat by reapportionment. Siksei campaigned hard, but Malsol had the advantage of more relatives in the four coastal states and blood connections are more important than endless rhetoric on issues.

As expected, Lazarus Salii ran away from the field in the Sixth Senatorial District. He received nearly two-and-a-half-times more votes than the second-place finisher. The incumbent, Mitch Solang, had been a Remeliik administration supporter but was unable to match Salii's voter appeal.

Of the fifteen incumbent senators who ran for reelection, only five were successful. Nearly all the losers had been anti-compact and this was the main reason for their losses. Unlike the Senate, the House had been pro-compact and supportive of the Remeliik administration. Five of the sixteen delegates were new faces. The only incumbent female delegate, Akiko Sugiyama, was challenged by Kubarii Etchell, another woman, and by Schwartz Tudong. Tudong defeated Sugiyama by fifty-five votes, thereby forming the second exclusively male National Congress. Given a two-thirds change of Senate seats and minor changes in the House where Carlos Salii had been speaker, the election results, at least on the surface, boded well for the Remeliik administration and the compact.

In the vice presidential race, Oiterong thrashed Silmai and Tarkong by taking 53 percent of the vote. The 1984 campaign had been organized by Yoichi Rengiil, who attributed the success to a door-to-door, low-keyed, personal approach. "Mr. Oiterong never tried to buy votes with food or money. He didn't believe in that technique," Rengiil reported.

Remeliik also defeated his challengers handily, taking 50 percent of the vote to 31 percent for Tmetuchl and 18 percent for the Ibedul. Remeliik won for several reasons: he rode on the compact issue, gaining, ironically, most of the government workers' votes; he had the strength of incumbency; and, most importantly, the opposition split their votes. On two occasions during the campaign Moses Uludong, from the Ibedul camp, and Bena Sakuma, from the Tmetuchl group, attempted to consolidate the two sides. The arrangement, which Tmetuchl reportedly accepted, was for Tmetuchl to pay all the Ibedul's campaign expenses and allow him to choose four cabinet ministers in exchange for dropping out of the race and giving Tmetuchl the choice of presidential assistants and overseas liaison positions. The Ibedul refused the deal because he thought he could win.¹⁰

President Remeliik: His Life and Funeral

Just six months into his second term, President Haruo I. Remeliik was brutally gunned down outside his official government residence in Koror during the early morning hours of 30 June 1985. At the time Palau had been preparing for its annual fair. A time of celebration and happiness was suddenly transformed by one criminal and senseless act into a national tragedy that generated a crescendo of shock, shame, sadness, and grief beyond understanding.

Haruo Ignacio Remeliik was born on 1 June 1933 and baptized on Peleliu on July 29 of that same year by Father Marino La Hoz, a Spanish priest. After the Pacific War, the young Remeliik attended Koror Elementary School and then transferred to Mindszenty Intermediate School, graduating in 1950. At the urging of Father McManus, he entered Xavier Minor Seminary in Truk and spent two years there studying for the priesthood. He returned to Palau and gradually worked his way up through the court system to become an associate judge. Remeliik began his career as an elected official in 1968 when he won an at-large seat in the Fourth Palau Legislature, where he served as vice-speaker. In 1970 he was appointed deputy district administrator for the then Palau District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

However, the pace of political events was accelerating throughout Micronesia. Under the leadership of Roman Tmetuchl, Palau broke away from the other Trust Territory districts in 1978 and later that year Remeliik was elected a member, and in the following year president, of Palau's Constitutional Convention. This return to elected office perhaps determined his fate because it brought him into Palau's political spotlight as a major player opposite Tmetuchl, who was then the dominant figure in Palauan politics.

Haruo I. Remeliik served as Palau's first president and reelected president from 1 January 1980 to 30 June 1985, the day of his assassination. He was a gentle and gracious man who, until his tragic death, was a man of good fortune rather than keen ambition. Of the five candidates in the 1980 presidential race--Palau's first under its new Constitution--Remeliik was an unlikely contestant and a more unlikely winner. He had not been a Congress of Micronesia member nor did he have the outward sophistication from years of travel and experience in dealing with foreigners as was true of the four other candidates. Yet he had certain advantages. Remeliik was perceived by some voters as a down-to-earth, people's candidate for whom the energy and vision of a group of young Palauan activists (including Moses Uludong, Tony Bells, and Moses Ramarui) worked a campaign "magic" that catapulted Remeliik ahead of both Tmetuchl and Lazarus Salii in the final vote count. In a five-man field, Remeliik took just 31 percent of the vote compared to 26 percent for Tmetuchl and 23 percent for Salii. John Ngiraked and David Ramarui rounded out the 1980 presidential field.

During the early part of his first term, President Remeliik hired several Salii supporters to fill key positions. When Salii had a falling-out with Ibedul Gibbons, one of Palau's two paramount chiefs and the mayor of Koror, Salii joined the Remeliik administration as ambassador for status negotiations and trade relations. This was an important solidification of political forces because Salii and former Palauan colleagues from Saipan--the so-called "Saipan Mafia"--formed an advisory group for Remeliik that later organized his very successful reelection campaign. In that election the Ibedul and Tmetuchl violated an age-old principle of Palauan culture, that of dualism. Instead of joining forces, they campaigned separately, and on election day they split the vote, returning the reins of power to Remeliik and his supporters.

President Remeliik's four-and-a-half years as chief executive were filled with opposition and setbacks. During his first term he went half a year without a Cabinet, had his office embarrassingly burnt to the ground in a violent strike by government workers, accomplished little in

the area of economic development, and faced defeat in court suits and in two compact referenda. So difficult was his first term that he stated in his 1985 inaugural address that "unless this Republic pulls together its various elements of leadership in one concerted action, we cannot hope to make any significant progress" (Remeliik 1985: 1).

Ironically, a scant six months after his inaugural call for people to observe and obey the laws of the land, Remeliik was shot and wounded after leaving his car, pushed down an embankment, and brutally assassinated, half his skull blown away. Hospital Road in Koror ran red with the president's blood, just one month after his fifty-second birthday.

The six days between the president's assassination and the state funeral were very long, sorrowful ones for Palau. Many Koror taxi drivers kept quiet vigil in shifts outside the hospital morgue. There too sat Sena Sugiyama, the late president's secretary. With deep loyalty and respect, Sugiyama remained almost without interruption for six days and nights. She was angry and shamed--"How could any Palauan commit such a horrible crime?"¹¹

Moses Uludong, a member of the Palau National Congress during Remeliik's first term, broke down and wept uncontrollably the morning of the assassination when he saw Remeliik's body, broken and lifeless on the Koror hospital emergency room table. Uludong had been enormously influential in putting Remeliik into office in 1980, but the two men had had serious disagreements throughout the first term. However, early in Remeliik's second term, they had become intimate friends again, having long talks about political and personal problems. It was during these discussions that Uludong realized that Haruo Remeliik was a desperately lonely president who did not have close male friends with whom he could share the anxieties of personal problems or talk about the joys and enormous burdens of his high office. This was the other tragedy of the Remeliik presidency that few knew about.

More than one thousand Palauans and leaders from throughout the Pacific basin and the United States attended President Remeliik's state funeral ceremonies on Saturday, 6 July 1985. His body had remained at the Remeliik private home in Koror overnight. At 9 A.M. on Saturday the casket was placed on an open-air hearse and followed by a fifteen-car cortege to the Palau National Congress Building. Because a huge crowd was expected, hundreds of chairs had been set up under awnings outside the building. These were filled and more people stood under the shade of nearby trees.

The Palau Evangelical Church choir sang the Palau national anthem, "Belau er Kid," "Palau is Ours." Father Thomas Smith, S. J., who had

rushed to the Remeliik home soon after the shooting seven days earlier, gave the invocation. Senate President Isidoro Rudimch read the National Congress resolution conveying its deepest sympathies and condolences to President Remeliik's widow, Regina, and family.

Palau's Interim President Alfonso Oiterong spoke in Palauan. He paid solemn tribute to his fallen colleague and reminded everyone that Remeliik "was a humble man . . . a reformer who understood his people, who cherished his culture and heritage and worked hard to preserve and enhance them" (Oiterong 1985).

Rubak Ngirakidel Secharkebur delivered a Palauan chant on behalf of the sixteen traditional chiefs who had served as advisors to President Remeliik on matters of custom. The chant reminded people of the necessary relation between leadership and social unity.

Thomas O. Remengesau, Sr., minister of justice in the Remeliik Cabinet, delivered a moving eulogy. Since Vice President Oiterong had been away in New York at the time of the assassination, Remengesau had assumed leadership of the government within hours of the president's death. Remengesau and the late president had worked together for nearly ten years as the district administrator and deputy administrator prior to self-government in 1981. Remengesau's eulogy brought tears to many eyes. Visiting dignitaries sat transfixed by the reverence of the moment. Remengesau's delivery was broken several times as he struggled to hold back his emotions. The time, he said, was "the darkest moment in the history of our nation." Remengesau described Haruo Remeliik as a man of peace and moderation, as a man who could have lived aloof from people but instead intermingled freely and thereby came to know nearly everyone in Palau by name, lineage, clan, and title. "Mr. President," Remengesau said in a hushed voice, "we bid you farewell. And as you enter eternal rest we assure you that your magnanimous spirit and wisdom will continue to guide this young nation as we journey over difficult waters toward our final destiny" (Shuster 1985a).

The Reverend Hubert Charles closed the state ceremony with a benediction and then hundreds upon hundreds of people from both inside and outside the Congress Building filed quietly past the closed, light blue casket. A crown of flowers and the Palau national flag--a golden full moon on a sky of dark blue--graced the top of the casket. With the conclusion of last respects, the hearse carrying Remeliik, followed by a motorcade of local and visiting dignitaries and escorted by policemen on motorcycles, slowly traveled the mile to the Sacred Heart Catholic Church.

Dozens of Remeliik family members, dressed in mourners' black,

entered the church. Visiting dignitaries followed. Next came Remeliik's Cabinet ministers and other executive branch officials, President Oiterong and his wife Josepha, National Congress leaders, and citizens. The Reverend Felix Yaoch, S. J., assisted by Northern Marianas Bishop Tomas A. Camacho and several other priests, said the funeral mass. The ceremony was graced with beautifully sung Palauan-language hymns. Father Yaoch blessed the casket with incense and holy water. After Mass, the casket was carried from the church by six policemen and placed once again on the hearse. The body of the late president was returned to his Koror private home. During the remainder of the day and far into the night, Mrs. Remeliik and women of the clan sat with the casket, keeping constant vigil as small groups of people paid their final respects. The Palauan *kemeldiil*, funeral custom, takes place over several days and nights and performs an important social unifying function.

Funeral ceremonies continued on Sunday, July 7. A motorcade again accompanied the casket and family members as they traveled together from the Koror home to the Fisheries Dock, Malakal. There the casket was taken by speedboat to Peleliu. After a third nightlong vigil at the Remeliik family home on Peleliu, the casket was moved by a carriage pulled by a dozen Peleliu young men. A police color guard carrying the Peleliu State, Palau, and American flags headed the procession. Following the casket down the narrow sandy road walked some hundred Remeliik family members, President Oiterong, his ministers, Mrs. Oiterong, congressmen, and citizens. Peleliu women holding flowers stood reverently every twenty paces along the wide sandy path leading to the Peleliu State Government Building.

At half past one, the final ceremony honoring the late president was conducted by the Peleliu State Government. Hundreds of mourners stood under wide shade trees near the crowded building. After the Palau national anthem and a prayer by Father Yaoch, President Oiterong again paid tribute to the man with whom he had worked so closely. Peleliu Governor Yukio Shmull entreated everyone to pull together to complete Remeliik's political agenda. The ranking chief of the island, Obak Singeo, spoke, followed by solemn remarks from the speakers of the Peleliu and Melekeok state legislatures, who each presented a resolution of condolence to Mrs. Remeliik and the Remeliik family.

When the Peleliu State ceremonies ended, the casket was carried to the carriage and transported a short distance to the grave site. There Father Yaoch said prayers and blessed the casket for the last time with

holy water. It was then lowered carefully into the grave. Loved ones, colleagues, and neighbors walked solemnly past the grave, dropping flowers gently onto the casket and praying silently. Women wept without a sound. Palau's first national leader, Haruo I. Remeliik, was laid to rest on the island of his birth surrounded by his family, friends, and citizens of the new republic. The young nation's first president was gone.

Special Election, 1985

Upon the death of a president, the Palau Constitution calls for an election within two months of the vacancy to fill the offices of president and vice president. The newly elected executives would complete the remaining three-and-one-half years of the Remeliik-Oiterong term.

At the time of Remeliik's assassination, Vice President Oiterong had been in New York City. He returned to Palau immediately. It appears that during his long trip home he had made up his mind to run for the presidency. Shortly after the Remeliik funeral, Lazarus Salii met with Oiterong and agreed to run for vice president.¹² This was a short-lived agreement: On July 28 Salii announced his own candidacy for the presidency. Prior to that announcement, both Oiterong and his campaign manager, Yoichi Rengiil, were more concerned with the likelihood of an Ibedul candidacy. Following the president's murder, the chief had calmed Palau's turbulent emotional waters and appeared to be a national unifier.

Despite his poor showing in 1984, the Ibedul was in fact poised to run in the special election, but changed his mind because the nine other Koror chiefs told him that Oiterong was too strong to be beaten. However, about two weeks before the August 28 election, these same chiefs switched their support to Salii.

Oiterong's 1985 campaign was more intensive than the one in 1984. He and Rengiil made trips to all the Babeldaob villages, visited Peleliu and Angaur, and had their campaign team canvass Koror's hamlets numerous times. As the Salii campaign gained momentum through August, a group of Ibedul advisors became alarmed. They joined the Oiterong team and began campaigning in what was interpreted as a non-Oiterong style.

Salii established his campaign headquarters at the same site used eight months earlier for the successful Remeliik campaign. The Salii group ran a strong campaign. They were very eager for a win and began with a simple but effective idea--"We're behind!" Keeping this constantly in mind, the Salii team worked hard. Salii went to every

leader and personally asked for his support. He said he would follow Remeliik's programs and deal with issues decisively. He also went from office to office within the government, promising to raise salaries and begin a workers' retirement program.

The Vice Presidential Candidates

The seven-man vice presidential field for the 1985 special election consisted of two Cabinet ministers, two national congressmen, a lawyer, a state legislator, and the former speaker of the Seventh Palau Legislature. Palau election law does not provide for a primary, so the seven candidates were expected to chop the expected 8,060-vote total (based on an 84 percent turnout in November 1984) into small pieces with the luckiest runner winning.

Listed first on the ballot was F. Kazuo "Frank" Asanuma, forty-one, a House of Delegates member representing Melekeok State, which had 431 registered voters. Asanuma based his campaign on accomplishments. "I deliver to my constituents. Look at the capitol project and road in my state." Asanuma enjoyed the support of the high-clan people of east-coast Babeldaob and the minority group in the Olbil Era Kelulau House. He said that he would try to get two thousand votes but thought thirteen hundred might be enough to win the race. Asanuma was a long shot, however, because his base of support in Koror and Peleliu (4,027 registered voters altogether) was weak.

At sixty, Sadang Silmai, number two on the ballot, was the senior candidate in the large field. Silmai, an educator for many years and speaker of the Sixth Palau Legislature, was a member of the Ngardmau State Legislature and had mounted a strong vice presidential campaign in November 1984, taking 2,373 votes (30 percent) to winner Oiterong's 4,252 (53 percent). Silmai supported the compact but felt it needed improvement. He was a solid candidate given his age and experience. His chances were weakened by two other candidates--Tarkong and Remengesau--who were competing for the same base of support in northern Babeldaob.

Third on the ballot was Palau's minister of administration, Haruo Willter, forty-eight. He had run for the vice presidency in 1980 and felt a vice president "must go in with an open mind, without political or business connections. I have a neutral stance and could bring people together," he said (Shuster 1985b). Having lived outside Palau for many years, Willter tended to be rather candid and even blunt, an unusual characteristic in Palau, where indirect statements and subterfuge are

valued behaviors. In an August 5 campaign letter to voters on Guam, Willter stated that people in Palau had “suffered a great deal as a result of internal political fight[s] among our leaders to gain political power.” He further stated seven reasons for the suffering:

1. Because of politics, we are disunited and do not seem to trust each other.
2. Because of politics, some of our people have turned against their own government even to the extent of destroying government properties.
3. Because of politics we have forced our government into deficit financing.
4. Because of politics, it has become extremely difficult to attract foreign investors and as a result our economic development has suffered.
5. Because of politics, our negotiations regarding our future political status with the United States has been stalled.
6. Because of politics, people who used to support each other are now working against each other.
7. Because of politics, we are suspicious of and fear each other.

(Willter 1985)

Like Asanuma, Willter was another long shot due to an apparently narrow political support base.

Thomas Remengesau, Sr., Palau’s minister of justice, was listed fourth on the ballot and was the front-runner. Like Silmai, Remengesau, fifty-five, was well known in and outside of Palau because of his nine years as district administrator prior to the beginning of self-government under the Constitution. Remengesau favored village development in Palau’s fifteen rural states outside Koror as a way of equalizing the distribution of wealth. He had served as acting chief executive in the tense days following President Remeliik’s assassination. His campaign momentum might have been stalled by the uncertainty clouding the murder: Charges against the three men suspected of killing Remeliik were dropped on August 16. The minister of justice was in charge of the investigation.

John Tarkong, forty-six, was number five on the ballot. He had finished third in the vice presidential race in November 1984. Tarkong, a lawyer who likes clarity, said that issues get very confused in Palau. “The lack of clarity and communication is the foundation of all the confusion and problems in Palau,” the candidate said. Tarkong favored

what he called "a people-approved compact" and agreed that in Palauan politics, personality is often more important than issues (Shuster 1985b). With seven candidates vying for support, Tarkong believed that issues should be used to differentiate them. Tarkong was another long shot in the race.

Number six was Toshiwo Nakamura, forty-seven. He had run a very strong campaign in 1980, finishing second just 247 votes behind the winner, Oiterong. Nakamura believed he could be a good unifier. "A vice president should unite the three branches of government, the state governors, and traditional leaders in order to get this country moving," he said (Shuster 1985b). Nakamura supported the compact but wanted a statement that the U.S. would not store, test, or dump dangerous substances in Palau. He had the support of key leaders in Koror and Peleliu but needed to win some votes on Babeldaob. His chances looked good at election time.

Seventh on the ballot, Senator Joshua Koshiba was a skilled campaigner and legislator, having served four terms in the Palau Legislature and National Congress. Outspoken, popular but combative, Koshiba takes on issues and individuals. "I despise the rumors I've heard floating around Palau. If I'm elected vice president, no one will manipulate me. My allegiance will be to the Palau Constitution," Koshiba said (Shuster 1985b). Koshiba believed Palau was then in a good position regarding the compact. He was deeply concerned about lax law enforcement and misuse of tax monies. He had a sense of justice and wanted the nation's wealth more fairly distributed. Koshiba had a good number of supporters in the thirty-member National Congress and in Koror. He was a strong candidate and the only one who publicly called for the assistance of the Almighty in his campaign billboards.

Results

As expected with a seven-man field, the vice presidential vote was highly fragmented. Of the 7,573 votes cast, Remengesau received the largest chunk--1,968 votes or 26 percent. Nakamura finished with 18 percent, Asanuma with 15.5 percent, and Senator Koshiba fourth with 15 percent.

In the presidential race, Lazarus Salii won with 4,077 votes or 53.6 percent. Oiterong captured 46 percent (3,484 votes). If Oiterong had won every one of the 4,252 votes he had received eight months earlier, he could have defeated Salii. Oiterong's loss was due to several factors. Certain members of the Salii group began an effective dirty rumor campaign, linking Oiterong with Tmetuchl.¹³ These rumors were effec-

tively spread on Guam and Saipan and lost votes for Oiterong. Second, the change in style initiated by former Ibedul followers appeared to break Oiterong's momentum; third, Oiterong suffered from overconfidence due to a commanding win in 1984; and, finally, the perception that Salii was more able or mentally agile than Oiterong hurt. With 4,077 votes, Salii had finally achieved a goal he had set for himself during the 1979 Palau Constitutional Convention. He now was president of the Republic of Palau.

Conclusion

Since self-government began in 1981, the compact has been a dominant, even obsessional, issue for Palauans. In the 1984 election Remeliik and Oiterong swept back into office on the basis of their strong compact stance. Other 1984 candidates, whether incumbents or challengers, perceived as anti-compact inevitably lost.

President Remeliik, by temperament, was not an assertive leader yet he attempted to secure approval for the compact document from the Palau electorate in February 1983 and again in September 1984. His work was frustrated by his opponents' insistence on respecting the Palau Constitution's nuclear-free clause, which required approval of the compact by not less than 75 percent of the Palauan electorate. Remeliik faced a dilemma here. He had been the president of the Palau Constitutional Convention and fought both Palauan and U.S. government officials who insisted the Palau Constitution be changed to incorporate U.S. defense and security needs. He gained the national presidency partly because of his nationalist loyalty to the original Constitution. On the other hand, Palau's compact is "front-loaded" with over \$140 million granted to the government in the first year. The prospect of millions upon millions of U.S. dollars flowing into Palau has been overpowering to many Palauans, especially the leadership class. In the two referenda during President Remeliik's first term, the best his efforts could bring were a 62 percent approval in 1983 and 67 percent in 1984. And there, perhaps, lay his fatal weakness.¹⁴

For Palau, the beginning of self-government in 1981 under the Constitution was an enormous change. Many areas of overt political life--an arena traditionally given to Palauan men--were up for redefinition and room for maneuver and countermove was extensive. At the root of much of the controversy and even violent confrontation over the compact is the constant struggle for political power within Palau. Haruo Remeliik, it appears, was a victim of that struggle.

President Salii has brought the compact issue to the electorate on four

separate occasions with the following results: 21 February 1986--72 percent approval; 2 December 1986--66 percent approval; 30 June 1987--68 percent approval; and 21 August 1987--73 percent approval. On 4 August 1987, President Salii was able to have the nuclear-free clause of the Constitution suspended in a referendum called for that purpose. Some 73 percent of the Palau electorate approved the suspension. Throughout 1987, President Salii pushed the compact issue vigorously and even forcefully, creating a host of political enemies who have, it appears, coalesced to form the Palau National Democratic Party.¹⁵ The compact issue and Salii's handling of it will be the key factors keeping the Palauan cauldron of political passions boiling as the republic approaches the November 1988 general elections.

NOTES

1. Joseph Tellei (also known as Oikawasang), personal interview, Koror, Palau, 21 December 1980.

2. The nuclear-free section of the Constitution of the Republic of Palau does not declare an absolute ban on nuclear materials but, rather, it calls for a conditional ban on such materials. Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution reads: "Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom, shall not be used, tested, stored or disposed of within the territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval of not less than three-fourths ($\frac{3}{4}$) of the votes cast in a referendum submitted on this specific question." Article II, Section 3, defining sovereignty and supremacy, contains nearly identical language. This 75 percent condition has prevented the consummation of a political relationship of free association as defined in a compact agreement between the United States and the Republic of Palau whereby Palau is granted full self-government, including control of its foreign affairs. The U.S. will provide financial assistance in exchange for full authority in defense and security matters for fifty years.

On 4 August 1987, the Palau electorate approved the suspension of these two sections of the Constitution in an amendment referendum. This change allowed the compact to be approved by a simple majority vote. Voting a sixth time on the compact issue, Palauans went to the polls on 21 August 1987, and 73 percent voted approval. However, prior to the two August referenda, three Palauan men filed a suit in Palau's Supreme Court challenging the legality of the two plebiscites. The men withdrew their challenge at the urging of High Chief Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons, while President Lazarus Salii agreed to refrain from using his power of eminent domain to provide land for U.S. military use without the consent of the owners and just compensation, and also to designate Palau's Council of Chiefs responsible for considering all U.S. requests for military land use rights within Palau. The issue took a new twist when the Bilung (queen), Gloria Gibbons Salii, sister of the Ibedul and wife of President Salii's younger brother, leading a group of about thirty elite-clan women, on 31 August 1987 refiled the suit. The women claimed that the August 4 referendum to amend Palau's Constitution had been illegal.

This opposition to President Salii's efforts created tensions that resulted in a strafing attack on the home of Santos Olikong, Palau National Congress's speaker of the House of Delegates, on 5 September 1987; and two bombing attacks on the evening of 7 September 1987, one dangerously near the home of Gabriela Ngirmang, a plaintiff in the suit. The same night, the father of Roman Bedor, an antinuclear activist and legal advisor for the elite-clan women, was murdered. These violent acts appeared coordinated: All occurred within minutes of each other just after Koror's electrical power went off that evening. Two days later, the women took action to have the court dismiss their suit. Judge Robert A. Hefner, who was to have heard the case, wrote, "There are indications that the dismissal was brought about by intimidation through the use of violence" (Perry 1987).

3. The first Olbiil Era Kelulau had eighteen seats. A constitutionally mandated reapportionment was carried out in 1984 before the second general election and reduced the number of seats to fourteen. The five members of the Reapportionment Commission appointed by President Remeliik and confirmed by the Senate were Norman Chin, Kaleb Olegeriil, Masaharu Tmodrang, Grace Sam, and Mike Ngirairikl.

4. The Republic of Palau consists of sixteen local governmental units called states. Koror (7.1 square miles) has the largest state population--9,419--and Sonsorol State (.9 square mile) is the smallest with 38 people (Republic of Palau 1987:98, 99).

5. Unlike most presidential systems of government where presidential and vice presidential candidates run on joint tickets, the Palau Constitution requires such candidates to run separately. This creates a contradictory situation where vice presidential candidates, according to political etiquette, publicly state that they can work with any of the presidential candidates, yet maintain an unspoken preference or alliance.

6. For a descriptive analysis of the Republic of Palau's first election under constitutional government, held in 1980, see Shuster 1983.

7. President Remeliik, in his 20 April 1984 State of the Nation address, described the difficulties of his first term: "The survival of the Republic was manifestly earned through our own hard work, despite the occurrences of numerous misguided efforts both from within and from without the Republic to bring the government to its knees. Together we have survived extremely critical financial crises for each of the last three years and we are now in the midst of our fourth financial woe" (Remeliik 1984).

8. Lazarus E. Salii served as a consultant to the Koror State Government for a short time in 1981. After a falling-out with Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons in 1982, Salii became Palau's only ambassador, without pay. At the time of his appointment he did not hide his disenchantment with the poor showing to date of the Remeliik administration: "I do feel resentment over the fact that the National government has failed in nearly two years to provide any direction to the nation. No goals, no vision have been defined for us as a people, as Palauans" (*Koror State Government Newsletter* 1982[?]:3).

9. The first referendum on the Compact of Free Association was held on 10 February 1983. Proposition 1 on the ballot contained two questions: one regarding approval of free association on which 62 percent of the Palauans voted positively and a second regarding approval of an agreement concerning the introduction into Palau of radioactive, chemical, and biological substances. Some 53 percent voted approval of this issue. In response to the Remeliik administration's claim that the compact had been approved, the Senate of the Palau National Congress filed suit. Justice Robert A. Hefner of the Palau Supreme

Court ruled that because the Palau Constitution requires 75 percent approval on the second question and because the two questions were inseparable, the compact was disapproved according to Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution (see note 2 above).

10. Moses Uludong, personal interview, Agana, Guam, 30 May 1987.

11. Sena Sugiyama, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 4 July 1985.

12. Yoichi Rengiil, personal interview, University of Guam, 14 March 1988.

13. A week before the special election, Roman Tmetuchl's son, nephew, and another man were arrested for the murder of Haruo Remeliik. A few weeks later charges against the men were dismissed without prejudice because of inconsistencies in a key informant's story. The same three men, however, were rearrested, tried, and convicted in March 1986. The men remained free on bail pending an appeal. In July 1987 a three-judge Palau Supreme Court appeals panel reversed the convictions (Stinson 1987). Since the reversal, the Palau government has attempted to appeal the panel's decision to the Trust Territory High Court. This appeal may not be heard because U.S. Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel, seeking to extend self-government in Palau, issued a secretarial order on 10 July 1987 limiting the Palau court's appeals process such that there could be no appeal beyond the Palau Supreme Court. In January 1988, Secretary Hodel amended his original order, allowing appeals of Palau Supreme Court rulings to the Trust Territory High Court. Regarding the appeals panel reversal, Palau's attorney general must file a new motion with the Supreme Court and, if rejected there, the government could appeal to the Trust Territory High Court. In March 1988, the appellate division of the Palau Supreme Court reaffirmed the reversal decision, rendered by the appeals panel eight months earlier, that there was insufficient evidence to convict the three men (Teodosio 1988).

14. It seems likely that the truth of Remeliik's brutal murder may never be known because the dynamics of Palau's small-scale, face-to-face society require that such sociologically destabilizing truths remain hidden. A full revelation of the historical truth might hurt too many highly placed people. Regarding assassination, the anthropologist McKnight has written about Palau, "Individual striving for status in Palauan society did, to some extent, assert itself in direct assaults upon higher positions in the vertical structure and many eras of chieftomship are punctuated by an assassination" and "the privacy of clan conflict does not, necessarily, reduce its intensity--it may be in fact the most emotion-involved area of competition in the whole arena. There is at least one clan in Palau that, as a result of political competition, produced a series of strategic assassinations a generation ago that has left only a single side-leg. The fission of this single leg, with internal friction among the remaining lineages and population growth, is already evident" (McKnight 1960:100, 67).

15. In September 1987, the Ta Belau Party, Inc., was formed to support Salii's reelection. The party replaced the Furlough Committee, which was involved in activities viewed by some Palauans as harassment during July, August, and early September 1987. Furthermore, the Progressive and Liberal parties formed in 1963 and quiescent since 1978 had been formally retired during an elaborate ceremony held in April 1984. The occasion was the formation of the Sunshine National Policy Platform spearheaded by John O. Ngiraked. The purpose of the movement was to solidify political forces to challenge President Remeliik in the 1984 election (Shuster 1984a).

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GUAM'S QUEST FOR POLITICAL IDENTITY

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Introduction

Guam is an interesting political anomaly among the island communities of the Pacific. The first island to experience European intrusion, it is among the last to remain under outside control. Conservative and inwardly focused, prosperous through U.S. subsidies, and Americanized by a large U.S. military presence, Guam was bypassed by the international politics of decolonization that shaped the rest of the Pacific islands after World War II.

If judged by United Nations criteria on decolonization, Guam has remained a nonself-governing colony of the United States ever since American sovereignty over the island was made legal in 1898 by the Treaty of Paris with Spain. In the nine decades of U.S. rule only one fundamental change has occurred in Guam's political status: In 1950 an Organic Act by the U.S. Congress made Guamanians American citizens. According to Carano and Sanchez (1964:8-10), Guamanians numbered about twenty-three thousand in 1950 and were predominantly of mixed ancestry through marriages of the indigenous Chamorros with Filipinos, Spaniards, and other immigrants. There were no pure Chamorros. English and Chamorro are the official languages. Guam was also granted limited, but fully democratic, internal government. Although Guamanians were not permitted to vote on the Organic Act, overwhelming support for it emerged during public hearings on Guam (Hearings 1950).

As of 1988, the U.S. Congress continues to exercise plenary authority over Guam through the now much-amended 1950 Organic Act. The island still does not have its own constitution, and not all provisions of the U.S. Constitution apply because of Guam's status as a U.S. territory. In size and in sociopolitical terms Guam is equivalent to a small rural county in the U.S. system, but its geographical significance is unique.

Too small to become a U.S. state, too strategic to be permitted independence, Guam lives on in a neocolonial limbo. This condition is quite satisfactory for U.S. national security interests, but is increasingly anachronistic as the other islands of Micronesia have moved toward resolution of their final political identities.

Guam's condition of political stasis is now changing. Through a series of plebiscites and the drafting of a "Commonwealth Act" for approval by the U.S. Congress, the people of Guam are attempting to transform their relationship with the United States. Guam's goal is to change from an unincorporated territory under traditional U.S. legal doctrine (whereby Guam can never become a U.S. state) to a new commonwealth status. This status, the people of Guam hope, will permit expanded local autonomy through a future Guam constitution while continuing American sovereignty. The precedent for a Guam commonwealth is the neighboring Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which was established in 1976.

The Guam commonwealth effort is still underway, and is not at all certain of realization. Success depends not only on the responsiveness of a distant U.S. Congress, but also on the unity of purpose and willingness to compromise of the Guamanians. Unfortunately, these are characteristics often absent in the island's factional local politics, where clashes between personalities, not issues, tend to determine policies.

This article analyzes the relevant historical factors, the legal issues, and the politics involved in Guam's quest for political identity. Guam's case is notable not only because it concerns the fate of one of the world's last small colonies, but also because it significantly conditions the durability of the American presence throughout the strategically important Western Pacific, a region heretofore considered an "American lake," but now quietly undergoing political decentralization.

Guam in the Pacific: Geopolitical Imperatives

Geopolitics was, is, and will continue to be the dominant factor in the development of Guam. Although small (only a little over two hundred square miles with an estimated population of 130,000, of which some

twenty-five thousand are nonresident U.S. military personnel and dependents), Guam nonetheless has been significant in geopolitical terms for all the major Pacific maritime powers since Magellan stumbled onto the island in 1521.

Guam lies almost dead center in the vast, almost empty expanse of the western Pacific Ocean south of Japan and north of the equator. About half of that oceanic region is comprised of Micronesia, of which Guam is now the commercial and military--but not the political--hub. On the east-west axis that crosses five thousand miles of the Pacific between Hawaii and the Philippines, Guam is not only the largest but also the only high island with a protected major harbor and sufficient area for multiple airports and logistical bases. Similarly, on the north-south axis that stretches nearly three thousand miles from Japan to Papua New Guinea, Guam again in the largest and most useful landfall for communications, shipping, and military installations.

Therefore, American strategic doctrine has long held that any major military power that governs Guam and Micronesia thereby commands the sea, air, and outer space approaches to the Asian rimland from the east. Conversely, that same power controls the approaches to the United States out of Asia (Webb 1974). This geographic and politico-military condition pertains with or without allies outside the region.

As a consequence of its enduring geopolitical significance, Guam has been occupied by outside military forces without interruption for the incredible span of 320 years. Geopolitics was the main reason Spain held Guam from 1668 until the Spanish-American War of 1898, and why Spain was replaced in the Western Pacific by new colonial powers: the United States and Germany. Geopolitics was the overriding reason Japan replaced Germany in Micronesia in 1914, invaded Guam in 1941, and fought to hold the area against the Americans in 1943-1944. It was the motivation behind establishment in 1947 of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in Micronesia under U.S. administration. And it is why the United States is not about to relinquish military control of either Guam or the rest of Micronesia to any foreign power for the indefinite future.

Even in the post-Mahan space age, Guam remains strategically crucial to the United States. Military installations sprawl across one-third of the island's surface and include one of the Pacific's largest nuclear weapons depots. Guam today is an unsinkable U.S. communications and logistics platform, monitoring satellites and missiles, supporting antisubmarine and B-52 bomber operations, and harboring prepositioned supply ships for rapid deployment strike forces. The Soviets con-

cur with the military value of the island. The respected historian K. V. Malakhovskii, in a succinct study of Guam with a chapter aptly titled "The Gibraltar of the Pacific," declared, "After the Second World War the strategic military importance of the Pacific Islands did not lessen" (1975:67).

Given its strategic value, Guam has been provided considerable financial support by the United States in comparison with assistance accorded most other Pacific communities. Since 1945 large direct U.S. subsidies and indirect spin-offs from continual military expenditures have underwritten a modestly healthy economy on Guam. Guamanians have enjoyed a rising standard of living in spite of destructive typhoons, occasional recessions, an overburdened infrastructure, and the usual staggering public debt caused by governmental overspending. The latest hard statistic on the average adjusted gross income for resident taxpayers (that is, wage earners, most of whom are Guamanians; U.S. military personnel on-island need not pay Guam income tax) was \$16,628 in 1984 (*Guam Annual Economic Review* 1985:130).

Although low by U.S. domestic standards, this income is respectable in comparison to that of other Pacific islands. Over half of Guam's families own their homes. Unemployment on Guam in the third quarter of 1987 was only 3 percent. The existing government-based economy is supplemented by an expanding flow of tourists from Japan to Guam's tropical beaches. Tourism is the islands major private business. With more than 480,000 visitors in 1987, according to the Guam Visitors Bureau, Guam ranks second only to Hawaii among Pacific islands in numbers of tourists. Guam, in short, is no longer part of the Third World in economic terms.

One effect of assured, if modest, prosperity for Guam's people has been to blunt political discontent. Conservative, family-oriented, and deeply Catholic from their Spanish heritage, Guamanians were passive in regard to political status in the years from 1950 into the 1960s while most of the Third World was decolonized. Congressional authorization of a locally elected governor, beginning in the 1970 elections, tended to focus political energies inward on Guam's own tumultuous local elections. Branches of the national Democratic and Republican parties emerged to contest fierce gubernatorial elections every four years and to clash every two years over the twenty-one seats in Guam's unicameral legislature.

Because of its status as a U.S. territory, Guam has been marginally involved in Pacific regional or international organizations. It is a member of the South Pacific Commission, the Pacific Basin Development

Council, and the Pacific Post-Secondary Education Council, and is active in Micronesian legislative and executive coordinating bodies such as the Association of Pacific Island Legislatures. Guam received permission in 1987 to send athletes to participate in the Olympic Games, including, oddly, one for the Winter Games. With commonwealth status, Guam could become somewhat more active regionally, but not in international bodies that require some element of sovereign status for membership such as the South Pacific Forum. Guam confirms Crocombe's conclusion that "for most forms of power, the island countries are not so much a region as they are peripheral extensions of capitalist industrialized states on the Pacific rim" (Crocombe and Ali 1983: 193).

Despite preoccupation with local partisan politics, nagging problems have remained unresolved between Guam and the United States, particularly land use by the military. In the post-Organic Act era Guam's problems with the federal authorities were addressed piecemeal through the U.S. Department of the Interior, which has administrative oversight of all U.S. territories, or through congressional amendments of the Organic Act. Despite dissatisfaction with Washington's sometimes burdensome bureaucratic oversight, Guamanians rarely resorted to the U.S. courts for redress of grievances, as did other American minorities (Leibowitz 1979). It took the emergence in the 1970s of political status negotiations in the nearby Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) to arouse serious Guamanian interest in changing Guam's status.

The TTPI district of the greatest interest to Guamanians as a precedent was the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI). Despite being politically divided since 1898, the Mariana Islands as a whole (Guam is the southernmost; Rota, Tinian, Saipan, and smaller islands all lie within two hundred miles to the north) form a natural archipelago, both culturally as the homeland of the Chamorros and geographically as a north-to-south volcanic chain of high islands. In the 1970s, when the other TTPI entities of Palau, the Marshalls, and the Federated States of Micronesia began separate talks with the United States that would lead to free association, the NMI chose instead to seek commonwealth status under permanent U.S. sovereignty. Puerto Rico's commonwealth status since 1952 provided a vague model, but the NMI sought wider latitude in local government and greater limitations on federal authority than Puerto Rico possesses.

In the wake of defeat in Vietnam, the United States military was eager to retain the NMI permanently for the strategic protection of Guam as well as for military training, radar, and communications sites.

Guam, Palau, and the NMI were also considered potential sites for a rollback of U.S. forces from the Philippines and other forward Asian bases (Webb 1974; Grinter 1980). Consequently, the United States quickly negotiated a commonwealth agreement in 1974-1975 that provided most of what the NMI sought under "the right of self-government" (Hearings 1976). However, just what constitutes self-government for the new NMI commonwealth, which is neither a state nor a formal territory within the U.S. federal system, is not yet fully defined.

Ambiguity about sovereign powers had vitiated Puerto Rico's commonwealth, according to former Governor Carlos Romero-Barcelo (1980). To avoid that problem with the NMI, United States negotiators insisted that the Marianas commonwealth agreement (called a "Covenant" to distinguish it from Puerto Rico's "Compact" of 1952) accept complete federal supremacy over the NMI, which was to become an unincorporated U.S. territory like Guam. The NMI, on the other hand, sought to delimit U.S. congressional legislation for the NMI to those enactments applicable only to the fifty states.

