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## **PATRONAGE AND BUREAUCRACY IN THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1840–1893**

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The government of the Hawaiian monarchy operated as a patrimonial system until constitutional change in 1887 restricted the power of the king to control executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. Ministers, governors, senior officials, legislators, and judges owed their positions to royal favor and influence, thus continuing for Hawaiian and foreign “service gentry” the practices of the pre-1840 kingdom by valuing loyalty higher than efficiency or selection by competition. At a second level, patronage by governors and senior officials expanded the ranks of those executives who ran public finance, land administration, internal trade, education, police, and the judiciary. The records of the Ministry of the Interior, which undertook most government business and worked through island governors, testify to the widespread prevalence of appointments through influence and the gradual formation of a more permanent set of civil servants who bridged the period between monarchy and provisional government in the early 1890s. Royal patronage became departmental patronage open to new forms of political manipulation.

### **Introduction: Constitutional Monarchy or Patrimonial State?**

ONE OF THE MORE INTRIGUING QUESTIONS about the Hawaiian monarchy’s transition from the political dominance of a ruling lineage to forms of constitutional prescription defining the limits to monarchical rule involves the ways in which local government functions were carried out. While senior appointments at the level of island governors, cabinet ministers, and others close to the royal household are well documented, the origins of the Hawaiian “civil service,” including police and the judiciary, at the levels of municipal and district administration have not been pursued in any detail. Indeed, the term “civil service” does not feature in the indexes to most standard texts on Hawai‘i’s political history.

The question is important, moreover, for understanding the changing functions of the royal lineage in the circumstances of pressures for “reform” of Kamehameha I’s legacy of autocratic centralization in favor of corporate representation of chiefs, nobility, foreign settlers, and, to a lesser extent, Hawaiian commoners. It would be agreed that both Hawaiians and foreigners were incorporated into Hawaiian government in advisory and executive capacities at critical periods of political change such as the rejection of the *kapu* system in 1819 by Ka’ahumanu, as regent and former favorite wife of the deceased king, or the definition of settler rights and monarchical privilege through external treaties and constitutional prescriptions in the 1830s and early 1840s. The most notable early examples were missionaries headed by Hiram Bingham, when Ka’ahumanu used conversion to the new religion from 1825 to legitimize the authority of the royal lineage in combination with leading *ali’i* (chiefs, nobles) in the face of opposition from the beach community of settlers and seamen; and secondly, the reassertion by Kamehameha III after 1839 of royal privilege in combination with *haole* (foreign) advisers at the period of law making and constitutional construction from 1840 to 1845.<sup>1</sup> In both cases the new definition of Hawaiian government according to the precepts of the Decalogue or imported notions of cabinet and representative government created officeholders owing their place to the favor of the paramount.<sup>2</sup> What is less certain, however, is that Hawaiians in general, outside the immediate circle of ministers and officials in Honolulu, were displaced by *haole* executives until much later in the 1870s and 1880s, as civil service departments expanded; and, even then, there is a case for arguing that education or efficiency were not the sole criteria for recruitment and employment in Hawaiian administration, but, rather, included older principles of kin dependency and above all loyalty to a superior in rank.

In short, for much of the period of consolidated government throughout the Hawaiian Islands to 1887, the administration could be more accurately described as that of a “patrimonial state,” rather than a “constitutional monarchy.” “Patrimonialism” or “inheritance from the ancestors” has its roots, moreover, in the appointments and structure of government following Kamehameha’s conquests in 1795, rather than in the activities and advice of foreigners. Such an interpretation, however, has not found much favor in the orthodox histories of Hawai’i. Consequently, historians have had some difficulty characterizing the “Hawaiian Kingdom” before 1887 or the revolution of 1893, except in terms of a concentration of power at the center.<sup>3</sup> The historiographical consensus focuses on a shift of that power from native Hawaiian to *haole* hands, mainly through the mechanisms of land redistribution and the gradual assertion of resident-foreigner control over government through constitutional changes that altered the balance between royal

executive and an elected legislature and made separation of the judiciary from the executive possible. The backing of United States settlers for such changes is a constant but not entirely conclusive factor until the demise of the monarchy. There are considerable differences of emphasis within this economic and political explanation for the subversion and eventual subordination of a small Polynesian state to external interests. The key topics are seen as a shift in the ownership of land as a major resource, control of external and internal trade and investment, tensions between ethnic groups, the high politics of local party formation, and foreign relations. But because of this emphasis on externalities, rather than internal administration, some of the principal characteristics of the kingdom in its transformation from “feudalism” through prescriptive constitutions to a measure of responsibility of the executive to a legislature have been obscured on the way in favor of a “hegemonic” interpretation of foreign influence over the Kamehameha lineage and its successors. Somehow the “kingship” that was such “a very real element in the government,” in the opinion of the constitutional historian T. M. Spaulding, was written out of government by a mix of militant republicanism and vested economic interests, assisted by tactical errors on the part of the last monarch.<sup>4</sup>

The factor of foreign advice and overt pressure is not disputed here, nor is the central location in Honolulu. There is fair agreement that the kingdom that emerged under the dominance of the Kamehameha lineage in the 1830s was initially dependent on the administrative abilities of Dr. G. P. Judd, Lorrin Andrews, R. C. Wyllie, and others. The published sources have made much of these early advisers, especially Wyllie, first foreign minister and setter of trends in style and etiquette; Andrews, longtime resident and a client of the monarchy who had left the mission to become judge and assistant to Governor Kekūānaʻōʻa of Oʻahu; and John Ricord, straight off a vessel and into the post of attorney general as the only lawyer in the islands. There were many such—some fourteen foreigners as judges, harbor masters, customs officers, sheriffs, and constables by 1844 and perhaps some forty-eight by 1851.<sup>5</sup> A case can be made that to all appearances foreigners ran the elementary form of royal cabinet that was created in the early 1840s, though not the small appointed and elected houses of Hawaiian nobles and delegates beholden to Kamehameha III. Foreign advice was valuable, but too much should not be made of the status of foreigners; like the missionaries before them, they were subordinate to the close-knit hierarchy of royals and their affines who commanded the resources and labor of land and population.

The basis for this argument lies in the social and political structure of the Hawaiian hierarchy of royals, chiefs, and officers of state as well as their values, which laid considerable emphasis on the loyalties of kin and asso-

ciates at the highest levels of government. This structure and its underlying ideology of intimate trust between the highest grades of leaders by ascription and their executives, incorporated into the ranks of titled offices by gift of royals and chiefs, continued and was adapted to the requirements of an emergent “bureaucracy,” which had little in common with foreign conceptions of recruitment, promotion on merit, and prescribed status and duties.

The argument is supported by the more recent revision of Hawaiian political structure and public offices presented by Terry Young.<sup>6</sup> According to this view, the king, following Kamehameha’s conquests, retained absolute power to allocate offices to near relatives and land management to stewards (*konohiki*), who in turn supervised chiefs and commoners who had usehold of *ahupua’a* and *’ili* lots. The monarchy appointed its own officials from near relatives and high chiefs kept near to the king as a precaution against defection. The extended network of royal supporters drawn from cousins, siblings, and titled clients—the *kaukau*—survived under Ka’ahumanu and Liholiho in ways that replace the older stereotype of “feudal absolutism” with a more subtle interpretation of the roles of a stratum of officials, personal attendants, and those who sought a leader in the context of loyalty and correct behavior. According to this analysis, high chiefs throughout the group depended on a family support system, including those incorporated by achievement and marriage. Such clientage through a *ho’opili* or a *haku* relationship of close personal friendship was tempered by deference on the part of those who “stepped up to serve” as *kaukau*. Royal patronage cemented together Hawaiian government in the transition period from centralization by force to a measure of constitutional bargaining between the royal lineage and its chiefly constituents. “Far more than mere genetics, the organizing principle of ancestry and its processual component *ho’opili* imbued the aforementioned chiefly servers [*kaukau*, *konohiki*, *kahu*] with an empowering *mana* offered by politically influenced roles in the Kamehameha circle of power.”<sup>7</sup> I take this statement to mean, in short, that the monarchy was underwritten by a “service gentry” not so different in origins and function from other examples in Indian and African hierarchies.<sup>8</sup>

This interpretation, moreover, can be extended to the early missionaries who worked through a patronage system centered, in Hiram Bingham’s terms, on the “natural powers” of the “royal family circle, and its honored connections” of extended kin, by using the cautious friendship of Liholiho (Kamehameha II) and the warmer response of the influential Ka’ahumanu as principal royal executive till 1832.<sup>9</sup> They had little but Christian precepts to offer in return until the arrival of a mission press gave the royals a monopoly over the distribution of printed tracts and access to a new technology. Arms, a schooner, and the visits of British naval vessels were manifests of the distant

patronage of the British monarchy and also served to raise the status of the Hawaiian hierarchy. Boki, a chief of Maui and governor of O‘ahu who accompanied Liholiho to England, interpreted this attention in terms of his own idea of government, acknowledging King George IV “as my landlord and myself as tenant (or him as superior and I inferior).”<sup>10</sup> Too much should not be made of this deferential civility to a distant monarch, any more than the vague “protection” offered by Vancouver’s treaty with Kamehameha I. Lord Byron’s visit on HMS *Blonde* to bring back the bodies of Liholiho and his spouse as well as a British consul reinforced the point of friendship without commitment. But some of Byron’s advice on the value of allegiance, a system of leases under chiefly authority, centralization of taxes and port duties, and justice by king in council did not go unheeded, because the views of this British aristocrat were not so far removed from those of Hawaiian aristocracy.

Thus, from within the structure of Hawaiian government as centralized by Kamehameha and his successors, there were strong patrimonial elements in the selection of executive officers of state, codified in the 1840 constitution and the Acts of 1845–1847 and endorsed by the advice of foreigners who were co-opted into this structure.<sup>11</sup> The first constitution begins with a list of the king’s prerogatives based on the general principle of royal protection in return for loyalty and “correct deportment” (*pono*): the preservation of dynastic succession, power to manage all lands, direction of all executive means of government, reserve of royals’ private lands and lands taken for nonpayment of taxes or fines, and conduct of treaty relations and external commerce. Executive officers consisted of a premier as a “special counselor” (an echo of the former *kuhina nui*) and four governors of the islands to supervise tax gatherers, a house of nobles, and a representative body to discuss legislation, judicial officers, and law enforcers.

