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Constructing Moral Communities: Pacific Islander Strategies for Settling in New Places

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PACIFIC STUDIES

CONSTRUCTING MORAL COMMUNITIES:

PACIFIC ISLANDER STRATEGIES FOR SETTLING IN NEW PLACES

Guest Editor
JUDITH S. MODELL

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CONSTRUCTING MORAL COMMUNITIES: PACIFIC ISLANDER STRATEGIES FOR SETTLING IN NEW PLACES

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PACIFIC STUDIES

SPECIAL ISSUE
CONSTRUCTING MORAL COMMUNITIES
Pacific Islander Strategies for Settling in New Places

Vol. 25, Nos. 1/2 March/June 2002

INTRODUCTION

Judith S. Modell, *Guest Editor*
Carnegie Mellon University

The essays in this collection originated in a session prepared for the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania; we called the session "Constructing Community in Urban Settings." The authors of the essays adapt and accommodate the original theme of the session to reflect particular experiences, changes in their views of the subject, and the comments of other session participants. In the end, all of the contributions describe modes of *settling:* settling into a new environment and settling under new circumstances. We discuss the process of settling not, or not primarily, in terms of the establishment of political, economic, or educational institutions, but in terms of creating bonds of solidarity. We use the word "moral" to indicate the nature of these bonds: sentiments and feelings that unify individuals and provide a noncontractual basis on which to act, to hold together, and to transcend self-interest in the interests of the collective. Durkheim wrote: "As long as men live together there will be some common faith between them" (in Bellah 1973:xxii).

Why "urban"? The word effectively captures the background setting for the strategies of settling we describe. In the following essays, community creation goes on in settings of complexity, heterogeneity, and diversity characteristic of the "city."[1] These are settings in which class replaces kinship and distance replaces closeness as the basis for interaction, where clues to personal behaviors are puzzling and anonymity the mode of self-presentation. The authors also recognize the importance of migration by Pacific Islanders, and though not everyone represented in the following pages has left home, all are surrounded by the urban world to which migrants (usually) move. "Urban" works as an overarching trope for the forms of globalization that

generate the particular creations of community discussed in our essays. These creations take place in a context of alienation and anonymity, of heterogeneity and diversity—characteristics that appear in classic accounts of the city.[2] In the essays below, urban has multiple meanings, from a geographic, political, and socioeconomic entity (the "city") to a symbol of colonial discipline and power.

Urban acquired further meanings as we drew the contributions together into one volume. Uses of "urban" in the following essays reflect a diversity of historical and cultural circumstances, material conditions, and cultural values, as well as incorporating local understandings of the nonlocal. In the end "urban," as much as anything else, means something different to every individual exposed to its features.

Recognizing the complexities of a twentieth-century world, the essays do not deal only with those who move into an urban environment—the classic pattern of migration—but also with those who are forcibly moved and those who find themselves moved in on by city life. Altogether, the contributions are concerned equally with individuals who are *captivated by* and individuals who are *captured into* the city; being tempted and being trapped by a city can have similar effects and consequences for individuals. In both cases, individuals enter a world of bureaucratized, contractual, and impersonal relations. Over time, a common faith is reconstructed through the process of creating moral communities. Given the situational and often temporary quality of entry into an urban environment, these communities may well themselves be temporary, expedient, and variously nested within one another. The burden of our essays is to show how solidarity nevertheless occurs.

Moral Communities

In emphasizing the significance of the "moral," our collection pushes beyond standard accounts of community building, of ethnic and cultural identity, of enclaves and support systems. We develop the concept in a somewhat Durkheimian sense: ties of affect and of sentiment that transcend physical and material arrangements. We delve into the ways these ties succeed or fail in regulating individual behaviors and interactions. The moral represents the collective conscience characteristic of modern life; as Durkheim wrote in *The Division of Labor,* "It more and more comes to consist of very general and very indeterminate ways of thinking and feeling, which leave an open place for a growing multitude of individual differences" (in Bellah 1973:xxv).

Moral communities based on sentiments and "indeterminate ways of thinking" are not bounded, specifically located, or composed of a definite and definable population. A flow occurs in the personnel and in structural

dimensions, always against the backdrop of changing symbolic representations of collectivity. Moral communities are important as sources of survival in an urban/modern arena precisely because of the flexibility in such symbolic representations of community.

With the concept of moral communities, then, we expand the literature on migration, solidarity (or "society"), and the modern. The contributions to this volume all point to the urgency of creating communities that is a product of a global movement and relocation of people and of institutions. In addition, the essays address the relationship between values evident in a moral community and interpretations of an "indigenous" or "home" culture. We discuss the impact on community of the conditions of migrating, moving, and becoming absorbed in an urban environment. If Anutans in Honiara and Samoans in Auckland equally search for unity, histories and biographies differentiate the resulting communities from one another.

The essays have roots in classic anthropological studies of migration, urbanization, and social solidarity. Ultimately we all owe a debt to Durkheim, who describes society in words that are relevant to a generation that doubts the entity: "a complex of ideas and sentiments, of ways of seeing and of feeling, a certain intellectual and moral framework" (in Bellah 1973:xlii). The essays also refer to contemporaneous theories of modernity, postcolonialism, and transnationalism. We bridge the classic and the contemporary in an emphasis on the "sentimental" dimensions of society, in our attention to modes of establishing a moral framework within a nonbounded group of individuals, and in our exploration of the uses of "community" in struggles for autonomy and sovereignty.

Specifically, we build on earlier studies of migration and urbanization in the Pacific, on the large literature dealing with tradition, custom, and culture, and on recent analyses of the meaning of identity and ethnicity for Pacific Island peoples. These writings are themselves framed by an interdisciplinary discourse on nationalism and transnationalism that has challenged ethnographic method and anthropological theory over the past two or three decades.

We do not, it might be noted, draw absolute boundaries around geographical and cultural areas.[3] Instead we train our inquiries on movements and processes, narratives and norms. Nor are the essays written purely in the spirit of academic revisionism; rather, we join scholars in a number of fields who are questioning disciplinary conventions that came with (and were implicated in) a certain state of the world. The contributors grapple with the loss of our own "home" traditions—the comfort of an ethnographic style—as we enter a world characterized more by temporal than by cultural or national boundaries. Along with the theoretical premise, several contributors blur genres, for example, ethnography and autobiography, social sci-

ence and narrative. The profound challenge of the situations we describe—the moral communities we observe—is to review the principles guiding our own anthropological community. Anthropologists, like everyone else, are engaged in a world of circulating individuals, without boundaries and with few fence posts. We are participant-observers, now, without a place or a people or even, perhaps, a problem to bind our inquiries and interpretations, our concepts and conclusions.

The Context: Metropolitanism

By choice, circumstance, chance, and coercion, individuals end up living far from home or what they consider familiar. They end up in distant or foreign territories, exposed to foreign institutions. Strangeness and strangers abound, disconcerting and disconnecting the individual from others. In the first half of the century, the sociologist Georg Simmel conveyed the essence of this experience, calling it *metropolitanism.* The attributes he accords to a metropolis resonate with the "urban" evoked in our essays. The settings we describe display the properties he outlined in "The Stranger" and "The Metropolis and Mental Life" (in Wolfe 1950:402–408, 409–424). Simmel's understanding of the city, too, included a sensitivity to its impact on a person's identity and self-presentation—the psychological dimensions of living in a city. "For the fundamentally mobile person comes in contact, at one time or another, with every individual, but is not organically connected, through established ties of kinship, locality, and occupation, with any single one" (ibid.:404).

The urban dweller, in other words, is deprived of familiar ties, alienated from others, and adrift in a world without obvious anchors. Whether the individual has run away from, been relocated to, or swallowed up by a metropolitan context, he finds himself surrounded by strange faces and manners. He is stripped of the comfort of face-to-face interactions and encounters with known others. Personal intimacy remains an illusion, whether because an individual has left behind those with whom he or she is intimate or because the spread of an urban style erodes the forms of contact and conversation that create intimacy.

Exiles and Migrants in Oceania, the 1977 Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania volume on Pacific Island migration, demonstrates the significance of a transformation in personal relationships. There Michael Lieber writes: "On a tiny atoll in which each person has face-to-face relationships with everyone else, where there is little privacy, and where gossip continually supplements first-hand observation, each person brings to a relationship the more or less total biography of the other" (1977:39). Those who move from the tiny atoll of Kapingamarangi into the urban environment of

Ponape relinquish a way of knowing; grasping the total biographies of encountered others is not a possibility. Lieber's comment is even more pertinent if "atoll" is seen as a metaphor as well as a geographical entity, much as we are according "urban" many dimensions of meaning. "Atoll" can then refer to the actual island individuals have left, to the memories of home glimmering on the horizon, and to a perception of some behaviors as traditional or old or genuine compared with others. From this vantage point, "atoll" signifies customary, kinship-based ways of interacting with others; "atoll" stands for the bonds of solidarity that come when all faces are recognizable and all gestures legible.

"Atoll" is the other side of the story of metropolis, referring to the familiar, the traditional, the remembered. Out of conceptualizations of "atoll" come the symbols, references, and sentiments individuals draw on to create moral communities in diverse, heterogeneous, and strange settings. Such a formulation does not in the least mean an atoll is not physically present, any more than an open definition of "urban" erases the crowded, jumbled, and anonymous places people who live there and who visit there call a city.

Cities, as urban geographer David Harvey once wrote, have not been easy to delineate, explain, or understand (1973:195). But cities are also clearly not the same as an atoll, either for analysts or in the experiences of individuals. The conditions of urban living explain the mechanisms of creating community—the several circles of solidarity that characterize modern populations, unplaced and mobile. Seventy years later, Harvey paints a picture that resembles Simmel's: anomie, alienation, anonymity; Harvey adds the suffocating imposition on individuals of a capitalist mode of production. If the scholar in Harvey balks at the difficulty of theorizing about the urban, the sensitive writer he is aptly conveys the feelings of being an urban resident or, it can be said, a resident of a modern world.

In *A World of Strangers,* sociologist Lyn Lofland vividly conveys the hardships of city living. Urban inhabitants, she writes, "know nothing personally about the vast majority of others with whom they share this space" (Lofland [1973] 1985:3). There are few grounds for certainty and trust. The urban dweller wends his or her way through a crowd of faceless others, too many to know. Simmel suggests both the emotional impact of the situation and the individual's response in a protective reserve: "If [in a city] so many inner reactions were responses to the continuous external contacts with innumerable people as are those in the small town . . . one would be completely atomized internally and come to an unimaginable psychic state. Partly this psychological fact, partly the right to distrust which men have in the face of the touch-and-go elements of metropolitan life, necessitates our reserve" (in Wolff 1950:415).

Yet, as Simmel recognized, the right to distrust grants an individual the freedom to go one's own way, disguising one's own and ignoring the biographies of others. The freedom to distrust becomes the freedom to act and, moreover, to jump stage—to move from scene to scene, unfollowed and unknown. For not only is the city peopled by faceless strangers, it is also filled with spaces of privacy and opportunities for disguise. The map Lofland gives of spaces without names, areas without specified activities is a chart for going your own way—the appeal of urban life to many, Pacific Islanders included. Its spatial and conceptual openness renders the city appealing; anonymity as well as opportunity, personal flexibility, and the chance for social mobility beckon. Unmistakably, urban environments are as attractive as they are alienating. There are two ends to the magnet: adventure and bright lights coupled with anonymity and lack of familiar clues to behavior.

The traveler suffers loss and loneliness. Entering the "strange," he or she embodies and painfully articulates the abstract features detailed (often with feeling) by the student of the city. "It is obviously only the obverse of this freedom if, under certain circumstances, one nowhere feels as lonely and lost as in the metropolitan crowd," writes Simmel. "For here as elsewhere it is by no means necessary that the freedom of man be reflected in his emotional life as comfort" (in Wolff 1950:418). That is, freedom can feel bad. Being cut loose and unaffiliated is intolerable, as Lofland points out: no one, she claims, can permanently endure the anonymity and distrust of an urban environment ([1973] 1985:viii). The analytic concepts of alienation and autonomy implicit in the descriptions by Simmel and Lofland serve as guideposts in the following essays. In one way or another, each essay explores particular reactions to the discomfort of freedom and the ambiguous results of the right to distrust an urban setting offers.

Overall, then, the collection considers the urban on several planes: as a place, a political entity, an organization of relationships, and a symbol of modern society. "Urban" does not have a concrete or univocal definition, referring rather to a set of traits and circumstances historically driven and individually interpreted. In its most encompassing version, "urban" represents a state of mind and a way of life not only appropriate to but also constitutive of a geographical entity or an administrative unit. "Urban" conveys the fluidity, complexity, diversity, and dilemmas people experience when they fly from home or when home is engulfed by an intruding colonial presence. Moreover, as urban anthropologist Ulf Hannerz notes, urban now describes the world most people occupy (1996). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, accounts of the metropolis are useful precisely because they illuminate phenomena broader than the city.

Creating Communities

The idea of community creation is not new. Examination of the building of community appears in various guises in both immigration and urbanization literature. Immigration scholars classically focus on the strategies individuals adapt for constructing communities in the unfamiliar and complex settings of their destinations. Scholars of the city, too, outline the inner circles of community that allow residents to survive, to thrive, and to achieve their goals. Much of the existing literature, however, treats the desire for community as self-evident and the same in all settings, regardless of national, cultural, and structural differences. Such a perspective fails to recognize the contested meanings of community for participants, the instrumental uses to which "community" is put by actors, and the rhetorical value of "community" when the competition for resources is severe. The following essays move beyond assumptions about community creation in several ways: emphasizing the material constraints on and conditions under which communities arise; delineating the situational and the temporary aspects of any community; expanding an interpretation of "community" to include styles of conflict resolution, local modes of discipline, and forms of restraint on individual action.

In his analysis of moral communities in urban Aotearoa/New Zealand in this volume Macpherson, assuming the existence of a desire on the part of many Samoans for a community based on a Samoan worldview and lifestyle, focuses on the conditions in which such communities have been realized. According to Macpherson, the formation of community requires a critical population mass, an effective organizational strategy like fictive kinship, and active local institutions. Added to the intention of maintaining a Samoan worldview, material conditions allow Samoan migrants to establish viable and visible communities in an urban setting—though, as Macpherson concludes, always subject to change. He suggests a view other essays develop: the tenuous quality of communities may constitute a strength, in the form of resiliency.

Each of the essays examines conditions under which Pacific Islanders who move to or are engulfed by metropolitan contexts create community. Along with material and demographic factors, conditions for community include values brought from "home" and ideologies confronted in the new environment, like racism and class discrimination. Conditions for community also include the physical spaces available to a population, as well as the ability to move through the "space" of the city. General institutional elements, like economic and political systems, evidently play a role. There are other factors

in the construction of community as well, as Alan and Irwin Howard pointed out in an earlier piece, and these vary with time, place, and individual (1977). The argument of this volume is that such factors, while analytically generalizable, gain meaning in the particulars of a situation, including the particulars of an individual life and life story.

Moreover, our essays indicate that conditions permitting the creation of communities also predict the nature of the ensuing solidarity. A fine example is provided by Allen's piece on Marshallese residents in the deeply American town of Enid, Oklahoma. Sources of solidarity come from the prescripts of the local Assembly of God Church. Centered in church doctrine, rules for behavior and strictures on personal expression constitute the collective representations of a Marshallese community. Other essays show how within an urban environment geographical distance forces the establishment of networks of communication. These networks entwine individuals in what might be called a narrative community.

The two essays on Hawai‘i bring out another dimension of creating community. Merry and Modell look at the mechanisms of solidarity that are developed by those who are not migrants but who have been overrun in their own lands. Under such circumstances, communities are a strategy for dealing with the spread of urban modes of discipline that accompany modernization and global capitalism. In the two cases described, local responses to systems of formal punishment create a community with distinct representations of solidarity. Sites, symbols, and sentiments of sociability differ from those cited in other contributions.

Although all the essays concern themselves with the individuals who move between "atoll" and "metropolis," contributors in the second half of the volume give prominence to subjective interpretations of community. These essays take up the theme Simmel bequeathed to urban studies: the anomie and the impersonality of the metropolis are at once liberating and distressing. Ambiguous and anonymous, stimulating and stressful, the metropolitan world mesmerizes and overwhelms the individual person. But metropolitanism does not deny the individual strategies of survival. While there are tragedies, there are also triumphs evident in the imaginative inventions, person by person, our volume brings forward. Particular voices and individual experiences, on street corners and on beaches, substantiate the abstract processes of settling that all the contributions describe.

Individuals confront and ultimately manage metropolitanism in a variety of settings. Collective representations and common faith extend beyond the cultures anthropologists once sought them in, instead belonging to the individuals who circulate through a twenty-first-century world. The lesson of this volume both pulls together and transcends the experiences of Pacific

Island peoples in a world in which migrating is no longer very different from staying home in its effects and attendant strangeness.

Migration: Movement and Circulation

"Migration in its literal [i.e., Western] meaning means uprooting and relocating oneself permanently, but this is not how Samoans conceptualize the word. Instead, the Samoan word for migration is *malaga* or *feoaiga* which mean to travel back and forth" (Lilomaiava-Doktor 1996:1). In these sentences, Sailiemanu Lilomaiava-Doktor suggests a more profound revision of theories about migration than just the idea of a return trip. She describes a way of conceptualizing movement; she is not just referring to the pull-and-push behavior that appears in standard writings on European migration. A notion of back-and-forthness alters the implications of "moving" for Pacific Island peoples; to paraphrase Murray Chapman, Pacific Islanders *circulate.* Thinking of migration as back-and-forthness or circulating influences the process of creating new communities—or communities in a "new" setting—as essays in the collection demonstrate.

Furthermore, a concept of back-and-forthness challenges disciplinary assumptions about geographical distance and located place. Back-and-forthness suggests a more open or accessible world than earlier studies of migration or urbanization offer. In addition, Lilomaiava-Doktor's title, "A Personal Reflection on Samoan Diaspora," reminds others that the subject of moving is ultimately personal. None of the patterns and processes we describe occurs without the individual who makes a decision to leave or return, who is forced to sail from atoll to city, or who suffers under the encirclement of an expanding bureaucratic state.

Several years ago, the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai introduced a special issue of *Cultural Anthropology* on "Place and Voice in Anthropological Theory." He recriminated his colleagues for clinging to the ethnographic trope of "culturally defined locations" (Appadurai 1988:16). Addressed to an anthropological audience, Appadurai's criticism of too-easy presumptions of a "there" there pertains to the interpretations of migration this volume provides. For those who circulate, we show, culturally defined locations are daily problematized, mulled over, and reimagined; such locations may mainly be *projectively* there. While Appadurai advocates that anthropologists do without place, those who actually move around may not find it so easy to do without place. That does not mean migrants retreat to geographically bounded, confining locations in interpreting their own experiences; it means that we have to consider the ways in which place is constituted out of images and concepts for everyone.

Those who move, circulate, and crisscross oceans do construct place. But these are places whose primary existence and defining features are as much symbolic as geographical. In the place-and-voice introductory essay, Appadurai refers to the "spatial migration of images and concepts" (1988:20). Though in the service of a different agenda,[4] Appadurai's phrase captures processes we describe: Those who circulate carry images and concepts that are crucial to creating a "place" for themselves in a new setting. From this perspective, place can be at once a physical location and a figurative representation of perceived unity. To adapt an idea from Anthony Giddens (1990), images and concepts turn space into place, but not into a located, geographical place. As our essays suggest, images and concepts body forth a *sense* of place, even when physical manifestations are missing.

Emphasis on the symbolic construction of place in turn expands notions of community. This is true for those of us who write about community formation, and it is true for those who are actually making communities under circumstances of circulating and being encircled. A "modern" academic view of place as existing largely in imagination, in other words, illuminates vital components through which individuals adjust to the modern world that spreads around them. At the same time, symbolic constructions of place—imagined communities—occur within the borders and against the restrictions of nation-states. Macpherson reminds his readers that Samoans develop *fa'asamoa* in an Aotearoa that is also New Zealand—indigenous land within the regime of a nation-state. In his essay here on urban *marae* and Maori identity, Tapsell provides a detailed analysis of the links between decisions about ceremonial sites and the "state" of New Zealand politics. The essay is a reminder, too, that encirclement by a state produces conflicts within indigenous communities: Today's nontribal and tribal leaders seem to have been temporarily captured by the Crown's tactical policies.

An imagined community is not a fictitious entity. As the following essays show, collective sentiments and symbolic constructs establish a "place" within and against a nation-state. Imagination is rarely unconfined or immaterial.

In the 1977 volume on migration, Michael Lieber shows how important the coining of new concepts and ideas is to circulating peoples. Comparing two Kapingamarangi communities, one on the atoll and the other in Ponape, Lieber notes that the continual movement of individuals from atoll to city alters the meanings of "Kapinga people" and of "community." The meaning of each term is universalized, he argues, detached from location in or identification with a particular place (Lieber 1977:58–59). As individuals travel back and forth, then, concepts crucial to cultural and personal identity expand, swing free of their moorings in concrete material references—but not completely, as Lieber and others recognize. Universalizing is not equivalent

to dropping everything that is familiar, close, and secure; our volume argues for a new approach to the subtle links between universalizing and localizing in anyone's experience.

In his 1996 collection of essays, *Transnational Connections,* Ulf Hannerz instructs his colleagues to attend to the expandability or looseness of "place," the local, and the cultural. He slyly hints at an anxiety of rootlessness that fixes anthropologists to the familiar "atolls" of their discipline. An anxiety of rootlessness also (more justly perhaps) besets indigenous peoples caught in and by an aggressive, capitalizing world. We show that Pacific Islanders have responded with transmutations of place, locality, identity, and collectivity that are more daringly postmodern than the theories of some well-known academicians. If anthropologists continue to imprison natives in culturally defined places and rigidly bounded locales (Hannerz 1996:94), "natives" themselves do nothing of the sort.

While arguing that communities are created out of conceptual transmutations of the universal and the particular, our essays do not neglect the significance of material conditions encountered by migrants to and residents in an urban context. Pacific Islanders who travel, are transplanted, or are administratively overrun struggle to find housing, jobs, education, and so forth, under circumstances of imperfect autonomy, limited opportunity, and, often, blatant discrimination. These struggles exist alongside efforts to redefine "people," land, culture, and solidarity. The presence of imagined communities provides a resilience, justification, and legitimation for the mechanisms individuals use to create a livable niche within (increasingly pervasive) metropolitan settings.

Emphasis on images and concepts takes our essays beyond discussions of "ethnic strategies" and "immigrant networks" in literature on migration. Though the same institutional components ground the processes we analyze —churches, households, work groups, and schools—each contributor recognizes the extent to which meanings accorded these forms of social solidarity are moral. Kinship, for example, is a topic that appears in our pages just as it does throughout immigration literature (e.g., Yans-McLaughlin 1990). And it plays a similar part, indicating the ways in which people know and exploit connections in a new environment. Our inquiries, however, go further in focusing on kinship as a mode of collective representation: Valued traits and aspects of temperament, norms for conduct, and concepts of self are coded through kinship. Again, we do not dismiss the "real" importance of related people for helping one another. Rather, we add to that the feelings and sentiments that "discipline" individuals into or out of a kinship-based network—and therefore into or out of community. In our essays, kinship is a source of judgments, evaluations, corrections, and sanctions.

Kinship also communicates "cultural meanings of spatial mobility" (Silverman 1977:5). As Silverman and others have pointed out, interpretations of "moving" are part of movement; in turn, interpretations of family and household are central to views of mobility. The "essence of movement," Murray Chapman writes, is intimately connected to meanings of "home" and to "links between mobility and identity" (1995:255). Kinship provides the "collective representation" that links mobility and identity by embodying measures of attachment and of attenuation. Kinship symbolizes the substance of "identity" when a person is apart from those at home.

Yet, as our essays show, even kinship cannot reliably secure the individual who travels back and forth, in and out of a metropolitan world. Far from home, but with home as symbol, individuals struggle against the anomie and anonymity, aloneness and alienation of cosmopolitan life. And kinship ties do not always sustain.

Global processes are individually interpreted, by the observer as well as the participant. The lesson is apparent in the complementary essays contributed by Rosenblatt and Tapsell. Rosenblatt is the "stranger" who is gradually accepted into a group focused on a Maori *marae* in Auckland. He learns about home, mobility, and identity—his and theirs—through the generosity of those involved in settling in an urban environment. In his piece, Paul Tapsell draws on a personal intimacy with the meanings of Maori *marae* in order to locate these meanings in a world of back-and-forthness, metropolitanism, and global movement. For Rosenblatt and Tapsell equally, urban *marae* constitute primary sites for local interpretations of universal processes. The two do not disagree about the significance of *marae* for the creation of moral communities in modern Aotearoa/New Zealand, but they diverge in their views of the components—the symbolic references to land, tribe, and kinship.

The divergence, in turn, reflects the complexities produced by attending to particulars of personality, place, power, and procedure in analyzing community creation. Neglecting these complexities, entailed by metropolitanism itself, would be unfair to the multiple functions served by creating communities. In a world of circulating individuals, these functions are sentimental, social, normative, and oppositional.

Identities and Moral Communities

We are not talking about migrant communities (Lieber 1977:353) or about cultural or ethnic communities, but about *moral communities.* The phrase is at once more abstract and more personal than the related phrases used in earlier studies of Pacific Islanders who leave or lose their homes and homelands.

In 1990, Jocelyn Linnekin and Lin Poyer published an important collection of essays, *Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific.* In their introduction, the editors delineate the difference between Pacific Island and Western notions of identity. Pacific Islanders in general, they write, assume cultural identity is *invented;* Westerners, by contrast, assume that identity is a *given* (Linnekin and Poyer 1990:4). In a memorable formulation, they phrase the difference in terms of Lamarckian and Mendelian theories: following Lamarck, identity in the Pacific is circumstantial and learned, whereas for Westerners identity is primordial, inborn, genetic (ibid.:7). If you are a Pacific Islander, the heart of who you are is the creative invention of who you might be.

By and large, the essays in that collection concentrate on group dimensions of inventing or invented identity: the articulated and visible distinctions between groups that are deemed, interchangeably, *ethnicity* and *cultural identity.* It is time to pass beyond those insights, first to ask how invention goes on, and, second, to examine the connections between self-identification and wider forms of collective representation.

All the essays in our collection in one way or another describe *collective representations.* These may be manifested in a physical structure, through a perception of the workplace, embedded in a style of resolving conflict, or expressed in consciously constructed symbols. Like Durkheim, from whom the phrase comes, we link collective representation to a notion of the moral. Recognizable signs of "unison" signal a moral community. But why moral? Durkheim claimed society is inherently moral inasmuch as a sense of solidarity guides individual conduct. "Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of his ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong" (Durkheim, in Bellah 1973:136).

He also argued that to be a moral force solidarity must be embodied, envisioned, apparent. "From another point of view, however, collective representations originate only when they are embodied in material objects, things, or beings of every sort—figures, movements, sounds, words, and so on—that symbolize and delineate them in some outward appearance. For it is only by expressing their feelings, by translating them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that the individual consciousnesses, which are, by nature, closed to each other, can feel that they are communicating and are in unison" (Durkheim, in Bellah 1973:160). As our cases demonstrate, in a twenty-first-century world replete with people in circulation (including anthropologists), it is necessary to reconceptualize the links between "material objects" and individual consciousnesses or identities.

In the following essays, material objects, things, and beings of every sort represent a sense of solidarity. However, these objects, things, and beings include abstract ideologies as well as the concrete embodiments Durkheim relishes; the "things" to which he refers are in our presentations elaborated concepts as well as physical entities. Concepts have as much impact on individual consciousnesses as any totem or temple.

"At the same time, while 'communities' used to be thought of mostly as rather more tangible, small, face-to-face entities, unproblematically situated in space, they can now be 'imagined'" (Hannerz 1996:92). Several of the essays in this volume address "imagined" collective representations. Initially, we had conceptualized community in a bounded way—tangible entities if not in terms of economic and political institutions, at least in terms of common space, style, and self-definition. Led by essays like Merry's and Modell's, we eventually rejected the assumption of an entity, whether physical/geographical or sociocultural. As Merry writes in her contribution, "There are not distinct, bounded groups sharing integrated and cohesive sets of practices and worldviews. Instead, there are multiple, overlapping, communicating communities that share some ideas and contest others; within communities, different groups have different interpretations of the same symbols."

In an urban setting, manifestations of collective solidarity activate social ties that are attenuated when a person moves away from home. And as Durkheim noted, anything that fosters solidarity is "moral." Extending his thesis, the forms of collective representation described below focus (in one way or another) on notions of proper conduct. These notions bind individual to individual, sometimes along customary kinship lines and sometimes through a replication of kinship. The world no longer consists of faceless strangers but of people who assess one another, just like (though not in the same way as) "back home." Brought into a community by and of judgments, individuals recompose their actions and their identities to fit—and consequently to perpetuate—shared standards.

The moral content of collective representations provides a dynamic element to the creation of communities: A person feels bad if he or she does not comply and conform. Or, to put it another way, a person realizes when he or she is refusing to comply or conform, as Feinberg tells us Anutans discover on settling in Honiara. Realization drives a person either toward or away from those who seem to be imposing their wishes. But the person is not lost or bereft of community. "Urbanized" or "citified," he or she has access to multiple communities of solidarity. "A community is created by members imagining common sentiments and connections. This definition is not based on geographic proximity, nor is it limited to one community at a time" (McGrath 1997). Common sentiments and connections, we show, are ex-

pressed through individual transactions and personal testimonies, which means "community" is not absolute in time or place.

The significance of words, language, metaphors, and narratives to the creation of moral communities is evident in all the essays in this volume. With more or less emphasis, each contribution recognizes that the stories people tell themselves and each other are crucial to an ongoing process of settling. In addition, as Donner suggests, a metaphorical framing of experience negotiates the contrast between "atoll" and "metropolis," providing a guide to the creation of community. For the Sikaianans he knows, the dichotomous pairing of "fish and taro" and "rice and tea" creates both the community of home and the communities of Honiara.

Merry's analysis here of the punishments imposed on residents of the Hilo area by a formal, Western court provides another dimension to the importance of discourse. Behind judicial sentences lie structures of control to which the individual can respond with either obedience or opposition, lack of comprehension or a deliberate reconstruction of meaning. Detailing a century's worth of interchanges between court and custom, Merry provides a complex picture of the sociopolitical contexts of community creation. With discipline as her theme, Merry makes no bones about the power differential that influences community creation in all instances: the land policies of a state authority, for example, or the gaveled opinion of a judge in a hearing on domestic violence.

Communities as Sites of Resistance

If, as Howard claims, community making involves "crystallizing attitudes and emotions around collective symbols" (1990:260), the assertion becomes more valuable when the sources and manifestations of inequality are inserted into the equation. One then has to ask whether community creation sets terms for resistance as well as for solidarity and survival. Do the moral communities described in this volume represent anticolonialist, antimodern, and antimetropolitan positions?

Linnekin and Poyer refer to Pacific Island peoples who formulate an "explicitly countermetropolitan identity" (1990:12). These are peoples who have been sucked into an alien metropolis or a pluralistic nation. The phrase implies resistance to surrounding customs and the creation of identity in opposition to "foreign" sources of control. The discussion also implies an active effort to assert autonomy and rights. The picture that emerges from the data in the present volume shows the need for a more complicated interpretation of "countermetropolitan." As Hannerz suggests, the "counter" is often performed by those who share a metropolitan style (1996:52). He also

argues that when "counter" is attached to the concept of culture, it becomes the province of an elite (ibid.:75). That is, an association of "identity" with "culture" dispossesses the majority in favor of the articulate minority.

The point to be taken from Hannerz is that "communities" can no more be attached to culture than to place, no more be attached to assimilation than to resistance. His views are a warning against too quickly confusing an asserted cultural identity with a rebellious separatism or assuming that collective solidarity implies distance from a modern ("urban") world. The relationship of collective identity to "metropolis" is subtle and circumstantial.

In an early draft of his contribution here, Rosenblatt wrote that "one can understand the *marae* as an inversion of the space outside it: there Maori customs, values, and language have more status than those of the Pakeha, and a kind of uncolonized space is thus constructed." The notion of uncolonized space is less confined to "culture" and less attached to a particular mode of action than either "countermetropolitan" or "resistance." Rosenblatt's phrase opens the way to recognizing the importance of popular, nonbounded, and "flowing" positions/identities, a theme that also appears in other essays. In Enid, Oklahoma, for example, Marshallese migrants established an Assembly of God Church that, according to Allen, accomplishes several modes of "uncolonizing" for its congregants. "The formation of an ethnic church, separate from the larger Assemblies of God organization, has been a means for Marshallese transmigrants to ensure individual survival by assuring group survival via the creation of a sacred ethnic space in the Enid urban environment." Allen goes on to show how the local Marshallese Assembly of God in Oklahoma enshrines values distinct from those of the parent church, of middle-American neighbors, and of the Marshallese remaining at home in the islands. The community created through the strictures of this highly localized church is neither "cultural" nor "ethnic," neither modern nor traditional. It is not imprisoned by absolute definitions. It is, however, evidently the product of postcolonialism, modernity, and transnationalism.

A similar reading of community creation comes from the essays by Modell and Merry. Both address the situation of native Hawaiians who have been moved over by a colonial and a state authority; Hawaiians are a prime example of (initially) unwilling participants in a metropolitan world. Both essays describe the intrusion of a metropolis represented by law, court, and social workers into the most intimate aspects of life and identity. Modell details a local response to such intrusion: Hawaiian members of a domestic violence group act out a charade representing their collective values, creating a temporary community of resistance to social work ideologies. With a focus as well on the control of domestic relationships, Merry sets the issue of identi-

ties and communities in the wider context of Euro-American dominance, global cultural and political movements, and an anthropological embrace of cultural relativism. "Cultural relativism grew out of an artificial imagining of cultural distinctiveness and boundedness, an imagining that provided useful fodder for resisting colonialism." She concludes that "cultural relativism and the notion of separate and contained cultures [are] inaccurate and misleading as a moral guide in the late twentieth century."

These essays underline the significance of sanctions and norms as they occur on multiple levels, from face-to-face contact to the encounter between one system of justice and another. From this standpoint, the idea of "counter" simplifies the phenomena we describe. If we drop its connotations of hierarchical relationship and direct reciprocity, then "countermetropolitan" serves our purposes, indicating a competition among moralities, themselves constitutive of communities. Such a usage of "countermetropolitan" prompts further inquiries into the ability of common sentiments, however manifested, to discipline individuals whose familiar interactions have broken down or no longer exist. Can the importance of *marae* hold Maori together in the presence of sharply conflicting interpretations of the ceremonial site Tapsell discusses in his contribution? Can an articulated understanding of *fa'asamoa* unify Samoans in Auckland who rarely visit one another and whose children grow up in another world? How do collective sentiments bear up under the strain of disciplines imposed from outside, including racism and denial of resources? Beyond the legal and official strictures on those who circulate or are encircled lie numerous other controls over their activities. In response, groups develop local disciplines that are potentially but not self-evidently countermetropolitan, anti-urban, and resistant.

Moral communities, then, hold individuals together by force of a discipline that may be symbolic, instrumental, rigorous, or weak—and always changeable. As Feinberg shows in his essay, people with common sentiments do not necessarily agree, and in anger they often forget or neglect the "right" ways of handling conflict. In a world in which conflicts are newly premised and divisions newly formed, he writes, "the moral order that provides the underpinning of their old communities is inevitably challenged." Anutans in Honiara, he continues, struggle to maintain community despite factions, conflicts, and confusions, drawing on both the symbols of "island life" and the resources of the "city." The discipline individuals experience sustains the moral communities individuals create. The story of Anutans confronting a modern, capitalist, and urbanizing setting, Feinberg notes, has no end.

This volume, too, has no end. Rather we open up a number of questions about changes wrought in and on Pacific Island peoples by the spread of

metropolitanism—literally and metaphorically. Each essay takes a different slant on back-and-forthness, yet all suggest the lack of boundaries in a twenty-first-century world—there are no insulated cultures or bounded cultural places—and the consequent intensification of the modes and the importance of imagining communities, selves, sanctions, and sentiments.

Organization of the Volume

The ethnographic sites in this volume range from conventional urban settings like Auckland to the punishments imposed by Hawaiian family courts from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth century. Overall, the collection is unified by a concentration on people in circulation and people encircled. The concept of circling brings the two situations together, insisting that in the current era the phenomena are not distinct. Individuals who migrate share histories and experiences with individuals who are subjected to the movement of a metropolitan into a local world. In either situation a response to the process is the creation of moral communities. That is, the collective representations of solidarity exert disciplinary force, influencing behaviors, feelings, and definitions of responsibility, though not always resolving conflict.

Section 1 contains essays by William Donner, Richard Feinberg, and Cluny Macpherson. Each is concerned with the social structural and economic factors that create a context for community formation on the part of transplanted or migrant individuals. Donner and Feinberg write of immigrants to Honiara, in Donner's case from Sikaiana and in Feinberg's from Anuta. The authors describe a tension between ways of living—of distributing resources, preparing meals, solving disputes, and so forth—in a city and ways of living associated with being back home. Apparent in the first two essays, too, is the self-consciousness with which migrants look to the "island" and look to the "urban" in order to monitor the actions of themselves and others. Anutans seem more at risk in the metropolitan environment than Sikaianans, perhaps because, as Vern Carroll once suggested (1977), some people lack the stamina for "community" that others possess.