As a compromise, there is nowhere in the NMI covenant any mention of the NMI as a "territory" of the United States. The extent of the authority of the Congress to legislate for the NMI in matters other than defense and foreign affairs is left open. This ambiguity constitutes a potential limitation on the plenary authority of Congress, which it exercises under the territorial clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. Limitation of federal power is a key legal issue that could accord a fundamental political advantage to the NMI that Puerto Rico as a commonwealth does not possess, and that Guam clearly lacks under the 1950 Organic Act.

The political and legal implications of the NMI covenant are, therefore, potentially significant for all U.S. territories. If the NMI view of self-government were to be upheld by U.S. courts, it would alter the traditional U.S. territorial doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Insular Cases of 1901. Court tests of this point have begun, the latest in 1987 when NMI attorneys L. Hillbloom and J. S. Sirok brought suit in the U.S. District Court of the Marianas against federal intrusions in NMI affairs. Although rejected in part by the judge (King 1988), the issue is not dead.

Meanwhile, the tiny economy of the NMI with its fifteen thousand people in 1976 grew dramatically as a result of the many new benefits under commonwealth status. Millions of dollars in federal grants for capital improvements and expenses of the new government poured into the NMI from Washington. Local NMI control over visitor and tempo-

rary worker visas resulted in a tourist boom. Local taxing authority created a munificent tax system in which up to 95 percent of personal and business taxes are rebated, spurring outside investment. No federal income taxes are paid. Duty-free status and exemptions from U.S. import quotas under Headnote 3A created a Saipan garment-finishing industry. Local political and economic control was assured by the covenant's provision for no land alienation to persons not of Northern Marianas descent for a period of twenty-five years after 1976 (Covenant 1975). Many of the benefits the new American citizens of the NMI received after their islands became a commonwealth were--and still are--tauntingly unavailable to the people of Guam, who have been American citizens since 1950.

Constitutional Developments and Political Status Options

The perceived inequity between the political status of the NMI and that of Guam provoked dissatisfaction with the status quo among Guamanians. Leaders on Guam created a series of temporary commissions in 1973, 1975, and 1980 to study political status and to inform the public on options Guam might undertake. In addition, informal polls and official plebiscites were conducted in 1976, 1980, and 1982 on political status alternatives. The Fifteenth Guam Legislature also commissioned, in 1979, the first in-depth assessment of all possible status options for Guam, including integration with the NMI and annexation to the state of Hawaii as a county. The study concluded that commonwealth status based on the NMI model would be the best option for Guam (Rogers, Warner, and Sablan 1980).

Results of the opinion surveys and plebiscites showed a shift in Guamanian attitudes from support of status quo (51 percent in 1976) to support of commonwealth (49 percent among all alternatives in the first plebiscite in 1982; 73 percent in the second plebiscite between commonwealth and statehood). Independence and free association were favored by only 12 percent or less in all surveys and votes (Guam Election Commission 1987). The NMI example clearly influenced the shift in Guamanian attitudes. The two final plebiscites on status options in 1982, both official, committed Guam to seek commonwealth status.

During the 1970s Guam took one turn into a political blind alley: an aborted constitution. In 1976 Congress authorized Guam and the Virgin Islands to draft constitutions. Guam did so in 1977, producing a sound text based on the latest constitutional models in the fifty states. Under the proposed constitution Guam would have continued as an

unincorporated territory (*Guam Constitutional Convention* 1979). Congress approved the draft, but the Guam electorate rejected it by 82 percent in a 1979 referendum (Guthertz 1982). Among the reasons for rejection were that the constitution was not really a local expression of self-determination (i.e., Chamorro) and that the political status question remained unresolved for Guam.

The turning point in Guam's rather cautious preliminary steps to change its political status came at a conference in December 1983 in Albuquerque between a large bipartisan Guam delegation, led by Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo, and two key congressmen: Guam's own delegate to Congress, A. Won Pat, and Congressman Manuel Lujan of New Mexico, who at that time was vice-chair of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. That committee has basic jurisdiction within the Congress over all U.S. territorial matters. Albuquerque was the conference site because it is the home district of Congressman Lujan, who extended the invitations. At Albuquerque the Guamanians made a commitment to draft a federal-territorial relations act and to submit it to Congress. This process meant Guam would attempt to attain commonwealth status through a legislative track instead of negotiating an agreement first with the U.S. executive branch as was done in the NMI case.

The submission of a bill directly to Congress was first proposed by Congressmen Lujan and Morris K. Udall (from Arizona, and chair of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee) in a letter to Governor Bordallo in October 1983. The United States, as administrator of the TTPI, had been compelled to negotiate with the NMI on political status because of the latter's residual sovereignty under the United Nations trusteeship. However, there was no obligation for Washington to negotiate with Guam, which was already owned by the United States. The two congressmen therefore urged Guam to go directly to Congress as the quickest way to commonwealth (Udall and Lujan 1983). Interior Department officials also agreed draft legislation was the best approach for Guam.

As a result of the Albuquerque meeting, the Guam Legislature established, by Public Law 17-42 in January 1984, a formal eight-member Commission on Self-Determination with representatives from all three branches of government and both political parties. The task of the commission was to draft a federal-territorial relations act (known as the Guam Commonwealth Act) to be submitted to Congress to replace the 1950 Organic Act and establish commonwealth status for Guam.

Despite the agreement at Albuquerque, the new commission promptly fell to squabbling over the legislative versus the negotiated track.

After four months of argument, the commission majority decided to go ahead on the legislative track. By the end of 1984 the commission had gone through four working drafts of the proposed act. The last version, Working Draft No. 4, was a well-crafted synthesis of all views and was written by the commission's legal counsel, Arnold H. Leibowitz (see Rogers 1984 for complete text of Working Draft No. 4).

The major substantive issues Guam wished resolved were addressed in Working Draft No. 4. These were based to some extent on the NMI precedent and were listed by Governor Bordallo in a letter to the Interior Department in 1983:

1. Determination of a new political status for Guam as a self-governing commonwealth protected from congressional plenary power in a manner similar to a state of the Union;
2. The adverse impact on Guam of certain federal statutes and policies;
3. Military ownership of Guam's most valuable land and economic resources;
4. The nonavailability of local capital to invest in facilities likely to promote commerce and industry;
5. The need for liberal, locally controlled tax, finance, and immigration authority;
6. Federal assistance to Guam;
7. Ending Department of the Interior fiscal oversight of Guam.

Congressional attitudes toward Working Draft No. 4 were explored in late 1984 and early 1985 by the commission on visits to Washington, D.C. Because the draft was not overly demanding in light of the NMI precedent and past U.S. territorial doctrine, officials in Washington expressed an informal view that it was acceptable except for a few major points that Congress might find difficult to approve. Congressman Udall and his staff suggested the difficult points be revised and Guam delay any local plebiscite on the draft act until it was transmitted to Congress and returned for one final vote before enactment.

Udall's suggestions were not followed because of the intrusion of an issue not addressed in Working Draft No. 4: Chamorro self-determination and indigenous rights. Primarily a Guamanian political concern, this controversial matter would be injected into the entire tone of the proposed federal bill and the plebiscites on it.

A quiet chord of indigenous Chamorro identity had survived on Guam ever since the seventeenth century's "barrage of sheer terrorism,"

as Spate characterizes the Spanish Catholic conquest of the Marianas (1983:116-118). Stories persist in Guamanian folklore of the legendary Chamorro youth, Juan Malo, constantly outwitting the Spanish authorities during Guam's long colonial twilight in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Chamorros were not completely tranquilized by the "pax Hispanica," as Kotzebue thought in 1817 when he visited Guam (1821:25). Under the Americans the Chamorro language persevered as the core of local identity despite almost complete disappearance of other indigenous Chamorro cultural characteristics. Political manifestations of Chamorro resentment were, however, always cautious and subordinated to concerns of church, family, and survival, even long after World War II.

The political status issue rekindled Chamorro consciousness and gave it a cause. Part of the post-World War II generation of young Guamanians educated in American universities, a small but vocal group of Chamorro activists organized in the 1970s to present petitions to the United Nations and advocate self-determination for Guam. The activists tend to favor independence or free association for the island. They view commonwealth primarily as a means to assert Chamorro rights and to move away from the smothering U.S. embrace, rather than as a prelude to U.S. statehood.

Many statesiders (residents of Guam born in the states, usually Caucasians), Filipinos, and older Guamanians on Guam disapprove of the Chamorro activists, believing them to be anti-American radicals of the Left. In reality, although radical by Guamanian standards, Chamorro activists are decidedly mild in their demands in comparison with indigenous-rights advocates in New Caledonia, Fiji, and Southeast Asia. Politically, Chamorro activism appears to be a nonideological, mildly nationalistic movement by a minority on the political Right. It favors preservation of Chamorro culture under a political status that will allow an autochthonous government for Guam (for a polemical expression of these views, see Souder-Jaffery and Underwood 1987).

Opposition to the 1979 draft constitution was led by Chamorro activists. Although small in membership, the indigenous-rights movement could, as shown in the defeat of the 1979 constitution, provoke a formidable oppositionist vote by arousing latent racial resentment in Guamanians of Chamorro descent, who still form the majority of the Guam electorate. In other words, indigenous rights is a divisive issue on multiethnic Guam, where racism is not an overt phenomenon. Therefore, Guam's politicians treat indigenous rights as a valence issue to be avoided or endorsed, not to be publicly opposed. In fact, most local

political leaders are of Chamorro descent and are naturally sympathetic to rectification of past injustices against Chamorros.

Chamorro attitudes toward the draft commonwealth act were expressed regularly in the media and in almost every meeting of the Commission on Self-Determination from 1984 into 1988 by leaders of the Organization of People for Indigenous-Rights (OPI-R). They repeatedly requested revisions in the working drafts, and many of their suggestions were adopted, such as the requirement for Guam's approval of any major changes in U.S. military bases on the island. OPI-R's most radical demand was that only Chamorros should vote on the draft commonwealth act, a demand not granted.

The Chamorro activists gradually created a perception in public opinion that Washington's view and that of Chamorros on Guam were so divergent that a choice, not a compromise, had to be made between the two. In response to that perception, and to deflect OPI-R opposition, the commission members (mostly elected politicians) chose to wrap themselves in the Guam flag. Working Draft No. 4 was revised in 1985 to give it a strong Chamorro imprint, regardless of Washington's suggestions.

Attitudes toward the draft act as it took final shape hardened along ethnic lines on Guam, and into a Guam versus Washington dichotomy overall. Washington's reaction became progressively more negative as the draft became more demanding for political autonomy beyond what the NMI had received (Guerrero 1985a). Statesiders on Guam opposed the provisions in the draft's Article 1 that would accord preferences to Chamorros in voting rights. Filipinos were hostile to the provisions in Article 7 that would place Guam outside the United States for immigration purposes. Most Guamanians of Chamorro descent favored the draft as a whole, but many were uncomfortable with OPI-R stridency.

Guam's delegate to Congress, Republican Ben Blaz (who had defeated Democrat Won Pat in 1984), began to raise warning signals in 1985, pointing out that while he fully endorsed the goal of commonwealth for Guam, the commission should take into account congressional views (Guerrero 1985b). Otherwise, he said, Congress might reject the draft act. Udall requested a study of the draft by the Congressional Research Service. Predictably, the CRS took a negative view of the draft as a whole and questioned the constitutionality of several provisions (CRS 1986).

Overall, by the time the final drafting was completed in late 1985, Guam's proposed commonwealth act had become highly controversial, both in Washington and on Guam. This had not been the case with the

NMI covenant. The next step for the commission was to have the Guam Legislature set a date and provide money for a plebiscite in 1986, but local politics intervened to delay a public vote on the draft act for well over a year.

Politics and Plebiscites

Politics on Guam are pervasively personalized, and the most prominent political personality from 1974 through 1986 was Ricardo J. "Ricky" Bordallo. Dynamic and controversial, Bordallo was seen as a charismatic champion of Chamorro rights by his supporters, and as a volatile, romantic dreamer by his opponents. Leader of the Democratic party on the island and governor in 1974-1978 and again in 1982-1986, Bordallo chaired the Commission on Self-Determination in the years when the proposed commonwealth act was drafted. The draft act is seen as his creation by the public and by Bordallo's political enemies, many within his own party.

By late 1985, when most revisions had been completed on the draft act, Bordallo and the commission began to discuss the ballot and possible dates for a plebiscite in 1986--an election year, not just for the Guam Legislature but also for the governor and lieutenant governor. Therefore, by taking so long to draft the commonwealth act, the commission had made approval of the now-controversial draft a political issue in the regular 1986 elections. In November 1985, the commission formally requested the Eighteenth Guam Legislature to set the plebiscite on the draft act for 12 April 1986 to avoid entanglement of the status issue with the September primary and November general elections.

One of the debilitating characteristics of Guam's government during the 1970s and 1980s was the constant, divisive conflict between the governors and the legislature, regardless of party control. Vetoes and overrides abounded. The Eighteenth Guam Legislature was under the speakership of Democrat Carl T. C. Gutierrez, who was preparing in late 1985 to challenge Bordallo in the 1986 September primary election. The chairs of several key committees were also held by opponents of Bordallo. Consequently, when the senators received Bordallo's request to authorize and fund a plebiscite on the draft act, they delayed a decision while they considered the ballot format for the vote. One view was that an article-by-article vote should be taken. The other view was that the articles were so interrelated that some articles could not be voted down without destroying the integrity of the whole act. The latter view was that of the majority of commission members, who requested the legislature to set a single *yes* or *no* vote on the draft.

Other reasons for the delay were political in nature: Some Democratic senators feared they would have to take a public position on the controversial commonwealth draft, a position that might boomerang against them in the fall elections. The Republican senators, among whom were two tickets for the gubernatorial elections, also did not favor a commonwealth vote that, if successful, might help Bordallo. There was also genuine concern among senators that the public would be distracted from the draft act if a vote on it was held simultaneously with the regular elections. Thus delay or postponement of the commonwealth vote was politically useful to many incumbent senators of both parties.

Because of the continuing legislative delay, the commission once more requested that a plebiscite date be set, this time for June 1986, again to avoid interference with the fall elections. The recommendation was rejected; the legislature finally voted to have an article-by-article ballot and to hold a special plebiscite in mid-April 1987, long after the 1986 regular elections.

With no looming deadline, the commission finished the Legislative Histories (legal explanatory notes) for each section and on 11 June 1986 signed off on the final draft. A Chamorro translation was completed and sent to the Chamorro Language Commission for review. The self-determination commission also distributed a printed version of the draft to the public as inserts in the local newspapers and by direct mail to all registered voters just as campaigning heated up for the fall 1986 regular elections.

Bordallo handily won the September primary and was favored in several polls to win the general election, but fate intervened rudely. A federal grand jury indicted the governor on seventeen counts, mainly for bribery, as a result of an extensive FBI investigation into widespread governmental corruption on Guam. Bordallo was subsequently tried early in 1987, found guilty on ten of the counts, and sentenced to nine years in prison. In the meantime, he lost the November 1986 general election by a wide margin due to the indictments (Dizon 1987).

In January 1987, the new Republican administration of Governor Joe Ada and Lieutenant Governor Frank Blas reconstituted the Commission on Self-Determination with Ada as chair. The commission quickly made two major decisions: first, to postpone the plebiscite on the draft act until 8 August 1987, and, second, to retain the text unchanged. The decisions sparked negative public reaction from Guam's delegate in Washington, Ben Blaz, who has the difficult task of getting the proposal approved by Congress. Blaz recommended a later plebiscite date to allow the draft to be revised because "the document itself is full of

holes" (quoted in Perry 1987a). He was promptly castigated by the OPI-R activists for being pro-Washington. The commission rejected his advice.

After obtaining a budget from the Nineteenth Guam Legislature, the commission launched an intensive islandwide educational campaign on the draft act in June, July, and early August 1987. The commission utilized village meetings, direct mail to all voters, electronic and printed media, and debates (for example, *Pacific Daily News* 1987). Commission members took a relatively neutral stance on how to vote. One court suit to stop the election was instituted by statesider opponents of the act, the Shapiro family, but the suit was thrown out.

The results of the August 8 plebiscite were disappointing to commonwealth supporters. Only 39 percent of Guam's normally conscientious voters turned out, and they rejected Article 1 on the political relationship and Article 7 on immigration by narrow margins of 204 and 139 votes, respectively. All other articles passed, but not by wide majorities with the exception of Article 11, which requests increased federal funds for Guam; it received 61 percent approval.

The Commission on Self-Determination and the Ada administration reacted to the results with aplomb. After all, the proposed act was a creation of the discredited Bordallo, and the partial rejection of his draft caused no political damage to the incumbents. The commission decided it would rewrite the two rejected articles and submit those two to voters again on November 7. The second plebiscite on the two articles was scheduled to be held simultaneously with an election to fill an empty seat in the legislature caused by the death from illness of Senator Pedro Sanchez. Senator Sanchez was a respected former educator and new vice-chair of the Commission on Self-Determination.

First, however, the two rejected articles had to be rewritten. After a quick series of public meetings to receive input, the commission decided the low voter turnout at the August plebiscite was caused by many Chamorro-Guamanians' staying home. Opponents of the draft, on the other hand, turned out heavily, in particular the Filipinos who opposed Article 7 on immigration and the statesiders who opposed Article 1 with its Chamorro preferences. The commission, therefore, decided it would do only a minimal rewrite of the two articles, and campaign to motivate more Chamorros to turn out and pass them.

The commission renumbered the four sections of old Article 1 into three new sections, but essentially kept the substance in different word order. The original controversial Section 103(a) on Chamorro self-determination was changed in new Section 102 to say that Congress recog-

nizes the "right of self-determination of the indigenous Chamorro people of Guam, defined as all those born on Guam before August 1, 1950, and their descendants." This change is more one of style than meaning.

One provision of old Article 1 that was changed in legal substance was the residency qualification for voting or holding public office on Guam. The commission deleted wording that required residency of up to five years, which had been criticized by Washington as unconstitutional. New Section 102 simply authorizes a future Guam constitution to "establish reasonable residency requirements." Nearly all the other language of old Article 1 was retained.

The immigration provisions of old Article 7 were rewritten in a way that will still give Guam control of immigration, but merely postpones the implementation of such authority until two years after the proposed act is enacted. This procedural change did not satisfy Filipino-Guamanians, who still lobbied against the new version.

In the brief educational campaign in October and November 1987 prior to the second plebiscite, the commission members endorsed a *yes* vote and abandoned any pretense of neutrality. This stance angered some non-Chamorros. Also, for the first time in a plebiscite on Guam, nearly all incumbent and former political leaders except Filipinos urged a *yes* vote on both articles, including Bordallo, who was waiting an appeal of his conviction (Bordallo 1987; Sablan 1987).

The second plebiscite also saw the appearance of a different group of Chamorro advocates among the OPI-R activists. Young, personable, and articulate, they mobilized a Chamorro grass-roots campaign in conjunction with the OPI-R and a new political party, the Guam National party, that was created during the campaign. The Chamorros campaigned on the slogan *Hunggan*, "Yes" in Chamorro. Media advertisements, posters, and rallies urged all Chamorros to turn out for a *yes* vote on both articles.

The commission's gamble that a bigger Chamorro turnout would approve the two mildly reworded articles proved correct. On November 7 the turnout topped 58 percent, or 20,765 voters, the largest proportion of whom were undoubtedly Chamorro-Guamanians. All sections in both articles were approved by margins over three thousand votes each, according to the Guam Election Commission. In the senatorial race among a large field of candidates from both parties, Democrat Madeleine Bordallo--the popular statesider wife of former Governor Bordallo--won by a massive margin. She had run a low-key campaign without much mention of the commonwealth articles.

Finally, after fifteen years of study and preparation, Guam had on 7

November 1987 a comprehensive, if still controversial, proposal to change its political status. As Guam entered 1988 the next decision the commission faced was how to go about obtaining approval of the draft act in Washington. Again, as so often in the past, the Guamanian leaders would base their decision on local political considerations rather than on the distant realities of Washington, where practical compromises, good timing, and influential friends often affect outcomes as much as do just causes.

Congress and the Draft Commonwealth Act

The most influential friend of Guam in Washington, D.C., is Congressman Morris K. Udall, chair of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee with oversight of all U.S. territories. It was Udall who initiated drafting of a commonwealth act for Guam in 1983. Throughout the four-year process of preparing the act he continued to endorse the concept of commonwealth status for Guam, and it was to him that the draft act would be referred for congressional enactment. His role and support are thus crucial for Guam.

As noted earlier, during the drafting of the act Udall made basic recommendations to Guam's leaders. The first recommendation, made in 1983 and repeated later, was that Guam not hold a vote on the draft act prior to its submission to Congress. He explained that a preliminary vote on Guam would tie his hands greatly in obtaining congressional approval. Nearly all bills submitted to Congress are changed. He needed flexibility, particularly to obtain approvals from the powerful standing congressional committees and executive branch departments involved in defense, foreign, and judicial affairs. In Udall's words, a preliminary vote on Guam could "unnecessarily raise expectations and then disappoint the people of Guam" when Congress returned a changed text (Udall 1986). He suggested a final -confirming vote on Guam only after congressional approval.

Guam's leaders, however, believed they needed a preliminary vote on the draft act in order to strengthen their hand in presenting Guam's case in Washington. They did not want another Organic Act written and approved by Congress. The Guamanians, therefore, ignored Udall's first suggestion and proceeded to hold plebiscites that fixed an exact text with a set of demands in the minds of Guam's voters.

The second basic suggestion was made by Udall in 1985. He recommended that several provisions of the draft be softened because Congress was not only unlikely to approve them, but might even kill the act

before committee hearings if presented with such demands. These provisions concerned: (1) "approval" by Guam of U.S. military bases on the island, (2) trade preferences that would place Guam in a more favorable position than that of any other U.S. territory, (3) veto power by Guam's congressional delegate over federal legislation for Guam, (4) life tenure for the U.S. District Court judge on Guam in place of the present ten-year tenure, and (5) exemption of Guam from all U.S. international airline agreements and from federal authority over labor laws on Guam.

In reviewing Udall's suggestion, Governor Bordallo noted that none of the provisions involved Chamorro rights, which was becoming the main local issue. He therefore urged the commission in April 1985 to approve Udall's recommendation to modify the draft. Immediately the leader of the Republican party, then-territorial Senator Joe Ada, threatened to withdraw his party's support of the draft if the commission acceded to Washington (Ada 1985). To maintain local bipartisan support, the commission rejected Udall's second suggestion except for points three and four, which were later quietly removed from the draft's language.

The third suggestion by Udall was a procedural one. He and Congressman Ron de Lugo (Democrat, Virgin Islands, who is now chair of the Insular Affairs Subcommittee, which may be the first to review the act) wrote, in December 1987, "that the best way to obtain congressional consideration of the draft bill would be to informally transmit the proposal to the [Interior] Committee" (quoted in Perry 1987:13). Udall would then work with the executive branch and congressional committees to "revise those provisions which could not pass muster during legislative consideration and replace them with language in a substitute proposal which could be enacted." This was a polite but clear warning by the congressional leaders upon whom Guam's commonwealth depended that the act was in clear danger from the federal viewpoint unless it was revised before introduction.

The Commission on Self-Determination refused Udall's third recommendation, as it had the first two. Governor Ada, with the majority of the commission, argued that the act must be submitted to the Speaker of the House to be placed as is directly in the legislative hopper without any revisions prior to committee referrals. The governor wants to argue Guam's case before each committee on the basis of the language approved by the people.

In the highly rhetorical review of Guam's history that prefaces the draft act presented to Congress, the Commission on Self-Determination

states that Guam's quest for political status "has now matured into a burning ambition to increase local autonomy" (Guerrero 1988). This statement reflects the OPI-R and Chamorro activists' minority view, not necessarily that of the majority of people on Guam, as evidenced by the low voter turnouts in both 1987 plebiscites on the draft act. In fact, much more public interest was focused in the media and legislative hearings in late 1987 and early 1988 on the questions of gambling and local cable television than on commonwealth.

Guam's leaders seem to view the political status process as a kind of zero-sum game. Although aware that Congress will in the end change the draft act, the Guamanians say they will negotiate compromises during formal public congressional hearings. What Udall and Blaz were trying to do in effect during the four-year preparatory process was to negotiate compromises informally before the draft reached Congress, but the Guamanians refused to negotiate that way. Politics in Washington is not a zero-sum game; there are always costs as well as benefits in obtaining a transfer of political power. One cost to Guam could be to see its commonwealth proposal die in committees without even an opportunity to debate the text.

In February 1988 the draft act was presented to Congress for introduction without changes. Congressman Udall decided to cosponsor it, but said, "I do not want their people [on Guam] to be misled now by my co-sponsoring into thinking that I have changed my mind with respect to these concerns" (Udall 1988). Subsequently, on 16 March 1988 Senator Bennett Johnston, chair of the Energy and Resources Committee, introduced the draft act in the Senate, also with cautionary words for the people of Guam. In the House the draft act, as H.R. 4100, was referred to Udall's Interior Committee and to the Ways and Means Committee. As of May 1988 no hearings on the bill had been scheduled and it was unclear if any would be held in 1988.

Even less clear is whether the act will eventually- be enacted in some form, presumably no earlier than 1989. What is fairly sure is that the draft 1987 Guam commonwealth act will not become law in its present language, and that Guam may have jeopardized its enactment by being so uncompromising. Ironically, rejection would be most welcomed by the Chamorro rights activists who are themselves most responsible for Guam's uncompromising attitude.

Conclusion

There is in Guam's quest for political identity a fundamental contradiction in what Guam is trying to accomplish. The Chamorro activists

belatedly seized upon self-determination as a principle behind commonwealth. But self-determination marches under the flag of freedom, whereas commonwealth marches under the banner of equality. Although they may seem to go arm and arm, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that freedom and equality will always be at odds with each other.

The draft commonwealth act mixes the two concepts. In effect, the leaders of Guam allowed themselves to be pushed by Chamorro activists into putting freedom ahead of equality in Guam's demands on Washington. The ordinary Guamanian, on the other hand, regardless of ethnicity, appears to be seeking equality with other U.S. citizens as a first priority; not immediate full political equality, but an equality of opportunity. In every vote on political status the majority of people on Guam have favored those choices that would bring about equality of status within the American system, not freedom outside it. In short, Guam's leaders may have been too far ahead of, and out of step with, their own people in the commonwealth effort in the 1980s; they certainly were out of step with Washington.

Even if the present proposal dies in Congress, Guam's quest for political identity is not ended. The momentum behind the wave of political decentralization throughout American Micronesia appears to be irreversible. Guam will probably find its way to a new political identity someday despite the largely self-inflicted problems so far in its quest.

In this quest the symbolic logotype for Guam's commonwealth effort is a traditional Chamorro outrigger canoe riding the crest of a star-crossed wave. Guamanians were late in catching the wave, and have floundered a little in learning to sail on it. Yet surely they might be forgiven for forgetting how it is done. After all, it has been a long, long time since the people of Guam were last permitted to build and sail their own canoes.

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**BEFORE THE STORM:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIJI GENERAL ELECTION OF 1987**

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On 7 April 1987, the people of Fiji went to the polls for the fifth time since attaining independence from Great Britain in 1970. After a long three-month campaign and a week's polling, the newly formed Fiji Labour Party-National Federation Party Coalition won a convincing and historic victory over the long-reigning Alliance party, capturing twenty-eight of the fifty-two seats in the Fiji Parliament. Dr. Timoci Bavadra, the new prime minister, assumed power with quiet dignity but unmistakable firmness, and quickly set in motion a government intent on delivering early on its various election pledges. Bitterly disappointed with the unexpected results of the election, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the defeated Alliance leader, conceded defeat in a terse statement and urged his party to accept the verdict of the ballot box. This surprisingly smooth, textbook transfer of power led Sir Leonard Usher, the doyen of local journalists, to write, with premature optimism as it turned out, "It had been a long--too long--campaign, and at times some unpleasant elements of bitterness had crept in. These were now set aside. Democracy, clearly, was well and alive in Fiji."¹

The 1987 election results both reaffirmed the dominant trends in Fiji's ethnically-based electoral politics and heralded the faint beginnings of a new era that promised to break away from it. In the circumstances, it was change and the promise--as well as the fear--of further divergence from the established patterns of political behavior that

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received the most attention. For the first time in the modern history of Fiji, it was not one of the small but extremely powerful coterie of paramount maritime chiefs--a Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna or a Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara--but a western Fijian of middling chiefly rank who was at the helm of national leadership. For the first time, too, the Fijians of Indian descent were able to achieve a significant measure of national political power. The new Cabinet, young, exceptionally well educated and nominally left-leaning, promised a new direction designed to create a nonethnic state and a distributive society for Fiji, a move that sought to end the legacy of communally divisive politics bequeathed by seventeen years of Alliance rule.

Not surprisingly, then, some members of the former Mara administration and the Alliance party, their vested political and personal interests threatened and their careers in ruins, organized themselves into a militant indigenous force named the "Taukei Movement" and launched a carefully orchestrated campaign to derail the newly elected government. Within a week of the election, Fiji was rocked by a violent and terrifying campaign of arson, sabotage, roadblocks, and protest marches, climaxing with the military-led overthrow of the Bavadra government on May 14. The coup leaders attempted to reinstall the defeated Mara government back into power, but were thwarted in their efforts by determined but peaceful internal resistance and considerable external pressure. Unable to achieve their immediate goal and isolated, rebuffed, and ostracized by the international community, they then struck with a second coup on September 25 and severed Fiji's links to the British Crown. As this is being written, a search is underway for a political solution that, while maintaining the paraphernalia and appearance of parliamentary democracy, would nevertheless entrench indigenous Fijian control of the political process. Whatever the eventual outcome of the exercise, it is already abundantly clear that the coup has dealt a severe, perhaps even a mortal, blow to the country's internal multiracial cohesiveness, wrecked its economic base, and tarnished its reputation and moral authority on the international stage. The coups brought to a cataclysmic end one era in Fijian history, and, a year later, another was struggling to be born.

The traumatic sequence of events that followed the election was in marked contrast to the long and uninspiring campaign that preceded (and precipitated) it. The 1987 election--which might very well be an epitaph to Fiji's multiracial democracy--provided both the text as well as the pretext for the coup of May 14. This article examines certain important aspects of the campaign to understand its character as well as

the causes of the historic outcome. I focus, in particular, on the political parties that contested the election, the important campaign issues and strategies, and, finally, on the voting patterns that led to the Coalition's victory.

Political Parties

The 1987 election was contested by four political parties or coalitions, two of which appeared on the political scene on the eve of the campaign.² The Alliance party, led by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, had been continuously in power in Fiji from 1966 to 1987, except for a brief four days in April 1977 when it lost to the National Federation party, only to be invited into power again after the NFP was unable to form a government.³ Its long reign in office was the result of many factors including, among others: strong, many would say autocratic, leadership; effective use of political power and patronage; solid support by its traditional constituency, the indigenous Fijians; and, not least, the absence of a credible alternative among the frequently warring opposition parties. In 1987 the Alliance, as usual, appeared financially the best equipped of all the political parties to last the distance of a long campaign. To further improve its prospects, it fielded a safe team, dropping four Cabinet members and seven backbenchers who were considered liabilities and thus potential opposition targets. Some of those discarded formed their own parties or contested the election as independents.

Since its inception in 1965, the Alliance has had a federated political structure with three distinct constituent branches: the Fijian Association, the Indian Alliance, and the General Electors Association.⁴ The Fijian Association constitutes the backbone of the party, consistently capturing over 80 percent of the Fijian communal votes. Chastised by the temporary loss of power in April 1977, brought about by a split in the Fijian communal vote, the FA began to expand and consolidate its base and, turning a blind eye to the party's public proclamations on multiracialism, accepted within its ranks members of extremist and racially motivated Fijian parties, such as the Fijian Nationalist party. Thus in the 1987 campaign, the Alliance gave a blue-ribbon Fijian communal seat to Taniela Veitata, an FNP candidate in 1977, while another former FNP strategist was recruited to help diffuse the impact of Fijian splinter parties in marginal national constituencies. Fijian unity above all else, and the promotion of ethnic Fijian interests, became the overriding goal of the FA--and the Alliance party--in the 1987 campaign.

The General Electors Association, composed of Europeans, part-

Europeans, Chinese, and others of mixed descent, is the smallest though financially perhaps the strongest of the three Alliance branches. Ever since the advent of party politics in Fiji in the early 1960s, the GEA has thrown its weight solidly behind the Fijian-dominated Alliance. History, race, economic interest, and a keen sense of power all helped to forge this politically expedient bond of trust. But in the 1987 elections, for the first time, a rift appeared in the GEA ranks, with the younger as well as the working-class members of the part-European community joining the Labour party. Others deserted the Alliance complaining of stepchild-like treatment. The shift was small but significant, and it helped the Coalition in the crucial marginal constituencies such as Suva.

Of the three constituent bodies, the Indian Alliance was the weakest spoke in the Alliance wheel. Its credibility in the Indian community, always low, was seriously compromised by the defection of many of its disillusioned former leaders to the rival NFP. Unhappy with its performance and prestige, Ratu Mara ignored the Indian Alliance establishment and recruited Indian professionals and political opportunists personally loyal to and dependent upon him to boost the party's prospects in that community. In 1987, he bagged a prized catch in the person of Mrs. Irene Jai Narayan, who was not only a skillful politician--she had held her Suva communal seat continuously since 1966--but who was also a former president of the rival NFP and the deputy leader of the Opposition. Ousted from the NFP after an internal power struggle in 1985, she had briefly flirted with the Labour party, then joined the Alliance in November 1986. Political survival rather than a genuine conversion to Alliance philosophy appeared to be the main reason for her switch, as Mrs. Narayan justified her action thus: "Let's face it, whether one likes it or not, the Alliance will remain in power for a long time. It is difficult for an independent member to do much."⁵ Mara selected Mrs. Narayan for the crucial Suva national seat. This was a critical tactical mistake that was to cost the Alliance dearly, for the Alliance leader had badly underestimated the Indian electorate's unwillingness to forgive Mrs. Narayan's defection to a party that she had so vehemently criticized all her political life. And Mrs. Narayan's own unexpectedly virulent attack on her former party and her erstwhile colleagues, mounted with the fanaticism of the twice converted, damaged her prospects further. The response of the Indian Alliance leadership, or what was left of it, to being ignored and bypassed was a quiet withdrawal of its support for the party and a silent move to the Coalition camp. In the end, then, the Alliance was left banking on the charisma

of a single candidate for a crucial seat, while the Coalition remorselessly exploited Mrs. Narayan's formerly vitriolic attacks against the Alliance with great effect. But these were errors that surfaced only at a later stage in the campaign. For much of the time the Alliance was confident of a victory and dismissive of its opponents.

Unlike the Alliance party, the Coalition was launched on the eve of the election. It was a coalition of two parties drawn together into an expedient, and initially reluctant, political union to defeat the Alliance, realizing fully the disastrous consequences of "going it alone." The older partner in the Coalition was the mainly Indian-supported National Federation party, founded in the early 1960s, and the main opposition force in Fiji since 1970. The party has had an unfortunate history of bitter and ill-concealed internal squabbles since the death of A. D. Patel, its founder, in 1969. S. M. Koya's tenure as leader in the 1970s was generally marked by controversy about his dictatorial methods, which eventually led to his ouster in 1977. His successor, Jai Ram Reddy, brought about sufficient party unity to come within four seats of winning the 1982 elections, but he resigned from Parliament in 1984 over heated exchanges with the undoubtedly partisan speaker of the House, thus throwing the NFP into yet another round of disarray. Despite subsequent attempts to promote party unity, the NFP continued to suffer defeats in municipal and national by-elections and, perhaps most importantly, in public esteem as a credible alternative to the Alliance. Several of its sitting parliamentarians switched to the FLP as did many longtime party loyalists, disheartened by years of meaningless, interne-cine fights at the top. On the eve of the 1987 elections, the NFP was divided and drifting. Coalition with another party was the only alternative to avoid an almost certain political demise.

That prospect was provided by the emergence of the Fiji Labour party, whose nonethnic platform, multiethnic composition, and vehement opposition to the ruling Alliance made it an attractive partner. The trade union-backed Labour party was launched in July 1985, primarily in response to the Mara administration's confrontational actions and unilateral decisions to combat a host of economic problems that besieged Fiji in the mid-1980s. One such policy was the imposition of a wage freeze in 1984 to boost an economy severely damaged by hurricanes, droughts, rising foreign debts, and burgeoning civil service salary bills. The government wanted to use savings from the wage freeze--to the tune of F\$36 million--to expand the primary sector and assist the employment-generating business sector. The unions criticized the freeze as unnecessary and oppressive, especially to lower income groups, and

also as a breach of the spirit of the Tripartite Forum.⁶ Later, in an act designed to weaken the power of the union movement, the Mara government withdrew the exclusive recognition long granted to the Fiji Trade Union Congress as the union representative on the forum. This was a major blow since the congress was the national umbrella organization of various trade union bodies. The government wanted to encourage trade union leaders sympathetic to its policies.

Anger about the government's economic strategies was fueled further by policies of the Ministry of Education that brought it into a bitter and prolonged conflict with the teachers' unions. The Volunteer Service Scheme, devised by the government to give fresh graduate teachers employment on a cost-share basis, incurred the wrath of graduating teachers, who accused the government--rightly as the courts subsequently agreed--of reneging on an earlier binding promise of regular employment, and led to hunger strikes and massive protest marches. A large-scale and arbitrary transfer of teachers, part of a wider policy to integrate Fiji's communally oriented schools, smacked of an arrogant and confrontational attitude, especially on the part of the minister, Dr. Ahmed Ali, who was accused by both Indian as well as Fijian teachers of "adopting an anti-teacher stance designed to undermine the professional status of teachers in the country." Indeed, Ah's policies unwittingly provided the basis of a common front between the Indian-based Fiji Teachers Union and the exclusively *tauvei* (indigenous) Fijian Teachers Association, both of which protested against the government's educational policies.⁷

Such actions, coming at a difficult economic time and carried out in stark contrast to the Mara administration's earlier record of consultation and dialogue, politicized the traditionally apolitical trade union movement, which in turn led to the launching of the Fiji Labour party in July 1985. New on the scene, brimming with enthusiasm and armed with progressive social and economic policies contained under the general rubric of "democratic socialism," the FLP promised, among other things, public ownership of vital industries, minimum wage legislation for the manufacturing sector, and increased local participation in such vital industries as tourism.⁸ Not surprisingly, the Labour party attracted much local attention. Just four months after being launched, Labour won the Suva City municipal elections and made a strong showing in the North Central Indian national constituency by-elections. But for all the euphoria and early unexpected success, the FLP remained primarily an urban-based party, led by white-collar trade unionists. To become a national force strong enough to contend for government, the party had to broaden its base.

Initially, however, the FLP scorned the idea of a coalition. As party secretary Krishna Datt claimed in July 1986, "Both the Alliance and the NFP work within the framework of capitalism and the FLP cannot share their ideologies."⁹ Yet a few months later, chastened by the hard realities of Fiji politics and realizing the folly of confronting the Alliance alone, the FLP changed its tune and initiated discussions with the NFP, which it had recently criticized as being a party of "a handful of businessmen and lawyers."¹⁰ By October the two parties had held seven secret meetings, and by December a coalition had been arranged.