As John Ricord noted in his preface to the 1846 edition of the constitution, little had been changed by an 1839 bill of rights: the constitution was still patrimonial because “engrafted on the ancient form of government.”<sup>12</sup> The political principles underlying the code of civil laws and the constitution framed by the Rev. William Richards and the converted and educated Hawaiians David Malo, John Īī, Timothy Ha‘alilio, and Boaz Mahune, who were close to royalty, enshrined the hierarchy of older and new service roles, because government centered on the king, “whose executive functions are assigned to the management of five ministers, dependent solely upon him, but controllable by a majority of ministerial voices.” This slight ambiguity says more about Ricord’s struggle to reconcile a form of absolutism with legal prescription than the ways in which the king raised up his officials to office and employed them. In practice there was no ministerial veto over the king or his executive before 1887. In theory, too, the judiciary was indepen-

dent, but in practice it was responsible to the king as chief judge of a supreme court. Departments of state were not outlined in detail but left to ministers to invent and run. Governors, however, as royal appointments by king in council were accountable to the minister of the Interior under the Acts of Kamehameha III from 1845; and all ministers were ex-officio members of the Privy Council of selected nobles and accountable only to the king and the premier.

Little attention has been paid to the ways in which officers of state were appointed from the 1840s on, in favor of accounts of high politics and relations with the United States and other foreign powers. Although advisers managed, the king ruled; this pattern of patrimonial domination continued well into the 1870s and 1880s, and was entrenched by constitutional revision.<sup>13</sup> In a group of scattered islands, moreover, the cohesion of the kingdom depended on the ways in which power was delegated, who exercised it, and what royal prerogatives kept subordinate ministers of departments, governors, and lesser officials in check. A patrimonial system could not operate without delegation, especially in the important areas of finance and justice. But it could not survive disloyalty and administration in the name of locally vested interests any more than it could survive advancement of foreigner interests at the expense of royal authority. Certain features changed. Governors were not formally styled as subordinate to a *mōʻī* (paramount chief); nor were they necessarily related or *kaukaualiʻi* in the older sense of the term. But they were in the most fundamental sense the executive arm of the monarchy for accessing island resources and, therefore, were royals or close clients of royals, the first line of defense of privilege based on descent.

Furthermore, the formal responsibility of governors to a minister, and especially to the ministers of Interior and Finance, simply came to reflect the greatest change of all, namely the expansion of resources in tax, land, and labor, dealt with for the most part by one department and gradually subdivided among new executive officials controlled on the outer islands and on Oʻahu by the governors.<sup>14</sup> Tax and other offices were filled by commissions to individuals awarded by king in council; and as such they were a formalization of the older tradition of offices in the gift of the *mōʻī* to loyal followers and not any importation of British or American practices, however familiar the titles “assessor,” “collector,” “marshal,” “sheriff,” “magistrate,” or “circuit judge” may have sounded to nineteenth-century ears. Control of resources underlay this proliferation of offices; and Hawaiian bureaucracy began with a reform of royal indebtedness by a “Treasury Board” in May 1842, appointed by king and legislators, consisting of the two faithful servants, Dr. Judd and John Īī, who restored solvency by extending, inventing, and imposing new taxes on Hawaiians and foreigners.<sup>15</sup> These resources were col-

lected through the Ministry of the Interior. Of the five executive departments set up under ministers by the Acts of 1845–1847, Interior and Finance shared the management of taxation and land divisions beginning in the 1840s. Their functions were defined under Kamehameha's second act of 1846 together with a Board of Commissioners to Quiet Titles (Land Commission).<sup>16</sup> Such measures opened up a rich source of rewards in estates for chiefs and former landlords (*konohiki*) as well as land transfers by sale and lease to foreigners, accompanied by a wide definition of “government” lands. The division created many new jobs for recording and carrying out land and title transactions, surveys, and boundaries; and these legal formalities tapped new resources in the form of fees and rents. The roots of Hawai'i's civil service, therefore, lay first within the tradition of patrimonialism as adapted by the royal lineage from the end of the eighteenth century to cover incorporation of resident foreigners and Hawaiians as advisers and senior officials holding ministerial and other appointments; and, second, in the proliferation of posts required to manage new sources of state revenue, which, in turn, created a second layer of functionaries as clients of senior officials.

### **The Ministry of the Interior**

The evidence for the interpretation outlined above rests mainly on the records of the Interior, which handled more government business than any other department and dealt directly with island governors. Correspondence and letterbooks provide numerous examples of patronage appointments for both Hawaiians and *haole* who worked for a department that accumulated more duties and spent more money than any other branch of ministerial government. Such detail is ignored in the standard works; and no claim is made here for a complete or systematic treatment of Hawai'i's nascent civil service. Anyone relying on the formal lists of the civil establishment compiled relatively late in the *Hawaiian Almanac and Annual* from 1875 could be forgiven for thinking Hawaiian government was O'ahu government. Nothing is included on the administration of the outer islands; governors themselves are not listed before 1877. The officials of the Interior department were not listed until 1880 in the *Almanac's* “Register and Directory” of the civil and military establishment; and from then on there is an annual civil list and not just lists of court, cabinet, legislators, nobles, and foreign diplomats.

The budgets for posts listed in financial records, however, illustrate the full scope of the Interior (Figure 1). In addition to the salaries of the minister and his staff of clerks and messengers, the department paid the four governors and their clerks, the marshal and four sheriffs of the islands, jailers, surveyors, postmaster and mail carriers, vaccinators, printers, the police, and

the Honolulu Fire Department. Responsibility for “public improvements” also brought under the minister of the Interior a further dozen or so superintendents and road supervisors and sundry contractors. In short, from 1846 the Interior department was the main channel for official communications with the districts and municipality of O‘ahu and the other islands in a mix of central and local government functions. It handled through its agents every kind of receipt, paper permission, and anything on which an impost might be charged; and it supervised and appointed the agents who were responsible for assessing and collecting such charges. It undertook public works of every kind. In time the Interior developed a ramage structure subdivided into ancillary departments and bureaus responsible for most of the state controls exercised over water, forestry, immigration, and the post office until these were split off in the 1890s. Expenditure within this vast domain of developing bureaucracy accounted for nearly half of total appropriations for most of the period (Figure 2).

Even more than the Finance department, the Interior was the supervisor and collector of the kingdom’s revenue; and it spent the most on a wide variety of offices and capital projects. The earliest lists of appropriations in the 1840s indicate that funding went mainly toward salaries within departmental budgets. The Interior was the biggest spender because of its appointment of local government executives, headed by island governors whose salaries ranged from \$1,000 (for the main island) down to \$500 for the governor of Kaua‘i.<sup>17</sup> But it was not a spendthrift department in its early years, and it did not overrun its allocations. It is worth noting that it was D. L. Gregg, the American minister to Hawai‘i, who congratulated the Interior on improved finances in 1861 and who put up the idea of a loan from England, Belgium, or Holland to take the Treasury out of reach of commodity or currency speculators, an idea accepted all too readily as ambition for public spending grew (see Figure 1).<sup>18</sup>

A summary analysis of the department shows that, in addition to the minister, its strength in central office personnel grew from three in the 1850s to twelve in the 1880s, including a chief clerk and three of four junior clerks. But other senior officials responsible for conveyancing, registration, surveying, the post office, public works, and water supplies are listed as Interior functionaries in the budget, reflecting the department’s management of the Mahele land division and implementation of investment in infrastructure. The “head office” view of senior personnel in the *Almanacs* presents a selective and limited list of personnel and omits the direct links between the department and executive officials administering taxation, licenses, and patents and, through the offices of the island governors, the marshal and sheriffs responsible for forts, prisons, judiciary, and other functions later allocated to the attorney general’s office. The positions of marshal and sheriffs fitted






FIGURE 1. Hawaiian government expenditure, 1850–1892. It should be noted that “government debt” in terms of the issue of Exchequer notes and external borrowing is reported in a mix of fiscal and biennial years. Servicing charges are not reported separately. Nevertheless, the main trend is clear, especially after the Loan Acts of 1874 and 1876. (Sources: *Reports of the Minister of Finance, 1850–1890* [Hawai'i State Archives, Rhodes House, Oxford]. See, too, Theodore Morgan, *Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change, 1778–1876* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948], appendices, 230–231; Ralph Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1854–1874: Twenty Critical Years* [Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1953], 192)




FIGURE 2. Ministry of the Interior expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure, 1850–1890. (Source: Reports of the Minister of Finance, 1850–1890)

awkwardly into the Interior hierarchy. There had been a “high sheriff” as early as 1843 until the office was taken over in 1847 by the marshal, the most long-appointed of whom was W. C. Parke, who left a valuable memorandum on the scope of his job. Marshals ran the prisons; but prisons (usually the forts) came under the Interior. Any petitions from prisoners (“the lowest persons and scum of the earth,” as they humbly termed themselves when appealing for better conditions in 1855) went directly to the minister and were never reviewed by a judge.<sup>19</sup> The department also supervised sheriffs, who had the functions of a prefect of police. The department, therefore, ran the Honolulu police court, which had an unusually large jurisdiction, acting in all municipal and civil cases and as a grand jury for O‘ahu. Outside of Honolulu, governors appointed police, and the sheriff had little authority except at Hilo, where he doubled as chief of police; this anomaly continued till the police department came under the attorney general’s office in 1888.

For other reasons, too, the Interior handled much business normally associated with other departments, because the early years of constitutional monarchy were marked by a lack of precise demarcation between ministerial responsibilities or, indeed, between ministers who occupied a succession of posts and often held several at the same time. Kamehameha III used his trusted *kaukauali‘i* John Young (Keoni Ana) or his own brother, Prince Lot Kamehameha, to head the Interior. Young acted as governor of Maui and prime minister while holding this office, and Prince Lot acted as minister of Finance.<sup>20</sup> It was also the case that the immediate links between the Interior and officers on O‘ahu and the islands, especially the governors, gave it primacy over other branches of government. These links were carried out through executives appointed by and responsible to the minister of the Interior because of the requirement laid down in Kamehameha III’s first act that governors report first to the Interior on finance, education, justice, and all other matters they dealt with.