Considering the urban niche as a social, political, and economic environment, Macpherson outlines the factors that permit the actualization of a desired (or imagined) community for Samoans in Aotearoa/New Zealand. His piece adds two further components: the devastating impact on community formation of racism and the risk posed by the rebellion of a younger generation against the communities established by an older one.

The second section contains contributions by Linda Allen, Daniel Rosenblatt, Paul Tapsell, Judith Modell, and Sally Engle Merry. Allen's essay details the creation of a "genuine" Marshallese community in Enid, Oklahoma. Using

the spaces and scriptures of the Christian Assembly of God Church, Marshallese far from home create a Marshallese identity that is more traditional than the one (perceived) on the island. Allen's contribution indicates just how significant rules of conduct are for creating a moral community and how effectively rules capture "custom." Like Allen, Rosenblatt focuses on the importance of a sacred site, the *marae,* to delineate the processes by which Maori create community in urban centers of New Zealand. His account of the construction of an urban *marae* through storytelling, gatherings, and negotiations with Pakeha reveal workings of imagination that are far from automatic or unconscious. Tapsell's piece, while also dealing with *marae* in modern Aotearoa/New Zealand, offers a different interpretation from Rosenblatt's. While Rosenblatt focuses on the sources of solidarity in and around the *marae,* Tapsell focuses on the role of *marae* in establishing Maori tribal identity within a nation-state. Not contradictory, the essays provide turns of the prism on the multiple functions of community in any setting.

The contributions by Modell and Merry also complement one another. Modell's analysis of a domestic violence group in Hawai'i, forming solidarity with and against the social workers who represent an urban world, is a counterpoint to Merry's discussion of the long century of American reconstruction of Hawaiian family and domestic relations. The narratives offered by women in a domestic violence group create a community that can be seen as an intense local response to the laws and judgments Merry analyzes in the framework of colonization, capitalism, and globalization. In the Hawai'i instances, the "urban" not only pulls an individual into its throes but also seeps into the private spaces of identity and personhood. In those cases, communities are composed of constantly transforming and transformed selves.

All five essays in Section 2 emphasize the importance of local and personal interpretations to the construction of a moral community. Interpretations include the stories told on a *marae,* the translation of scripture into custom, and the formal opinions of a judge. All five essays show, too, the importance of self-other interaction, a theme in Section 1 as well. Inevitably, who and what compose "others" cannot be predicted. As Allen writes, others may be on the "atoll" as well as in the "metropolis." Marshallese in Enid construct a moral community in juxtaposition to a modified Marshallese culture at home.

Contributions in Section 2 convey the diversity of material objects, things, and beings that represent collective sentiments: a road to a *marae,* a story told by father to son, a punishment laid down by a court of law, an anecdote reported at a women's group. Varied and often haphazard, these embody the moral dicta that constitute the elements of community.

Both sections emphasize the mobility of concepts and symbols. Each

essay in the volume recognizes the transformations such building blocks of moral community undergo in traveling back and forth, from atoll to metropolis and the other way around: a circulating imagery. All contributors posit a kind of double take, noting that the creation of moral communities is simultaneously countermetropolitan and *counterhomeland.* The very process of community creation erodes the gap between there and here, "island" and "city," past and present. At the same time, local communities provide the references and common sentiments through which individuals handle the constant transformations in their own lives.

The collection as a whole speaks to issues pertinent in a world in which few individuals stay home, in place, and at length. The reality of a globe populated by peoples in circulation gears academic debate to theories of postmodernism and transnationalism that too often become abstract and distant. Our essays instead turn the debate to the experiences individuals have of these global processes and specifically to the mechanisms by which individuals create communities of solidarity that modify the anonymity and alienation initiated by "back-and-forthness." Ultimately, exposure of these local mechanisms can best illuminate both the causes and the consequences of the large flowing population of which we all are increasingly a part. The fact that lives are at stake makes the global processes of migration, urbanization, and transnationalism worth anthropological attention.

Few isolated "atolls" exist anymore, and, as Hannerz said, the world of "cities" is the world most people now inhabit one way or another. If the following essays are persuasive, the communities contained by disciplines will also require redefinition. It is unfair to argue against the boundaries of a "culture" and to uphold the boundaries that isolate disciplinary "places" from one another. If the collection contributes to our understanding of circulating, settling, and designing and redesigning settings, then it should also alter the scholarly approach to such matters. For these are likely to be the "matters" of the new century.

NOTES

1. See Mayo 1987 for a precise discrimination of the terms "urban," "urbanism," and "urbanization." All three categories are implicit in our essays, although often with the recognition that it may be hard to maintain distinctions among concepts of place, of a state-designated unit, and of a characteristic mode of production and distribution.

2. See, for example, Park 1925; Wirth 1938.

3. Nearly ten years ago, Alan Howard (1990) pointed to the imperialism implicit in a division of the Pacific world into three major geographical and cultural areas.

4. He talks of the politics of this migration and the dominance of "the Euro-American panopticon" (Appadurai 1988:20).

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RICE AND TEA, FISH AND TARO: SIKAIANA MIGRATION TO HONIARA

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For the past seventy years, the people from Sikaiana in the Solomon Islands have been migrating away from their atoll. After World War II, most Sikaiana migrants settled in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, located on Guadalcanal Island. Several generations of Sikaiana people have matured in Honiara, and, during my stays in the 1980s, the Sikaiana population in Honiara outnumbered the population on Sikaiana. In Honiara, Sikaiana migrants have developed many activities that bring them together as a community, including a residential settlement, funerals, wedding exchanges, and fund-raising events. Sikaiana people living on the atoll form a small face-to-face community of biographically known others. Sikaiana migrants in Honiara have developed institutions and events that maintain this kind of intimate community, but economic and demographic factors are not stable, and the lives of migrants are changing in ways that may alter their communal activities. Collective ownership is being replaced by individual ownership, generalized reciprocity is replaced by new market relations, and most Sikaiana migrants are now dependent on earning wages in an uncertain economy and social system.

Polopolo mai te tinana koe ka hano ki Tapuaki
Sulu tahi ki too sikulu ko he naenae noa i te kuki

I promised your mother to make you go to school.
Always study hard so that you will not end up making yourself tired
working as some white man's cook.

Noho lautama tanata o te moana
Heai mana he kete haahaa ki kaveiholia

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Mai tona male ku heai i a koutou
Tona lautama e noho i Sikaiana

The young man living abroad
He is not sent any baskets of taro.
He has been forgotten by you,
The young people of Sikaiana.

THESE ARE TWO SONGS from Sikaiana.[1] The first song was written in traditional style in the 1950s and describes a guardian who is concerned about a young man's education. He wants the young man to learn at school so that he will be able to find a good job rather than work as a cook or house servant for a white man. The second song is composed in the guitar style that became popular among young people in the 1970s. A young Sikaiana migrant, away at school or work, laments his separation from Sikaiana. He has not received a basket of taro from Sikaiana and fears he has been forgotten by his friends and relatives there. Taro, *haahaa (Colocasia antiguorum),* is a main staple on Sikaiana. Sikaiana people often send baskets of taro to relatives who have migrated to other parts of the Solomon Islands, especially Honiara, the nation's capital and largest city, located on the island of Guadalcanal. These songs reflect a central theme and at times contradictory tension in Sikaiana life: the desire to maintain close communal relations and the desire to participate in modern and Western activities.[2]

It is within this tension that the modern urban community of Sikaiana migrants in Honiara must be understood. Migrants want to participate in many modern activities, but they also have developed and maintained many activities and institutions that define them as a distinct community. This urban community is not only a "moral" one of shared values and interests, it is also an interactional one of known individuals who participate together in the same events and activities. But this community is not stable, and its composition and internal cohesion are constantly affected by the problems of living in a multicultural society and making a living in a market-oriented economy. Some Western cultural practices have been incorporated into communal ones, but other Western and modern cultural influences have the potential to erode the ties that bind Sikaiana migrants together into a community.

Migrants must earn wages to survive, while life on Sikaiana can be managed with mostly local resources. Often, this aspect of the dichotomy between life on the atoll and in town is expressed in idioms concerning food. People, jokingly, describe the harshness of life in town as based on a diet of rice and tea, commodities that are imported into the Solomon Islands. On Sikaiana the main diet is based on locally produced resources, especially fish and the

preferred variety of local taro, *haahaa,* described in the song above. In Honiara there is the excitement of a diverse, consumer economy, but one must have income to survive; on Sikaiana life may seem less exciting, but there is access to local resources.

Sikaiana is an intimate society. The 250 Sikaiana who live on the atoll can be described as a "primary" group, that is, everyone is involved in intense, emotional, and continuing interaction (Cooley [1909] 1923). People are known as biographical others with shared personal life histories. There is not only a shared set of ideas, values, knowledge, and morals, but also especially intense interactions among people as known biographical others. In a small community, everyone is famous.[3]

Migrants have developed activities and institutions that not only reflect shared interests and commitments, but also preserve their face-to-face intimacy. They have established a resettlement community, Tenaru, outside of Honiara, where many Sikaiana reside near one another on contiguous plots of land. Moreover, migrants, whether or not they reside at Tenaru, participate in common activities including fund-raising events, sports teams, dance groups, weddings, and funerals. Migrants not only form a moral community with shared values, but also have occasions when they form an interactional community. Although it can still be lonely for people who attend schools or work in remote areas of the Solomon Islands or in other countries, there is a large and well-organized community of Sikaiana migrants living in Honiara.

But this migrant community is not stable. Since 1999, there has been intense ethnic fighting in and around Honiara, where most Sikaiana migrants live. More generally, the atoll's resources can support only a limited number of residents, and with the population rapidly increasing, the number of migrants in Honiara continues to rise. These migrants are dependent on earning wages in an uncertain economy. Moreover, migrants engage in new activities and relationships that are not so easily incorporated into community life and may weaken ties among themselves.

Context

Sikaiana is located about 160 kilometers east of Malaita Island in the Solomon Islands. Sikaiana is small, four small islets with about four square kilometers of dry land. In the nineteenth century, Sikaiana became a popular stop for whalers and acquired a reputation for being friendly to visitors. By the late nineteenth century, trade goods were essential in the local economy, and almost all tools were steel. Trade goods were acquired in exchange for copra and coconut oil and, in a few cases, the wages received by the Sikaiana men who worked away from Sikaiana.

The British incorporated Sikaiana into the Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1897, but administrators visited only sporadically until the 1930s. In 1929, Anglican missionaries from the Melanesian Mission established a permanent mission on Sikaiana, and most of the atoll's population converted to Christianity in the 1930s. The Sikaiana claim that their elders decided it was important to learn to read and write in order to maintain access to important trade goods, and they wanted missionaries on Sikaiana so that younger people could be educated.

During the 1930s, the Melanesian Mission was the main source of contact with the outside world. It ran a school on Sikaiana, and it sent a boat to Sikaiana every year to take young men and women to mission boarding schools in other parts of the Solomon Islands. The mission hired some Sikaiana men to work for them throughout the Solomon Islands. Apparently concerned about overpopulation, the mission also organized a small resettlement community on Isabel Island. Although this community did not last long, it foreshadowed later efforts to establish resettlement communities.

After World War II, new institutions besides the church became integrated into Sikaiana life. These new institutions include a primary school, a local court, an elected council, a cooperative store, and a clinic. At the same time that these institutions were being integrated into daily life on the atoll, the Sikaiana people were becoming integrated into a larger social system that extended beyond the atoll. People left the atoll for schooling and to find work. Many migrated permanently from Sikaiana. Although they returned for their yearly holidays or even for longer visits, migrants and their children became established in other parts of the Solomon Islands, and these children were raised away from Sikaiana.

By the time of my first arrival in 1980, Sikaiana was isolated only in a geographic sense; in other respects it was firmly involved in global economic and cultural processes. There was a shortwave radio that had daily contact with Honiara (once, my sister called from Pennsylvania). Half the houses were made of concrete and masonite with iron roofs. Most families owned a radio–cassette player and listened to the national radio system. Young people listened to Western rock and popular music. Most people spoke Solomon Islands Pijin; some young people preferred it to Sikaiana in their informal conversations (see Donner 1996).

For the most part, the Sikaiana people were eager participants in these changes. They acquired a reputation among Europeans and Americans for friendliness in the nineteenth century, and they found that there were benefits in maintaining ties to the outside world. For many years, they pressured the British government to offer them access to wage-paying jobs. They became enthusiastic Christians. Formal education became valued and success

in Western occupations admired and praised. But despite these changes, Sikaiana remains a tightly knit, intimate society. People know one another and prefer one another's company to that of outsiders. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, moreover, Sikaiana migrants self-consciously redefined and maintained their community.

Emigration and Population Growth

Following the conversion to Christianity in the 1930s, there was a continuous increase in population. The population residing on Sikaiana had been stable from 1900 to 1987 at about 200 to 250, and this is probably the number of people who can be supported by its resources.[4] The total Sikaiana population, however, increased rapidly, and people migrated away, mainly to Honiara. In the 1930s, a little less than 20 percent of the total population of about 300 people had emigrated from Sikaiana. By the 1950s, approximately 40 percent of a total population of about 400 people were emigrants. By the 1970s and early 1980s, more Sikaiana people were residing abroad than on Sikaiana.

The Sikaiana say that population growth was the result of Christianity's protection of people from deaths caused by vengeful ancestral spirits. Older people recall that the spirits of deceased ancestors *(aitu mate)* used their supernatural power to harm those who offended them or their descendants. They also claim that, under the traditional practice of arranged marriages *(aavana puluna)*, couples did not marry until late in life and therefore had fewer children. Moreover, they say that, before Christianity, people practiced abortions. Christian missionaries discouraged abortions and arranged marriages. Couples chose their own partners, married at an earlier age, and had more children. In addition, improved health programs became available. There were opportunities for wage labor in other parts of the Solomon Islands, and Sikaiana people were no longer totally dependent on the atoll's limited land resources. Migration, both before and after World War II, has been motivated by a combination of economic need and the desire for adventure (see Donner 1995). After World War II, most Sikaiana migrants went to Honiara, the new capital of the Solomon Islands, which was built around the roads, houses, and construction materials left by the American military operations during the war effort. These migrants settled and raised children who lived most, and sometimes all, of their lives away from the atoll.[5]

Honiara had a total population of about 15,000 in 1976. By 1981, Honiara's population had increased to over 20,000 and was growing at a rate of about 6 percent per annum (in 1986 there were about 30,000 people). In terms of population density, Honiara hardly qualifies as an urban center. But if the term "urban" refers to an array of cosmopolitan processes, then Honiara is

urban (see Mayo 1987:101).[6] Honiara has a diverse population, attracting migrants from all of the approximately sixty different ethnic and linguistic groups throughout the Solomon Islands, including Melanesians, Polynesians, and other ethnic groups who migrated to the Solomon Islands while it was a British protectorate, notably Gilbertese (Kiribati) and Chinese. Honiara has Western institutions associated with a specialized, differentiated economy, including several banks, an international communications facility, an international airport, hotels, the Solomon Islands' best-equipped hospital, several Western-style stores and supermarkets, and the main government offices. There are telephones, electricity, plumbing, and video rental stores.

The Sikaiana population is mobile, and people frequently move back and forth between Honiara and Sikaiana. Small groups of Sikaiana people are also found near Kia in Isabel Province and at the Lever Brothers plantation at Yandina. Many Sikaiana migrants spend their yearly vacations on Sikaiana. It is not uncommon for people to live on Sikaiana for several years and then leave to work for wages for a few years. Sikaiana is also the home of last resort for people who have lost their jobs or are retired. People temporarily leave Sikaiana for a variety of reasons: to attend training courses run by the government or religious organizations; for medical and health reasons, including the birth of a child; to purchase building equipment; to visit relatives; to help relatives with the care of children or with work projects; and to help sponsor wedding exchanges in Honiara. During my stays in the 1980s, few people lived the entire time on Sikaiana. Most people left Sikaiana at least once, and some left and returned several times.

Town Life, Atoll Life: Migration as a Cultural System

Two Sikaiana men described the consequences of change, migration to towns, and development in terms of different concepts of freedom and opportunity. One man had lived abroad and worked for wages for a while. He married a woman from another ethnic group, but he decided to return to Sikaiana and live there. There, he said, he did not have to work for a boss; no one else profited from his labor. He lived as he wanted, and most things on Sikaiana were "free," whereas cash was required to buy things in town. By contrast, another man who had spent most of his life working for wages explained his reasons for staying in Honiara. A man who had money could buy anything he wanted: different varieties of food, a radio, land, and other consumer goods. Life on Sikaiana provides a person with the resources to live, but there is limited opportunity; life in town can be more exciting with more diversity, but a person is dependent on earning money to survive.

Some people find that life on the atoll is comfortable, but there are only limited resources and no opportunities for economic or educational advancement. Copra is the only marketable item from Sikaiana, and production is so labor-intensive and land so limited that it is not possible to accumulate large amounts of cash. There are no large development projects on Sikaiana. There are very limited resources, and there is little land for developing coconut plantations. The Sikaiana people consider the people of Ontong Java to be wealthy, because they have large numbers of islets along their long reef where they can harvest coconuts, bêche-de-mer, and trade shells, such as trochus.[7] Sikaiana's reef is plentiful with fish, but it is not practical to freeze the fish and then transfer them on the monthly boat to markets in other parts of the Solomon Islands.[8]

Life in the towns, on the other hand, can be unattractive for unskilled laborers. In the early 1980s, the base salary for an unskilled laborer was only about US$100 per month (although many Sikaiana men earn higher wages). The lowest-paid regular government worker earned SI$2,298 per year (about US$1,150); the highest regular civil-service salary was SI$17,172 (about US$8,500). People who worked for the government on a per diem basis received less; their minimum wage in 1985 was SI$5.76 per day (about US$2.80). As a result of devaluation, the U.S. dollar more than doubled its value against the Solomon Islands dollar during the 1980s; by 1993, the U.S. dollar had tripled its exchange value since my first arrival in 1980; in 2000, the exchange value of U.S. dollars had increased fivefold (SI$5 = US$1) since my first arrival in 1980, when the currencies were about equal in exchange.[9] Given these circumstances, some Sikaiana men choose not to work in towns for wages that merely meet bare necessities. They return to Sikaiana, where life is more relaxed, and many basic resources are available through gardening and fishing.

Life on Sikaiana can be managed with a small amount of cash, but it does require some income. People consume imported foods and goods, including rice, tea, sugar, soap, and tobacco. Everyone wears manufactured cloth. Fishing line and hooks must be purchased. Everyone owns a machete for work in the bush, and people have axes, hammers, sickles, and other tools. Most people need kerosene to fuel their lanterns. Many families own a radio that needs batteries, especially if younger people are playing their cassettes. Flashlights are used when diving for fish at night. Other purchased goods include cosmetics, bedding, lumber, ornaments, and packaged foods.

On the atoll there are several sources of income. Some people work in jobs that pay salaries, although most salaries are small. These jobs include the teachers at the local school, the area constable, a local medical dresser,

the village priest, the radio operator, local court justices, a court clerk, and copra graders. In 1980–1983, Sikaiana people could also make copra and sell the copra to the local cooperative store, which resold it in Honiara. A family that worked hard could earn as much as the equivalent of about US$50 in a month from copra, although it would be hard to sustain that level of income across several months. After a cyclone in 1986 destroyed the coconut crops, the Sikaiana people stopped harvesting copra (they had not resumed in the early 1990s). Some Sikaiana leave the atoll to earn wages for a while and then return to Sikaiana with supplies. Sikaiana families also send special items from Sikaiana, such as dried sea snails, taro, and pandanus leaves for making sleeping mats *(vasa),* and in return they receive goods from relatives in Honiara.

The atoll is viewed as a place that has good local resources in coconuts, fish, and taro but nothing that can be developed: a good place for a rest, retirement, or if one tires of working for wages. One young man who took his yearly leave on Sikaiana described it to me as a good place for a "picnic" but not a place for someone with "plans." Town life also offers excitement that is lacking on Sikaiana, and some Sikaiana describe Honiara as *hai ola* (literally, "having life"). *Hai ola* may refer to a variety of stimulating or exciting situations, including romantic ones. Honiara has stores full of consumer goods. There are a variety of foods. In the early 1980s there were movie theaters, and by my return in 1993 several families owned their own VCRs. Most people who continue their education beyond the primary level must do so in Honiara. New dance styles, music, and technology come from town.

Life on Sikaiana by comparison can be somewhat boring and provincial. There is a Pijin word, *lokolo,* derived from the English word "local," which describes a kind of provincialism or lack of sophistication (*bus,* "bush," seems to be an equivalent in older Pijin). A person who fumbles with technology or is unfamiliar with current fashions may be derided as *lokolo.* Although most often used jokingly, the term reflects a real concern with the modern and sophisticated. People, especially women, who have been raised on Sikaiana are sometimes teased for being *tu lokolo,* that is, for being unsophisticated about modern practices. These terms can be used in a variety of contexts: When I could not get my pressure lamp to operate properly, a Sikaiana man joked that I was *tu lokolo.*

But in town, the necessity of cash makes Sikaiana migrants dependent on the labor market. In 1993, there were many young men who did not have jobs and were living with relatives. Unemployed people are described somewhat derisively by the Pijin term *liu.* Sometimes they are also described, again derisively, as *fulbai,* which implies that they are living off the wealth of others. Although these terms are used jokingly, they reflect migrants' de-

pendency on wage labor and cash. Most people can expect to be supported by their extended kinship relations. But unemployed young people can become a strain on household resources. The number of unemployed young Sikaiana men living in Honiara seemed to me greatly increased in 1993 compared with 1980–1983 and 1987. Moreover, I know some young men who were unemployed in 1987 and still had not found any steady work by 1993 (see Jourdan 1995 for a relevant discussion of the concept of *liu*).

Life in town can be especially intimidating, moreover, because of the diversity of ethnic groups. Although this diversity offers some fascination for the Sikaiana people, there is also some fear of the malevolence of foreign ethnic groups, both for their physical violence and for the alleged use of sorcery. The Sikaiana claim that they never used sorcery. The Sikaiana term for such harmful magic is *lapu,* and it is always used to describe the malevolent magic of other ethnic groups. Almost all accusations of sorcery are leveled at foreigners. The accusations of *lapu* and the more generic use of the term *kastom* or *kastam* (customary practices) to refer to the harmful magic of other islanders reflect the distrust and fear that the Sikaiana people feel toward the motivations of non-Sikaiana people.[10] The recent ethnic fighting of 1999–2000 is another indication of the vulnerablities of migrants.

Like Louis Wirth (1938), Sikaiana people feel that life in towns can lead to immorality and social disintegration. The excitement of town life is often described as corroding traditional practices, including knowledge about indigenous traditions, sexual propriety, obedience toward elders, and willingness to work. Town life includes contacts with foreigners whose motivations are feared and whose cultural practices are often ridiculed. The priest on Sikaiana felt that living in town could have a harmful effect on church attendance. Whereas the twice-daily church services on Sikaiana are well attended, few people living in town attend church on days other than Sunday. In 1980–1983, drinking alcohol was curtailed on Sikaiana by the local church committee: Men could not drink Saturday and before the afternoon service on Sunday; women could only drink on special holidays. No such prohibitions were established or followed among migrants in Honiara. The church on Sikaiana had a policy of temporarily expelling young people who had premarital intercourse until a public confession. Such policies were never implemented for the large, multiethnic congregation in town, where it was difficult to monitor the activities of young people. Sikaiana people often complained that living in town resulted in sexual licentiousness and even prostitution.[11]

Many Sikaiana parents complained that younger people were disobedient and violated Sikaiana traditions because of their upbringing in towns and exposure to other ethnic groups. Parents and elders described this disobedience in a variety of ways. They complained about the premarital sexual rela-

tions of younger people. They said that many younger people lacked the knowledge about their extended family and descent that is considered necessary to legitimate one's rights to land on Sikaiana. Some young people were criticized for not following traditional prohibitions *(tapu)* on interpersonal relations, especially between in-laws and cross-sex siblings. Generally younger people, especially men, were considered to be lazier than their parents and incompetent in traditional crafts such as canoe making and weaving. Heavy, disruptive drinking was considered to be a relatively recent development and a sign of a general social disintegration associated with modernization. Although there are a fair number of marriages with other ethnic groups, there is a general preference among Sikaiana parents that their children marry within the Sikaiana ethnic group (see Feinberg's contribution to this volume). Almost all marriages with other ethnic groups take place in town.

Sikaiana Community Events in Honiara

Although town life can be viewed as having a corrosive effect on the Sikaiana people and their relationships, the residents of Honiara are involved in several activities that maintain and support them as an ethnic community. Some of these activities maintain traditional Sikaiana practices; others develop a sense of shared community and ethnicity among Sikaiana's migrants in new ways. Large numbers of Sikaiana migrants gather at funerals and the feasts that follow. Weddings are also occasions for community involvement. Present-day weddings include a Christian marriage ceremony followed by an indigenous exchange, *penupenu.* This marriage exchange involves exchanges between the extended families of the groom's father and the bride's father, and then between the extended families of their respective mothers. Cloth is collected and then redistributed among a broad range of relatives. Most weddings also include several days of feasting, drinking, and celebrating. Many Sikaiana families like to have exchanges both on Sikaiana and in Honiara. The exchanges in Honiara often include most Sikaiana migrants who live there.[12]

The Sikaiana migrants in Honiara have also formed organizations to raise money for various Sikaiana projects, including a sports league, a disaster relief campaign, and a church at the Tenaru settlement. These fund-raising activities include walkathons in which people are asked to give money to sponsor a person who participates in a walk. There are parties at which people pay for food, fermented toddy, and beer. Activities at these parties include raffles, gambling, and paying to sponsor the performance of *kastom* dances. Money is also raised by charging admission to dances with rock music held at clubs. These activities not only raise money for Sikaiana interests, the events themselves bring together large numbers of Sikaiana migrants and

generally focus on the participation of Sikaiana people rather than people from other ethnic groups (Donner 1992b).

In 1986, a major cyclone struck Sikaiana, destroying many houses. Sikaiana people in Honiara formed a disaster relief committee that raised money to help the people on Sikaiana. The committee held several different fund-raising events that involved most of the Sikaiana people living in Honiara. In the mid-1980s, some Sikaiana migrants began gathering to practice traditional, or *kastom,* dances and songs. Eventually, these people formed an informal dance troupe that performed at community events such as weddings and at special events in Honiara. In 1987, some Sikaiana women formed sports teams to play in a Honiara netball league. Shortly after, the Sikaiana men formed a sports league, Vania, which sponsored sports events and teams that played in Honiara sports events. Vania also became the main sponsor for the rehearsal and performance of *kastom* dances.

Drinking alcohol has been integrated into many Sikaiana communal events. On Sikaiana most alcohol is made from fermented coconut toddy; in Honiara people often drink beer. In Honiara, there are frequent fund-raising events to support Sikaiana activities that include the consumption of alcohol. Sometimes beer is bought in stores and then resold at marked-up prices; other times fermented toddy is sold. Alcohol consumption among smaller and more informal groups in Honiara also takes place on many other occasions (see Donner 1994).

Land and Resettlement

Land is one of the most important resources on Sikaiana, and the significant corporate groups on Sikaiana are landholding patrilineages, *kano hale* (see Donner 1992a). Among migrants, there is a widespread interest in acquiring rights to land in other parts of the Solomon Islands. In the 1930s, the Melanesian Mission resettled some Sikaiana families on mission land in Isabel Province. After World War II, other migrants tried to purchase rights to land outside of Sikaiana. By the time of my first arrival in 1980, several Sikaiana families had purchased land rights in other parts of the Solomon Islands. Usually, these rights were based on agreements with customary landowners, and they consisted of long-term (ninety-nine-year) leases rather than fee simple ownership.[13]

Until the ethnic fighting of 1999, the largest resettlement of Sikaiana people was at Tenaru, about twenty kilometers outside of Honiara. By my arrival in 1980, about seven extended families had bought long-term leases for contiguous plots of land there. Tenaru is often used for activities that involve most of Sikaiana's migrants, for example, marriage exchanges or fund-

raising events. These activities often include the consumption of alcohol and may continue for several days. Tenaru provides an area that is large and relatively isolated for large community activities.

In 1980, a large number of Sikaiana people met in Honiara to discuss establishing a resettlement community on government land. Several other ethnic groups, including the Tikopians and the Gilbertese, had been given land to resettle under the former British protectorate government (see Larsen 1966, 1977; Knudson 1965, 1977). The Sikaiana wanted to find a large tract of land so that they could establish their residences near one another.[14] The project never was accepted by the government, but one influential Sikaiana person suggested that they start to collect money to purchase some resettlement land on their own without government aid. This meeting in 1980 foreshadowed the expansion of the settlement at Tenaru.

In 1987, about fifteen Sikaiana families began the process of purchasing a long-term lease on a large tract of land adjacent to the settlement at Tenaru. The tract of land was a former palm-oil and rice plantation. When I stayed at Tenaru for a few weeks in 1993, I found that most of these families had built houses on this tract of land. Many of these people worked at jobs in Honiara and commuted from the settlement. The size of the Tenaru settlement increased about threefold between 1980 and 1993. Unlike the Gilbertese and Tikopian settlements, both of which were sponsored by the protectorate government, the settlement at Tenaru had been established by the Sikaiana people themselves.

Tenaru offers the Sikaiana people the opportunity to live together, produce food, and still work for wages. Residents own land where they can grow coconuts, tapioca, yams, and bananas, and also keep some animals. The settlement is along the shore, and although it lacks the reefs preferred by the Sikaiana, it is possible to go fishing. Since the settlement is only about twenty kilometers outside of Honiara, many people commute to their places of work. It is also a center for Sikaiana activities: funerals, weddings, fund-raising and other community events. Other authors in this volume (e.g., Tapsell) have noted the symbolic importance of land in establishing an urban community among Pacific Islanders, and more generally land is an important source of identity throughout the Pacific (see Lundsgaarde 1972). For the Sikaiana, Tenaru offers economic resources as well as a locale for community activities. By the time of my return in 1993, Vania, the Sikaiana sports association, was no longer functioning, although several people said they wanted to start some kind of sports club again. But considerable communal effort was put into fund-raising for the church that was being built at Tenaru. During my first stay in 1980–1983, there were plans to raise money to start a

church. By 1987, a small church had been completed. After 1987, there were continuing efforts to collect money to enlarge the church. During my short stay in June 1993, there were two different fund-raising events for the local church. One was a party at Tenaru, the other a dance at a nearby social club.[15]

Social Differentiation

Sikaiana migrants in Honiara have developed community activities and maintained personal interaction. But life in town includes some significant changes in Sikaiana social relations. On Sikaiana it is rare to use money in any social relationship. Economic relations are organized around reciprocity. Very rarely are any goods sold. When people help others on work projects, they are often rewarded with participation in a toddy-drinking session (see Donner 1994). When I returned to the Solomon Islands in 1993, I found that many families living at Tenaru had started small businesses in which they charged money to their Sikaiana neighbors for food and services. One man went fishing and then sold his fish to other people in the settlement. Another family sold small “ringcakes” (donuts) in the morning. Several families raised and sold chickens. Another family had a VCR and charged admission to see videos. In 1994, I learned that a man was selling fermented coconut toddy, a drink that is usually used in patterns of generalized reciprocity.

In the past, several people tried to start small stores on Sikaiana in which they had supplies sent from Honiara and then resold them after a markup. These enterprises usually failed, because relatives would ask to be given credit to buy goods but would never settle their accounts. Struggling entrepreneurs were caught between the need to make a profit and social obligations for sharing with kin. One successful businessman acquired the reputation for being a very hard man who was willing to make money by limiting his obligations to kin. Some Sikaiana people expressed grudging admiration for his willingness to acquire wealth at the expense of his kinship obligations. Several Sikaiana people told me that they feel they must limit their obligations to other Sikaiana compatriots, or *wantok,* if they are to achieve success in a Western economic system (see Feinberg, this volume).

Kinship and social relations remain important in towns, but there are some changes that suggest increasing differentiation and attenuation of kinship ties. Fosterage is a very important institution on Sikaiana, and many children spend considerable lengths of time with foster parents. In three separate censuses in 1980, 1982, and 1987, I found a consistent pattern in fosterage: about 50 percent of the children living on Sikaiana

were living with foster parents, whereas about 25 percent of the children living in Honiara were doing so. Rates of fosterage are high by any standard, whether in town or on the atoll, but clearly rates are lower in Honiara (see Donner 1999).

Land on Sikaiana is held by corporate patrilineages and for the most part is not partible among its membership (see Donner 1992a). Because of a population increase, the number of people entitled to a lineage's land has increased greatly. All of these people have rights to use their lineage's land, although there is not enough land should everyone decide to return to Sikaiana to exercise their rights. By contrast, land purchased in other parts of the Solomon Islands is owned by an individual and is inherited by that person's children, both male and female, not by the patrilineage. Whereas the control of land on Sikaiana has emphasized the solidarity of expanding patrilineages, Sikaiana land tenure in other parts of the Solomon Islands emphasizes individual rights and inheritance in the nuclear family. Several men proudly told me of the land they had purchased in other areas of the Solomon Islands and that they planned to leave that land as an inheritance for their children. The land at Tenaru is held in long-term leases by specific individuals.

Migrants attend schools with people from other ethnic groups. Schools and life in town expose them to other cultures, in particular Western influences. Assimilation is evident in language use: Pijin and to a lesser extent English are replacing the Sikaiana vernacular in many spheres of usage. Many younger people, especially males who were raised in Honiara, are much more comfortable speaking in Pijin than in the vernacular (see Donner 1996).

It seemed to me during a short visit in 1993 that there had been a noticeable increase of unemployed young people. The total Sikaiana population is increasing rapidly, but the population that the atoll can support is limited. Most of my research was done in the 1980s, when the atoll could support about a third to half of the people who had claim to its resources. The Sikaiana have a rapid rate of population growth, and the atoll supports a diminishing percentage of the total population. Moreover, during my research in the 1980s, the first generation of people who had been raised in Honiara were coming to maturity. These people are now approaching middle age, and a second generation has matured in Honiara. Finally, a primary force affecting migrants' lives is their economic situation. Although there are opportunities for earning wages in Honiara, migrants are dependent on general economic conditions in the Solomon Islands, which are shaped by global social and economic forces. Whatever the tenacity of Sikaiana efforts to maintain their community and culture, these economic conditions may have very severe consequences, both for individual migrants and for their communal institutions.

Ethnic Warfare in the Solomon Islands

As mentioned throughout this essay, the situation of migrants—and Sikaiana life in general—is not stable. Since the conference session leading to this volume, there have been dramatic events in the Solomon Islands that have affected Sikaiana migrants. Beginning in late 1998, there has been violent ethnic conflict on Guadalcanal Island, the location of Honiara and the largest settlement of Sikaiana migrants.

A group of Guadalcanal people known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement has attacked settlements of non-Guadalcanal people living on Guadalcanal. The main targets were migrants from Malaita, the most populous of the islands in the Solomon Islands. In late July 1999, the group raided the Sikaiana settlement at Tenaru and forced the removal of almost the entire population. In June of 2000, a group calling itself the Malaita Eagle Force and claiming to represent the interests of displaced Malaitans, counterattacked, taking guns from the police armory in Honiara, forcing the formation of a new national government, and launching a counteroffensive against the Isatabu Freedom Movement. Eventually, an armistice was signed but as of November 2001 the situation remains tense. For a time, the entire Sikaiana population had to evacuate Tenaru, and many returned back to their atoll. More recently, some Sikaiana people have returned to Tenaru and some have collected compensation for lost property. The long-range effects of this ethnic warfare on the Sikaiana people and their settlement at Tenaru are still unclear.

I expect that these events will, at least initially, further enhance ethnic identity and community support as the Sikaiana people living in Honiara help those from Tenaru and are reminded of their shared interests and heritage. But these events also point to the complex and constantly changing circumstances of life all over the world, including in the Solomon Islands. If Tenaru is eventually lost as a settlement, Sikaiana migrants will also lose an important location for community events. These recent events seem to justify the combination of a fascination with a wider world and a general distrust of that wider world found in Sikaiana thinking about culture change and modernization (see Donner 1995).

Discussion: The Organization of the Sikaiana Community

Vern Carroll once argued that Nukuoro migrants were too individualistic to form migrant communities (1977), contrasting them with other Micronesians and Polynesians, such as the Kapingamarangi, who do form migrant communities (see Lieber 1977). Sikaiana migrants in Honiara clearly form a commu-

nity. The formation of a resettlement community, fund-raising activities, *kastom* dances, funerals, and weddings are collective events, both representing a "moral" community of shared meanings and values, and also bringing people together as participants in an interactional community. The Sikaiana community in Honiara is not simply a residual one derived from a common ancestry on the atoll; it is also one that is constructed and developed. Since my arrival in 1980, Honiara migrants expanded the Tenaru settlement, built a church there, and organized numerous fund-raising activities and associations. They also maintained traditional community practices such as fosterage, wedding exchanges, funerals, and drinking festivals among many other social gatherings.

Residents of Sikaiana can easily form a face-to-face community because of the atoll's small size. Sikaiana residents of Honiara do not necessarily come into daily contact with one another. Nevertheless, throughout my stays in the 1980s, migrants maintained a community of association at marriages, funerals, and community fund-raising events. The settlement at Tenaru, at least until 1999, has been a setting for both daily and festive interaction. The Sikaiana community is not so much a Durkheimian "mechanical" society structured around similarity as a communal society based on familiarity and association. There is, for example, considerable conflict and a strong undercurrent of gossip within the community. The Sikaiana do not always like one another, but they maintain institutions that assure their interactions with one another.[16] Several situations described in this volume refer to a kind of abstract "imagined" community (see Anderson 1991). But Sikaiana migrants form and maintain an interactional community that does not require much imagination, and many of the activities of migrants in Honiara emphasize this interactional aspect of the community.