Terms of the arrangement were never made public though several features later became clear. One was a seat-sharing formula according to which the NFP agreed to give the FLP six of its twelve blue-ribbon Indian communal seats as well as half of the winnable Indian and Fijian national seats. This formula enabled the FLP to project itself into the hitherto inaccessible rural areas, while the NFP was spared the almost certain humiliation of losing its traditional iron-clad grip on the communal seats to FLP's Indian candidates. Another notable feature was the acceptance by the predominantly Indian-based NFP of an ethnic Fijian, from another party, as the leader of the coalition. This was both a tacit acknowledgement of weakness by the NFP as well as a concession to the nonethnic philosophy of the Coalition. It also represented a significant shift in Indian political opinion, which only a decade earlier had rejected a Fijian leader for the party (Ratu Julian Toganivalu). But the reality of ethnic politics in Fiji was that an Indian prime minister would not be acceptable to the majority of the *taukei*, and for the NFP to achieve any measure of political power, a coalition with another party with a Fijian leader, and a political philosophy broadly compatible to its own, was the only route to a possible victory.¹¹ The third outcome of the coalition arrangement was the formulation of a compromise manifesto that whittled down some of the FLP's radical-sounding economic policies, such as encouraging worker participation in the management of industry and the nationalization of selected industries, and that removed from the electoral arena such perennially contentious issues as land tenure and education. Finally, both parties agreed to present a combined, fresh slate of candidates. A start was made by endorsing only five of the twenty-two sitting Opposition parliamentarians.

The Labour Coalition, however, was not the only coalition to contest the 1987 elections. There was another, which consisted of a faction of the NFP aligned with the Western United Front, NFP's 1982 election partner. The NFP-WUF coalition was the handiwork of Shardha Nand, deposed secretary of the NFP, and other politicians discarded by the

Labour Coalition's candidate selection committee, including S. M. Koya. They massaged their personal grievances into a political cause by presenting themselves as champions of Indian rights placed in danger by having a Fijian (Dr. Bavadra) as the leader of the mainly Indian-supported opposition party. Taking the logic of ethnic politics to its extreme conclusion, they argued that only an Indian could be trusted to lead the Indian community. Among other things, this faction of the NFP demanded a separate Ministry for Indian Affairs along the lines of its Fijian counterpart, ninety-nine-year leases on Crown lands, and the allocation of jobs in the public sector according to the percentage of seats occupied by each ethnic group in Fiji's parliament, that is, 42 percent each for the Fijians and the Indians and the remaining 16 percent for General Electors.¹²

The Western United Front was a reluctant and silent partner in the coalition. Its leader, Ratu Osea Gavidi, the charismatic campaigner of 1982, was quiet and generally inaccessible, spending more time battling his irate creditors in court than fighting political opponents in the election. Since 1982 WUF itself had become somewhat of a spent force. The policies for harvesting pine, the dispute about which had led to the formation of the party, was now a nonissue, and many western Fijians, outside of the Nadroga/Navosa region, had been enticed back into the Alliance fold.¹³ And the WUF had lost credibility with many NFP leaders because of its withdrawal from the royal commission investigating allegations made against the original NFP-WUF coalition of receiving Russian money in the bid to defeat the Alliance in the 1982 election.¹⁴ The NFP-WUF coalition campaign began promisingly, but its prospects vanished when Koya and some other candidates withdrew, ostensibly to avoid being tainted with the spoiler's role. In the end, most of the Indian members of the coalition, widely perceived as grasping opportunists, suffered an ignominious defeat, losing their deposits by getting less than 10 percent of the total votes cast in their constituency. Gavidi lost (42 percent of the votes) to his old Alliance rival, Apenisa Kuruisaqila (53.5 percent).

Of all the political parties, the Fijian Nationalist party maintained the lowest profile in the 1987 campaign. Founded by Sakiasi Butadroka in 1975 on a "Fiji for Fijians" platform, the party had captured 25 percent of the Fijian communal vote in the April 1977 elections, but had since lost ground to the Fijian Association. For the 1987 campaign, the FNP maintained its stridently anti-Indian stance while at the same time advocating a platform designed to promote Fijian interest.¹⁵ The party proposed the "thinning out" of Fiji Indians through an active policy

encouraging emigration, to be funded by the British government that had introduced Indians into Fiji in the first place. The FNP made an issue of the paucity of Fijians in commercial and industrial sectors, which it saw as a direct result of a conspiracy by Indian and European business classes. It drew attention to the disparity in the numbers of Fijians and Indians employed in the public sector, blamed the Alliance for the problem, and demanded urgent remedial action. And finally it demanded an exclusively *tauvei* parliament through revision of the 1970 Constitution; absolute Fijian control of the political process was seen as a precondition for Fijian economic and social progress. In the end, however, while there was personal support and sympathy for Butadroka—who won 37.9 percent of the votes, an increase of 7.3 percent over the 1982 figure—the FNP failed to recapture its old ground, though its candidates drew sufficient Fijian support in marginal national seats to help the Coalition defeat the Alliance.

The Campaign

The campaign for the general elections began early in the year, partly in anticipation of a February poll. It was long and unremarkable, lacking, for instance, the dramatic tension of the last stages of the 1982 campaign when the contents of the so-called Carroll Report were revealed in an Australian television program, or the intense and ultimately self-destructive struggle between the competing factions of the NFP in the September 1977 elections.¹⁶ But this election had its own unique features that helped to define its character. Learning from past experiences, both the Alliance and the Coalition dispensed with the problematic public spectacle of touring the country to select candidates from a list prepared by constituency committees. Instead, each party appointed a small committee that made the selection and whose decision was final and irrevocable. This swift, if undemocratic, action gave them more time to focus on each other instead of having to contend with internal selection squabbles. It also produced an avalanche of defections as the frustrated aspirants switched parties. In the end, however, most of the defectors suffered ignominious defeat at the polls.

Another significant difference between this election and previous ones was that, for the first time since the advent of elections in Fiji, the leaders of both the ruling as well as the leading opposition parties were ethnic Fijians, Ratu Mara for the Alliance and Dr. Bavadra for the Labour Coalition. This fact diluted the importance of race and the use of racial fears for political ends in the campaign, issues that were at the

forefront in many previous campaigns. Race, however, was replaced by other emotional distinctions such as regionalism and class, for many Fijians saw in the election a contest between western--and commoner --Fijians led by Dr. Bavadra, and the traditional chiefly elite and eastern Fijians led by Ratu Mara.

As the campaign developed, the strategies of the two rival parties revealed themselves. Confident of victory, the Alliance adopted a dismissive attitude toward the opposition. Ratu Mara set the tone in November 1986 when, referring to the Labour politicians, he asked: "What have the Johnnys-come-lately done in the promotion of national unity?"¹⁷ He returned again and again to this theme throughout the campaign. Dr. Bavadra became the personal target of a sneering newspaper campaign. In a typical advertisement, the Alliance said: "Bavadra has never been in parliament. He has no EXPERIENCE. He has no INFLUENCE. The Council of Chiefs do NOT listen to him. The international scene where we sell our sugar has NEVER heard of him. He cannot get renewal of leases for farmers."¹⁸ In the opening Alliance campaign address over Radio Fiji, Mosese Qionibaravi, the deputy prime minister, called Bavadra an "unqualified unknown." The Coalition was often portrayed as weak, vacillating, and not to be trusted. One typical campaign advertisement ran: "The opposition factions are fragmented and quarrelling among themselves. Their policies are confused and shift constantly as one group or would-be leader gains ascendancy. Principles are proclaimed as fundamental and are then dropped when pressures are applied by vested interests, or for political expediency." The Alliance on the other hand presented itself as the very model of stability: "united in purpose, strong and fully accepted leadership, clear and consistent policies, and a political philosophy with values that have been proved by experience."¹⁹

Other important features of the Alliance campaign strategy were to appeal for Fijian ethnic solidarity and to instill fears among the *tauvei* about the consequences of a Coalition victory. The unmistakable Alliance message was that only an Alliance government headed by paramount chiefs could guarantee the security of Fijian interests. Once again, Ratu Mara led the Alliance charge. "Fijians have the political leadership despite being outnumbered in this country," he said, and "if they failed to unite that leadership would slip away from them."²⁰ And Mara accused the Coalition of trying to undermine Fijian leadership by taking up Fijian causes with the intention of discrediting the Alliance, such as the Nasomo land dispute in Vatukauloa, the plight of the cocoa growers in Vanua Levu, and competing claims of ownership of Yanuca

island in which his own wife was involved. Mara's racial appeal became so blatant that he was taken to task in a *Fiji Sun* editorial, the only political leader to be so criticized in the entire campaign: "In past elections, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara called for political parties not to indulge in politics of fear, and not to fight the election on racial lines. But now the Prime Minister himself has begun a racially oriented campaign. His call for the Fijians to unite to retain political leadership is unwarranted. If every individual race began campaigning on these lines, the country would be in trouble."²¹

Fear was an important aspect of the Alliance campaign strategy, fear not only of the *tauvei's* losing control over their land but also of being forced to embrace an ideology alien to their cultural values. The Alliance told the Fijian electorate, especially in the rural areas outside the purview of modern influences, about the evils of democratic socialism, the Coalition's creed borrowed from the Anglo-Australasian tradition. It was a system, the Alliance claimed, "in which LAND, FACTORIES, MINES, SHOPS, etc. are ALL OWNED by the STATE and the COMMUNITY. This is opposed to the present system in Fiji where ownership of Fijian land rests exclusively with Fijian *mataqali*, and businesses belong to individuals or shareholders in a public company."²² The fact that some of the trade union leaders had visited Moscow (as indeed had some government ministers) was presented as proof enough of the Coalition's sinister designs.

In contrast to the Alliance, the Coalition entered the campaign as a distinct underdog. It was new and inexperienced, underfunded and comparatively disorganized, unable to match the Alliance in the media war. Its candidates, therefore, ran their largely self-financed campaigns in pocket meetings in their own constituencies. But the Coalition message was clear: it charged the Mara administration with abuse of power and reminded the electorate of the mounting economic difficulties for lower-income families. Bavadra, in his concluding campaign speech, said, "Wage and salary earners remember the wage and job freeze; farmers remember their extreme hardships and insecurities; rural dwellers remember the high prices; parents remember the increased bus fares; squatters remember physical removal and neglect; teachers remember Dr. Ahmed Ali's reign of terror in the Ministry of Education; students remember the pain of their hunger strike; the *tauvei* remember that most of Fijian development money goes to a few provinces."²³ The Coalition, for its part, promised a new direction and a clean and compassionate government. Its election theme, "time for a change," caught the mood of the electorate as the campaign concluded. It was, by all

accounts, a remarkable transformation, brought about as much by the Coalition's own effort as by the voters' deepening disenchantment with the Alliance's negative campaigning.

Issues

Leadership

Leadership was an important issue in the campaign. The Alliance projected an image of unity and purpose and of experience in the complexities of government. The Coalition, on the other hand, was portrayed as a bunch of professional critics whose view of the real world was "so flawed that it would not pass as seconds." Ratu Mara was once again the trump card of the party, and he vowed to fight to the end: "I have not yet finished the job I started and until I can ensure that unshakeable foundations have been firmly laid and cornerstones are set in place, I will not yield to the vaulting ambitions of a power crazy gang of amateurs, none of whom has run anything, not even a bingo party."²⁴ He assured the nation that "as long as the people of this blessed land need me, I will answer their call. I will keep the faith. Fear not, Ratu Mara will stay." According to Mara, the future of Fiji and the Alliance party were inextricably linked; one could not--nor would be allowed to--exist without the other. Without his and his party's leadership, Mara said, Fiji would go down the path of "rack and ruin"; it would become another of those countries "torn apart by racial strife and drowning in debt, where basic freedoms are curtailed, universities closed down, the media throttled and dissenters put into jail and camps."²⁵

Ratu Mara's long incumbency was Dr. Bavadra's main problem for, unlike Mara, Bavadra was a newcomer to national politics, and virtually unknown outside Fiji. By profession a medical doctor, Bavadra had held a number of senior positions in the civil service before retiring in 1985 to head the newly formed FLP. Bavadra came from a chiefly background, though he was not himself a paramount chief,²⁶ was a sportsman, and had attended the Queen Victoria School, but his credentials with the Fijian establishment were tenuous and suspect. His cause was not helped by the Alliance's concerted effort to paint him as a tool of Indian politicians and therefore an untrustworthy guardian of Fijian interests. Thus Bavadra was forced frequently to defend his own "Fijianness" as well as his party's platform.

By the end of the campaign, however, Bavadra had managed to turn public opinion in his favor. His unassuming character, his common

touch, an accessibility and openness, all contrasted with Ratu Mara's characteristic aloofness throughout the campaign, and projected an image of a compassionate man who could be trusted. His style of leadership received praise from his colleagues. Commenting on Bavadra's "first among equals" approach to leadership, Satendra Nandan wrote: "It is a type of leadership which a democracy requires in the modern world, by the command of the people rather than by an accident of birth. It is a leadership which encourages growth in a team, rather than the banyan tree leadership under which everything else dies for lack of light. It is the leadership by a man who is known nationally as a leader, not identified with one particular province of a country; by a man chosen by a genuinely multiracial party; a leader who is easily approachable, not held in awe but in affection; a leadership which sincerely believes in collective responsibility for collective decision for the collective good."²⁷ Never before in Fiji had the contrast between two competing styles of leadership been presented so starkly to the public.

Conduct of government

The Alliance campaigned on its record of experience and stability, while the Coalition drew support by launching a concerted attack against it. "We have all become accustomed to the arrogance of power, abuse of privileges, and insolence of office," said Dr. Bavadra.²⁸ The Alliance had "reneged on the fundamental principles of democratic responsibility and accountability. It pretends to be democratic but in fact puts all the major decisions in the hands of a very few. This brand of democracy has benefitted a few at the expense of the vast majority." This theme was pursued throughout the campaign. The Coalition accused the Alliance of practicing the politics of racial separation, similar, in effect if not in name, to the apartheid regime of South Africa. The difference between the two was "one of degree, not one of substance." In rebuttal, the Alliance affirmed its commitment to opposing "any suggestion of constitutional change that would weaken or destroy the principle of guaranteed representation of Fiji's major racial groups in the House of Representatives."²⁹

To check what it saw as abuse of power caused by complacency and corruption, the Coalition proposed an anticorruption bill, a code of conduct for parliamentarians, and the abolition of legislation that allowed certain secrecy in government, specifically the Official Secrets Act. The Alliance, for the most part, chose to dismiss the issues raised by the Coalition. As Mara declared: "Allow me simply to say that there is

no country in the world today in which similar concerns do not emblazon the headlines. The fact is that these problems are a by-product of modernization. Fiji neither has a monopoly on these problems nor are they extensive and corrosive here."³⁰ His point was valid, of course, but the Alliance's complacent acceptance of the reality contrasted sharply when viewed alongside the Coalition's strong promise to tackle these problems with vigor. The above attitude seemed to symbolize the Alliance's apathy and aloofness to many in the electorate and certainly hurt the Alliance in the urban and peri-urban areas where violence and crime had increased dramatically in the last five years.

The Economy

The economy was another important campaign issue. Predictably, the Alliance trumpeted its record: inflation remained around 2 percent, the balance of payment figures were sound with foreign reserves at record levels, and the country was assured of guaranteed prices for its basic export item, sugar, through long-term international agreements. The Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to the promotion of individual enterprise within a capitalist framework. In short, the Alliance promised "business as usual" along an assured and well-trodden path.

But the Alliance's optimism about the state of the economy was based on shaky foundations. A number of experts pointed out that the Fijian economy was in serious trouble from overplanning and overreliance on the public sector to generate employment and investment. As Table 1, based on figures from a World Bank report of 1986, illustrates the Fijian economy had begun to show signs of serious problems in the mid-1970s. Professor Helen Hughes, director of the National Centre for Development Studies at the Australian National University, described the performance of the Fijian economy during the last five years as "miserable by comparison with other developing countries."³¹

The Coalition criticized the Alliance's management of the economy, but in general its economic strategy and philosophy differed from the Alliance's mainly in degree, not in substance. The Coalition went to great lengths to assure the business community that it was not antibusiness. Its election manifesto stated that "employment creation through an expanding private sector will form a major thrust of our economic policies." To generate private-sector growth, the Coalition promised to facilitate "easy access to long-term loan finances at low interest rates." And in his closing campaign address, Bavadra left no doubt of his support for the private sector: "I reaffirm the Coalition's recognition and

TABLE 1. Performance of the Fijian Economy, 1970-1985

Indices	1970-75	1975-80	1980-84	1985
GDP Growth Rate (%)	5.8	4.1	1.2	-1.5
Gross Domestic Investment (as % of GNP)	20.4	26.1	22.7	18.0
Gross National Savings (as % of GNP)	17.1	21.3	16.3	14.5
Overall Budget Deficit (as % of GNP)	1.1	6.5	5.1	3.0

Source: S. Yusuf et al., *Fiji: A Transition to Manufacturing* (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1986), 2.

acceptance of the vital role of the private sector in the development of the nation. There is no threat. The private sector must remain. It will remain.”³² This was a politically sensible stance that prevented the otherwise almost certain large-scale defection of the Indian business community to the Alliance fold. Their support in the marginal Suva seat proved crucial for the Coalition.

While the two parties agreed on broad issues of economic philosophy, however, they differed on both the performance as well as the management of the economy. The Coalition made an issue of unequal regional development in Fiji, pointing out that certain areas had been developed at the expense of others. A campaign attack alleged that Lau, Ratu Mara’s own province, had received a disproportionate share of development aid, scholarships, and hurricane relief money.³³ Mara naturally denied the charge of favoring Lau, but statistics confirmed the Coalition allegations. For example, between 1984 and 1986, Lau, one of the smallest of the Fijian provinces, received \$528,099.05 in scholarships, 21 percent of all the money allocated for Fijian scholarships. On the other hand, much larger provinces received far lesser sums: Ba, \$156,085.25 (6.2 percent); Tailevu, \$364,244.44 (14.5 percent); and Rewa, \$221,638.93 (8.3 percent).³⁴ Bavadra said, “It is important to remind ourselves that the government resources poured into Lakeba are derived from wealth produced by others elsewhere in the country. It is time that the government stopped viewing the rest of Fiji as serving the interest of a few centres in the east. The people of Lakeba are entitled to a share in the national interest, but just a share. It is time we had a government that is more truly national in outlook.”³⁵

The Coalition also highlighted the deteriorating plight of the disadvantaged sectors of Fiji society that had missed out on the Alliance’s

“economic parade”: the grossly underpaid garment factory workers, squatters, and other poor families. Indeed, the Coalition alleged collusion between big business and the Alliance government in keeping wages down, and made the still-unrefuted charge that Indian garment manufacturers had contributed about F\$51,000 to the Alliance campaign fund to prevent the legislation of a minimum-wage policy for the industry. Pointing to the Alliance’s record of high foreign reserves, Bavadra asked: “But what use is that when there is so much unemployment? What use is that if people can’t afford bus fares? What use is that if business confidence is lacking?”³⁶ Bavadra’s logic appealed to those who felt marginalized and left out of the economic picture portrayed by the Alliance.

Another difference between the Alliance’s and the Coalition’s economic policies was the latter’s emphasis on the need to promote greater local participation in Fiji’s economic development. This was in direct response to the increasing feeling that the Mara government had become less concerned over the years to the plight of local entrepreneurs and to local sensitivities. The difference between the two parties was aptly captured in their respective approaches to the promotion of the tourist industry. Both parties supported the promotion of tourism in Fiji, but the Coalition went further. It proposed to develop hotel-linked farms owned by neighboring villages, facilitate greater equity participation of local people in the hotel and allied transport industries, and provide special incentive allowances to those reinvesting tourist dollars within Fiji. The Coalition presented itself as a friend of local business and local entrepreneurs, which helped it to allay their fears and win their much-needed financial support. The Alliance, in contrast, appeared to be a part of--and for--big business.

Taukei Affairs and National Development

The Alliance and the Coalition differed sharply in their policies and visions for the nation and for the *taukei*. Both parties accepted the provisions of the Constitution that entrenched certain vested ethnic political and other interests. Not surprisingly, however, while the Alliance championed its long-held view that “race is a fact of life” and pledged itself to ensuring its continuation in the Fijian body politic, the Coalition was committed to the philosophy of a nonethnic state in which race by itself played a negligible role. It pressed for a common, unifying national name and identity to forge a genuine multiracial nation out of its component ethnic parts. The Alliance, on the other hand, rejected

the notion of a common designation for all Fiji citizens, arguing that it would pose a serious threat to specific *tauvei* rights, particularly land. The Alliance similarly rejected out of hand the Coalition's proposal to reform the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) to make it more efficient and responsive to both landowners' needs and tenants' concerns. As Bavadra noted in July 1986, "My concern is that the NLTB has become too much the tool of certain vested interests in this country and that all too often steps taken by the NLTB are not in the best interests of the majority of the landowners themselves."³⁷ To improve the situation, the Coalition proposed to establish a National Lands and Resources Council, composed of tenants' and landowners' representatives, that would oversee the NLTB and work to provide a fair return to the owners as well as ensure greater security of tenure to the tenant community. But the Coalition made it clear that it would not "attempt to change the existing land laws without the full consultation and approval of the Great Council of Chiefs."³⁸ The Alliance opposed any reform to the NLTB whatsoever,³⁹ and Mara called the FLP's thinking on the subject extremely dangerous: "Fijians should be wary of it because it could lead to the slipping away of native land."⁴⁰ Precisely how that was possible when Fijian land rights are deeply entrenched in the Constitution, the Alliance party left unexplained, but the effect of the Alliance's strong public opposition was to plant fears in *tauvei* minds about the possible loss of their cherished rights under a Bavadra government.

On Fijian leadership and politics, the Alliance position was markedly at variance with the Coalition's. The Alliance preached the need to maintain Fijian *ethnic* unity under *chiefly* rule. "The chiefs represent the people, the land, and the custom. Without a chief there is no Fijian society," said Senator Inoke Tabua, a close Mara associate.⁴¹ But in recent years, both the role of the chiefs as well as the formerly cohesive nature of traditional Fijian society were being threatened by modern influences in a multiracial context (education, urbanization, mass media). To stem the tide, and to reinforce chiefly rule, the Mara administration attempted to reintroduce selected aspects of the old Fijian Administration that had been abolished in 1967 in response to pressures for change in the 1960s. A specially commissioned report, prepared by the Pacific Islands Development Program of the Honolulu-based East-West Center under the leadership of ex-Fiji colonial official Rodney Cole, provided the blueprint for reforms in the system.⁴² Among its specific recommendations were the retention of many hitherto discarded customary laws, official recognition of village leaders, and so forth. These recommendations, formally implemented in March 1987, would,

so the Mara administration hoped, buttress chiefly rule and protect the traditional structure of Fijian society by insulating it from the corrosive influences in the larger society. Withdrawal into the shell of communal isolation rather than the initiation of a national dialogue was the Alliance's response to a host of serious social and economic problems facing the *tauvei*. This approach received much support in many rural areas and in the islands where the *tauvei* were practicing subsistence agriculture and had minimal contact with other ethnic groups; but it had little relevance and meaning in urban areas where individual struggle for existence took precedence over communal solidarity.

The Coalition's markedly different attitude on Fijian leadership drew a clear line between modern political and traditional roles for Fijian chiefs. The Coalition promised to educate the *tauvei* on their constitutional rights as opposed to their traditional and customary obligations. As Bavadra said, "The FLP will continue to educate and inform the indigenous Fijian people so that they can grasp the difference between what can properly be deemed to be indigenous Fijian obligations demanded by tradition and his [*sic*] fundamental rights guaranteed in the Fiji constitution[. S]o long as the Fiji constitution specifically guarantees individual political freedoms and associations, no individual irrespective of his color, creed or sex is obligated to be subservient to a master, whether it be a chief or a political party, other than what his conscience dictates."⁴³

Neither was the FLP supportive of further insulation of Fijian society from the mainstream of Fiji society, as the Alliance promised to do. Bavadra told a meeting in Suva, "By restricting the Fijian people to their communal lifestyle in the face of a rapidly developing cash economy, the average Fijian has become more and more economically backward. This is particularly invidious when the leaders themselves have amassed huge personal wealth by making use of their traditional and political powers."⁴⁴ Needless to say, this attitude presented a direct and unprecedented threat to the chiefs, such as Ratu Mara, who had acquired considerable wealth and influence by juxtaposing their modern political and traditional roles. They naturally reacted with unremarkable indignation, and predicted a dire future for the *tauvei* under a Coalition government.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy was not a significant campaign issue in Fiji but received considerable attention externally. A large part of the reason for outside

concern was the widely, if inaccurately, held view that the Coalition consisted of leftist radicals bent on wrecking Fiji's traditionally pro-Western policies. In fact, the Coalition's foreign policies were almost identical to those of the NFP-WUF coalition's 1982 platform. In 1982, the NFP-WUF had promised to "maintain an active policy of non-alignment"; to "keep the Pacific region free of big power rivalries, and in co-operation with countries in the region, oppose all forms of nuclear testing or nuclear waste disposal in the Pacific"; and to "support, by all peaceful means, the struggle of peoples of remaining colonies in the Pacific for independence and self government."⁴⁵ The Coalition promised to pursue these same policies, with one curious exception. Whereas the 1982 coalition had sought to "establish and strengthen Fiji's relationship with all nations without prejudice to their political ideologies," the 1987 Coalition said it would not allow the Soviet Union to open an embassy in Fiji. The 1982 coalition, it appears, was even more left-leaning than its 1987 counterpart, though of course, its views had not received as much scrutiny or publicity.

For its part, the Alliance, too, committed itself to a nonaligned policy for Fiji, a nuclear-free Pacific, and independence for New Caledonia. But it added, significantly, that it would pursue its policies "bearing in mind that it [Fiji] is a small nation and needs friends for its security."⁴⁶ One friend that the Mara administration courted assiduously, and with good result, was the United States, which had begun to view Fiji as the key player in regional politics. Fiji's strategic importance to the U.S. was enhanced by New Zealand's firm antinuclear stance and the consequent problems with the ANZUS alliance. In the final analysis, however, as on many other issues, the difference between the Coalition and the Alliance on important matters of foreign policy was more one of degree than of substance. Once in government, the Coalition was intent on pursuing a prudent and moderate foreign policy course, seeing as its most important challenge the need to consolidate its power within Fiji first.⁴⁷

As the campaign ended, the two parties painted contrasting visions of Fiji under their respective rules. Dr. Bavadra's Fiji would be a progressive, nonethnic state, committed to social justice and economic equality for all. The Alliance, on the other hand, promised to keep Fiji on the accustomed path of communal politics under Fijian chiefly leadership, firmly ensconced within a capitalist framework; without the Alliance, the electorate was told, Fiji had no democratic future. In his last election message to the nation Mara said, "I firmly believe that these elec-

tions will be crucial to the future of our homeland. Let there be no doubt in your mind: Fiji is not so much at a turning point, as it is at the crossroads. If we take the wrong direction, we will finish up in blind alleys, from which there is no return and no way out."⁴⁸

Voting

Voting in Fiji is a complex affair determined by a complicated electoral system. The compromise constitution adopted at independence in 1970 provides that election to the House of Representatives be based on the principles of ethnicity.⁴⁹ Accordingly, each major ethnic group has an allotted number of seats in a fifty-two-seat parliament: Fijians and Indians each with twelve communal seats and the General Electors three. The candidates as well as voters for these seats have to be members of their respective ethnic categories. The remaining twenty-five seats are designated national seats with ethnic reservations: ten each for Fijians and Indians and five for the General Electors. The candidates must be ethnically Fijian or Indian or General, but the electorate is multiracial. It is a contrived formula that attempts to maintain a balance between communal and national interests.

Given the communal electoral system, it is not surprising that voting follows an ethnic pattern. As Table 2 shows, Fijians have always voted overwhelmingly for the Fijian-dominated Alliance and the Indians have rallied behind the NFP. The General Electors have been consistent in their support for the Alliance, 90 percent in 1982 and 85 percent in 1987. Political success in Fiji is thus contingent upon maintaining solidarity in one's own ethnic community while actively promoting disunity among the opposition's. The Alliance has played the game with much skill, preserving Fijian unity while capitalizing on dormant factionalism and disunity in the Indian community. The NFP, as the figures show, has not encountered much success in splitting the Fijian communal vote in its favor.

The 1987 election confirmed the historic trend of predominantly ethnic patterns of voting, but the figures also belie the emergence of some new trends. Although Indian support for the Alliance remained constant around 15 percent, it is important to note that support was not as broadly based as it had been in the past. In recent years, the Indian business class and a significant section of the Muslim community constituted the base of the Indian Alliance; the party's support among the South Indian community, or among the reformist Arya Samaj religious group, important in the past, declined significantly in 1987. And while true that the majority of Fijians supported the Alliance, it is also signifi-

TABLE 2. **Voting Patterns in Fiji, 1972-1987**

Party	1972	Apr. 1977	Sept. 1977	1982	1987
Fijian Communal Vote					
% Alliance	83.1	64.7	80.5	83.7	76.6
% NFP (Labour Coalition)	2.4	--	0.1	0.8	9.6
% FNP	--	24.4	11.6	7.7	5.4
% WUF	--	--	--	7.0	3.4
Total no. of votes cast	76,462	82,651	94,038	121,366	120,701
Indian Communal Vote					
% Alliance	24.1	15.6	14.4	15.3	15.1
% NFP (Labour Coalition)	74.3	73.2	84.9	84.1	82.9
Total no. of votes cast	84,753	103,644	103,537	110,830	122,906

Sources: Figures for previous elections derived from my own research (see my "Politics since Independence, 1970-1982," in *Politics in Fiji: Studies in Contemporary History*, ed. Brij V. Lal [Laie, Hawaii: Institute for Polynesian Studies, 1986], 90); figures for 1987 obtained from the Office of the Supervisor of Elections in Fiji.

Note: I have not included percentages for independents and minor parties.

cant that 21.8 percent voted for other parties and independents, thus indicating that among many Fijians, the Alliance was not regarded as the sole representative voice of the Fijian community. On the other hand, the Coalition was able to make significant inroads into the Fijian constituency, enough to cause the Alliance's defeat in marginal seats.

An important feature of the 1987 election was a record-low voter turnout, the lowest since independence. Indian turnout declined from 85 percent in 1982 to 69 percent in 1987, while in the same period the Fijian turnout dropped from 85 percent to 70 percent.⁵⁰ The decline affected the outcome in the marginal constituencies. The reasons for the drop are not clear, though several are plausible. One, undoubtedly, was the confusion caused by the omissions of names from the hastily prepared and improperly checked electoral rolls, or inadvertent transfer of voters names from one polling station to another, thereby causing unsuspecting voters to miss the deadline for casting their votes at a specified time and place. Another reason could have been the widespread feeling of the election's being a foregone conclusion in the Alliance's favor, thus causing some supporters to stay away. Among some Fijians, especially in urban areas, absence from the polling booth was a protest against the Alliance. Unable to bring themselves to tick against the Alliance wheel, they refrained from voting altogether.

The Alliance suffered from a decline in Fijian voter turnout in all

except four of its twelve communal constituencies, the largest decline being in areas where it was already particularly vulnerable. In Lomai-viti/Muanikau the Fijian turnout dropped by 23 percent, in Rewa/Serua/Namosi by 17 percent, in Kadavu/Tamavua by 16 percent, and in Ra/Samabula by 13.4 percent. Tamavua, Samabula, and Muanikau all are a part of the greater Suva area and within the Suva Fijian national constituency where a voter turnout drop and a swing to the Coalition caused the Alliance's defeat. This was a constituency that the Alliance had always won with the slightest of margins and, in the 1987 elections, it was widely viewed as the seat most likely to tip the balance of the election. It had a total of 41,179 voters (16,962 Fijians; 20,778 Indians; and 3,439 General Electors). The Alliance's candidates were Ratu David Toganivalu, the deputy prime minister, and Mrs. Irene Jai Narayan. Pitted against these two seasoned politicians were the Coalition newcomers, Dr. Tupeni Baba, a Fijian academic at the University of the South Pacific, and Navin Maharaj, former Suva (and Alliance) mayor and businessman. The Alliance counted on the experience and popularity of its candidates to carry the constituency. But that was not to be. Maharaj, a veteran of municipal politics, mounted an effective, door-to-door campaign, and Baba developed with the campaign to become an articulate and accomplished spokesman for his party, especially with the city's younger voters, both Indian and Fijian. Business community support for Toganivalu was neutralized among the powerful Gujerati community by Harilal Patel, who contested the Suva Indian communal seat. And Mrs. Narayan, instead of being an asset, became a liability. Her previous record of solid opposition to the Alliance was used against her; many of her former supporters refused to overlook her defection from the NFP to the Alliance; and the Indian Alliance, feeling discarded and discredited, refused to campaign for the party. Making matters worse for themselves, leading Alliance party functionaries, including Mara, devoted an inordinate amount of time in the west hoping, at long last, to win an Indian communal seat. A low voter turnout--60 percent in the Suva national constituency--hurt the Alliance, and was a major factor in its defeat.

Another marginal seat was the Southeastern national (Naitasiri/Nasinu area), which the Alliance also lost to the Coalition. Here, there were 22,228 Fijian registered-voters, 19,974 Indians, and 761 General Electors. Several factors helped to defeat the Alliance. One was the low voter turnout: 67 percent compared to 83 percent in 1982. But perhaps more important was the effect of the Fijian Nationalist Party, which collected 8.5 percent of the Fijian communal votes that otherwise, it

can reasonably be supposed, would have gone to the Alliance. The Coalition candidate, Joeli Kalou, a teacher and a trade unionist, was an accomplished campaigner while his Alliance rival, Ratu George Tu'akaitau Cokanauto, youngest son of the late Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau, remained uncomfortable on the hustings, relying more on traditional political connections than on active campaigning. For its Indian candidate, the Coalition astutely chose a Muslim, Fida Hussein, in an area of large Muslim population. His presence on the ticket helped to blunt the effect of the Alliance's assiduous courting of the Muslim voter. Once again, then, the Alliance downfall in this constituency, as elsewhere, was caused both by astute Coalition strategy as well as by the Alliance's own complacency and ineffectiveness.

An election campaign that began with a whimper ended with an unexpected bang, in the process surprising both the victors as well as the vanquished. But while the new government set about its work, its opponents--defeated after almost two decades of untrammelled rule--organized to oppose and eventually overthrow it, climaxing with a military-led and Alliance-condoned coup of May 14.⁵¹

At his first news conference after being sworn into office on April 12, Dr. Bavadra had briefly reflected on the momentous events of the previous week. He viewed the "the peaceful and honorable change of government" as the reaffirmation of the "deep democratic roots of our society and the profound unity of our people." He saw in his triumph the dawn of a new era, full of new potentials and opportunities. "Together," he said, "let us write a new chapter, which, God willing, will be one which we and our children will be proud of."⁵² Unfortunately for him and his supporters, neither the gods nor his opponents were willing or prepared for change.

NOTES

Many people have contributed to the completion of this brief study of the Fiji elections. I am grateful to Shiu Singh and Va Pickering of the Fiji Broadcasting Commission and to many other people in Fiji who shared their thoughts and perceptions. I should add that this article was completed a few months after the general election of 1987. Since then, as we know, many momentous changes have taken place on Fiji's political scene. I have analyzed them in my book, *Power and Prejudice: The Making of the Fiji Crisis* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, currently in press). This article is offered as a contemporary on-the-scene account of an important event overtaken by dramatic changes. I have resisted the temptation to revise it in the light of subsequent developments in Fiji.

1. Sir Leonard Usher, *Mainly About Fiji: A Collection of Writings, Broadcasts, and Speeches* (Suva: Fiji Times, 1987), 146. This book was published a week after the elections.

2. In addition to the four political parties discussed here, there were four others that vanished either on the eve of or during the campaign: Social Democratic party (opposed to the chiefly system), Christian Democratic party (make Fiji a Christian state), Fijian Democratic party (led by a former dropped Alliance backbencher), and the National Labour party (disenchanted with the Fiji Labour party). None of them made any impression on the electorate.

3. For a brief survey of postindependence politics, see my "Fiji: Politics since Independence, 1970-1982," in *Politics in Fiji: Studies in Contemporary History*, ed. Brij V. Lal (Laie, Hawaii: Institute for Polynesian Studies, 1986), ch. 4.

4. I write in the present tense here to describe the situation as it existed before May 14. The coup has destroyed multiracial party politics in Fiji.

5. *Fiji Times*, 8 Nov. 1986. Three other former NFP officials were given Alliance seats, underlining the diminishing ideological differences between the two old rivals.

6. The Tripartite Forum--composed of the Fiji Trade Union Congress, Fiji Employers Consultative Association, and the government--was formed in 1976 to reach "common understanding [on issues] which affect national interest such as industrial relations, job creation, greater flow of investment and general social and economic development of the country."

7. *Fiji Times*, 24 Sept. 1985; the 1985/1986 issues of the *Fiji Teachers Journal*.

8. See my "Postscript: The Emergence of the Fiji Labour Party," in *Politics in Fiji*, 148-155, for the launching manifesto of the party.

9. *Fiji Times*, 20 July 1986.

10. Lal, "Postscript," 149.

11. This certainly was the major theme in Jai Ram Reddy's speeches throughout the campaign, which helped to some extent to diffuse and eventually destroy any support for the Koya faction of the NFP.

12. See "National Federation Party-Western United Front Coalition Manifesto," typescript (4 pages).

13. Origins of the Western United Front are discussed at length in my article, "The Fiji General Election of 1982: The Tidal Wave That Never Came," *Journal of Pacific History* 18, no. 2 (April 1983): 139-141. The danger of the WUF's being 'coopted by a wing of the Fijian Association' is discussed in my "Fiji: Politics since Independence, 1970-1982," 95-101.

14. See my article, "The 1982 General Election and Its Aftermath," *University of the South Pacific Sociological Society Newsletter*, no. 5 (July 1983): 3-17. The report on the investigation by Sir John White is found in *Fiji Parliamentary Paper 74/83*, Government of Fiji, 1983.

15. This is based on my conversation with FNP officials and on the "FNP Radio Broadcast." Typescript of this election eve address is in my possession. For an account of the origins of the FNP, see Ralph R. Premdas, "Constitutional Challenge: The Rise of Fijian Nationalism," *Pacific Perspectives* 9, no. 2 (1980): 30-44.
16. For a study of the 1982 Fiji elections, see my "Fiji General Election of 1982," cited above; for the 1977 elections, see Ahmed Ali, "The Fiji General Elections of 1977," *Journal of Pacific History* 12, nos. 3-4 (1977): 189-201.
17. *Fiji Times*, 28 Nov. 1986.
18. *Fiji Times*, 15 Mar. 1987.
19. Advertisements in the two Fiji dailies; *Alliance Party Election Manifesto 1987*, 2.
20. Reported in the *Fiji Times*, 24 Sept. 1986. Apisai Tora, a senior cabinet minister in the Alliance government, made a similar statement: "It is the considered strategy of the Fiji Labour Party to divide the Fijian people so that their political influence in Fiji is lessened. It is a political party whose real goal is to reduce the Fijian race in their own land" (*Fiji Sun*, 25 Oct. 1986). Following the elections Tora would become one of the chief engineers of the Taukei Movement.
21. Editorial, *Fiji Sun*, 24 Sept. 1986.
22. *Alliance Party Newsletter*, Nov. 1986; see also *Fiji Times*, 11 Mar. 1987.
23. Dr. Timoci Bavadra, "Closing Election Address on Radio Fiji," 4-5.
24. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, "Alliance Party Political Broadcast," 4-6. Typescripts of both Bavadra's and Mara's addresses were made available to me by Radio Fiji, which had invited me to chair its election panel discussions.
25. *Ibid.*, 2.
26. Bavadra came from the chiefly Veseisei village, was the traditional head of *i tokatoka* Werekakaca of the chiefly *yavusa* of Sabutoyatoya, Vuda, and was a member of both the Ba Provincial Council as well as the Great Council of Chiefs. His wife, Adi Kuini Teimumu Vuikaba, was from the chiefly family in Naikoro/Navusa and related through her paternal grandmother to Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna.
27. *Fiji Times*, 24 Mar. 1987. Nandan became the minister of health in the Bavadra government.
28. *Fiji Times*, 24 Feb. 1987.
29. *Alliance Party Election Manifesto 1987*, 2. Since the coup of May 14, the Alliance has in fact endorsed changes to the Fiji Constitution to give ethnic Fijians numerical dominance in the Parliament.
30. Mara, "Alliance Party Political Broadcast," 4.
31. Helen Hughes, "Towards Economic Upturn: Identifying the Opportunities," a paper presented to the Annual Congress of the Fiji Institute of Accountants, Sigatoka, Mar. 1987, 1.
32. Bavadra, "Closing Election Address," 14.
33. See Coalition candidate Dr. Tupeni Baba's allegations in the *Fiji Sun*, 30 Mar. 1987.