### **Monarchs and Ministers**

For their part, senior *haole* ministers such as Dr. G. P. Judd were safely protected in office, so long as they found favor with royalty, given their ability to manage revenue. Safe from the political dangers inherent in any system of responsible cabinet government (such as the one that had emerged only gradually and recently in the United Kingdom), Judd moved from Foreign Affairs to the Ministries of Interior and Finance. He made his first annual report in 1845 to show that he had reduced a \$60,000 debt to a reasonably balanced account at \$64,045 in revenue and an expenditure appropriation of \$70,537, which got the monarchy out of crisis though not completely out of

deficit. But he made the report to the king, not the legislature, because he was principal among the king's servants and a client subject to dismissal in favor of others. Ministers of the Interior, like their colleagues in other departments, did not remain in office for long unless they were close to the monarchy by blood or friendship. John Young took over the department from Judd in 1846, serving as premier till 1855 and continuing till 1857 in a term that accumulated many of the multifarious duties assigned to his officials. This trend was continued from 1857 to 1863 by Prince Lot Kamehameha, who occasionally ran other departments as well. They were followed by short-term clients, G. M. Robertson (1863–1864) and C. G. Hopkins (1864–1865). A longer ministerial term under F. W. Hutchinson introduced a more bureaucratic insistence on record keeping and a more stable corps of civil servants owing their appointment to the minister, from 1865 to 1873. Thereafter, there was a quick succession of ministers—E. O. Hall, H. A. Widemann, W. L. Green, W. Moehonua, J. Mott-Smith—until S. G. Wilder (1878–1880). This pattern of quick turnover reflecting royal idiosyncrasy and cabinet instability continued and contrasts strongly with the longevity of the departmental senior clerks, superintendents, and commissioners of government bodies. There were eleven Interior ministers in ten years through the 1880s (W. M. Gibson served as minister twice) before a constitutional change in 1887 and the ministries of L. A. Thurston, C. N. Spencer, C. T. Gulick, and G. N. Wilcox began to politicize the department and set the scene for the revolution of 1893.

While in office, however, ministers mingled freely with royalty and frequently met the island nobles and governors as they moved between executive office, selection as legislators, and membership in the Privy Council. As a group they could be termed a “service gentry.” Paul Kanoa, as minister of Finance in 1842 (though not officially listed), or the Hon. J. M. Kapena worked in residence with Kamehameha III. Inadequately housed along with other ministries in two government bungalows in the 1840s and 1850s close to the king's palace bungalow, armory, and courthouse (both used for legislative meetings), the Interior fought for space less effectively than it fought for resources. It did not find better quarters until the construction of Ali'iōlani Hale as the main government building, between 1872 and 1874, thus taking priority over, but not exceeding in extravagance, the royal 'Iolani Palace constructed from 1879 to 1882 at a cost of \$350,000.

Evidence of appointments at senior levels suggests the Kamehamehas and their successors retained much of the power of patrimonial selection until the 1880s. Under Kamehameha III the king personally nominated and commissioned the head of the government press, the marshal of the Hawaiian Islands (as principal law enforcement officer), the chief justice, the attorney general, ambassadors, heads of boards and commissions, and sundry military

officers. The Hawaiian historian Samuel M. Kamakau had a poor opinion of appointments in the 1850s and regretted that the powers of the governor—the *aliʻi kiaʻāina*—had been spread among other officials.<sup>21</sup> But this view is too sweeping and may reflect Kamakau's experience of bureaucracy as it administered his own publications. The king could also intervene directly in the business of a department. When in 1886 a shortfall was recorded in the accounts of the waterworks and the post office, Kalākaua proposed a wholesale dismissal of all officials in these sections of the Interior. In fact the damage caused by embezzlement was limited by the sudden departure of the assistant postmaster general, I. B. Peterson (a *haole*), who was replaced by a Hawaiian. If the king trusted an envoy, he promoted him at will, as, for example, when Curtis P. Iaukea, former collector general of customs, chamberlain, and governor of Oʻahu became ambassador to Britain in 1887.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, Luther ʻAholo, who served as clerk to the governor of Maui, rose to the legislature and became minister of the Interior in 1886–1887, under Kalākaua's favor, as did Paul Kanoa (junior), who became governor of Kauaʻi from 1881 to 1886, member of the House of Nobles from 1882 to 1892, privy councillor from 1883 to 1888, and minister of Finance in 1886 and 1887. Those whom kings put down could also be raised from the dust, as was the case with the part-Tahitian Charles B. Wilson, a clever man who superintended the public water supply in the 1880s and was a close friend of Liliʻuokalani, who immediately promoted him to the position of marshal on her accession.<sup>23</sup>

All kings, therefore, created ministers—rather than accepting nominations through a legislature or embryonic party system—and none more frequently than David Kalākaua (1876–1887), who commissioned some thirty-seven in all, eleven of whom were Hawaiians or part-Hawaiians. Other forms of patronage were less in the public interest: for example, his support for the Italian confidence man Celso Moreno in his bid for steamer and cable lines and an opium concession.<sup>24</sup> These bids for subsidy came to nothing, but Kalākaua made Moreno minister of Foreign Affairs until he was forced out by the diplomatic community's lack of recognition.

At this level of royal promotion, successful ministers usually staffed their own departments or accepted what they found, as a second level of patronage that secured appointments for the handful of clerks who executed daily business and who came to have considerable expertise and influence. In 1846, for example, G. M. Robertson began his long career in Hawaiian government by writing to John Young for a post in the Interior as a clerk, because the premier had the power to make such appointments “according to your own wish,” though he hoped Judd would also consent.<sup>25</sup> In June 1847 Robertson renewed his clerkship for ten years at a salary of \$1,300 a year, an appointment confirmed by Young and Judd under ministerial seal. In 1848 he threat-

ened to resign if his salary was not increased to \$2,000, equal to the treasurer or the minister of Education, and got his way. Such correspondence from a useful ministerial client has survived in miscellaneous files, rather than in the carefully transcribed and copied files for departmental sections, largely because of its semi-informal nature, in the absence of any system of selection by competition or examination. It shows that other chief clerks entered service in the same way as Robertson—by personal appointment through the minister of the day—but they did so less frequently, as old hands stayed in the top jobs. By the 1880s J. A. Hassinger could fairly be said to have become a permanent principal secretary (as chief clerk) with an annual salary of \$3,000, or half that of the minister, and lasted for fifteen years between 1880 and 1894, as ministers came and went and the monarchy was dissolved.

The outward letterbooks of Interior correspondence from the 1840s reveal a different and less personal style, confirming or disallowing agents and governors' decisions, offering advice, citing legal precedents, and giving directions on how to hear cases according to rules of evidence. Indeed, a surprisingly large amount of Interior work covered legal and court business normally handled by a Crown prosecution service or an attorney general's department. Otherwise outward letters take the form of directives aimed at controlling the rising tide of land divisions and sales, when decisions were handed down by the king in privy council. One formal reply to begging letters became standard. However precariously the government itself might live on credit, the department refused to grant loans to Hawaiians starting up a business.

One can gain some idea of what Hawaiian officers thought of the Interior department as an instrument of government from the suggested plan of reorganization sent in by the noble and sometime judge Z. Kaunamaea to the king in November 1848. He envisaged a whole departmental section devoted to royal and noble genealogies (complete with victories and defeats) to maintain the credentials of those in high office, a section to manage the property of the kingdom, emphasis on loyalty as a qualification for office, and a department on constitutional problems—in all a revealing document on the difficulties of reconciling patrimonialism with constitutional prescriptions.<sup>26</sup>

### Governors

As in the case of ministers, patronage was exercised at the first level by appointment of nobles to governorships, the Privy Council, and cabinet office with charge of departments, along with *haole* clients of the king. According to the 1840 constitution, governors were appointed by the king for Maui and Kaua'i with the approval of both houses—in fact by the nobles. But in 1845 Kamehameha III removed Young from Maui and made him premier “be-

cause he was a favorite and the choice of the king” and simply nominated his replacement, J. Kaneohea, on his own initiative.<sup>27</sup> In effect such a practice simply continued consolidation of power by the Kamehameha lineage in the 1820s and 1830s, when a number of the immediate descendants of the paramount chiefs of Maui and Kauaʻi were appointed as governors. For Hawaiʻi island royals were a more usual choice, beginning with Kuakini, brother of Kaʻahumanu, and continuing through a line of close relatives throughout the period. Following Boki’s governorship of Oʻahu (1819–1830), the patriarch Mataiao Kekūanaʻa stayed in office as governor for some thirty years, as the husband of a daughter of Kamehameha I and himself father of two kings (Lot and Liholiho). He was followed for a period of twenty years by Prince John Dominis, who also governed Maui in the early 1880s. But these royal appointments and pluralities disguised the functions of a number of deputies and acting governors who in many ways are the successors to the *kaukaualiʻi* (Table 1).

As nobles and officers of the Crown, the island governors corresponded with all departments, but especially with the Interior. Second-level patronage, rather than competition by applicants, secured posts for their subordinate officials who carried out the functions the governorships were intended to service, especially in revenue collection and general supervision of Crown and government lands. They were not well furnished to do this; and there were constant appeals for paper, ink, furniture, and copies of statutes. J. M. Kapena, as assistant to Acting Governor Kapeau on Hawaiʻi, complained in 1851 he was ashamed of his office and his inability to carry out repairs and feed and clothe the soldiers of the fort when appropriations did not come to hand.<sup>28</sup>

Reliable secondary appointments, therefore, were vital to the main function of governors and ministers in charge of internal affairs and finance, namely, assessment and collection of numerous direct taxes (poll tax, schools, road labor, animals) and licenses. In 1848 Governor Kekūanaʻa on Oʻahu appointed his own deputy, John ʻĪʻĪ, and suggested a relative, Namauli, to assist him.<sup>29</sup> It was normal in the 1840s for a governor to appoint tax officers (as Leleiohoku did for Hawaiʻi in November 1845) simply by sending in a list of names with their areas of collection or assessment. Theirs was the first line of access to resources on the part of the monarchical state, including forced labor of prisoners, set to work cutting coral for roads, and others forced to pay their road tax by labor. In return, they were expected to protect commoners’ rights, ensure access to a judicial system and elementary education (in return for a special tax), and supervise road construction, the main form of public works.

In general, a governor did not make up the accounts for returns of public works. These accounts were meticulously made out and forwarded through the governor to the Interior department and to Finance by the overseers for

TABLE 1. **Governors of the Hawaiian Islands**

	O'ahu	Maui	Hawai'i	Kauai'i
1836–66	Mataiao Kekūāiō <sup>a</sup>	1845 Kekauonohi, John Young	1820–45 Kuakini	1845 Keali'iahonu
1855	N. Kahulanui, deputy	1848–50 J. Kaneoha	1845–46 W. P. Lelelohoku	1850s–1872 P. Kanoa
1866–86	Prince J. O. Dominis <sup>b</sup>	1851–74 P. Nahaolelua <sup>c</sup>	1851–54 C. L. Kapeau, J. Kapena (assistant)	1875–80 J. E. Bush
1886–87	C. P. Iaukea	1875–76 J. Kapena 1877–78 W. L. Moehonua 1879–86 Prince Dominis 1886 R. Hoapili 1887 R. H. Baker	1856–74 Ruth Ke'elikōlani 1876–78 S. Kipi 1880 Likelike <sup>d</sup> 1881–84 Kekaulike 1885–86 Pomaikelani 1887 Ululani	1881 F. W. Beckley 1881–86 P. Kanoa Jr. 1887 Lamihau

*Sources:* Hiram Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands*, 6; Hawai'i State Archives, Interior, Misc. boxes and letterbooks; card index of personal names; *The Hawaiian Almanac and Register* (1875–1893).