Essays in this volume describe the formation of communities not only as maintaining a unique identity, but also as exhibiting Gramscian mechanisms of resistance in oppressive conditions (for example, Modell, Rosenblatt, Macpherson, and Tapsell). Sikaiana differs from these situations in a significant respect. Most of the other communities described in this volume developed in a clearly visible, industrialized, Western context where there was a visible gulf between the bearers of a dominant culture and the immigrant communities. The Maoris and the Hawaiians are now a minority in their own homelands. The Samoans in New Zealand and the Marshallese in Oklahoma are migrants in industrialized nations. The Solomon Islands is not an industrialized nation, and within the Solomon Islands there are about sixty different ethnic groups. The Sikaiana do not directly confront the racism or oppression of being a minority in a society with a clearly defined, dominant cultural group. The present ethnic fighting suggests not the domination of one group, but the diversity of interests among different ethnic groups.

The essays by Merry and Modell raise important issues about the kinds of control that colonialism and imperialism can impose. Sikaiana is complicated, because in some respects Western systems of control are most evident on the atoll, where life is confined and the church effectively permeates significant aspects of social life. Church restrictions on drinking and premarital sex are more strictly enforced on the atoll than in Honiara. Some Western practices are less pervasive and dominating in Honiara, with its greater anonymity and diversity, because there is a less tightly structured community to enforce them.

Furthermore, many of the communal institutions and practices, both in Honiara and on Sikaiana, are derived from Western and modern influences. On Sikaiana, church events are some of the most important community events. In Honiara, the organization of fund-raising events for Sikaiana interests, the building of a community church, and the formation of a sports club are derived from Western institutions, although they are also self-consciously oriented to maintaining a distinct community. The purchase of land at Tenaru was based, in part, on Western concepts of leases deeded to individuals; nevertheless, the Sikaiana use the settlement to preserve a collective identity.

In some important respects, however, town life is shaped by the kinds of transformations of relations described by Merry and Modell. Becoming wage earners in a market economy is among the most challenging changes associated with town life, and in some respects, the shift dominates individual choices and lifestyles. For Sikaiana migrants, there is less control over personal morality than on the atoll, but there is the necessity to labor for wages. In Honiara, Sikaiana migrants become producers and consumers in a global economy and must find paying jobs to survive. As producers and consumers, moreover, they are vulnerable to global economic conditions that are shaped by the actions of wealthier and more powerful foreign nations.[17]

Unlike Sikaiana migrants, Anutans who live in Honiara do not seem to form an urban community (see Feinberg, this volume). Compared with Anuta, Sikaiana has a longer history of emigration, and there are many more Sikaiana emigrants living in Honiara. But very much like the Anutans, the Sikaiana feel the same tension between the desire to participate in a larger, mainly Western and modern, global system and the desire to maintain their distinct cultural traditions. This tension is expressed in the songs at the beginning of this essay. The Sikaiana are devout Christians. They enjoy Western videos and music. They are interested in world events. But they also, thus far, form a community of shared interests and commitments to one another. They enthusiastically participate in modern life, but they also lament the harmful changes that they think it has brought into their social relations.

Urban communities are not stable, as is clear from the recent ethnic fight-

ing in the Solomon Islands. But beyond these recent events, a certain amount of instability is inherent in Sikaiana migration. In this volume, Macpherson suggests that the community of Samoans in New Zealand may be weakening among younger generations of Samoan migrants. Tapsell describes the competing interests among Maoris in defining an urban identity. Sikaiana migrants in Honiara face continuing pressures that could alter their activities and relationships. Moreover, there is an important demographic factor affecting the Sikaiana migrants. The population of the Sikaiana people is increasing, but the atoll's resources support only a limited number of people. More and more people must live in Honiara, where they must find work in order to survive. Living in a market economy and a diverse modernizing social system, Sikaiana migrants face pressures to distance themselves from other Sikaiana migrants that may ultimately corrode their communal identity. They are vulnerable to the problems of being wage earners in an uncertain and ultimately global economic system. On the atoll, with its small population, new cultural practices can be transformed into communal ones with relative ease. But in town, the community must constantly be reestablished and reasserted.

NOTES

1. I lived with the Sikaiana people from October 1980 to July 1983 and March 1987 to September 1987. For several weeks in May and June 1993, I lived at the Sikaiana settlement at Tenaru, outside of Honiara. It is important to emphasize that this essay applies mainly to Sikaiana life during my periods of stay. In 1999, after most of this essay was written, the Sikaiana people living at the resettlement community at Tenaru were forced to leave there as a result of ethnic fighting in the Solomon Islands. Although there is an uneasy truce, the outcomes of this ethnic fighting still remain unresolved at the time of this writing (November 2001). Most of the discussion in this essay describes the situation at Tenaru before this ethnic fighting.

2. The songs themselves, moreover, reflect a combination of the modern and the traditional. Song composition is a traditional expressive medium. The first song was written in traditional style but concerns a modern theme. The second song was composed to guitar music, a newer style that was introduced relatively recently (see Donner 1987).

3. For discussions of the concept of "biography," see Simmel 1950:307–376; Simmel 1971; Schutz 1962:17–19; Goffman 1963; and Lieber 1977.

4. Bayliss-Smith estimates that Sikaiana's carrying capacity will support between 215 and 430 people (1975:295–297).

5. The Solomon Islands became an independent nation in 1978. Its population, like that of Sikaiana, is increasing steadily. At the time of its 1976 census, the Solomon Islands had a total population of about 200,000 people and was growing at about 3.3 percent per annum. The population in the late 1980s approached 300,000.

6. During my last visit, in 1993, there was something of a local debate in the Solomon Islands about whether Honiara should be labeled a "town" or a "city."

7. Although hundreds of kilometers distant, Ontong Java, another Polynesian outlier, has close cultural and historical relations with Sikaiana. The Ontong Java people are described by the Sikaiana as much wealthier than the Sikaiana people but also far more conservative in their cultural practices.

8. Occasionally, a few people speculate about the possibility of mining phosphorous, and some even hope for oil. When I first arrived in 1980, some young men speculated about the feasibility of building an airstrip on Sikaiana.

9. Some of these figures are from the *Solomon Islands Statistical Yearbook for 1984/5.*

10. During my stays in 1980–1983 and 1987, I never heard any accusation of sorcery being used by one Sikaiana person against another Sikaiana person. In 1993, someone recounted one incident of alleged use of sorcery by one Sikaiana person on another Sikaiana person. There were, however, accusations of sorcery performed by outsiders against Sikaiana individuals. The term *kastom* can be used to refer to a variety of traditional practices, including some that are seen as constructive and others that are now considered to be harmful (see Donner 1993).

11. Merry's contribution to this volume examines the redefinition of sexuality among Hawaiians. The Sikaiana adopted missionary standards for sexual morality (their traditional sexuality included secret adulterous relations, *hina*). Now they often see extramarital sex as the unhappy outcome of foreign influence. The prohibitions on premarital sexual intercourse are derived more from Christian teachings than from pre-Christian traditional culture. For most Sikaiana parents, Christian teachings were an essential part of their upbringing and are now viewed as traditional, or *kastom* (see Donner 1993).

12. Again, the word "tradition" must be used advisedly (Donner 1993). The marriage exchanges, *penupenu,* were modified in this century after the Sikaiana accepted Christian prohibitions on their traditional practice of arranged marriages. But these *penupenu* are now seen as traditional.

13. Solomon Islands law makes it very difficult to sell customary land.

14. They hoped to find land in Isabel Province. Isabel people have a reputation for being friendly; like the Sikaiana, they are mostly members of the Church of Melanesia. I once heard a Sikaiana woman in a casual conversation with another Sikaiana person describe a region she had visited in Isabel Province as *taulekaleka,* "wonderful, excellent." When I asked her why she thought this area so wonderful, she replied that it had a reef and added—for my benefit as an inquiring anthropologist—that for the Sikaiana people any place with a reef is wonderful.

15. In 1994, there was another large fund-raising event for the Tenaru church (I received a request by fax for a contribution).

16. As Georg Simmel made clear (1956), conflict can be one of the most intimate kinds of relations.

17. I think the ethnic conflict is, at least partly if not largely, based in the problems of finding work and opportunity for everyone in a developing market and wage economy. As stated above, my impression in 1993 was that there were a lot of unemployed young people in Honiara, not only among the Sikaiana people but among other ethnic groups as well.

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ANUTANS IN HONIARA: A POLYNESIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN COMMUNITY IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

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As formerly isolated peoples are brought under the umbrella of a new international political system and the world market economy, the moral order that underpins their old communities is inevitably challenged. In an attempt to meet this challenge, they may look to common origin, distinctive genealogical characteristics, shared connections to a special place, or their unique beliefs and customs. This essay examines people of Anuta, a remote Polynesian outpost in the Solomon Islands—the pressures and enticements encouraging Anutans to emigrate to Honiara, the national capital, and the way in which resettlement has created opportunities and problems for both the home community and the resettled enclave. It considers the Anutans' perceived need to balance a commitment to old symbols, values, and worldview against the changes wrought by new ideas, experiences, and economic forces. Lastly, it explores the complex relationship between the urban and home communities, with a special focus on the development of political factions in both Honiara and Anuta.

Pacific Islanders, like people elsewhere, are concerned with questions about who they are and what makes their communities unique. In attempting to resolve such questions, they may look to common origin, distinctive genealogical characteristics, connections to a special place, or a system of beliefs and customs that supposedly endows them with a unique moral standing. Such symbolic foci form the basis of Durkheim's (1965) characterization of the social order as a moral order (see also Parsons [1937] 1968). They provide people with a sense of commonality, set them apart from others, and are a defining feature of what is often termed "ethnicity" or "cultural identity" (see, for example, Barth 1969; Linnekin and Poyer 1990).

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As formerly isolated people are brought under the umbrella of a new international political system and the world market economy, the moral order that provides the underpinning of their old communities is inevitably challenged. Transportation, communication, commodity production and exchange, and the international division of labor bring people in increasing numbers from their rural villages or outer-island home communities to urban centers. There they deal with others who are different from themselves. Interethnic ties are frequently intensified through intermarriage. As this occurs, older customs often must be modified—sometimes, entirely discarded. In consequence, the values and implicit understandings that once served as a kind of social glue are questioned, and the task of holding old communities together assumes gargantuan proportions.

Several contributions to this volume focus on the problems faced by people from tradition-based, kin-oriented communities as they move to urban centers.[1] Essays by Macpherson on Samoa, Donner on the Sikaiana, and Tapsell on the Maori of Aotearoa (New Zealand) deal with Polynesian peoples who are struggling to maintain or regain a sense of community based on customary practices when moving away from ancestral lands and becoming immersed in capitalist relationships. Notions of custom or tradition, in each case, serve as shared symbols of community, while land, whether it be the islands of Samoa or Sikaiana, or the Maori homelands and *marae,* evokes the image of a former time and better way of life.

Here, I explore this issue as it has developed among people of Anuta, a remote Polynesian outpost in the Solomon Islands; pressures and enticements encouraging Anutans to resettle in the central Solomons, particularly on Guadalcanal in the area around Honiara, the national capital; and the way in which resettlement has created opportunities and challenges for both the home community and the resettled enclave. I consider the Anutans' perceived need to balance a commitment to old symbols, values, and worldview against the changes wrought by new ideas, experiences, and economic forces. Lastly, I examine the relationship between the urban settlements and home communities as well as the articulation between political factions and distinct, often incompatible, cultural orientations both within each enclave and in the overall Anutan population.

The title of this volume poses the salient problem as the creation of moral communities, implying that community structures have, in some way, broken down and must be revitalized. Anutans have not yet lost the sense of oneness that holds them together as a people while setting them apart from the remainder of humanity. Rather, their struggle is to maintain the sense that they are a community despite sometimes overwhelming pressures toward fragmentation.

As is true of other peoples featured in this volume, the Anutans have refused to become helpless pawns or victims of external forces beyond their control but have worked actively to forge a destiny of their own making. Still, as arguably the most recent Polynesian people to become incorporated into the world economic and political order, the factors with which they contend are only vaguely understood, and attempts to bring about a synthesis of old and new, traditional and modern in many cases have produced internal conflicts and dilemmas.[2] Here, I analyze the web of factions and alliances, of conflicts, plans, and aspirations that beset Anutans as they struggle to maintain what they take to be vital aspects of their culture while they grapple with realities of urban life and their position in the wider world.

This essay will focus on a devastating housing shortage that has plagued Anutans in the Honiara area and the ways in which attempts to redress this problem have affected a series of related dilemmas, generating further challenges to the Anutans' sense of who and what they are. To provide an appropriate context for assessing these dilemmas, I will begin with a discussion of Anuta, its traditional culture, and the conditions faced by Anutans when they move to the central Solomons.

Anuta: Ethnographic Background

Anuta is among the most remote and recently contacted islands in the Pacific. It is a half mile in diameter, seventy miles from Tikopia, its nearest populated neighbor, and more than two hundred miles from the closest significant population center. Over the generations, Anutans have interacted extensively with Tikopians, whose language and culture are similar to their own. By contrast, contacts with other Solomon Islanders, most of whom Anutans see as very different from themselves, have been few and sporadic until recent decades. Even today, Anuta receives visitors no more than once a month, and sometimes many months may pass without a ship.[3]

Owing to Anuta's isolation, small size, and absence of commercially exploitable resources, its traditional culture has remained remarkably intact up to the present. Subsistence gardening and fishing dominate the economy. The polity is led by two hereditary chiefs who, as senior male descendants of the ancient leaders, are thought to be imbued with awesome *mana*.[4] Houses and canoes are constructed of traditional materials in the traditional manner. Gardens are cultivated and fish caught using old techniques. Kinship remains the cornerstone of economic and social organization and, itself, is intimately associated with *aropa*—positive affect as expressed through economic sharing and cooperation.

Despite strong elements of continuity, however, change has been inexo-

rable. Through two centuries of European contact, Anutans have had access to expanded travel, new ideas, worldly experience, and a variety of European goods. More than a hundred years ago, a few Anutans traveled as deck hands to such far-flung places as New Zealand, Australia, and America's Pacific Coast (see Feinberg 1998: chapter 14). During the second decade of the twentieth century, the Melanesian Mission established the Anglican Church on Anuta, and since that time the population has been at least nominally Christian. Metal axes, knives, and fish hooks were introduced relatively early; now commodities including kerosene, lanterns, cotton cloth, and nylon fishing line are felt to be necessities. Tinned meat, rice, ship's biscuits, and the like are sought as luxuries.

In order to acquire cash to purchase foreign-made commodities and as a safety valve for an expanding population, Anutans in increasing numbers have moved off their home island. At first, such emigration was limited to a few individuals joining groups of Tikopian plantation workers—mostly at the Levers copra plantations in the Russell Islands of the central Solomons (see Firth 1969; Larson 1966, 1977). Starting around 1960, however, the number of Anutans traveling for a variety of purposes increased dramatically. By 1972, the time of my first visit to Anuta, every adult male had been overseas at some time during his life. In some cases, this travel amounted only to brief stays on Tikopia; in others it involved a permanent move to the central Solomons. Most émigrés have been employed as low-paid manual laborers for the Levers plantations, the Honiara Town Council, or one or another shipping company. In recent years, Anutan men in Honiara have gravitated to private security work. A few, however, have attended secondary school and even held prestigious jobs.[5] Until the middle 1990s, almost half the Anutans who traveled to the central Solomons went on to the Russell Islands; the other half remained in Honiara.

Honiara clearly holds attractions for many Anutans, and there is a steady stream of visitors.[6] At the same time, life in town is difficult for outer islanders. Some of these difficulties are a direct result of urban life; others derive from the attempt to maintain a distinctively Anutan lifestyle in a distinctly non-Anutan environment.

Trouble at Home: The Commercialization of Interpersonal Relations

Problems in the overseas Anutan community reflect tensions on Anuta and must be understood in light of pressures affecting the home island. These include a contradiction between *aropa*—which entails mutual obligation and material support among community members, all of whom are consid-

ered to be kin—and a preoccupation with individual gain that is imposed by life in a market-oriented urban center. *Aropa* is intertwined with chieftainship in that a chief must use his *mana* to ensure prosperity and health for the community, thereby expressing *aropa* for his followers. The latter, then, return the *aropa* as respect and obedience. Yet, competition to make money conflicts with the collectively based morality championed by the chiefs, whom people begin to resent as an impediment to their aspirations for social mobility. These contradictions, after incubating on Anuta, soon took on the aspect of a crisis in the overseas community.

I first became aware that something was amiss in 1983, when I learned of tensions that had developed during the mid-1970s. The major issue of contention on Anuta was the sale of taro, betel, tobacco, and bananas by several households to those that were short of food. This was a departure from traditional behavior, and it contradicted principles of *aropa* and kinship underlying proper action in the older system.

An Anutan chief is charged with the responsibility to guard the island's welfare; and in discharging this responsibility, the present senior chief has emphasized the community's collective character. Thus, during a food shortage in 1972, he ordered the entire population to act as one domestic unit, preparing and consuming food together. Anuta, he said, was a single family, and it would not be right for some members to eat while others starved. Sale of food challenged the basis of this action, and the chief forbade the practice.

By contrast, from the viewpoint of the sellers, exchanging food for money was part of a new orientation involving commitment to upward mobility in European terms. It provided an opportunity to accrue cash on Anuta and was thus part of a strategy for obtaining Western commodities. Moreover, the first two "houses" *(pare)* to start selling food had children in school overseas, whom they felt obliged to support financially. Thus, these "houses" did not share the positive value the chief placed on collective enterprise, discipline, and community harmony. They openly resisted orders to desist from selling food, and, indeed, the practice spread. To make matters worse, the *maru*—men of the two leading *kainanga,* "clans"—on whom the chief depended for enforcement of his orders were among the leaders of the opposition.

These tensions alternately waxed and waned over the next several years. During this period the chief's authority, both secular and in the church, was challenged. Finally, when threat of open violence was followed by a rash of accidents, a major epidemic, and at least three deaths—all of which Anutans took to be punishment for social discord—people came to the conclusion that their community's survival would be jeopardized if they should fail to

heal the breach. Since that time, both sides have worked to cool tempers and reestablish overt peace. This truce has been accomplished, however, by people talking less about the sources of tension, not by resolving them. Families that had been selling food desisted, but they still maintained that their actions were morally justified and wholly appropriate under the circumstances. And the chief refrained from vocal opposition to what he perceived as incorrect behavior, but he registered his protest by refusing to attend church services on Sundays.[7]

A second point of contention, with implications for Anutans in both Honiara and at home, involves relations with the Solomon Islands government. Despite factional strife, islanders throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s were united in their dislike for the central and provincial governments that claim dominion over them.[8] Anutans are acutely conscious of being part of a small Polynesian minority in an overwhelmingly Melanesian country. They perceive the government as being under the control of people who are very different from themselves and, therefore, have no interest in their welfare. Furthermore, despite some criticism of the chief, the chieftainship itself has long been a classical Durkheimian collective representation (Durkheim 1965)—a key symbol of Anutan cultural identity, distinctiveness, and self-respect. There is general agreement that traditional custom and local sovereignty are important and should be preserved, and for that reason many Anutans have advocated independence from the Solomon Islands. They still refuse to pay the national head tax or to participate in elections. Nonetheless, Anutans recognize the problems posed by the small size and isolation of their island, and they know that they receive important services from the government. The most essential of these, in their minds, is shipping. Shipping means access to Western commodities. It offers a safety valve in case of population pressure and provides opportunities for wage employment, education, and medical care. Therefore, Anutans have devoted a great deal of energy to obtaining a ship. However, acquisition of a ship is no mean task for outer islanders with limited resources, and the attempt involved the overseas communities—especially in Honiara.

Anutans in Honiara

At least since the 1950s, Anutans have been traveling to Honiara for a variety of reasons. While most short-term (and some long-term) laborers have, until recently, worked in the Russell Islands, many prospective wage earners have gravitated to Honiara. As the Solomons' capital, Honiara is the country's center of commerce and shipping. It is a convenient stopover point for travelers to and from the Russells. A number of Anutans have attended

school on Guadalcanal Island; others have worked as carpenters or gardeners for the Honiara Town Council, as bus and taxi drivers, as officers in the national police force, or as local security guards. In addition, people sometimes visit Honiara to see kin who have settled there or to enjoy a change of scenery. For those residing in the Honiara area on a long-term basis, material rewards and opportunities for social advancement in Western terms can be substantial. But these rewards come at a heavy price.

The price inheres largely in contradictions between what Anutans view as ancient custom and realities of urban life. Anutans, regardless of where they live, consider themselves to be members of one overarching community. Even those who have spent most of their lives in town and may never return home except for brief visits do not perceive themselves to be part of a community that is in any significant way different from or independent of Anuta and its chiefs. Without exception, Anutans value their home island and its customs *(nga tukutukunga).* For Anutans in the central Solomons, what sets them apart from other people with whom they come into daily contact is (1) their attachment to Anuta Island, (2) recognition of the island's chiefs as foci of collective loyalty and centers of authority even for matters arising outside of Anuta, and (3) participation in a system of relationships based on *aropa.*[9] Yet, they are hundreds of miles distant from Anuta. They are subject to a government and system of laws that is wholly independent of the Anutan chiefs. And the system of wage labor and production for private profit directly contradicts the *aropa* ethic, which emphasizes sharing, care, and mutual assistance as the basis of social relationships. As is true of Maoris and Samoans in New Zealand's urban centers (Macpherson, Tapsell, both in this volume), much of Anutan life in Honiara revolves around the drive to reconcile these contradictory impulses—to strike a balance between custom and the practicalities of living in an urban center immersed in the money economy, and being subject to national and local governments whose power is recognized even if their legitimacy is questioned.

Commitment to Anuta and its way of life is visible in many of the Honiara enclave's living arrangements. As of June 1988, I counted sixty people living in the Honiara area who might reasonably be called Anutans. These include people born on Anuta; their spouses, whether of Anutan birth or not; and all their children. Of these, thirty-six slept in a cluster of three houses in White River, a Honiara "suburb" to the west of town. Several others lodged with Tikopians in White River and were regular visitors in the three Anutan houses.

The three houses formed the core of the Anutan community on Guadalcanal. They were all within a few dozen yards of one another, and their residents were in constant contact. Approximately eleven people regularly slept in the smallest of the houses, a simple concrete structure with four bed-

rooms separated by a central foyer and graced with electric lighting but no plumbing. A somewhat larger wooden house, with raised floor, indoor plumbing, and a full kitchen, held about a dozen bodies. The largest of the houses, a not-quite-completed structure on stilts, perhaps ten feet off the ground, with two large bedrooms, living room, kitchen, and veranda, held about fourteen persons including myself. People in the largest and the smallest houses operated as a single household, cooking and eating their evening meals together in the foyer of the concrete structure. People in the third house usually ate separately. However, parties and dances drew participants from all three houses plus assorted friends and relatives from the surrounding area.

Within each house, the usual pattern was for a married couple and their children to share a room. Unmarried boys and men slept in a common area like a veranda, cook house, or living room. However, this arrangement was flexible. For example, Pu Penuamuri, a married man, often preferred to sleep outside in a shed next to the middle house to get away from his baby's crying. When the shed was full, he often slept in the living room of the large house. His wife and child, then, shared a bedroom with another woman and her baby.

Each morning someone from each house would heat water for coffee, while someone with a few cents to his credit walked three blocks to the local store to bring back two or three loaves of bread. As people awoke, they would help themselves to bread and butter, fix some instant coffee, and drift off to work. Those not holding paying jobs or watching children might go to the nearby garden land that had been allocated to the Anutan community by the Honiara Town Council and spend a few hours cultivating manioc or yams. Wage workers, on their way home at the end of the work day, were likely to stop at the market for fresh fish, vegetables, and betel, or at a store for biscuits and tinned fish. Their purchases were then pooled with the garden produce, cooked communally, and eaten by the household as a collectivity. On weekends and special occasions, members of all three households plus other Anutans in the area worked together to prepare "puddings" and other traditional foods. These were then shared at communal feasts and dances. Anutans in Honiara have, thus, done their best to recreate their traditional socioeconomic system under conditions of wage employment and commodity production. This attempt to retain ancient custom as well as the difficulties in doing so also can be seen in marriage patterns.

Through the generations, the vast majority of Anutans have married other Anutans. In part, this practice may be attributed to the insular character of the Anutan community and lack of contact with outsiders. But in large part it is also the result of a conscious decision to maintain Anutan customs and the feeling that, should people marry outside their community, customs would quickly become diluted.

By 1973, there had been a number of marriages between Tikopians and Anutans. They were deemed acceptable because of the similarity between the two communities. And if one goes back six generations or more, oral traditions identify immigrants from several Polynesian islands who married Anutans. However, as of 1973, there was only one Anutan who had ever married a non-Polynesian.

As more Anutans spent increasingly long periods away from home, the old marital patterns became harder to maintain. Long-term emigrants were predominantly male, and by the time they returned home, most women of their age group had already married. Thus, the men were faced with a choice between wedding non-Anutans or remaining single. In the Russell Islands, Anutan men married either Anutan or Tikopian women; in Honiara, not one Anutan man in 1983 had an Anutan wife. A few have opted not to marry. Two were married to Tikopians. Two were married to Melanesians—one from Santa Isabel and one from Malaita. And one was married to the daughter of a Tuvaluan couple who had immigrated to the Solomons. By 2000, the constellation of personnel included several couples in which both spouses were Anutan. Still, the tendency is more and more to marry non-Anutans.

The dilemma facing Anutan men in Honiara is well exemplified by the marriage of Frank Kataina (Pu Teukumarae), the younger brother of Anuta's senior chief. In 1983, Frank was a high-ranking official in the national police force. Despite his lack of formal education, he is literate and worldly, having visited Australia and Papua New Guinea in addition to much of the Solomons. His wife was the Solomons' first policewoman. She had been raised in Kira Kira, one of the country's main administrative centers, and in Solomon Islands terms she was a city girl. She also was literate, sophisticated, intelligent, and outgoing. Apparently an ideal match.

However, as a "city girl," she had assimilated Western feminist values of independence and self-realization. Although attached to her husband, she continued to associate with many of her old friends, going by herself to concerts, dances, and parties, and sometimes wearing slacks or even shorts—daring attire for a Solomon Islands woman in Honiara in the 1980s. Had the husband been an ordinary man, people might have registered their disapproval and then left the matter. As he was a leading officer and brother of Anuta's senior chief, however, his wife's behavior was perceived as an attack on the integrity of traditional custom, and pressure mounted upon Frank to leave her. By June 1984, the two had separated. Four years later, it was clear the break was permanent.

Frank's marriage and its unhappy outcome illustrate the value that Anutans place on keeping their community distinct by maintaining rigid island endogamy. While divorce among Anutans is virtually nonexistent, marriages to non-Anutans (with the exception of Tikopians, who are almost regarded

as honorary Anutans) often have dissolved under the influence of social pressure. In this way, even interisland marriage, in the end, has served to underscore Anutan distinctiveness and maintain cultural boundaries rather than to break them down.[10]

To operate within the framework of a money economy and remain faithful to the principles of *aropa* poses no fewer problems for Anutans overseas than does marriage. Particularly in Honiara, housing and food are expensive —comparable to the United States or Western Europe. For government employees, including police officers, housing is partially subsidized. A certain amount of garden land is provided. And many people build canoes so they can fish on their days off. Still, the amount of time available and the productivity of garden land and ocean are far more meager than back home. Substantial sums of money, therefore, are essential to survival. Yet, there are many pressures on the wage earner in Honiara, making it difficult to save and accumulate financial resources.

Every Anutan, regardless of how long he has been overseas, is a member of one or another domestic unit *(patongia)* and, as such, is expected to contribute to the unit's well-being.[11] Anutans have come, over the years, to depend on a variety of commodities of European manufacture, and their acquisition requires money. In addition, Anutans need money for boat fare if they are to travel overseas and tuition for children seeking secondary education. Opportunities for monetary income on Anuta are virtually nonexistent; therefore, a substantial proportion of the money that is earned by Anutans in the Russells and the Honiara area finds its way back to Anuta. Requests from home by people with little concept of the cost of living in town are often exorbitant. Yet, to deny assistance to one's closest kin violates *aropa* and inflames Anutan moral sensibilities.

Anutans constantly pass through Honiara, visiting for periods of anywhere from a few days to many months—or even years. Typically, these visitors are unemployed, with little cash. Furthermore, a housing shortage makes it difficult to find accommodations on short notice even for people who do have money. Thus, visitors inevitably stay in the houses of their employed fellow islanders.

For the people who own or rent a dwelling, it is a burden to accommodate as many as a dozen long-term visitors. The houses become crowded and uncomfortable. Often, the best rooms or sleeping places must be turned over to guests of high rank in the traditional system. These guests use water, electricity, and gas; and they must be fed. They are unfamiliar with city foods, do not shop, and have little concept of the relative expense of various comestibles; thus, they often indulge in the most expensive items, which then have to be replaced or done without. In short, visitors rarely contribute financially

to the household and often are a major drain. Yet, to put them out or even to suggest that they eat more of the less expensive items would be a breach of etiquette and is not done.

It is easy to appreciate the dilemma faced by an Anutan wage earner in Honiara after even a short period of participant observation. For several months in 1983–1984, my family and I stayed in the house of Frank Kataina. Of the fifteen or so people with whom I shared the house, only Frank was regularly employed. The two of us, then, were supporting the entire household. The following experiences, recorded a few days before I left, are typical:

> We got a large jar of shampoo for about $4.50. Rachel [a pseudonym] used it to wash clothes, and within one afternoon, the jar was empty.
>
> Last Thursday, I bought a large tin of Milo [a powdered chocolate drink] so that there would be some for our children to take with their antimalaria medication on Sunday. Sunday morning, my wife went to fix the Milo, and it was gone. That afternoon, I got another tin from the Rove store; the next morning, it was finished.
>
> Frank purchased a case of Taiyo tuna, and the first day, several tins were devoured with rice and potato. Toward the end of the meal, a new tin was opened, a few bites taken out, and as the meal was over, the almost-full tin was fed to the cat. This is the only case of pure waste that I saw; but just three of our current visitors seem quite capable, by themselves, of going through five cans at a meal. They also open tins for breakfast and lunch. Among people more accustomed to city life, two tins suffice for a large household for a day.
>
> A kilo of sugar lasts around three days.
>
> The household has been going through about two rolls of toilet paper a day.
>
> Peanut butter, at $2.80 a 375-gram jar, now lasts about a day.
>
> Two to three loaves of bread last a day. If there is just one loaf, it also lasts; but the more you get, the faster people eat. It does not last any longer.
>
> I bought a block of stick tobacco for the household. I mentioned it to Pu Matapenua [a pseudonym] and, within a day, it disappeared.
>
> Water is left running in the sinks.
>
> We boil water to sterilize it for the children, as Honiara tap water is considered to be unsafe. The water is then used for coffee or Milo before we can save it in a jar. Meanwhile, other people fill jars from the tap and put them into the refrigerator, making it impossible to know which water has been boiled and which has not.

> A large parcel of matches lasts two to three days.
>
> When someone makes a large pitcher of coffee or Milo for the household, immediately either Pu Matapenua or Tuku [pseudonym] grabs the pitcher to use it as a personal cup. They may go through a quart apiece at a sitting.
>
> Since the guests tend not to have money, they have no way to pay their own fare back home. Therefore, you have to pay again to get rid of them. Furthermore, they probably don't have the knowledge or initiative to book their own passage. Consequently, you must make arrangements for them, or they will stay indefinitely. Frank missed the latest booking deadline and will therefore have all of his visitors for at least another month.
>
> The alternative is a combination of pressure and bribery. Thus, Pu Matapenua was staying for some time with a Tikopian in Rove. For a while, his host accepted the burden with equanimity; but finally, he announced that his wife was about to give birth and he would need the space for her relatives. He tried to soften the blow by offering to pay Pu Matapenua's fare to the Russells while he awaits transport back to Anuta. Pu Matapenua declined, opting instead to move back in with Frank.
>
> The remaining defense mechanism is to buy only the bare necessities. Thus, when gas [for the kitchen stove] ran out, Frank declined to order a refill. If I had not made up the difference, all cooking from that time on would have been over wood fires—as indeed it was for a week.

As all that happens among Anutans in the central Solomons occurs with reference to events back home, the leadership crisis of the 1980s involving the Anutan chief made itself felt in Honiara as well. Factional lines developed following those on Anuta. While some issues of contention on Anuta were attenuated in Honiara, other problems, particularly those involving distance and the population's geographical dispersal, came to the fore.

In 1983, the structure of authority, in principle, was clear. The senior chief was represented by his brother, Frank, who also was a leading officer in the police. Frank had one or two close confidants with whom he consulted on matters of major importance, but when he spoke, it was with the chief's authority. Tikopia was similarly represented by Fred Soaki (Pa Nukuriaki), the commissioner of police, who also is, in the traditional political system, a member of a leading "house" *(paito)* in Tikopia's leading *kainanga* (clan). On matters concerning the two islands jointly, the two officers would consult, and the commissioner would speak for the combined community.

By 1988, the Anutans withdrew from their joint arrangement on the grounds that Tikopians had monopolized community resources.

The major difficulty with the authority structure was less its ambiguity or lack of legitimacy than it was the physical dispersal of the population and the fact that the leaders simply could not be everywhere at once. Coupled with this, the leaders had no enforcement powers; they had to depend on moral suasion and their subordinates' cooperation to implement decisions. Thus, for the most part, their pronouncements could be ignored with impunity. The one exception was in cases where a breach of custom also violated national law. Thus, when a man used funds belonging to a relative for his own bridewealth payment, Frank and his associates presented him with the choice of repaying the relative or having the matter turned over to the courts. The accused decided on the former option.

Anutans, then, have been faced with a set of pressing dilemmas. Among their chief moral values is *aropa,* which requires kindness, compassion, commitment to mutual assistance in matters related to material well-being, and a communal outlook upon social life. *Aropa* is associated with chiefly authority as a core symbol of cultural identity and differentiation of Anuta from other communities. In the old system, the chief was expected to ensure the community's prosperity and welfare. In doing so, he manifested *aropa* for his people while providing them with the material resources and moral bearing to reciprocate with their own expressions of *aropa* toward him and other men of rank. Every Anutan with whom I have discussed the matter over a period of almost thirty years has expressed commitment to these symbols, values, and understandings. Yet, in the view of many Anutans, to maximize their material well-being requires a large dose of self-interested individualism and intracommunity competition. Interest in money and competition for its acquisition conflicts with chiefly authority. It places pressure on individuals and families not to share. Anutans visiting relatively well-off kin residing overseas see a share in their relatives' prosperity as their fundamental right, while the hosts view the demands of less-than-understanding kinfolk as an economic burden even as they continue feeling pressure to display *aropa* in their outward behavior. These conflicts and dilemmas are illustrated in the case of an Anutan housing project that I had the opportunity to observe during a visit to Honiara in 1983–1984.

Housing: Proposed Solutions and New Problems

Through the last decades of the twentieth century, Honiara experienced a population explosion, and housing was at a premium. A few Anutans had access to their own houses, but most were not so fortunate. A majority of

Anutans in Honiara stayed with fellow islanders, sleeping on mats strewn about the floor. For example, Frank Kataina's house in 1983 was rather large by Solomon Islands standards, with three large bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, a veranda, and an indoor bath. During my visit, the house's population ranged from twelve to almost twenty persons.

Under these conditions, Anutans in the Honiara area set as a priority both more and better housing. Their first attempt to address the problem was to have Anutans in the area contribute toward the purchase of a plot of land near a Tikopian settlement in White River and build a small dwelling. The house was under construction during my visit to Honiara in early 1972 and was completed later that same year.

According to the story I was told in 1988, the building was intended to be a collective dwelling for any Anutans in the Honiara area who might need a place to stay. But one particularly persuasive leader convinced the rest of the community that, for legal purposes, the house should be titled in the name of one individual. As a sophisticated, long-term resident of Honiara, he suggested he should be that individual, and the rest of the community agreed. However, before long, he took advantage of his new position to sell the house to the Honiara Town Council. He pocketed the proceeds, resigned from his job, purchased a small fleet of vehicles, and started his own taxi company. At the same time, he purchased for himself an outboard motorboat and a smaller house on the other side of town. Within a few years, the boat sank, the motor was destroyed, and the taxis developed mechanical problems. He went out of business, had to sell his house, and abruptly left the Solomons to work for several years for Nauru Shipping.[12]

The first attempt at an Anutan house near Honiara, then, was a disaster. Still, the housing problem remained, becoming more severe each year. At that point, Pu Avatere, a man known to non-Anutans as John Tope, took the initiative.

Pu Avatere is unusual among Anutans. Inspired by a dream he took to be divine inspiration, he left home as a boy to attend school, initially on Tikopia and later on Guadalcanal. He attended Kohimarama Theological College during the early 1970s, training to become an Anglican priest. However, his assertive ways offended several leaders of the church, and on completion of his training, he was not ordained. This decision was eventually reversed, but by that time John had soured on the church, and he refused to join the priesthood. Instead, he took a number of secular positions—first as secretary to the Melanesian Mission and later with the Pijin language training program for U.S. Peace Corps volunteers.[13] The program at the time was headed by John Roughan, a former Catholic priest from the United States with long experience in the Solomons. After two years with the Peace Corps, Tope and

Roughan left to create the Solomon Islands Development Trust, a nongovernmental organization oriented toward promoting self-reliance and appropriate development in rural villages. Tope became the trust's first field officer; Roughan, the technical adviser.