34. These figures are derived from a report prepared by the Fijian Affairs Board and presented to the Great Council of Chiefs at their 1986 Somosomo meeting.
35. Comments made at the First Annual Convention of the Fiji Labour party at Lautoka, 19 July 1986. I have a copy of the speech.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. Similar sentiments about the NLTB were expressed throughout the campaign.
38. Bavadra, 'Closing Election Address,' 7.
39. *Alliance Party Election Manifesto 1987*, 7.
40. Ratu Mara spoke these words during the Fijian Association Convention at the Girit Centre in Lautoka. See *Fiji Times*, 17 Aug. 1986.
41. *Fiji Sun*, 2 Oct. 1985. The same senator predicted violence if Mara was defeated. He later became one of the leading lights of the Taukei Movement.
42. R. V. Cole, S. I. Levine, and A. Matahu, *The Fijian Provincial Administration: A Review* (Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development Program of the East-West Center, 1984). For a discussion of the problems of the Fijian Administration in the 1960s, see I. Q. Lasaga, *The Fijian People: Before and After Independence* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1984).
43. From Bavadra's address to the First Annual Convention of the Fiji Labour party, 19 July 1986.
44. Bavadra's speech at the Kshattriya Hall, reported in *Fiji Times*, 17 Nov. 1986.
45. *National Federation Party and Western United Front Coalition Manifesto, 1982 General Elections*, 78.
46. *Alliance Party Election Manifesto 1987*, 10.
47. This conclusion is derived from my conversation with leading Coalition officials. Labour Foreign Minister Krishna Datt himself told General Vernon Walters, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, soon after the election that his government was reexamining its position on nuclear issues.
48. Ratu Mara, "Alliance Party Political Broadcast," 1.
49. For more discussion, see my "Fiji: Politics since Independence," 76-81.
50. For 1982 figures, see my "Fiji General Election of 1982," 152. The 1987 figures were obtained from the Office of the Supervisor of Elections.
51. This is argued at full length in my *Power and Prejudice*.
52. Reported in the *Fiji Times*, 13 Apr. 1987.

THE 1987 WESTMINSTER CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN FIJI

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During the 1965 debates of the London Constitutional Conference, Legislative Council member S. M. Koya made a prediction in his arguments questioning the legitimacy of maintaining the communal roll electoral system:

If we accept today the proposition that the Fijian community has a special position in this country it follows . . . that they should have a special position in everything else--in the recruitment for the civil service, in the armed forces and any other services. It follows that as time goes on, from within the Fijian community--and I predict this--there will be a national movement purely on communalistic lines to say "Fiji for Fijians, Indians and others get out." . . . Can anyone really suggest that such a movement is not in existence in Fiji at the moment?¹

On 14 May 1987, the Fiji Constitution of 1970 came to an abrupt end through the forceful seizure of government by elements of the Royal Fiji Military Forces under the command of Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka, acting to restore the paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests.² After only one month of rule, the government of Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra was overthrown and the political future of the former British Crown Colony seemed uncertain as Koya's prediction was being fulfilled.

It is the purpose of this essay to analyze the course of these remarkable events in the context of political, constitutional, and social institu-

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tional relationships and transformations since national independence in 1970. More specifically, this analysis will focus on constitutional ideology and legitimacy, on the organization and transformation of native Fijian (*taukei*) political and military elites in tandem with class formation, and on popular reaction as indications of the changing nature of institutional relationships and conditions in island society. Rather than reconstructing an anecdotal scenario of events, this essay seeks to interpret the May 14 coup³ as the culmination of a progressive failure of constitutional ideology and legitimacy in the collective consciousness of many *taukei* (and perhaps many non-*taukei* as well), reflecting the inability of island social, economic, and political institutions and interests to resolve their respective differences so as to reconcile themselves into a unitary expression of national sentiment. It is, moreover, asserted that the primary consideration in the nation-building process in Fiji has been the ambivalence and persistence of traditional *taukei* elites in maintaining power and influence beyond traditional institutions and norms, particularly within the institutions of state.

Constitutional Ideology and Legitimacy

Postindependence Fiji has been described as a pluralistic society organized on a consociational model through which dialogue between the *taukei* and their Indo-Fijian counterparts occurs about the order and allocation of power and authority. Consociational democracy exists when the interests of the political elites are in preserving a unitary multiethnic state over countervailing interests that tend to break down state institutions into ethnic components.⁴ With respect to eventual independence, a constitution based upon the Westminster model was seen as desirable, if not necessary, for the orderly transfer of power from Great Britain to the new island state. Constitutionalism, as an ideology, is the primary charter of law and, in most instances, the sole source of legitimacy.

In many ways the constitutional system defines the new state, secures its territorial integrity and (if we may indulge in some excess of style and assertion) its institutions fasten themselves like a grid upon the scattered islands and their unadministered parts. By vesting public power in prescribed national institutions, it enables the ousting of competing claims and jurisdictions, whether at the local or regional levels, whether informal or organised. It seeks to establish a new basis of authority. But the capacity of the constitution to confer legitimacy upon the new system depends in considerable part on the process of its

making, and in particular the extent of the popular consultation and consensus on which it was based.⁵

Thus, any forthright analysis of constitutionalism as the source of both law and legitimacy must recognize that from the very beginning of its formulation in Fiji its legitimacy has always been suspect. As used here legitimacy, as a feature of political culture, is a claim to authority founded upon some separate, accepted source of entitlement apart from those people who exercise actual power. Legitimacy is a form of moral code supporting trust and confidence among people toward the institutions of governance.

Prior to the 1969-1970 London Constitutional Conference on independence, the commitment from both the Colonial Office and island elites to resolute changes in Fiji's constitutional structure seemed to be marginal at best. As J. W. Davidson critically observed,

Fiji lives in the past, constitutionally, both because of the complexities of its social structure and of the operation of factors of a more directly political and administrative kind. In Britain, ministers and permanent officials of the Colonial Office have been preoccupied with the problems of more opportunate colonial peoples; and, although they have regarded it as necessary that Fiji should eventually become self-governing, they have shown only an intermittent and unimaginative concern with the process by which this change should be brought about. In the colony itself, senior officers of government have largely retained an attitude of benign, but out-dated, paternalism. To these men, there has seemed little need for change. When London has required them to discuss constitutional development with representatives of the local people, they have done so without any deep sense of commitment to self-government and, partly as a consequence, without much political sensitivity or skill. The leaders of the Fijian and European communities have been very wary of change lest, in particular, it should enhance the political influence of the Indians. The old technique of 'divide and rule' has thus been maintained, not primarily for the reasons that anti-colonialists are wont to assume, but because it has been supported by those groups in the colony that are in closest touch with the official establishment.⁶

Any analysis of the constitutional decision-making process prior to independence indicates that the process itself was largely a negotiated

compromise between political elites, namely the *taukei*-dominated Alliance party and the Indo-Fijian-dominated National Federation party (NFP).

The Alliance party's approach to the issue of independence was based upon the principle that the *taukei* wished to preserve their tradition-based society, not only as a political majority, but also in a separately constituted form under the tutelage of the Fijian Administration. The rationale of such a position was the prevailing belief that since the sovereignty of Fiji was ceded to Great Britain by the island chiefs, it was both logical and equitable that sovereignty be returned to the *taukei* themselves.⁷ The 1874 Deed of Cession, for the *taukei*, was not merely a formalized transfer of power, but rather a covenant between themselves and Britain for the protection of Fijian interests. Thus the proposal for a common roll was not responsive to such doctrine even though the Alliance openly conceded that a common roll was a desirable long-term objective.

The NFP, on the other hand, initially endorsed a common roll as a primary constitutional feature. Based upon a simple democratic principle, a common roll was viewed by the NFP as necessary to any concept of "one people, one country, one nation."⁸ Rather than persist in a perhaps endless ideological debate, the NFP proved to be flexible on the issue and was prepared to accept a communal/national roll formula in the proposed House of Representatives. The NFP leader, S. M. Koya, proposed to his Alliance counterpart, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, that a second chamber be created that could function, *inter alia*, as a means of protecting Fijian interests.⁹ Although this proposal was acceptable to Mara, he was obligated by custom to present the matter to the Great Council of Chiefs, an influential body of traditional and administrative *taukei* elites constituted as an advisory body during the colonial period. The council, less than pleased, was critical of Mara for permitting such a high percentage of non-Fijian representation in the proposed parliament. It became clear that any further consultation with groups not party to the negotiations could jeopardize efforts to reach a final agreement. The Alliance strategy of discretionary, closed-end consultation on the proposed constitution was raised five years later by Fijian Nationalist party leader S. B. Butadroka during the parliamentary debates on his infamous motion to repatriate Indo-Fijians from Fiji. His lengthy speech, if closely analyzed, was directed more at the Alliance leadership than at the merits of the uncouth subject matter under discussion:

. . . One of the conditions reached during the London Constitutional Talk in 1970 . . . is that all alien races residing in Fiji,

if they so wish, could be permanent citizens of Fiji. The agreement was made without direct consultation with the Fijian chiefs and people. We, the Fijians, who have been taught by the British Government during the 97 years of colonial rule, have been made a "yes man" to our leaders. . . . As an example of that . . . a meeting . . . was called for the Fijians in the Central Division and was held at Nausori. The meeting passed the unanimous resolution that when asked about the position of the Indians in Fiji if it could be asked at the London Constitutional talks that the Indians be asked to leave Fiji after Independence. If I remember rightly . . . Fijians in all parts of Fiji passed the same tune of resolution. . . . The London constitutional negotiators, as far as the Fijians were concerned, did come back with a different picture altogether. The Fijians at home were calmed down by a speech made by the Prime Minister, while in London . . . to the Fijian people here.¹⁰

The Fijian Nationalist party view was interpreted into a broader rhetorical analysis following the 1982 elections, which restored the Alliance party to a parliamentary majority.

Since independence, a Native-Fijian-dominated party, led by a paramount chief and consisting of several other high chiefs, has been at the helm. In the eyes of several other ordinary Native Fijians as well as the indigenous elite, this is only natural and just an expression of the concept of Native Fijian paramountcy in national life; they have come to see this as more or less a permanent arrangement. If they had to, the native Fijians would *share* power with others, it has been argued by some, but they are unprepared to become subordinated to some other group. . . . If this perception of native Fijian sentiment is accurate, then it is pertinent to ask whether the paraphernalia of politics --elections, political parties, etc.--has much meaning in the ultimate analysis. In the present situation, a prior and determined claim (probably at the expense of some upheaval) to political power by one section of the Fijian society sharply contradicts the letter and the spirit of the constitution.¹¹

Legitimacy and the Modern Nation-State

British approval of a communal roll mode of election was less than enthusiastic. As Lord Shepard, minister of state for foreign and com-

monwealth affairs, said, "You have also got to take into account that when you become independent . . . you are to be judged by others. An election system that is clearly and utterly wrong and so rigid that there is to be no change will not bring credit to an independent sovereign Fiji."¹² Lord Shepard's remarks constituted a metropolitan restatement of the doctrine of state sovereignty, which is the primary ideological principle of the modern nation-state. Independence for Fiji was not merely a formalized transfer of power, but also a reconstitution of Fiji into a new jural expression with international significance, transcending all other forms of political organization. The transformation of a former Crown Colony into a nation-state is not only a political process, but also a moral one. While the political process may involve practical and legal terms and understandings, the moral process provides the nucleus of legitimation, embodied in the fundamental provisions of its constitution: "Modernity requires national sovereignty, which, in the minds of its supporters, presupposes the existence of a nation which rules itself through indigenous organs and persons. With or without representative institutions, the modern sovereign state is held to embody the essence of its society. National sovereignty means not only authority, but also an influential place as a modern nation on the world stage."¹³

Lord Shepard's concerns were obviously with this latter issue. British colonialism in Fiji could not legitimate itself even under the terms of the Deed of Cession. Independent Fiji would not only emerge as a nation-state, but also as a member of the international state system of which Britain was a foremost exponent. On the world stage, "there is a tendency to assume the primacy of the nation-state, and to assign universal legitimacy to its existence and without elaborating the normative justification for the validity of the nation-state. . . . Even then the idea of nation-building, which is assumed to be the central focus of sociopolitical activities in newly-independent states, is more closely reflective of a process of transition from state to nation rather than from nation to state."¹⁴ In spite of this, however, the transfer of power must be a rational process governed by fundamental notions of legitimacy and assumptions of validity. Such principles posed a dilemma for the Fiji elites since precolonial social institutions resisted the notion of having one racial community dominate contemplated national institutions. This dilemma, more accurately described as a crisis prolonged, needed to be either resolved or avoided altogether, as a barrier to independence. With seeming irony, a 1953 Hansard Society study on this issue noted:

It is always necessary for a state, if it is to be based on a fair degree of agreement on the part of its citizens on essential principles, for them to possess a sense of solidarity and common interests, an agreement on a few fundamental matters so strong that it allows differences of view on matters less fundamental. . . .

. . . *Plural society* is not so much a diagnosis as an admission that there is a condition to be remedied. Plural societies are not identical in character, and there is no standard prescription to be applied in all cases. Though . . . various constitutional devices . . . have been proposed for the plural society, it should not be thought that the answer lies solely in the construction of appropriate constitutional machinery.¹⁵

The political reality of the state-building process is that it necessitates recurrent activity involving the periodic renewal of state institutional legitimacy and the means by which the state ministers to the needs of its constituent groups. Even if such activity amounts to mere dialogues and slogans, the reconstitutive effect of such interaction is necessary to open up the possibility of even greater interaction and integration. Aside from their shared membership in the Commonwealth, Britain's influence in postindependence Fiji would be abruptly discontinued and confined to token, though competent, gestures about the eventual outcome of pluralistic politics. The assumption of such terminal gestures was based on the view that independence, as the final rite of passage, acknowledges that a colony has been adequately prepared to assume its position in the international state system as well as to assure its own internal order. This view of the nation-state as the primary vehicle for integration and consolidation was derived from previous decolonization experience in Africa and was deemed to be a suitable model for Fiji.

Nonetheless, Lord Shepard agreed with the negotiators that the modified communal roll system would be an interim measure and that a royal commission would be constituted within five years to make recommendations to the Fiji Parliament on possible changes to the electoral system. As a political strategy temporizing had the value of postponing a crisis indefinitely in favor of more immediate concerns on the assumption that no substantive changes will occur over the long term. In mid-1975, a royal commission was appointed by the Fiji governor-general to conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the existing electoral system. By year's end, the Street Commission submitted its recommendations. Essentially, the commission urged that the National Roll be

amended to eliminate all racial restrictions. Constituencies were to be reconfigured so as to permit single-member units that, by their very nature, would be more responsive to their electorates. The overall concern of the commission was to permit a gradual evolution toward a common roll consistent with the existing political and demographic realities and to encourage in the Fiji Parliament a balance of political parties rather than a balance of races.¹⁶ The Street Commission report represented Britain's last substantive statement on the independence Constitution and, once more, reflected the general disfavor with which metropolitan officials viewed Fiji's electoral configuration.

The response of the ruling Alliance party to the Street Commission recommendations was less than enthusiastic, though it was hoped that, after the 1977 elections, some movement toward electoral reform could commence. The arguments of the Alliance were oriented toward the security of the status quo, a desire anticipated by the commission's report: "The common theme running through the aspirations of any racial group was that its members must be given a tangible feeling of security. They must be able to feel that they would not be overwhelmed or dominated by any other group. It would be a potent factor of insecurity if a system of election were to be introduced under which no race would know how many of its members would eventually arrive in Parliament until the votes had been counted."¹⁷

The vagaries of popular voting behavior in the tumultuous elections of 1977 and 1982 convinced the Alliance party leadership, beyond any doubt, that preservation of the electoral status quo was necessary to its hegemony in Parliament. Its decisive defeat in the 1987 elections, however, precipitated a more definitive crisis when a military government was established. The reality of the communal roll was to categorize Fiji as a liberal parliamentary ethnocracy.¹⁸

Configuring a New Regime

On the issue of constitutionalism, the commitment of the Fiji Interim Military Government to legitimating the paramountcy of *tauvei* interests under the rubric of formulating a new constitution was continuously evident, though clearly contradictory. Rather than revoke the independence Constitution, Governor-General Ratu Sir Penaia Gani-lau assumed executive authority under the Constitution itself and issued emergency regulations that permitted the Fiji Interim Military Government to operate the machinery of power in a constitutional fashion until a decision could be made about the political future of the islands.¹⁹ The

option for a republic at that time was rejected, though discussed at length. The ambivalence created by the confluence of rapid changes with a long-standing political conservatism was pervasive during this brief period. Three options for constitutional changes, submitted by a group acting in the name of the Great Council of Chiefs, proposed to modify the existing Constitution on a compromise model of both the Westminster and American systems.²⁰ At the same time the governor-general organized a sixteen-member Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) selected from the dissolved House of Representatives, the Great Council of Chiefs, and others authorized to “make a useful contribution to the committee’s deliberations.”²¹ Most important, Ganilau emphasized:

Timing dictates that the committee will need to deliberate, receive representations and reach its conclusions fairly quickly. Members of the public will be given an opportunity to make submissions to this committee. The aim of this committee will be to produce a report which will be presented to me. I will then form a council of national reconciliation to arrive at a consensus to agree on the proposed changes to the Constitution and to agree on a covenant of national reconciliation. If that consensus is reached . . . the recommendations will need to be translated into an Act of Parliament, to be passed in accordance with the present Constitution. To achieve that I will need to call for new elections under the present Constitution for a new House of Representatives. Under the Covenant of National Reconciliation, a formula will have been agreed to for a national slate of candidates which, as far as I can call on the goodwill and understanding of the people of Fiji, will result in an uncontested election.²²

The problem for the governor-general was how to reorder the composition of the House prior to the elections so as to guarantee representativeness, constitutionality, and, above all, results that would assure the paramountcy of *taukei* interests. Such a complex exercise was fraught with risk. Once such amendments were put into final form, the governor-general would dissolve Parliament and general elections would be called that would complete Fiji’s return to parliamentary democracy. This plan was rejected by ousted Prime Minister Bavadra, who insisted that “any consideration for constitutional changes should involve the widest possible consultation, and must be considered by the current

Parliament duly elected on 11th April 1987 under the present Constitution."²³The concern for constitutional legitimacy and its pragmatic reconciliation with the realities of power would be the central challenge for the primary political personalities and groups in Fiji until year's end. The declaration of the Fiji republic on September 28 was an explicit acknowledgment that the constitutional reformation process had not secured the paramountcy of *tauvei* interests as defined by the military and that the political elites would not be permitted to once again negotiate a political settlement that would in any way dilute such expectation. Ancillary to this important issue was the maintenance of regional and sectional integrity. During the early postcoup days, resolutions were submitted to the Great Council of Chiefs to permit Rotuman independence and create a separate republic out of Ba province. Proposals that would strengthen the provincial councils of the Fijian Administration--or, more accurately, give them parliamentary recognition--were also submitted.²⁴ Above all, the separation of Fiji from the Commonwealth was always a working consideration among the less conservative *tauvei* factions.

From 1970 to the present, the issue of constitutional ideology and legitimacy has been a troublesome question for independent Fiji. For the *tauvei* elite, constitutional legitimacy meant the paramountcy of their interests, not merely confined to land, tradition, and customs, but also the numerical control of Parliament. This preoccupation with political numbers rather than with constitutional principles was founded on the conviction that *tauvei* interests could only be protected by the *tauvei* themselves and by the perception that non-*tauvei* were void of any concern for the *tauvei*. Suspension of parliamentary democracy could be justified under such assumptions with the proviso that such actions needed to be constitutionally transformed to assert any claim of legitimacy within the international state system. Indeed, the paramountcy of *tauvei* interests could only be assured by control of the institutions of the nation-state itself. The politics of numbers articulated through revised constitutional provisions would therefore assure the power of scale. Thus, *tauvei* acceptance of the independence Constitution was always tentative.

This outlook was compounded by a limited general understanding of the Constitution by most *tauvei*, due largely to the failure of the political elites--*tauvei* or otherwise--to disseminate the meaning of Fiji's fundamental document of governance. This fact emerged during the CRC review.

Whilst many submissions made to the Committee showed a good understanding of the existing protections and mechanisms of the 1970 Constitution, it was also often evident that this had only been acquired recently after the events of May 14. The unavailability of the Constitution in Fijian and Hindi was frequently stated to have contributed to a general unawareness amongst many in Fiji of their political and constitutional rights.

The Committee doubts that the translation of the Constitution is the best way to bring a wider understanding of its provisions. The 1970 Constitution is a complex document written in formal and legal language not readily understood by even well-read laymen. Moreover, it does not readily lend itself to translation into the Fijian and Hindi language forms.²⁵

More so than any other public statement, this admission revealed the elite nature of Fiji's political culture, which eschewed any substantive public ratification of its own national constitution. The CRC aversion to popular scrutiny of the island Constitution undermines its own legitimacy and, furthermore, tends to mystify the document, transforming it into a legal mantra to be recited by barristers on behalf of their political clients. Though the CRC agreed that its report should be translated into a number of languages with a colloquial explanation of its constitutional recommendations, the limited number of copies made available (some six hundred in all) revealed a lack of commitment by Fiji's political elite to popular input. Yet, to reiterate, the principle of legitimacy encompasses both substance and process, which cannot be divorced.

During the entire crisis, the governor-general was fully aware of the necessity of preserving what precarious legitimacy was left, not only under the independence Constitution, but also as the Queen's representative. Though the army possessed almost total power, it lacked legitimacy and, moreover, like the governor-general, it owed allegiance directly to the Queen, a fact that had considerable psychological value.²⁶ The process of constitutional revision, though less than thorough, was considerably more broad-based than that which had occurred during the preindependence negotiations. Hearings were held and some eight hundred public submissions, oral and written, were accepted from the major social constituencies, particularly the Great Council of Chiefs, the provincial councils, professional organizations, the Roman Catholic and Methodist churches, the deposed Bavadra gov-

ernment, and Muslim, Sikh, Gujerati, and Girit associations. Given the prevailing influence of *tauvei* interests upon the sixteen-member CRC, the fundamental question of adequate representativeness and impartiality always remained a serious challenge to the committee's legitimacy. It does not seem unreasonable to assert that the CRC's purpose was merely to arrive at some consensus as to the means by which the paramountcy of *tauvei* interests was to be constitutionally assured. In total, while the process of constitutional review possessed ostensible qualities of popular input, the assumptions under which the process was conducted negated any viable claim to complete legitimacy under any cognizable standard embraced by constitutional ideology. The end result of such events and circumstances has been the almost total breakdown of consociational pluralism in Fiji.

To summarize, the importance of constitutional ideology lies primarily in the self-declaration, acknowledged by popular consensus, that the constitution itself forms the basis and source of all lawful power and authority, even to the extent that it may determine the continuing validity of traditional institutions. Constitutions formalize and structure power in the form of institutions, which act as the organs of state authority. Above all, constitutionalism, in this context, derives its legitimacy from a representative vote that justifies the existence of the nation-state itself on a periodic basis. The electoral system is an institutional control mechanism, a process whereby political elites are made aware of popular sentiment and the people themselves are reminded of their own sovereignty. Though policies or personalities may remain unchanged, elections provide a means whereby they at least may be debated. It is, therefore, not surprising that Ganilau's sense of urgency in his postcoup agenda was directed toward an electoral termination of military rule. Elections, at the very least, serve to terminate popular polemics about political issues.

On its own terms constitutionalism directly competes with, if not subordinates, traditional notions of authority. It is therefore not difficult to understand why the 1970 Fiji Constitution failed after seventeen years--the foundations of its formulation and existence failed to incorporate the fundamental features of constitutional ideology previously mentioned. It would not be unfair to suggest that the independence Constitution was considered by the party elites to be an agreement of the moment to resolve the political issues of the day, rather than a perpetual yet evolving instrument of governance. This particular notion has been especially evident in parliamentary debates where political questions were argued in the light of what was agreed upon by the personalities

during the constitutional conferences rather than upon an interpretation of the words of the Constitution itself.²⁷ Moreover, Fiji has never developed a catalogue of national independence symbols aside from those inherited from British institutions. While this failure may not be peculiar to Fiji, it is an important indication that social and political integration has been limited or nonexistent.

The Ideology of Taukei Paramountcy

The stridency inherent in the paramountcy of *taukei* interests and Whitehall's lack of leadership enthusiasm were at the very beginning never subordinated to the principles of constitutional ideology. Rather, these elements were negotiated into the political background in the justified hope of attaining more urgent short-term objectives. The process, when taken as a whole, severely compromised the legitimacy of the independence Constitution.²⁸

What is especially remarkable about post-May 14 events was the almost ritual necessity of constitutionalizing the paramountcy of *taukei* interests through the ostensibly legitimating proposals of the governor-general. This may be an indication of generalized ambivalence, precipitated in part by the influence of island barristers and Queen's counsels as well as by the realization that *taukei* interests could only be actualized through the institutions of state power as set forth in the national constitution. For many *taukei*, Fiji's sovereignty meant *taukei* sovereignty, whose legal ancestor was the Deed of Cession. This important notion, though argued during the constitutional debates in London and Fiji, was treated as a peripheral idea and consigned to the independence Constitution's preamble. The logic of living continuity imparted to the Deed of Cession by many *taukei* had been largely overlooked by Whitehall and island elites. Whether the Deed of Cession had any constitutional significance in the postcolonial legal regime has never been adequately resolved. The dilemma posed by the coup was whether *taukei* institutions should be safely disengaged from the machinery of state, which by its definition would incorporate non-*taukei* constituents, or whether *taukei* domination of state instrumentalities would itself assure institutional paramountcy as a matter of course.

Transformations in Elite Organization

The political history of Fiji has been largely determined by the actions of its elites, which today may be arbitrarily categorized into traditional

and nontraditional systems. Though there is considerable overlap between these two systems, both have separate, distinct, and often antagonistic histories. It is argued here that the May 14 coup was largely the result of long-standing tension between the traditional and nontraditional elite systems. Following a seventeen-year hiatus, the two elite systems would confront each other for institutional supremacy in the islands during much of 1987.

The British colonial administration followed the paradigm of "indirect rule" with the creation of the Fijian Administration in 1875. This separate, but not necessarily autonomous, bureaucratic hierarchy was entrusted to the custody of the paramount chiefs and their subordinate nobility. Seemingly from the outset, the ideological conflict between the privileges of rank and the principles of administrative responsibility occasionally muddled the legitimacy of the Fijian Administration from a colonial point of view.²⁹ The inclination of many chiefs to assume that their administrative position was due to personal rank rather than to executive discretion was an ongoing issue, continuing to this day. The Fijian Administration, however, did institutionalize the ruling chiefs into a traditional elite system.³⁰

With the approach of greater home rule for the islands, a shift in emphasis toward political parties eroded the supremacy of the Fijian Administration in *taukey* affairs. With the contemplated transfer of power the necessity of political parties, operating on the Westminster model, created the very real probability that a new, nontraditional system of elites would govern an independent Fiji. Mara himself considered the origin of party politics to have begun with the "sugar politics" of 1959.³¹ This suggests that he did not consider the Fijian Association, formed in 1956, to be a true political party, but rather, as others have suggested, merely a populist arm of the Fijian Administration that had become aware of Indo-Fijian pressures for fundamental political change.³² Once Britain announced forthcoming constitutional change, members of the Fijian Affairs Board (the executive arm of the Fijian Administration, which included Mara, Ganilau, J. N. Falvey, and Ratu George Cakobau) issued the famous Wakaya Letter to Colonial Office officials. The 1965 letter set forth the *taukey* position on constitutional change and also asserted the primacy of the Fijian Administration in the *taukey* affairs and political action:

It is the Fijian view that the possibility of severance of this link [Deed of Cession] with the Crown--a link forged in the spirit of mutual trust and good will--should never be contemplated. . . .

We propose a new constitutional instrument which would embody this understanding of the relationship and would make provision for the safeguarding of Fijian interests, building on and strengthening the spirit and substance of the Deed of Cession. There would have to be precise re-statement of the guarantees on Fijian land ownership. . . .

The provisions in the Fijian Affairs Ordinance that all legislation should be referred to the Fijian Affairs Board or, on the recommendation of the Board to the Council of Chiefs, should be retained.³³

The position of the Fijian Administration in such matters, however, could not be assured if the *tauvei* themselves were granted suffrage rights, as had occurred in 1963. Direct election of *tauvei* political leaders thus undermined the primacy of the Fijian Administration even prior to independence. The Fijian Administration, moreover, had come under considerable expatriate criticism. The Burns Commission of 1959 expressed dismay toward Fijian Administration operations at the district and village levels and its authority to impose taxes, albeit on the *tauvei* alone. This was especially important in view of the commission's tendency to consider the Fijian Administration as an "almost independent government." Almost at the same time, the Spate Report characterized the Fijian Administration as "to a large extent a state within a State."³⁴

The Burns Commission noted it had "been informed that the absorption of the Fijian Administration into a multi-racial local government organisation would mean consequent loss of racial identity, custom and culture to the Fijian. We consider that customs and culture are of their essence changeable, and that those which are truly alive and viable will survive. . . . We have in fact, received many recommendations from witnesses (especially Fijians) for the immediate abolition of the Fijian Administration, which is said to be inefficient and an unnecessary expense."³⁵ The commission recommended that, under such circumstances together with fiscal considerations, the Fijian Administration should be abolished and absorbed into the bureaucracy. A more critical 1964 academic evaluation stressed that

my data and arguments support the view that the Fijian Administration is archaic and operating in a world of unreality, and that it is a major factor holding back the development of the Fijian people. . . .

The atmosphere is one of internal discussion and debate

between administrative officials, which in fact it is. In no sense is it 'the people' arriving at a policy which its appointed officials must carry out; in fact the officials are not appointed by the [Provincial] Councils and are not legally responsible to it, but to the Fijian Affairs Board or to the substantive department of Government. Nevertheless, the officials legislate an advisory policy, confusing the roles of legislators, technical advisers, and executive officers.³⁶

Expatriate criticism was based upon the belief that the administration's operation and existence were inimical to the state's ability to control the island economy through the formulation and application of government policy. The possibility that a large segment of Fiji's population, and an even greater portion of its natural resources, could have constitutional and statutory autonomy beyond direct parliamentary control was considered unacceptable by nation-state theorists. E. K. Fisk's 1971 study recapitulated such misgivings contained in the Burns Commission and Spate reports, that

this dual system of administration is clearly inappropriate to a modern dynamic economy in pursuit of a multiracial society. In fostering an outdated communal system divorced from the central government, the energies of the Fijian Administration have been diverted into political, administrative and communal matters. The administration has adopted a somewhat narrow and uncritical attitude towards the more immediate requirements of development, particularly at the village level. Above all, at a time when a major objective of development policy is the achievement of a multiracial society, the existence of a separate Fijian Administration accentuates the social and economic plurality of society and does nothing to channel the activities, interests and similar aspirations of the Fijians and Indians in the same direction to the greater mutual benefit of both races.³⁷

Such criticisms were not given serious consideration by *tauvei* policy-makers, though Fijian Administration control at the village and district levels declined progressively after statutory changes were initiated in 1966. In political terms, the heretofore inert Fijian Association suddenly assumed considerable importance. The decline of the Fijian Administration's direct influence over *tauvei* affairs and the rise of party politics among many *tauvei* were by no means coincidental. Rather, both circumstances are directly related and perhaps antagonistic developments.

In the changing Fijian political system, two major types of political leadership may be seen; one closely related with customary leadership and the other with modern associations such as trade unions. . . .

The established leaders are either government officials or chiefs; in either case their authority is closely related to traditional authority, which, at least in today's form, cannot be easily questioned from below. The emergent leaders, on the other hand, are a new *elite*, whose political importance has grown primarily out of the exigencies of the urban situation. They have risen from modern and more democratically-based associations, and are, therefore, dependent upon free elections for their authority as well as their continuance in leadership. They are leaders of organizations in which they must be responsive to their members, who may appoint or fire them as they please.

But while some friction has appeared between the two kinds of leaders, there is still a high degree of accord between them regarding issues concerning the political status and privileges of Fijians, as opposed to other peoples, throughout Fiji.³⁸

There was some concern among the paramount chiefs that the Fijian Association might usurp the functions not only of the Fijian Administration, but also of the Great Council of Chiefs. Only the adroit efforts of Mara allayed such reservations. The association, in a 1964 submission to colonial officials, reiterated the terms of the Wakaya Letter and added demands that only *tauvei* occupy the position of prime minister and, most important, hold a majority of seats in Parliament.³⁹ As long as the Fijian Association became the "lightning rod" of the communal roll debates, it would find the search for political legitimacy elusive. In the meantime, the Fijian Administration could maintain a discreet distance from politics while appearing to adhere to the standard of "responsible authoritarianism."⁴⁰

With the formation of the Alliance party in 1966, the scale of *tauvei* political action assumed an ostensible multiracial character. As a political organization, the Alliance party "was and remains a party of constituent structures, not a unitary body with a single membership at large. . . . In its formative stages, the Alliance thus followed a pattern of political parties that are created 'from the top' for the mutual satisfaction and joint interests of particular elites concerned to legitimise and maintain such interests under conditions of increasing electoral competition."⁴¹

The Alliance's subsequent victory in the 1966 election marked the

beginning of its parliamentary hegemony. The Westminster model, however, demands an Opposition. This key requirement structured the relationship between the Alliance and its National Federation party rival; the NFP and communal politics provided an adequate foundation for a Westminster-style parliamentary system. Although the NFP emerged from the tumultuous events of "sugar politics," the party came to be dominated by "lawyers and businessmen." Under the inaugural leadership of A. D. Patel, the NFP was concerned with the "ever present dangers of factionalism" and the necessity of having its "credibility as the dominant political voice of the Indian community fully endorsed."⁴² After Patel's death in 1969, the possibility of a consociational relationship between the NFP and the Alliance increased under the leadership of S. M. Koya. This relationship between political elites, however, was always premised upon the Alliance's assumption that the NFP would remain the minority party. As a general proposition, each party has been the reciprocal opposite of the other. Alliance leadership, under Mara, has been stable, if not entrenched. Its Indian Alliance and General Electors components have been relegated to unequivocally subordinate status to the Fijian Association component, though the rubric of multiracialism had always been political party doctrine. The main problem of the Alliance elites has been maintaining *tauvei* loyalty, especially under challenges made by the Fijian Nationalist Party and the Western United Front (WUF). In contrast, the NFP leadership, in spite of Koya's ability, has been beleaguered by internal factionalism. The NFP-WUF coalition victory in the 1977 elections was remarkable, yet the failure (or reluctance) of the party to nominate a prime minister to form a new government precipitated a political default to the Alliance.⁴³ The dominant electoral strategy has been for one political party to capitalize on division within the other.⁴⁴ Thus, the strength of political party elites--and indeed the legitimacy of the independence Constitution--has been tested periodically through the electoral process, which until 1987 had a preordained outcome.

The dynamics of party politics and electoral history have been discussed elsewhere in detail. To those aware of the less obvious though nonetheless cardinal permutations occurring within the more subtle sources of political power, the events of May 14 were not surprising. The emphasis here is upon the more obscure, though important, power groups and how they became chief actors during the institutional upheavals of mid-1987.

The Great Council of Chiefs has been the single most enduring remnant of the colonial era. While its origin is colonial, its purpose

and membership draw upon tradition for authority. Its legitimacy, therefore, has rested upon something more than colonial sufferance. Through more than a hundred years of existence, the council has guarded its advisory prerogatives on *tauvei* policy and expanded its membership to include *tauvei* parliamentary members, administrative officers, and provincial council officials through amendments to the Fijian Affairs Ordinance. Today, the council consists of some 154 members. In recent years, it has increased its meetings from once to twice a year, and during the period following the May 14 coup, the council met virtually *sine die* to consider policy recommendations from the military government. In the final analysis it, during this period, acted as a virtual parliamentary surrogate.

Politicization of the Fijian Administration

Historically the council's initial advisory role to the colonial governor expanded with the creation of the Fijian Administration. Though the council, under the 1970 Constitution, rendered its advisory input and eight senatorial nominees to the governor-general, the Fijian Affairs Board (chaired by the minister for Fijian affairs) acts as the executive arm of the council as well as the directorate for the entire Fijian Administration. During the post-World War II ministerial tenure of Ratu Sir J. L. V. Sukuna, the Fijian Administration underwent its first period of modernization. The words of Ratu Sukuna became its primary standing order:

. . . We can only be sure of our people continuing to follow us provided they appreciate that our authority is better than anyone else's, that as a result of our fore-thought and our energy they prosper--that is, when we cease to rely on status to see us through. . . . If we are merely decorative, our position is finished forever, we will soon be tossed aside when some other race rises to the fore. Chiefs, if we unanimously lay down a policy for all to follow, if we agree to select for the responsibility of administering provinces and tikina [districts] only those who are specifically qualified to do so through status and education, I have no doubt . . . we can achieve a lasting progress.⁴⁵

Ratu Sukuna's major reorganization of the Fijian Administration was the first since cession. Through his policies and speeches, he provided a modern rationale for its existence and functioning consistent with changing conditions in Fiji. As one observer noted:

It was the most important single source from which was derived the framework of ideas associated with 'building on traditional institutions', 'adaption', and change 'within the framework of traditional culture'. This is a powerful set of ideas in which the Fijians believe firmly. But it contains a basic contradiction in that one cannot change and preserve the same thing at the same time. Yet the very contradiction gives these ideas their appeal, for they provide an admirably ambiguous philosophy in terms of which the Fijians think they can resist change and yet embrace it, retain their culture and yet change their way of life, or again, simply take the middle of the road and either confidently or with resignation avoid the painful choice between change and preservation. . . .

It seems to me that one of the greatest obstacles facing the Fijians is the failure to recognize that there is a contradiction; they must now make the momentous choice between preserving and changing their 'way of life'.⁴⁶

The history of the Fijian Administration, particularly the Fijian Affairs Board, indicates that it has remained a virtual administrative province of the chiefs of the Koro Sea confederacies. It is a bureaucratic by-product of the political configuration that existed even prior to colonial rule. This reality emanates primarily from the power of key parliamentary offices. Since the prime minister appoints the minister for Fijian affairs, who in turn serves as the chairman not only of the Fijian Affairs Board, but also of the Great Council of Chiefs, the amount of political leverage in the Fijian Administration by the Fijian affairs minister is considerable. The minister, moreover, appoints fifteen members to the Great Council of Chiefs. Thus this ministerial portfolio is an administrative equivalent of political paramountcy over nearly half of the island population and its resources. This fact of politics has been fully appreciated by the chiefs of the Koro Sea confederacies. Since the debut of direct *tauvei* suffrage, the key political offices of prime minister, governor-general, minister for Fijian affairs, and membership on the Fijian Affairs Board have been monopolized for over twenty years by Ganilau (the Tui Cakau), Mara (the Tui Nayau), Ratu William and Ratu David Toganivalu (Bauan chiefs), and Ratu Sir George Cakobau (the Vunivalu of Bau), all of whom are high chiefs of Cakaudrove, Lau, or Bau provinces.

Today there is argument about whether Fiji should be divided into two or three major divisions based upon political alliances

of former days. In any case, the *matanitu* (confederacies) of Bau and Rewa are of independent status, Bau being recognized as superior. The 'Tovata' (the united states of Vanua Levu and Lau) are sometimes regarded as independent also, but at others as being part of the Bau confederacy. The significance of these arrangements today is that if political decisions or statements of policy affecting the whole of the Fijian people are made by a high chief of Rewa, or by him with one or more of the high chiefs of the *Tovata*, such decisions or statements will probably be supported by the whole of the Fijian people, because of a legitimacy based on the traditional political structure.⁴⁷

The administrative tradition of employing chiefs as bureaucratic officials is rooted in British colonial policy, which has lingered well into the postindependence period, especially with respect to the Fijian Administration.⁴⁸ A seminal postindependence study of *tauvei* leadership arrived at important conclusions on some of the inconsistencies between tradition-based leadership and administrative authority.