*Note:* This list must be regarded as tentative so far as some of the dates are concerned. In 1892, after formal abolition of governorships, there was a return to titular governors: A. S. Cleghorn (spouse of Princess Likelike), governor of O'ahu; T. W. Everett (a former sheriff), governor of Maui; J. T. Baker, governor of Hawai'i; W. H. Rice, governor of Kauai'i.

<sup>a</sup>A patriarch married to a daughter of Kamehameha I and father of two kings, Lot Kamehameha and Alexander Liholiho, as well as father of Ruth Ke'elikōlani. He frequently used deputies such as John Ī and N. Kahulanui.

<sup>b</sup>Prince consort (1832–1891) to Lili'uokalani.

<sup>c</sup>Also an agriculturalist in wheat and rice and an investor in milling. Used assistants such as J. Y. Kaneoha and Luther 'Aholo.

<sup>d</sup>Princess Miriam Likelike, a sister of David Kalākaua.



each district. But he was responsible for sending in audited lists of taxes. The outward letterbook of Governor Kekūanaʻa records in detail the business of keeping up the fort, the prison, and prisoners; numbers and salaries of tax collectors, magistrates, judges, and their clerks; payments made to the attendants of the king on tour; and taxes, provisions, and gifts to the king's servants (*hulu manu*).<sup>30</sup> Other governors were sometimes more casual in this administration of revenue. Acting Governor Kapeau did not hesitate to cover immediate expenditure directly out of tax collections to pay for judges, the police, jails, an official vessel, and a mountain road, which he balanced out neatly at \$753 for a quarter of 1850.<sup>31</sup> Governor Nahaolelua of Hawai'i simply reported in December 1855 that "quite a bit of money was received," leaving it to his assistants to forward vouchers. From about 1858, however, governors had to send in quarterly reports of revenue and other matters both to Finance and to the Interior, leaving these two departments to settle returns. And in 1860 the marshal was required to send in vouchers as a check against lists of tax returns. In order to budget more accurately, Gregg as Finance minister insisted on estimates of returns through the Interior from this date, though there was still some confusion about which minister and/or governor could have the last say in approving appointments of tax officials. Licenses to trade were invariably very detailed, though it is remarkable the returns were sent to Interior and not to Finance for audit. In the 1850s a new responsibility was added—management of licenses to growers of the stimulant *awa*, sold to Hawaiians who held certificates as "*awa* drinkers." Governors also handled for the department "letters patents" (a form of extortion demanded for publications or inventions, monopolies, and concessions of various kinds), the auction of liquor licenses, and a lucrative collection of "bonds" from anyone opening a business.<sup>32</sup> There was always a brisk turnover in the sale of certificates of nationality, because these were essential to foreign residents undertaking business or agricultural ventures.

### **Departmental Patronage and Governors**

Much of the special power of the Interior flowed from the ways in which executives were chosen and appointed by king and ministers. The Interior department received numerous solicitations from Hawaiians and Europeans for minor and senior posts, couched in a culturally determined code: fulsome, flattering, and obsequious in the Hawaiian letters; short and to the point (and mostly indifferent to references backing qualifications) in the case of foreigners. The governors were the first line of inquiry for acceptance or rejection of such applications.

It became usual for governors to exercise their judgment on filling local

offices by sending in notice of their choice to the Interior. Or, as Governor Kekūanaʻa of Oʻahu put it to Kamehameha, “because that is the King’s prerogative to know.”<sup>33</sup> But that was usually after an appointment had been made on other grounds. More typically, a correspondent writing to Governor Kanoa in 1840 identified a best friend (“favorite chum” [*punahele*]) of the governor of Oʻahu for whom a job had to be found on Kauaʻi.<sup>34</sup> From the outset of their careers the two nobles Kapena and Kanoa, who rose to become governors of Maui and Kauaʻi and were appointed by Kamehameha III as “companions in the administration of our Chiefs,” seem to have had a special understanding about finding jobs for Hawaiians.<sup>35</sup> While writing to his fellow noble the governor of Kauaʻi in 1853 concerning the commissioning of tax collectors, John Kapena put in a good word for a friend and client, Kuokoa (an officer at Wailua), who had been convicted by a local Hawaiian justice and needed a change of location.<sup>36</sup>

Such posts were keenly sought after for salaries and to avoid labor taxes from which officials were exempt, and it was not unknown for a supplicant to ask to be assessor and collector at the same time (though this was illegal). In Judd’s correspondence for 1845, appointment notes are listed with assigned areas and specification of duties, though no salaries are mentioned at this date, and officials may have received a commission instead. Later collectors were paid through the Finance department—a very high salary of \$6,000 for a collector general, which was more than the salary of a cabinet minister, while his clerk got as much as a minister. Collectors and assessors got about \$400 each.

Occasionally a bold applicant might go over the governor’s head, as when a certain Opuni petitioned Kamehameha III and Kekāuluohi—the *kuhina nui*—on 2 June 1845, for the tax district of ʻEwa on Oʻahu to replace an inefficient tax official who worked that district while living in Honolulu. There were also petitions directly to the premier for removal of unpopular tax collectors (on grounds of adultery, drinking too much *awa*, or favoring Catholics when allocating less arduous labor tax work). On Maui Governor Paul Nahaolelua was accused by a disappointed applicant of “appointing those who are closely related to him as Tax Collectors.”<sup>37</sup> Governors could also turn a blind eye to abuses. There is some evidence that George L. Kapeau, as acting governor of Hawaiʻi from 1846, tolerated tax extortion and fines from commoners, while richer land owners were exempted, and arbitrary remission of taxes was made by *konohiki* overseers.<sup>38</sup>

Such evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive proof of a more general pattern of partiality toward kin and friends or deference toward property owners and social peers. It was within a governor’s powers to allow exemptions of taxes on compassionate grounds, and it may well have been tempting to

make such exemptions for friends and relatives. Consolidated lists of internal taxes display very poor levels of collection of poll taxes in relation to population compared with property taxes.<sup>39</sup> But an overlenient or partial governor ran the risk of a challenge from other disgruntled taxpayers at this form of favoritism, as the governor of Maui found in 1857, though a departmental inquiry upheld his decision to allow exemptions. More rarely there was evidence of outright tax embezzlement, which came to light on Hawai'i, for example, in 1860.<sup>40</sup> All that can be said, perhaps, is that official clients of royals and ministers were not immune from conflicts of duty and loyalty toward their patron-employers, on the one hand, and their local constituency of friends and relatives, on the other, before stricter methods of accounting curtailed this largesse.

Governors also made free with lesser appointments, such as vaccinators and census officers, whose work was defined in a circular titled "Positions As Prescribed by the King," that were reserved for native Hawaiians only.<sup>41</sup> As a result of gubernatorial generosity in finding jobs, some districts clearly had too many officials, such as district 5 on Hawai'i with 104 constables, 76 school agents, and 72 teachers, all exempt from labor days—a constant source of complaint from the less fortunate. Such prescribed roles are evidence of an emergent bureaucracy at work using the government press and with a bias toward Hawaiians. But they should not disguise the fact that the actual appointments by selection were patrimonial. Consequently, there were sometimes tensions concerning the ethnic origins of applicants that did not necessarily work in Hawaiians' favor. In 1857 Governor Paul Kanoa of Kaua'i took issue with the appointment of two *haole* tax assessors by Lot Kamehameha, when he had already appointed six Hawaiians on the island. But he had to yield to the prince and employ the Hawaiians plus the two foreigners H. A. Widemann and G. Wundenberg, who were particularly in favor with the court at this period.<sup>42</sup> Ultimately, Widemann superseded the governor by becoming minister of the Interior in 1874. Governor Kekūanaō'a made appointments more cautiously by not omitting to issue commissions (as Kanoa had done) and by sending in his list for approval first. Ruth Ke'elikōlani as governor of Hawai'i island had no hesitation in moving judges from one district to another and suggesting appointments of tax collectors while Lot was minister, but then she had more influence as the prince's half-sister. In general, through the 1880s governors continued to send in lists of assessors and collectors who were all Hawaiians (including a relative of the minister J. E. Bush).<sup>43</sup>

Beyond the routine of executive administration, a governor was also a patron and adviser to commoners in social matters. Governors approved a list of ministers of religion permitted to conduct marriages (Mormons were excluded). Their approval was required for petitions for divorce, usually on

grounds of adultery or violence, which produced a steady flow of recorded marital misery reported to the Interior and accepted on the governor's recommendation. Divorces were expensive—\$17 to \$20 plus a fee for official notification. A governor could also interfere with minor court cases or settle matters of disputed inheritance in conjunction with another noble. Such decisions were final, where the litigants had no other recourse to law.

### **Judiciary and Law Officers**

Normally one would expect the judiciary to have been distinct from the Interior department. But in judicial matters there was at first under the 1840s constitution a very vague line between executive and courts. A defendant, Kauhahi, wrote successfully to premier John Young, on 17 June 1845, requesting the supreme court (consisting of Young and the king) not to refer a case to lower courts, where magistrates on O'ahu were "relatives and friends" of the governor who was prosecuting him. When in 1848 a judge appointed by the governor of Hawai'i punished the workers of B. Pitman (who had opposed his appointment), Young arbitrarily rescinded his judgments.<sup>44</sup> In 1868 a minister interfered with a court ruling on Moloka'i where judge Charles Kala had summoned D. Walsh, an agent of the Board of Health (and in charge of the leper station). Kala was admonished for attempting to try an official on a trivial charge. If a sheriff dismissed a police officer (as happened in April 1855), even the deputy to the governor of O'ahu (one N. Kahulanui) could step in to delay the dismissal until reasons had been given.

The early period of occlusion of functions between governors and the judiciary produced other anomalies, especially when judges appeared before the Land Commission at the beginning of the Mahele. Complaints were made to William Lee as the commission's president in 1848 that Z. Kaauwai acted as counsel for a friend and sat as a judge as well.<sup>45</sup> Problems also arose from the quasi-judicial functions of the governor when a judge was the appointee of a different patron. For example, Nahaolelua as governor of Maui sought permission to dismiss and bring to trial judge Kaauwai because of "erroneous" decisions in court. He hesitated to do this, however, because he had heard that the judge had been appointed by the minister of Public Instruction, the Hon. Limaikaika, until Keoni Ana, his own patron, agreed.<sup>46</sup>

But, in general, governors worked comfortably with island judges, whom they had to keep supplied with copies of laws. Hawaiians or part-Hawaiians in the 1840s and early 1850s filled the posts of circuit judges, magistrates, and assessors (nineteen posts in all for Hawai'i). Service with the judiciary, moreover, was a step toward executive or legislative office. John Kapena, when a circuit judge on Hawai'i, began his distinguished career by being appointed

deputy and assistant by Governor G. L. Kapeau, which he gratefully accepted to raise his income. Mobility of officeholders between executive functions in the outer islands and the central administration or the legislature was both a career inducement and a drain on local resources. Petitions in 1860 protested at the practice of schoolteachers, judges, and other officials standing for election to the legislature, which took away much-needed services; the protestors were backed by the governor of Maui. But the practice, which safeguarded an official majority in the lower house of the legislature, did not end.