During the two years that John worked for the Solomon Islands Development Trust, he initiated a number of development projects for the Anutan community. His first major project was to build a rest house for Anutans in White River.

In an effort to accumulate the capital needed to support his project, John approached governmental agencies, banks, and private individuals to ask for grants and loans. Not surprisingly, lending agencies demanded a plan to guarantee repayment of their loans, and even would-be grantors asked for assurance that the house would have some source of income for continued maintenance once it had been constructed. Thus, by almost imperceptible stages, the plan began to change. No longer was the building to be a rest house to provide free lodging for Anutans passing through the nation's capital. Instead, the plan was now to rent the house to non-Anutans. After the loans were repaid, profits would be used to maintain a piped water system, improve the school and clinic, and promote similar development projects on Anuta.

The point at which Tope became aware that the project had changed focus is unclear. It is clear that the process by which the change had come about and the rationale for the change were communicated poorly if at all to the community. By the time the change was common knowledge, many Anutans had already come to distrust Tope's motivations, and the change of plans confirmed their suspicions. John had a tendency to work by himself or with a small circle of confidants. Somehow, he had purchased land near Lata at Graciosa Bay, the capital of Temotu Province, and on Utupua, a large but sparsely populated island in the Santa Cruz group. No one knew how he had gotten the money, the nature of the financial agreements that made these purchases possible, or what he intended to do with this land. It was widely assumed, however, that he had acquired the land to promote his personal self-interest, caring little for the overall community's well-being. The change in plans regarding the White River rest house seemed to fit the larger pattern.

One of John's severest critics was Eric Toarakairunga (Pu Taumako), a man who had lived for many years in Honiara. He worked there first as a driver for Peter's Taxi Service; after about 1980, he drove for the Rainbow Bus Company, eventually working his way up to head driver. According to Eric's story, while he was a taxi driver, he became a trusted friend of Peter, the company's proprietor. Peter also owned a sizable tract of land in White

River; and when he left the Solomons upon retirement, he gave the land to his good friend. In 1983, Eric and his Tikopian wife were living in a small leaf oven house erected on that land. Out of a sense of social consciousness, he agreed to allow Tope to build the community rest house on his land, assuming that it would be used for the collective benefit. However, as suspicions rose about the project and its organizer, Eric grew increasingly annoyed and started threatening to give the land away to someone more deserving, thereby effectively quashing the rest house project.

John's understanding of the situation was rather different. By his account, Peter never gave the land to anyone. Rather, his intention from the start had been to sell it. Eric expressed interest, and Peter was prepared to sell it to him. However, Eric never tendered the money, and the deal would have fallen through had John not bought the land with his own earnings. Therefore, he contended that the land was his, and it was only through his own good graces that others might stay there.

In the event, the loan applications were turned down because of the amount of money requested and the small likelihood of its being repaid. In addition, potential lending institutions may have become soured on the project as they began to hear murmurings of the community's misgivings. Still, Tope persisted, eventually receiving a SI$10,000 grant from the Canadian Diocese of the Episcopal Church, to be administered by the local Church of Melanesia.[14]

With this grant in hand, construction was begun. Still, the confusion persisted. Most Anutans remained under the impression that the house was being built for them to occupy. As soon as it was livable, John and his wife moved in, intending to oversee construction and move to different quarters when the building was completed. Immediately, other Anutans moved into the house, but with no understanding that their occupation would be temporary. Soon the building felt the effects of heavy occupancy, and it became apparent that, upon completion, it would not be a new house.

While this was going on, Tope also was involved in several other projects. In partnership with a man from the Gilbert Islands community that had been resettled in the Solomons (see Knudsen 1977), he purchased a second house, a small concrete structure a few dozen yards from the one under construction. He successfully petitioned the Honiara Town Council to return to the Anutans the dwelling that had been sold without community authorization. And he convinced the Town Council to allot a plot of undeveloped land to the Anutans for the purpose of subsistence cultivation.

Many of John's fellow islanders happily availed themselves of the resources that he had procured. At the time of my 1988 visit, three dozen people were living in the three White River houses. The garden land was

virtually all cultivated—with manioc, sweet potato, yams, a small stand of taro, and a few fruit trees. Still tension continued and, in fact, increased.

John suggested to the Anutan community in White River that they construct one or more leaf houses in the garden area and vacate the new house so that it might be rented out, as required by his agreement with the church. It seemed to most occupants, however, that he wished to expel them in order to convert the building into his personal business enterprise. Almost to a person, his suggestion was resisted. Undeterred, John began construction of a small leaf house by himself. But without assistance this was a slow process.

In the midst of all this turmoil, the man who sold the first White River house returned from Nauru. He took a job with the police, settled once again in Honiara, and managed to regain possession of the building. Then he moved in, along with his wife from Santa Isabel, a number of her kin and fellow islanders, their children, and some Bellonese friends. Anutans in the house were now in a minority.

Other Anutans resented this turn of events, particularly their being displaced by people from other islands. Some believed that the Town Council still controlled the dwelling and had agreed to make it available to the Anutan community. Since it was not being used for its intended purpose, they feared that the Town Council might attempt to take it back.

Controversy also surrounded the small concrete house. Although no one doubted that John had contributed toward its purchase, there were questions as to where he got the money. As of 1988, he had not held a paying job for almost four years. Still, he managed to feed his family, he owned land on Ndeni and Utupua Islands in the Santa Cruz group, and he purchased a dwelling in White River. Suspicions turned to an earlier scheme to buy a ship.

As noted above, the Anutans decided in the early 1980s that if they could acquire a ship to be used for transport and commercial fishing, they could effectively be independent of the Solomons. Around that time, John organized the Anuta Community Development Project, one of whose goals was to obtain a vessel. In the name of the project, he contacted a number of granting agencies and the governments of many foreign countries. In addition, he took up a collection from Anutans both at home and overseas to contribute toward the purchase of a vessel. From the latter sources he accumulated approximately SI$500.

Eventually, he claims, the government of Singapore came forward with an offer of a ship. To finalize the deal, however, he felt he had to travel to Singapore. The trip cost SI$6,000 for food, lodging, and airfare. Unfortunately, the deal (if it ever existed) fell through.

John claims to have spent his own savings on the trip. When the ship did

not materialize, he says, he declared his intention to return all the contributions. However, I am unaware of his ever having done so. Meanwhile, his detractors were convinced that he pocketed the community's money, used it for his trip to Singapore, and spent the remainder on the White River house.

There is logic on both sides of this argument. It seems dubious that John saved enough while working to be able to support his family for four years, pay for a trip to Singapore, and purchase a house. When pressed on this question, he stated that he was assisted by his cousin, John Teonge, who had worked for many years as a deckhand with a Solomon Islands shipping company. Tope and Teonge had established savings accounts and, by being frugal, were surviving on the interest. This seemed plausible until I learned that Teonge was severely diabetic, spent much of his time in the hospital, and had, himself, not worked for almost two years. Still, wherever Tope got the money, most of it could not have been from contributions toward the ship, as the amount collected for that purpose, even by liberal estimates, was well under SI$1,000. The important issue, nonetheless, is less what really happened to the money than people's perceptions.

Given the atmosphere of extreme suspicion, it did not take long for some Anutans to conclude that Tope also was diverting funds allotted by the church for house construction to his own nefarious purposes. These suspicions were reported to the church, which rightly was concerned. To ensure that its funds would be used as first intended, the church decided to hold the grant in trust, select the carpenters, and pay the bills itself. No more money, then, would pass through Tope's hands.

At this point, the house was almost finished. The contractor, however, insisted that his bills had not been fully paid and refused to complete the job until he received what he felt was his due. Since the church would not release the funds, John could not pay him. Some members of the Anutan community convinced the government to prosecute John for misuse of funds. The contractor sued John for his back fees. And John sued the church for release of the funds so that he could complete the house. As of August 1988, John was cleared of criminal wrongdoing. The civil suits were eventually dropped without resolution.

Although the most active, John was not the only Anutan pursuing plans for community improvement. Alternative leadership in this area was provided especially by Frank Kataina. After he retired from the Royal Solomon Islands Police in 1985, Frank's interests turned to promoting a number of development projects. The most noteworthy of these were establishment of a community store to be run as a cooperative rather than for private profit, acquiring a ship, and convincing the U.S. Peace Corps to post a teacher or two on Anuta. Thus far, none of these projects has come to fruition.

The community store proposal, in particular, was as much a political statement as a plan for economic development. As the chief's brother and leading assistant, he felt compelled to guard tradition and the community's collective identity. For precisely these reasons, however, his efforts met with opposition from the several families that were trying to establish their own private stores.

Since these projects had such limited success, Frank's major contribution was to serve as watchdog to protect the community from schemes that might be detrimental to its interests. Frank's long experience with government and public service made him effective in this role. The net effect of his efforts, however, was to thwart most of the projects Tope had promoted. Since John so infrequently delivered on his promises, everybody's worst suspicions were confirmed. And without community support, chances of success for his endeavors were minimal.

Unlike Tope, who was a gold mine of ideas but often was inept at managing relationships, Frank was a master of symbolic manipulation. Several months before my arrival in 1988, the chief's son, Mataki, came to Honiara on another mission. Because of shipping problems, he was unable to return home for several months, during which time he stayed in the White River enclave. He and his wife were given a room in the small concrete house, and they contributed to the local community by working in the manioc gardens and helping prepare food. As chief's son and heir apparent, Mataki should have been exempted from the less desirable work, and he should have been shown special recognition. At meal times, he should have been presented with a special portion of food before anyone else might eat. He should have been given a special seat of honor and shown the utmost deference. Although he was entitled to such considerations, however, he never asked for special treatment, nor was he given any.

In Frank's view, this treatment was an insult to Mataki, the chief, the chieftainship itself, and custom. Rarely, however, do Anutans directly confront one another about perceived misbehavior. Thus, rather than berate the offending parties, Frank moved out of the house. He set up a bed and a box containing all his worldly goods in a small, unwalled oven house with coconut-thatch roof. Although he consumed food prepared collectively, he refused to take his meals with other members of the household, eating by himself in his small oven house.

This behavior was directly counter to all normal expectations. Sharing of food is the prime expression of *aropa,* and refusal to eat with other members of the group was seen as contrary to custom. For such behavior to come from the guardian of custom was perplexing and disturbing to virtually everyone. Clearly, something was very wrong, although most Anutans were un-

certain of just what the problem was. Meanwhile, Frank refused to discuss his motivation with other Anutans, leaving them to guess. He confided to me that he would return to the main house only after Mataki left Honiara and he was convinced that the community had resumed acceptable behavior.

Frank, because of his symbolic acumen, genealogical status, and long-standing position of leadership among Anutans in Honiara, occupied a pivotal position. Although many people had at least a few misgivings about Frank's judgment and decisions, he remained the most important leader during my 1988 and 1993 visits to the Solomons and continues as a major force at the dawn of the new century. John, by contrast, had but two supporters: his cousin John Teonge and a Tikopian named Elliott, who had been staying with Anutans in the small White River house. Increasingly, John was becoming isolated and faced the prospect of not only social ostracism but perhaps even prison. Within a month the tide had turned.

In June 1988, Pu Rotopenua, one of Anuta's traditional leaders, came to Honiara with a message from the chief. The chief had grown weary of reports of conflict in the Honiara community and decided to throw his support to Tope. Despite his sometimes clumsy handling of interpersonal relations, John was the only one who had managed to get anything concrete for the community. While not all his projects were successful, he had procured three houses and a large tract of garden land. The chief, through his assistant, stated that Anutans with jobs in Honiara had a legitimate reason to be there and could stay. However, those who were not working had no grounds to be there on a prolonged basis, and he ordered them all home. In the meantime, those who stayed in Honiara should treat Tope as their leader, scrupulously following his instructions.

This message was relayed at a community meeting a few evenings after Pu Rotopenua's arrival. The next morning, a dozen Anutan men were hard at work helping Tope build his leaf house in the garden. As quickly as John's star had risen, Frank's had set. Still, the issue was far from resolved.

Frank remained convinced that he was right to be suspicious of John's actions. He felt that the chief had been misled because he was not there to observe what was going on. But Mataki was there, knew the truth, and would explain it to the chief when he got home. At that time, Frank was sure, he would be exonerated.[15] Meanwhile, he would stay in Honiara, continue to survey events, and guard against abuse of the community. In order to conform with the letter of the chief's edict, he took a job as a projectionist at Honiara's Lena Cinema, and he refused to return to Anuta.

This story has no ending. Several months after my return to the United States in 1988, I received a phone call from the Canadian Diocese of the Episcopal Church, seeking advice on how to handle its part in the troubling

saga. After several years, Frank resigned his job at Lena Cinema; however, more than ten years later he still lives in Honiara, having returned home only for a few brief visits. The controversy has continued on and off. Anutans often are suspicious of each other's motives. For much of the ensuing period, the community remained divided against itself, estranged from Tikopia, and at odds with the central and provincial governments.

Conclusion

In 1973, shortly after my first visit to the Solomons, a fellow graduate student asked me to describe the nature and development of conflicts on Anuta and processes of resolution. My response was, "There are no conflicts."

That answer was tongue-in-cheek. I was aware that there were conflicts; indeed, I have written about some of them (e.g., Feinberg 1979, 1980b). Still, I was impressed at just how little overt strife there was and how well people for the most part got along, both with each other and with their cultural and social systems. Ten years later, the contrast was striking.

Some of the changes might have been in my perceptions rather than in the community. As my linguistic capabilities improved on later visits, it was easier for people to talk to me about sensitive issues. At the same time, islanders may well have grown more comfortable and willing to confide in me because of my prolonged association with them and their island. However, my perceptions of increasing conflict and discord were felt by Anutans as acutely as by me. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, they openly spoke about deteriorating social relationships in their community and referred to the early 1970s—the time of my first visit—as almost a golden age. Why should such severe disruption have occurred?

In part, the problem has derived from the large number of Anutans migrating to urban centers, most notably to Honiara. However, it is not urbanism per se, but rather urbanism within the context of a global sociopolitical and economic system that has exerted pressure on Anuta's social fabric.

Anutans are accustomed to crowded conditions. The sanitation system in White River differs from arrangements on Anuta, but it is probably no worse from the viewpoint of public health and safety. Anutans find the weather and physical surroundings less attractive. And diet in the Honiara enclave suffers somewhat in variety and from an easier availability of processed junk foods. These factors, however, are perceived as minor inconveniences compared with the social discord that Anutans have experienced.

The problems that have the Anutans most concerned spring from their participation in world capitalism and a certain incompatibility between this economic system and the traditional order on which their sense of cultural

identity depends. As Anutans try to operate within a system that promotes individual accumulation of material resources, the old social order based on mutual support and sharing becomes difficult to sustain. To survive in the new system, one needs money. Those without money look to those who have it for assistance and, according to the older value system, negatively evaluate those fellow islanders with access to cash income who are reluctant to share what they have.

By contrast, those with paying jobs are caught between a wish to help their kin, thus meeting their customary obligations, and the knowledge that if they do not place limits on their generosity, they cannot succeed in the new economic order. These contrary pressures generate confusion with regard to goals and strategies, and mutual suspicion on the part of people who find that one another's actions both fall short of the traditional ideal and are internally inconsistent. Mistrust, in turn, leads people to obstruct each other's plans, and negative evaluations turn into self-fulfilling prophecies.

Anuta has not broken into multiple communities with multiple moralities. Interaction among virtually all Anutans is too constant and intense to permit such an outcome, at least at the present time. Most Anutans share the same values and ambivalences, and are faced with the same dilemmas. However, different people have found differing solutions to the paradoxes that they all face. This has produced radically divergent strategy decisions and behavior patterns; and those, in turn, have led to conflicts, animosities, deep-seated distrust, and development of sharply differentiated factions, all of which are exacerbated by problems of geography and communication.

Where all this will lead is unpredictable. Other communities depicted in this volume have weathered similar stress and managed to emerge in their new sociopolitical and economic contexts with a renewed sense of moral solidarity. Perhaps a combination of determination and good fortune will enable the Anutans to reap similar results. Meanwhile, the current tale is devoid of villains; the antagonists are more like tragic heroes from the pages of a classic drama. Anutans have been struggling to make sense of a new world in terms of a symbolic system that no longer fits and to act according to a value system that is virtually impossible to realize given the economic pressures of the modern age. Whether, like the Sikaiana, Maori, and Samoans, they at length can reach a workable accommodation remains uncertain. The final chapter to this drama remains to be written.

Postscript

From September through November 2000, I spent two and a half months with Anutans, both in Honiara and on Anuta. Conditions in the Solomons at

this time were very different from those of my earlier visits. Two years of civil war on Guadalcanal and a paramilitary coup in June 2000 have shaken the country to its foundations. Anutans no longer perceive the government to be a powerful adversary, but they are increasingly dubious about its ability to provide even the most basic services. Meanwhile, military conflict and the breakdown of law and order have led most Anutans to return home. There is presently but one Anutan living in the Russell Islands, and the Anutan Honiara community has declined to approximately thirty persons. At the same time, the home island's population has risen to well over three hundred—more than double what it was during my first study. Thus, many of the older issues seem less pressing to Anutans and have been moved to the back burner, while new conditions have generated a fresh set of problems, pressures, and political alignments. These important changes will require further discussion and careful analysis. Their explication, therefore, will have to be deferred to future publications.

NOTES

1. The concept of "tradition" is problematic, since it implies an objectively identifiable baseline with which modernity may be compared. The fact is that cultural and social systems are constantly changing, and indigenous concepts of tradition are defined in the present, reflecting contemporary social and political concerns (see, for example, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Keesing and Tonkinson 1982; Keesing 1989; Feinberg 1994; Feinberg and Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1995; Feinberg and Watson-Gegeo 1996). My point here is that many peoples differentiate what they term "the traditional" or "ancient custom" (in Anutan, this is known as *nga tukutukunga mai mua*) from recently introduced practices, and they retain a sense of loyalty to the former even as the latter are incorporated into their daily lives.

2. Tapsell (this volume) eloquently describes disputes among Maori factions promoting divergent strategies for dealing with the pressures of modern capitalism and urban migration. The New Zealand context is quite different from the Solomon Islands; yet, the two sets of experiences show remarkable qualitative similarities.

3. In 1988, I spent three months in the Solomon Islands attempting unsuccessfully to reach Anuta. While awaiting transportation, I learned that the previous year the entire province of which Anuta is a part had been without a ship for approximately eight months and without air or radio contact for two or three. For further details, see Feinberg 1990.

4. See Feinberg 1978, 1981, and 1996 for discussions of *mana* in Anutan culture.

5. Frank Kataina, who will be discussed below in more detail, has been the most remarkably successful Anutan by Western standards, rising, with a minimum of formal education, to hold several prominent positions in the Royal Solomon Islands Police. Another remarkable success story is Lilian Takua, who could not read or write and spoke no English

until after she left Anuta when she was well into her twenties. She has become a widely respected national leader among the Sisters of the Church of Melanesia.

6. Honiara's attractions for Anutans are similar to those described by Donner (this volume) for the Sikaiana. It is for many of the same reasons that Samoans migrate to Hawai'i, California, and New Zealand (see Macpherson, this volume) and that rural Maoris move to urban centers such as Auckland (Tapsell, this volume).

7. Anutans are extraordinarily devoted Christians, attending church twice a day, seven days a week. Furthermore, the chief had been, for many years, the undisputed leader of one of the island's two churches. His refusal to attend services in the church whose construction he had personally overseen was a powerful statement of his moral opprobrium at the state of Anutan behavior.

8. Since my visit to the Solomons in 1993, the administrative structure of the country has been changed to reflect some of the Anutans' concerns. First, Anuta and Tikopia were removed from Temotu Province and administered directly by the central government in Honiara. Later, in 1997, I was informed that the easternmost islands of the old Temotu Province—Taumako, Vanikoro, Utupua, Tikopia, and Anuta—had been reconstituted as a separate, largely self-governing region within the province. Although the rationale behind this reorganization appears sound, it is too early to assess the results.

9. For a remarkably similar situation in a different part of the Pacific, see Flinn 1990.

10. Other interisland connections are more ambiguous. Through school and work, Anutans have come into contact with large numbers of non-Polynesian Solomon Islanders as well as European and Asian expatriates. In many instances, such contacts have led to the development of mutual respect and, in some cases, even close friendships. However, they have also reinforced among Anutans a sense of distinctiveness and, perhaps, of moral superiority in relation to the other peoples of the world. For further comment on this issue, see Feinberg 1980a and 1990.

11. I say "he" intentionally because a woman, when she marries, leaves the domestic unit into which she was born and joins her husband's. Therefore, a woman who marries a non-Anutan ceases to be a member of an Anutan *patongia.* Still, she may maintain emotional and economic bonds with her consanguineal kin.

12. Not surprisingly, this man's version of events is very different. He insists that he paid for construction of the house and that it was his from the start.

13. Pijin is the version of neo-Melanesian pidgin English spoken in the Solomon Islands. Although English is the Solomons' official language, Pijin is the lingua franca.

14. According to some informants, the grant may have been for substantially more—perhaps as much as SI$20,000.

15. In fact, Mataki did agree with Frank's assessment of the Honiara situation. He returned to Anuta around the same time that I left the Solomons in 1988.

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FROM MORAL COMMUNITY TO MORAL COMMUNITIES: THE FOUNDATIONS OF MIGRANT SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AMONG SAMOANS IN URBAN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND

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There is clear evidence of moral community within early expatriate migrant Samoan communities in New Zealand. This moral community was partly the consequence of many migrants' common life experiences and their resultant commitment to, and belief in, the integrity of their worldview and lifestyle. While commitment was a necessary condition, it was not a sufficient condition for moral community. This article argues that critical to the emergence of moral community were demographic, political, and economic factors—often underrated in anthropological explanations—that influenced the choice of migrants by their families, the processes of migration, and the concentration of migrants in residential and occupational areas. First- and second-generation New Zealand–born Samoans grow up with different social, political, and economic realities, and they do not share the social experiences that underpinned their parents' and grandparents' moral community. They may reconstitute a new form of moral community derived from parental cultures and common experiences of, and social positions within, New Zealand society.

Samoans who migrated from Western Samoa to New Zealand after the Second World War established viable and coherent communities in a number of New Zealand cities. The social organization of these centers has been characterized, by both Samoans and non-Samoan observers, as being "more Samoan than Samoa." This article argues that migrants established what Emile Durkheim referred to as "moral communities," "characterised by social integration (extensive and intimate attachments) and by moral integration (. . . shared beliefs about morality and behaviour)" (Marshall 1994:341), and

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examines the sociocultural and economic factors that made this phenomenon both possible and probable. These communities have been described elsewhere, and it is not my intention to describe them again.

I will instead argue that the desire to maintain social and moral integration is only a part of the explanation of the persistence of moral community in migrant enclaves and that social, economic, and political factors are crucial in determining whether moral communities develop. The article describes a set of factors contributing to the emergence of moral community among migrant Samoans in New Zealand. I will also show how this moral community is transformed as the circumstances in which it emerges change.

Moral Community: The Evidence

Community and Social Cohesion

The earliest evidence of the formation of viable and cohesive Samoan communities in New Zealand was provided by a study of the social organization and networks of one thousand Samoan migrants in four New Zealand cities published in the mid-1970s (Pitt and Macpherson 1974).[1] That study showed viable communities building steadily in all four centers. The survey and associated fieldwork revealed frequent, significant organized social activity based on the extensive and intimate attachments between Samoan migrants. The study also revealed a high degree of agreement on certain key social and moral values that derived from Samoan and Christian traditions and on which much individual and collective social action was based. In both of these respects, migrant Samoan communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand met the criteria of moral community: that is, significant degrees of social and moral integration.

Kinship

A separate study of the organization and significance of kinship among Samoan migrants in two centers revealed similar findings (Macpherson 1974, 1978). Extended kinship linkages served as the basis of significant amounts of migrant social organization from the location of accommodation and employment to the mobilization of capital. The organization of kin-based activities in the "migrant" communities were very similar to those in the "parent" communities in Western Samoa. There was also widespread agreement among migrants that kinship was the "proper" basis for organization of such activities. There was widespread commitment to and participation in these kin-based activities for a variety of reasons: from self-interest, to a lack of

familiarity with alternatives, to commitment to the principles on which they rested.

Religion

The centrality of the Christian church in Samoan life and social organization has been replicated in New Zealand. Many Samoans initially worshiped as part of a pan-Pacific Protestant church, the Pacific Islands Congregational Church,[2] which established congregations in Auckland, Tokoroa, Wellington, and Christchurch from 1946 on (Anae 1992). Others worshiped initially within the preexisting, and predominantly European, congregations of their parent churches. The Methodists, Roman Catholics, Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventists, and Assemblies of God all encouraged Samoan migrants to join existing congregations, and many did so initially. Before long, however, Samoans, who were accustomed to managing their own congregations, found that they were constrained by European rules and conventions from controlling their religious activity as they wished to, and they started to consider forming their own parishes and calling their own ministers from Samoa.

The first split involved a group from the Pacific Islands Congregational Church who left to form the Samoan Congregational Christian Church and symbolically changed its name to the Ekalesia Fa'apopotopotoga Kerisiano o Samoa (Anae 1992). Soon after, the Seventh-day Adventists and the Assemblies of God formed their own parishes. Some mainstream churches made provision for the formation of Samoan sections within their churches, but Samoans sought to establish their own parishes in which Samoans controlled the theological and political organization of the church.[3] Despite resistance from certain church hierarchies, notably the Latter-day Saints, that were unused to being dictated to by small groups at the "periphery" of multinational religious "empires," Samoans gained control of their worship. Many have now established their own parishes, which are funded and controlled by Samoans and ministered to by Samoans trained in theological academies in Samoa.

Most congregations have raised funds for and built their own, often expensive, churches and halls. In the process, close, cohesive social entities have emerged out of the trials of undertaking large, complex, and expensive projects with relatively small numbers of people on relatively low incomes.[4] These congregations seek to attract local Samoans as members and have increasingly replaced the village as the focus of their members' social and political lives. People increasingly use congregational membership as a form of "social location" and identify themselves as members of "the congregation of Pastor X."

Congregations place considerable financial and other responsibilities on members. The congregations build and then maintain their own, often expensive, churches and associated hall buildings as well as homes for their pastors' families. They also support their ministers through regular and significant financial donations and take on various special projects as a congregation.

Membership also offers certain social opportunities. There are, for instance, the possibility of recognition by fellow parishioners in the form of church office; the opportunity to travel and identify with a particular congregation in a variety of religious events such as *fa'aulufalega,* or church openings, and at "family services" that precede funerals; and the chance to participate in quasi-competitive events such as choral music festivals and straight-out competitive events such as choral competitions. The congregation provides an arena for participation in local political and social drama and competition, and is a vehicle for involvement within the activities of the larger Samoan community as groups travel the length and breadth of Aotearoa to meet and compete.

Village

This commitment to migrant churches did not, however, mean that villages from which people had migrated no longer had any social or political significance. *Fono matai,* or village councils, in Samoa periodically undertake new and major capital works and mobilize their expatriate members to provide capital for projects such as the building and rebuilding of churches and schools, women's committee houses, and village guest houses;[5] road building; and village beautification. Councils send delegates to Aotearoa/New Zealand and in some cases constitute standing committees made up of expatriate *matai* (chiefs) to organize and coordinate village activity in migrant enclaves. The activities most frequently focus on seeking contributions to village capital works projects but also include the conferring of titles and the resolution of disputes.

The donations are seen by most migrants as contributions that they make in lieu of physical labor and are made on behalf of nonmigrant members of their family, to which they continue to belong "in exile." The donations are also acknowledgment of the benefits that they have received from membership in the village at various times. Their vicarious participation in these activities is documented and publicly acknowledged by both the family and the village. Migrants' participation guarantees them good standing in the village and reaffirms their right to claim and exercise the rights of village membership.

Institutional Replication

Within these general fields of social activity over the last forty years, further evidence of moral community has taken the form of replication of institutions that both ensured and confirmed the existence of moral and social integration. The communities replicated *fono matai,* drawing on permanently and temporarily resident *matai* to organize certain types of community and family activity. Kin groups constituted expatriate *āiga potopoto,* kin assemblies, to determine fit people to succeed to titles and then to make the preliminary moves to bestow these.[6] Churches replicated their various councils, known generically as *fono a tiakono,* and determined the direction and substance of the parishes' activities, which in turn came to resemble those of "parent" institutions.

Beyond these formal institutions were other activities in which the existence of moral community was both confirmed and reproduced. In such areas as dispute resolution, formal ceremonial forgiveness procedures, or *ifoga,* both confirmed the existence of a transgression of the standards of the moral community and, by publicly redressing the issue, guaranteed the continuation of the moral and social integration. In such areas as marriage, or *fa'ai-poipoga,* the adherence to established patterns of balanced gift exchange managed by senior men and women of the families involved restated the significance of kinship as an organizing principle and the appropriate ways of enacting it in practice. By choosing to give the largest weddings for those members who had given generously to the family over time, the *āiga* publicly confirmed the values of reciprocity and commitment to family.

Studies have also revealed that the principles and practices of Samoan social organization were not confined to areas in which they had traditionally been evident: that is, the management of family activity and mobilization of resources for such events as life crises and dispute management and resolution.[7] The same principles and practices were invoked as the basis for nontraditional activities from employment location, through rotating credit organizations, to the celebration of university graduations and family reunions. They were also even employed for managing relations with non-Samoans.[8]

The term "principles" is used advisedly here. In the 1950s and 1960s, many of the migrants' formal and informal activities were necessarily modified because various key individuals, groups, and knowledge were not available in New Zealand. In the 1970s, as *matai, 'ie tōga* (fine mats), and much esoteric knowledge moved to Aotearoa/New Zealand, the activities became more and more like those in Samoa. Indeed, in some ways the principal difference was that migrant activities were increasingly larger and more elaborate than those in Samoa (Macpherson and Macpherson 1999).

Emerging Pluralism

The findings of these studies, and particularly of a relationship with the dominant society described as social and structural pluralism, flew in the face of two sociological orthodoxies popular in the 1970s and 1980s. Some migration theories tended to depict migrants as "progressive" and "modern" people who fled "traditional" societies to free themselves from the "bondage of tradition" to adopt an individualistic worldview and lifestyle. The supposed desire for freedom to pursue an "individualistic" lifestyle may have said more about the worldviews and political ideologies of its proponents than it did about realities of migrant life or the social and political linkages between migrants and their communities of origin. It did not anticipate the possibility that migrants might migrate to support a "communitarian" lifestyle. Assimilation theory contended that migrants would inevitably adopt the worldviews and lifestyles of the dominant ethnic group (Gordon 1964). I focus below on explaining the social and economic factors that produced this desire to retain the central features of Samoan social organization—the platform on which this moral community was founded—and that now appear to be undermining these features.

Economic Factors

A series of economic factors played a crucial role in producing the platform on which moral community could develop. These provide the context within which migration occurred: the patterns of the flows and of settlement that developed in Aotearoa/New Zealand. These factors are significant because they produced, as I will show, concentrations of Samoan migrants in a relatively small number of areas within a relatively small number of cities and occupations. These concentrations are essential to the development of a moral community for two reasons. First, they produce the critical masses of people necessary to establish and maintain certain core elements of worldview and lifestyle. Second, the concentrations make it easier for people to maintain contact with others for whom these core elements are normative and thus increase the probability that norms are retained.

The Restructuring of the New Zealand Economy

After the Second World War, New Zealand embarked on a policy of import-substitution-based industrialization (Ongley 1991, 1996), which was concentrated in urban areas and designed to lessen the country's dependence on core states in the global economy and to generate opportunities for local

capital and labor (Hawke 1985; Rudd and Roper 1997). World War II had produced two population trends that hindered this development. Heavy losses in the war had led to a loss of able-bodied men, and the local semi-skilled and unskilled labor needed for industrialization was in short supply at the time. The country's population growth rate, which had been dropping for some time before the war, slowed still further as a consequence of war losses and created a longer-term labor supply problem for an expanding economy.

New Zealand's "territories" and former "territories" in the Southwest Pacific represented a convenient source of inexpensive, able-bodied, and educated but docile labor that, indirectly, also dampened domestic wage demands.[9] Pacific Island migration to New Zealand began in the period immediately after the Second World War and continued until labor demand declined in the mid-1980s (Krishnan et al. 1994:12–25).[10] The largest numbers of migrants came from Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, and the Tokelau Islands, with which New Zealand had been administered earlier in the century and with which the strongest constitutional ties were maintained. Smaller numbers came from Tonga, Fiji, and French Polynesia, with which New Zealand had weaker sociopolitical linkages. Although the migration and depopulation had profound and detrimental effects on Pacific Island states' economies (Shankman 1976; Hayes 1991), their governments, faced with rapid population growth, the escalating demands of their citizens, and limited resources with which to meet these, offered no obstacles to emigration and later actively promoted it (Krishnan et al. 1994).

Urban Concentration

The demand for labor came principally from developing secondary and tertiary industries and as a consequence generated opportunities in relatively few cities, in which the growth was concentrated, and within relatively few industrial areas, in which rapid growth was occurring. Pacific Island men and women tended to be concentrated in the manufacturing and assembly of everything from motor vehicles to domestic appliances and in service industries. Service jobs included jobs in transportation, in cleaning, as hospital domestics, and so on (Krishnan et al. 1994; Spoonley 1990; Bedford and Gibson 1986; Gibson 1983).

By the 1960s, well-established "chains" brought increasing numbers of migrants from the rural villages of the Pacific Islands to suburbs in three New Zealand cities—Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch (Pitt and Macpherson 1974; Levick and Bedford 1988; Loomis 1991)—and a number of smaller provincial centers such as Tokoroa (see Department of Statistics 1992: tables 44, p. 97; 2, p. 27; 9, p. 39; 16, p. 51; 23, p. 63; 30, p. 75; 37, p. 87).

Suburban Concentration

Most early migrants arrived without significant amounts of capital and were dependent on rental housing, at least initially.[11] They confronted largely European landlords who knew nothing or very little of these new home seekers but who assumed that they were similar to Maori migrants who were arriving in the city at the time. The landlords tended to rent them large, old homes at extortionate rents in low-income neighborhoods in areas near the central city scheduled for urban redevelopment. This relatively docile renting population would pay high rents, because they had few housing options, and they would not generally seek enforcement of their rights as tenants for the same reason. Under the circumstances, housing was a relatively scarce resource, and incoming migrants generally settled with existing kin households rather than form their own households. This "economic racism" on the part of the "gatekeepers" in the housing market provided, at least in the earliest phases of migration, the critical masses within certain suburbs that are necessary to create and then sustain viable moral communities.

Even later, however, as Samoans took advantage of the many state-provided incentives to home ownership, concentrations of population built up in tract housing on the fringes of the city for reasons that were often primarily economic. Government housing packages were intended for lower-income families and were aimed at providing inexpensive new homes on relatively inexpensive lots in new suburbs on the edges of the major cities (Macpherson 1997). Those subdivisions were developed by large building and land development companies, who undertook major marketing initiatives among "target populations" including Pacific Islanders. The companies offered comprehensive packages that reduced the need to deal with bureaucracies and "topping up" packages with additional incentives (Macpherson 1997). These companies also took advantage of Samoan knowledge and very soon appointed Samoan marketing staff, who used their social networks and knowledge of Samoan social organization to sell in the Samoan community. Economic incentives were used to gain access to home buyers' social networks and to make multiple sales within a kin group or congregation.[12]

The net effect of these economic forces was to create concentrations of Samoans in suburbs of cities. These provided the critical masses of population necessary to establish and support effective moral community. The fact that employment guarantees required for Samoans to complete immigration formalities came mainly from relatives who were already employed led to concentrations within particular companies within particular industrial sectors. But concentrations were, of themselves, not enough to guarantee moral community. Social and moral integration was only possible because of

a second set of social forces that ensured that those who formed these concentrations were predisposed to accept and participate in activities that are the bases of moral community. These social forces are outlined below.

Social Factors

Motivation for Migration

For viable moral communities to develop, people must be committed to at least the core principles on which moral and social integration rest. Why was it that migrants who settled in New Zealand remained committed to values and practices associated with rural, agricultural villages in an urban industrial environment? The answer lies indirectly in the village economy and more directly in the expectations of those who controlled, at least informally, who would be allowed and encouraged to migrate. To understand this connection one needs to understand the structure of the village economy during the 1950s and 1960s and the situation of those whose sole or principal source of income was primary production. This structure is described in detail elsewhere by such authors as Stace (1956), Pitt (1970), Lockwood (1971), and Shankman (1976).

Many, especially rural, parents sought to lessen their dependence on income from primary production for several reasons. Traditional crops were vulnerable to the attacks of a number of pests and plant diseases. Traditional tree crops were also vulnerable to periodic cyclones and root crops to various blights. As a consequence, domestic prices were in a constant state of flux, and planning was difficult. The situation was made worse by the fact that prices in international markets were also unstable because of the fluctuating volume and quality of production from other Pacific Island producers of the same commodities. Despite the institution, by government, of price stabilization schemes for staple crops, agricultural producers could not plan with any certainty under those conditions. Even some relatively well paid civil servants and wage workers in Samoa were eager to migrate, because they realized that incomes in New Zealand were higher and more elastic than their own (Shankman 1976:49–50).