When traditional chiefs are also members of the Fijian Administration, they are to some extent set apart from their people, while their role as 'also of them' is not entirely lost. In such a situation they too are regarded with ambivalence, for although they are chiefs and therefore leaders, they are also officials and therefore bureaucrats. Criticisms made against the administration are also made against them as a class; we hear people say '*O ira qa na turaga era tabaki keda sobu tiko*' (only the chiefs are pressing us down). People cannot always look with absolute consistency to them or to the Fijian Administration for leadership. The Fijian Administration is, in part, a bureaucracy and, in part, a system for Fijian political representation. It does not involve 'real' political leadership. Such 'leadership' as it does provide is that of a benevolent autocracy, relying heavily on the legitimacy traditionally accorded to chiefs.⁴⁹

The influence on party politics by these chiefly personalities, though less than in the Fijian Administration, has been considerable. Thus control over the Alliance party as a means of control over Parliament has been the primary means of assuring the continued personal dominance of the Fijian Administration by this coterie of chiefs from eastern Fiji. As early as 1944 under the Fijian Affairs Ordinance, the reconstitution of the former Native Regulations Board into the Fijian Affairs Board was sta-

tutorily effected for the purpose of improving the relationship between the colonial bureaucracy and the Great Council of Chiefs. Such reorganization, if nothing else, has provided another forum from which chiefly power can be wielded in bureaucratic fashion. This particular political reality, of course, has not gone unnoticed, especially by those who have been less subservient to chiefly hegemony. During the course of parliamentary debates, trade unionist Apisai Tora of the Western Division, whose political career has been noted more for longevity than loyalty, candidly remarked:

Let me . . . speak for the silent majority of Fijians who come under the category of *na kai yasaysa vakaRa* (people of the western provinces), who suffer in silence at the heavy-handedness in the one-sided distribution of power . . . political-wise and otherwise in this country, as has been the policy of Fijian leadership and its predecessors, namely the British Colonial Administration, since the time of the great Fijian nationalist from the Western Division, Apolosi R. Nawai. . . . There is heavy suspicion amongst us Fijians . . . that we have been . . . and still are, the victims of nepotism and a conspiracy by at least three groups of people in this country, where the main stream of Fijian leadership are mainly drawn from, namely, the Confederacy of Kubuna in Tailevu and from the Confederacy of Tovata in Lau and Cakaudrove, and slightly from Burebasaga in Rewa, and probably one or two others but definitely not from the Western Division.⁵⁰

In another instance, the outspoken Butadroka, during debate on a Motion of Confidence in the Alliance party, seized the opportunity to inveigh against the paramount chiefs of eastern Fiji: "It is a *tovata* Government. The two Fijian Members from the Western Division where most of the economy of this country is derived from, only one became an Assistant Minister, the other is not. They own land where most hotels are built, sugar industry and gold industry and nearly every economic development of the country depended on the Western area. . . . Is this a Fijian Government?"⁵¹ This theme was articulated again by Butadroka in 1982 on the retirement of Governor-General Ratu Cakobau. The FNP leader urged that Burebasaga chief Ratu Mosese Tuisawau be appointed his successor in order that all three confederacies be accorded equal recognition.⁵² While the question of Tovata domination of status positions in government has generally been ignored by most commenta-

tors, it nonetheless has been a fundamental consideration in *taukei* politics, not only because of its historical implications, but also as an explanation of eastern political domination over the economic resources of western provinces.

In 1966, an effort was initiated in the Legislative Council to amend the Fijian Affairs Ordinance to eliminate the district and village level organization and consolidate the functions of the provincial councils. The motive for the reorganization, admitted almost twenty years later, was a decline in the Fijian Administration's finances due to inefficiencies and provincial rate evasion by many Fijians. Though the amendment passed, debate over the measure reflected non-*taukei* opposition to the Fijian Administration itself. Koya argued:

I will be quite blunt; in my view, the dual system of government in this colony is an anachronism. The sooner we abolish it the better. . . . If we look at the present Bill it is nothing in substance but a repetition of the old system. You are still going to have your Council of Chiefs with the power to recommend; you are still going to have the Fijian Affairs Board, which in my humble opinion amounts to an official political party in this colony recognized not only by this Legislature but perhaps His Excellency the Governor and the Government in the United Kingdom. . . . Their activities are not confined merely to help and better the conditions of the Fijian people socially or economically. They go into the area of politics too.⁵³

Since 1967, however, the Fijian Administration has declined due to fading control over district and village level councils and still-falling revenues. The Great Council of Chiefs became increasingly concerned about the general state of affairs and began asserting its identity in parliamentary politics. Once this occurred, potential institutional conflict with Parliament increased. Non-*taukei* members of Parliament harbored particular reservations about the council, which debated entirely in Fijian and acted on matters affecting all *taukei* without direct accountability to any constituency. This parliamentary attitude became most apparent during Senate debate on a resolution petitioning travel funds for the council to investigate electoral systems in other Pacific nations. The measure was defeated because its opponents argued successfully that such activities were not in the purview of the council and, further, that many council members were also parliamentarians who could undertake such a mission in their legislative capacities.⁵⁴

Taukei Challenge to the Constitution

Perhaps the most aggressive display of direct political involvement by the council was the 1982 Bau Resolution. In a belated reaction to the parliamentary elections that had restored the Alliance to a precarious majority, the council opened its annual meeting to media coverage. There, council members inveighed against Opposition criticism of certain paramount chiefs during the electoral campaign as having been highly disrespectful. Then the council passed a resolution demanding that two-thirds of the House seats be reserved for *taukei* as well as the offices of prime minister and governor-general.⁵⁵ Though Mara and his cabinet ministers abstained, the resolution was the first open indication that the council was beginning to reassert a direct political presence in national affairs, and also revealed a general apprehension among some of its members that the Alliance party was losing control of the government. Though Mara repudiated the Bau Resolution, the Opposition challenged his commitment to the Alliance's multiracial policies. The Bau Resolution was a clear instance where Mara, as a senior parliamentarian and a paramount chief, had difficulty in reconciling his traditional and modern roles in the face of controversy.⁵⁶

The significance of the Bau Resolution lay in its plea for changes in the 1970 Constitution to guarantee the paramountcy of *taukei* interests. It was the initial but firm indication of the *taukei* elite's lack of confidence in the existing electoral system, which placed such paramountcy at periodic risk, as demonstrated in the wake of the 1977 and 1982 general elections. Butadroka, in his own nonconforming manner, had offered his particular, but not necessarily inaccurate, evaluation of *taukei* reaction to the momentous 1977 election:

The Fijians thought all along that the Fijians would always become Governor-General, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Fijian Affairs et cetera. But when we [FNP] in one of our circulars showed that this was not the case . . . the Fijians then woke up. . . . The Fijian Association through the ex-Ambassador to the United Nations, Semesa Siki-vou, translated and argued our points in the Fijian Vernacular paper, *Nai Lalakai*. . . . [The Alliance] worried, because they later realised that what they were hiding in the Constitution were now forced out. That is the reason why I said, Sir, that the appointment of the minority [Alliance] Government was done deliberately in order to hide the . . . mistake done at the London Constitutional Conference.⁵⁷

The lengthy 1982 speech of Alliance backbencher K. S. Qiqiwaqa, made a few weeks after passage of the Bau Resolution, proved to be an adequate summary as well as a political prophecy.

We have just turned our backs on a most gruelling and hotly-contested General Elections, and if what happened then are indications of things to come, then it behooves everyone of us in this House to think very seriously about the future. . . . There is a definite need to a review and indeed a revision of the Constitution of Fiji. . . . The present Constitution is, to me, a recipe for a caretaker government. It is a recipe for the continuation of the Government that ruled Fiji during the colonial days. It is first and foremost non-racial. . . .

Understandably, all Fijians with nationalistic leanings are now questioning the wisdom of our leaders' agreeing to the adoption of this Constitution; but on analysis, however, I have come to the conclusion that the British Government had no option but to provide us with this Constitution, knowing fully well that to devise a constitution with "race" as its principal philosophical determinant will be up for serious questioning once the main races become conscious of their respective rights, privileges and power.

I must admit, however, that the present Constitution with its built-in systems of checks and balances is a masterpiece of political balancing act. . . . As I see it, the end of the road of the present Constitution is here. The events of the last General Election (and that of 1977) were and are indicative of this. There are definite signs of (and the hardening of) processes towards polarisation. . . . I personally feel that this Constitution poses a real threat to the long-term peaceful and orderly progress of Fiji as a whole; and to persist in adopting it would destroy democracy; to persist in it would lead to dictatorship; to persist in it would create political fanatics; to persist in it would lead to perpetual political stalemate and instability; to persist in it would titillate the palates of those susceptible to political bribery and corruption; and to persist in it would result in the permanent partitioning of Fiji into racial groupings of conflicting interests. . . . and I believe . . . a constitution that recognises and protects the Fijians' vested interest will in the long run be beneficial to Fiji as a whole. . . .

The Fijians have accepted their subservient role in the socio-economic sphere with grace, but judging from their reaction to

the last General Election, they are jealously watchful over their right to political dominance in Fiji. . . . Their reaction to being let down by some at the last General Election was so unusually and surprisingly violent that one would have thought that the Alliance Party had lost the election. . . . In the interest of Fiji, let us open dialogues on the Constitution.⁵⁸

Such movement by *tauvei* proponents of substantive constitutional changes was a manifestation of changes within the Great Council, stimulated largely by nontraditional elites who had been gradually incorporated into the council via the Fijian Administration; as a new *tauvei* constituency, this segment was keenly interested in making national civil service an issue to be included as a *tauvei* interest, the paramountcy of which could only be assured through constitutional amendments.⁵⁹ The Alliance in general and Mara in particular were not prepared to implement the general will of the council in Parliament, for that would jeopardize the multiracial structure of the party and also concede Mara's (and Ganilau's) titular and political leadership in both legislative affairs and the Fijian Administration. Yet it had become clear that expansion of the advisory functions of the council was, to a very large extent, a reflection of changes occurring within its membership. The council, journalist Robert Keith-Reid remarked, "is no longer the exclusive preserve of chiefs. Many of its present members are people who have won a place at its meetings not as an inherited privilege, but because of their own abilities and drive or because of their election to office by political processes far removed from the old Fijian way of choosing leaders. . . . However, with improvements in transport, communications [and] education, and with the exposure of commoners to ideas and doings in the towns, where the new breed of Fijian leader is a trade union leader, lawyer, or university educated young man with no chiefly background to help him on his way, the power of the traditional chief is under attack."⁶⁰

In 1983, the council seized the initiative in attempting to revitalize the Fijian Administration at the district and village levels. It commissioned the Honolulu-based Pacific Islands Development Program, an arm of the U.S. State Department-sponsored East-West Center, to review the Fijian provincial administration and to assist the Fijian Affairs Board in making recommendations accordingly. Consultation with administrators and village residents during a three-month period yielded the "Cole Report," recommending that the village and district level councils be reinstated and reorganized in a manner consistent with

rural finance and development planning. The Fijian court system, moreover, should be reinstated and empowered to enforce the administrative rules of the Fijian Administration. Submitted to the Great Council of Chiefs in early November 1984, the report's recommendations were approved for implementation.⁶¹ The report, in effect, was the charter for a reorganization of the Fijian Administration based upon the Sukuna model and for direct control over district and village level activities. It was, in essence, a restoration of the "state within a state" and an attempt to lay the foundation for future political mobilization of the *tauvei* electorate, as well as a prelude to council challenges to the 1970 Constitution. The Great Council of Chiefs was adjusting its own political agenda to conform with the provisions of the Bau Resolution.

The Militarization of the State Bureaucracy

It is important to note that subtle, yet substantive changes were occurring in the middle-level bureaucracy of the Fijian Administration. A considerable number of *tauvei* retirees from the British Army were returning to Fiji. Many of them began to seek second careers in the deteriorating Fijian Administration. Their presence in the administrative ranks was no doubt in part responsible for the reorganization initiatives, since expansion of the Fijian Administration was only possible at the district and village levels. In early 1985, Opposition House member J. V. Smith expressed dismay at the "militarisation" of the district administration by such retirees.⁶²

The influence of returning retirees in newly independent states is an important social development. While their individual experiences abroad tend to expand their capabilities and knowledge, their suddenly retired status, often at a comparatively young age, stimulates an interest in politics and a second career in the state bureaucracy. The 1963 coup in Togo, for example, was precipitated by returning veterans from the demobilized African regiments in the French Army following the end of the Algerian war. In that case the small west African state could not absorb them into the national army or the state bureaucracy and then had to contend with them in a violent seizure of the government. Quite often, however, returning servicemen are seen as suitable candidates for lower-level positions, often at the local levels of the bureaucracy. Fiji has not been a notable exception to this characteristic of colonial rule. It is important to underscore that young military retirees often become influential in both social and political institutions. A long period of military service generally provides a suitable background for

the development of common symbols and aspirations on various political and social issues. To the extent that such characteristics apply to veterans, they may assume all the characteristics of a distinct social group, if not a social class. In Fiji, members of this new constituency would make their presence known after the May 14 coup.

The institution of standing armies is a European concept, extended to other areas by colonial policies. A problem emerges when the colonial power transfers power to a new state, leaving in its wake an active military infrastructure that retains many of its former colonial characteristics. This aspect becomes increasingly problematic when the possibilities of internal social, political, and economic conflict remain unresolved.

In fact, the removal of the colonial power, which had so often promoted ethnic divisions and rivalries as part of the strategy of divide and rule, left behind a crippling legacy of intergroup tensions and communal mistrust. The uneven development of different regions, different education policies that had favored particular ethnic and tribal groups, merchant minorities that had been introduced to fill the intermediary commercial and bureaucratic roles in the colonial economy, and the selection of so-called "martial races" to monopolize the military and policy functions . . . combined to place an ethnic curse on so many postcolonial regimes.⁶³

The Royal Fiji Military Forces has been the most dynamic, yet least known, segment of institutionalized power in Fiji. From a seven hundred-man force in 1975, the R.F.M.F. has now grown to nearly two thousand, with possibilities of further expansion to a five thousand-man force complete with more sophisticated hardware.⁶⁴ Yet like all colonial period by-products, the R. EM. F. has not escaped the politics of communalism since its rank and file is over 90 percent *tauvei*. As an arm of government, it is seen by many *tauvei* not only as a prestige occupation, but also as a primary provider of unskilled employment. The military in newly independent states often attracts recruits from aspiring social groups who are prepared to expose themselves to the physical rigors of military life because it is an assured means of social mobility. The career process for such individuals, even in a hierarchial society, is less likely to be affected by their humble social origins: "Among the Fijians themselves, new relationships had been acquired during service in the army. Local and tribal prejudices were broken down and friendly relation-

ships extended. The once localised chiefs who had become officers in the army extended their influence and were respected in other areas where men who served under them lived. Those who did not have traditional chiefly titles assumed new status by still being referred to by their rank in the army."⁶⁵

The armed forces, as a latent source of *tauvei* power, have always been seen by Indo-Fijian elites as problematic. The 1977 remarks of parliamentarian Irene Jai Narayan on behalf of the NFP were a reflection of such controlled apprehension:

. . . it has always been the considered view of my Party that the composition of the Fiji Military Forces should broadly reflect the racial composition of our population. When this matter was first raised in the Legislative Council in 1966 by the Opposition, the Rt Honourable the Prime Minister had given the assurance that the recruitment into the forces would be considered as a matter [but] was neither raised here nor in London. Some years after independence many of us began to feel strongly that a definite policy for recruiting Indians into the army must be formulated. And even, as it is stated in the Constitution that the policy of the Public Service Commission should be to ensure that each community in Fiji receives fair treatment in the number and distribution of officers . . . the same policy should be to adopt a policy of parity in regard to the recruitment of the Fiji Military Forces.

In 1972 when I had raised this subject on the floor of this House, the late honourable Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau [Home Affairs Minister] assured the House that the recruitment to the army was not discriminatory in any respect but as many Indians did not apply for recruitment only a few were selected. We believe that if they do not apply in sufficient numbers, they should be encouraged to do so.

. . . the preponderance of one racial group in the army may be harmful to the public interest because members of that racial group which is inadequately represented may have little faith in the impartiality of the Forces and may perhaps even fear them.⁶⁶

Since that time, it appears that the Home Affairs Ministry has incorporated a policy of attracting *tauvei* school-leavers into the ranks as a means of promoting both employment and rural development.⁶⁷

Recruitment practices tend to set the framework for future policies. Indications presently suggest that coup leader Brig. Rabuka himself has taken a personal interest in recruiting select groups of *tauvei* in a paradigm resembling British colonial practice. In a recent tour of the northern Lau Islands, perhaps Fiji's most remote constituency, Rabuka addressed Mualevu villagers, offering ten billets for recruits. He was reported to have said that the men "possessed skills which could be used to improve the economy of their village" and urged parents to "consider ways and means of making use of youth manpower." After completion of their military training, Rabuka suggested, recruits should return to their village, rather than remain away as apparently has been the case with others.⁶⁸

The personnel composition of government agencies is difficult to alter since public servants are apt to be career-oriented and hence their employment may span twenty- or thirty-year periods. Once heavy recruitment of favored ethnic groups begins, it is likely to continue since the criteria may be framed to replicate the desired results earlier deemed to be objective in nature. In an ethnically divided country, the politicization of the military may be the direct result of military-politician cooperation, producing a patron-client relationship between the armed forces and key ministers and parliamentarians: "Jobs in the ordinary rank and file of the military can be politically valuable in periods of high unemployment. . . . In ethnically skewed governments, such politicization can also intensify pressures to preserve the existing state-sanctioned communal distribution of power."⁶⁹

Consequently, when the Bavadra coalition reiterated Narayan's insistence on racial balance in the military, the R.F.M.F. replied that the percentage of Indo-Fijians entering military service was minimal to negligible, that those who were recruited would leave prior to the completion of training, and that to change training policies to encourage racial balancing "would be detrimental to the professionalism of the force in general."⁷⁰ Unlike the state of Fiji, the R.F.M.F. had resisted its own independence from colonial policies in a manner consistent with the attitudes of Fiji's political elites. As with almost every government agency, the institutional instinct for self-preservation applied to the Fiji military. In a 1985 Labour party manifesto, Bavadra had promised, "Something should also be done about the Fijian military. Our army is in danger of becoming little more than a band of mercenaries. . . . We must see to it that our military serves our needs and not those of others. In this regard, we must be particularly mindful that we can pay for it ourselves and especially the pensions."⁷¹

Given the preexisting facts, the R.F.M.F. had a direct interest in the outcome of the April 1987 elections beyond a mere change in government. Though the general policies of standing armies are directed to the security of the state, military forces that are dominated by a single ethnic group are apt to focus their loyalties upon the political destiny of that group. Such sentiments, however, occasionally take political form and, in doing so, create a dilemma. Political activity among military personnel tends to precipitate internal organizational deterioration. Military involvement in national politics extends that same deterioration to the state itself. Bavadra's statement indicated a lack of awareness that the army, like its counterparts in the civil service, would react to protect its privileges. The R.F.M.F., as a distinct corporate group, was an armed bureaucracy, capable of direct action if its patron political party could no longer maintain parliamentary hegemony.

The Fijian army, as with other former colonial military forces, is also part of a greater system existing beyond the boundaries of individual nation-states. This system consists of arms standards, warfare doctrine, and institutionalized training devoted to specific purposes, namely the monopolization of technological force that, in its total sum, transcends national boundaries and ideologies. Such relationships, though modified at independence, are occasionally maintained with little or no attention to indoctrinating institutional loyalty to the newly created state. The transfer of political power does not automatically mean the transfer of military loyalties to the independent state, especially when the armed forces played no significant role in any independence movement. In Fiji's case, army loyalties generally were directed to both the Crown and the paramount chiefs, rather than to Fiji and its constitution.⁷²

Taukei domination of the military rank and file, moreover, is perhaps the most salient evidence of the failure of both the colonial and postcolonial governments to engage in substantive nation-building. Military recruitment is a primary index on how far a particular nation, especially one with pluralistic features, has developed a sense of national unity and citizenship. Popular participation, on a voluntary basis, in the military functions as one of the rights of citizenship. Popular representation in the military is therefore a primary indication of the legitimacy of the armed forces as an institution of the state.⁷³

Formal analyses of military governments in Africa and Latin America suggest that such regimes may actually be an impetus for "modernization."⁷⁴ Another analysis, to the contrary, argues that soldiers as bureaucrats may be forces for "political retraditionalizing" of govern-

ment, as readily seen in East Africa.⁷⁵ This hypothesis may be applicable in circumstances where ethnic differences tend to be institutionalized and specialized along ethnocratic lines. The very constitution of the nation-state may lend political and legal legitimacy to such institutions, thereby creating inherent inequalities and disequilibrium in the distribution of political resources and attainment of political goals. In this context, military forces--especially those that have been ethnocratically institutionalized--readily assume that rivalry with other ethnic groups is part of a continuing process that legitimately incorporates economic dimensions as well.⁷⁶ Such an outlook may have originated in traditional political strategies where an aggressive warrior tradition existed and functioned as a means of subduing economic institutions to the political control of a single chief or kin group. Military regimes with such histories and under such circumstances may very well attempt to revive such traditional political strategies and "retraditionalize" the existing political configuration of the state. In short, the monopolization of force may be used by such military regimes as a means of dominating internal activities that have economic significance. The peculiar matrix that may be established under such circumstances is one in which military governments seek to transform themselves from those who control the means of destruction to those who control the means of production.⁷⁷ The process of such transformation is a part of a more generalized change. It is this transformation that seems to be occurring in Fiji, albeit with its own peculiarities, as manifested later in the process that formulated the proposed terms and conditions of Fiji's second constitution.

One of the major problems for military regimes is how to manage power once it has been obtained. Rabuka, just a few days before the "second coup" on September 28, studied the plan for a caretaker government and reiterated his disengagement policies: "I believe that we are still duty-bound to make sure that whatever course of action is taken will achieve the aim of the coup. The minimum of that is a demand made by the Great Council of Chiefs that changes to the Constitution would ensure that the interests of the Fijians in their own country are guaranteed in perpetuity within the Constitution, not only their political control but also their economic interests. . . ." ⁷⁸

Attempts to reach a political compromise between Mara and Bavadra had culminated in the Deuba Accords, which would have provided a caretaker government until constitutional revisions had been completed and a return to parliamentary rule concluded. The terms of the Deuba Accords, however, failed to satisfy Rabuka. His dissolution of the civil

administration under the governor-general was a prelude to his declaration of Fiji as an independent republic.⁷⁹ His candid explanation of this dramatic and seemingly irreversible act was interrelated with his policy of eventual military disengagement from government.

I made a statement . . . that I had been monitoring the progress of the tripartite talks at Deuba between the two political groupings and the Governor-General. . . . When I looked at the progress I realised that even the Governor-General himself had been influenced. . . . When I looked at this Interim Government or Caretaker or Council of State, I realised that they would have the [Labour/NFP] Coalition having equal numbers as the Alliance Party and the Governor-General would have his own input. . . . If now we allow the Coalition group to come in then the chances of achieving my coup objectives were really nil. That is why I had to re-exert military authority yesterday.⁸⁰

Under the authority of the new Fiji republic, Ganilau as president granted all coup participants an unconditional pardon in January 1988.⁸¹ Thus, the prevailing pattern of military disengagement had been nearly completed. All that remained were the finalization of the republic's constitution and the reinstatement of parliamentary rule. While administering a government by decree is an efficient method, it is necessary for the military regime to press the return to parliamentary government with dispatch. For purposes of setting long-term policies a "neo-administrative state," a mode of government in which the army and bureaucracy determine and implement policy, is not competent to structure ongoing commitments. Rabuka has adopted such a mode of governance until the return to parliamentary rule is completed. In the process of establishing the Fiji republic, Rabuka opposed the idea of having an interim constitution.⁸² Indications, however, are that Rabuka has an undisclosed agenda that he intends to complete prior to disengagement and return to parliamentary rule. His timetable for military government was at least one year, with a possible extension to two additional years. More importantly, Rabuka was not certain or concerned as to how any forthcoming constitution would be implemented. During the interim, the military and the bureaucracy would continue to enact legislation by decree.

Though military doctrine incorporates group discipline as a policy of control, such strategies may be ill-suited to the management of politics

and bureaucracy once entrusted to civil administration. Military officers, unlike their civilian counterparts, have little of the bargaining skills necessary for effecting political decisions and compromises. Political culture--and Fiji's is no exception--is a process of continual bargaining among its participants.⁸³ Rabuka's method of integrating the military's role into civilian government has been to incorporate the Home Affairs Ministry's long-standing policy at a higher level of involvement. In an effort to stimulate economic development within its capabilities, the army has become involved with "large-scale farming for soldiers and commercial fishing for sailors."⁸⁴ Various schemes involving purchase of freehold land from Carpenters Fiji Ltd. and Burns Philp have been initiated.⁸⁵ As with other political endeavors, the necessity of legitimating the military's sudden intrusion into civilian affairs has followed a model not unlike similar regimes elsewhere. As noted previously, an army, once it has seized power, is often called upon to give direction to the economic system. While the possibilities for success in this respect depend on the training and material capabilities of the armed forces, the potential of the military to initiate long-range economic planning over a broad range of wealth-producing activities is normally quite limited or, at least, too specialized. Military skills and experience, furthermore, are not directly transferable to large-scale organizational cadres such as a state bureaucracy.⁸⁶ Yet the very idea of military direction of state policy gives the regime some sense of legitimacy or at least the hope of achieving it. Such developments were best summarized in a Nausori address by Rabuka to the R.F.M.F. Sixth Battalion wherein he declared, "You are the government. The present government will be glorified or criticised over how you perform."⁸⁷

The R.F.M.F., as with its African counterparts, may be considered a unique class unto itself. In some social settings, recruitment into the army is preferred over formal education. Furthermore, rugby and respect for social superiors are coherent aptitudes among many *tauvei* that have suitable military application and social value. Hence military service becomes particularly attractive because its social and economic benefits accrue social recognition similar to other elite professions.

Rabuka admitted that he had formulated a policy for military involvement in civil affairs while attending the Indian Defence Staff College in 1979: "It was there that I wrote a thesis on the role of the military forces in the socio-economic development of nations. As part of the thesis I studied coups in various African and Latin American states, It reinforced my belief that the Royal Fiji Military Forces could have a very active part to play in the socio-economic development of Fiji."⁸⁸

The Politicization of Class

A major consideration in the political culture of any parliamentary government is how electoral outcomes are influenced by changes in the domestic economy. Such characteristics generally indicate the growing presence of class interests, which are rooted in the market economy. As discussed previously, the military in this context may be forthrightly considered as one such category in the midst of others. For my purposes here, a class is defined as a social and economic category that results when a group feels and articulates that its common interests are different from, if not opposed to, those of others.⁸⁹ The 1987 elections were an unequivocal expression of increasing class development in Fiji and its incipient significance in island political life, thus complicating the existing dichotomy of the Fiji political configuration. The displacement of loyalties based upon ethnicity to those based upon class interests jeopardized the prevailing political strategies of the ruling elites. The emphasis here is not upon the dynamics of island class formation, but rather on the way class, like ethnicity, has become politicized and taken into serious constitutional consideration in the postcoup period. Contemporary commentaries, with good reason, have tended to stress ethnicity as a dominant feature of the island political landscape. The statistical results of periodic elections have value beyond their ostensible worth because the communal roll makes this politicization of ethnicity quantifiable. Class formation, however, is more elusive, though no less important in the modernization process in developing areas.⁹⁰

The existence of class-based interest groups, as a factor in political and social action, needs to be emphasized as a major feature of recent Fijian history unobscured by the dominance of ethnic issues. There is reason to believe that ethnicity as a political issue is often used to conceal status group dominance of intra-ethnic relations.⁹¹ As an elusive social and economic phenomenon, appropriating a workable definition of class reveals its evasive nature. It must be emphasized as well that class is merely a "common tool" for analyzing the social structure of societies in which "money and monetary exchange are the principal determinants of one's social position."⁹² Yet the significance of class-based response to political change can be realized in relationship to two general considerations, namely the state and its economy and the challenge of class-based interests to indigenous traditional authority.

Recent studies have attempted to address class formation and its consequences for modern Fiji.⁹³ But the question here is to determine the immediate political consequences of class formation among *tauvei* who

have harbored political aspirations in derogation of ethnicity as the primary measure of political affiliation.

In pursuit of class formation, it is first necessary to discover some of the elementary and relevant institutions and conditions responsible for its development. The single most important institutional occurrence in post-Cession Fiji and certainly the most important postindependence legacy is the apparatus of state and its attendant economy. Great Britain, through its early policies and administrations, created both a colonial state and a colonial economy based upon exportable agricultural crops marketed chiefly in Europe.⁹⁴ The imperial insistence on fiscal self-sufficiency gave each colony a sovereign self-interest in the orderly expansion of its natural and human resources that, through its various mechanisms and strategies, may be termed the colonial state economy. Aside from the commercial objectives of such endeavors, the reorganization and mobilization of the island economy was a moral exercise in the maximization of sources of exploitable wealth that was largely beyond the capabilities of the *tauvei* leadership. Although the authority of the Fijian chiefs was largely preserved through the policy of indirect rule, the traditional *tauvei* elites were discouraged from directly participating in the colonial economy. A complex dilemma arises as the status of the chiefs, directly attributable to the traditional social economy and its attendant obligations, requires a stable demographic base, yet comes under challenge from an aggressive market economy requiring a mobile pool of wage labor. The true irony is that the traditional *tauvei* economy is a necessary component of the greater market economy, that the "reality . . . is that the whole cash economy is based on the so called subsistence sector in the first place," because of the land resources and the extra-subsistence demands of its participants.⁹⁵

It is not surprising, therefore, that the state economy demands a "greater sense of national unity and national identity."⁹⁶ The use of imported and indentured labor, the rise of mercantile enterprise, and the circulation of capital as part of the expanding colonial economy created a corresponding civil state greater than the sum of its constituent parts. Yet even under such circumstances, the traditional *tauvei* economy and its hereditary lords survived, although in modified form, to a substantial degree. The role and position of the traditional *tauvei* elites in the postindependence state is complicated by the indisputable fact that the chiefs, while accorded full titular status in their respective traditional estates, cannot as a group lay the same patrimonial claim to the Fijian state, which in its totality consists of a demographic majority of non-*tauvei* and is dominated by an array of non-*tauvei* institutions.

Thus the current, ongoing issue involves the confrontation between these two institutional systems in the forum of political conflict. Common to all principals is the realization that Fiji's national economic condition is still based primarily upon the production of exportable commodities, a dependence that is increasing not only in importance, but also in unreliability.⁹⁷ Political mobilization based upon class-based interests is likely to occur under such conditions, as the possibilities for continued economic prosperity become less promising. In a recent study of military seizures of governments, Fiji was identified as "being vulnerable to a coup" based upon the downturn in its highly concentrated export economy and a correspondingly low per-capita gain in individual earnings.⁹⁸ If nothing else, the rise to social action by class-based interests is a major index of political behavior peculiar to a modern state, especially when long-standing partisan loyalties are transcended.

The principal actors in this dilemma are the traditional *tauvei* elites and their nontraditional and neotraditional counterparts. Access to both power and wealth for these groups has been marked by considerable differentiation and specialization under the preexisting parliamentary regime. For purposes of this discussion, access to wealth and power is confined primarily to the state-sponsored wage economy, particularly the civil service. Those individuals, particularly the nontraditional *tauvei*, who have managed to maintain a livelihood in the elite sector of the wage economy, have become largely separated from their rural counterparts who have continued in the traditional social economy. Money--more specifically, the development of a monetized economy--has been the single most influential factor for many *tauvei* in providing an economic alternative to the traditional social economy.⁹⁹ Payment of commutation fees to the Fijian Administration is an obligation, however, that links urban *tauvei* to the bureaucracy. For this social category, the costs of maintaining their social obligations in this context have been problematic and occasionally prohibitive.¹⁰⁰ Both social segments, additionally, have been linked in the periodic ritual of elections in support of the Alliance party. In recent years, though, economic downturns, high unemployment rates, inflation, and labor disputes between government and the public service union have precipitated a political rethinking on the part of many *tauvei* wage earners in the elite economy.¹⁰¹ Under such conditions, social control of this social and economic constituency by the political elites has been difficult to maintain by traditional means. To a large extent, this challenge has been met by traditional *tauvei* elites by manipulating the careers of select titleholders through modern educational and administrative institutions.

Nontraditional Elite Formation

Hence, political interest in educational institutions by *taukei* of all social categories has been a "recent development."¹⁰² The colonial legacy of separate educational systems has left the postindependence state with a public and private school system marked by significant religious, sectional, and linguistic differences. For many *taukei*, access to status occupations is greatly influenced by their attendance at Fiji's elite secondary schools and Australian or New Zealand universities, usually on government scholarships. For those less politically or socially positioned, the University of the South Pacific provides the only possible alternative. The politicization of entrance requirements at U.S.P. has taken the form of "positive discrimination" whereby examination scores for *taukei* have been discounted in their favor, causing a major confrontation with Indo-Fijians who have obtained higher scores on their entrance examinations.¹⁰³ While such a policy has been rationalized as a remedial measure to improve the educational opportunities for otherwise disadvantaged *taukei*, the controversy has revealed the social reality that what land is for the *taukei*, education is to the Indo-Fijian.¹⁰⁴ Such maneuvers should not have been unanticipated. The politicization of the public service was a harbinger that political pressures on heretofore neutral ground would continue unabated.

Politically active chiefs were fully aware of the actual and potential power of their commoner counterparts who had achieved elite status. Realizing that ascriptive qualifications have become increasingly important to political and personal advancement, many chiefs have come into gradual political opposition with *taukei* elites of commoner background over the issue of national leadership. Status differentiation in *taukei* society, though still potent, has become increasingly troublesome in modern life. While the leadership role of the chiefs has been continually stressed over time, reconciliation with the ideology of initiative and achievement has never been fully resolved. Perhaps the most diplomatic restatement of this perplexing dichotomy is the following:

Fijians regard their society in terms of a fundamental unity between the people and the chiefs. They often refer to this unity as *turaga ni tamata* and *tamata ni turaga*, that is to say, the chief belongs to and is of the people, and the people belong to and are of the chief. This unity is cemented by a common bond of allegiance, loyalty and reverence binding together the people and their chief, and is demonstrated by the reciprocal duties

each side has for the other. The Fijians realise that they must serve their chiefs and at the same time, the chiefs are obliged to look after the people. . . .

The major factors of change are largely economic through wage employment and cash cropping which have brought close involvement in the cash economy to an increasing number of Fijians. Through this process thrift and acquisitiveness are being encouraged among many Fijians throughout the country. Although these values are not yet characteristic of Fijian society generally they are accepted as essential components of Fijian progress in the modern world and spreading. A new balance in Fijian social relationships seems to be developing; it encourages individual effort and does not appear to be paying much attention or giving much support to the traditional groupings in society. If this trend continues the value of social groups, based on . . . the chiefly system could be seriously undermined and weakened. . . . Chiefs have particular and specific functions in the social milieu; this should be reciprocated by the people in order to continue the social system as a living entity and as a going concern.¹⁰⁵

Penetration of the rural economy by the state economy has been a process of continuous concern to many *taukei*. Politically ambitious *taukei* have manipulated this fact into fungible terms, casting this perception in more generalized terms as the appropriation of *taukei* land by non-*taukei*, largely because of the higher profile and vulnerability of non-*taukei* and because of a reluctance to admit that some chiefs are themselves involved in such a process. Historically, chiefly power over commoner labor was the primary means of inducing material productivity on the traditional estates of the chief. Since the colonial period, however, this relationship has been almost reversed through the bureaucratization of *taukei* tenancy and the politicization of lease arrangements with non-*taukei*.¹⁰⁶ It has been forthrightly suggested that land is the "focus of clashes between two economic and social systems, not simply between two ethnic groups."¹⁰⁷ Land as a metaphor for *taukei* security, as an issue for cross-ethnic conflict, also reflects *taukei* aversion to economic risk in contradistinction to the aggressive capital investment peculiar to a market economy. While many have stated that the Indo-Fijians control the economy, such has not been the reality. *Taukei* control their own social economy, although considerable market influences have penetrated its fabric, Resort to such rhetoric reveals the fact that

tauvei do not consider their traditional social economy as an autonomous system, but rather as a subordinate part of their traditions.¹⁰⁸ The political penetration of rural communities by the state economy has formed a part of the rhetorical lexicon in *tauvei* political discourse even prior to independence.¹⁰⁹ A postelection speech of A. V. Tora's to chiefs of the western provinces illustrates such strategies:

Already two million acres of our land, most of it our best and most fertile land, has already been leased to 24,000 tenants, of whom 18,000 or 75 per cent are non-Fijians. . . .

Those who do not want us; those who do not want our chiefs, they should vacate our land. . . .

We are not a wealthy community, but we have shared our only asset, land, generously with others. . . .

Our generosity, our willingness to share and care have been used to slap us in our faces. They have been used to push the *tauvei* aside. They have been used to deprive us of the paramountcy of interests which the Deed of Cession guaranteed and which the fathers of the present Constitution undertook to uphold and protect for all *tauvei* forever.

This sacred covenant, this sacred agreement is now broken. Our independence is now broken. . . .

We cannot remain silent as our traditions and customs are endangered, as the leadership of our *turaga* is spurned, as our land, our only asset and the source of our security, is put in the control of others.¹¹⁰

The Politicalization of Nontraditional Tauvei Elites

The formation of the Fiji Labour party (FLP) on 6 July 1985 occurred amid an array of economic and social problems resulting from high unemployment rates, low wages, and labor disputes between the government and civil service. Stimulated largely by the Fiji Trade Union Congress, the FLP faced the immediate challenge of integrating the manual labor trades into a political movement centered largely on public sector employees. Timoci Bavadra, a physician and recently retired president of the Fiji Public Service Union, was elected party president. A former member of the Alliance party and member of the Great Council of Chiefs, Bavadra made an appeal for national integration of Fiji's economic, social, and ethnic communities.