### Noblesse Oblige

Governors were persons of high social status as well as administrative standing. Ruth Ke'elikōlani, a noble and chieftainess in her own right who became governor of Hawai'i, brought to the notice of Prince Lot an alleged insult to her dignity on the part of a police constable who excluded her from a meeting and had him reprimanded.<sup>47</sup> Hawaiian attitudes, however, remained fairly constant in their respect for governors. On Kaua'i in 1872 a petition urging provision of a pension for Governor Kanoa received 131 signatures from those who felt that "some high born Chief" should be appointed, more specifically Prince Lunalilo or David Kalākaua. A more delicate situation arose on Maui, where, during the election of a new monarch in 1872, Governor Nahaolelua was excluded from meetings (largely in favor of Lunalilo) on the grounds he was a Kalākaua or Dominis supporter until he attended a second electoral meeting and kept his preferences to himself.<sup>48</sup>

Governors were also the channel for petitions to king and ministers, as one in 1845, for example, asking for lighter taxation and "no foreigners" as senior officials.<sup>49</sup> But it became more difficult to discriminate against *haole*, who were important as a source of tax revenue. Providing they took oaths of allegiance to the Hawaiian monarchy, foreigners had no difficulty obtaining licenses, lands, and jobs. Other forms of petition infrequently made out a case for support for Hawaiians in business. In 1851 Kamehameha was asked to assist in the formation of a Hawaiian company (*hui*) with a loan of \$550 and two officials to help run it, on the condition that the money would be paid back in due course, or "our lives will be forfeited."<sup>50</sup> Some of the nobility and royals were not above petitioning also. Princess Lili'uokalani and others successfully requested Bush in 1882 to remove the Hon. J. Moanauli from a water commission at Kona, O'ahu, because he was an interested party to the case, having caused a stream to be closed.

Finally, governors were in charge of the forts, their armament, and their militias. In 1861, for example, Governor Kekūanaō'a of O'ahu reported directly to Prince Lot in Honolulu, as commander in chief, on his selection of

a hundred police recruits and a hundred volunteer soldiers. Kapena in his meteoric career was made a (temporary) brigadier general as governor of O'ahu in 1878. In general, this pattern of employing civil officials in military roles was entrenched by royals' predilection for military pomp. When Prince Dominis became governor of O'ahu, he took over control of the military as adjutant general. The institution of military titles is a feature of the Kalākaua regime along with the creation of princes (Leleiohoku was made captain of a guards cavalry company); and much was spent on decorations, arms, and accoutrements—band, flags, and salutes (priced at \$33,365 in the financial returns for 1883). A royal staff was added to the king's entourage in the 1880s, and majors added to the governor of O'ahu's staff. Dominis was made commander in chief of armed forces by Kalākaua in 1886, resigning the governorship of O'ahu, to which the king appointed Curtis P. Iaukea, and the Hon. R. Hoapili (formerly royal chamberlain) was made governor of Maui.

While the royals embellished themselves with new titles and founded orders of chivalry, the civil servants looked for new ways to expand their own fiefs. By 1854 G. M. Robertson as a clerk to the Interior understood thoroughly how the system worked. As senior assistant and client to Young, he had no difficulty in exercising his own patronage by looking favorably on a request from S. M. Keonekapu written in Hawaiian to "Robikana" that posts of surveyor or vaccinator be found for friends on Maui. Direct application through the department's clerks as well as indirect requests through the island governors were made for positions like auctioneers, mail carriers, road supervisors, enumerators, and jailers, as government expanded its reach. The obituary columns were closely watched for vacancies not advertised in any other way. In 1859 J. H. Ka'auwaepa'a, on learning of the death of J. Pi'ikoi, privy councillor, immediately applied for his sinecure as clerk of the Honolulu market. More unusual applicants sought to run the penitentiary at Lahaina in 1851. Although solicitations for employment on behalf of friends were usually from Hawaiians, it was not unknown for a Hawaiian to ask for the appointment of an American resident, as J. H. Napela did for his friend John Boardman in June 1857.

Some of the department's appointments merged with normal contracting for the services of builders, roadmakers, and shipbuilders. At this level of public employment, the department did business with local firms, usually for a fixed fee, but also on a long-term basis at an annual retainer (\$300 a year was not unusual) with a proviso the contractor remain sober. But no tenders were called for, and the work was not allocated on a competitive basis. As public works expanded, the governors were called on to appoint road supervisors more frequently; and Kapena as governor of Maui was still doing this in 1876, when he was commissioned by the king as a member of the

House of Nobles and continued his governorship. Other arrangements for what look like personal appointments were dignified by a formal contract. In October 1846 there was an open-ended agreement between the Interior minister and the king, on the one hand, and S. P. Kalama, on the other, to enter government service as a writer, surveyor, or overseer (or any other work) for \$20 a month and further increments. In 1862 applicants began to produce references, as in the case of John S. Low, who applied directly to Gregg for the position of registrar of public accounts. But such formality was not always observed. In 1873 it was still possible for an ambitious young Hawaiian, D. S. Kupahu, to apply to the minister of the Interior, E. O. Hall, “as a friend,” to become road overseer and agent for all government contracts in Kohala. Once one was in the ranks of officialdom, mobility of all grades was common. A tax assessor whose post came to an end applied in 1875 to the minister—a fellow Hawaiian—for work in the office for shipping “Polynesian” labor.<sup>51</sup> Such applications expanded in number under Kalākaua; and there was frequently a debate within the Interior and with legislators acting as patrons regarding who exactly should be a land agent or a road supervisor, if colleagues of the minister refused an applicant. When a minister was on tour, he was more vulnerable to this kind of petition. An offer of accommodation was made to Moehonua in 1875 by D. S. Kupahu (“we being true Hawaiians”) in return for permission to purchase some government land.<sup>52</sup> Thus, too, was S. K. Ka’ai (“younger kin”) appointed by Moehonua in August 1875 as overseer of government lands and road supervisor in North Kona, where he began taking out leases on his own behalf. If sponsored mobility among officials was common, so too were pluralities in officeholding. A constant feature of the 1880s is the frequency with which senior officials from the Interior, including the minister, doubled as land commissioners; appraisers of lands; commissioners of private ways, water rights, fences, and boundaries; and, not least, inspectors of stallions, as the plethora of measures to squeeze revenue from the market in property rights expanded.

### **Governors as *Konohiki*: Land and Cattle**

A major source of access to resources had always been through land management; and this did not change, as new mechanisms were developed in the course of the great land divisions of the 1840s and 1850s. For nobles and governors, land was managed by agents or landlords—*konohiki*—with responsibility for providing livestock for feasts. Before the division of estates, some *konohiki* continued to control forced labor, particularly that of women, “the same as in ancient times,” to provide mats, tapa cloth, and fishing lines, which conflicted with laws requiring women to keep house.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, prisoners

at Hilo were used as labor on coffee and taro lands managed by landlords for the government at Waihaka in 1848.<sup>54</sup> The same delegation of economic functions to loyal subordinates from chiefly lineages runs through the correspondence of Boaz Mahune and Governor Kanoa in obedience to Kamehameha III's orders in September 1840 to group together tenants—"persons who plant by the acre at Wailuku"—under a royal overseer to teach them plantation work and to punish them if necessary. The growing industry of cattle ranching required a different technique. Permits for use of government land on Maui were issued by Kamehameha III in return for one-tenth of the cattle reared, which became a standard tribute or rent. In 1845 the royal plantation experiment at Wailuku was ended, and Mahune was made overseer of a royal herd, tended by client commoners for a tenth of reproduction and returns from slaughtering.<sup>55</sup> This cattle culling and management had come about, as Assistant Governor Kaneoha reminded the king in 1850, as a result of Vancouver's gift of cattle "to your father and my father."<sup>56</sup> How were they to be shared out between their family interests and the heirs of John Young—"the close companion of your father" (*ka hoapili o ko Makuakane*)? In the end they were counted, rounded up, branded, and divided equally. This duty of care on the part of a client official for the assets of royalty continued; and Governor Kanoa on Kaua'i took personal charge of contracting labor to run Prince Lot's herd of cattle.<sup>57</sup> The prince extended his interests into growing wheat for milling on Maui in 1857—a part-official and part-private enterprise superintended by Governor Nahaolelua. The governor also undertook management of cattle pounds in the 1850s to lessen conflicts between cultivators and uncontrolled livestock. To these sources were added commissions on land sales, a quarter interest in allocation of *kuleana* lots to commoners, income from the sale of captured wild cattle, and a tax from Hawaiian seamen going abroad.

The land divisions of the 1850s and early 1860s added considerably to the duties of governors, created new posts, and opened ways for land acquisition by officials. Agreed by Kamehameha III and organized through the Interior, the initial share-out was intended to divide lands among government (after allocation of royal lands), chiefs, and commoners.<sup>58</sup> In effect, a Privy Council committee consisting of Young, Judd, Pi'ikoi, and Kekūanaō'a began the process in 1847 and 1848, leaving the complex verification of titles and survey to the Land Commission of 1848–1850 and its successor agencies. In general, titles in perpetuity were refused to Hawaiian applicants until the first division of chiefs' and royal estates "for the reason that one chief has lived after the example of another by way of Konohikis (landlords) in the form of relatives and they are doing away with the idea of living promiscuously."<sup>59</sup> This somewhat arcane reason indicated a political change in the mobility and



hierarchy of chiefs, in the sense that many wished to end a roving supervision of royal and *ahupua'a* lands in favor of a permanent allocation of estates held personally and not administered through clients as landlords (“as companions by birth”). So untitled applicants had to wait; and no foreigner could be granted land in fee simple until taking an oath of allegiance that could only be administered on O‘ahu.