Migration of family labor into the wage labor markets of Aotearoa/New Zealand guaranteed a significantly better return than employment in the plantation or the wage sector of the Samoan economy. It was relatively easy to augment basic incomes in New Zealand by working additional hours and on public holidays, which were paid at penal (overtime) rates, and with less well paid work in service industries, which was also available for those who wanted second, and occasionally third, jobs. Migrants regularly worked very

long hours to take advantage of penal rates, and took either casual or permanent second jobs. The returns on their labor were potentially higher, more assured, and better protected than the returns on their labor on the plantation or in wage work in Samoa. [13]

Selection

The benefit to the family accrued only as long as those who migrated remained committed to the vision of themselves as members of a family the needs of which took precedence over their own personal needs and interests. Such people would accept their responsibility to remit a significant part of their income to the family and effectively diversify the range and quality of income streams. This realization led parents who had access to guarantees of work in Aotearoa/New Zealand to select with considerable care those of their children to whom these guarantees would be given.

Unmarried women were favored, because they were thought to be more committed to their families than were young men, and, as Shankman noted in the case of Sa'asi, this belief had a solid basis in fact. While young men could, and generally did, earn more than young women, they were generally considered less reliable remitters than young women. Single people were favored by both immigration regulations and parents because a single person's entire income, or at least significant parts of it, were at the disposal of the family. Married people were less favored, because marriage usually meant that the migrant's income would be the subject of periodic calls from a spouse's family and because of the higher costs of establishing and maintaining a larger household. People were encouraged to remain single to extend their effective remitting life until such time as major projects were complete.

Thus, it can be argued that a set of somewhat instrumental concerns led to the "selection" of people who were thought to be more likely to serve their families and who had demonstrated this commitment in their conduct in Samoa. Such people were more likely to be more committed to other Samoan values and practices and provided a solid platform from which a moral community might emerge.

Orientation

This outcome depended on keeping new migrants focused on the need to support family while surrounded by a new set of opportunities and with access to relatively high individual incomes. For these reasons, the circumstances in which new migrants were "inducted" into New Zealand society

were crucial if they were to remain committed to their "mission." In this respect, the emergence of moral community was fostered by both immigration regulations and Samoan social organization.

Immigration regulations at the time required that all migrants provide the address at which they would be living on arrival in New Zealand. Immigration officers then inspected the dwelling to ensure that it complied with existing health and safety regulations before issuing an entry permit. Securing accommodation from a distance in a housing market in which many landlords tended to discriminate against Pacific Islanders was difficult, and so many migrants turned to their kin to locate housing for them. In many cases the "sponsor" provided his or her own address. But the choice of a sponsor owed a considerable amount to Samoan beliefs about the nature of young single people, who were thought of as having a predisposition to stray from the more difficult obligations to service, *tautua,* and to seek individual freedom and self-gratification unless they were adequately supervised. This risk was considered much higher in the cities of New Zealand where there were more reasons and opportunities to stray, and more difficulties in detecting and disciplining those who faltered. These beliefs about young people's lack of self-discipline in turn shaped beliefs about the appropriate environment for induction and the appropriate sponsor.

Many parents believed that close supervision of young migrants' activities was necessary for both social and financial reasons and sought out older migrant relatives whom they believed could and would provide "guidance." Many migrant households were headed by such people; usually an older relation acted in loco parentis and effectively controlled members' social and financial activities.[14] This supervision was not seen, at least initially, to be an unreasonable restriction on freedom by either parents or their migrant children. Most migrants accepted that such supervision was appropriate at the time and that it was no more or less than they would have expected in Samoa. Most acknowledged that they could not have migrated without the assistance they received from the families to which they went and accepted a degree of control over their economic, religious, and social freedom in return for relatively inexpensive accommodation, access to employment, and social and emotional support.

These households often contained other young, single migrants, so that new migrants necessarily spent much of their time with other young people chosen for similar reasons and in similar situations. Furthermore, these households were frequently managed by persons who had been chosen by parents who believed that they were thoroughly committed to the *fa'asamoa* (the Samoan way) and that they would ensure that appropriate standards of conduct would be maintained. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising

that many new migrants maintained a commitment to a Samoan worldview and lifestyle.

Work Life

The values that were central in the home situation would have been more difficult to enforce had they been directly and openly contested in the work situation. This was often not the case for a number of reasons connected with both immigration requirements and Samoan choices. Immigration regulations required that new residents have a guarantee of employment for a named position in a specific company. Proof was presented to immigration authorities in the form of a valid offer of employment on company stationery. For many people such documents would have been impossible to obtain from a distance. In fact, most such guarantees were obtained by Samoans working in companies in New Zealand and forwarded to their families in Samoa.

These people, often supervisors or employees of long standing, used their own work record and abilities as "collateral" for employment guarantees for relatives and friends. These people became, in effect, gatekeepers to the employment market, and both employers and family came to depend on them. The employers depended on these key personnel to identify, induct, and manage new employees, and often placed new Samoan employees with or under the control of those who had sponsored them.[15] So too did their families, who regarded them, correctly, as conduits to permanent residence. These gatekeepers clearly had a vested interest in obtaining people who would accept their direction and whose conduct would consolidate their own position and reputation within a company. If their early recommendations proved to be successful employees, their prospects of obtaining further guarantees increased as did their status within their families.

This system presupposed that the new employee required "controlling." This was, however, not usually the case. The new Samoan employee often hoped that his or her performance would eventually qualify him or her for access to work permits and entitle him or her to the social prestige that came with this access. For these reasons, new employees tended often to be fairly compliant ones who acknowledged their obligation to those who had found them work that they could not otherwise have found and readily accepted the directions of their sponsors.

The consequence of this second facet of chain migration was the concentration of large numbers of Samoans in particular industrial areas and indeed within particular parts of companies. In these situations the new migrants often found that the core elements of the Samoan worldview and

lifestyle were the norms within their workplaces. Furthermore, as long as employers and Samoans benefited from this informal system and maintained it, it would tend to favor the growth of a pool of migrants who were chosen because they were committed to the *fa'asamoa* and who found themselves in situations in which certain key elements of the *fa'asamoa* were the norms.

Nonwork Life

The control of nonwork life extended often to the social and recreational activity of the new migrants. The heads of households to which new migrants were sent were charged with maintaining "appropriate" patterns of social and religious life. To this end, they determined to a significant extent the composition of social networks and patterns of social activity of those under their care. An active religious life was held central to reinforce the key values of the *fa'asamoa* in the midst of temptation, and most households required new migrants to attend religious services on Sunday. One woman remembered the walks to church:

> We lived with my aunt, who decided that all those living with her would attend her church. We would all dress up early on Sunday morning and walk all the way from P to N [a distance of about 7.5 kilometers]. We took turns at carrying my aunty's children and pushing their prams. We must have looked like a hen and chickens bobbing along in white and in line. And yet when I think back to those times, I was not self-conscious, because about the only people walking on the roads at that time of day were other families that looked like us. As you got nearer the church, there were more and more of us.
>
> We would sit through the service and then turn around and walk home. We never got to talk to anybody much at church, because when my aunty was ready to go home, she just announced we were going, and off we went. Sometimes she would meet people at church and invite them home. Those were exciting times. When we got home, we would have our *toana'i* and sleep for the rest of the afternoon. I can't imagine asking my own children to walk to church and back on an empty stomach, but in those times it was a good part of the week.

The heads of households, ever conscious of their responsibility to protect their charges, sought to limit their social activity to that connected with the church, where it was presumed they would be safer. This effectively con-

fined activity to choir rehearsals and performances, fund-raising socials and dances on church premises, and church-affiliated sports clubs and youth groups. In this area boys were allowed more freedom than girls, but even so shift work and extended working hours often limited people's freedom and energy for these activities. Another woman remembered the dances:

> A boy would ask my cousin if I could dance with him. He never asked me directly. If my cousin agreed, he would watch us like a hawk throughout the dance. Sometimes, I would be dancing close to a boy, and my cousin would dance up beside us and glower at me and my partner until we got a bit farther apart. Then my cousin would not allow me to dance for the next couple of dances as a reminder to me to watch my step. That was what passed for a good night out then, and compared with some of the other people with whom we worked, and who were not allowed out at all, we felt pretty free. I could understand why it all happened that way and had no problem. It was the *fa'asamoa,* and that was all most of us knew then.

Under pressure from younger people, the heads of families started to allow young people to attend public dances run by non-Samoans *(papālagi).* Even then, however, the girls were almost always chaperoned by male relatives, which meant that, even in the midst of ostensibly *papālagi* activity, many of the people involved were adhering to Samoan standards of propriety.

In these circumstances, the limited social life that many new migrants enjoyed away from home was with other Samoans and in venues and activities in which Samoan values and norms of conduct prevailed. It is not difficult to understand why Samoans were able to retain a relatively high degree of social and moral integration and felt bound to a significant degree to a moral community.

Overstaying

The prospect of relatively high, secure income proved extremely attractive, and increasing numbers of Samoans arrived in New Zealand as visitors and tourists on three-month visas but remained, disappeared, and worked there illegally. Their illegal immigrant status made them particularly dependent on their kin for work and accommodation and for shelter when they were forced to move at short notice to keep ahead of immigration authorities. This pressure and the resulting dependence became even greater as the New Zealand economy slowed down from the mid-1970s, and immigration

authorities moved more deliberately to locate and deport illegal immigrants. This dependence increased again after 1990 as the government tightened its administration of social welfare and paid social income only to those who could provide evidence of legal residence status (Macpherson 1992). Many illegal residents were left without means of support and were increasingly dependent on their relations and friends for maintenance.

Illegal immigrants were more likely to play their parts in family and village affairs, because they were aware that those who were well regarded were more likely to be supported and sheltered than those who made no useful contribution. Relatives tired of supporting people who made little contribution to family or village would hand them over, usually anonymously, to authorities. This dependence on legal migrants further improved the probability of compliance on the part of people who were outside the system and might otherwise have been expected to be independent of their families and to enjoy greater freedom.

The Undermining of Moral Community

A generation later, the moral and social integration that underpinned much of the social organization of the immigrant Samoans is being transformed. The social, political, and economic factors that gave rise to moral community have changed. In place of the earlier, singular community that had its foundations in Samoa are several moral communities founded on different combinations of factors.

The most obvious factor in the process is the changing demographic composition of the expatriate Samoan population. The Samoan-born migrant population is steadily aging as a consequence of the transformation of the New Zealand economy (Macpherson 1992), which no longer requires large amounts of unskilled and semiskilled labor. The demand for younger Pacific Islanders has waned, and most Samoans migrating now do so under the family reunification provisions that allow older family members whose children have migrated to join their children in New Zealand. This small stream of people tends to share the worldview and practices of the early migrants and to reinforce the moral community that characterized early settlement. A small number of professionals migrate under an immigration points system that gives preference to those with specialist occupational skills in short supply in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand 2000).

The New Zealand born and raised children and grandchildren of the migrants are coming of age in ever larger numbers and are becoming increasingly influential within the community (Cook et al. 2001). By 1996, New Zealand–born Samoans comprised 56 percent of the Samoan popula-

tion, and this proportion is rising quickly. The ethnicity of this group has been discussed in more detail elsewhere (Macpherson 1984, 1991, 1996, 2001). They bring to the community a broad range of social experience; they have been more systematically exposed to the English language and to non-Samoan cultures as a consequence of their socialization, formal education, and intermarriage (Macpherson 1972; Cook et al. 2001). They have, as a consequence, significantly larger amounts of *papālagi* cultural capital than their parents did. New Zealand–born Samoans have higher educational qualifications and incomes and more secure positions in the labor market than do migrants (Macpherson et al. 2000). This status, theoretically at least, frees them from economic dependence on friends and relatives and the requirement of compliance with parental and community requests for support.

They have, at the same time, been denied the village-based secular and religious socialization that produced commitment to a single and publicly "enforced" and "celebrated" set of social values and associated practices. This group has, in many cases, neither the cultural capital nor the inclination to participate in the forms of social organization that were the bases of their parents' sense of cohesion and moral community. The loss of cultural capital results from the level and pattern of their exposure to Samoan values and practices. Nor do they necessarily have the knowledge of the Samoan language that is necessary to participate in Samoan events that are enacted in New Zealand. Language loss has increased among New Zealand–born Samoans to the point that, while 90 percent of Samoan-born speak Samoan, only 46 percent of New Zealand–born do. As Hunkin-Tuiletufuga notes (2001), this proportion is likely to increase steadily in the absence of policies and a determination to maintain language. To see the New Zealand–born Samoans as having some sort of cultural deficit is, however, to miss the point.

The loss of inclination is a product in many cases of the existence of a viable alternative (Macpherson 2001; Anae 2001). New Zealand–born Samoans have a range of alternative identities available to them. The political, economic, and social conditions in which they were raised have provided them with a range of identities such as "New Zealand–borns," "P.I.s," or "Polys," and, as a consequence of high levels of intermarriage, "part-Samoans." This is not to suggest that they have abandoned the culture and language of their parents. Many remain proud of their Samoan heritage and think of themselves as Samoans (Anae 2001). But it is true that the basis of their moral community as Samoans is different from that of their parents, because the social, political, and economic conditions in which it has been generated are different. The nature of their social and moral integration reflects a different relationship with their parents' Samoan worldview and lifestyle.

These young people have redefined "Samoanness" and have altered its

content. They have adopted new symbols of their identity that reflect the circumstances in which their identity was formed (Macpherson 1984, 1991). The *taulima,* a design tattooed around the mid-bicep and designed originally as a "cultural souvenir" for Peace Corps volunteers who served in Samoa, has been widely adopted by New Zealand–born Samoans as a mark of Samoan identity for both young men and women who might in Samoa have been expected to have had quite different sorts of tattoos. The young, whose fluency in Samoan varies significantly and is frequently somewhat limited (Hunkin-Tuiletufuga 2001), have developed a patois that mixes English and Samoan languages in a way that allows them to communicate and to "mark" common Samoan cultural heritage.

New Zealand–born Samoans have created new forms of art that incorporate Samoan symbols and materials but in a range of new media and in a way that allows them to practice a new range of art forms and to identify as Samoans. Similarly, in music, dance, and drama, the young have created new forms that incorporate traditional ideas, stories, styles, rhythms, and movements in new forms of music, dance, and drama that they identify as Samoan. Thus, one finds such musical styles as "Jamoan" and rap that embodies Samoan stories, experiences, and values (Zemke-White 2001). New Zealand–born Samoans have expropriated non-Samoan forms such as European opera to perform traditional Samoan songs. While the blending of older symbols into newer media is often interesting and easy and commands the support of young and old alike, this is not always the case.

The new and distinctive moral community emerging among New Zealand–born Samoans is not simply an "incomplete" version of that of their parents. New Zealand–born Samoans and others who have spent significant amounts of time in New Zealand have started to reflect critically on the Samoan culture and society of their parents. They have taken advantage of the distance from Samoan society to question some of the central precepts and values that underpin the moral community of their migrant parents and grandparents (Macpherson 2001).

Albert Wendt initiated the trend in a series of novels and short stories about Samoan society that were critical of a series of central elements that underlie Samoan moral community.[16] While he was criticized by many "traditionalists," he gave voice to many other Samoans and won wide critical acclaim outside the Samoan community. More recently author Sia Figiel has won professional acclaim with three powerful, critical novels about the experience of girls, women, and migrants in Samoan society (1996a, 1996b, 1999). Playwright David Fane has written a series of humorous, satirical plays that have dealt with such issues as the tensions between Samoan-born and New Zealand–born in families in *Fresh off the Boat;* the treatment of *fa'afafine,*

or transsexuals, in the *Flight of the Frigate Bird;* dysfunctional Samoan families in *Naked Samoans Talk about Their Knives* and the comedy slots of *Milburn Place,* about a migrant family in which a set of Samoan central values and those associated with them are heavily parodied on prime-time television.

Every year exposes more dramatic and musical talent, and each time a song, play, or book publicly challenges the foundations of the moral community that migrants established almost fifty years ago, it opens the way for others to extend the challenge. The values that underlie the earlier moral community and the institutions which enacted and reproduced it are changing but in an increasingly positive social climate. They are being rearranged to form the foundations of new, multiple moral communities that reflect new ways of being Samoan in an urban industrial society. In New Zealand the existence of alternatives and the freedom to criticize the underpinnings of "Samoan" moral community have made the migrant community a site in which a New Zealand–born moral community, constructed out of new cultural materials and in different circumstances, can emerge and live alongside its "parent."

NOTES

1. Auckland, Wellington, Tokoroa, and Christchurch were the centers in which the population had concentrated at that time.

2. This denomination was connected with the London Missionary Society church, which led the earliest Christian missionary activity in the South Pacific. It became, and remains, the most influential denomination in many Pacific islands (Gunson 1976) and established its first parish in Auckland for Cook Islanders, Samoans, Niueans, Tokelauans, and Tuvaluans in 1946 before expanding southward.

3. This involved "calling" pastors who had been trained or had ministered to congregations in Samoa and who could and would replicate "appropriate" theological and organizational models.

4. These projects require significant commitments, since they typically involve relatively small numbers of members in an area deciding to build a church and call a minister. Most hope to open these buildings either without debt or with a relatively small debt. Thus, foundation members are often asked to mortgage their homes to provide capital. The congregation must continue to service the mortgage, or they risk losing their homes.

5. Recently, periodic cyclones have put immense pressure on members, who have been required to replace or rebuild not only their own family homes but also the village facilities that were damaged twice in as many years by the cyclones Val and Ofa in the early 1990s.

6. The moves precede the village *fono* acknowledgment of the title's transmission and the formal registration of the new titleholder in the Lands and Titles Court.

7. The New Zealand Samoan migrants were by no means unique in this respect. Studies of expatriate Samoan communities in various parts of California revealed similar orientations to Samoan social organization (Ablon 1971; Rolff 1978).

8. In 1994, after an altercation between Samoans and Tongans in which one Tongan was killed, Samoans sought and were given the consent of the Tongans to make an *ifoga,* or ritual self-debasement and formal apology, for the death as a prelude to reconciliation.

9. Pacific Island labor was generally unfamiliar with the highly institutionalized system of labor relations that existed in New Zealand. Workers were generally unfamiliar with the objectives and organization of trade unions, which they were required in most case to join, and somewhat suspicious of the notions of class solidarity that were at the time central parts of the discourse of labor relations.

10. In fact the Pacific Island migration started significantly earlier, when the ancestors of the Maori moved out of Eastern Polynesia and into the South Pacific some one thousand years ago.

11. There were exceptions, such as those relatively wealthy part-Samoans who left Samoa in the period leading up to independence in 1962 because of uncertainty as to how their position would change in a newly independent nation born in a climate of strong Samoan nationalism (Pitt and Macpherson 1974).

12. Samoan sales people offered various bonuses to people who introduced other kin with whom they could discuss home purchase and to those people who introduced kin who subsequently signed housing contracts. Given that there are significant entry expenses, people were motivated to introduce others for the bonuses.

13. In the sectors into which most migrants moved, labor union membership was effectively compulsory, and the power of the labor unions guaranteed the protection of the wages and conditions, and to a lesser extent the jobs, of employees in these sectors.

14. The degree of control varied. In some households people surrendered unopened pay packets to the heads of their households, who deducted various charges, set aside a sum to be remitted and another to be banked, and returned a small sum in pocket money. In others, people were simply required to provide proof that certain savings and remittance commitments had been met weekly. In other households less formal control was exercised over income, and peer pressure seems to have produced much the same result in terms of commitment to remit.

15. This system saved them the costs of advertising for, interviewing, and formally inducting new employees. The growth of a multicultural workforce gave little cause for concern, because the system also guaranteed them a good degree of control over the management of the new Samoan employees.

16. These stories include "Sons for the Return," "Flying Fox in a Freedom Tree," and "The Leaves of the Banyan Tree."

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MAINTAINING MARSHALLESE FUNDAMENTALS WITH CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM

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From 1902–1903 Emile Durkheim offered a series of lectures at the Sorbonne in which he suggested that participation in a "moral community" compels us to recognize ourselves in the collectivity and to commit ourselves to moral goals of the group. This essay discusses the formation of a Durkheimian community by migrants from the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the midwestern city of Enid, Oklahoma, and attempts to identify the political and economic factors that made the community's formation possible. More important, however, this essay explains why this particular moral community became essential for the social and psychological survival of the Enid Marshallese group.

The Role of the Christian Church in Maintaining Ethnic Identity and Community Viability in the Enid Transmigrant Milieu

In Enid, Oklahoma, teachings of the Assemblies of God church have been employed to structure obligations and responsibilities needed to maintain a Marshallese ethnic identity. Boundaries defining aspects of Marshallese ethnic identity have been drawn by disapproving "all unscriptural teachings, methods and conduct" deemed inappropriate for Assembly of God churchgoers (Oklahoma District Council of the Assemblies of God n.d.:18). To be a member of Marshallese society in Enid, participants are obligated to practice and maintain the traditional customs of the Marshall Islands as reinterpreted by church doctrine. In Enid, this practice consists primarily of par-

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ticipation in the Pentecostal fellowship of the Marshallese Assembly of God Church. Such participation is not only requisite for inclusion in the community, but it also provides prima facie evidence of one's ethnicity. Nevertheless, Marshallese custom reinterpreted according to Assemblies of God church doctrine does not merely represent an "unreflectively inherited legacy" passively received (Linnekin 1992:251), but rather it illustrates custom fashioned and observed in the present as a response to the exigencies of life in the urban migrant milieu and essential to the maintenance of the Marshallese ethnic community in Enid.

To this end, the establishment of a separate Marshallese Assembly of God church facility can be viewed as a first step in the process of ethnic identity formation for Marshallese migrants to Enid. The First Marshallese Assembly of God Church symbolizes "continuity with the past" (at least the past since missionization) and "an image of a better future for its members" (De Vos 1975:17). As De Vos suggests, "Ethnicity in its deepest psychological level is a sense of survival" (ibid.). The formation of an ethnic church, separate from the larger Assemblies of God organization, has been a means for Marshallese transmigrants to ensure individual survival by assuring group survival via the creation of a sacred ethnic space in the Enid urban environment.

Moreover, by participation in an exclusively Marshallese church, transmigrant "believers" in Enid attempt to resist external forces that threaten to obscure their identity and contribute to a decentering of subjectivity (cf. Levy 1973:251–255 for a discussion of Tahitian subjective thought). Through a synthesis of their experiences of many different places, Marshallese migrants from several communities of origin have collectively created a cultural identity in Enid. They have accomplished this through the formation of an *essential community* in the idealized context of the Marshallese Assembly of God Church (see Table 1).

The community formed by Marshallese migrants to Enid is essential for two separate but related reasons. First, unlike Micronesian migrant communities formed by college students living in the United States during the 1970s, the Marshallese community in Enid currently contains a stable migrant population of approximately 189 individuals living in twenty-five households. And, like the New Zealand Samoan communities discussed by Macpherson (this volume), most of the Marshallese households are in daily communication, and they compose the social core that is essential to the maintenance of community viability in Enid. Moreover, multilateral linkages within this core of households provide a network for the exchange of essentials (e.g., information, social, and material resources) among households and to new immigrants entering the Enid Marshallese community. Thus, I

TABLE 1. **Enid Marshallese Population by Island of Birth, November 1994**

Island of Birth	Number	Percentage of Total
Majuro[a]	63	41
Kili	32	21
Kwajalein-Ebeye[a]	29	19
Ailinglaplap	5	3
Ebon	5	3
Namu	4	3
Ailuk	3	2
Jaluit	3	2
Likiep	3	2
Arno	2	1
Bikini	2	1
Wotje	2	1
Mili	1	1
Total	154[b]	100

Source: Author's community census.

[a] Majuro and Kwajalein-Ebeye are the "urban areas" of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

[b] This number differs from the total Marshallese migrant population figure given in the text, because thirty-five members of the community were born in Enid, Oklahoma.

have chosen the polysemic term "essential" to refer to the Enid migrant group to convey the fundamental nature of the community form for the maintenance of the social/psychological and material well-being of its members.

Nevertheless, to appreciate the centrality of the role of the Assembly of God Church for the Enid Marshallese, it is important first to review the significance of the Christian church and theology for people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

A Brief Overview of Christianity in the Marshall Islands —Yesterday and Today

Yesterday

Buoyed by their success on the islands of Pohnpei and Kosrae, in November 1857 the missionaries George Pierson, Edward Doane, and Hiram Bingham, from the Congregationalist American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, ignored warnings to steer clear of the "dread of seamen" and sailed

to the Marshall Islands to spread the message of the gospel (Hezel 1983: 201). Well received by Kaibuke, the then powerful paramount chief of the Marshalls' southern Ralik Chain, the missionaries encountered few difficulties in establishing a mission on the chief's home island of Ebon. Sabbath services were soon attended by great numbers of Marshallese, and the missionaries were greatly encouraged by the "polite and obliging" behavior of the islanders on Ebon (ibid.:202).

Within three years, however, the mission was all but abandoned. Pierson, Bingham, Doane, and their families, plagued by disease and discouraged by hardship, fled the Marshalls to regain their health. Fearing that the "race for souls" had been lost in the Marshalls, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions quickly staged a final attempt to salvage the mission by sending Hezekiah Aea to Ebon in 1860. Aea, an energetic Hawaiian missionary who had won recognition for his role in establishing a successful indigenous mission in the Gilbert Islands (now Kiribati), was determined to do the same in the Marshalls. Within nine months of his arrival, Aea became fluent in Marshallese, and, with the assistance of additional Hawaiian missionaries sent by the board, he established mission schools on three islands in the Ralik Chain by the close of his first year on Ebon (Hezel 1983:207). Aea also began the process of training Marshallese to be teachers and "emissaries for the new religion" within months of his arrival in the Marshalls (ibid.:209).

Encouraged by Aea's efforts, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions sent the Reverend Benjamin Snow to act as supervisor for the growing mission. Snow, who had been successful in establishing a mission on Kosrae, was less than enchanted with the efforts of Hawaiian missionaries during his tenure there (Hezel 1983:316). But, after witnessing the Hawaiians' success in establishing churches on seven islands throughout the Ralik Chain by 1875, Snow was forced to "admit that the mission could not have been carried on successfully without them" (ibid.:207).

More important to the church's success, Snow acknowledged, were the native Marshallese mission leaders and teachers. Working side by side with the Hawaiian missionaries, the Marshallese missionaries and teachers helped to extend the church's teachings to the Ratak Chain and became "'the backbone' of their own mission just fifteen years after it was founded" (Hezel 1983:209).[1]

Today

In contemporary Marshallese society, participation in the Christian community remains a salient part of daily life. This is especially true in the rural

areas of the Marshalls, where members of the religious community view church participation as "one of the principal bases of social identification" in Marshallese society (Heine 1974:34). But Marshallese religious affiliation has not been limited to the brand of Christianity introduced by American Congregationalists (now the United Church of Christ) in 1857. In fact, since the end of the nineteenth century, a number of mainline churches as well as sect-type religious groups have gained footholds in the Marshalls. For example, since establishing a mission on Jaluit in 1899, the Catholic Church, with over four thousand current members, "has grown in size and esteem to become an accepted feature of Marshallese life" (Hezel 1991:288).

Since the 1970s, however, a number of sect-type religious groups, including the Assemblies of God, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church), Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Baha'i, have prospered at the expense of the mainline denominations by focusing their efforts on establishing local churches under Marshallese leadership. Most of these sects have small congregations numbering a few hundred each, but with thirty-eight churches, a Bible school, and ten thousand members, the Assemblies of God church is, by far, the largest sect-type religious group and a growing threat to all other religious denominations in the Marshalls.

Church affiliation and participation have also come to represent forms of resistance to the impact of secularization and Westernization throughout Micronesia (Heine 1974:35). In a number of churches in the Marshalls, members, as a "community of believers," have responded to the forces of modernization by constructing a "lived space" infused with the experience of tradition and protective of contested village "place" (Rodman 1992:642). The compound of the Assembly of God Church in Majuro, the capital and urban center of the Marshall Islands, is illustrative of this kind of constructed social arena. While carrying out religious duties and daily social activities within the confines of the compound, church members resist the intrusion of modern Western influences by attempting to construct an urban "village" community. Markers of "traditional" life such as modest dress for men and women, and foods obtained locally and prepared according to custom are chosen by congregation members to signify resistance to the effects of modernization that threaten to destroy cultural identity and social solidarity in the Marshalls. The church compound, "as an effective ideological backdrop against which to deplore the present" functions as what Scott calls a "remembered village" (1985:178).

The church compound is also the site of elaborate religious ceremonial activities that provide congregation members with spiritual solace in the Marshalls' rapidly changing social milieu. Participation in the "remembered

village" affords congregation members a sense of social solidarity in the face of growing social class distinctions based on money and is evocative of intragroup ties lost with the rise of individualism in the Marshalls.

Church members in the urban areas of the Marshalls have also attempted to resist the impact of modernization/Westernization by organizing regional and national conferences to highlight the need to apply Christian teachings to social concerns. One such national conference, jointly sponsored by the World Council of Churches and Women United Together/Marshall Islands, was held in 1990. Conference participants called on all churches in Micronesia to join forces with island governments to stop the loss of traditional patterns associated with caring for others and to stem the rise of social problems in the urban environment by empowering communities with the principles of Christian faith (Johnson 1990).

The Role of the Assembly of God Church in the Formation of the Enid Marshallese Essential Community

The Assemblies of God is a Pentecostal Protestant religious body organized at Hot Springs, Arkansas, in 1914. The denomination is doctrinally structured by the beliefs of Jacobus Arminius, a sixteenth-century Dutch theologian who challenged the teachings of Calvin on the points of free will and predestination. In addition to the tenets of Arminianism, the Assemblies of God draw on the principles of Congregational and Presbyterian doctrine to ensure the spiritual status of all human beings as brothers and sisters in the Holy Spirit and the sovereignty of local congregations. The Bible is recognized as the all-sufficient rule for faith and practice, and emphasis is placed on new birth, baptism in the Holy Spirit accompanied by the sign of speaking in tongues, divine healing, and the premillennial return of Jesus Christ.

The Assemblies of God is a dynamic organization with thousands of churches located throughout the United States and missions in over seventy countries. And, although the Baptist denomination has the largest following in the "Bible Belt," the church is growing at a steady rate.[2] In Oklahoma alone, there are sixty-three Assemblies of God churches, with ten of these churches located in Enid.

The Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church

Most of my Marshallese consultants suggested that intracommunity tensions have been reduced and non-kin transformed into *bamli* not through the formation of secular kin ties in Enid, but rather by being based on the fundamental Assemblies of God belief that all congregation members ultimately

belong to the true family of "believers."[3] In fact, congregation members assert that, within the lived space of the Marshallese church, distinct groups have been fused through rebirth in Christ to form the essential core of the migrant community.

Moreover, unlike Samoan migrants living in the United States whose "good standing" in the community is predicated on both giving support to a Samoan church and attending to the needs of their families (Janes 1990: 164–165), members of the Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church need not choose between household and church obligations. According to church dogma, the Marshallese church *is* the locus of the true Marshallese *bamli.* Spiritual and physical needs are addressed through the Marshallese Assembly of God Church in many of the same ways that the *bamli* attends to the needs of its members. For example, requests made by new migrants for assistance in finding food and shelter are met by a congregation-wide outpouring of support. Individuals and families may sponsor one or more needy persons at any given time, often at the cost of substantial hardship for their own households in the process. Indeed, one family lost their small, two-bedroom rented home, because their household grew too large (approximately twenty-six adults and children) as a result of taking in needy congregation members. Their landlord, fearing structural damage to his property, forced the family to leave by serving an eviction notice. With few resources available to secure a new home large enough to accommodate the entire household, members were forced to stay in the homes of others in the essential community until suitable housing could be found. Eventually, household members were reunited when they accumulated sufficient resources to rent two houses on adjacent lots near the edge of town, but not before they had precipitated similar kinds of financial crises for a number of the households in which they had been given emergency shelter.

In his position as religious leader for the Enid Marshallese community, Assembly of God pastor Makolok has played a key role in maintaining the congregation *bamli.* In addition to dispensing spiritual guidance, the pastor, in concert with his assistants and the church women's group, is responsible for making certain that congregation members receive whatever material assistance the essential community can provide. The pastor has also assumed the role of family patriarch for the Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church community. In this role, he is regularly consulted for his opinion on topics that range from matters of church doctrine to advice on how to apply for public assistance.

Pastor Makolok and his household are not only responsible for directing community support activities, but they also frequently provide material solace from their own meager resources to aid migrants who are unable to

provide for themselves. In fact, within the span of two months during summer 1994, the pastor's household grew to include twenty-eight adults and children. Household residents included one paroled convict, a variety of migrant newcomers and their children, and several community members who had recently become unemployed. However, unlike the large household discussed above, the pastor and his household were able to lay claim to church resources and locate two homes directly across from the First Marshallese Assembly of God Church in which to house all of these people.

The Role of the Enid Marshallese Essential Community in Creating a Context in Which to Be Marshallese

The Marshallese Assembly of God Church is also the lived space in which migrants can express their difference by defining how they, as congregation members, are similar. For example, a behavioral variation practiced at first predominantly by the less-urbanized Kili Marshallese in Enid centered on wearing conservative attire when attending religious services or during church-sponsored functions. This practice subsequently has been redefined as a "traditional Marshallese custom" and is now observed by all Enid Marshallese community members.

A similar situation has occurred in regard to foods consumed by members of the Marshallese migrant community. After returning from an Assemblies of God conference in Majuro held during the first three weeks of July 1994, many congregation members expressed sadness over what they perceived to be the rapid loss of tradition in their homeland. Citing the increased consumption of so-called fast foods or junk foods as an example of this alarming trend in the Marshalls, congregation members banned all "junk foods" from their church celebrations in Enid. Only foods that they consider to be traditional to Marshallese culture were declared acceptable for preparation and consumption at church gatherings. Determining which foods would be acceptable and what style of preparation would be practiced by everyone, however, required many hours of discussion among members of the church women's organization before a consensus was reached. The decision to eat only "real Marshallese food" resulted in considerable additional financial expense for the community, because it meant that congregation members frequently had to drive ninety miles south to Oklahoma City to purchase fresh and dried fish at a large seafood outlet there. Such foods were unavailable in Enid.

The lived space of the Marshallese Assembly of God Church has also provided an important context in which the collective fears of the migrant community might be expressed. For example, during several congregational meetings community members raised concerns over their children's inability to

speak competent Marshallese. The problem, they posited, was particularly acute for Marshallese children born in the United States. Suggesting that they felt language loss was the first step in a process that would ultimately lead to loss of their "Marshallese way" of life (or, in other words, toward assimilation), many migrants called on the church to take action. Ultimately, the church responded and Marshallese Assembly of God church dogma was changed to state that in the future all church services would be conducted only in the Marshallese language (rare exceptions were made for visiting non-Marshallese Assemblies of God officials). Congregation members were also encouraged to use only the Marshallese translation of the Bible for service readings and to discard all English versions they may have acquired while living in the States.

In hypercathecting ethnic identity in the Enid essential community, other relevant aspects of identity have been drastically changed or reduced in importance (Devereux 1975). For example, social class status, a long-standing and increasingly salient component of individual identity in the Marshalls, has undergone an unexpected alteration in Enid.

In traditional Marshallese society, a strict division was maintained between *iroij* (nobility) and *kajur* (commoners) classes (Spoehr 1949). Following European contact, an additional class composed of individuals of mixed Marshallese-European ancestry arose. Termed "mixed-bloods," this group has enjoyed a marked level of prestige in Marshallese society (Mason 1947). This has been especially true for the descendants of three nineteenth-century traders, Carl Heine, Anton DeBrum, and Edward Milne, who married island women and formed the basis for a European "caste," initially on Likiep Atoll but now on other atolls in the Marshalls as well (Chave 1948). In more recent years, members of both the mixed-blood and *iroij* groups have gained status in the new Marshallese nation-state by acquisition of college degrees and government employment.

In the Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church, these indicators of social class back home are of little significance. In fact, aspects of elite class status or educational attainment are often deemphasized in the migrant community. This erasure of class markers has occurred primarily because members of the Enid Marshallese Assembly of God church *bamli* believe that status can only be acquired by becoming a member of the clergy in the ethnic church. Selection for these positions, however, is strictly controlled by the pastor and, according to him, is based on an individual's commitment to "Marshallese custom" (as defined by the Enid Assembly of God community) and suitability to serve God. Pastor Makolok, a self-described member of the Likiep Atoll *kanak*s (native Marshallese or lower class), asserts that all members of the community are equally eligible for clerical positions if they meet

these criteria. However, with only one or two exceptions, most persons selected for the clergy have not been college graduates or from the mixed-blood group. In fact, most assistant pastors and deacons have been selected from the pastor's extended family or from among the more culturally conservative Kili Marshallese.

The pastor's selections caused dissent to surface among some members of the Enid Marshallese community with mixed-blood heritage. When a downturn in the Enid economy made wage work difficult to secure or keep for many members of the Marshallese community, acquiring a position in the church hierarchy guaranteed both a salary and high status in the community. As a result, more aspirants professed to have received a "calling" to perform sacred service to the church (especially among those of mixed-blood heritage). Mixed-bloods even went so far as to suggest that there was some bias in the selection process to gain access to desired positions in the Marshallese church. But when I pressed for examples of favoritism on the part of the pastor, they quickly retreated from any suggestion of possible impropriety by stating that, whatever the pastor's decision, it would still be "God's will" that was performed.