Tupeni Baba, a reader in education at the University of the South

Pacific, became one of the FLP orators who appealed directly to the economic reality of the day: "There is an increasing income difference between the rich and poor, between the professional and businessman and the ordinary worker, between the chiefs in politics and those who are not."¹¹¹ He continued criticizing the chiefly system of political leadership at a Suva conference with fellow academician Simione Durutalo, where he emphasized that many chiefs were becoming increasingly involved in accumulating wealth directly from commercial enterprises. Disregarding traditional norms of prescriptive generosity, many of the modern chiefs were not sharing the rewards of such business ventures with their traditional following.¹¹² Seemingly by fortuitous circumstances, Baba's accusations were verified by disputes among the *rentier* high titleholders of western Fiji, whose revenues occasionally exceeded that of their extended km groups collectively. As Ratu Osea Gavidi, one of the disputants, remarked, "People feel that it is their democratic right to question something they are not happy about. This did not happen in the past when disputes were dealt with in the Fijian traditional system."¹¹³

Baba and a cadre of intellectuals at the university became the most virulent source of criticism against the chiefs active in the Alliance party. Rather than confining their attacks to the regional concentration of political power among the chiefs of the eastern confederacies, Baba and his colleagues challenged the clientism and patronage system afforded to the political chiefs as being irrelevant and counterproductive to the operations of a modern government. Some of the conclusions to be drawn from the events and rhetoric of the months immediately preceding the 1987 elections inevitably point toward the rise of class consciousness as a political force. Differences in income and access to basic economic resources were becoming increasingly disparate.¹¹⁴ Efforts by the FLP to forge political alliances with other organizations proved successful. While an alliance with the Western United Front came easily, negotiations with the NFP were more difficult because of concern, especially by Koya, about accusations that Labour was only for "rich civil servants who enjoy automatic payraises, and not for the labour . . . who can't afford to wear ties."¹¹⁵

Communal politics, though still a barrier to cross-ethnic cooperation, was subrogated to a pragmatic alliance between the FLP and the NFP when Jai Ram Reddy assumed the leadership of the latter party. The formation of the Coalition proved decisive. The "educated Fijians" of the Coalition were criticized by dockworker unionist Taniela Veitata as working to undermine the chiefly leadership system.¹¹⁶ During the

period immediately preceding the elections, a move by part-Europeans to support the Coalition indicated that class-based interests would be the margin of victory for Bavadra.¹¹⁷

Postelection reaction to the Bavadra victory came after the new prime minister selected his Cabinet, which was composed of six *tauvei*, seven Indo-Fijians, and one part-European. Bavadra retained the Fijian affairs and home affairs portfolios for himself, a move particularly audacious from the viewpoint of the paramount chiefs and the military. Under such circumstances the *Tauvei* Movement mounted a series of large demonstrations in Suva. Veitata, fellow unionist Apisai Tora, and a few Methodist church ministers were some of the movement's orators. The thrust of the movement's demands was summarized by a *tauvei* journalist:

One is that they want the country's leadership to be always in the hands of Fijians. The second is their preference that the chiefs should always be at the leadership helm. And they believe that their culture, identity and heritage will be protected if their demands are allowed. . . . For those who do not fully comprehend Fijian mentality, the protest could be simply seen as sour grapes in the wake of the Alliance party defeat in the recent elections. But the stark reality of the situation is that the marchers' sentiments appear to be similar to the Fijian Nationalist Party's policies. Yet the organisers of this new exclusive Fijian struggle say theirs is a subtle difference. They are saying that Sakiasi Butadroka's Fijian Nationalist Party is anti-Indian whereas their movement is simply pro-Fijian.¹¹⁸

Butadroka himself kept a discrete distance from the leaders of the *Tauvei* Movement. His interpretation of the protest conformed to his historical interpretation of Tovata dominance of government: "When you begin to talk about the three traditional Fijian confederacies (Tovata, Kubuna and Burebasaga) then you have a different perspective. I see Prime Minister Dr Timoci Bavadra as a man from the Burebasaga confederacy. This is the first time that a man from this confederacy has risen to high office. Why don't we support him?"¹¹⁹

The shifting composition of the *Tauvei* Movement characterized group ideology, though the consistent demand was for a change in the 1970 Constitution that would assure *tauvei* dominance in Parliament. Movement leaders were occasionally at odds with each other, especially when the possibility of physical force was discussed.¹²⁰ Perhaps for the

first time since the tumultuous days of Apolosi R. Nawai, the political elites had to contend directly with nonelites on a collective basis. The Taukei Movement and its activities, however, did provide Rabuka with a reason (or pretext) to assume military control of the government. Bavadra's reaction was contained in his submission to the Constitutional Review Committee: "The Alliance Party has distanced itself from the Taukei Movement and so has the Taukei Movement from the Alliance. Who does the Taukei Movement represent? We submit that the Movement represents elements who are being used by vested interests to maintain their elitism through control and influence of politics in this Country."¹²¹

Organizational and advocacy efforts by the Taukei Movement leadership continued at the parish level. Indeed the Protestant churches were the single most influential source of group communication (or agitation) of Taukei Movement sentiment. Rabuka, at one church service, told the congregation to seek peace for the country and spiritual support for the Taukei Movement.¹²² It is apparent that Rabuka depended upon the Taukei Movement for support (or a *raison d'être*) during the early weeks of military rule. He appointed Tora, Veitata, Kelemedi Bulewa, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, Adi Litia Cakobau, Ratu Meli Vesikula (a retired career commando in the British Army and the assistant Roko Tui of Naitasiri), and Butadroka to his council of advisors, all of whom were highly visible in the crowd politics of the Taukei Movement.

As noted earlier, the Great Council of Chiefs came to be regarded as a surrogate parliament by many *taukei* during this period. The council's proposals for constitutional revisions were aimed at restoring the "consensus" system of government based upon the recommendations of the 1984 Cole Report and upon the system that existed prior to 1963. Under such a system, *taukei* would no longer vote directly for parliamentary candidates, but rather would exercise their franchise through village, district, and provincial councils. (Other ethnic groups would retain direct elections.) Urban *taukei*, moreover, would be compelled to participate in the rural districts of their birth for the selection of their representatives. The "consensus" system as a mode of *taukei* decision-making is perhaps the least understood institution in Fiji. It stands in almost complete contrast to party politics as a social strategy, requiring prolonged discussions in a formal, face-to-face setting, punctuated with ceremony and protocol. The opinions of the paramount personalities are accorded deference and great weight. Most important, personal accusations, a favorite device for politicians, are avoided altogether as a vulgar breach of decorum. This explains why interethnic tensions are

greatest during political campaigns, not only because of the contest for power, but also because many of the paramount chiefs are subjected to intense criticism by their opponents.

The council, exercising its titular authority over the Fijian Administration, was fully aware that the changes envisaged by the Cole Report would be difficult to implement under the 1970 Constitution. The constitutional safeguards concerning key Fijian Affairs statutes required a three-fourths Senate majority for change, assuring the paramountcy of *taukei* interests could not be left in the hands of a minority of non-*taukei*. The same provisions, however, could act as a political obstacle to statutory amendments initiated by the Fijian Administration itself. In such instances, the Senate Opposition could comfortably veto any changes.¹²³

The FLP's Baba reacted quickly to the council's proposals, saying that they were aimed at strengthening the traditional chiefly system at the expense of the "urban and educated minority" of *taukei*.¹²⁴ Inoke Tabua, a senatorial nominee of the Great Council's and a Taukei Movement personality, agreed with Baba and said that the *taukei* must accept that the pre-1963 "nomination days are over" and that such an electoral configuration was unacceptable.¹²⁵ Nonetheless, the Constitutional Review Committee accepted the council's proposals, at least in principle.

Attempts to create a consensus caretaker government were made by Mara and Bavadra at Deuba. Once an accord was announced in late September, Rabuka examined the terms of the proposals, declared them unacceptable, and by decree pronounced Fiji a republic. He then proceeded to dismiss Ganilau, Mara, and other members of the interim military government. In early December, he dismissed from his Executive Council Minister Butadroka and several Taukei Movement personalities (except Veitata and Tora) whom he felt were using their portfolios to further elective political aspirations.¹²⁶ The nature of Rabuka's replacements--mostly military officers--suggests that loyalty was an important consideration as well. In an interview, Vesikula, one of the more articulate and aggressive members of the Taukei Movement, commented on the sudden changes: "I see no chance at all of my two ratus [Mara and Ganilau] here changing their outlook and their life and the running of the country in general. This is their life. They were responsible for the 1970 Constitution and putting them back there is tempting fate. What has the old system achieved for the Fijian people? It has achieved the erosion of traditional leadership, it has achieved a lack of patriotism. It has achieved disparity between the races in Fiji. It has

culminated in two military coups and the possibility of another or in some other form of violence.”¹²⁷

The Taukei Movement, seeking ideological succor from the Great Council of Chiefs, soon began to see itself as the “only meaningful opposition to the government.”¹²⁸ Whether the Taukei Movement is a genuine nationalist group is uncertain. Its demands have been remarkably simple and direct. The movement, however, has not been able to resolve adequately the question of political leadership. Though the chiefly system is used as a rubric, the reality is that the traditional *taukei* elites do well at the policy-making level, but tend to monopolize all sources of political emoluments at the expense of well-deserving, qualified commoners. Such group behavior is counterproductive to an efficient government worthy of public confidence. The Taukei Movement envisions, in almost religious terms, a *taukei* state. As Vesikula said, “Fijians have sovereignty and sovereignty is God-given to any race and Fiji belongs to the Fijians.”¹²⁹ Such rhetoric is not uncommon among Taukei Movement leaders. As a neomillenarian movement, it lacks only a singular and unchallenged prophet. Ethnic sovereignty, as the political objective of the Taukei Movement, may be sufficient to classify it, however, as at least a quasi-nationalist group: “Nationalism is also a form of ethnicity, but it is a special form. It is institutionalization of one particular ethnic identity attaching it to the State. . . . Ethnic groups do not necessarily act together except when they have special interests to secure. When these interests are to obtain a State of its own (or part of a State) the group becomes a *nationality*. Those which become successful become *nations*. . . . Nationalism refers to movements, to activities and ideologies developed in order to acquire or sustain a State of one’s own.”¹³⁰

The question for the Taukei Movement and the Great Council of Chiefs was how to properly and constitutionally subordinate the Fijian state to the norms of *taukei* society. The possibility of a pure *taukei* state is illusory because of the demographic superiority of non-*taukei* and the reality of a state economy that has become increasingly internationalized since independence. Yet movement within the council suggests that some rethinking about its own composition has occurred recently to conform with a more traditional mode of *taukei* governance. One paper circulated for tabling before the council in mid-1988 proposed a restructuring from the current 154 members to some thirty-eight. As noted earlier, following the adoption of the Sukuna model of the Fijian Administration, the council expanded--with some reluctance on the part of the paramount chiefs--to include a variety of members, including military. The paper in question has proposed formation of an upper house to

include only the ten chiefs of the Tovata, Burebasaga, and Kubuna confederacies. A lower house would consist of the fourteen provincial representatives and fourteen chiefs of unspecified titles.¹³¹ Thus status and class, as dual social characteristics in seemingly continuous opposition in *tauvei* society, have surfaced once more within an important institution. The present constitutional proposals submitted by the Great Council of Chiefs, in tandem with such a proposed configuration, would virtually eliminate nontraditional *tauvei* elites from any policy-making role in government. These proposals, moreover, place the military in a curious, perhaps precarious position. Currently the Fiji ministries consist of an armed and unarmed bureaucracy, with the former in support of the Fijian Administration in its present form. With the return to parliamentary government postponed for the immediate future, the political elites of Fiji will have time to consider the options for change more or less at their leisure. The discussion here of class-based interests has been deliberately confined to a *tauvei* context. The issue has, of course, broader application to island society.

When and if competition between races is superseded by rivalry within races then, just as moderately able Indians miss out, the not-so-able Fijians will do likewise, and the elite of both races may be subject to the intense pressures from within their own ethnic groups. Then history might take two courses. The first may lead to class formation. The elite of the two races might unite to preserve their own class interest. Or, Fijian elements will continue to be placated at the expense of Indians. Just as now the not-so-able and average ones are unable to receive the plums, later the most able will find themselves in a singular predicament; it becomes a question of time. If the first occurs, then there is class competition . . . we might have a multiracial bourgeoisie battling a multiracial proletariat with dramatic consequences. Although race will not be eliminated it should become secondary. If the second alternative occurs then racial polarization will be the deciding factor. Indians will be left with two options: either to leave Fiji or to serve on Fijian terms.¹³²

Conclusion

This study has attempted to address some of the key institutional questions surrounding the constitutional crisis in Fiji in terms of sentiment,

substance, and process as it applies to the *tauvei* and their institutions, apart from the more dominant issue of interethnic conflict. While much political commentary has been expended on Fiji's *constitutional* processes, the May 14 coup suggests that the sudden penetration of military forces into power, and their subsequent administration of the state, is an authentic process in itself. When Fiji is viewed in conjunction with other former colonial areas, the militarization of government appears to be a process rivaling that of its constitutional counterpart. Such a process may arise when the export sector of the economy becomes destabilized to the point where government loses its popular support.¹³³ Of some consequence for the future is whether the party system as it existed in precoup days will continue to function as the major institution of popular political mobilization. The disintegration of the General Electors Association and the Indian Alliance following the 1987 elections suggests otherwise. The forthcoming constitution, as it seems, would make the role of political parties irrelevant or redundant, for the political outcome in ethnic terms will have been constitutionally decided. What appears to be an alternative, though less formal, institution is clientism, which has existed as an integral means of obtaining and maintaining influence in island politics. Ironically, under the contemplated constitutional regime, clientism will become a more important avenue of interethnic collaboration than previously existed during the Alliance era. Clientism in Fiji, with its own traditional and nontraditional history, has thus acquired a form of recognition as a means of obtaining or maintaining power. At the focal point of the patron-client relationships will be the chiefs and the military/public service bureaucracy.

When the privileged holders of state power consent to recognise informal authority and thus give it formal status, they do so largely for self-interested purposes; to co-opt that power into their own ranks or to aggrandise their own positions. Yet this act requires that those at the top extend power and privilege to others. In the course of human events, the extension of power has not been freely made, but comes as a result of the recognition by ruling elites that to keep power they must retain--through real or illusory means--the compliance of the people they govern.¹³⁴

Clientism may well be a normal part of the political process. The question is whether patron-client relationships will be sustained at the

expense of the general public welfare. The irony of the above is that island democracy and multiracial collaboration may come about as a result of clientism if such a system is sanctioned. Clientism, of course, is no substitute for democratic parliamentarism, merely an alternative until more stable configurations of constitutional administration emerge in more dominant form.

NOTES

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1. *Legislative Council (Hansard) Debates*, 17 December 1965, p. 703.
2. An account of the early months of the coup may be found in Roderic Alley, "The Military Coup in Fiji," *The Round Table*, 1987: 489-496.
3. In my view a military coup, like a constitutional government, often takes a long period of time to sweep aside the institutional remnants of the previous government. In Fiji, I consider there to have been a single coup, initiated on May 14 and not completed until September 28 when the Republic of Fiji was unilaterally declared by Brig. Rabuka, severing Fiji's ties with the Commonwealth.
4. R. S. Milne, "The Pacific Way'--Consociational Politics in Fiji," *Pacific Affairs* 48 (1975): 413-431. See also Ralph Premdas, "Ethnic Conflict Management: A Government of National Unity and Some Alternative Proposals," in *Politics in Fiji*, ed. Brij V. Lal (Laie, Hawaii: Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young University-Hawaii, 1986), 107-138.
5. Yash Ghai, "Constitutional Issues in the Transition to Independence," in *Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics*, ed. Ron Crocombe and Ahmed Ali (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies-University of the South Pacific, 1983), 27.
6. J. W. Davidson, "Constitutional Changes in Fiji," *Journal of Pacific History* 1 (1966): 164.
7. Remarks of Ratu W. B. Toganivalu, *Legislative Council (Hansard) Debates*, 17 June 1970, p. 221.
8. Roderic Alley, "The Development of Political Parties in Fiji" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 1973), 33.
9. *Ibid.*, 35.
10. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 9 October 1975, pp. 1104-05.
11. Brij V. Lal, "The 1982 General Election and Its Aftermath," *University of the South Pacific Sociological Society Newsletter*, July 1983: 9.
12. Quoted in R. K. Vasil, "Communalism and Constitution-making in Fiji," *Pacific Affairs* 45 (1972): 14.

13. Edward Shils, "Political Development of the New State," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 11.
14. Ladun Anise, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa, Some Theoretical Considerations," in *Ethnic Autonomy--Comparative Dynamics in the Americas, Europe, and the Developing World*, ed. Raymond L. Hall (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 338.
15. *Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies* (London: Hansard Society, 1953), 55, 76.
16. *Report of the Royal Commission Appointed for the Purpose of Considering and Making Recommendations as to the Appropriate Method of Electing Members to, and Representing the People of Fiji in, the House of Representatives*, Parliamentary Paper 24 of 1975, 14-18.
17. *Ibid.*, 14.
18. An ethnocracy has been defined as "a system of government based upon either ethnic exclusivity, or ethnic division of labor, or quantified ethnic balance" (Ali M. Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda* [Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975], 215).
19. *Fiji Times*, 10 June 1987.
20. *Ibid.*, 12 June 1987.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1987.
24. *Ibid.*, 5 June, 10 June 1987.
25. *Report of the Constitutional Review Committee*, July/August 1987, Parliamentary Paper 21 of 1987, 60.
26. *New Zealand Herald*, 1 October 1987.
27. For example, see the remarks of K. C. Ramrakha, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 15 May 1980, pp. 296-298. The thrust of the NFP doyen's comment was directed at the political relevance of the independence Constitution to existing circumstances, which, in his opinion, had changed from the assumptions that had formed the basis for the actual negotiation of the 1970 Constitution.
28. This phenomenon has been observed among former colonial states in Africa:

Decolonisation typically involved the adoption of an independence constitution to provide an institutional framework for the new state. . . . However, they were usually abandoned in the decade following independence in the face of rising civilian and military authoritarian regimes. . . . Suffice it to say that they were alien frameworks for European cultures that had little meaning for most Africans who were expected to live under them. . . . African rulers who had accepted them in order to gain independence were not necessarily prepared to stick by them at the risk of losing power afterwards. Their opponents also had little more than instrumental attitudes then. In short, they lacked real legitimacy. (Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosbery, "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment:

- Juridical Statehood in the Africa Crisis," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 24 [1986]: 15-16)
29. Deryck Scarr, "A Roko Tui for Lomaiviti," *Journal of Pacific History* 5 (1970) : 3-31.
 30. T. J. Macnaught, "Chiefly Civil Servants? Ambiguity in District Administration and the Preservation of a Fijian Way of Life, 1896-1940," *Journal of Pacific History* 9 (1974): 3-20.
 31. *Selections from the Selected Speeches of Ratu Sir Kamisese T. Mara* (Suva: n.d.), 24.
 32. Alley, "Development of Political Parties," 61.
 33. *Legislative Council (Hansard) Debates*, 21 December 1965, pp. 752-753.
 34. O. H. K. Spate, *The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects*, Legislative Council of Fiji, Council Paper No. 13, 1959, p. 31.
 35. *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji, 1957*, Legislative Council Paper No. 1 of 1960, pp. 31-32.
 36. Cyril Belshaw, *Under the Ivi Tree: Society and Economic Growth in Rural Fiji* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 221.
 37. E. K. Fisk, *The Political Economy of Fiji* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971), 39.
 38. R. R. Nayacakalou, *Leadership in Fiji* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1975), 129.
 39. Alley, "Development of Political Parties," 44.
 40. Ibid.
 41. Ibid.
 42. Ibid.
 43. Ahmed Ah, "The Fiji General Election of 1977," *Journal of Pacific History* 12 (1977): 189-201. See also the remarks of Jai Ram Reddy, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 25 May 1977, p. 45.
 44. Brij V. Lal and Simione Durutalo, "The 1982 Fiji General Elections," *Review [Fiji]* 3 (November 1982): 19.
 45. Quoted in Deryck Scarr, *Ratu Sukuna: Soldier, Statesman, Man of Two Worlds* (London and Suva: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1980), 147. The Sukuna model was aptly summarized in his own words: "To train chiefs and people in orderly, sound, progressive local government better to fit them eventually for the give and take of democratic institutions" (*Parliamentary Debates [Hansard] House of Representatives*, 24 May 1966, p. 147).
 46. Nayacakalou, *Leadership in Fiji*, 138.
 47. Ibid.
 48. T. J. Macnaught, *The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neotraditional Order under British Colonial Rule prior to World War II* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982), 38-74; Ahmed Ali, "Fiji Chiefs and Constitutional Change, 1874-1937," *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* 33, nos. 54-55 (1976) : 55-64.

49. Nayacakalou, *Leadership in Fiji*, 122-123.
50. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 2 December 1975, pp. 1768-71.
51. *Ibid.*, 26 May 1977, p. 117.
52. *Fiji Times*, 4 November 1982.
53. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 24 May 1966, pp. 82, 87.
54. *Ibid.*, *Senate*, 18 July 1974, pp. 195-204.
55. *Fiji Times*, 5 November, 17-18 November 1982.
56. *Ibid.*, 18 November 1982.
57. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 26 May 1977, p. 115.
58. *Ibid.*, 22 November 1982, pp. 943-946.
59. Nayacakalou, *Leadership in Fiji*, 128.
60. *Fiji Times*, 13 November 1982.
61. The review team consisted of Rodney V. Cole, School of Development Studies of the Australian National University; Stephen I. Levine of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Victoria University of Wellington; and Anare V. Matahau, a Fijian lawyer. See R. V. Cole, S. I. Levine, and A. V. Matahau, *The Fijian Provincial Administration: A Review* (Honolulu: East-West Center, Pacific Islands Development Program, 1984). This report has a perhaps unusual history, having been prepared following a request from the Great Council of Chiefs to Felipe Bole, then director of the Pacific Islands Development Program of the East-West Center and former member of the Fijian delegation to the United Nations. (Bole is currently minister of education, Republic of Fiji.) The report was subsequently translated into the Fijian language and distributed throughout the villages and communities inhabited by ethnic Fijians. See also Stephen I. Levine, *The Fijian Provincial Administration Review: Regional Report* (Honolulu: East-West Center, Pacific Islands Development Program, 1985), for a summary of the philosophical rationale underlying the review team's approach and recommendations.
62. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 28 February 1985, p. 179.
63. John Stone, "Ethnicity versus the State: The Dual Claims of State Coherence and Self-Determination," in *State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, ed. by Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 85.
64. *Fiji Sun*, 28 July 1987.
65. Asesela Ravuvu, *Fijians at War* (Suva: South Pacific Social Sciences Association, 1974), 60.
66. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 8 December 1977, pp. 235-236. Her remarks paralleled similar concerns expressed five years earlier (*ibid.*, 5 December 1972, pp. 2151-52).
67. Such a policy was explained by Home Affairs Minister S. S. Momoivalu in 1977 as part of a response to Narayan's criticisms: "The only point worth mentioning about the

Army is the recruitment of our younger people leaving school in order to join the engineer squadron. This will be used extensively in rural development exercise. . . . I must say there is no barrier whatsoever, for anyone to walk into camp when the advertisement appears in the Press. . . . But there is one aspect that must be borne in mind. I repeat, it is the physical endurance that the standard in the Army requires. . . . A number of Indian recruits have been taken and they chose to ask for their de-mobilisation because of the rigor of the Army discipline and, perhaps, the insufficiency of pay and the unpalatability of Army food" (ibid., 12 December 1977, p. 360).

68. *Fiji Times*, 12 January 1988.

69. Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1980), 175, 185.

70. *Fiji Sun*, 14 July 1987.

71. Brij V. Lal, "Postscript: Emergence of the Fiji Labour Party," in Lal, *Politics in Fiji*, 154.

72. *Islands Business*, September 1987, 9.

73. Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," in *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques van Doorn, Sage Studies in International Sociology (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976), 79.

74. Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Johnson, *Role of the Military*, 80-89.

75. Ali M. Mazrui, "Soldiers as Traditionalisers: Military Rule and the Re-Africanization of Africa," in *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, ed. Ali M. Mazrui (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), 236-258.

76. Ibid., 255.

77. Ibid.

78. *Fiji Times*, 25 September 1987.

79. *Fiji Gazette*, 3 October 1987. A reorganization of the Fijian state, as Rabuka saw it, could only be accomplished outside of the institutions prescribed by the 1970 Constitution.

80. *Islands Business*, October 1987, 16.

81. *Fiji Republic Gazette*, 16 January 1988, Decree No. 10.

82. *Fiji Times*, 12 January 1988.

83. The "give and take" of politics was underscored by Mara (*Fiji Times*, 26 August 1987).

84. *Fiji Times*, 27 August 1987.

85. Ibid.

86. Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 39-40.

87. *Fiji Times*, 10 August 1987.

88. *Islands Business*, September 1987, 7.
89. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 9.
90. Shehu Othman, "Classes, Crises, and Coups: The Demise of Shagari's Regime," *African Affairs* 83 (October 1984): 441-462; Onigu Otite, "Ethnicity and Class in a Plural Society: Nigeria," in *Research and Ethnic Relations*, ed. Iona Bagley Marrett and Cheryl Leggun (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1979), 91-93.
91. E. G. Mukonoweshuro, "Underdevelopment and Class Formation in Sierra Leone: A Neglected Analytical Thesis," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 21 (1986): 159.
92. William M. Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe: A Critique of Historical Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), ix.
93. Alex Mamak, *Color, Culture, and Conflict: A Study of Pluralism in Fiji* (Sydney: Pergamon Press, 1978); Alex Mamak and Ahmed Ali, *Race, Class, and Rebellion in the South Pacific* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979); Jay Narayan, *The Political Economy of Fiji* (Suva: South Pacific Review Press, 1984).
94. John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914," *Journal of African History* 20 (1979): 487-505.
95. Vijay Naidu, "Fijian Development and National Unity: Some Thoughts," *Review [Fiji]* 2 (May 1981): 7-8. See also Asesela D. Ravuvu, *The Fijian Ethos* (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies-University of the South Pacific, 1987), 326.
96. *Fiji's Development Plan, 1986-1988: Policies, Strategies, and Programmes for National Development*, Parliamentary Paper No. 69 of 1985, 30.
97. *Ibid.*, 7-9.
98. Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups* (Avebury, Connecticut, 1987), 100-101.
99. Bruce Knapman and Michael A. H. B. Walter, "The Way of the Land and the Path of Money: The Generation of Economic Inequality in Eastern Fiji," *Journal of Developing Areas* 14 (January 1980): 207.
100. Lasarusa Vusoniwailala, "Communication, Social Identity, and the Rising Cost of Fijian Communalism," and Nacaneila Rika, "Is Kinship Costly?" in *Fijians in Town*, ed. Chris Griffin and Mike Monsell-Davis (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies-University of the South Pacific, 1986), 166-179, 189-195.
101. For economic data, see *Fiji's Development Plan*, 9, 24, 28-33.
102. Mamak, *Color, Culture, and Conflict*, 61.
103. Naidu, "Fijian Development," 7-8; Ahmed Ali, "Indians in Fiji: An Interpretation," in *The Indo-Fijian Experience*, ed. Subramani (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1979), 20-21.
104. Ahmed Ali, "Fiji's Indian Politics," *Journal of Pacific Studies* 4 (1978): 13.

105. Isireli Lasagua, *The Fijian People: Before and After Independence, 1959-1977* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1984), 128, 130.
106. Henry J. Rutz, "Capitalizing on Culture: Moral Ironies in Urban Fiji," *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 29 (July 1987): 539-540. Examples of the politicization of leases to non-*tauvei* are given during the debates on the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance Bill of 1976 (*Parliamentary Debates [Hansard] House of Representatives*, 12 October 1976, pp. 865-939). Such leases became an issue after the Bavadra election victory (*Fiji Sun*, 22 April 1987).
107. Robert Norton, "Colonial Fiji: Ethnic Divisions and Elite Conciliation," in Lal, *Politics in Fiji*, 59.
108. This perception has been used by government planners to formulate the integration of the rural sector into the national economy. See John D. Weston, "Roads, Rice, and Cane: Regional Planning and Rural Development Projects in Western Vanua Levu, Fiji" and Michael Sofer, "Progress through Transformation--A Fijian Village," *Pacific Viewpoint* 28 (May 1987): 41, 17.
109. *Broadsheet* [Auckland], August/September 1987, 35-37.
110. *Fiji Sun*, 22 April 1987.
111. *Fiji Times*, 8 July 1985. For a summary analysis of the political shift in emphasis from race to class by the FLP, see Stephanie Hagan, "The Party System, the Labour Party, and the Plural Society Syndrome in Fiji," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 25 (July 1987): 126-140.
112. *Fiji Times*, 8 July 1985.
113. *Fiji Sun*, 29 May 1986.
114. Remarks of I. S. Busawaiya, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives*, 4 March 1985, pp. 227-228.
115. *Fiji Sun*, 25 May 1986.
116. *Ibid.*, 20 March 1987.
117. *Ibid.*, 21 March 1987.
118. *Ibid.*, 25 April 1987.
119. *Ibid.*
120. *Ibid.*, 21 April 1987.
121. *Ibid.*, 23 July 1987.
122. *Ibid.*, 27 July 1987.
123. *Report of the Constitutional Review Committee*, 47-48.
124. *Fiji Sun*, 29 July 1987.
125. *Ibid.*, 1 August 1987.
126. *Fiji Times*, 12 January 1988. The dismissals may have been executed in anticipation of the return of Ganilau and Mara to power. When Mara formulated his Cabinet, he gave

military officers four portfolios including youth and sports, rural development, and Fijian affairs. Rabuka became home affairs minister, giving the military administrative control over the key ministries integral to its political survival.

127. *Islands Business*, February 1988, 11. Vesikula was adamantly opposed to the return of the "Tovata group" to power (*Fiji Times*, 8 December 1987).

128. *Fiji Times*, 17 February 1988.

129. *Islands Business*, February 1988, 11.

130. Johnathan Crush, *The Struggle for Swazi Labour, 1890-1920* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 247-248.

131. *Fiji Times*, 10 February 1988.

132. Ali, "Indians in Fiji: An Interpretation," 24.

133. O'Kane, *Likelihood of Coups*, 48.

134. Sandra T. Barnes, *Patrons and Power: Creating a Political Community in Metropolitan Lagos* (London: Manchester University Press, 1986), 219.

REVIEWS

Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello, *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1986. Pp. 529, maps, illustrations, appendixes. US\$6.95.

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The dominant focus of contemporary Pacific scholarship is on the islanders themselves, on the central events that have governed their lives over time. This is in marked contrast to an earlier (and imperial) historiography, which assumed that the only history worth recording began with European exploration dating from the sixteenth century, a vision that the current paradigm has effectively overturned. And its findings have been impressive, especially in the area of cross-cultural exchanges. The nature of commercial transactions, the spread of Christianity, and resistance to imperial authority take on new meaning once the islanders assume center stage. The end result has been to expand our awareness of the active role Pacific Islands people have played in the shaping of history.

The imperial perspective may be discredited, but one of its key assumptions nonetheless continues to pose problems for Pacific studies. The assumption is that power--technological and political--sets the context in which cultural negotiations have been (and are) worked out. W. H. Peterson understood the implications of this when he explored the nature of eighteenth-century contact in Tahiti. "European terror," an eighteenth-century version of gunboat diplomacy fashioned by Wallis and Bougainville, Cook and Banks, supplied the basis for "relations

between Europeans and Tahitians in the first ten years of contact." Indeed, only by the conscious policy of intimidation could the benign (if misleading) notion of a "*mirage taiten*" emerge among the salons of Paris and London. "Amiable as the Tahitians no doubt were," Peterson concluded, "their celebrated benevolence to the intruders was exacted at gunpoint."¹

Things have not changed much in the twentieth century. Although the current Pax Americana was exacted at an even heavier price--the deadly ramifications of gunpowder do not begin to compare to those of nuclear fusion, as the Bikini Islanders can attest--in either case the islanders' concerns are subordinated to the concerns of those whose power is greater. This is all the more difficult to accept given the region's intellectual assertion and political declaration of autonomy. And nowhere is this modern tension between independence and dependence more evident than in *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific*, an extended exploration of the deployment of American nuclear might, its significance for the late-twentieth-century Pacific, and the means that might be employed to defuse this explosive situation.

This impressively researched book begins with a bang: "The superpowers are on the road toward nuclear war" (ix), the authors warn, a road that potentially leads straight to the Pacific. "Recent changes in superpower military strategy and force deployments make it as likely that World War III could break out in the Pacific as in Europe or the Middle East" (ix). How is it that the increased threat of nuclear war hangs so heavily over Oceania?

In "Manifest Destiny," the first of the book's three parts, authors Hayes, Zarsky, and Bello unravel U.S. nuclear strategy in the Pacific since World War II, from the administration of Harry Truman to that of Ronald Reagan. They argue that nuclear weapons quickly became an integral part of the U.S. arsenal in the Pacific precisely because the conventional military was so overextended, with bases stretching from the Northwest Pacific to Southeast Asia, from Australia to Hawaii. American dependence upon that nuclear firepower has clearly influenced its strategic designs for and political behavior in the Pacific. The authors, for example, trace U.S. involvement in Korea, the Taiwan Straits crisis of the late 1950s, and Vietnam, demonstrating time and again that America's need to project power and to defend what it has considered its lake has led it to become more entrenched in Island affairs, more convinced that only a nuclearized military could adequately defend the whole.

This historical evaluation is not as unique as *American Lake's* dust

jacket blurbs would have one believe; its findings depend less on “previously undisclosed and formerly classified Pentagon files” than on a wide range of previously published secondary sources. Nor is its handling of the ideological currents that swept through America at mid-century always deft. We are told, for instance, that in the late 1940s George Kennan and Harry Truman were responsible for moving the containment of communism “from ideology to policy” (27). Three pages later we find that containment has been elevated from “strategy to ideology” (30). What these terms mean and what the contradictory shifts signify are never delineated. These caveats aside, the overall analysis in “Manifest Destiny” provides a context for the contemporary situation, explored in the book’s second section, “Pacific Arsenals.”

And it is here that the book makes a major contribution. The authors provide an in-depth survey of American forces in the Pacific, a survey that begins with a careful reconstruction of the “deadly connection” between conventional and nuclear forces, making it plain that the two cannot be thought of as separate components. Additional chapters detail the ways in which “the vast, multi-service U.S. arsenal is welded together into a unified structure--the Pacific command” (153). This command oversees the deployment of more than three hundred thousand troops in an area encompassing nearly half the earth’s surface, a deployment superbly illustrated in the various maps and charts that supplement the text. To hold this vast empire together requires a sophisticated ground and satellite communications network, and again *American Lake’s* treatment of this so-called invisible arsenal is comprehensive. No less so is its analysis of the U.S. missile test ranges, its depiction of the various alliances with Pacific nations that enable the U.S. to establish a line of forward deployment, and its coverage of the controversial Tomahawk cruise missile. On this issue, the authors pull no punches: “More than just another weapon system in America’s nuclear arsenal, the cruise missile changes the capabilities of U.S. forces in ways that are new and fraught with hazard. With deployment of the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, the number of ships in the Pacific Fleet which can launch a nuclear land-attack strike will increase from five in 1984 to about fifty in 1990, perhaps raising the tempo for nuclear war by the same ratio” (253). Its sustained analysis and provocative insights, when combined with its welter of detail and synthetic quality, make “Pacific Arsenals” a veritable handbook for students of the U.S. agenda in the Pacific.

Comprehensive, *American Lake* is also controversial, especially in two respects. The first of these concerns its limited coverage of the role

of the Soviet Union in Pacific affairs; only two of the book's twenty chapters explicitly focus on the Soviet presence. This is partly due to the nature and amount of evidence available: The authors acknowledge that they were unable to obtain classified Soviet documents but could secure American ones, access to which they obtained through the "uniquely democratic U.S. Freedom of Information Act" (xii), a difference that obviously influenced the balance of the book's coverage.

But the Soviet threat is downplayed for another reason. Hayes, Zarsky, and Bello do not believe that the U.S.S.R. poses the same kind of threat that the United States represents. They argue that on the basis of the best available estimates of Soviet military capabilities, some of which come from U.S. intelligence sources, the Soviets can only mount a defensive posture in the Far East. Its navy, for example, is bottled up in Vladivostok and Petroslovak, and its surface vessels and submarines perform so poorly that their task is simply to protect sea-lanes (293-308). The only offensive threat the Soviets pose, in sum, is in the vivid imaginations of U.S. military strategists, State Department officials, and White House politicians.²

This revision is instructive, suggesting that the United States tends to project its own aggressive tendencies on other nations, a point reinforced by the epigrams that the authors have selected to head various chapters. "In the Pacific, as in all other areas of the world, our greatest threat remains the Soviet Union," Admiral William Crowe, former commander-in-chief of the Pacific, declared in 1985 (291). His bellicose and hardline approach is in sharp contrast to the benign stance of A. Sidorenko, a Soviet military analyst, who observed that "nuclear weapons should not be thrown around like hand-grenades" and Leonid Brezhnev's declaration that "we will never be the first to let such weapons fly" (323). The implication is that, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union is not only incapable of establishing an offensive deployment, but is unwilling to do so.

Such reticence flies in the face of the historic thrust of Russian and Soviet expansion since the seventeenth century, and is contradicted by the increasing number of its missile tests in the northern Pacific, particularly in the summer of 1987, one of which flew over the Hawaiian Islands. That provocative demonstration at once should make one wary of Gorbachov's much-ballyhooed Vladivostok peace initiative and should remind us that the Soviets are no less imperial than the Americans, a combination that poses a double threat to the Pacific peoples.

Can Oceania liberate itself from its imperiled position? The authors believe so and in the third section of their book, "Charting a New

Course,” they lay out their solution, one that will also generate some controversy.

Their ultimate goal is a nuclear-free Pacific and, by extension, the demise of the American lake. The first stage in this transformation “will require separating and disengaging of superpower nuclear forces” (10-11). They recognize, of course, that this can only be accomplished by the withdrawal of such forces from the region, something neither power will accept. “Left to their own devices,” Hayes et al. contend, “the Cold Warriors in Washington and Moscow are unlikely to cede an inch of their nuclear deployments or spheres of influence” (402). This situation will change only if regional allies exert pressure upon the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to change their positions, and this is the point of entry for the grass-roots, antinuclear political movements that have emerged since the 1970s to challenge the development of a nuclearized Pacific. In concert these forces could (and should) work to establish nuclear-free zones in Korea and Japan, China and the Philippines. Movements in smaller, less powerful states could also play an important role by protesting the right of the United States to use their islands as staging areas “for naval-nuclear warfare in the Pacific and Indian Oceans” (404). For Australia, tightly bound up in its obligations to the American war machine, the authors have a special plea--to act quickly, to break from ANZUS and, by “going it alone,” to compel “the U.S. to choose whether it is committed to arms control or to nuclear superiority” (420).

In various ways, then, this “people’s diplomacy” may hold the key to regional disarmament and, more broadly, to sheer survival itself. The authors make Vanuatu Prime Minister Walter Lini’s rhetoric their own: “It is a matter of life and death . . . that our Pacific Ocean be declared a nuclear free zone. . . . On this crucial issue there can be no retreat. If we continue to deny ourselves any decision on this, our children of tomorrow will condemn us, and it will be a condemnation we will have deserved” (406). In the classic pattern of reform literature, *American Lake* casts a harsh light on a question of vital importance and then provides the means of salvation through a stirring promise of the efficacy of personal, direct action.

Not all will be so swayed. *Foreign Affairs*, in a brief review of *American Lake*, called its analysis “alarmist” and its solutions “simplistic.”³ It would. But there are points at which one suspects that the book is designed to generate the very coherent and forceful political movement that by implication it must presume exists already; in this sense art precedes life. Still, to dismiss it at that would be a mistake, for the proposed strategy for negotiation, for creating a peaceful Pacific, is not only

clever but has a historical basis. It recalls the shrewd maneuverings of those eighteenth-century Tahitians who, when confronted with the superior military muscle of the British navy in the first years of contact, managed to wage peace under the shadow of the cannon (and send the navy on its way). The present struggle will be more protracted, the chances for success less certain, as the recent deletion of antinuclear provisions in Belau's constitution--deletions purchased by American largess--suggest. But this only heightens the drama and intensifies the debate. "The time to avert the nuclear peril in the Pacific is now," Hayes et al. conclude, "not when a nuclear war is upon us" (389).

American Lake is a provocative book, but it is surprisingly passionless. That is in part because its cumulative detail overwhelms one's emotional response, though such data are absolutely crucial to make the political case for demilitarizing the Pacific. It is as well a result of the book's flat, unimaginative language. It seeks to evoke an impassioned reaction, for example, through a vocabulary that is overloaded with such words as "frenzy" and "peril"; similarly, chapter 19, "Nuclear Epitaph?" is a leaden fantasy of how a nuclear war might erupt. Things could have been different. When, for instance, the authors discuss the *Starfish* test, a 1.4-megaton atmospheric explosion in July 1962, they give an accurate, straightforward account of its destructive capacity, but none of the eyewitness reactions that would have induced empathy and political outrage (240). One has to turn to *Life* magazine, of all places, to get an idea of the chill that swept through the crowd gathered on Honolulu's beaches eight hundred miles away to witness the explosion. Initially blinded when night flashed into day, one of them, correspondent Dick Stolley, wrote that the sky "turned almost instantly to a bright, bilious green, a color so unexpected that the watchers on the beach gasped." As they gaped, the drama continued to unfold: "Great green fingers of light poked out and through the clouds. From the center of the blast, a red glow began expanding upward . . . a deep solid red, and the people afterwards groped for words to describe it." One who so groped declared that it was "as if someone had poured blood on the sky." The stain on the nation's conscience was real enough: It is no coincidence that the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty was ratified within the next year.⁴

That is how I wish *American Lake* would have moved me, much as did E. P. Thompson's far shorter *Beyond the Cold War* (New York, 1982), a brilliant and engaged analysis of the tensions that Europeans feel living under the threat of nuclear Armageddon. I recognize that it is unfair to ask the authors to write a different book, and yet there remains the question of its effectiveness as a polemic, for that it is. Yes, it

is a consciously designed assault upon political orthodoxy. Yes, it is at times a penetrating critique of the American empire, teaching us much about its military strength and political impact. Yes, it seeks to break the Pacific out of its dependency and to set out the means to full-fledged independence. But whether the book will transcend its pedagogic character, and truly inspire and galvanize its audience, is another matter. Time will tell.