There are some early notices of sales, however, for example, to G. M. Moore in 1847—100 acres at \$1 per acre. An exception seems to have been made, too, for a Hawaiian, ‘Atoni, who was awarded “the Uluwalu Lands” in March 1849 by the king in privy council in fee simple as a reward for doing government business.<sup>60</sup> A hard line had to be taken, however, with an island governor, Kanoa, when Young leased land (on which Kanoa had planted sugarcane) on the grounds it belonged to the government.<sup>61</sup> But by the early 1850s there is a detectable sale of estates from chiefs to foreigners reported to the Interior through the governors, at prices ranging from \$2 to \$5 an acre, subject to survey and award of title. Similarly, the Hon. S. M. Kamakau purchased lands from the government at Kalihi, O‘ahu, for the high price of \$6 an acre at this date. Governor Kanoa bought ten acres at \$3 per acre in December 1850 and then a further fifty acres at \$2 an acre at Hilo. As correspondence on the subject expanded, it is clear that many title sales during this early phase of the Mahele were to Hawaiians, as the basis for the formation of a landed elite of nobles and officials. Many had difficulty funding their investments. Governor Kapeau fell into arrears over payment for lands bought in 1855 (585 acres on Hawai‘i) and had to be reminded twice in 1857 and 1858 of his debts before settling.

A report of the minister of the Interior in 1850 included for the first time a section on the Land Commission, which from 1848 to 1850 handled 10,360 claims. At this date awards were few, because of the need for surveys—only 697, of which 54 were titles in fee simple. But land sales had already begun. From 1847 to 1850, some 247 sales were made, disposing of 27,292 acres in fee simple for \$57,086 (or about \$2 per acre). Outward letters from the department listed dozens and dozens of titles arising from the preliminary division between chiefs and government in which rights of commoners were generally “reserved” but had to be defended and defined before the Land Commission for fees. In all, as is well known, during the height of the land division, from 1846 to 1865, some half a million acres of public (government) land were sold off for wetland farming, homesteading, truck gardening, and ranching at an average price of \$1.11 per acre.<sup>62</sup> To benefit the new gentry, a land tax was suspended between 1852 and 1859, when it was reintroduced by a government desperate for revenue.<sup>63</sup> After 1865 sale of “Crown” lands—the royals’ share of some three-quarter million acres—was curtailed. This

curtailment did not prevent royals acquiring more: David Kalākaua acquired a lease of lands on Hawai'i for \$500 a year in 1886.<sup>64</sup>

By 1868 much of this land business was handled routinely by the clerk of the Interior, Widemann, and through the governors, especially Nahaolelua on Maui.<sup>65</sup> Much, too, was delegated in the case of boundaries to locally appointed commissioners of private ways and water rights and to agents concerned with leases of commoners' lands. A governor's supervision of royal and government estates became vital when the practice of sending land agents and surveyors was adopted in the late 1850s. Governors' duties now included inspection and advice on suitability of land for cultivation or grazing. Any would-be purchasers had to apply first to the agent for an evaluation reported to the governor. Later, in 1870, official "appraisers" of lands were approved and appointed by Hutchinson; L. 'Aholo gained experience in this function before becoming water commissioner and then clerk to the governor of Maui. In the case of Prince Lot's lands on Hawai'i, Ruth Ke'elikōlani took a special interest in the work of these officials who held a coveted appointment and who could determine the area and price of land sales and leases. In 1858 Kamehameha gave her detailed instructions on how to appoint land agents for Kona and Ka'ū districts, and left it to her to choose them. She also advised on lease of royal lands in Kohala, suggesting suitable tenants, though more usually his agent, William Uepa, forwarded rents for the king's estates at Lahaina and Honokōwai.<sup>66</sup> In 1870 there was a shift in responsibility. Ruth Ke'elikōlani clashed with the minister, Hutchinson, over her appointment of government land agents on Hawai'i whom Hutchinson dismissed: "and I know that you have already made up your mind to give this work to one of your foreigners."<sup>67</sup> Hutchinson's reasons were simply that her agents had never forwarded any reports on disbursements and land values, and he politely denied her allegations of *haole* patronage. But by 1873 all such business on Hawai'i was handled by the *haole* R. A. Lyman, as lieutenant governor, an indication of the way in which royals as governors of that island were undermined by the Interior department.

Clearly, behind the general concentration of ownership of fertile lands in Hawaiian and foreign hands, there lies an important history of administrative management that still remains to be accounted for in detail. Island governors and their nominated officials were central in changes of ownership, control, and investment. But the work of a governor as supervisor of lands became more difficult to handle, especially where *haole* ranchers surrounded a block of government lands and encroached, as in South Kona in the mid-1870s, obliging the land agent and the governor to impound trespassing stock.<sup>68</sup> L. Kaina, for his part, earned the praise of Gulick, clerk to the Interior, in January 1870 for his work as agent for government lands on Hawai'i and especially for his generous attention to the needs of *haole* purchasers. But

after 1875 land claims were referred increasingly to the courts, where agents or appraisers and governors had more difficulty influencing and settling conflicts of interest.<sup>69</sup> The work, moreover, took up a governor's time, when it could not be left to subordinates. In 1877 Governor Moehonua of Maui was appointed as agent for government lands for Maui, Moloka'i, and Lāna'i, leaving all routine business to his assistant, Luther 'Aholo. In the mid-1870s long lists of allocations of *kuleana* land lots to commoners with valid claims were handled by the Interior with serial numbers well into the six or seven thousands, for a registration fee of \$5 each.<sup>70</sup>

### Patronage and Bureaucracy

From about 1870, during Hutchinson's ministry, one can detect both an expansion of posts for *haole* and Hawaiians and a willingness to take tighter control over appointments made by governors' patronage. In the departmental letterbook for 1872–1875, more *haole* officials were appointed as agents and auctioneers (for example, N. H. Greenwell on Hawai'i, who delivered royal patents awarding land titles and collected dues for a commission of 5 percent), responsible directly to the minister of the Interior.<sup>71</sup> At a more senior level, however, Hawaiians were still favored. In 1874 the post of commissioner of boundaries was awarded to L. Kaina to separate "Crown," government, and *konohiki* lands at Puna district on Hawai'i in cooperation with W. Kaloi (as government representative), with responsibility to the king and cabinet. This post entailed determining the value and price of lands to be sold. The Hon. S. Kipi was appointed as an appraiser along with the Hon. R. A. Lyman (deputy governor of Hawai'i) and J. Nāwahī at same date in an effort to establish the unimproved value of all government lands. A delicate case arose concerning W. M. Gibson's claim to a lease of all government lands on Lāna'i in 1873, which Lot Kamehameha had agreed to when minister of the Interior and then reversed when he became king. Governor Nahaolelua was ordered to handle this case and reported that the lands (also in the names of Kamehameha V, Queen Emma, and other royals) were small lots occupied by many commoners, though Gibson pointed out that they were also leased by a company (*hui*) registered in the name of the governor, but no fees had been paid. The king and cabinet decided to lease three blocks to Gibson, the king's friend and future minister, partitioning the island in effect, and left Nahaolelua to arrange rents and boundaries. On O'ahu, too, in the mid-1870s the allocation and ownership of *konohiki* lands formerly in the charge of royal landlords resulted in a partition organized at the highest level by nobles representing the Crown, Princess Ke'elikōlani, and "various parties"—*haoles* or Hawaiians prepared to lease from royal titleholders.<sup>72</sup>

So, although correspondence on land and other matters became more

legalistic in tone, access to resources on the part of the Hawaiian elite continued to be controlled directly by king and ministers. Within the Interior department the ministers Hutchinson, Hall, Widemann, and Green (1873–1876) were in office too short a time to do more than keep pace with the need to find executive officials suggested by governors. But much of the older informality concerning appointments continued under Kalākaua with Moehonua as minister, when patronage swung in favor of Hawaiians again. The governor of Maui could choose his own deputy and resisted Hutchinson's attempts to foist H. Dickenson on him in 1871, when his own choice was David Kamaipili. But applications for the position of circuit judge to Hutchinson from Hawaiians who did not have English were not sanctioned, though the usual begging letters for tax jobs were not rejected for this reason. There was a bigger clash between Hutchinson and Circuit Judge J. Nakila, Maui, when his judgments were rescinded. In the sensitive area of land administration, race was not necessarily a deciding factor, though it was ever-present. The Hawaiian A. Kaiwi suggested D. Māmaki for the Board of Appraisal of lands on Maui in 1874, because he was "honest and acceptable to foreigners," in a job that had been done formerly by a *haole*, and the *haole* minister gave his consent.<sup>73</sup> But to some extent battle lines in the civil service were being drawn. When an assistant to a deputy sheriff (a post earning \$20 a month) was dismissed by a *haole* in 1874, he wrote at once to a noble legislator for a job as a road overseer in Kohala, adding a postscript: "Take notice of us Hawaiians or you will make a mistake and entertain the foreigner" (*Eike ia kona Hawaii oikipa hewa oka haole*).<sup>74</sup> A departmental list of executive officials in 1876 distinguishing between those with an understanding of Hawaiian and English from those with a working knowledge of only one language indicates that the law officers (marshal, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs) had considerable linguistic ability; overseers had Hawaiian only; while twenty-three district judges were in the main Hawaiian with only three *haole* (and none bilingual).<sup>75</sup> Circuit judges and clerks were all *haole* and sometimes insensitive to the problems faced by a governor and assistants lacking the latest laws in Hawaiian editions.<sup>76</sup> The Kalākaua regime appears to have reversed Hutchinson's preferences for Europeans. W. Martin, a part-Hawaiian, sent his congratulations to the minister H. A. P. Carter in October 1880, because there had been so many appointments "agreeable to the people of the Nation."<sup>77</sup> At this period, too, some Hawaiian business applications begin to appear in departmental files as multiple partnerships under license—some in "co-partnership" with government for provisioning and handling government stores. But they are few in number compared with business applications from Chinese in the 1880s. Many more Hawaiians moved into auctioneering than into retailing.

Through the early 1880s to 1887, the governors carried out the same

system of appointments as before of judges, magistrates, and tax officials, even while Lorrin Thurston was Interior minister. There was a small contest of wills between the two systems of patronage by governor or minister in October 1887, when S. E. Kaiue, clerk to the governor of Maui, asked Thurston to call a halt to lease of lands to W. M. Gibson on Lānaʻi, where only three blocks were left to its Hawaiian inhabitants. Kaiue intervened to save these by permanent lease in the face of Gibson's claim to own the whole island by appealing to the minister, "as you are in the position of a kind of father over the rich as well as the poor." In other words, Thurston was asked to exercise a patrimonial discretion on behalf of the commoners.<sup>78</sup> Thurston was not deaf to such appeals. He received favorably a request in 1888 from J. G. Hoapili, who had been dismissed as district magistrate (for another Hawaiian) and found him a position. In the past such requests would have come through an island governor, but by the late 1870s and 1880s ministers handled departmental patronage directly.