Whatever their level of commitment, Marshallese migrants view their participation in the Assembly of God Church as vital to the maintenance of the essential community. Each community member is required to commit a substantial amount of time and resources to the church. Commitment varies by gender and age. For instance, adolescents and young adults (up to thirty years of age in Enid) participate in the Marshallese Assembly of God youth group, which meets, at a minimum, five evenings per week. These meetings usually consist of one to two hours of Bible study, followed by an hour or so of hymn singing, and when preparing for religious events, they may last until dawn. Girls and young women also prepare for ceremonial and celebrational activities through the church women's group Jar in Ebolmen. In combination, these church-related activities require that Marshallese teens and young adults allocate at least sixteen hours per week to devotional and service activities in the Assembly of God essential community. Little time is left to socialize outside the church group, and this isolation allows Marshallese youth to "maintain their identity despite proximity to others" (De Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1975:367). Marshallese teens suggest this situation is "good," since they claim they do not feel happy "when we are with *ripalle* [white persons]." This emblematic contrast is further reinforced by the responses of non-Marshallese youth of the larger Enid community, who describe Marshallese as "strange" or "different." In fact, most American young people in the Enid community stated they had few opportunities to get to know them outside of the educational setting, because "those Marshallese always stick together."

Adult members of the Assembly of God Marshallese community must also display strong commitment to the church. Tithing 10 percent of all income is required for adult congregation members, and frequent additional fund drives for new materials or building projects result in additional contributions that sometimes exceed hundreds of dollars for each household per year. These demands often create financial crises for Marshallese households. With at most only one or two adults employed at what are usually minimum-wage jobs, it is a struggle to make ends meet. Households are often forced to make flour and water pancakes to feed their adult members and to thin down soy-based milk formula with excessive amounts of water to extend food supplements for infants and toddlers. Support from U.S. government entitlement programs is limited to coupons for formula and some supplemental food for small children, as Marshallese are not eligible for food stamps or other forms of public assistance.[4] Most households send requests for supplemental funds to their relatives back in the islands, but these funds may take weeks to arrive.

Still, for most congregation members the economic hardships incurred as a result of church demands are far outweighed by those exacted through stringent devotional and service requirements. Typical adult church service consists of devotional attendance three times per week, weekly men's and women's group responsibilities, periodic all-night prayer vigils, impromptu Bible study groups, planning meetings to host visiting clergy, and frequent aid missions to nearby Assemblies of God congregations in Springdale, Arkansas, and Neosho, Missouri. Any and all of these activities may require individuals to cancel household plans and leave work at a moment's notice. Such unexplained work absences result in lost wages and often in loss of employment, making it extremely difficult for Marshallese migrants to fulfill their financial obligations at either the household or the church level.

Moreover, like Enid Marshallese youth, most adult migrants have had little contact with the larger Enid social environment since the formation of the essential community.[5] Ritualized Marshallese Assembly of God religious acts require specialized knowledge that is embodied in the ethnic identity of Enid Marshallese.[6] Members of the larger Enid community, as "outsiders" to Marshallese society, cannot possess this knowledge. Consequently, non-Marshallese visitors are welcomed as "guests" in the Marshallese church, but many Marshallese migrants assert, "They don't need to know Marshallese people and our customs."

Thus, the religious doctrine of the Assembly of God Church has served as an "ethnognomonic trait" for Enid Marshallese (Schwartz 1975:108). It is a cultural totem, "at once emblematic of the group's solidarity and of the group's contrasting identity" (ibid.:108).

New Problems, Old Solutions: Managing Intragroup Tensions by Reinforcing Group Ties

Fundamental to the formation of the Enid Marshallese essential community has been the reconstruction of social networks or links between groups. In many ways similar to the patterns of interisland assistance actualized among islands following natural disasters in Micronesia (Lessa 1986; Marshall 1979; Nason 1975; Schneider 1957), these links in Enid have facilitated the transfer of information, social support, and material resources (the "essentials") vital to sustain the physical and psychological well-being of migrants in the Enid context. Transmigrants to Enid have sought to reduce or downplay intracultural differences and to ensure intragroup dependency by employing three relational mechanisms that have been practiced for centuries in the Pacific Islands: marriage, adoption, and familial obligation.

Marriage/Dating in the Enid Marshallese Community

With only three exceptions, all Marshallese married in Enid have selected partners from within the migrant community (Table 2). These marriages have all been sanctioned by the Marshallese Assembly of God Church and are a cause for elaborate celebration in the community.

TABLE 2. **Current Marital Status of Enid Marshallese, Ages Sixteen and Older, October 1995, by Sex**

Marital Status	Males	Females	Subtotal	Total
Currently married				54
To Enid Marshallese spouse	16	16	32[a]	
To Marshallese spouse	11	7	18[b]	
To American spouse	2	1	3	
To Chuukese spouse	1	0	1	
Never Married	27	15		42
Formerly Married				6
Widowed from non-Enid Marshallese spouse	0	3	3[c]	
Divorced from non-Enid Marshallese spouse	0	3	3[d]	
Total				102

Source: Author's community census.

[a] Note that Enid Marshallese–Enid Marshallese marriages appear twice, under both males and females, if both spouses are in Enid.

[b] Majuro = 6; Ebeye = 3; Arno = 1; Likiep = 1; Ebon = 1; Unknown = 6.

[c] Kili = 2; Wotje = 1.

[d] Kili = 1; Wotje = 1; Unknown = 1.

Marriage or dating outside the Enid Marshallese community is not enthusiastically acknowledged and supported. In fact, in those instances where migrants have engaged in relationships outside of the Enid Marshallese community, the reaction of the migrant group has been consistently negative in tone. For example, any migrant who dates outside of the Enid Marshallese community will immediately become the subject of substantial community gossip. The migrant's family members may attempt to dissuade her/him from continuing the relationship by reminding her/him of one's *nukwi* (duty to one's relatives) to the Marshallese community. In most cases, such community-wide disapproval provides sufficient social pressure to convince her/him to end the relationship. But, on more than one occasion, an individual has ignored public opinion and continued dating an outsider. In fact, in four such cases migrants have elected to marry the non-Marshallese partner and settle in Enid (see Table 2). Their decision to wed does not, however, lead to a softening or a "live and let live" change of opinion in the Enid Marshallese community. In fact, the couple may find themselves even more marginalized as a result of their behavior. They will receive little recognition and support from the Marshallese community, and only on rare occasions will they be invited to attend community affairs.

I was able to observe an example of one such situation firsthand when I attended the wedding of a Marshallese man and his American fiancée in July 1994. The services, held in the backyard of the couple's rented home, were conducted by a Baptist minister selected by the bride's family. With the exception of Pastor Makolok, of the Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church, his wife, and the groom's immediate family, few members of the Enid Marshallese community were present. Moreover, only Pastor Makolok, the mother of the groom, and five young Marshallese males and females who participated in the nine-member wedding party wore formal attire.[7] All other Marshallese guests, including the pastor's wife, wore very casual clothing. Uncharacteristically, no one from the Marshallese community brought a present to place on the gift table. In fact, at the close of the ceremony, one Marshallese male hurriedly passed around his ball cap to collect donations of money from other members of the community. In a hushed tone of voice, he explained that they had not brought gifts because the groom was "not with the Marshallese" and "liked to be with *ripalle.*" The collection, placed in a folded piece of paper, was laid on the gift table.

Eventually a few Marshallese guests joined Pastor Makolok and his wife in shaking hands with the newlyweds and the wedding party, but most of the Marshallese guests returned to their vehicles, parked haphazardly on the newlyweds' lawn, and exited the situation as quickly as possible. When I stopped one young Marshallese woman and asked her why so few Marshallese attended the wedding, she replied:

> It is a *ripalle* wedding. Only Sisa's family are here with him. It is not like our weddings. Pastor Makolok was not asked to do the service. The men did not even have a party for him. He does not come to the Marshallese church, and he only visits his mother, Ruth. There are other things about him. He used to have parties for all the boys in the community and give them beer and cigarettes, but no one will go to his house now.

One other Marshallese male was said to be married to an American woman, but he and his family did not attend any Marshallese functions during my research in Enid.[8] Most Enid Marshallese considered him a snob, because, it was frequently suggested, he did not "live like Marshallese people."

Marriages between Marshallese women and American men have occurred even more infrequently. In fact, to date, there is only one example of such a marriage in the Enid Marshallese community. The couple, David and Rona, met while attending a nearby community college and married as soon as they graduated. They have one child, a girl, born shortly before my arrival in Enid in April 1994. Rona was frequently teased about her *ripalle* husband, who was referred to as a "nerd" by the Marshallese males in the community. She was also teased about her baby, Mary, who was called a *ripalle ninnin* (literally "white baby") because of her light brown hair and blue eyes. But since Rona was Marshallese and frequently attended the Marshallese Assembly of God Church with her daughter, the child was acknowledged to be a part of the Marshallese community. Rona also participated in the women's church group and other community celebrations, but David was conspicuously absent. As Rona suggested, this was a point of disagreement for the couple. David, she said, felt she devoted too much time to the demands of the Marshallese church/community group and would benefit from more frequent contact with his family. Rona said she tried to please David, but she stated, "I need to be with Marshallese people, to be like at home, and it is good for Mary."

Marshallese disapproval of relationships formed with non-Marshallese also extended to those made with members of other Pacific Islander groups. I learned of this view as the result of an incident that occurred one Sunday morning after church services. I had been visiting with the pastor and two of his deacons at the Marshallese church when one of the pastor's children burst through the open office door to announce that his lunch was prepared. The child's announcement also served as a reminder to everyone present that it was nearly 2:00 P.M., and evening services were scheduled to begin in just four short hours! We quickly completed our discussion of the plans for a new Sunday school room in the church and then walked outside to our vehicles to begin our respective journeys home.

Parked nearer the church entrance, the pastor and his assistant deacons made their way to their vehicles and drove off in a matter of seconds. But, since I was one of the last to arrive for morning services, I had been forced to park some distance from the church on an empty nearby dirt street rarely used and nearly overgrown with wild brush. Walking down the deserted road to my pickup truck, only the muffled sound of my footfalls on the soft red dirt surface broke the silence of the early spring afternoon. As I slipped my key into the locked door of my truck, Betina, a Marshallese teen, appeared as if from nowhere along the driver's side. Startled, I stepped back and yelped, "Betina, where did you come from?" She placed her finger to her lips to signal silence. I looked around and there was no one else in sight. I asked her what was wrong, and she responded by asking if I would take her home. I told her I would be happy to, and she climbed into the passenger side of the truck's cab. We rode in silence for about ten minutes, when she suddenly asked if I wanted to know why she was still at the church after the rest of the congregation had left. I told her I was a little curious, but I had assumed she had overslept and arrived too late to hear the pastor's morning sermon. "No," she giggled, "not Marshallese time, Linda!" Betina then described how she had arrived with her auntie and uncle for the 9:00 A.M. Bible study class. But, she said, as soon as most of the rest of the congregation arrived for the regular 10:00 A.M. Sunday services, she left. She explained that she had walked up the street to a nearby convenience store to place a telephone call and had lost track of time.

> I didn't know church was over. I went up to the store to call my boyfriend in Springdale. I left the church so my uncle would not know I was talking to him again. He is from Yap and Uncle does not want me to see him.
>
> When I came back, you were the only one there, and I was so afraid that Uncle would know I did not go to hear the pastor talk. I don't know what to do now. He will beat me if he finds out that I called my boyfriend. What can I do, Linda?

Noting the look of fear in her eyes and her extremely anxious state, I sensed she believed she was in real danger. "Why," I asked, "would your uncle beat you for just talking to your boyfriend on the telephone?" Wiping tears from her cheeks with the sleeve of her aloha-print dress, Betina slowly related an account of a series of events that had occurred a few months earlier when she ran away from her uncle's home in an attempt to elope with her Yapese boyfriend, Sam: "We left to get married. We stayed at a hotel in Blackwell for a week, but my uncle found us. My uncle said he told my grandpa that I wanted to marry a man from Yap. He said grandpa was angry

and I should come home with him. I did, and my auntie beat me with a broom. I was not allowed to go out after school for a month, and Uncle said I could never talk to my boyfriend again."

In subsequent interviews with other members of the Enid Marshallese community, I learned that, although it was recognized that Marshallese teens had occasionally dated teens from outside the Marshallese group in the past, this would no longer be considered acceptable behavior. Community members pointed out that there were now many Marshallese young people in Enid and made it clear that they wanted Marshallese singles to date within the community. Intracommunity dating, they stated, would help "keep the customs" and ensure that Marshallese young people did not emulate the lifestyle of American youth, who were perceived to be disrespectful, all too often tempted to use drugs and alcohol, and possibly involved in gang activities.

Kaajiriri—*Marshallese Adoption in Enid*

Adoption is very common in the Marshall Islands, as it is elsewhere in Oceania (Brady 1976; Carroll 1970; Kiste 1974; Rynkiewich 1972; Spoehr 1949). But, unlike Western or "legal" adoption that serves to separate an adoptee from her/his biological parents and genealogical identity, Pacific adoption traditions emphasize the importance of maintaining kinship ties between family groups and other relatives (Kiste 1974; Marshall 1976; Ritter 1981; Spoehr 1949).

According to tradition in the Marshall Islands, *kaajiriri* (adoption) may only occur after a child's *kemem* (first birthday party) has been held. A few months before the birthday, close relatives of the child's mother and father organize the party that is as much "an expression of family solidarity" as it is a celebration of the first stage of a "child's growth toward adulthood" (Spoehr 1949:209). After the *kemem,* the child may be adopted and leave the household. The adopter is usually a sibling of one of the child's parents or a grandparent. As a consequence, the adoption "becomes a solidifier of the kinship system" (ibid.:211).

Recently, however, the traditional *kaajiriri* restrictions have been obviated as the result of "foreigner" adoptions. Marshallese infants and toddlers have become increasingly popular with Americans who are looking for a child to adopt but have little patience with the red tape associated with adopting a child in the United States and other countries. Marshallese children have even been depicted on an Internet website sponsored by one of the half a dozen U.S. adoption agencies involved in this practice (Johnson 1999). The government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service have announced plans to impose stricter

regulations governing the adoption of Marshallese children. Some observers, however, suggest that these actions have been instrumental in the creation of a black market for adoptions.

In the Enid Marshallese community, *kaajiriri* remains an important means of bringing families together. In fact, three children born as the result of intracommunity marriages have been adopted.[9] Enid Marshallese suggest these adoptions further reinforce intragroup solidarity through the creation of kin ties between previously unrelated family lines. But, as the comments of Marshallese parents listed below suggest, the practice of *kaajiriri* is not without emotional trauma. For instance, during lunch one Sunday afternoon, my Marshallese companion, the biological mother of a six-year-old boy, confided: "I miss that boy. I still love that boy. He calls her 'Mom' and he calls me 'Tia.' But it is good, because we are all *bamli.* We are close now, because we gave that boy to them. I see him at church, and he comes sometimes to play with his brothers, but he doesn't live with me now. It is our way."

In another discussion of the practice of *kaajiriri* in Enid, Harold, a Marshallese father of two, explained his frustration over his sister-in-law's adoption of his eleven-month-old daughter, Melena. Holding Melena in his lap, he tearfully explained: "They are kidnaping my daughter. I don't want to give her up. They have other children, but they want Melena. We have our new baby boy, but Melena is our only daughter. My wife cries, but she says her sister will take good care of our daughter. I don't like this Marshallese custom. Is it like this for you in America? Can someone take your child if you don't want to let her go?"

Fortunately, Harold's sister-in-law changed her mind and returned to the Marshall Islands without his child, but whenever her name was mentioned after that, he became visibly agitated.

In recent years, intragroup marriages and kinship ties based on adoption have increased as the population of the Enid Marshallese migrant community has grown. Stronger than the "informal friendship networks" that developed during the early years of the Enid community's existence, these kin-linked social networks have tied groups of households together and intensified rights and obligations within the Marshallese essential community (cf. Janes 1990:63 for a similar situation in Samoan migrant communities). As yet, however, these kin links are relatively few in number and lack the structural complexity that would be necessary to bind the Enid Marshallese migrant community together more intensively.

Conclusions: Why?

I posit that the Enid Marshallese migrant essential community has been based on Assemblies of God fundamentalist doctrine for two reasons. First,

the dogma of the church has facilitated the translation of intracultural differences and aided in the formation of intracommunity ties. Within the Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church, variations in custom among migrant groups from Majuro, Kwajalein-Ebeye, and Kili have coalesced into a single, true Marshallese tradition. Congregation members have become *bamli* in both real and symbolic terms in the essential community. As a "community of believers," Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church members have drawn on church teachings to evoke an idealized community that was lost in the migration process.

A second, related reason why Christian fundamentalism has played an important role in the formation and maintenance of a Marshallese essential community in Enid concerns the impact of assimilation/acculturation processes on Marshallese culture and tradition. Return visits to the Marshall Islands have exacerbated Enid migrants' fears that their homeland is undergoing irreversible change. Social and cultural stresses associated with acculturation are evidenced "back home" by high crime rates, the loss of kinship ties, and the ubiquitous presence of Western food and clothing. These factors are observed by Enid migrants during their visits to the Marshalls. When they return to Oklahoma, most Enid Marshallese express a fear that traditional lifeways have been lost in their homeland. Their concerns become even greater as pressures to assimilate in the migrant context evoke resentment at the implied inferiority of their culture. Compelled to find a solution to "salvage" their cultural selves, Marshallese migrants have turned to the socially peripheral sectarian Assembly of God Church with its doctrinally conservative perspective to resist culture loss and to foster a sense of autonomy by creating an exclusive moral community in Enid.[10] The Enid Marshallese essential community, as that moral bastion, has provided a standpoint from which they can maintain resistance to culture loss in the face of threatened indiscriminate assimilation.

NOTES

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1. Within fifteen years of their introduction to Christianity in 1857, Marshall Islanders became leaders in their own churches. Today, being a "Christian person" is considered a traditional role in Marshallese culture. Participation in the Enid Marshallese Assembly of God Church is, however, a relatively recent traditional custom, since the church was founded in 1993.

2. There are 396 Baptist churches in Oklahoma. Thirty-three of this number are Baptist churches located in Enid.

3. The term *"bamli"* was adapted from the English term "family" and refers to a family group or a household.

4. In conversations with social workers at the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, I learned that the Marshallese are specifically prohibited by U.S. federal law from receiving most forms of U.S. entitlement or medical supplemental assistance. According to the Compact of Free Association (Article 4, Section 141c), Marshall Islanders may not become naturalized citizens of the United States. They may acquire permanent resident alien status in the United States (or "green cards"), but they may not receive health and other entitlement benefits allocated exclusively to U.S. citizens or eligible aliens.

5. Marshallese adults do have contact with coworkers, but they rarely socialize with coworkers outside of the workplace.

6. These ritualized religious acts are similar to those discussed by Emile Durkheim in his work *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915).

7. The pastor wore a black business suit made of polyester double-knit material, a white shirt, and a red and black striped tie. The mother of the groom wore a Western-style dress and high heels. In contrast, the pastor's wife and all other Marshallese females in attendance wore muumuus and zoris. Marshallese males wore jeans, T-shirts, zoris or athletic shoes, and ball caps. With the exceptions noted, the casualness of the Marshallese attire was striking. I had attended a number of less formal occasions (e.g., first birthdays or reunions for lineages living in other migrant communities in the United States), and all Marshallese in attendance were dressed in their best Sunday or party outfits. Even babies and small children attending these functions were beautifully dressed, often with new clothing purchased especially for the event.

8. The Marshallese man, his American partner, and their two children reside in a middle-class housing development on the edge of Enid. They are both longtime employees of a local food-processing firm, and their social activities predominantly focus on activities with family and friends of the wife.

9. At the time of my field research, three children (two males and one female) had been adopted within the Enid Marshallese community. However, one of the children (the female) was born anencephalic and died within the first year of life.

10. I am not suggesting that the formation of an essential community is dependent on religious affiliation/organization. I feel the Enid Marshallese essential community is structured by the Assembly of God Church primarily because this was the organizational form that allowed community members to find consensus and strength in the transmigrant milieu. In other contexts different forms of organization may prevail. For example, from his research conducted among Marshallese living in Costa Mesa, California, Jim Hess has suggested that migrants to that community have formed complex networks based on a number of organizations (for example, common interest associations, community clubs, and churches) (personal communication, July 1994).

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"TITIRANGI IS THE MOUNTAIN": REPRESENTING MAORI COMMUNITY IN AUCKLAND

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Although "culture movements" of the sort that have become increasingly common in the Pacific and elsewhere are reactions and responses to colonialism and globalization, and are often at least partly inspired by imported models, they nevertheless have locally (culturally) specific content and effects. This is because the things that are "revived" are always grounded in particular local institutions, genres of practice, traditions of interpretation, and modes of expression. Form in these cases carries content, and the content is for that reason rooted in local socially inherited traditions. Contemporary New Zealand Maori liken urban communities to those based on kinship, and they do so by employing a variety of representational conventions, ranging from songs to carved meeting houses. These forms connect asserting kinship to making claims about land, and link land to culture and to a distinctive status within the nation-state.

From the time they began to live in cities in large numbers (in the wake of the Second World War), indigenous Maori New Zealanders have talked about urban life as inimical to many values they hold dear. They have attempted to combat this problem by establishing institutions in cities within which those values may find expression. Foremost among these are urban *"marae,"* community gathering places centered on carved meeting houses of a type once found only in rural, kin-based communities. The houses facilitate a discourse about community in contemporary New Zealand that links it to kinship, culture, and land. By examining that discourse I hope to be able to say something about how Maori have understood and reacted to "the here and now"—to borrow Arjun Appadurai's resonant phrase (1996). In so doing I aim to con-

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tribute to recent discussions of what "modernity" and "being modern" mean among people other than Western Europeans and their colonial progeny (Mitchell 2000; Rofel 1999).

This essay began its life as part of a conference session devoted to looking at the ways Pacific peoples constructed communities in urban settings. "Urban," the participants agreed, was really our way of talking about the processes to which the people with whom we worked had been subjected: Cities stood for (and were part of) the destruction of older community norms by the cultural flows associated with globalization, the imposition of alien disciplines typical of colonialism, and the incorporation of people into a capitalist economy centered on wage labor and commodity consumption. The people we wrote about had come to live in cities because their prior forms of existence had become somehow unsatisfying or untenable. Sometimes migration was prompted by the pull of jobs and the excitement of bright city lights; at other times it was a result of the push of rural overpopulation and loss of land. All of these reasons applied in the case of Maori. But, however Pacific Islanders came to be in cities, they found them strange—and estranging. As Modell notes in the introduction to this collection, cities are places of diversity in which people constantly encounter others who not only are strangers, but have different customs, values, beliefs, and ways of life. More starkly, cities are places of alienation and anonymity where persons are presumptively individuals rather than members of a collectivity. None of this is unique to the Pacific, nor are Pacific Islanders the only people to be disenchanted with these aspects of urban life. I highlight them here partly because the ways Maori have sought to create community in cities have been explicitly framed as responses to their experiences of disaffection and dislocation.

For Maori, who are now a minority within their own country,[1] living in cities surrounded by people with different values and customs has provoked a crisis of "identity" as well as a crisis of "community"—both the individuality enforced by urban life and the diversity encountered within it are seen as threatening their continued existence as a distinct group with a distinct "culture." Urban living threatens both the boundaries between different Maori groups (generally referred to as "tribes") and those between Maori and other New Zealanders. Early on in the course of Maori urbanization, the problem (and one possible solution) was apparent to Maori observers. The following passage is from a proposal for an urban *marae* complex written sometime in the 1960s by two Maori women who had moved to the suburbs of West Auckland. Here is how they contrast the urban situation with the rural past:

Urban Situation

While the majority of tribes lived in the rural areas, there was freedom to build maraes, tribal houses, upon lands they owned, which maraes they used unmolested by the pressures and standards of modern society. . . . Today we find the Maaori population,[2] mainly for economic reasons, is becoming more urbanised, city dwellers, owning homes or living in rented accommodation, adjusting as far as is humanly possible to modern standards of living. Today, then, Maaoris of different tribes are, in a sense, de-tribalised. As city dwellers, they find themselves living side by side with members of other tribes, daily meeting as work mates, oft engaging in social and welfare work for the common good, befriending one another, socialising, and intermarrying as well. So it can be fairly said that the distinct tribal identities of urbanised Maaoris have given way to but one grand identity, Maaoritanga [Maoriness]! Let us accept this change as an indisputable fact, for it has everything to do with planning maraes in an urban situation.

Cosmopolitan People of the New Zealand Nation

Let us look outward from the Maaori tribes. We find that we have immediate and close neighbors: the Paakehaa [settlers], the Mangumangu [blacks], the Tareraa [Yugoslavians], the Hainamana [Chinese], the Hamoa [Samoans], the Tahiti, the Niue, the Rarotonga and other Polynesians, all living, working and striving for a place under the sun. We find intermarriage taking place quite normally between members of the Maaori ethnic group and members of these other ethnic groups, as if no ethnic identity existed, the highest common factor being plain love. This being so, the children of these marriages tend to lose their ethnic identity and so tend to become known by the politically-created identity, New Zealanders: citizens living together under one law. While however, there is this tendency for ethnic identity to be submerged, the cultural survival of some groups is not so easily submerged, as witness the positive upsurge of Maaori culture and its language. (Brown and Hakaraia n.d.; glosses and note added)

I quote Brown and Hakaraia's position paper at length because of the remarkable grasp they have of what is at stake in urbanization: As they make clear, it is not only that the practices and experiences of everyday life change

with the move to the city, but as a result, the basis of understanding the self in relation to society as a whole is transformed. Citizenship takes over from things like genealogy and connections to land as the foundation of identity. For Brown and Hakaraia the submergence of Maori identity is not a foregone conclusion—the interest of urban Maori in their "culture" and their language is a response to the possibility of such submergence, and the purpose of their paper is to argue for the establishment of institutions in which such a cultural revival can flourish. The *marae* complex they propose, the John Waititi Memorial Marae in West Auckland, was in fact built, and it was the primary site of the research I conducted some twenty or thirty years after they wrote.

Below I examine the way Maori "cultural" identity is imagined, looking both at some of the forms in which culture is expressed and at the nature of the *marae* complexes that are thought to enable it. As Brown and Hakaraia make clear, some of the emphasis on "culture" is a response to urbanization and consequent dislocation.[3] At the same time, however, the efforts of urban Maori have been grounded in an understanding of "community" rooted in the institutions and ways of thinking that characterized their previous rural existence. Before beginning a more focused discussion of Maori practices, I want to address briefly some of the larger theoretical issues at stake by situating the analysis of such a "culture movement" in the context of current debates about the nature of global modernity, the future of cultural difference, and the aftermath of colonialism.

Community, Culture, and the Global

First, what are the implications of the term "moral community," which we agreed (at the conference where this collection was born) captured the things that the people we wrote about understood as making life "humanly possible" under "modern standards of living"? The term is Durkheim's, and he used it to discuss precisely the dilemma that Brown and Hakaraia see as central to the urban situation, namely, the felt need for something to belong to that is more immediate than the state and for ties that are more satisfying than those of economic interdependence (Durkheim [1893] 1933). As Modell notes in her introduction to this volume, the insistence by Maori and other indigenous people on such ties comes to stand for an opposition to the subsumption of all forms of morality by an overriding economic logic. For these reasons the term "moral community" makes sense—it apprehends something important about what Pacific Islanders have sought to create in cities and why they have done so. But in Durkheim's hands, the idea of a moral community is part of a more general historical or evolutionary theory of how

complex societies are constituted, what kinds of problems they face, and what might be done to alleviate those problems. How much of that theory we might want to endorse or adopt in the process of importing the term "moral community" is an issue I will return to at the end of this essay, when I can do so in light of the particular ways that Maori practices have instantiated the idea.

More generally, to speak of cultural revival or constructing community as a form of resistance to colonialism is to evoke a whole series of debates about both the state of the world and the proper direction for anthropological research. A whole field, "postcolonial studies," has grown up largely in celebration of forms of resistance that eschew localism in favor of some sort of cosmopolitan hybridity, understood as a refusal of reified ethnic identities imposed by the colonial process.[4] While I can hardly review the arguments on postcolonial discourse here, I do want to state my view that such a hybrid identity is (despite claims to the contrary) as local—that is to say, as culturally and historically particular—as any more traditional "ethnic" identity. Of course, hybridity shares this localness with the allegedly universal Enlightenment discourse it seeks to challenge. Hybridity, Western rationalism, and various cultural (and other) nationalisms (not to mention class-consciousness) are alike partly products of and partly creative responses to the conditions in which they were formed (so much for the Hegelian idea of the "subject of history"). All of this suggests two things: (1) that hybridity is not a better subject position from which to critique the West than some more specific form of cultural alterity (it is merely an alternative one) and (2) that a social movement is not reduced to merely participating in the reproduction of that which it opposes simply because it shares some categories (like the idea of culture or Maoriness) with it—whether something amounts to social reproduction or social transformation being, in any case, a matter of perspective.

Within anthropology, "culture" has become an increasingly problematic term for many analysts, for reasons related to (but not entirely congruent with) its rejection by theorists of the postcolonial. Talk of "cultures" has been seen as a form of anthropological collusion with colonialism (Abu-Lughod 1991; Fabian 1983; Fox 1985; Obeyesekere 1992) but also as a kind of self-delusion engendered by mistaking the representations of culture anthropologists create in collaboration with our informants for something that is really there (Clifford 1988; Clifford and Marcus 1986). One result has been to shift culture from an analytic concept (which can help account for other things, like the way people act) to a "folk" concept (which needs to be accounted for *by* other things, like colonialism or globalization). The vast and contentious literature on the "invention of tradition" and the "politics of culture" mostly emphasizes the political forces that shape and give significance to

aspects of custom that have become emblems of identity for subjugated non-Westerners.[5] Again, without addressing this literature in any detail, I want to take a position with respect to it—namely, that culture, in the analytic sense in which it "names and distinguishes . . . the organization of human action by symbolic means" (Sahlins 2000:158), both helps to shape the particular forms that emblematic cultural differences take and makes it possible for such differences to take on political significance.

This essay is part of a larger project whose goal is to make that argument with respect to the cultural revival known as the Maori Renaissance—to show that both the things Maori revive and the ends they hope to achieve have emerged out of the history of their relationship to the settlers, which was in turn molded by the understandings, values, and institutions that they brought to the encounter. To that end, in other contexts, I have looked at the emergence and institutionalization of the meeting house in the colonial context, at the symbolism of the house, and at the history of its use as site and symbol of Maori community life (Rosenblatt n.d.). Here I address one piece of my more general argument, having to do with the significance of the fact that cultural ideals are usually represented and expressed in particular forms that are handed down or adopted from the past. Using such forms has an impact on the meaning of that which is thereby promoted. The forms reflect indigenous systems of meaning and understandings of the world, and they introduce such understandings into contemporary political activity. Less abstractly, what I look at below is the way Maori liken urban communities to communities based on kinship and the political implications of the representational conventions by which they do so.

Whakawhanaungatanga: Making Kinship at Hoani Waititi Marae

"*Whakawhanaungatanga*" is a word Maori use to describe activities that facilitate people getting to know one another in an informal and relaxed way. Such activities are often included in gatherings devoted to other ends, so that participants will develop feelings of affection and solidarity for one another. For example, at a gathering I attended of Maori language students from all over New Zealand, one night was devoted to entertainment: Classes from different areas presented songs and skits to each other.[6] I mention the word here, because it betrays what is at stake for Maori in the act of creating a sense of community around affective ties: *Whanaunga* are relatives, and the literal meaning of *whakawhanaungatanga* is "the making of relatives"—the sense of community created in groups such as the one consisting of language learners from around the country is modeled on kinship.

While talking about communities and groups of various sorts as being

"like families" is common in many places and contexts, the representation of community as kinship by Maori goes far beyond such easy metaphors, both in its scope and in its implications. The culturally particular forms these representations take determine their force as social action. Below, I will look at how these representations function and the field of discourse from which they emerge by discussing some of the specific forms in which kinship is evoked by urban Maori and by looking at their implications for understanding the political content of the Maori Renaissance. Specifically, I will look at two songs and at carved meeting houses. I hope to show that at the same time that these cultural forms enable people to talk about themselves as united in kinlike terms, they also enable them to assert claims to land, to connect land to culture, and to claim a distinctive status within the nation-state.

"Ko Titirangi te Maunga" is a song I sang many times while I was in New Zealand. The title translates as "Titirangi Is the Mountain," and it is the source of the title of this essay. I learned the song by being part of a group of mostly young people taking a six-month course in the Maori language that met at Hoani (John) Waititi Marae every day from 8:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. We sometimes sang the song when we had guests to entertain, and we sometimes used it in ritual contexts in which a group might be required to sing a song in support of someone who had just made a speech representing them. Why a language class might need to provide hospitality or participate in rituals will become clearer below when I talk about *marae* complexes, but for the moment it will suffice to say that those commitments were among the consequences of reckoning ourselves as kin. The song "belonged" to the national organization that had developed the curriculum and trained the teachers for our language class, and the chorus of the song promised that the language would not be lost. But my concern here is with the first verse, which was modified by each group who sang it to adapt the song to their local circumstances—the verse proclaimed the identity of the singers, which is part of what made the song appropriate for ritual use. The version my class sang was this:

Ko Titirangi te maunga	Titirangi is the mountain
E karanga atu nei	Which calls out to you
Ngā Tumanako whare	Nga Tumanako is the house
E powhiri nei. . . .	Which welcomes you here. . . .

By referring to a mountain and a house, the song evokes (indexes) a genre of speech act called *pepeha,* which are a kind of proverb about a tribe or an area. For example, a *pepeha* about the Ngati Porou people is

Ko Hikurangi te maunga,	Hikurangi is the ancestral mountain,
Ko Waiapu te awa,	Waiapu is the river,
Ko Ngāti Porou te iwi.	Ngati Porou is the tribe.[7]

Pepeha assert the identity of a descent group and connect its people to features of the landscape in the territory they claim as home—or, as Maori would say, the territory over which they "hold the *mana*" (*mana,* a word found throughout the Pacific, is famously difficult to translate but in New Zealand today carries the senses of the English words "power," "authority," and "pride"). By echoing the structure of the *pepeha* in our song—by naming "our" mountain and "our" meeting house—we, the members of the language class, represented our group as being analogous to a descent group.

Such representations abound these days in Auckland. Part of their logic derives from other references to kinship in talking about urban groups, such as the ubiquitous use of the term *whanau* (extended family) in the name of such groups. The language group I belonged to was Te Whanau Iti Kahurangi (The Small, Precious Family), and a social-services provider in the area was Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust (The Family of Waipareira Trust).[8] Because the use of terms like *whanau* is reinforced by borrowing motifs from the *pepeha,* the representation of urban groups in kinship terms often takes the form of asserting a connection to land—a connection that is in some sense a claim. These claims have multiple meanings. As a general assertion of a connection to land and a claim to land based on that connection, the song I quoted resonates with Maori attempts to regain land that was stolen from them and with more general resistance to the consequences of colonialism. "Culture"—songs and the like—is thus tied to a broader politics. But because claims to land embodied in cultural performances are paradigmatically expressed in ways that can't help referring to specific lands, they can complicate relationships between different groups of Maori. From a Maori point of view, Maori residents of Auckland are divided into immigrants and "home people" or "people of the land" *(tangata whenua).* The latter are urban not because they came to the city but because the city came to them—they are descendants of those who traditionally hold the *mana* of the land on which Auckland was built. All Maori, immigrants and home people alike, recognize that the home people have a distinctive position within the city, but the exact nature of the relationship is subject to negotiation. Songs such as "Ko Titirangi te Maunga" are a possible site for such contention—the traditional owners of the land may feel that for others to use such imagery relating to land fails to respect their own claims and therefore, as they put it, tramples on their *mana* (see Tapsell, this volume; Kawharu 1968).

Land, cultural revival, anticolonial struggle, and the modeling of commu-

nity on kinship are even more complexly intertwined in another song, this one composed by Pita Sharples, director of Hoani Waititi Marae and the leader of a cultural performance group that practiced at the *marae.* The song is what is called a *patere,* a "song of defiance" (Ngata and Hurinui 1959:xxiv), and it is a type of *"waiata tawhito"* (old-fashioned song), which is to say that it employs a traditional Maori scale rather than the standard Western scale and is otherwise modeled on older forms of composition.[9] According to Dr. Sharples, the song was meant for all performing groups in the Auckland region, and it therefore talks about the land of that area.