NOTES

1. W. H. Peterson, "European Intimidation and the Myth of Tahiti," *Journal of Pacific History*, 1969: 199, 216-217.

2. Research commissioned by the U.S. State Department reached similar conclusions about Soviet penetration in the South Pacific; see Robert C. Kiste and R. A. Herr, "The Potential for Soviet Penetration of the South Pacific Islands: An Assessment," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, April-June 1986: 42-60. Significantly, Kiste and Herr conclude that "the most concrete instances of [Soviet] opportunity have occurred as a result of controversy that could be seen as generated by the western nations themselves" (56). That would, of course, include U.S. disregard of nuclear-free zones, of island sovereignty.

3. *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1987: 1118.

4. *Life*, 20 July 1962, 26-28. See also Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light* (New York, 1985).

Stewart Firth, *Nuclear Playground*. South Sea Books, Pacific Islands Studies Program, Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987. Pp. xii, 176, bibliography, index, illustrations. US\$14.95 paper.

Reviewed by F. Allan Hanson, University of Kansas

The nuclear arms race has occasionally drawn considerable attention to itself, as happened with the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and once more with the recent treaty to take them out again. And when they think about it, most people would agree that nuclear weapons represent the gravest of a number of threats facing humanity today. But usually people do not think about it very much. This allows the arms race to be run largely in the way that it is run best: quietly but inexorably, doing its destructive work as unobtrusively as white ants or white-collar criminals. Attention is averted from the arms race for several reasons: because people with healthy minds cannot both remain healthy-minded and focus constantly on the unutterably horrifying

prospect of nuclear war, because other issues (Vietnam, "the Gulf," AIDS, a stock market crash) crowd it out of the headlines, and because those responsible for perpetuating the arms race have learned to do so unobtrusively, in out-of-the-way places that nobody thinks about very much, such as deserts and remote Pacific islands.

Pacific islands, however, are not remote to Pacific islanders (including those who inhabit the island-continent of Australia), and Stewart Firth has done the important service of making their story available to those who, albeit only occasionally, do think about the nuclear arms race and the threat of nuclear holocaust.

Although the nuclear age had a Pacific beginning--in Japan, in two terrible days in August 1945--Firth begins with the postwar period. Almost half the book is devoted to American activities in Micronesia: the evacuation of Marshall Islanders from Bikini and Eniwetok atolls in order to conduct atmospheric tests there, the radioactive fallout from the 1954 test *Bravo*, the use of Kwajalein as a target for testing intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the oppressive effect of all this on Micronesian steps toward independence. French nuclear testing in French Polynesia also receives extended treatment. Third, Firth discusses two recent movements in the Pacific to disengage from nuclearism: New Zealand's ban on nuclear-armed and -powered ships and the American retaliation of essentially expelling New Zealand from the ANZUS alliance, and the establishment of a somewhat anemic South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. A brief chapter covers British nuclear tests in Australia in the 1950s, and an epilogue presents a fictionalized but all-too-plausible account, set sometime in the 1990s, of how World War III began in the Pacific.

Firth is an avowed foe of all things nuclear, and there is no difficulty in distinguishing the good guys from the bad guys in his book. The latter category includes the United States, France, and Great Britain: powers that have imperiously pursued nuclear testing in their Pacific colonies or dependencies with callous disregard for the Micronesians, Polynesians, and Australian aborigines who might get in their way. One of Firth's theses is that dependency status invites exploitation, and therefore that the Pacific can be truly nuclear-free only when it becomes truly independent. The accusatory finger here points most directly at France, which continues to hold colonies in New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

The good guy is New Zealand, which under current Prime Minister David Lange has the sense to realize that it is better off without the "protection" of American nuclear weapons and has courageously per-

severed in its antinuclear policy in the face of American displeasure. Vanuatu receives admiration for stressing the necessary connection between independence and a nuclear-free Pacific, and for refusing to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty because (largely at Australian instigation) its provisions had been watered down in order not to be overly offensive to the United States.

The government of Firth's own Australia (he teaches politics at Macquarie University) comes in for contempt. This largest and strongest of Pacific nations, afraid to cut loose from a Great Protector, has played the role of lackey, first to Great Britain and now to the United States. Written before recent dramatic developments in Fiji, the book also chides Ratu Mara's government in Fiji for selling out to American financial enticements on the issue of port visits by nuclear vessels.

Given the patent absurdity of nuclear weapons--the hazards involved in their testing, the disastrous consequences of their use--we need to understand why the world powers have embraced them and, in the process, become hostage to them. Firth touches on this issue in his chapter, "Why the French Love the Bomb," but much deeper historical, psychological, and cultural study of the United States and the Soviet Union in this vein is sorely needed. The main contribution of this book, however, is to shed light on how nuclear weapons afford yet another opportunity for powerful nations to dominate weaker ones.

Bruce Knapman, *Fiji's Economic History, 1874-1939: Studies of Capitalist Colonial Development*. Pacific Research Monograph no. 15. Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, The Australian National University, 1987. Pp. xi, 153. A\$12.00.

Reviewed by John Overton, Australian National University

This volume deserves a wider readership than that which is likely, given its publication as a monograph. Although it is a reworking of a Ph.D. thesis, careful editing has removed the turgid prose, interminable footnotes, and literature reviews that often characterize such works and has made this into a readable, relevant, and stimulating book.

Despite its title, the book is not, in fact, a comprehensive summary of Fiji's economic history throughout the colonial period, and readers in search of a reference work on this subject will be disappointed. Instead, Knapman has confined himself to the period before the outbreak of the Second World War and has attempted to analyze the nature of colonial

capitalism in Fiji by means of six case studies. He examines, in turn, the role of the dominant Colonial Sugar Refining Company, the indigenous noncapitalist sector, the rise and fall of white planter settlement, shipping, merchant companies, and colonial monetary policy. These chapters analyze a great deal of data that, in many cases, are seen for the first time and Knapman proves adept at using both such detailed material from archives and more macro-economic statistics. Thus, for those with a specialist interest in Fiji, there is a greater insight into, for example, the pricing policies of the C.S.R., the transformation of merchant capital, or the reasons why high export earnings were not translated into increased domestic consumption and incomes of Indian sugar laborers remained very low.

The chapter on the indigenous noncapitalist economy introduces a new level of debate on Fijian historiography. To date there has been a basic division between those who see the colonial policy of conservation as a laudable effort to protect indigenous polities and societies and ease the traumas of incorporation by Western capitalism, and those with a more cynical eye who view conservation as merely a means to lower the costs of social control and assist the penetration of foreign capital. Knapman, however, takes a different tack, though on balance he tends perhaps to the former view. He argues that conservation did not trap indigenous Fijians in a world without opportunity or economic incentive and many were able to exploit new opportunities in wage laboring, production, and trade. It was a far from static sector in the economy and the colonial state did not so much "conserve" as facilitate gradual change. While this must be accepted, it does not end the debate, for economic change occurred at a time of selective political and social ossification--particularly the entrenchment of a privileged elite who were able to exploit both traditional status and colonial protection to enhance its power and wealth. This, together with Indian and foreign dominance of entrepreneurial activity, has constrained indigenous Fijian social and economic transformation and is behind much of the political and economic crises that have surfaced in the past two years.

However, although the selected case studies are, in some ways, unconnected they do allow for an understanding of the central features of Fiji's colonial economy and the dynamics of change simply because they cover the most important sectors of the economy. And, more than an examination of the impact of capitalism within Fiji, these case studies also provide much insight into the development of Australian capitalist enterprise in the Pacific, for it was Australian capital that was dominant in Fiji.

Perhaps of greatest interest to more general readers, though, is the final chapter. Here, Knapman addresses more general theoretical issues. Although he demonstrates (probably more effectively than did previous authors such as Jay Narayan [1984] or William Sutherland [1984]) just how exploitive and inequitable colonial Fiji was, Knapman attacks the neo-Marxist view that colonial capitalism “underdeveloped” Fiji. In this, he is reminiscent of other revisionist economic historians such as Paul Mosley (1983), who use empirical data and economic analysis to question the assertions of radical historians and political scientists. It is usually a convincing approach. Knapman’s critique of the underdevelopment hypothesis has two sides. First, he shows how the view is both theoretically unsound (being tautological and simplistic) and empirically invalid, for it denies the evidence of significant income and infrastructural growth in colonial Fiji, despite exploitation and inequality--Fiji, after all, achieved very high rates of exports per capita by tropical country standards. Secondly, he states that, for all its faults, colonial capitalism in Fiji was simply the best alternative, others being “utopian or inferior” (p. 142). Colonial capitalism offered many opportunities as well as significant constraints.

Such is the contribution to the debate: informed analysis, aware of the unhappy, iniquitous, and unstable nature of colonial Fiji, but sufficiently sober to discount the often facile rhetoric of underdevelopment theory. Overall, this work makes a significant contribution to our understanding of Fijian and Pacific history. As well as filling a major gap--the lack of studies on Fiji’s economic history--it is economic history that addresses political and social issues and thus is of interest to those working in other disciplines. It stimulates a debate on Fijian underdevelopment that is bound to continue, now much better informed.

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Reviewed by Robert Norton, Macquarie University

The coup and the prolonged political crisis in Fiji have shattered a national economy already shaken by natural disasters and downturns in foreign trade, and pressured by a rapidly growing labor force. The trauma of the economic collapse is intensified for ethnic Fijians and Indians alike by the comparative affluence of the first fifteen years of independence from colonial rule.

A 1983 survey conducted for the government by a team of foreign academics (including Michael Taylor) presented an impressive picture of a complementary growth of agricultural and urban industry in which the majority of people were doing well by Third World standards, and the destitute were a tiny minority. Taylor maintains that in the period 1965-1980 Fiji's rate of growth outpaced that in Australia, the U.S., and New Zealand. Fiji was the success story among postcolonial societies of the region, and stood out among most other countries of the Third World.

The prosperity came mainly from a sugar industry propped up by privileged access and prices in the EEC, secured for Fiji by its former colonial ruler, Britain. Taylor describes the sugar income as a form of aid "with dignity," nourishing the country via a well-developed capitalist market system, in contrast to the aid grants received and distributed by bureaucrats in neighboring island states.

The government's takeover of the sugar industry in 1973 coincided with increasing world demand. Expanded production stimulated diversification of enterprise in agriculture, manufacturing, trade, and service. In 1980, with sugar generating 81 percent of foreign exchange, the economy seemed sound and overt unemployment was low. Popular expectations were running high: the economic growth had enlarged the work force and encouraged union demands for better pay and conditions. The expanding and relatively affluent working and middle classes provided added local market stimulus for the continued growth of commerce and industry.

But subsidized sugar exports were Fiji's Achilles' heel. The world market began a decline in 1981, and the preferential treatment given to Fiji under the Lome Agreement was cut to less than half the crop: the growers received F\$35 per tonne in 1980, but only F\$19 in 1984. The crisis in trade also affected the other major exports, gold and copra. The impact on the rest of the economy was rapid: Taylor reports that in 1983 over 80 percent of school-leavers could not find paid employment, compared to only 18 percent ten years before. In 1975, 73 percent of school-

leavers were absorbed into "formal sector wage and salary jobs," while only 1.5 percent were in 1983.

A rift widened between "haves" and "have nots"--between people enjoying the high wages and job security won by unions in the period of growth and affluence, and those unable to follow them, the young and the farmers and workers losing out in the sugar industry. The tension between rising expectations and falling opportunities contributed to an increase in crimes of theft and violence by Fijian youths in the towns, and encouraged rebellious behavior by youth in the villages.

The economic and social problems of the mid-1980s provoked a stark divergence of leadership responses that contributed to the political crisis in 1987. Conservative Fijian leaders resolved to reinstate the old paternalistic village administration to save their people from corruption in an economically failing and immoral Westernized society. At the other extreme some union leaders, mainly Indians, swung to the left. They opposed the government's wage freeze, left the Tripartite Forum that had regulated industrial conflicts since 1977, and made plans to form a Labour party.

The launching of this party in July 1985 was the first fateful step toward the military coup of May 1987. The party's formation reflected the expansion of the multiracial work force during the 1970s and union leaders' confidence that they could develop from this a political movement to resist the government's policies for managing the economic recession.

Brookfield's and Howard's chapters in *Fiji: Future Imperfect?* will be the most useful for readers seeking background to the political crisis. Brookfield cogently analyzes changing patterns in commercial agriculture since independence, giving particular attention to the problems arising in the 1980s. Howard surveys the development of the most powerful trade union movement in the Pacific islands and recounts the events in industrial relations that culminated in the formation of the Labour party. His predictions about the party's future were presciently cautious, and his doubts about its prospects for attracting wide Fijian support have proved well-founded: in the April 1987 elections, anxiety about land issues again submerged cost of living, employment, education, and health issues, as it always has in Fijian politics since party struggles began in 1966. But Howard does not give due attention to the role that union successes have played in stimulating economic growth by strengthening the domestic market. The union movement became a factor for local capitalist development.

Howard's chapter would have been more valuable had he taken up

the issue of class formation, instead of merely giving us a potted history of its organizational manifestations. The only chapter that does adequately address the issue of class formation is Ward's, on inequality among rural Fijians. Marked inequality by hereditary rank has long existed in the sharing of rents received from non-Fijian tenants--especially since the expansion of foreign investment in the tourist industry, a minority of Fijians have gained considerably from rent incomes. There is now emerging a more politically potent inequality between a majority who hold adequate land for subsistence and cash farming, and a growing minority who have insufficient land or none at all. The trend has been strengthened by the efforts of some Fijians to devote more and more of their hereditary estates to commercial use, leaving less and less to share with needy relatives and neighbors. Ward's analysis of this trend corrects the widespread misconception that Fiji's land problem is simply one of Indians encroaching on Fijian land.

In view of the extremist Fijians' rationale for the coup as a defense against the alleged threat of Indian domination, it is regrettable that the book does so little to inform us about the real significance of the Indians in Fiji's economy. Many Fijians and Europeans have for decades maligned the Indians as avaricious exploiters and hoarders of the country's wealth. Yet foreign companies, still predominantly European in ownership, continue to enjoy greater power in the economy than local Indian businesses. The vast majority of Indians remain small farmers and workers whose labor has been the most important ingredient in the country's prosperity. The Indians were also the initiators of the union movement from which most of the indigenous Fijians have benefitted.

Taylor erroneously attributes the high wage levels to the capacity of the subsistence sector to absorb labor. This explanation is refuted by considering neighboring Tonga and Western Samoa, where the subsistence sector is as strong as in Fiji, yet wages remain low. The Fijians' subsistence farming limited pressures for wage increases for Fijian workers because it subsidized the cost of maintaining them and their families. By contrast, the Indians generally had no access to land for subsistence farming and so were wholly dependent on money incomes. It is precisely this that distinguishes Fiji from its neighbors in the development of a modern economy: it was the immigrant workers' total dependence on wages and prices, not the indigenes' relative independence of the cash economy, that, in conjunction with the prosperous sugar industry, gave rise to the union movement and high wage levels,

Only Connell, writing on population and migration, adequately considers the Indians' contribution. Sadly, he does this by examining their

exodus in the tens of thousands since 1970. The emigration of so many young Indians to Canada, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand has helped narrow the racial gap in Fiji's population, and it has opened some new economic opportunities for Fijians. But the net effect has been grossly damaging to the economy and to the education and health services, for most of the emigrants have been skilled in trades and professions. The problem has troubled Fiji's planners for more than a decade and is being profoundly worsened by the present political crisis.

Accelerated Indian emigration will damage the locally owned manufacturing and service sectors. Taylor sketches the trend toward local control associated with a flight of foreign capital. Like the foreign companies they are replacing, the local businesses have been depositing substantial portions of their profits in overseas banks. But by the early 1980s they were the main employers of new job seekers, though their pay rates are low compared with foreign and government employers, and their labor is usually not unionized.

Tourism suffered immediately from the coup. Since 1975 it had contributed up to 55 percent of export income. By 1985, says Britton, it had become "essential for the maintenance of economic stability, employment growth, and the generation of foreign exchange." But ownership remained largely in foreign hands. In 1977, for example, over F\$100 million of the income from tourism went to the foreign companies. Of the remaining F\$29 million, approximately F\$10.5 million went to local European-owned enterprises, F\$11 million to Indian-owned enterprises, and less than F\$1 million to Fijian-owned businesses. The foreign companies repatriated large portions of their profits--in the case of the largest international resort, 60 percent of the turnover deposited in Fiji banks was sent to parent companies abroad.

Britton's documentation of the dismal failure of the Fijian-dominated government to secure for Fijians a stronger share in tourism profits provokes questions about the fate of several government-sponsored schemes set up since 1970 to encourage Fijians to compete in the capitalist economy. Unfortunately no chapter in the book deals with this issue. Its importance is highlighted now by the probability of stronger state actions in this direction in the wake of the coup.

Fiji: Future Imperfect? is recommended as a valuable review of the precoup economy. But too much of the book is a rather dry presentation of the facts and figures of general trends. In the present crisis we have all the greater need for an analysis of the human dimensions of these trends, particularly the implications for inequalities and conflicts of both race and class. For this we must consult the far more comprehen-

sive report of the Fiji Employment and Development Mission mentioned at the beginning of this review, to which several of the book's authors contributed. The Fiji government published it as Parliamentary Paper no. 66 of 1984. Hopefully its authors will now arrange a revised edition in more accessible form.

Claudia Knapman, *White Women in Fiji, 1835-1930: The Ruin of Empire?* Allen & Unwin, 1986. Pp. xiv, 226, map, photographs, orthography, notes, bibliography, and index. A\$15.95.

Reviewed by Noeline V. Hall, University of Queensland

Claudia Knapman's *White Women in Fiji* is one of those rare books worthy of unreserved praise. The author is a happy blend of historian and sociologist, and her analysis of the role of white women in Fiji breaks frontiers of understanding that highlight the complexity of the role of gender in that multiracial society. Her interest in this subject stemmed, she states, from personal experiences as an expatriate wife and mother. This book was one of three nominated in 1987 for the Nettie Palmer Prize for nonfiction.

Knapman sets out to argue against the long-held belief that women were responsible for rigid enforcement of racial discrimination and sees them as scapegoats for and an extension of the male of the species, subject to his decisions that reflected the imperial dream. She demolishes the gender explanation for the failure of colonialism; this she claims obscures the realities of the power relationships between the dominant and the dominated races.

Arguments, more or less accepted until recently by writers in the disciplines of history and sociology and in fiction, are examined. Rudyard Kipling and W. Somerset Maugham have provided images of women in colonial settings, which were reflected in academic studies such as James McAuley's work on New Guinea. McAuley maintained that the white woman drew "a circle of exclusion round her domain"--and in so doing "is perhaps the real ruin of empires" (quoted on p. 9). An analysis of Fijian society from 1835-1930 clearly shows that male perceptions and attitudes provided the stereotypes so difficult to bury.

A chronicle of the lives of a range of female groups--the missionary wives, the wives of government officials and businessmen, and those on the plantation scene, with its indentured labor system--indicate a wide variety of experiences. Some women faced overwhelming problems

both psychological and physical. The assumption that women can be stereotyped cannot be sustained. Knapman's rigorous research makes nonsense of the belief that this colonial society contained lots of Mrs. Lucy Hauksbees as portrayed by Kipling in *Plain Tales from the Hills*, sexually jealous and leading bored and useless lives. What is illuminating is what many women endured, an unenviable life of childbearing and childrearing and household duties accomplished under difficult circumstances. Often it was a question of survival, and this offers a new understanding of their roles in Fiji pre- and post-Cession. The missionary woman was the other stereotype, cast in the "heroic" role, a woman who carried the additional burden of evangelism and was meant to provide a model of Christian family life.

Perhaps only a combination of historian and sociologist could have penetrated the truth, successfully proving the argument that white women were at the root of racial tension is "conceptually, theoretically and methodologically" an untenable position to sustain (p. 9). In her first chapter Knapman spends some time dealing with those writers, like John Young, who provided the stereotypes and the myths about women in colonial situations. She points out that women writers, like Caroline Ralston and Rita Cruise O'Brien, were more guarded in their approach but reinforced the general propositions. The first effective challenge came from Amirah Inglis in *Not a White Woman Safe* and Susan Gardner's questioning of accepted propositions. In the tradition of feminist scholars the author makes the point that all the social aspects relating to women must be examined and that the question that must be addressed is "why are women (whether 'idle' or 'moralistic') regarded as irrelevant to the main historical themes and events, and at the same time seen as significant in the vital area of race relations?" (p. 16). In chapters 2 to 6 women's daily lives are analyzed in depth, to show the quality of life and to indicate the types of contact, which were varied, white women had with Fijians and Indians.

Selective and twisted evidence, Knapman argues, has led to the male assumptions about racial prejudice. There is no hard evidence to support the belief that there was more racial disharmony where white women were concerned. Facts are examined in terms of economic, political, and cultural reasons for antagonisms between the Europeans and the Fijians. There are examples of women's standing on their own feet, where possible or where necessary. In crises like epidemics the notion that women were the weaker vessels needing to be protected is shown to be nonsense. Women worked hard in many areas to assist husbands and fathers to establish good relations with the Fijians. The wife

of Trader Thompson was described by a contemporary as being more courageous and tactful than her husband. Women were especially compassionate with regard to childbirth and other health crises, unmindful of race in such situations. The heterogeneity of women's experiences is firmly established. In whatever situation there was a desire for the most part to establish positive relationships, but in the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was little perception that to achieve this the indigenous society and its culture at least needed to be understood. With the influx of Europeans in the 1860s and 1870s patterns of colonialism became more set by men, and while women accepted the patterns it did not follow that they were more exclusive than men. Women, again by virtue of the male's setting the pattern, were more circumscribed in their contacts with Fijians.

Dualistic theories about gender and race, so long a part of Western thought, are effectively discounted by Knapman. This, she rightly maintains, has to be done before the root problem can be tackled. Dualist theories, she points out, put the black races into the same category, if in a lower stratum of that category, as that of white women. The white man is superior and hence assumes the role of protector, reflecting racial superiority, as well as being superior to irrational, fallible woman. So if this concept is seen to be a failure, white women can be cast in the role of destroyer by being charged with greater racial intolerance.

The continual theme of this book is that racial theories of history explain behavior in terms of racial characteristics, not social conditions, and that these were not challenged (indeed still die hard) until the First World War. These theories leave no room for individuality, which Knapman's evidence shows was present in this multiracial society. Evidence there is of violence on both sides before and after the big influx of women. The marked decline in such amicable relations as there were, prior to Cession, developed from the struggle for land and labor and conditions of law and order, which brought, for instance, planters into conflict with the host society. Clumsy approaches and the development of fear exacerbated the situation. In the light of the evidence offered, the accepted stereotypes were not the norm for women when their numbers increased significantly.

Men then and later had double standards and this was expressed through the white man's control over European women, especially in the field of sexuality and childbearing. Higher standards of living and more rigid standards of behavior were not simply responses to women's exclusiveness, but due to better commerce and trade. The case is firmly

made by Knapman that the hardening of race relations is more related to the ambitions of the new settlers whose wives reflected these ambitions. She asks, if racial characteristics and gender explain race relations, women being women, why were not bad relations evident before the Fiji Rush? Most judgments on the mistress-servant relationship stem from mid-twentieth-century observations, when these relations are believed to be a problem. In the context of the times there is no evidence that the household servant was more harried than the fieldworker, though no doubt there were exceptions to the rule. There is evidence offered that many servants were happy in their domestic positions where only patience and understanding produce a good servant. Indentured Indians preferred to be in a household. The white woman, while certainly physically vulnerable, had to rely on the moral force of control, where men frequently fell back on various forms of physical force.

This book, with its well-chosen photographs, reaches into the heart of interrelationships concerning gender and race and convincingly breaks down the old stereotypes and myths, while painting a sympathetic picture of the difficult, and for the most part, industrious lives white women led. Knapman destroys without doubt the fallacy that women were more racially intolerant than their male counterparts. This study is a lively, scholarly, and exciting breakthrough destined to become a classic of its kind.

Laura Marie Torres Souder-Jaffery, *Daughters of the Island: Contemporary Chamorro Women Organizers on Guam*. MARC Monograph Series no. 1. Guam: Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam. 1987. Pp. xi, 259, photographs, bibliography, index. US\$20.00 hardbound. US\$13.95 paperbound.

Reviewed by Eve C. Pinsker, University of Chicago

The University of Guam's Micronesian Area Research Center has chosen well in publishing *Daughters of the Island* as the first monograph in its new series. It focuses attention on a topic on which little information has been available: the role of Chamorro women in contemporary Guam. Souder-Jaffery focuses on women identified by their community as key activists and community organizers. She is uniquely qualified to conduct this study, as she is herself a Chamorro woman activist as well as a scholar cognizant of issues in contemporary social science. This book is a revision of her 1985 doctoral dissertation, sub-

mitted to the American Studies department at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. Souder-Jaffery did extensive interviews with the nine women that provide the case material given in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the book. Many of these women she has also known since childhood, enabling her to elicit rich information on their family lives and careers.

In the first three chapters, Souder-Jaffery addresses the problems of writing about the history and contemporary experience of the Chamorro women of Guam. She sensitively treats the relationship of history and consciousness, noting that what is today considered Chamorro "tradition" is an amalgamation of Chamorro, Spanish, and American ways (p. 8). This syncretism does not prevent Chamorro identity from being important in women's lives, as her case histories show. Furthermore, ancient patterns persist despite lack of consciousness of them (pp. 212-213). Souder-Jaffery cites the records of early Western observers of Guam to show that precolonial Chamorro women had control over their children and property and considerable standing in the public sphere (chapter 3). The power of women within the family and an emphasis on maternal relatives have persisted in spite of the increasing restrictions put on Chamorro women by the Spanish administrators, the Catholic Church, and later the American naval administration.

Only in the 1960s did "modernization" and greater exposure to the American mainland bring many women out of the family context back into the public sphere. This change, perceived by some Chamorro women as a break from the "tradition" that they know, is perceived by Souder-Jaffery as a return to more ancient traditions of women's strength. As she and other Chamorro scholars rediscover and communicate Guam's past, Chamorro women's views of their own history will probably change. Some might see this as a violation of social science "objectivity," but I see it as a legitimate reconciliation of Souder-Jaffery's roles as scholar and as activist.

The historical background given by Souder-Jaffery puts in perspective the situation of the particular generation to which most of the women in her case studies belong. These women were "either adolescents or adults at the onset of the modern period [the 1960s]" (p. 8). Thus, they are "transitional figures" (p. 9), having experienced both the modern and traditional periods within their lifetimes. Souder-Jaffery develops this theme in her concluding chapter, saying that in their activism these women have sought "modern solutions but are motivated by traditional values" (p. 207)--the moral well-being of their children and their families. To work for these values, these women felt impelled to go beyond their homes and become active in the larger community. Several

ultimately were elected to the Guam legislature, but they do not consider themselves “feminists.”

Souder-Jaffery does see a split, however, between the women who went off-island to college and those who stayed on Guam. The women educated off-island “adapted modern organizational strategies,” working through professional women’s organizations and formal political organizations. The women who had remained on Guam preferred to organize through the more traditional networks of church and family (p. 208). All of her subjects, however, used a network of extended family and friends to organize community activities or for help in maintaining their own family obligations when outside duties were pressing. Some of the women were consciously aware of “networking” and some did not become aware that they were using this strategy until it became apparent through the interviews.

Souder-Jaffery devotes a whole chapter (chapter 4) to Cecilia Bamba, who clearly deserves the chapter title of “Lady Extraordinaire.” Mrs. Bamba’s short life was full of tragedy, but also of accomplishment. As a young girl she lost both parents--her mother died after the birth of her younger brother and her father was beheaded by the Japanese (p. 77). She herself died of cancer at age 51. She was raised by her grandmother and great-grandmother, married at the age of sixteen, widowed at the age of forty-four, and had ten children. This amazing woman, nevertheless, was a leader in countless community organizations: the Agana Heights Women’s Group (founder), the Red Cross, the Girl Scouts, the Guam Memorial Hospital Volunteers Association (founder), the Guam Women’s Club, the Women’s Association of the Democratic Party of Guam, and others. She was a delegate to several U.S. Democratic party conventions (though she later followed her husband in switching to the Republican party) and several international women’s meetings. She worked as a partner in her husband’s businesses, supported him in his political career, and later herself became a senator in the Guam legislature. She went to Washington and successfully lobbied for restitution for Guamanian lands taken by the U.S. government (pp. 109-115). This woman’s life clearly deserves a full-length biography and Souder-Jaffery, who had a close personal relationship to her, apparently has the material for one. I hope that she writes it. This would give her an opportunity to explore issues there is no space for in a chapter-length treatment, such as what motivated Mr. Bamba’s switch to the Republican party and whether Mrs. Bamba had any qualms in following him. In the space she does have Souder-Jaffery shows the relation between Mrs. Bamba’s extended family and her political career; her

grandmother's help in the home made it possible for her to spend more time outside of it.

When I finished this book, I had many questions that remained unanswered. Souder-Jaffery mentions several Chamorro values--hospitality, humility, respect for elders--but I was left wanting much more detail on contemporary Chamorro culture, so that I could better understand the context in which these women were functioning. She mentions several times the Chamorro word *chenchule'*, which is translated as meeting "mutual obligations through exchange of services" (p. 56), and several times refers to the importance of a "Chamorro system of reciprocal exchange and obligation" (p. 183; see also p. 209), but gives no specifics except to say that the mothers side of the family is more important. Some information about it can be inferred from the case study of Geri Gutierrez, who says that in preparing food for social functions she helps people who have formerly helped her, and recruits others to help them as well (p. 192). Non-Chamorro readers could use more explanation of this important concept.

Another Chamorro custom that is mentioned in the notes (p. 235) but not explained is that of nicknaming. The women in the case studies are sometimes referred to by their nicknames ("Ding" for Clotilde Gould, "Chilang" for Cecilia Bamba, and in the notes Souder-Jaffery lists four nicknames for Elizabeth Arriola), and they sometimes refer to Souder-Jaffery by her nickname, Loling. In what contexts are nicknames used or not used, and what does it indicate about the relationship between the people? The reader should be told.

Other Chamorro customs are mentioned in passing but not explained, for instance, the support given by *comadres* and *compadres* (p. 191), which Souder-Jaffery implies, but does not explicitly state, are the godparents of one's children. Similarly other kin terms are used in referring to people, but not explained. Also, several of the older women's names are prefaced by "Tan," and the *tan* is referred to and glossed once as "female elderly" (p. 56), so *Tan* is apparently a title for a female elder, but that, again, is never explicitly stated.

It would also have been useful to include a discussion of the differences between "formal" and "informal" organizations. Souder-Jaffery uses these terms without explaining how she is defining them. She states that "local women rarely . . . organize for themselves at the formal level" (p. 166). She mentions in many of the case studies, however, the church-related organizations of Christian Mothers and the Sodality of Mary. If these are not formal organizations, what are they? Is it necessary to have a board of directors and a set of bylaws to be a formal

organization? If this is what Souder-Jaffery means she should say so. More information on Christian Mothers also would be appreciated, as it seems that this is a grass-roots organization of long standing that is primarily Chamorro.

I would have found the historical information in chapter 3 more useful if it were organized in terms of typical women's life cycles during the precolonial, Spanish, and American naval administration eras, and then compared with a typical scenario for a woman of the generation to which the subjects of the case studies belong. Admittedly women are all individuals and make different choices about when to marry and bear children, but I would like a better sense of the major events in Chamorro women's lives and how they are marked or celebrated, both today and in the past. The women profiled are all, in some sense, exceptional women, and could be understood better with a background knowledge of the more typical expectations for women's lives.

The concluding chapter includes suggestions for further research: comparing the generation studied in this work to their daughters and comparing the women's organizing careers to those of their husbands and brothers (pp. 216-217). I hope that Souder-Jaffery continues this work and that she continues to make people aware, on Guam and in the wider world, of the strengths and the contributions of the Chamorro women of Guam.

Stephen Levine and Raj Vasil, *Maori Political Perspectives: He Whakaaro Māori Mō Ngā Ti Kāinga Kāwanatanga*. Auckland: Hutchinson of New Zealand, 1985. Pp. 206, appendixes, further reading. NZ\$15.95 paper.

Reviewed by Michèle D. Dominy, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

In an article written for the *New Zealand Listener* in March 1980, Ken Piddington, former director of the New Zealand Council and now commissioner for the environment, addresses the "puzzled Pakeha":¹ "I meet a lot of people who ask what is special about the place of the Maori view in any plan for the future of New Zealand. Sometimes they are not even clear whether it should be accepted as a separate view. Although racial issues are now being stated much more bluntly there is still a lingering reluctance to accept that a Maori view of the New Zealand scene can be so different" (20). Toward the end of 1979 Piddington worked on

He Matapuna, a Planning Council publication in which several leading Maori thinkers were invited "to say it the way they saw it" (20). His article explains Maori demands for greater autonomy in New Zealand and suggests some ways in which those demands can be met. For example, he suggests to the Pakeha that "they can accept the reassertion of Maoritanga as one important and continuing strand in the fabric of New Zealand's national identity" (21).

Stephen Levine and Raj Vasil's *Maori Political Perspectives: He Whakaaro Māori Mō Ngā Ti Kanga Kāwanatanga* is a book-length presentation of those same Maori needs for autonomy presented not only by leading thinkers, but through the voices of Maoris from all walks of life, and addressed to those same puzzled Pakehas. In acknowledging the familiarity of what they say to a Maori audience--"They are, after all, more aware of their situation than we are" (10)--the authors admit to writing for a Pakeha audience in order to show the diversity of political perspectives within Maoridom, the quality of thinking, and the depth of commitment to articulating a distinctive Maori presence in New Zealand society. "It is to this end--a politics based on the fact of Maori aspirations and grievances, and their accommodation, rather than the fantasy of a harmonious ethnically homogeneous society--that this study is committed"(10). The authors also state that there "seems little point in glossing over the very clear fact that Maoris and Pakehas do not feel 'alike,' do not classify themselves together, whatever some may believe they *should* feel or think" (12). Levine and Vasil attempt to render the Maori politically visible to the Pakeha.

The authors note the limitations of mainstream political science in answering the race relations crisis facing New Zealand in the 1980s. In so doing, they seem to acknowledge the limitations of the scientific bent of political studies by relying upon informal, in-depth interviews--"conversations"--with Maori speakers of diverse viewpoints and backgrounds who address us in their own voices. They were not chosen as a representative sample; thirty of the main participants are selected and contextualized for us in admittedly impressionistic "character studies" in appendix 1. The studies identify personality, political party affiliation, religious affiliation, gender, occupation, residence (urban, rural, North Island, South Island), and ideological perspective (feminist, separatist, etc.), but the descriptions provided are not equally detailed or parallel for each individual. Given the significant role of young radical women in the Maori separatist movement, I was surprised not to find a portrait of such an individual, although some of the informants did comment on the role of young urban feminist radicals.² We are not told

how many people in total were spoken to, but that the number was "fairly small." Nor are the specific questions asked of these informants included except within the transcribed texts of certain speakers and from context. It is not clear if the same questions were asked of all informants, or to what degree the interviews were open-ended.

Each chapter begins with a series of quotations selected by a Maori reader to reflect its main points. In chapter 1, "The Political Context," the authors assert the need to accept and support a separate identity for the Maori people. The Maori need not only a share of the country's wealth and a political role and voice, but also symbolic recognition as an indigenous people. They summarize the attitudes of the major New Zealand parties--Labour, National, Social Credit, and the New Zealand party--toward Maori issues and suggest that political science in New Zealand has limited its notion of Maori politics to the four Maori seats in Parliament. Maori notions of politics are far broader, however, and the questions asked elicit what contemporary Maori political culture includes, what Maori attitudes toward the four seats and other institutions might be, and what Maoris want from Pakehas. The strength of the chapter reflects the strength of the book as whole--the compelling evidence that politics, its institutions, role, and the solutions it can offer need to be conceptualized in Maori terms. A multiplicity of indigenous perceptions of politics, in which the consensus- and *marae*-based nature of politics emerges as shared among Maoris, are voiced in chapter 2, "Images of Politics," written in primarily Maori voices.

Separate Maori political institutions are the focus of chapter 3, not only formal political institutions such as the Maori seats, the Maori Affairs Department, and its statutory bodies, but also cultural institutions that present an alternative direction free of government. These include Tu Tangata ("To Recognize the Stance of the People"), which stresses the worth of Maori culture independently of government, the Mana Motuhake party, and organizations within Maori community life--voluntary associations, trust boards administering Maori tribal trusts, and *marae* political institutions. Here Levine and Vasil trace the historical development of Maori political institutions from the Treaty of Waitangi to present bodies such as the Maori Council and the Maori Land Court with clarity, detail, and superb integration of informant narrative.

The authors ask mainstream political science scholarship to acknowledge alternative Maori political structures and not to take Pakeha academic perspectives or the assumption of Pakeha culture as the norm. They strive to present an indigenous conception of politics but fall short,

presenting for the most part Maori views of the New Zealand political system and the ways it diverges from some aspects of indigenous Maori politics. To do so adequately would have demanded a more concentrated focus on the integration of politics and religion in colonial and postcolonial Maori culture. This is the approach taken in the scholarship of Judith Binney (Binney, Chaplin, and Wallace 1979), Ranginui Walker (1984), and Peter Webster (1979) (cited in the book's further readings) who focus especially on the prophetic tradition. Walker explores the genesis of Maori activism in that tradition from the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840; he writes, "the history of Maori activism since that time has been characterized by a restless search to recover and reassert that lost sovereignty" (1984:269). Interestingly, Walker asserts that a "central myth-theme" in New Zealand society is racial harmony but its nonexistence has been problematic since 1840 "as the two races of vastly different cultural traditions competed for the land and its resources" (ibid.). Ultimately Walker asserts that the Maori dynamic of self-determinism has persisted historically through various transformations.

While Levine and Vasil present a range of Maori attitudes toward Maori and Pakeha leaders and parliamentary seats in separate voices often reflecting tribal affiliation, it is evident that attitudes toward various issues are closely related. "Maoris do feel that their situation in New Zealand is unique, that their interests and goals are distinctive, and that they require their own political leaders. Whether these leaders are chosen as they are now, in the same numbers and as part of the same institution, appears to be secondary. What seems paramount is that Maoris want leaders who are 'close to the people,' who are chosen by, from, among and for the Maori" (106). Several chapters point to complexity--there is no homogeneous Maori perspective on politics, but politics is necessary to preserve Maori cultural heritage and identity and its distinctiveness from Pakeha ideas about the Maori language, the educational system, economic development, and land. Ultimately, though, within the Maori community there is no clear consensus about the role of politics. "New political structures and redefined political symbols are not yet seen consistently as the most appropriate ways to express the Maori heritage and the pride that goes with it" (161).

Despite the lag between the collection of primary data (May to September 1980) and the publication of the volume (1985), the issues of land, language, culture, and self-determination (*mana motuhake*) for the Maori people that the authors address are as salient today, if not more so, as ever before. In their connecting analyses, concluding chapter, and the appendixes (the "Recommendations of the National Hui on

the Treaty of Waitangi” in September 1984, “Extracts from the Report of the Waitangi Tribunal” in March 1983, and the final communique from the Maori Economic Development Summit Conference in 1984), Levine and Vasil incorporate political events and changes occurring in New Zealand in the interim. These include the Labour landslide of 1984 and the appointment of two Maori members of Parliament to Cabinet positions, the revival of the Pacific Affairs portfolio, the establishment of Maori International, the effects of the 1981 Springbok tour, the introduction of the new Maori language syllabus to schools, and the establishment of *kohanga reo* (language nests).