It is clear, too, that in the case of royal governorships (on Hawaiʻi and Oʻahu), there is much less correspondence through the department, reflecting the busy life of a key local official. Rather, the bulk of business was transferred to superintendents of public works or to land valuers and was usually in English only by about 1880. There are many Hawaiian correspondents in the outward letterbooks, but few are written to more than once or twice as road supervisors or commissioners of private ways, compared with W. H. Rickard, a road supervisor, or L. Severance, sheriff of Hawaiʻi. So important did the post of road supervision become that supervisors in chief were appointed from 1885, and they were invariably *haole*. The bulk of district judges were Hawaiian. But at the highest levels successors to governorships from among the royals did not have the time or the capacity to match the work of their predecessors or those who had risen to become experienced professionals, such as Kapeau, ʻAholo, Kapena, or Kanoa. By 1882 Paul Kanoa (junior), governor of Kauaʻi and an old hand in island business for thirty years, simply drew his salary and made a few recommendations for filling posts, while his contemporary J. M. Kapena moved on to become postmaster general.

The practice of appointing royals to govern Hawaiʻi island continued into the late 1880s and spread to Kauaʻi. But time was running out for sinecures among the *kamaʻāina*. Princess Ululani found to her surprise she could not appoint the Hon. J. G. Hoapili as her chief magistrate, because a change of law gave this right to the chief justice.<sup>79</sup> A governor's power to appoint a road supervisor passed to the road boards, while the appointment of deputy sheriffs lay in the hands of the sheriff. Ululani came too late to exercise much patronage. L. A. Thurston informed her that the office of governor had just

been abolished by the legislature, and all records were delivered up to island sheriffs under the law of 8 December 1887.<sup>80</sup> The first casualties of the constitution crisis of 1887, some of the governors were the last to appreciate fully what had taken place. In fact, it took two acts to make sure of their abolition. The first was passed, like the second, over Kalākaua's veto in December 1887. It was largely the result of representations from the attorney general, Clarence W. Ashford, and his report to the new legislature following the "bayonet revolution," condemning governors' selection of the Hawaiian islands' two hundred police and their refusal to accept their removal or reform by sheriffs or the marshal.<sup>81</sup> A second act followed in August 1888 repeating much in the first. Even so, governorships enjoyed a brief revival in the twilight of the monarchy for titular royals and their consorts, and for friends of Lili'uokalani such as Everett, Baker and Rice—a sheriff, a politician, and a rancher/scholar who had come to the end of their careers (see Table 1 note).

In truth many jobs were left for Hawaiians as commissioners, police, and judges, virtually all the jailers' positions, and as poundmasters as well as cabinet officers and privy councillors; while for the royals there was a pile of honorifics without much power. Yet it was difficult for Hawaiians, unless they were nobles, to provide the necessary financial surety for senior supervisory posts. The road boards were nearly all *haole*-manned, unless a Hawaiian could be found willing to pay a bond of \$600 to become chairman. Moreover, by 1892 the queen could not alter the list of circuit judges as approved by cabinet ministers, and the last link between royal executive and the judiciary disappeared. Hawaiian posts remained numerous (just how many is difficult to say in the absence of a full civil list designating ethnicity). But the patronage power to favor such appointments for Hawaiians was on the way out.

The Interior department, however, continued unshaken through the revolution of 1893, hardly missing a license or failing to collect a tax. Like some tropical plant the Interior burgeoned offshoots in the 1880s—a bureau of public works and an office of government lands, water, electricity, survey, immigration, patents, forests, parks, and nurseries—which remained firmly fixed to the main stem. More remarkably, hardly any of the nine or so bureau and board heads were displaced by the provisional government of 1893–1894, though there was one new senior post, perhaps as a sign of the times, under the Interior: Dr. A. McWayne was appointed as the first physician to the insane asylum.

### Conclusion

It may be, as J. C. Ching has argued, that Hawaiian loyalties to the monarchy were on the wane anyway by the late 1880s, as so few of the eight thousand

or so Hawaiians in Honolulu turned out for national celebrations or elections, except to enjoy free handouts of gin and salt salmon, and fewer still gave any backing to radicals such as Robert Wilcox or, indeed, to Queen Lili'uokalani in her trials of strength with cabinet and conspirators.<sup>82</sup> But that argument is another way of recognizing, as others have done in more detail, that O'ahu politics were fissile, party loyalties were ephemeral, and government was in the hands of factions too weak to determine issues without outside support by the end of the 1880s. Even those seemingly loyal to the monarchy, such as Gibson and Dole, were self-promoting clients and brokers for other interest groups. In the end Ching defines Hawaiian government as “an oligarchy and aristocracy with monarchical trappings,” which seems a long way of saying that it was a quasi-patrimonial state, legitimized by constitutional provisions in 1840, 1854, 1864, and 1887.

Defined in this way the Hawaiian kingdom has numerous counterparts in other Pacific, African, and Asian hierarchies in which the primary loyalties of both related and unrelated officials were to the person of a ruler who could define their functions at will, as opposed to a “rational-legal” bureaucracy of a Weberian type.<sup>83</sup> In practice, patrimonialism does not exclude elements of “defined” bureaucratic practice; and the emergence of Hawaiian civil service practices amply illustrates this prescriptive allocation of office within the hierarchy of royals and officials owing primary allegiance to the king. Nor does it necessarily detract from criteria of “efficiency” or “good government,” though it does raise questions about the interests being served by such a regime. Again, in practice, the records of the Hawaiian state, and particularly those of the Ministry of the Interior from 1846 to 1893, do not show great corruption or inefficiency compared with island states taken over by colonial powers or the independent kingdom of Tonga. What they do show is the operation of patronage at all levels of government; and it can be argued that in time and without other corrective mechanisms patron-client loyalties worked in favor of the royals and the wider group of “service gentry,” as I have defined the successors to the *kaukauali*'i, and some *haole* interests, rather than for the Hawaiian population as a whole. This would seem to be particularly true for the administration of land redistribution, if it can be shown by more detailed research than is at present available that the service gentry benefited in the early stages of the Mahele at the expense of commoners' later claims. It also has a bearing on the incidence of taxation, direct and indirect, levied internally and on external trade, in relation to landed wealth and levels of income in the nineteenth century. I think it can be concluded for this area of public finance that clientage as exercised through island governors, their assessors, and collectors may have spared the poorer population from the rigors of the numerous imposts applied, if the low levels of tax collection are taken into account. The important area of police and

judiciary, however, requires detailed attention, if later charges of partiality by post-1887 attorney generals are to be sustained. Indeed, the whole topic of crime and policing under the monarchy would seem to be a rich and untapped source of Hawaiian social history.

The main conclusion, however, from this survey of the expansion of local government through the Ministry of the Interior, is that the patrimonial monarchy preferred loyal servants with education in order to access resources, and offered a measure of status and financial security in return. Loyalty and not simply race was the chief criterion for appointments, followed closely by a measure of education and competence. Loyal officials were well rewarded. Ministerial salaries more than doubled in the period covered to some \$6,000 a year, while chief clerks in the end were paid more than island governors. Taken together with high levels of recruitment and investment in infrastructure, the maintenance of royals especially during the Kalākaua regime, and expensive representation abroad, the main result of patronage could be said to have been extravagance at the highest levels.<sup>84</sup> Racial differences played little part in this bonanza. And it may be correct to conclude as Young has done that the “traditional server-superior relationship” was simply exploited by new men in the service of the *mō*.<sup>85</sup> Demography may also have played a part, though it remains to be demonstrated that the Hawaiian elite declined in numbers at a differential rate, in proportion to Hawaiians as a whole.<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless, it is true the royal lineage had fewer talented representatives to draw on by the end of the 1880s and spent more time creating successors as “princes” of the line. But their demise was more because of loss of patronage in 1887 through abolition of governorships and allocation of judicial and police appointments to other departments, plus loss of control over the legislature and a smaller proportion of “civil list” allocations to royals.

The analysis presented above parts company, therefore, with Young’s assertion of a *haole* takeover in ways that “circumvented the traditional server-superior relationship” and replaced the traditional *kaukauali*.<sup>87</sup> While Young’s claim may be literally true in terms of kinship relations and titles, functionally it can be argued that in the absence of responsible cabinet government in Hawai‘i, service relationships continued very much according to older patrimonial principles. At the second level of clientage, moreover, as this essay has tried to indicate, governors and other departmental officials recruited by nomination from among friends and relatives, and the practice spread quite comfortably to incorporate *haole* executives as well as Hawaiian. Gradually, however, well-paid officials at the level of senior clerks in the Interior department came to exhibit features of a “civil service” that outlasted ministers and politicians. Whether this took place in other departments is a topic open to further research. Yet the patrimonialism of the monarchy was not immedi-



ately replaced by a political “spoils” system, however much the embryonic political parties supporting constitutional reform may have expected this.<sup>88</sup>

## NOTES

1. For an overview, see Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778–1854: Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 1938); Hiram Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands* (reprint, Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1981); Stephenie Seto Levin, “The Overthrow of the *Kapu* System in Hawaii,” *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 77, 4 (1968): 402–430; Char Miller, “Rumors and the Language of Social Change in Early-Nineteenth-Century Hawaii,” *Pacific Studies* 12, 3 (1989): 1–28.

2. Bingham, *A Residence*, 162–163; Miller, “Rumors,” 13–16, 20.

3. Norman Meller, “Hawaii: A Study of Centralization” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1955), chap. 5, 193–198; Carol Santoki Dodd, “Power through Centralization: Race, Politics, and Education in Hawaii, 1840–1970” (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawai‘i, 1980), chap. 1.

4. This in no way detracts from our debt to Ralph Kuykendall’s first volume, which is largely about the interaction of foreign factors with a “feudalistic” government and society: *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778–1854: Foundation and Transformation*, 29, 43, 51–52. See, too, T. M. Spaulding, *Cabinet Government in Hawaii, 1887–1893* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Occasional Papers No. 2, 1924), 18, for the importance of kingship; Patrick V. Kirch and Marshall Sahlins, *Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the Kingdom of Hawaii*, vol. 1: *Historical Ethnography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 2–3, 45, 101.

5. Dodd, “Power through Centralization,” chap. 1; and more generally Gavan Daws, *Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1968).

6. Kanalu G. Terry Young, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past* (New York: Garland, 1998), xi, 11–15, 44.

7. *Ibid.*, 58.

8. For a comparative analysis of patrimonial governments under colonial rule, see Colin Newbury, “Patrons, Clients and Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies in Asia and Africa,” *Journal of World History* 11, 2 (2000): 227–263.

9. Bingham, *A Residence*, 87.

10. Cited in Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778–1854*, 79.

11. For the 1840 constitution, see *Translation of the Constitution and Laws of the Hawaiian Islands: Statute Laws of His Majesty Kamehameha III* (Honolulu, 1846).

12. *Ibid.*, 3.

13. This would seem to be the main conclusion of Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1854–1874: Twenty Critical Years* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1953), esp. chap. 4.