E Noho Ana Au[10]

	E noho ana au	As I rest upon
	I te tara Waiatarua	the summit of Waiatarua
	Ka huri nga whakaaro	my thoughts are turned
	Ki te wa a mua	to a bygone age
5	*Ki te wana ki te wehi*	A time of the might and power
	O nga iwi Maori	of the Maori people
	Uhia nga kanohi	My eyes feast below
	Kei raro te whenua	upon the land of
	O te awa papaku	the shallow stream
10	*Te wai tohi i tohia rangatira*	of holy water wherein were baptized chiefs
	Ka roaka te ingoa	This stream has become known as
	Waipareira	Waipareira
	Tera takoto ra	Further out lies
	Te riu o te awa Whau	the bilge of the river Whau
15	*Kopikopiko atu tae ake*	meandering northwards
	Ki Te Atatu	to Te Atatu
	Ka ringihia ki te tai	spilling into the sea
	O Waitemata	of Waitemata
	Papaki ake nga ngaru	The waves clap
20	*Ki nga matamata*	along the headlands
	Kokoru	and beaches
	Tae atu ki nga wai	reaching into the waters
	O Okahu	of Okahu
	Ki te takutai	to the foreshore
25	*Kei Orakei*	of Orakei

	E tu mokemoke ana	Standing quite forlorn
	Te maunga Rangitoto	is the mountain Rangitoto
	E titiro iho ana	mounting watch over
	Ki nga waka	the sea vessels
30	*Me nga tamariki a Tangaroa*	and the children of Tangaroa
	Kai uta hei parepare	Inland as a fortress
	Ki nga whenua	to the surrounding land
	Ko Maungawhau	stands
	E tu noa	Maungawhau
35	*Ko Maungakiekie*	while Maungakiekie
	E toha ra	stretches upwards to
	Ki te tai whakarunga	the four winds
	Ki te tai whakararo	
	Ko te awa whakatauki	To the east
40	*E hahae tonu ana*	continually tearing at the land
	I te rawhiti	is the proverbial river
	Me te kohikohi haere	gathering as it flows
	I nga awa ririki	the small streams
	Tuakina rawatia	to be finally disemboweled
45	*Ki raro tamaki-makau-rau*	in the North, Tamaki of a hundred lovers
	Tu ke Mangere	Standing alone is Mangere
	Ki te matakitaki	watching over the
	Iwi ki te rawhiti	settlements to the east
	Me te tai tamatane Manukau	and the western sea of the Manukau
	Ko te whai	where a stingray
50	*Tiehutia ake*	splashes its way
	Ki Te Ru O Te Whenua	westward to Te Ru O Te Whenua
	Ka hoki nga whakaaro	And now my thoughts return
	I Waitakere e	upon Waitakere
55	*Koa ana kei roto*	Happiness abides within me
	Tu tonu nga tohu	for those symbols of an age gone by
	A mua e	remain with us still.

Understanding "E Noho Ana Au"—especially understanding it as a political statement—depends on a familiarity with Maori conventions of compo-

sition and narrative. The song is a tour of the landmarks of the Auckland area, offered to all the culture groups who live and practice in that area as a lesson about their home and something they can use as a statement of their identity. Apirana Ngata called such songs *"poi,"* a word that usually refers to white balls attached to lengths of string, which are held in the hand and spun by women in another genre of Maori performance. Here the word is used to capture the way the words of such songs "skim over the tribes, in pursuit of genealogical links." Ngata applies the term to any song that "takes a spiritual journey over various territories or battle grounds, or is a recital of the deeds of the ancestors" (Ngata and Hurinui 1959:xxiv). Part of the traditional function of such songs was to proclaim the identity of the descent-based groups who sang them, so their use in asserting a more general Maori ethnic identity is an extension of their previous use, much like the references to mountains in the song "Ko Titirangi te Maunga" is an extension of the *pepeha.*

Like "Ko Titirangi te Maunga," "E Noho Ana Au" links identity to land (and like the former it might be seen as offensive by those with a more traditional claim to the land named in the song than those who were singing it). But beyond performatively linking the identity of the singers to land, the song is a political statement about what it means to revive culture. The song is a narrative, which begins with the narrator resting on a mountain, at which point his thoughts turn (line 3) to the past—to a time when Maori people had power. Then they had *wana* and *wehi* (line 5), which are the energy of growth and the power to inspire fear or awe.

Two things are worth commenting on at this point. The first is that the position of the narrator, sitting on a mountain, is itself in a certain sense a position of power: Mountains for Maori are beings with *mana,* and for a person to be represented in the song as sitting on top of a mountain implies that that person also has *mana,* enough at least to contain the *mana* of the mountain.[11] To put it another way, as a position from which to speak, the top of a mountain implies more than simply the ability to see in all directions. The second thing to remark on is the implications of the narrator's "thinking" in line 3. The feeling in English is reflective; the idea of thoughts turning to the past suggests a kind of nostalgic contemplation. But in Maori the phrase evokes a common narrative device that takes thought to be not the opposite of action, but its root. As Gregory Schrempp describes it (with reference to the idiomatic phrase *"ka tupu te whakaaro"*—"the thought grew" —which is used to introduce new episodes in Maori stories), "There is a sort of narrative-suspense created by the sense of major new situations developing first as ideas or schemes, and then in their physical implementation" (1992:101). This attitude toward thought and action seems to persist today;

often when people told me stories about the origins of things (such as Hoani Waititi Marae), they would begin by telling when people had begun thinking about them.[12] So the mood invoked by the first verse of the song is less one of contemplation and more one of anticipation.

The rest of the song is a journey through the Auckland region, naming its landmarks with their Maori names (some of which are still in use, and some of which are not). Most important to notice about this section of the song (comprising all of it except for the first verse and the last) is that the landmarks named are all rivers and mountains. These are the most important features of the landscape to Maori, who often think of them as ancestors, and it was by naming rivers and mountains that more traditional versions of such "landscape skimming" songs asserted at once the tribal identity and claims to land of those who sang them. So one implication of describing the Auckland region in terms of its mountains and rivers is to remind people that, although it is now a city built and run along Western lines, it was once land that belonged to tribes.

Koa ana kei roto—"Happiness abides within me" (line 55). The narrator ends the song happy. Why? Because "these symbols of an age gone by/ remain within us still" *(Tu tonu nga tohu/A mua e).* The narrator is able to draw strength and joy from seeing these signs of the past, which are evidence of a different New Zealand. Through the journey recounted in the song, the movement from thought to its physical embodiment has been effected. As long as the mountains and rivers remain (or as long as their names are known), the song argues, that other New Zealand to which the narrator's thoughts turned will not really have disappeared, and the *mana* of the land described in the song will still be held by those who descend from those mountains.

"Culture," in the multiple senses of the song performances and of the knowledge contained in the song and required in order to appreciate it, is thus given a political importance: Through culture Maori are able to maintain *mana, wehi,* and *wana*—pride, authority, power, and the ability to inspire awe and trembling. The act of proclaiming identity, especially the act of proclaiming identity in kinship terms, which involves invoking a connection to land, gives the land itself new meaning—it becomes a sign of the continued Maori claim to it. In another context I have argued that some performances of culture construct the nation as a kind of palimpsest in which a precolonial nation is overlaid by the colonized one but is nevertheless still readable (Rosenblatt 1999). Something similar is going on here: The song genre in which identity is proclaimed embodies within its form the continued existence of a Maori claim on the land of Auckland.

Carvings and Community at Urban *Marae*

Marae—carved meeting house complexes used to provide hospitality for guests—are the most important means through which Maori identity is asserted and talked about. Like the songs just looked at, *marae* proclaim identity in ways that involve claiming much else as well: In particular, they assert claims to land and to a special status for Maori within the nation-state. Meeting houses are complex and richly symbolic objects, and they have long been sites of resistance to various aspects of colonialism. Numerous houses were built in connection with anticolonial prophetic movements in the second half of the nineteenth century, and many others were constructed as part of a conscious effort to preserve traditional Maori arts and knowledge in the first years of the twentieth century. While a full explication of the meanings associated with *marae* complexes is beyond the scope of this essay, a brief description (with a bit of history) will clarify just how it is that meeting houses allow people to represent contingent urban communities as being analogous to rural tribes organized around descent. I start with a physical description of a *marae* complex.

At the center of every *marae* complex is a meeting house. A rectangular gabled building, the house always presents its short end to a plaza or courtyard, on which ritual welcomes are staged. The word *marae* actually refers to this courtyard, which is a transformed version of the empty space at the center of eighteenth-century Maori fortified villages. In addition to the house and the courtyard, a *marae* complex will almost always have a separate large building for cooking and dining and a small building with toilets and showers for the guests. Other buildings may be present but need not. The whole arrangement is also usually marked off from the surrounding area by some sort of wall. In rural areas this "wall" might be as insubstantial as a row of stones on the ground or a waist-high wire fence serving mainly to keep out stray animals, but in cities it is usually something more solid.

The meeting house itself is elaborately carved, painted, and decorated with woven panels, both inside and out. The house is thought of and named as the body of an ancestor of the group to whom it belongs. At the point of the gable, there may be a small figure or a face (or both) representing this ancestor or someone closely related to him or her. The ridgepole, running the length of the house, is his or her spine, and the rafters coming down from each side are ribs. The interior of the house is the bosom of the ancestor, and the whole house may be named something like Te Poho a Rawiri—The Bosom of David. Inside the house, attached to each rafter, are large carved panels *(poupou)* that represent more recent ancestors and their deeds. An-

cestors more recent still are often represented in photographs, which are framed and hung from nails or hooks on the walls. Woven panels *(tukutuku)* between the carvings have more abstract designs, which may stand for things like "knowledge" or "courage." The porch of the house is also carved and may present tribal history, mythology, or more genealogy. In short, houses are richly meaningful objects, interpretable in complex ways. In particular, because the carvings in a house represent not only the body of a group's founding ancestor but the lines of descent that connect present-day people to that ancestor, houses become representations of genealogies and thus objectifications of descent groups.

It is partly because they are presumptively objectifications of descent groups that meeting houses in cities are able to represent the communities that are formed around them as kin or kinlike groups. There is a kind of "grammar" to the house (as John Kelly [1988] uses the term) that assigns a meaning to various aspects of its structure. Individual houses, which are all different, are able to signify in terms of that already given structure—the particular carvings on a house represent a particular set of people as a group. While in rural situations such groups are usually existing kin groups, it is possible to use the grammar of the carving to represent other kinds of groups and other kinds of connections between people—and urban houses exploit that possibility.

In general, the carvings at urban houses are less specific than in tribal houses or refer to more-remote ancestors. For example, the house at Hoani Waititi is not named after a person. Rather, it is called "Nga Tumanako," meaning "The Dreams" or "The Desires," which is said to commemorate the fact that the house exists because the people of West Auckland wanted it there.[13] Other urban or otherwise nontraditional houses take a different strategy, naming the house after someone genealogically remote enough to be ancestral to everybody, so that the meeting house of the Maori Studies Department at Auckland University is called "Tane Nui a Rangi" after one of the sons of Ranginui the sky father and Papatuanuku the earth mother, who gave birth to the entire cosmos.[14] Similarly, the anonymous Polynesian canoe paddler above a house commemorating the Treaty of Waitangi and the figure of Kupe (the legendary discoverer of New Zealand) above the meeting house at Victoria University in Wellington can serve as ancestors for all Maori.

Inside the houses the differences between urban and rural continue. Throughout New Zealand there are a number of different regional and tribal styles of carving that experts can distinguish. The carvings inside Nga Tumanako show ancestors from many tribes and exemplify all of these different styles so that the house can be a home to anyone, regardless of tribal back-

ground. Underneath the window at the front of the house, there is even a carving of three European ships, including James Cook's *Endeavour.* Such carvings are said to represent the Pakeha community and to express their right to stand and speak on the *marae,* just as the carvings from every part of New Zealand express the right of any Maori person to speak there. Similar kinds of strategies inform the carving in other nontraditional meeting houses: Carvings are chosen that provide openings to many different kinds of people and that can represent, in some fashion, the unity of the group the house is to serve. What is achieved in the carving of these houses is an apparent paradox: a cross-tribal unity in an urban community that is built not outside of kinship or in opposition to kinship (which is commonly seen as dividing people) but through it.[15]

Because houses are so symbolically rich, their use as focal points for urban communities and their prominence within the renaissance generally has many consequences. Here, I focus on those that relate to land and to the relationship between making claims to land and making a claim about the place of Maori within the nation as a whole. *Marae* effect a claim to land in a number of ways—most simply because the *marae* plaza, the area in front of the meeting house, *is* land. It can thus stand for "the land," both in the sense of the land that was taken from Maori and in the sense of the land to which they claim a unique relationship. The *marae* plaza is sometimes addressed as Papatuanuku (the earth mother), emphasizing its relation to the land from which Maori claim descent. *Marae* are also a kind of Maori "public space" (Sinclair 1990; Salmond 1975) that serves as a reminder or remnant of an uncolonized nation. This symbolism is facilitated by the wall that surrounds the complex and helps to emphasize its distinctness. The existence of such a public Maori space suggests that Maori identity is not simply a matter of private affiliation for individuals who are otherwise New Zealand citizens like any others. Rather, it implies that New Zealand is a country with a Maori side —that it is not simply Maori (or even settlers) who need to be "bicultural" but the state or the nation.

The rituals of encounter that take place on the courtyard of the *marae* reinforce and extend this last claim. In these rituals, the hosts—the *tangata whenua,* or people of the land—welcome their guests to their territory. During the ritual, genealogical connections between hosts and guests are traced and recited, and the guests are temporarily absorbed into the home group. For the duration of their stay, the guests are said to have become "people of the land" as well. The protocol employed during the ritual varies from group to group, and that of the hosts is always followed, out of respect for their dignity and their connection to the land.

In the urban situation these relationships are generalized. Because of the

way the carvings in the house generalize the idea of the kinship group to include all Maori, so too the notion of "people of the land" is generalized to refer to Maori as a whole. Indeed, *tangata whenua,* the Maori version of the phrase, is the way Maori refer to indigenous peoples generally, no matter what country they live in. In the ritual this identity is enacted with respect to groups who may include settlers, again reinforcing the modeling of the colonial relationship on that between hosts and guests on the *marae.* Among the implications is that Maori culture or custom is also due a certain respect, as a way of acknowledging their prior occupancy of the land. In this way, Maori can attempt to resist being reduced to—in the words Letty Brown and Tuini Hakaraia used in the proposal quoted at the beginning of this essay —"New Zealanders: citizens living together under one law."

Conclusion: Modernity and Culture

I began this essay by offering the practices I describe as an example of the way Maori have responded to the here and now, and I suggested that the way Maori have tried to make urban living congenial says something about the nature of modernity—and in particular about the significance of cultural difference today. Against a tendency by many writers to think that the most important thing about cultural difference is that it is a way of making a *difference* (Abu-Lughod 1991; Appadurai 1996; Turner 1993; Young 1995), I think I have offered evidence that it is at least as important that the difference made is *cultural.*

Perhaps I should elaborate. What I mean is simply this: "Culture" has become the focus of an enormous amount of political activity over the last few decades, and this fact has in turn become the object of much social theory. Overwhelmingly, the emphasis in most of that theory has been on the way culture functions to construct groups and create boundaries. From this point of view, the particular content of culture matters little. What I have tried to show by looking at what it means for Maori to sing certain kinds of songs or to build meeting houses in cities is that the politics of culture is not only about making boundaries and marking identity—the content does matter, and in order to understand the import of what people are doing when they revive aspects of culture, one needs to know where those things came from, what they meant, and how they fit into a particular vision of the world. For example, "community" for Maori is linked with kinship, and kinship is in turn connected to land, and by building community people question the nature of the modern nation-state and its assertion that all the people under its jurisdiction have identical status. Moreover, I would generalize this argument

from the Maori instance: Culture is everywhere revived or preserved by reviving or preserving particular customs, institutions, and practices whose meanings give political import to the act of reviving them.

How much political import, for whom, and when are more complicated issues than I can account for here. Whether and how the readings of songs and meeting houses offered here achieve some kind of real social existence (whether someone really understands them in the way I have suggested they can be understood) is a more complicated problem, and the possible political effects of these readings is even more complicated. For example, the friction sometimes created when nontribal urban groups sing songs about local mountains suggests that the possible claims to land implied by such acts are understood by some. But just how salient those claims are and exactly how they are understood (as referring to specific lands or to land in general) need to be determined in particular instances. Similarly, the implications for the way the nation-state is imagined of performing a ritual in which Maori are figured as "people of the land" are hard to specify in general and in advance. Certainly Maori and the government understand differently the implications of the idea that some people "belong to the land." Different interpretations may be made salient in individual ritual performances, and there is no reason to suppose a priori that Western interpretive schemes are the only ones in operation or will always win out in the end—the history of the colonial relationship in New Zealand is filled with such contested events and practices, which are neither always won by the settlers nor ever fully settled (Belich 1996). As for the political effects of practices and institutions of the sort I have considered in this essay, they too are hard to specify in general but not necessarily trivial for that reason. Once practices are revived, they are out in the world and can frame experiences; as Bourdieu argued (1977), the experience of living in a Kabyle house can shape dispositions and subjectivities that in turn shape both interpretation and action—and thus affect the survival of a sociopolitical system. Certainly the proliferation of urban meeting houses and the implied recognition of a Maori public sphere mean that New Zealand is unlikely to return to the situation of the mid-1960s, at which time a prominent white analyst and advocate of Maori could state without controversy that "biculturalism" was mostly a matter for people's private lives rather than a concern of the state (Schwimmer 1968:17–18).

And what of alienation and urban life? The kinlike groups created by the people I worked with at Hoani Waititi bound them to each other by ties of sentiment and obligation, and formed a kind of intermediary between them and the state. Durkheim saw such intermediary bodies as necessary cures for the anomie created by the absence of familial ties in modern life, but

where Durkheim saw such groups as replacing kinship bonds with a more generalized morality, the situation I found is more complex. Kinship bonds are replaced with kinship bonds of a different sort.

More generally, the movement Durkheim describes in *The Division of Labor in Society* ([1893] 1933) from mechanical to organic solidarity is an evolutionary scheme in which the European past is taken as a model for the future of the rest of the world. Kinship and bonds based on a similarity of beliefs are to be replaced by relations based on functional interdependency, and urban life is seen as everywhere characterized by relatively impersonal relationships between independent individuals. The concept of moral community was for Durkheim the exception to the general rule, the place where the kinds of ties characteristic of simple societies remained important in complex ones. In that sense it is an appropriate description for what is found in the Pacific, but perhaps it is best to throw out the rule, even if the exception is worth keeping. Alternative stories of modernization may be possible. To the extent that peoples are able to maintain a distinct identity, they may also be able to develop multiple modernities, multiple ways of being modern persons, whose form in particular cases emerges in a unique historical process out of the particular tools available and in response to individual historical circumstances.

NOTES

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1. Maori are some 15 percent of New Zealand's population today. European settlers (mostly British) and their descendants make up 76 percent of the remainder, with the remaining 9 percent divided among people of Pacific Island, South Asian, and Asian descent.

2. Some people use doubled letters to represent long vowels in Maori. When quoting other people's writings, I follow the usage in the quoted text. Otherwise, I have not marked vowel length. Brown and Hakaraia also use an "s" to form the plural of Maori words used in English. Because words in Maori do not generally change form in the plural, contemporary practice, which I follow except in quotation, is to refrain from marking the plural when using Maori words in English, allowing the reader to infer number from context.

3. I qualify this assertion because preserving "culture" first became an important part of Maori political aspirations around the turn of the century, well before urbanization had begun. Maori had been aware of cultural difference long before, and had even indexed identity as a marker of different moral universes from the first moments of contact, but culture became more important politically when the settler government achieved substantial sovereignty over Maori at the end of the nineteenth century (Belich 1996; Rosenblatt n.d.).

4. The critique of identity grows out of the work of Edward Said (1978, 1989), and hybridity has been celebrated most forcefully by Homi Bhabba (1994) and Robert Young (1995). For criticism of the postcolonial celebration of hybridity, see, among others, Cheah 1998; Dirlik 1997; and Thomas 1996.

5. This literature has also been criticized for its seeming deconstruction of Pacific Islanders' political projects (arguments on both sides of the debate include Hanson 1989, 1991; Jolly 1992; Jolly and Thomas 1992; Keesing 1982, 1989, 1992; Lindstrom and White 1993; Linnekin 1983, 1990; Sahlins 1993; Thomas 1992b, 1992a; and Turner 1997).

6. The event was called a *po whakangahau* (a party), but we were cautioned that the aim of the singing was not competition (which is sometimes the case when people engage in performing arts), but rather *"whakawhanaungatanga."*

7. This is a widely known *pepeha.* This version comes from a list of similar *pepeha* at the beginning of the *Reed Dictionary of Modern Māori*, which is also the source of the translation (Ryan 1995:21). Note that Ryan translates *"te maunga"* as "ancestral mountain." The word "ancestral" isn't written, but is implied in the Maori version by the context—the fact that the text is a *pepeha.* In translating the line of the song, the issue is more ambiguous: Is "ancestral" implied? While the form of the line argues for an answer in the affirmative, the identity of the group doing the singing suggests that the answer must be negative. The ambiguity is the point. This is a simple illustration of the issues involved in the way people represent their connections.

8. Waipareira is a name for the part of the West Auckland area where the trust is situated. The social-services provider was also known as an urban "tribal" *(iwi)* authority and in some contexts had legal status similar to that of a more traditional tribe.

9. Most Maori performance combines singing or chanting with gestures. In a *waiata* these are individual rather than in unison (as they are in the twentieth-century genre called an "action song"). While *waiata* are modeled on older forms of music, they are still being actively composed today: Culture competitions, which are a primary context for Maori performance, award points for originality. "E Noho Ana Au" was performed in an Auckland regional competition in 1993 by "Te Toi Huarewa," which was made up of members of Te Roopu Manutaki who weren't performing in the regular group.

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11. Jeffrey Sissons relates a story in which an ancestor of the Tuhoe tribe climbs a mountain on top of which he finds a spring. The waters become riled as he approaches, and a fearsome creature emerges that he is only able to subdue by plucking a hair from his own head and throwing it in the stream—thus containing the *mana* of the mountain with his own *mana,* which is represented by the hair, something that comes from a highly *tapu* (sacred) part of his body (Sissons 1991:9).

12. A genealogy given by the historian Pei Te Hurinui for the high god Io (from whom the rest of the cosmos descends) reflects a similar conception of thinking. Given in the form of a list, as Maori genealogies often are, the genealogy traces Io's emergence out of the potential-filled void (Te Hurinui 1959:257):

1. Te kore	The formless void
2. Kotahi te ki	The one unspoken thought
3. Kotahi te korero	The one spoken word
4. Kotahi te wananga	The one sacred assembly
5. Te kore whiwhia	The intangible formless void
6. Te kore Makiki hi rere	The formless void pierced by a line extending into space
7. Makaka	The sacred curve
8. Io	The Supreme Being

13. This doesn't necessarily mean that the house is not an ancestor: According to Peter Sharples, the director of Hoani Waititi Marae, every carving in the meeting house is an ancestor, whether it is "a person or an event" (Peter Sharples, February 1995, in a speech given to a group of young people starting employment training courses at Hoani Waititi Marae).

14. Tane is not only the creator of the first woman and the father to all people, but he is said to have ascended to the twelfth heaven and returned with three baskets containing different kinds of knowledge—hence he is a particularly appropriate ancestor for an educational institution.

15. The potency and appropriateness of using houses to construct groups in this way is increased by the fact that they emerged in the nineteenth century, partly as a way of making more concrete local groups whose coherence and cohesiveness was threatened because their other functions (making war and organizing collective production) had been disturbed by colonialism (Neich 1993; Rosenblatt n.d.).

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MARAE AND TRIBAL IDENTITY IN URBAN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND

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This article examines the ceremonial courtyard called a *marae,* the quintessential focus of tribal Maori society, which not only represents customary authority over surrounding land but also provides the forum on which *taonga* (ancestral treasures) are ritually performed. Historically rooted in the Pacific, the tribal *marae* has stayed intact for countless generations serving generations of kin communities in their ever-changing social, political, and economic contexts. After World War II the *marae* underwent new transformations as descendants began migrating in their thousands from relative rural isolation to newly developing metropolitan areas. Competition and accessing new opportunities based upon ethnicity gave rise to new community morales at the expense of customary practice and brought about the genesis of the nontribal and immigrant-tribal *marae.*

To comprehend the dynamics involved in maintaining a Maori tribal identity within Aotearoa/New Zealand, it is important to understand the most central of all Maori institutions: the *marae.* The *marae,* a ceremonial courtyard usually extending from the porch of a *whare tupuna* (ancestrally named meeting house; see glossary, following endnotes), continues to provide the paramount focus to every tribal community throughout the country. When evoked, it is a physically bounded three-dimensional space, capable of spiritually joining Papatuanuku (land) with Ranginui (sky) into which *ira tangata* (the human principle) may enter and commune with *ira atua* (the divine ancestors).

The role of the *marae* and how it might function as the central focus of any kin group's identity become most apparent during life crises, such as *tangihanga* (death rituals), when non-kin-group visitors are ritually wel-

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comed across the *marae* threshold. Home ritual maintains the boundary between host and visitor until such time as it is successfully negotiated via oratory. During such ritual, tribal leaders often empower and perform the kin group's *taonga* (tangible or intangible treasures passed down from ancestors) on *marae* (Tapsell 1997). Ceremonially layered, these performances assist descendants and related visitors to relive their common genealogical ties to each other, to ancestors, and to the land. The associated meeting house and other prominently named buildings and structures of the *marae* further reinforce both individual and kin group identity in relation to outsiders by physically representing ancestors to which all members of the *marae* community genealogically trace their origins.

Consequently, the *marae* can be interpreted as a dynamic, Maori-ordered, metaphysical space, embracing the fundamental kin-based values of *whakapapa* (genealogical ordering of the universe according to *mana* descent and *whanaungatanga* kinship) and *tikanga* (the lore of the ancestors maintained by senior elders), where rights of access, especially in times of ritual, continue to be proscribed or prescribed solely by kin leaders. Moreover, these core values—*whakapapa* and *tikanga*—encapsulate what it essentially means to be Maori. That is to say, tribal membership for Maori is codefined first by genealogical links to a common ancestor after whom the descendant group —*iwi* (tribe) or *hapu* (subtribe)—is often named (for example, Ngati Whakaue —the people of Whakaue) and second by individual members from time to time attending the community's *marae* during important *hui* (ritual-associated kin group meetings) so they may fulfill various roles as designated by their elders. Maintaining such an ongoing presence, therefore, enables descendants born or residing beyond the physical confines of the community (for example, in faraway cities) legitimately to uphold their *turangawaewae* (home birthright, place to stand) and to interact with their ancestral *marae* and associated *papakainga* (village).

While conducting my doctoral research (1996–1997), I asked my Ngati Whakaue of Te Arawa elders about their understanding of the *marae.* For all of them, the *marae* represents the core, the very essence of their genealogical identity to the surrounding lands, which they interpret as *mana o te whenua* (supreme ancestral authority of and over the lands). They see their home *marae* as both a tangible (physical) and an intangible (spiritual) space to which they belong—*turangawaewae*—where the "now" is metaphysically embodied within their ancestral past. This past reaches back beyond the shores of Maketu—the original landing place of the voyaging Te Arawa kin group in Aotearoa—to the sacred temples of Rangiatea (Ra'iatea) in Hawaiki (the ancient Polynesian homeland of Te Arawa). To the elders the *marae* is a living genealogical connection not only to the distant past, but also to the

land itself, Papatuanuku. The tribe's *whare tupuna,* which in my region is an elaborately carved eponymous ancestor, is deemed to be the ultimate *taonga* of the people, because it brings both physical and spiritual authority to the *marae* on which it rests. The house genealogically reinforces the prestige of the *tangata whenua* (home people—descendants of specific ancestral lands) and leaves *manuhiri* (non-kin-group visitors) in no doubt as to who is in charge, at all times, within the *marae* space. The elders use references such as ancestral warmth, presence, reverence, respect, *mana* (authority), *tapu* (restricted), *wairua* (spiritual presence), and *mauri* (life essence) to highlight that a *marae* also has *taonga*-like qualities.[1] Unlike *taonga,* however, the *marae* is considered inalienable,[2] because it is ultimately associated with the living soil of Papatuanuku.

My research also revealed that existing literature on *marae,* especially from a tribal perspective, is scarce. Apart from work by Kawharu (1968, 1989) and Marsden (1987), most other writings reviewed (for example, Walker 1975; Salmond 1976; Tauroa 1986; Barlow 1991) provide generalized understandings of *marae,* but they do not explore its dynamics regarding tribal identity maintenance within modern contexts. My recently completed doctoral thesis provides a tribally informed perspective on the genesis of *marae* and its roles in modern New Zealand (Tapsell 1998). Here I have limited my focus to the recent development of the urban *marae* phenomenon and its associated tensions.

I have identified two main types of urban-located *marae: tangata whenua* (tribal) and *taurahere* (immigrant), with the latter being further divided into two basic categories: nontribal and immigrant-tribal. From each of these three main categories I have chosen an example that best demonstrates the roles each category (tribal, nontribal, and immigrant-tribal) plays in maintaining a sense of Maori identity and community in an unfamiliar urban setting. As my first case study I chose Orakei Marae, because it graphically illustrates many of the difficulties urban-encircled *tangata whenua* groups have been experiencing in New Zealand's city regions over the past fifty years. John Waititi Memorial Marae, also in Auckland, was chosen because it is credited with being the first non–tribally organized urban *marae* in New Zealand. The third *marae* example, Mataatua in the city of Rotorua, has been selected because it represents the first ever immigrant-tribal *marae* to be erected in a New Zealand urban setting under the authority of the *tangata whenua*—home people. Belonging to the moral communities each of the above *marae* categories represents is as much dependent on individual choice as it is on the associated *marae* group accepting one's membership. Whereas tribal-type *marae* require genealogical connection, they nevertheless differ little in terms of moral obligations from nontribal *marae,* inasmuch

as maintaining membership ultimately depends on participation, especially during life-crisis *hui.* But when the freedom to maintain a tribal identity is taken away from the individual—as was the case with Orakei, when the tribe's *marae* was abolished owing to outside political forces, or at John Waititi, where an urban leadership strategy unwittingly obviated the importance of *tangata whenua* status and genealogical identity—the morality of belonging to an urban Maori community becomes more a question of personal benefit than a realization of an individual's ancestral responsibility (whether *tangata whenua* or *taurahere*) to uphold the *mana* of the land on which he or she stands and its associated tribal community.

Tangata Whenua Marae

No one knows for certain where the *marae* originated, but the evidence suggests that this organizing concept of Maori tribal society has been among my ancestors for hundreds if not thousands of years. In "*Taonga:* A Tribal Response to Museums" (Tapsell 1998), I provide a historical narrative, drawn from archaeological, written, and oral evidence, of how today's tribal *marae* evolved from the time that kin groups like Te Arawa, Tainui, and Mataatua arrived in Aotearoa from their Hawaiki homeland of Rangiatea over twenty generations ago. I investigate from a Te Arawa perspective the development of the *marae* and its subsequent transformations on arrival in Aotearoa. These transformations can be understood as dynamic responses by kin group leaders to geopolitical crises. So long as the *marae* has survived, the kin group's identity to its ancestral estates—as represented by *taonga*—has endured. Successful adaptation, over generations, to new climactic and environmental conditions, inter-kin-group competition, the introduction of Christianity, and European colonization guaranteed tribal identity. Kin groups that failed to adapt ceased to exist.

Today, tribal *marae,* like Te Papa-i-Ouru at Ohinemutu, endure as the accepted customary focus of Maori society. Whether it is tribal discussion, the hosting of dignitaries, or providing for life crises and *hui,* a tribe's *marae* represents customary authority over its associated ancestral landscape. Most important, it provides a tangible link to Hawaiki, the spiritual homeland of past illustrious tribal leaders who are still called on to visit their descendants in times of crisis through the *marae* performance of *taonga.* The *rangatira* (kin group leader) and his or her *tohunga* (spiritual advisor) control these performances, centered on the core values of *whakapapa* and *tikanga,* enabling descendants to refocus their tribal identity while fully participating in an ever-changing Western modernity. The *marae* provides a place to stand —*turangawaewae*—where the values of Hawaiki continue to synthesize

with the challenges of the present, giving descendants new directions into the future while still keeping sight of their ancestral past.

By belonging to the Te Arawa kin group Ngati Whakaue, I am perhaps fortunate insomuch as my *marae,* Te Papa-i-Ouru, has not been engulfed by the urban growth of its surrounding city of Rotorua. Late colonization, ongoing control of tourism, and legislated sharing of natural resources (see Stafford 1967:524) have helped maintain my tribe's profile in the overall governance of Rotorua. Tribes in other urban centers have not been so lucky. For example, Ngai Tahu in Christchurch and Dunedin, Te Ati Awa and Ngati Toa in Wellington, and Ngati Whatua O Orakei in Auckland have all been subjected to the humiliation of becoming *marae*-less on lands their ancestors initially sought to share in good faith with the incoming colonial power. The following case study is a poignant example of how the Crown, in pursuit of obtaining desirable real estate in New Zealand at all costs, breached its treaty promise to uphold Ngati Whatua's customary authority over their Orakei lands and villages.

Case Study One: Orakei, a Tribal Marae

Unlike the exceptional situation of Ngati Whakaue in Rotorua, where a Western-urban city developed around its tribal *marae* communities as a direct result of tourism (Tapsell 1998), the Ngati Whatua people of Orakei in Auckland were never seen as part and parcel of the metropolis that encircled them.[3] Instead their presence was seen as a stumbling block in Auckland's progressive development. The Orakei lands represent the most desirable real estate in New Zealand, and the Crown was prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to procure title and to eradicate an aesthetically displeasing community in the process. By the 1950s the Crown had prevailed. It stripped this once powerful kin group of all their lands and evicted them from their Okahu Bay–located *papakainga* (ancestral village) and *marae.*

When the Crown had signed the Treaty of Waitangi three generations earlier in 1840, Ngati Whatua's descendants were numerous, having established permanent settlements and *marae* around both the Waitemata and Manukau harbors. Their principal *papakainga (pa)* was located on the volcanic cone *pa* named Maungakiekie, better known today as One Tree Hill. However, by the mid–nineteenth century Ngati Whatua of Tamaki had relocated its headquarters to the *papakainga* at Okahu Bay in Orakei to take advantage of the Pakeha trade and commerce that began flowing into the Waitemata after 1840. Nevertheless, the tribe's undisputed domain at this time stretched from the western Waitakere range, east to Awataha and as far south as the Tamaki River and Onehunga, covering over five hundred square kilometers.

Soon after the treaty was signed in 1840, the Crown, on Ngati Whatua's invitation, shifted its new capital from the northern township of Russell to the southern shores of the Waitemata at Horotiu (the bottom of Queen Street, central Auckland city). Three thousand acres of surrounding land was duly made available *(tuku rangatira)* in exchange for cash and goods, which officially cleared the way for the new township of Auckland to be established (*Orakei* 1987). This transaction marked the beginning of a one-hundred-year-long concerted Crown acquisition program during which almost all of Ngati Whatua's land in the Tamaki isthmus passed into Crown ownership (ibid.). Kawharu, a kin group descendant, comprehensively documented how Ngati Whatua lost their last seven hundred acres (280 hectares)—the Orakei Block—in his 1989 publication *Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi.* His evidence demonstrates that three generations of tribal leadership struggled to have their Maori land tenure protected. Numerous protests were lodged with the Crown and its agencies after the first troubles, which arose in 1869 when thirteen trustees were awarded title to the Orakei Block. It soon became obvious to the tribe that their last remaining seven hundred acres of inalienable estate, now vested in individual trustees, was in fact titled land to which communal ownership had been extinguished (Kawharu 1989:218). On one hand, the leaders of the tribe protested time and again to the Crown for proper trusteeship over the Orakei Block to be recognized and resecured, while on the other hand individuals sought to convert their fortuitous ownership into personal windfall (ibid.). Successive rafts of legislation compounded the situation and provided the Crown with further opportunities, as self-appointed sole purchaser, to acquire more and more Orakei land for Auckland expansion (ibid.:221). Eventually the last ten acres, which included the community's *papakainga* and *marae,* was taken under the Public Works Act in 1950, just months after the prime minister of New Zealand, Peter Fraser, publicly criticized the Okahu Bay village as "a blot on the landscape" (in ibid.:222).

Kawharu's 1989 account outlines the events that led his Orakei people to be evicted from their *papakainga* and *marae* in 1950 and forced them to burn their tribal meeting house, Te Puru o Tamaki, rather than allow the Crown to desecrate it (also see Kawharu 1995–1996). The Kawharu passage written in 1975, however, perhaps best captures the pain and consequence of his tribe's irrevocable loss:

> The necessary proclamations were issued in March, all appeals had been heard and summarily dismissed by May, and the meeting house was burnt down in December. At the time, the wells of anguish in the hearts of those who gathered mutely above the

> cinders of their meeting house seemed likely to never run dry. And perhaps those who came to pass judgment on the ensuing apathy of these people need not have looked further for causes. (Kawharu 1975:12)

With the last *marae* forcefully abandoned, the Crown had effectively erased Ngati Whatua of Auckland from their own ancestral landscape. All that remained under the tribe's direct *mana* was a single quarter-acre cemetery and chapel, and a dislocated community rehoused in state-owned properties on the nearby Takaparawha Ridge subdivision. As the Ngati Whatua *tohunga* who spoke on behalf of the Orakei people at a later tribunal explained:

> [I]t was unthinkable that they should surrender their marae for that was but the heart and soul of their papakainga. To surrender the marae was to surrender their papakainga, and by association, their mana, their tapu and mauri. After their forced ejection and relocation . . . they were tenants of the Housing Corporation living in houses and on land that did not belong to them. They were not tangata whenua; their status was as that of any other Maori, or for that matter of Pakehas, who were tenants of [the Crown]. Turangawaewae, as the symbol and kernel of the land, unless they [are] firmly established on their own land, is a meaningless concept. He tuporo teretere. [Without a *marae* they are] but floating logs. (Marsden 1987:3)

From 1951 onward, Ngati Whatua O Orakei had become a people without land, any obvious *taonga* (e.g., their meeting house), or *marae,* and for all official intents and purposes they were a ward of the state. Their *turangawaewae* had been pulled from under them, and the loss of their last *marae* in Tamaki prevented Ngati Whatua from asserting their *tangata whenua* status over the wider Auckland metropolitan area. Before eviction the elders pleaded: We will go but leave us our *marae* (Kawharu 1989:224). But to no avail. Without their *marae* the tribe were not only denied their symbolic expression of political, cultural, and spiritual legitimacy over the surrounding ancestral landscape, but were also prevented from maintaining their kin group identity. In effect: cultural genocide. The community's relocation into state houses on Crown-purchased lands of their ancestors resulted in the despairing deaths of many elders. Not surprisingly, the new generation raised on Boot Hill was culturally impoverished as the community struggled to maintain a sense of pride on lands that no longer belonged to them. The appropriate *marae* forum by which countless generations had observed and

learned ancestral lore and practice from elders had been forcibly removed. Tribal identity, once openly expressed on *marae* in lavish hospitality and in honoring the dead, was forced underground for forty years. The community's lack of an appropriate facility brought shame to its members, who had to make do with inadequate private residences or call on their Reweti relations in the Kaipara to assist with life crises such as *tangihanga* (Marsden 1987:5). The Okahu Bay cemetery and its chapel provided the community with its only source of symbolic identity, spiritual in its delivery but nevertheless a sanctuary from the everyday humiliation of being bereft of both land and *marae* (Kawharu 1995–1996:87).