In conclusion the authors write that “the Maori challenge to the political system is so profound, and of such dimensions, that any set of priorities which does not address the Maori’s place in the New Zealand system, urgently and intelligently, must be mistaken. Nor are Maori aspirations so intractable that, in our view, they cannot be constructively resolved” (166). The political system, the state, must create a society where Maori and Pakeha can coexist in conditions of equality while maintaining their separate cultural traditions. They suggest that comparative political inquiry in Vanuatu, Hawaii, Australia, and other Pacific nations may provide some solutions. As Ken Piddington so insightfully wrote in 1980, “New Zealanders are forcibly reminded that the historical period of world-wide European dominance is drawing to a close” (21). The issues addressed here are of global proportions.

NOTES

1. Pakeha is the Maori term for white New Zealanders, those of European ancestry, as distinct from Maori ancestry.

2. As an example, Donna Awatere comes to mind. Quite possibly, such radicals, concerned with articulating Maori sovereignty rather than helping Pakehas to understand their own role in denying Maori self-determination, refused to speak to the researchers. In her book she writes: “Sharing that knowledge [about the Maori world] with *our* children is surely a priority” (Awatere 1984:95). Maori knowledge as a “treasure” is often “written down in a way readable only by the white academic world.” Levine and Vasil say that they sought a better understanding of a Maori political resurgence from those who would share, implying that not all would.

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Angela Ballara, *Proud to Be White? A Survey of Pakeha Prejudice in New Zealand*. Auckland: Heinemann Publishers, 1986. NZ\$19.95.

Reviewed by Barbara Harrison, Waahi Whaanui Community Training Centre, Huntly, New Zealand

When I first visited New Zealand in 1985, I was on a mid-year break from the University of Alaska-Fairbanks and was visiting friends who were on sabbatical leave from that same university. In New Zealand for only a few weeks when I arrived on their doorstep, they were quick to inform me of all they had so far learned about the country. Among the first things I was told was, "There is no prejudice in New Zealand." I was skeptical, but my two-week vacation was too short a time to allow further exploration of the topic.

I returned to New Zealand in September 1986, this time on my own sabbatical leave. I was affiliated with the Centre for Maori Studies and Research, University of Waikato, but I spent the year living in the Maori community at Waahi Marae in Huntly, where I conducted an ethnographic study of educational programs in the community. I quickly learned that the Maori view of prejudice in New Zealand was quite different from that told to me by my American friends, and, over the period of my ten-month stay, I observed repeated expressions of Pakeha prejudice toward Maori. (Pakeha is the New Zealand term applied to people of European descent.) I concluded that the belief that no prejudice existed was a convenient myth. I wondered, however, about the source of the myth as well as its functioning in New Zealand society.

Thus, Angela Ballara's book, *Proud to be White? A Survey of Pakeha Prejudice in New Zealand*, was of particular interest to me when it was published in late 1986. After reading it, I was left with no doubt as to the validity of the author's major premise: Ethnocentric and racist attitudes among Europeans have been pervasive factors in the development of New Zealand society.

The book is based upon a systematic sampling of newspaper articles and cartoons, beginning with New Zealand's earliest publications. Newspaper accounts have been supplemented with other published

accounts, manuscript material, and official records. The author states that the quantitative frequency with which "eurocentric" themes occurred determined the direction the study took.

The text is intended as a supplement to more comprehensive works on New Zealand history. The emphasis is on the role of the beliefs of Europeans about Maori in the significant events of the nineteenth century--the Treaty of Waitangi, the land confiscations and wars, and the removal into the King country. The rapid decline of the Maori population during the nineteenth century led Europeans to believe that the Maori were a disappearing race, and the population decline was used as justification for the suppression of Maori culture and language.

The earliest documentation selected for analysis came from the missionaries who began arriving in New Zealand in 1814. It will not surprise most readers to learn that the early missionaries had little or no sympathy for the indigenous culture and that they equated the expansion of their Christian religion with the expansion of civilization. Early settlers held similar views. European prejudice was most devastating in its impact because the beliefs supported the European right to acquire the land. The beliefs of the settlers in the inferiority of Maori culture and race provided justification for the settlers to reject the right of the Maori to own the land.

European prejudice continued to influence government policy throughout the twentieth century. Ballara describes segregation in churches, schools, theaters, employment, and other institutions based upon a color bar that persisted until after World War II. The increase in the Maori population in the first half of the twentieth century, however, made it impossible to maintain the myth of the disappearing race, and, by the 1950s, government policy centered on the notion of assimilation--the belief that Maori people would eventually be absorbed into the dominant European culture and society.

The resurgence of Maori culture and political strength in the past thirty years has forced further adaptation of government policy. Ballara writes with some optimism about the changes of the 1980s:

But by the 1980s all the major parliamentary parties have recognised and adopted at least nominally the ideal of multiculturalism. Institutions such as the Race Relations Office, the Human Rights Commission and the Waitangi Tribunal have been set up. The principle of consultation where Maori legislation is concerned has been established, and the principle of affirmative action in some employment and training situations

recognised. Encouragement of Maori bi-lingualism has been initiated by Maori leaders, some of them in government positions, but has received state financial backing to an increasing extent. (P. 169)

The author continues, however, that "it would be falsely optimistic to assume that a multi-cultured Utopia is near" (*ibid.*). Nearly two centuries of prejudice in New Zealand has had an effect on the present generation of both Pakeha and Maori. If the goal of a multicultural society is to be achieved, further change in attitudes of Pakeha about Maori will be essential.

I am now in my second year of residence in the Maori community at Waahi Marae, and it seems to me that many Pakeha are learning to value certain dimensions of Maori culture. For example, "Te Maori," the exhibit of Maori treasures that attracted wide attention in the United States, attracted equal attention in New Zealand. But, there is a much more limited acceptance of other dimensions of Maori culture. Currently proposed legislation related to the protection of children does not take into consideration the role of the extended family and tribe, for example, and control of the administration of institutions and government funding remains very much in the hands of the dominant group rather than in a multicultural administrative structure.

If the present policy aimed at achieving a multicultural society is to be effective, the significance of the history of race relations in New Zealand must be recognized, and Ballara's work contributes to achieving that end. Ballara intended her work for a general, nonacademic readership. In other words, the book is intended as an educational text for the general population of New Zealand. This purpose is reflected in the educational stance taken throughout, as Ballara supplements analysis of documentation with explanations of Maori perspectives that provide Pakeha readers with a better understanding of Maori viewpoints.

Because the book is intended for a general readership rather than for an academic one, it contains only an overview of the methods used in the survey, and academic readers may wish that greater detail had been included on the method of content analysis and on the means used to select supplemental documentation. It is difficult to determine from the description of the method, for example, how the quotations from supplemental documents were selected.

Newspaper editorials and articles, of course, are not necessarily representative of the attitudes of a society as a whole. They are likely to

represent the interests of money and power. One can only conclude from Ballara's study that prejudice has existed in at least part of the European population ever since the arrival of Europeans. Nevertheless, the substantial documentation provided by the author leaves little doubt as to the historical significance of that prejudice.

The title is apparently a modification of a spray-painted graffiti wall that reads "Proud To Be White!!" pictured on the title page of the book. Although apparently used to draw attention to the book's major point, the title's strident tone may well turn some potential readers away. Because the book's major theme is an important one for New Zealanders to be aware of, a less intimidating title would have been useful in drawing readers to the book rather than turning them away.

In the appendix, Ballara provides a brief discussion of the history of racial prejudice in Europe as far back as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Racial prejudice among Europeans is not, of course, unique to New Zealand. European colonialists around the world have used racial explanations to justify colonialism from the fifteenth century to the present time, and their descendants are often unaware of that history. In other settings, too, descendants of Europeans believe the myth that "there is no prejudice," and historical studies of the history of prejudice are needed to dispel that myth and to bring about better understanding of contemporary conflicts.

Ballara's work will be useful primarily in New Zealand. It is a text that can be incorporated into university courses in New Zealand history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and Maori studies. In other countries, it will be most useful to those who bring some knowledge of New Zealand history and of Maori culture to the reading. Because it is not a complete history, it would be difficult reading for anyone who is totally unfamiliar with the setting.

On the other hand, Ballara's work provides an international model for the historical study of prejudice. Other studies of the same kind are needed in former European colonies where the European prejudice of the colonial period has been forgotten or buried. In the United States especially, descendants of Europeans need to be educated about the role of prejudice in the conquest of North America and the Pacific as well as about the role prejudice plays in contemporary American life.

Ian Cameron, *Lost Paradise: The Exploration of the Pacific*. Topsfield, Massachusetts: Salem House Publishers, 1987. Pp. 248, numerous plates, appendixes, bibliography, index. US\$24.95 cloth.

Reviewed by O. H. K. Spate, Australian National University

Ian Cameron appears to belong to a class of "professional-amateur" historians--writers whose profession is producing narrative histories, but whose approach is more or less amateur. Their books are usually well illustrated (this one is splendid in that respect) and written in a lively, engaging style (this again applies), but while they usually give a list of sources, sometimes sketchy enough to betray ignorance (this is not the case here), the texts themselves are not specifically documented. There is nothing wrong in all this; I have never disdained drawing from books sometimes much more naive than Cameron's. Theirs is indeed a laudable pursuit if it stimulates some readers to go further. All depends on the degree of conscientiousness; and while Cameron is conscientious, he sometimes has sad lapses, or else his editor has let him down.

This is certainly so in the extraordinary map that illustrates "The Forming of the Pacific" (p. 21), seen correctly as a function of continental drift and plate tectonics. This is a tricky geomorphological topic, and Cameron naturally enough seems a little out of his depth; but only carelessness can account for a map showing the Kuril trench south of Java and the Sundan where the Kuril should be, the Tongan along the Aleutians, and, to crown all, the Puerto Rico trench off New Zealand: drifting indeed! Fortunately this shocker stands alone, but minor carelessnesses and false emphases are strewn through the book.

This is followed by two chapters on the people of the Pacific (or rather Polynesia) and on "Vikings of the Sunrise." These are quite good introductions, if inclined to take too rosy a view of Islands life and to lean too heavily on Alan Moorehead's *Fatal Impact*; no account is taken of recent criticisms of his view by Islands historians. Cameron strives to strike a balance between the extreme views of Andrew Sharp and David Lewis on indigenous voyaging, though he does not reckon with the psychological factor that, until the Societies were reached, all experience would suggest that good high islands might lie just over the horizon to world's end. But the heart of the book is in the succeeding five chapters on European exploration, and here Cameron's strengths and weaknesses are well displayed.

His main strength is a gift for narrative, the sine qua non of similar writers, and he avoids Eurocentrism, though that is not so singular a virtue now as it once was. He tells a good story with a fine sense of tension, best shown perhaps in his accounts of d'Urville and Bering. But--and this is a besetting sin of amateur historians--while he handles a specific episode well enough, he seems to lose his grip when it comes to the geopolitical setting and the rationale of the voyages.

Explorers just appear out of the blue, and sometimes vanish into it. Thus Arellano makes the first west-to-east crossing from the Philippines, but we are given no hint whatsoever of how Spaniards happened to be there (p. 79). There is nary a mention of Urdaneta's far more significant role in setting up the all-important Manila-Acapulco route. Narrative skills are all very well, but we need *some* analysis if the narrative is to be intelligible on more than a superficial level. Cameron does indeed discuss some topics at length, such as the Noble Savage, and makes some shrewd points, though he is rather too eager to give that hypothetical creature the benefit of the doubt.

Here and there in these chapters I have a sense of déjà vu, but the borrowings are not excessive and, as Cameron refers to me handsomely in his bibliography, I am not complaining. It is, however, amusing that his remarks on buccaneer literature (pp. 112-113), clearly derived from my *Monopolists and Freebooters* (at pp. 156-158), are prefaced by the words "a spate of best-selling derivatives." Subtle acknowledgment, or Freudian slip?

There are also some startling omissions and disproportions. Cameron does justice to Quiros (pp. 80-81), but were it not for three short lines in appendix 1 ("Principal Voyages"), the reader would be quite unaware of Mendaña's exploration of the Solomons in 1568. Cook's second voyage, to judge from Cameron's account (pp. 125-126), was all but confined to the Antarctic. On Cameron's scale Byron certainly, Wallis and Carteret possibly, deserve no more than the passing references they get. But La Pérouse after all explored the one corner of the Pacific, in the northwest, that Cook had left, and this is omitted from the two short lines given him in appendix 1; and d'Entrecasteaux's voyage in search of his fate is not mentioned even there. (There is one text reference to La Pérouse, but merely in passing [p. 174]). Almost five pages are devoted to Darwin (pp. 132-136, 145), but there is no mention at all of his most influential coral-reef theory. Against these inexcusable omissions, Cameron must be credited with paying more than usual attention to Chirikov and Wilkes.

After sins of omission, sins of commission. Samuel Johnson wrote truly that no large work was ever free of "a few wild blunders, and risible absurdities," and I have never allowed a few factual errors to detract from my appreciation of a lively and stimulating book. But *Lost Paradise* is not a large work, and the mistakes, while hardly risible, are not few and some are not trivial. It is not trivial, for instance, that a complete misapprehension of the geopolitical background should lead Cameron to say that Magellan's voyage "had dealt so crippling a blow at the Portuguese oriental empire" (p. 78). Le Maire's route around

Cape Horn in 1616 did *not* “soon become one of the great arteries of the world” (p. 96), despite the brief episode of the Malouin traders in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Per contra, it is no “indication of the lack of liaison between the nations of Europe” that Bougainville took the tortuous course through Magellan’s Straits 150 years after Le Maire (p. 147); the Horn route was well known, but the last two who had tried it, Anson and Pizarro, had had horrific passages, and this is an indication of liaison, not the reverse. Then we are told that “by the end of the eighteenth century, whales and seals in the northern hemisphere had been hunted to near-extinction” (p. 159), but later we have a graphic description of whaling and sealing in the North Pacific “towards the end of the [nineteenth] century” (pp. 200-201). The account of Cook’s death conveys the impression that in the scuffle a chief was accidentally shot (p. 132). Cameron has confused this incident with one in another part of Kealakekua Bay, and all the evidence is that Cook deliberately shot and killed a warrior; not, in the circumstances, that this could be called murder, any more than Cook’s own slaying could. One could go on, but it would be tedious.

There is a place, and an important place, not to be sneered at by academics, for books like *Lost Paradise*; they can stimulate curiosity, but on the whole I think that Cameron does not quite make the grade. He writes in good faith and with some verve; if now and then he seems a little tired, who wouldn’t be in traversing such a vast field? The resources of the Royal Geographical Society were open to him, and he might have written something like Beaglehole’s classic, but more comprehensive (Beaglehole stops with Cook), less Eurocentric, and more in keeping with modern values. Cameron goes some way towards this and there are admirable passages in his book, but too many disproportions, false emphases, and plain errors to be wholly satisfying. *Lost Paradise* is a good read, but by and large better as a tale than as real history.

Gary L. Fitzpatrick with Riley M. Moffat, *Palapala‘āina: The Early Mapping of Hawai‘i*. Honolulu: Editions Limited, 1987. Pp. 160, 90 illustrations: maps, portraits, views, color and b & w. US\$65.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Norman J. W. Thrower, University of California, Los Angeles

Doubtless some of the present-day residents or tourists in Hawaii, while working or relaxing with all of the trappings of civilization about them,

reflect on the earlier Island landscapes that the first English visitors found a little more than two centuries ago. A great help in appreciating this earlier and pristine Pacific paradise is *Palapala'āina: The Early Mapping of Hawai'i* by Gary L. Fitzpatrick. The author of this historical atlas is senior reference librarian at the Geography and Map Division of the Library of Congress and thus has ready access to that great collection. But he has also used other collections and consulted fellow librarians in Britain, France, and Australia, as well as in Hawaii.

The original plan for the book was to have a single volume presenting an illustrated account of Hawaiian Islands cartography from its European beginnings to the present time; there were to be coauthors, Fitzpatrick and Riley M. Moffat. Wisely it was decided to restrict the time span from 1778 to the end of the nineteenth century and to have two atlases, the first concluding at about 1850 with Fitzpatrick as author and Moffat as contributor, The sequel volume with, presumably, Moffat as author and Fitzpatrick as contributor, will focus on the cartography of the Hawaiian Islands in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Following the preface and acknowledgments Fitzpatrick comes to grips with his subject in chapter 1, "Captain James Cook and the First Map of Hawai'i." Six other chapters follow: "The Explorers"; "Harbor Charts"; "Mapping Hawaiian Volcanoes"; "Missionaries and Maps"; "Hawai'i in the World"; and "Hawai'i Nei." This last is the native term for the entire chain of islands. Each chapter includes text, maps, and, where appropriate, profiles, views, and portraits of the leading personalities in the charting and mapping of these remote islands. The surveyors and cartographers include such well-known explorers as Cook, Bligh, La Pérouse, Vancouver, von Kotzebue, Wilkes, and Lisiansky (for whom one of the outermost Hawaiian Islands is named). But some lesser-known individuals enter the picture as well, such as the missionaries William Ellis and John and Ursula Emerson. (Mrs. Emerson is one of the relatively few women cartographers of this period known to us.)

The highly original charts of Matthew Fontaine Maury on winds and currents and on whaling, in respect to Hawaii, are discussed. Maury remains one of the least appreciated American scientists in his own country and it is good to see his charts reproduced in this atlas. Among the controversial topics that are addressed but that cannot be answered definitely are: the possible primacy of the Spanish in the discovery of the major islands of Hawaii owing to the Manila-Acapulco, trans-Pacific trade; and the true authorship of the first printed chart of Hawaii (from Cook's expedition), whether by William Bligh, master of the *Resolution* and later of *Bounty* fame, or by his assistant, Lieutenant Henry Roberts.

The appearance of Captain Cook's expedition of 1778-1779 at Hawaii forever changed the isolated way of life of the island peoples. We are told that the native Hawaiians did not make maps, which is surprising in view of the near ubiquity of so-called primitive maps including the stick charts of wave patterns of the Marshall Islanders. After the Hawaiian Islands were discovered and mapped by Europeans, they were frequently visited by traders and also occupied by agriculturalists who left their mark on the land. One striking example is a map of basic Hawaiian land subdivisions, 1838. It is the job of the cartographer to delineate such distributions and, up to the middle of the last century, cultural phenomena are shown on particular maps in the atlas. The increasing number of place names as the century progresses and the changing methods of expressing the volcanic landforms would be two general topics of interest to students of Hawaiian life and land, and for cartographers generally.

By bringing such a diverse group of maps of one area together in a single volume--from detailed charts of harbors to world maps that show Hawaii in context--Fitzpatrick has performed a valuable service. Considering the faintness of some of the originals, the maps in the atlas are remarkably good; the volume was printed in Japan and the large size and clarity of the reproductions permit examination of even small map symbols. As one would expect, the citations to illustrations are precise and there is a pertinent bibliography and a useful text index. The endpapers are utilized to good effect as a graphic index of the maps and views in the atlas.

Palapala'āina: The Early Mapping of Hawai'i is mainly a work for reference libraries, but some individuals with a special interest in Hawaii might want to obtain a personal copy. When the companion volume is published we will have a detailed cartographic record of one of the most glamorous areas on the face of the earth for about a century and a quarter following its discovery by Cook. In the meantime, through Fitzpatrick's work, we can appreciate the maps produced during the first seventy-five years or so of this period.

John Bach, *The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific, 1821-1913*. Kensington, NSW: New South Wales University Press, 1986. Pp. xii, 260, maps, illustrations, bibliography, appendixes, indexes. A\$29.95.

Reviewed by Joseph C. Meredith, LCDR, USN (Ret.), Indiana University

The best way to tackle John Bach's impressive *The Australia Station* is carefully to read and then re-read his introductory chapter, wherein he identifies the limitations imposed on his study. It is to be the story of the Royal Navy in Australia told from the Navy standpoint, and "only indirectly concerned with the accepted traditional themes of Australian history." The purpose, he says, is "to honour the memory, in however modest and imperfect a fashion, of a great institution, the existence of which, however much we may seek to ignore it, allowed us to become what we are" (p. 4).

Thus we are to expect a fairly narrow account of a specific institutional activity, addressed to a national audience already well informed about the political circumstances that attended it. However, a widely shared sense of, and interest in, the theater in which ships of the Australia Station ranged, far beyond Australian waters, should give it much broader appeal.

Dr. Bach has organized his work topically rather than according to strict chronology. The second chapter, "Origin of the Australia Station 1821-59," really goes back to the days of Governor Phillip and his successors over the previous thirty years, whose needs were ill-met by ships "unsuitable in design or in unserviceable condition." It was in 1821 that arrangements finally were made for a proper warship to be detached from the East India Squadron for service at New South Wales. A few years later responsibility of the naval command was extended to cover New Zealand and the Friendly and the Society Islands. However, the Australia Station as such did not come into existence until March of 1859, when it was designated a separate command, with Captain William Loring, in *Iris*, as its commodore.

Midway during this time, developments, recounted in chapter 3 covering the "Tahiti Fiasco--1842-47," threatened armed conflict between the British and French naval commanders in the Society Islands. The crisis showed how a capable officer on the scene (Captain John Toup Nicolas), with no means of timely communication with his superiors, could be utterly thwarted by standing instructions that were ambiguous and evasive.

The author turns next to the relationships between the Royal Navy and the influx of traders--mostly English--coming into the islands, and between them both and the ever-vocal missionaries. The Navy was expected to protect the native inhabitants from white depredation, and on the other hand to punish the not-always-noble savages for outrages that they indulged in from time to time. These were mainly police and juridical duties for which naval officers were seldom prepared and

which could, if things went awry, result in embarrassment, censure, and imposition of damages. Bach traces the twists and turns of official policy in such matters--rendered all the more irksome by chronic tension between naval and civil authority. Typical was the problem of the labor trade, which became increasingly offensive in the 1860s, leading to adoption of the Imperial Kidnapping Act of 1872 along with a set of vague and uncertain directives loosely derived from the (African) Slave Trade Instructions.

We next turn to consideration of the Maori Wars (1845-1864); of "Colonial Services" (for example, hydrographic survey, transportation of dignitaries); of the contention over Samoa, ending in Britain's withdrawal in 1900; of Fiji and Tonga where the British were more successful (annexing the former as a Crown Colony in 1874, and declaring a protectorate over the latter in 1901); and of the establishment of the office of High Commissioner for the Western Pacific in 1877. This last grew out of the need to provide some form of jurisdiction and authority over British subjects residing in islands outside regular colonial control. The move gave rise to a whole new series of complexities, but one good feature was the designation of the incumbent commodore with the additional title of deputy high commissioner authorized to take direct action against miscreants.

In touching on the international rivalry for influence and commercial advantage in the South Pacific, the author treats the French and their ambitions with particular distaste. The French navy, he says, "quickly demonstrated that it was not handicapped by the legal inhibitions shown by its British counterpart." Nevertheless, the joint Anglo-French "Mixed Naval Commission" set up in 1887 to maintain order and to protect persons and property in the New Hebrides seems to have functioned fairly well, in spite of the divergent methods and attitudes of the participants.

The author says little about Germany's commercial penetration in the Pacific islands, initiated by the Godeffroys in the 1850s, or about the program of colonial expansion adopted by Bismarck in 1884, even though the German presence ultimately grew to become a major threat. After all, the northerly limit of the Australia Station (after 1864) excluded most of New Guinea and the northern tier of islands where the Germans were busiest. Aside from the confrontation over Samoa their diligence seems to have done little at the time to arouse concern.

The touchy relationships between the colonists, with their push for local naval forces under their own control, and the Admiralty, with its

broader view of Empire defense, dominate the remainder of this history of the Australia Station. Introducing the subject in "The Navy and Imperial Defence" (chapter 12), Bach writes: "The Australia Station squadron was part of an imperial organization, manned by imperial not colonial officers and however unpalatable it may be to modern nationalist historians, the Imperial Navy's view of the colonies was inevitably that taken by a superior to a subordinate, in which the interests of the inferior are naturally subsumed in those of the superior. . . . This view, that the sum of things is best preserved when the centre is held, was unacceptable to those colonists who translated it as meaning that in a global war they were expendable" (p. 172). The Naval Defence Act of 1865 and the "naval reforms" (that is, cutbacks) instigated by Hugh Childers and enacted in 1869 aggravated the controversy, even as they compromised Britain's posture in the Pacific. As time went on, "the senior officers and the admiralty also spent much time reiterating to the disbelieving colonial authorities the fundamental truth that the Navy was concerned with the defence of the whole Empire and not just that of Australia, a concept that meant, in theory at least, that the squadrons located physically in the waters of a particular station were not to be seen as being restricted to the defence of that region. They were not regional fleets . . . but were rather temporarily dispersed elements of a single naval force" (p. 186).

By 1890, in the face of compelling strategic developments, the entire concept of foreign stations came under critical scrutiny, even though the need for Australia and New Zealand to contribute somehow to their own regional defense remained. Bach traces the arguments and concessions of the next two decades largely in terms of these issues, and largely from the Admiralty's viewpoint. He sees the situation as ending in stalemate--resolved at last by creation of the Royal Australian Navy and by the events of 1914.

The Australia Station concludes with a narrative of the development of the Sydney Naval Base and an outline of the social aspects of the Royal Navy in Australia, of mostly parochial interest.

This is a work of great scope, probably definitive as a chronicle of the Royal Navy's actions in furtherance and protection of British interests in the Southwest Pacific from the time of Governor Macquarie to the time in 1913 when the functions of the Australia Station passed to the Royal Australian Navy. It is based to a large extent on the author's 1963 University of New South Wales doctoral thesis, "The Royal Navy in the South Pacific, 1826-1876," with additional research performed in 1981

to bring it up to 1913. The resultant work has been criticized as inadequately updated--somewhat unfairly, considering the set nature of academic productions and the fact that more recent writings, although they may enrich or reinterpret, do not amend the basic research.¹

More to the point is the difficulty of converting the kind of narrow, rigorous presentation preferred by a doctoral committee into writing that does justice to situations that are inherently colorful and lively. Often in this history we sense great drama but are left to imagine it for ourselves. Only once does the author let himself go, with a narration of the Apia hurricane of 1889 based on the account of H. G. Kane, commanding HMS *Calliope*, a passage most readers will remember.²

We are forewarned not to expect traditional themes, but there are times when more than passing reference to technological developments--the advent of steam, screw propulsion, armor, and electronic communications--is needed to show how profoundly they affected naval operations in the Pacific in the nineteenth century. Also the general reader needs more orientation and summary than the author has provided; not everyone is familiar with Australian history, nor owns a copy of the *Historical Dictionary of Oceania*.

Altogether admirable is the care with which the book has been furnished with maps, illustrations, chapter notes, bibliography, appendixes, indexes, and a splendid dust jacket. Chapter notes are placed where they belong, instead of at the end of the text. Illustrations are scattered throughout, rather than being cheaply bunched in a separate gathering. The endpapers by L. J. Henderson--showing the 1859, 1864, 1872, 1893, and 1908 limits of the Australia Station--are most useful.

On balance, this is a splendid production, for which both the author and the New South Wales University Press are to be congratulated.

NOTES

1. James A. Boutilier in *Pacific History Bibliography and Comment*, 1987: 41-42.

2. This reader prefers R. L. Stevenson's narrative, and his description of the scene after the storm: "Conceive a table: the *Eber* in the darkness had been smashed against the rim and flung below; the *Adler*, cast free in the nick of opportunity, had been thrown upon the top. . . . In all weather, under a cloudless sky, in those seasons when that ill-named ocean, the Pacific, suffers its vexed shores to rest, she lies high and dry, the spray scarce touching her--the hugest structure of man's hands within a circuit of a thousand miles--tossed up there like a schoolboy's cap on a shelf; broken like an egg; a thing to dream of" (*A Footnote to History; Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa* [New York, 1892], 253-254).

Jean-Paul Latouche, *Mythistoire Tungaru: Cosmologies et généalogies aux îles Gilbert*. Langues et cultures du Pacifique, 5. Paris: SELAF, 1984. Pp. 488, 23 loose charts. F180.

Reviewed by H. G. A. Hughes, Afonwen, Clwyd, Wales

With this fifth, hefty monograph in its scholarly series on languages and cultures of the Pacific, SELAF (the Société d'études linguistiques et anthropologiques de France) shifts its focus from Océanic française to eastern Micronesia, to the Republic of Kiribati, homeland of the Tungaru people, commonly misnamed "Gilbertese." Captain Thomas Gilbert, chance "discoverer" in 1788 of populated atolls, undeservedly lives on in the name Kiribati (that is, Gilberts), chosen in 1979 as the name of the independent republic.

Jean-Paul Latouche, backed by the prestigious Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research in New York, carried out the field work on which this monograph is based during two visits to southern islands of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, then still under British administration. His first visit was to Nikunau from July 1971 to April 1972; his second to the neighboring island of Beru during the second semester of 1975. Latouche gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of forty-four principal informants whom he lists individually, with comments (pp. 30-41). Three major primary sources, still not fully explored, are also acknowledged (pp. 44-46). These are the collections assembled by Arthur Grimble, Ernest Sabatier, and H. E. Maude. For the Grimble papers, now available on microfilm (Arthur Grimble 1964), Latouche prescribes "utilisation délicate." The documents and replies to questionnaires assembled by Father Sabatier (with whom I was privileged to have most fruitful discussions on the language) were consulted by Latouche in 1967 at Abemama. They were then "en fort mauvais état" (p. 45). May one earnestly hope that these irreplaceable papers be preserved for scholarly use before they are lost forever?

Latouche considers the "characteristic feature" of social organization in Kiribati to be the existence in each of the islands' districts of *maneaba*, large communal houses of assembly (p. 7). (The cover design by Danièle Molez illustrates a typical *maneaba*.) These *maneaba* have a "crucial role" in traditional social life, particularly on the southernmost islands. "Indispensable" to the study of this role is the oral tradition (represented here by the texts recorded in Nikunau, for the most part, and Beru) that provides "a kind of sociological theory for it."

Latouche comments that Lundsgaarde and Silverman (1972: 110) had seen that for social institutions such as the *boti* and the *kaainga* to be fully understood they needed to be considered in their context of traditional cosmology-- "sans malheureusement en tirer les conséquences" (p. 33).

As these traditional texts are partly myth (particularly in the various versions of the myths of origin) and partly genealogical history, they can only be understood from prior knowledge of cultural organization, the main features of which are summarized in an introductory chapter (pp. 21-31) embracing Kiribati geography and history, language, and the evolving social organization. Maps of Kiribati, Nikunau, and Beru locate the informants and sources consulted by Latouche for genealogies meticulously tabulated in twenty-three loose charts, each covering on average a score of generations, and for the related texts from oral tradition. Of the latter, he asserts: "The texts, which are the source of endless arguments within the community itself, reveal cosmology as the temporal generation of an order leading to a precise spatial distribution not only of the communal houses but of the entire Tungaru universe" (p. 7).

My own experiences in Micronesia as an inwardly impatient witness to "endless arguments" lead me to commend Latouche for this essential caution. However elaborate and impressive may be the "documentation" of a study such as his, the fact remains that memories are fallible and oral tradition sometimes falters or fails. The complexity of tradition, even in two islands of only some five thousand inhabitants, is daunting and is reflected in the method, structure, and data of this courageous, infinitely patient, pioneering monograph.

Latouche acknowledges F. M. Cornford (1907) as his source of the concept and term *mythistoire*. "Ce mot . . . désigne ici un corpus de textes où l'opposition entre le mythe et l'histoire n'existe pas" (p. 13). This absence of opposition of myth and history gives to the assembled Nikunau and Beru texts a notable originality.

"Ce qui fait toutefois l'originalité de ce corpus est son caractère systématique, liant chaque individu, quel que soit son statut, aux origines par des chaînes généalogiques multiples" (ibid.). Every individual is systematically linked to the origins of the people, by the genealogies.

In the northern islands distinctive, more "dynastic" patterns of social organization broke this "continuité avec les origines," and gave the people a different view and representation of their own past.

Mythbtoire Tungaru is meant for linguists and specialists in Oceanic oral literature, for students of social organization, and, last but definitely not least as far as Latouche is concerned, for the Tungaru people

themselves. The thirty-two vernacular texts translated word-for-word (*juxtalinéaire*) into French are faced by accurate and pleasing French versions (pp. 113-383). Annexes 1-3, similarly translated and annotated, contain myths of very special interest. Annexe 1 has the cosmogonic myths of the Karongoa tradition of Beru, mainly as edited by May Pateman (1942). Other versions of the Karongoa tradition--by Grimble, Sabatier, and Maude--are critically noted (pp. 406-411). Annexe 2 (pp. 413-433) presents the cosmogonic myths of the Karongoa tradition of Nikunau, based on versions by three informants. Annexe 3 (pp. 435-440) outlines the story of the northward expedition from Beru and Nikunau led by Kaitu and Uakeia several centuries ago. This avoided Onotoa (regarded as a source of women) and invaded southern Tabiteuea and then Abemama, Kuria, Aranuka, Maiana, Tarawa, Abaiang, and Marakei. Latouche names twenty-six captains of war canoes (*baurua*) with their *kaainga* of origin in Beru or Nikunau and, from Abemama written sources, lists thirty-six *baurua* names, with fourteen of their captains.

Latouche, correctly in my view, is not at all inclined to accept Maude's assertions that this expedition extended the Beru *maneaba* system to the whole of the group up to Marakei, that it can be considered as marking the beginning of modern Gilbertese history, and that, by genealogical calculation, it may be dated to circa 1650 A.D.

Annotations and commentary on all the texts are painstakingly and competently done. Speculative renderings are clearly indicated. Restricted as it is to a single genre, *Mythistoire Tungaru* succeeds (in contradistinction to Sigrid Koch [1966] and Rosemary Grimble [1972]) in laying a sounder foundation for the study of Tungaru oral traditions than any book hitherto available. Texts are given in full, faithful to the original oral rendition or to the exercise book in which today many elderly islanders record their traditional lore lest it be lost through the indifference of younger generations. Latouche gently chides S. H. Elbert and T. Monberg (1965) for easy assumption of the existence of a unitary tradition. Unlike them, he presents several versions of a single episode or story, as in the case of the cosmological myth. Throughout the corpus of texts, variants and alternative interpretations are scrupulously arrayed and glossed. Only rarely did I find myself perplexed or in disagreement. Latouche has a generally sound acquaintance with the Kiribati language, having clearly benefited from able indigenous informants and from the sterling linguistic skill of Father Kerouanton of the Sacred Heart Mission. Latouche uses the "official," standardized orthography, with slight modifications to bring out differences of meaning

thus obscured. I am an inveterate admirer of the orthography devised by Dr. Hiram Bingham, missionary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, with its clear differentiation of the phonemes *b* and *b'*, *m* and *m'*, and its useful indication by macron of vowel length. *Maneaba* rather than *m'aneaba*, for instance, and some inconsistency in word division and in vowel-length marking (here by vowel doubling) can on occasion get in the way of ready comprehension. It would be wrong to overstress this criticism, as adjustment is easily made. The magisterial stature of the corpus of texts and its accompanying critical apparatus is in no way diminished.

Latouche is especially interesting and thought-provoking in his analysis (pp. 55-95) of the system and morphology of the communal houses of Nikunau and Beru, with plans of *boti* in six *maneaba* in Nikunau and three in Beru.

Tungaru mythology holds that ancestral spirits take possession of places (districts or even whole islands), and their first concern is to build a *maneaba*. This symbolizes their eminent rights. They allot themselves seating places (*boti*) in the *maneaba*. Parcels of land are allotted for sitting private dwellings or for burying their dead. Areas for carrying out their magical rites are termed *kainga*, and these sometimes take the same name as the respective *boti*. Areas for growing crops are *buakoni-kai*. Fishing rights over defined areas (*bike*) and certain other privileges are also established. One notes here the original identity or, rather, overlap of the notions of *boti* and *kainga*.

Most importantly, it is rights in the *maneaba* that are the foundation of and embrace the privileges and other rights associated with land--and not the other way round.

The wealth of detail provided by Latouche regarding theory and practice of the *maneaba* demands the greatest concentration. Valuable earlier studies such as that by Maude (1963, reprinted 1977) now need to be read together with this complementary work by Latouche. Comparison illuminates both works, to mutual and general benefit. Maude is seen to have given a perhaps undue preponderance to the Karongoa tradition, while his analysis of social organization in the southern islands in terms of "exogamous, totemic and patrilineal" clans (1963:54) is held to have distorted (*faussée*) the perspective and to have made incomprehensible several aspects, such as the relations between *maneaba* and between the *boti* within them (p. 24). I consider this criticism of Maude's seminal work to be well founded. Latouche eschews polemic here, but promises thorough discussion of all relevant data and theories in a future supplementary study, to be entitled *Parenté, loca-*

lité, maison: L'organisation sociale traditionnelle des îles Gilbert. This will also comprise many songs, stories, and cycles of legends shedding further light on the matters discussed in *Mythistoire Tungaru*.

The great care with which this complex and difficult monograph has been prepared and printed is evident. Errors (surprisingly infrequent) are of minor consequence. They may be exemplified by slips such as "textes" for texts (p. 7), "Abemana" for Abemama (p. 27 n. 3), and "Samuel E. Elbert" for Samuel H. Elbert (p. 15). The guidance that Latouche offers on how to pronounce the name of the equatorial republic, "Kiribati (*prononcer* Kiribesse)" (p. 13), would be better given as "Kiribats" or "Kiribas."

The cursory bibliographical references (pp. 441-443) relate to works consulted. Lacunae include Pateman (1942) cited at length in Annexe 1 and passim. The glossary (pp. 445-478), although not a fully comprehensive cross-reference guide, is well done and quite indispensable in exploring the labyrinth of the genealogies and related texts.

I find this impressive work of scholarship both useful and endlessly fascinating. It is a veritable linguistic and sociological Golconda. *Mythistoire Tungaru* is a masterly exemplar for future scholars to emulate, island by island.

Latouche writes of his work: "Peut-être ce travail suscitera-t-il ainsi des imitateurs parmi les Tungaru eux-mêmes" (p. 15). May that day soon come!

Jean-Paul Latouche merits our gratitude and our admiration for this splendid work.

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**A Further Note on De Peyster's
Rebecca Logbook, 1818-1824**

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The unexpectedly eventful Pacific crossing of the merchant ship *Rebecca* in 1819 coupled with its being relatively well documented have resulted in a comfortable niche in Pacific historiography for this particular voyage. Indicative of this was the notice in the November 1986 issue of *Pacific Studies* (vol. 10, no. 1: 146) concerning the hitherto little-known logbook of the brigantine's master, Arent Schuyler de Peyster, which in itself was prompted by an earlier article in *Pacific Studies*. Since then it has come to my attention that portions of de Peyster's logbook were published exactly one hundred years ago as an appendix to a family history compiled by J. Watts de Peyster, entitled *Miscellanies by an Officer: Col. Arent Schuyler de Peyster British Army, 1774-1813 with original letters of Col. de Peyster; Brig. Gen. Sir John Johnson, Bart; Col. Guy Johnson; and others from 1776 and 1813, never before published; also discovery of de Peyster Islands, &c., in the Pacific Ocean, &c.; and biographical sketches of the de Peyster, Watts, and affiliated families since their settlement in the present United States* (New York; C. H. Ludwig, 1888), lxxiv-lxxx.

The extracts from the logbook cover the period in Tokelau and Tuvalu

waters in May 1819. The high point of this part of the voyage occurred in the hours before daylight on May 17 when the *Rebecca* came desperately close to being wrecked at Funafuti atoll. These forty-five minutes of fear, when the brigantine's crew took evasive action, are graphically described. The dark-haired de Peyster was so shaken by the experience that his forelock reportedly had turned white before daybreak.

The appendix also contains an extract from the *New York Mail and Express* of 18 September 1888, which indicates that portions of de Peyster's logbook were published "years ago." The place and date of publication are not specified and await further research.

I am grateful to Mr. Mark Jerome Seidenberg of Arlington, Virginia, for drawing my attention to these published extracts from de Peyster's *Rebecca* logbook.

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