14. The bulk of the material on which this argument rests derives from the Hawai'i State Archives (HSA), Department of the Interior, Misc. and Letterbooks, 1840–1893; files of the Ministry of Finance; and printed reports for the same period. Especially useful is the *Hawaiian Almanac and Annual* (compiled by Thomas G. Thrum) from 1875. I am also indebted to the archivists of the HSA for pointing out to me the utility of a file-card system of many of the officials who surface in documents and in particular the "Hawaiian Chiefs Bibliographical Abstract." But there is no formal list of officials, and then only at senior levels, until the 1870s.

15. Taxation is discussed in Theodore Morgan, *Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change, 1778–1876* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), 108–111.

16. Kamehameha III's second act of 1846 gave the minister of the Interior (also the premier) responsibility for the press, commerce, public works, the governors, naturalization, fisheries and interisland trade, the land office, all stamp duties, licenses, and public contracts. The act also specifies that governors' responsibilities for tax collection were to be discharged under the minister of Finance, but in practice governors reported to both ministers.

17. HSA, Finance, Letterbooks, 1848–1881; printed *Reports of the Minister of Finance*.

18. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, Gregg to Interior, 1 August 1861. For Gregg's opinions on what he considered to be a somewhat timid set of ministers wholly beholden to the king in the 1850s, see Pauline King, ed., *The Diaries of David Lawrence Gregg: An American Diplomat in Hawaii, 1853–1858* (Honolulu: Hawaiian Historical Society, 1982), 184.

19. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 145, W. C. Parke memorandum, n.d.; and prisoners' petition to Kamehameha, 21 June 1855.

20. John Young, 1810–1857, as is well known, was the son of John Young ('Olohana), 1742–1835, by his second wife, Melie Kuamo'o. As *kuhina nui* in 1845 and a careful administrator, he exemplified in every way the incorporation of European descendants into Hawaiian politics.

21. Samuel M. Kamakau, *The Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii* (Honolulu: The Kamehameha Schools, 1961), 414.

22. Curtis Piehu Iaukea et al., *By Royal Command* (Honolulu: Hui Hanai, 1988). This book provides a good example of how a clerk to the chamberlain's office and a loyal *kahu* could rise to higher things as land agent, governor of O'ahu, and royal secretary. See, too, Jacob Adler and Gwynn Barrett, eds., *The Diaries of Walter Murray Gibson, 1886, 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1973), 31.

23. It is tempting to equate him with C. B. Wilson, temporary British consul at the period of French occupation of Tahiti in 1842. Possibly he was a son (and, therefore, a grandson of Charles Wilson, London Missionary Society missionary). For his antecedents, see Patrick O'Reilly and Raoul Teissier, *Tahitiens: Répertoire biographique de la Polynésie française*, 2d ed. (Paris: Société des Océanistes, 1975), 605.
24. Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 215.
25. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 141, Robertson to Young, 14 April 1846.
26. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 142, Kaumaea to Kamehameha III, November 1848. An act of 1880 did set up a board to “perpetuate the genealogy of the chiefs of Hawaii” but was repealed in 1887.
27. Kamakau, *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, 399.
28. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 144, Kapeau to Young, 3 July 1851.
29. HSA, Interior, Letterbook 5, Kekūanaō‘a to ‘Īī, 3 April 1848.
30. HSA, Interior, Letterbook 5, part 2.
31. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 144, Kapeau to Young, ?September 1850.
32. When the historian Samuel Kamakau wished to have his “Hawaiian History” published in the newspaper *Kuokoa*, he had to apply to Hutchinson, in September 1868, for this privilege and to pay a patent fee.
33. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 141, Kekūanaō‘a to Kamehameha, 13 September 1861.
34. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 141, Konia to Kanoa, 13 March 1840.
35. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 141, Kapena to Kanoa, 5 June 1840. Kanoa was also elected to the legislature in 1842 and was secretary to the House of Nobles.
36. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 144.
37. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, Mahoe to Lot Kamehameha, 8 September 1857. Nahaolelua may have been demoted for a time but turned up again on Maui signing himself as “money collector” in 1866 for issuing licenses “at 10 per cent per dollar as my remuneration.” HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, Nahaolelua to Widemann, 12 October 1866. He must have been reinstated and was governor of Maui in the early 1870s and minister of Finance in 1874.
38. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 141, Kapeau to Keoni Ana, 15 January 1847.
39. Morgan, *Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change*, 108–110.

40. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, acting governor to S. Spencer, 9 July 1860. There was also a case of embezzlement of education funds in 1848 that Kapena tried and for which he fined the official \$515.
41. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147.
42. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, Kanoa to Lot, 11 August 1857. It was stated that Wundenberg “belonged” [*sic*] to the minister of Foreign Affairs, R. C. Worles, at this time. Widemann became clerk to the governor of Maui in 1865.
43. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 152, Kanoa to Bush, 29 May 1882.
44. HSA, Letterbook 2, Young to Hoaii, 16 February 1848.
45. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 143.
46. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 144, Nahaolelua to Ana, 23 October 1851.
47. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, Ke’elikōlani to Lot Kamehameha, 8 June 1857.
48. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 150, Nahaolelua to Dominis, 18 December 1872.
49. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 141, Petition to Kamehameha III, 1 April 1845 (three hundred signatures of Maui chiefs and commoners).
50. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 144, Petition, 7 May 1851.
51. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 150, C. K. Kapule to W. L. Moehonua, 22 January 1875.
52. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 150, Kupahu to Moehonua, 30 April 1875.
53. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 143, Kamakau (tax assessor) to Young, 14 April 1848.
54. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 2, Ana and Judd to Dr. Petham, 20 April 1848.
55. When Kamehameha III died, he left a herd of 494 head of cattle and other livestock. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 145, Davies to Webster, 24 March 1855.
56. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 144, Kaneoha to Kamehameha III, 6 April 1850.
57. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 145, Kanoa to Prince Lot Kamehameha, 30 September 1856.
58. Preliminary results of the Mahele in 1855 show that gross distribution of 4,126,000 acres allocated 36 percent to government, 39 percent to *aliʻi* (including *konoʻhiki* lands), 24 percent to royals (“Crown”), and only 0.7 percent to *makaʻānana* (commoners) at that date. U.S. Senate, 57th Congress, 2d Session, Subcommittee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico, *Report on General Conditions in Hawaii: Part I* (Washington, D.C., 1902), 86. The Mahele is still one of the more difficult areas of Hawaiian history for identifying those who benefited initially. The standard work, Jon J. Chinen, *The Great Mahele: Hawaii’s Land*

*Division of 1848* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1958), 1–31, is too slight in content; the useful volume by Robert H. Horwitz and others, *Public Land Policy in Hawaii: An Historical Analysis* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 1969), is strong on economic geography but lacks history. See, too, Kirch and Sahlins, *Anahulu*, vol. 1, 167–169.

59. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 2, Young to Kekalei, 19 February 1847.
60. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 2, Kalama to 'Atoni, 10 March 1849.
61. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 2, Ana to Kanoa, 16 October 1847.
62. Horwitz, *Public Land Policy*, table 24.
63. Morgan, *Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change*, 200.
64. HSA, Letterbook, vol. 28, f. 301. By 1893 “Crown” and government held just half of land owned in titles or lease (3,654,344 acres); Americans and Europeans held 28.8 percent, and native Hawaiians 10.1 percent of private lands. James Blount, *Report of the Commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands*, U.S. Congress, House Executive Document 47 (Washington, D.C., 1893), 606. At the coup of 1893, the Provisional Government expropriated the Crown lands.
65. For example, HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 8, contains numerous cases of approval of titles and registration of sales with names of owners.
66. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, Ke'elikōlani to Lot, 23 January 1862.
67. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 149, Ke'elikōlani to Hutchinson, 20 April 1870; Interior, Letterbook, vol. 10, Hutchinson to Ke'elikōlani, 24 May 1870.
68. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 150, Ku'ikahi to Gulick, 15 June 1876.
69. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 13, Gulick to G. C. Harris, 23 September 1875, encl. lists of land grants on O'ahu for the 1850s and early 1860s (a mix of Hawaiians and *haole*) with boundary conflicts unresolved after patents granted.
70. For example, *ibid.*, Letterbook, vol. 15, ff. 130–134.
71. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 12, Gulick to Greenwell, 24 May 1873.
72. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 15.
73. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 150, Kaiwi to Green, 20 August 1874.
74. *Ibid.*, Paakiki to Moehonua, 11 November 1874.
75. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 151.
76. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 153, Kalaukoa to Thurston, 29 February 1888.

77. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 151, Martin to Carter, 7 October 1880.

78. HSA, Interior, Misc., box 153, Kaiue to Thurston, 7 October 1887. For a portrait of Gibson, see Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 220. Gibson was a typical political broker and confidence man elected from Lahaina to the legislature in 1878, then promoted to the premiership and head of foreign affairs by Kalākaua in 1882; in short, he was a royal client who held all posts, some at the same time, and a profligate spender. The evidence does not support the view, however, that he and Kalākaua “purged the civil service of all but sycophants”: Daws, *Shoal of Time*, 240. While this may be true for ministers, the senior ranks of the Interior saw greater continuity and promotion in office as posts expanded in the 1880s.

79. HSA, Interior, Letterbook, vol. 34, Interior to Hoapili, 24 January 1888.

80. *Ibid.*, Interior to Ululani, 24 January 1888, and to Dominis, whose records were transferred to J. L. Kaulukou, Marshal of the Kingdom.

81. “As two of the four present Governors are women, and as the remaining two are gentlemen unfamiliar with the needs and methods of a true police government” [*sic*]. *Biennial Report of the Attorney-General to the Legislative Assembly of 1888* (Honolulu, 1888), 2–3; and see, too, “Marshal’s Report,” 16–17.

82. J. C. Ching, “A History and Criticism of Political Speaking in the Hawaiian Kingdom, 1874–1991” (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1962), 21–32, and for general conduct of elections, use of tax receipts for voting, and pressure from the King’s Guards.

83. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London, 1947), 342–354.

84. Interesting proof of accumulation by royals can be found in Finance department records of spending on coronations and funerals and in HSA, Interior, Misc., box 147, which contains long inventories of the estate of Kamehameha IV.

85. Young, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past*, 112.

86. *Ibid.*, 127. Young accepts uncritically the thesis of population “collapse” from very high levels put forward in David Stannard, *Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western Contact* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1989); see for reviews *Pacific Studies* 13, 3 (1990): 255–301; and Andrew F. Bushnell, “‘The Horror’ Reconsidered: An Evaluation of the Historical Evidence for Population Decline in Hawai‘i, 1778–1803,” *Pacific Studies* 16, 3 (1993): 115–161.

87. Young, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past*, 112.

88. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1874–1893: The Kalakaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967), 402, has a section “Reform and Patronage,” which broaches this important topic.