In 1954 the Crown exacerbated the tribe's plight by setting aside an acre or so of the original Orakei Block as a reserve for the use or benefit of Maori (*New Zealand Government Gazette* 1950:1340). The land was located on the higher ground of Takaparawha Ridge beside the rehoused Ngati Whatua descendants. In 1959, at a time when the immigrant Maori population of Auckland was estimated to be between twenty and thirty thousand, the Maori Land Court was persuaded to vest this land, designated for *marae* purposes, in an ad hoc agglomeration of trustees. This persuasion came from a very small coterie of influential Maori welfare officers, tribal committee personnel, and university lecturers, together with elders of the Orakei *hapu.* But the elders stated that they wished not to "prejudice any possibility, however remote, that their former marae in Okahu Bay might be returned to them" (ibid.:226). Nevertheless, the court decided that the Crown land reserved on Takaparawha Ridge was to be a multicultural *marae.* Moreover, only four of the sixteen appointed trustees were from Orakei, along with eight Pakeha and four Maori members of parliament. This imbalance, according to Marsden, "effectively neutralised Ngati Whatua's mana in any future control, planning, organization or decision-making of the new marae" (1987:4).

In 1973 the trustees, who had earlier developed a major building program and attracted funding from the wider Auckland community, council, and government, began the erection of a new meeting house on the *marae* reserve. Elsewhere in Auckland, four other *marae* projects were also being built. Two were non–*tangata whenua* tribal developments: Mahurehure in Point Chevalier, which was the initiative of urban descendants from the powerful northern tribe of the same name, and Te Tira Hou in Glen Innes, which was constructed by Tuhoe immigrants from the Bay of Plenty who now lived in Auckland. The other two *marae,* Te Unga Waka in Epsom and John Waititi Memorial Marae in Henderson, were not too dissimilar in the multicultural aspect from the new Orakei project. They all sought to build a complex, Maori in nature, that would offer a sense of home to persons who were not *tangata whenua* of Auckland. The difference with both Te Unga

Waka and John Waititi was that they opened membership to anyone of Maori descent. As a matter of record, only the two *marae* that were tribal in nature sought the full blessing of Ngati Whatua O Orakei before commencing with their respective projects, whereas the new Orakei Marae, Te Unga Waka, and John Waititi Memorial Marae did not.

When the Orakei Marae meeting house shell was completed in 1974, the southern tribe of Tainui ritually opened it under the noses of Ngati Whatua. Further insult was to follow. The Pakeha ethnologist from the Auckland Museum had the name Tumutumuwhenua ritually bestowed on the shell by the visiting tribe. In an instant the proposed meeting house had been transformed into a *whare tupuna*—an ancestral house—because Tumutumuwhenua represented "the eponymous ancestor of all Ngati Whatua from Maunganui to Tamaki." Thus a major decision, "which no Maori dare to make without consultation with all of Ngati Whatua whose tupuna had been chosen, was made by a Pakeha" (Marsden 1987:4). Finally, the ethnologist also decided the names of all the ancestors to be represented in the house, and the responsibility for carving them was then passed to a non-Maori from Australia. Thereafter, Ngati Whatua had to endure the pain of living in the shadow of a *marae* to which they had no *tangata whenua* status or controlling authority: a *marae* built on their dispossessed lands that now officially belonged to all the people of Auckland. Not surprisingly, the morale of the Orakei community was arguably at its lowest ebb during this difficult time (Kawharu 1975).

An opportunity to begin rebuilding Ngati Whatua O Orakei's *mana* after more than a century of Crown desecration presented itself in the form of the Orakei Block (Vesting and Use) Act in 1978. Land on Takaparawha Ridge, which had been taken decades earlier for public works, was returned to the tribe after the Crown decided it had no use for it (Kawharu 1995–1996:80). The Public Works Act gave the *hapu* title to its former rental housing estate and restored in substantial measure the *hapu*'s claim to the status of *tangata whenua* (Kawharu 1989:227). It also allowed for the formation of a seven-member Trust Board, which provided seats for four elders. Beneficiaries were decided on by *whakapapa* rather than any prior certificates of land title, and the returned land was vested to the tribe under one inalienable title (Kawharu 1995–1996:90). Initially, the Trust Board was preoccupied with administering the repurchase of houses on the tribe's recovered estate so as to consolidate the new *papakainga.* But one major problem remained: The community still had no *marae* to call its own. The return of residential land had effectively reestablished the tribe's position as *tangata whenua.* Without a *marae* exclusively available to host *manuhiri* and conduct *tangihanga,* however, the tribe was trapped in a humiliating position. Their lack of control over the Orakei Marae's administration resulted time and again in Ngati

Whatua being unable to provide for visitors and death rituals in times of crisis. Building a new *marae* was also inconceivable so long as Tumutumuwhenua continued to cast his shadow over the Orakei community (Kawharu 1989:227).

Ngati Whatua's *marae* dilemma was eventually addressed on 8 October 1983 at a specially convened *hui* in Tumutumuwhenua. Attending the meeting were numerous representatives from tribal and other Maori organizations, the minister of Maori affairs, the member of parliament for Northern Maori, and the highly respected Ngapuhi leader Sir James Henare. A proposal was placed before the Crown to vest Tumutumuwhenua and the Orakei Marae in Ngati Whatua O Orakei with the full support of all the Maori groups and tribes present. As Sir James said: "Without a marae the people are nothing and a marae is nothing without the people [i.e., *tangata whenua*]" (in Kawharu 1989:228). Consent and agreement were reached at this *hui,* and the minister of Maori affairs returned to Wellington with a promise that he "will go back and see if we can put procedures in motion" (ibid.:230). Unfortunately for the Orakei people, the minister failed to act immediately, and during the 1984 snap election he lost office with the change of government. The new minister of Maori affairs was predictably cautious and wished to consult all interested parties personally (Hon. Koro Wetere, in ibid.).

From 1869 to 1986, three applications to the Maori Land Court, three Supreme Court hearings, one Committee of Inquiry, one Commission of Inquiry, and one Royal Commission of Inquiry, not to mention the Bastion Point protest (see Walker 1979 and 1980–1988 for a commentary on this pan-Maori occupation protest) and a direct appeal to a minister of the Crown, made little impact on Ngati Whatua's loss of its *marae* (*Orakei* 1987:152). Then in August 1986 members of the Orakei Trust Board along with the Reverend Maori Marsden took the opportunity to submit their *marae* proposal to the Waitangi Tribunal:

> We therefore appeal to the Tribunal to recommend to the Crown that it rectify its administrative oversight forthwith and so remove the insult inflicted upon a tribal group that continues to be prevented from exercising its rights and responsibilities in the name of its ancestor [Tumutumuwhenua] according to custom. (Tumahai et al. 1986)

In November 1987 the Waitangi Tribunal released its "Report on the Orakei Claim" and in its findings stated that the Orakei Marae and the ancestral house Tumutumuwhenua "symbolised not only Ngati Whatua's loss

of their land, but the takeover of even their culture—by Europeans and Maori from other places" (*Orakei* 1987:137). After reading the tribunal's findings, the Crown announced on 1 July 1988:

> The key to restoration of tribal mana to Ngati Whatua of Orakei is the marae, so it is very pleasing to confirm the vesting of the Orakei Marae, church, urupa and access strip in the Ngati Whatua of Orakei Trust Board. The marae will now be a place where Ngati Whatua of Orakei have standing as of right once again. (Crown press statement, in Kawharu 1989:231)

While the final drafting of legislation was awaited to give official recognition to Ngati Whatua's standing as *tangata whenua* of the Orakei Marae, the ancestral house, Tumutumuwhenua, was badly damaged by fire in February 1990. In 1991, the Orakei Act 1990 was passed into law. It included the return of lands, an endowment of NZ$3 million, and the vesting of Orakei Marae along with the burned-out skeleton of Tumutumuwhenua back to the tribe. The Orakei community received the *marae* with appropriate ritual, whereupon the decision was made to rebuild Tumutumuwhenua.

There can be no doubt that since this time Ngati Whatua O Orakei's *mana* has been restored. Their *marae* redevelopment program includes new *poupou* (interior carved ancestors) for Tumutumuwhenua and a proper dining hall to entertain guests suitably. The Trust Board's responsibilities have increased dramatically in recent years, and it is now a professionally run tribal administration. It not only provides an array of social services, such as housing, health, and education to its beneficiaries, but also participates as the major investor in the overall commercial development of Auckland's new multi-million-dollar waterfront, sited on railway lands purchased back from the Crown by the tribe. Today, all of Auckland's major civic functions and receptions include Ngati Whatua *rangatira* as a matter of course. These elders are honored as VIPs and when appropriate are called on to provide the necessary *tangata whenua* rituals of prayer and welcome. A recent example was the 1999 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting where Sir Hugh Kawharu, on behalf of Ngati Whatua, welcomed distinguished world leaders to Auckland, New Zealand. After his *mihi* (public speech), Sir Hugh symbolically joined the *tangata whenua* with the *manuhiri* by performing the customary *hongi* (pressing of noses) with the then president of the United States, Bill Clinton. This image was reproduced by the media throughout the world, reinforcing Ngati Whatua O Orakei's status as the *mana o te whenua* of Auckland.

Since the return of Ngati Whatua's *marae* and the associated restoration

of their *mana,* the dominant presence of nontribal urban Maori organizations, which arose out of the recent decades of a Crown-induced *tangata whenua* vacuum, has begun to be countered. At the time the Crown promised to return Orakei Marae (1988), Kawharu reported: "While this news was pleasing to the kaumatua, it was their belief that even with the assistance of the Marae, it could take another ten years for their people to recapture fully the status of tangata whenua that their forebears had enjoyed during the first two centuries of their occupation of the Tamaki Isthmus" (Kawharu 1989:231).

It seems that the elders' prediction made one decade ago is proving to be uncannily accurate. Today, in 2002, there is no denying that Ngati Whatua holds customary authority over Auckland (Kawharu 2002). Some of its traditional boundaries, which in the past forty years have been disregarded and eroded by outside Maori kin group descendants, are being reestablished, but not without conflict. Auckland's city government departments, courts, councils, and administrative bodies are currently relearning this lesson as they begin to realize that consultation with ad hoc Maori groups concerning *tangata whenua* issues and Treaty of Waitangi partnership principles will not provide them with long-term solutions. Ngati Whatua O Orakei is regaining the social, economic, and political influence they once unconditionally exercised as *mana o te whenua* in Auckland. The prominence today of their Orakei Marae and house, Tumutumuwhenua, stand not only as a powerful testament of this return to power, but also as confirmation that *whakapapa* and *tikanga* remain relevant in a metropolitan context.

Taurahere Marae

In contrast to the *tangata whenua marae*—based on concepts of *mana o te whenua* developed over countless generations—the two types of *taurahere* (Maori immigrant) *marae* have recently come into existence in New Zealand's urban centers. Their genesis appears to be more the result of urban migrant Maori wishing to reconstitute their sense of moral community in a foreign environment than exploration of common genealogical connections on another tribe's ancestral land.

The first wave of Maori to migrate to Auckland arrived around the 1950s, when Ngati Whatua's *tangata whenua* identity was at its lowest. For a time everyone but Ngati Whatua prospered in the post–World War II boom years as tens of thousands of young Maori migrated to cities like Auckland and Rotorua, in search of a more prosperous way of life than that available in their impoverished homelands. Then in the late 1970s the country entered a deep recession, and Maori, as the main labor force, were hardest hit. Out of

this politically charged era arose the nontribal *marae* concept, which marginalized Ngati Whatua's *tangata whenua* status in favor of battling for nationalized Maori (nontribal) rights. One of the first such *marae* to be built in New Zealand was John Waititi Memorial Marae, opened in 1980 in West Auckland.

Waititi, however, was not the first immigrant *marae* ever to be built in an urban milieu. The first was in the fledgling township of Rotorua in the 1920s, where the maintenance of *whakapapa* and *tikanga* by Maori immigrants from neighboring tribes prevailed despite relocation. Whereas the Waititi *marae* evolved in a *tangata whenua* vacuum in Auckland (1951–1991), the Mataatua initiative sought to honor their high-profile *tangata whenua* hosts, and the subsequent building of the *marae*'s dining hall in 1969 and the rebuilding of its house in 1979 confirmed this. The customary identity factors of *whakapapa* and *tikanga* allowed a long-term relationship with the Ngati Whakaue of Te Arawa to be genealogically established and maintained through common ancestry, gifting of lands, and prestations of *taonga.* Thus, the dominance of customary core values ensures renewed vitality of Mataatua Marae as it travels through time and continues to be maintained by Tuhoe tribal immigrants living in Rotorua.

These two *taurahere marae* examples, John Waititi Memorial Marae and Mataatua Marae, are the first of their kind and have since been replicated many times over throughout city areas of New Zealand. The second part of this essay highlights and contrasts these two very different types of *marae* in order to provide a clearer understanding of the two disparate value systems underpinning today's immigrant Maori communities.

Case Study Two: John Waititi, a Nontribal Marae

Just sixty years after the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, it was commonly thought by the majority in New Zealand that the Maori were a dying race. From the 1860s Maori leadership battled to maintain control over their people and resources as the Crown pursued deliberate programs of land individualization, fragmentation, and alienation (Walker 1990). By 1900 the Maori population was at its lowest, confined mostly to poorly sanitized, disease-ridden reserves on marginal lands. Two world wars provided some opportunity for young Maori men to break the cycle and explore new horizons but at great cost. After World War II the Maori population resurged with new health and housing initiatives, and its younger members fled their economically isolated *papakainga* to embrace the new and exciting non-kinship-economic lifestyle offered by New Zealand's main city centers.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Maori support networks were created in response

to the needs of thousands of descendants who had resettled in new and unfamiliar urban surroundings. The 1962 Maori Welfare Act, administered by the Ministry for Maori Affairs, gave rise to new Maori Committees that, in Auckland, were operated by respected government officers like Monty Wikiriwhi, Peter Awatere, and John Waititi. The initial goal of these committees was to assist the transition of Maori from a tribal to an urban environment by forming support networks that reached into urban Maori communities. However, these networks also became, either consciously or unconsciously, effective vehicles for countering the integration and assimilation policies pursued by the Crown during this era. By the 1970s, the early Maori Committee initiatives were bolstered by autonomous national Maori organizations such as the New Zealand Maori Council, Maori Wardens, and Maori Women's Welfare League, which arose out of wider political and social needs of urbanized Maori. These national bodies, like the Maori Committees, also sought the continuation of culture and tradition, in reaction to Crown policies. This resulted in the creation of kinlike nontribal structures to assist Maori living in the cities. The consequence of these two waves of Crown-reactive initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s was to establish and reinforce a nontribal identity, overriding tribal affiliation. Within a generation, tribal affiliation was often superseded by a new sense of Maori identity, entitling individuals access to all sorts of opportunities, ultimately Crown-funded. In the earlier years this funding was plentiful because of the huge labor shortage in cities.

By the late 1970s, however, this all came to an end as the country fell into an unparalleled long-term economic recession. Overnight, urban-living Maori became a burgeoning social welfare dilemma. A large percentage of the unskilled urban workforce were Maori, and they now faced the prospect of long-term unemployment. While Pacific Island minority immigrants retained a strong sense of community—religion, inability to speak English, and large extended-family units living in close proximity assisted maintenance of ethnic identity in a foreign urban milieu—Maori found themselves relatively isolated and bound to state homes pepper-potted throughout New Zealand's main cities. Not surprisingly, the Pacific Island communities were better able to organize themselves to take advantage of the growing factory-driven employment opportunities that emerged in the late 1970s. In contrast, most urban Maori families of this era struggled to survive owing to lack of ethnic solidarity or requisite skills to step up into white-collar employment opportunities. Although their children were reaping the benefits of good education and health, the majority of city Maori remained financially dependent on the Crown through housing. Any notions of returning home to a supportive *marae,* elders, and community proved unrealistic given that rural Maori society continued to remain deeply impoverished as a direct result of the Crown's continuing land alienation policies.

During this time some Maori sought higher education as a means to escape the poverty trap, and a few of this number later became leaders of nationalized political protests against the Crown's abandonment of the Maori. Amidst soaring crime, unemployment, and political protest, an urban-driven Maori renaissance surfaced (Walker 1987, 1990), led by younger academic and union-trained descendants. These individuals publicly laid blame for the social ills of urbanized Maori at the feet of their coloniser, the Crown (and by extension all Pakeha), alleging that blatant land alienation policies and racism had, first, severed their generation from their ancestral heritage and, second, entrapped them in a cycle of low wage earning and social dependency (Greenland 1984).

Some, however, sought to reconstitute the *marae* in an urban context to fulfill immigrant Maori yearnings to belong to a moral community they could exclusively call home. In West Auckland's Waipareira community, a long-term *marae* project was already well under way by the late 1970s. Young charismatic Maori stepped into positions of authority and guided the *marae* project to become a vehicle of pan-Maori urban unity. It was decided that if city Maori had their own *marae* where they could maintain a sense of culture and tradition, then their self-esteem would also benefit. According to evidence given during the Whanau O Waipareira claim hearing to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1994, Ms. Tuoro stated: "With so many Maori coming to live in West Auckland (Waipareira), and many of them increasingly out of touch with their families at home and their culture and traditions we sought to establish a place where they could learn from and which they could belong to and identify with" (WAI 414).

The *marae* that the Waipareira community sought to establish was also required for welcoming *manuhiri* and holding *hui,* especially *tangihanga.* Eventually the present site was secured, and the Ngati Porou carver Pine Taiapa blessed the land. In due course, after years of fund-raising, the *marae* and associated house Nga Tumanako (aspirations) were built by Pine and his brother, John. According to Ms. Tuoro, this construction gave the *marae* a lot of *mana.* She went on to say that the "Marae was meant to be pan-tribal. [It] left no room for the tribal bit. You had to leave your tribalism at the door. . . . What we were trying to create . . . was a sense of family and a sense of belonging when people were no longer able to readily access their whanau ties in the areas they were originally from" (WAI 414).

Another person to give evidence in 1994, Tai Nathan, explained that even though people involved in the *marae* might not originate from West Auckland, "they have since been buried in Waikumete Cemetery and have kept their link with the land that way" (WAI 414). In other words, because their dead were buried in the land, this gave them a sense of *tangata whenua* status to their urban Waipareira district, not based on *whakapapa* (kinship

ties to Ngati Whatua), but on noncustomary occupation (Crown title, purchase) and a sense of community.

Some tribally oriented Maori, however, were not so accepting of the nontribal direction in which the proposed urban *marae* was heading, especially because it was taking place on another kin group's *mana o te whenua.* Dr. Pita Sharples is recorded as saying that half of the Maori people he and his committee approached about building a *marae* in West Auckland said, "No, my marae is [in] Ngati Porou and that's it," or "My marae is . . . in Te Arawa, and that's it, you can't have a marae in town" (WAI 414). Sharples disagreed with these answers because, in his opinion, "the street was our marae, our houses were our marae when *[tangihanga]* came up, our schools were our marae" (ibid.).

A paper written in 1976 by Pepe reviews these trials and tribulations, and records that Sharples, chairman of the *marae* planning committee, used the Tuhoe example in Rotorua (Mataatua Marae) to demonstrate to his many doubters that an outside group could build and own a *marae* in another tribe's territory. It appears, however, that the special *tangata whenua* relationship on which the Tuhoe example had actually been built and that is still maintained today (see case study three, Mataatua, below) was overlooked in favor of creating a nontribal *marae* to which everyone could equally belong. Sharples and his followers devised a new set of nontraditional rules *(kawa)* designed not only to prevent any one group from taking control of the proposed *marae,* but also to reinforce the Waipareira Maori community of West Auckland as one *whanau* (extended family) (ibid.). And so out of this philosophical stance the idea of a permanent nontribal *marae* was formed, "built by the people for the people, and [John] Waititi was chosen as an ideal that we might all aspire to. So with permission from Ngati Whatua elders . . . and with permission from Whanau a Apanui to carry John's name, we built this marae" (Sharples, in WAI 414)

Exactly who the Ngati Whatua elders were who gave this permission remains unclear, especially as the many tribes of Ngati Whatua extend over one hundred kilometers north as far away as Dargaville and Whangarei. According to the Orakei people of Ngati Whatua, who hold *mana o te whenua* on which John Waititi Memorial Marae (Waititi) was built, certain individuals may have been approached, but as a tribe they were never directly consulted (Kawharu, personal communication, 1998). In comparison, Tuhoe immigrants went to great lengths to acquire the mandate of the *tangata whenua* to build Te Tira Hou, and in return Orakei attended this *marae*'s opening in force. However, the lack of *tangata whenua* at the opening of Waititi indicates that proper communication with Ngati Whatua O Orakei was never achieved.

Interestingly, Sharples also stated in his evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal that Waititi was initially planned as a *takawaenga*—a place that could act as an intermediary *marae*—for the many thousands of Maori dwelling in the city (WAI 414). But then he says that the *marae* committee began noticing that Maori who moved to the city developed non-kinship relations out of which a new pantribal Maori community arose: "Obligations and privileges which we enjoyed with our [relations] . . . back home, we were now extending to our fellow Maori neighbours. . . . So to me it is very clear that . . . non-tribal . . . Maori people in urban areas, have got to be recognised" (ibid.). It was, therefore, decided that instead of being a *takawaenga,* Waititi would become a pantribal focus of identity for Maori living in the Waipareira district. If the *tangata whenua* wished to participate on Waititi Marae they, like everyone else, were expected to leave their tribal identity behind at the gate. Again, such a decision was made without proper consultation with Orakei.

Confusingly, when the *marae* was opened in 1980, it was still being interpreted by visiting tribal Maori as a *takawaenga* where their urban-living descendants could learn skills and reestablish their kinship ties with their home *marae.* Te Arawa were under this impression when they appeared in force to support the opening of Waititi. But some time after being welcomed onto the *marae,* they realized that all things tribal were being overridden, and there were no *tangata whenua* present to reassert the *mana* of the occasion. When organizers stubbornly decided to reseat extra people, including women, directly in front of the *kaumatua,* it was interpreted as a transgression of *tapu* that could not be tolerated. This insult coupled with the realization that Ngati Whatua O Orakei were conspicuously absent finally made the elders realize that the John Waititi Marae was never going to be the *takawaenga* they had envisaged. Led by Tenga of Ngati Whakaue, Te Arawa controversially packed up midway through the opening ceremony and returned to Rotorua.

Nevertheless, since its dramatic opening, the Sharples nontribal response to the Crown's historical imposition of land alienation and consequent urban relocation has undoubtedly assisted many Maori in bridging their traditional sense of community with the everyday metropolitan reality of individualism. Waititi not only fulfills the educational aspirations of its leaders, but it has also successfully focused an urban Maori cultural revival in West Auckland at a time when Ngati Whatua, because of Crown intervention, were unable to extend hospitality to the thousands of incoming tribal immigrants settling on their lands. Over the past two decades, Waititi has made a positive contribution to eviscerated tribal immigrants by providing them with an in lieu Maori identity built primarily on a sense of community. In an attempt to overcome the ancestral reality of the land on which the *marae* stands, Sharples

has on one hand used pantribally recognized Maori symbols, concepts, and elements as the cultural anchor to which its beneficiaries might hold firm, while on the other he has made it clear that the people of Waititi Marae are not claiming land, because they still recognize Ngati Whatua as *tangata whenua* of Auckland (WAI 414).

This proclamation indicates that Waititi accepts and supports, in theory, Ngati Whatua's *mana* over the surrounding Waipareira region. In practice, however, its non–tribally based cultural and social programs appear to be obviating Ngati Whatua's *tangata whenua* status. In its quest to create and uphold an affirmative community-based urban Maori identity, Waititi does not transmit to its members the Maori moral importance of recognizing tribal status both back home and in the cities. While the *tangata whenua* vacuum existed, this nontribal approach to rebuilding Maori identity worked quite successfully. But in more recent times, mainly as the result of the Waitangi Tribunal process, *tangata whenua* groups throughout Aotearoa have begun to reassert *mana* over their ancestral landscapes, and metropolitan areas are no exception. As a consequence, new conflicts of identity and authority between *tangata whenua* and nontribal groups like Waititi have begun to surface. Today, John Waititi Memorial Marae may still be perceived by its followers as "a symbol to pan-tribalism and multi-culturalism" (Tamihere, in WAI 414:37), but they can no longer avoid the fact that the *tangata whenua,* Ngati Whatua O Orakei, are not only back in the picture, but also have begun reasserting their customary authority over all things Maori in their Auckland territory (for example, the Maori Advisory Committee [Taumata-a-Iwi] at the Auckland War Memorial Museum).

In the future, therefore, it appears that *marae* like Waititi will need to reconsider their relationships with *tangata whenua* seriously if they wish to remain relevant and vital to all Maori. Reconsideration of the *takawaenga* concept, providing a bridge for the recovery of tribal identity, and cementing proactive partnerships with *tangata whenua* seem to offer an exciting new direction in which these *marae* might head.

By the same token, rurally based tribes will also need to implement new strategies by which they might best reclaim (Maaka 1994:311) and provide for their urban descendants all the benefits their relations receive back home. The current system of land share ownership, which only favors those still fortunate enough to own shares, excludes most descendants from benefiting both financially and in terms of identity. This Crown-imposed system needs to be reviewed so that it might genealogically recognize that all descendants of a selected common ancestor, no matter their residential locality on the planet, are equally entitled to tribal benefits. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of tribal chiefs to search out all their tribes' descendants so they might

once again participate as bona fide members. In this respect, urban *marae* like Waititi could perform a valuable role in partnership with urban *tangata whenua,* by bridging wider tribes with their urban descendants.

Case Study Three: Mataatua, an Immigrant-Tribal Marae

My third *marae* case study provides a tribal-orientated contrast to John Waititi Memorial Marae. It examines the background to New Zealand's first ever migrant-tribal urban *marae,* Mataatua, to demonstrate that *whakapapa* and *tikanga* can remain relevant and vital to non–*tangata whenua* descendants who live, work, and reproduce in an urban context away from their ancestral homes.

There are twelve *marae* in the city of Rotorua, but they are not all controlled by Te Arawa kin groups. The one notable exception is the *marae* generally called Mataatua, which belongs to the people of Tuhoe. Formerly a formidable enemy of the Arawa people, the Tuhoe are customarily affiliated with lands located in the bordering Urewera region of Whirinaki and Ruatahuna, some fifty or more kilometers from Rotorua. Oral traditions associated with *taonga* held by both kin groups provide rich accounts of the numerous conflicts waged over the generations, culminating in stories of warrior deaths, peace-making marriages, and subsequent births of new leaders (for example, the story of Pareraututu in Tapsell 1997). When Europeans began taking hold in the northern reaches of New Zealand, Te Arawa chose to embrace the opportunities the newcomers offered, including firearms, to keep kin groups such as Tuhoe at bay. Conversely, Tuhoe, who had no direct access to the sea or European trade, became more and more disadvantaged during the nineteenth-century colonial expansion on the North Island and chose instead to retreat into the relative safety of the densely forested Urewera mountains (Binney 1979, 1995).

Between the two tribes stretched the Kaingaroa plains, a traditional buffer zone where many intertribal wars were fought. Because of poor soil quality and wind-swept exposure, very few people ever permanently occupied it. Originally the plains came under the dominion of the Ngati Whare people, who are as closely connected genealogically to Te Arawa as they are to Tuhoe. In post–European contact years, Ngati Whare decided to retreat into the relative safety of the Urewera mountains among their Tuhoe kin of Ruatahuna. In the early twentieth century, during Ngati Whare's absence, the Crown high-handedly appropriated these scrublands and planted a huge pine forest. Ngati Whare were understandably aggrieved, because they had never ceded control of the Kaingaroa plains—including Murupara—to the Crown. (For examples of grievances associated with the Kaingaroa forest

and estates, see Tuhoe Waikaremoana Trust Board [WAI 40]; Ngati Whare Iwi Claims [WAI 66]; Ngati Tuwharetoa [WAI 269]; and Ngati Rangitihi [WAI 524]. Also see Crown Forestry Rental Trust 1996–1997 for claim objectives.)

By the 1950s, first harvesting in the Kaingaroa forest had begun, and then the fast-growing timber industry chose Rotorua as one of its central milling centers. The township rapidly expanded to city proportions in order to cater to the huge influx of labor required to fell trees, operate the mills, and provide supporting industries (Stafford 1988). During this time, hundreds of young Tuhoe and Ngati Whare descendants left their traditional homelands in search of a way of life that freed them from the poverty that had been strangling most central North Island tribes since before the First World War (Walker 1992). The post–World War II generation was not blind to the opportunities presented by the growing forestry industry, and many took up the government's offer of cheap housing to enable them to work and live a far less impoverished lifestyle in Rotorua. However, their parents and elders, who remained isolated in the Urewera mountains, continued to endure difficult conditions. Although contact with their remote home *marae* was maintained by migrants, especially in times of life crises, it did not come without friction from non-Maori employers who struggled to understand the underlying cultural importance of *hui.* The need to return to *marae* to take on senior duties as their homeland elders died neither assisted the migrants' job security nor their families' livelihood back in Rotorua. Compounding the situation was the fact that, as a new generation of Tuhoe was being born and growing up away from home, the original immigrants of the 1950s were not only aging but also dying. The ongoing difficulty of arranging *tangihanga* at *marae* in the geographically isolated regions of the Urewera, not to mention the ongoing kinship separation of elders from their urbanized grandchildren, rapidly drew Tuhoe into a head-on confrontation with Western world values.

Fortunately, when the Tuhoe immigrants of Ruatahuna and Ngati Whare arrived in mass in Rotorua in the 1950s, they had a distinct advantage over all other visiting descendants. Although Tuhoe had originally retreated into their mountains during the nineteenth century, they still desired access to Western goods and food products. Every January they used to travel down to Rotorua by horse and dray to camp on the outlying lands, now occupied by the Whakarewarewa Golf Club, and collect supplies for the upcoming winter. According to the esteemed Tuhoe elder of Ruatahuna, John Tahuri (personal communication, 1998), Ngati Whakaue in the 1920s took pity on their Ruatahuna and Ngati Whare relations and decided to make available a township block of land *(tuku rangatira)* named Nga Tarewa Pounamu

for their use. In 1923–1924 Tuhoe erected a large carved house on this block and subsequently named it Mataatua—in memory of an associated ancestral voyaging *waka* (canoe) from Hawaiki—and provided shelter for visiting Tuhoe and Ngati Whare until it became derelict in the 1950s. It was around this time that Ngati Whare were forced to sell some of Ngati Whakaue's *tuku rangatira* to the Rotorua County Council for nonpayment of rates. Fortunately, the remaining four acres, under Ruatahuna control, was vested as a Maori reserve that protected the remaining lands from further alienation.

In 1969 a *wharekai* (dining hall) was erected beside the old Mataatua house to allow Tuhoe immigrants to supplement *hui* with appropriate hospitality. Then in 1975 the old house was finally pulled down, and fund-raising for a new one commenced. Its development was guided by the *kaupapa* (vision) that it must represent all the Tuhoe who were by then living permanently in Rotorua, including descendants not only from Ruatahuna and Ngati Whare, but also from Ruatoki and Waimana. This guiding vision was to ensure that all descendants were provided with a bridge—*takawaenga*—home so long as they were born, lived, and died on the *mana o te whenua* of another tribe, Ngati Whakaue of Te Arawa. Native timbers were sourced from the Whirinaki forest, seasoned, and then taken to the New Zealand Maori Arts and Crafts Institute for carving by Pine Taiapa. Eventually the responsibility of deciding on the ancestors after whom the carvings were to be named was passed to John Tahuri because of his genealogical relationship to both Ngati Whakaue—the original donors of the land—and Ruatahuna—the original recipients.

In a taped interview, this Tuhoe *kaumatua* released all the knowledge he had surrounding the building of the new Mataatua, which was considerable (29 April 1998). He explained that the first *poupou* (on the left) in the house was named Maraki, because this Ruatahuna ancestor was also a direct descendant of the Ngati Whakaue leader Tunohopu. Another important ancestor to be depicted, this time as the *poutokomanawa,* was Rangiteaorere. He became famous for assisting his Te Arawa uncle Uenukukopako (the father of Whakaue) in capturing Mokoia Island, and many of his descendants make up Ngati Whakaue today (see Stafford 1967:61–74 for a Te Arawa–grounded history of Rangiteaorere).

After three decades of participating as unskilled labor in primary industries on the volcanic plateau,[4] Tuhoe were finally able to open their new Mataatua house on 2 June 1979 (Stafford 1988:365). The dramatic opening was marked by the Ruatahuna people presenting a famous *taonga (wahaika)* of their nineteenth-century leader Te Kooti, named Te Manaaki, to Ngati Whakaue as a peace offering. This was necessary because, as Kaki Leonard

noted, the *wharekai* (originally opened on 5 April 1969) should not have been given a name that included the *tapu* words "Te Arawa" because of the building's association with food (it was named Te Aroha O Te Arawa, "The Love of Te Arawa"). Apart from that one incident everything proceeded smoothly, and today Mataatua Marae provides the many hundreds of Tuhoe's Rotorua-based descendants with a *taonga*-rich place where they can bid farewell to their dead and conduct their monthly religious rituals (of the Ringatu Faith, held on the twelfth day of every month) first established by Te Kooti in the late nineteenth century (see Binney 1995 for background on Ringatu in the Rotorua region).

As for the *wharekai*'s name, nothing was immediately done, because Ngati Whakaue did not quickly provide Tuhoe with a more appropriate replacement. In fact it was not until the late 1980s that the Ngati Whakaue elder Tomairangi Kameta finally gifted to Tuhoe the Ngati Whakaue ancestral name Hinetai, while he was attending a *tangihanga* at Ruatahuna. He explained that Hinetai was not only the daughter of Tunohopu, from whom the land on which the Mataatua Marae stands originated, but she was also the ancestor of the famous Tuhoe leader Te Whiu Maraki. Tomairangi therefore suggested that Hinetai would meet with Ngati Whakaue's approval as a replacement for Te Aroha O Te Arawa as the name for the *wharekai* at Mataatua Marae in Rotorua.[5]

Around the same time the special relationship between the *tangata whenua* and Tuhoe was reaffirmed when Ngati Whare presented to Tomairangi a large *totara* log as *utu* for losing some of Ngati Whakaue's gifted Nga Tarewa Pounamu lands to the Rotorua County Council. From this log the 1990 Te Arawa *waka taua* (ceremonial war canoe) was expertly crafted by the master Te Arawa carver Lyonel Grant, and this *taonga* has since been paddled not only in New Zealand, but also overseas at the 1992 America's Cup regatta in San Diego.

Discussion

The purpose of this essay has been threefold. First, I noted that there are three types of *marae* operating in New Zealand today: tribal, nontribal and immigrant-tribal. Second, tribal *(tangata whenua) marae* belong to a genealogical continuum reaching far back into Maori society's ancestral Pacific origins, while the other two immigrant *(taurahere)* examples demonstrate diverse usage of cultural identity markers to maintain Maori identity in an urban context. Third, I have tried to make the reader aware that each of the immigrant *marae* situations operates under two disparate Maori value systems. On one hand, nontribal *marae* seem to have arisen out of urban

descendants' aspirations to counter Crown integration and assimilation policies, creating an institution to which all Maori who dwelled in the local city community might equally belong. On the other hand, the immigrant-tribal *marae* has developed out of special relationships forged and maintained with the *tangata whenua* that, from time to time, are reaffirmed through the prestation of *taonga* at specially significant occasions. Whereas nontribal *marae* have exclusively developed a pan-Maori identity in reaction to Crown policies and ethnic competition, immigrant-tribal *marae* have explored synthesizing genealogically ordered lore and custom *(whakapapa)* with the customary authority of the land *(mana o te whenua)* of the host tribal community.

While in the past nontribal *marae* have provided an effective vehicle to counter recent urban dilemmas, especially in the absence of *tangata whenua,* their current ability to adapt to the resurgence in tribal identity appears to be limited. The reemergence of *tangata whenua marae* in urban areas increasingly challenges the morality of any nontribal *marae* that resists honoring the primary status of *mana o te whenua.* Meanwhile, immigrant-tribal *marae* that offer alternative routes to ameliorating life crises, maintaining kin group identity, and conducting religious rituals without having always to return to geographically isolated homelands appear to be strategically well positioned to provide their descendants with a *takawaenga,* or bridge, into the twenty-first century.

Essentially, the recent urban transformations of *marae* are best understood as part of a cultural continuum of dynamic adaptation and fluidity that has existed for millennia. The more recent *marae* transformations, such as those experienced when kin groups moved from Rangiatea to Aotearoa, from pre–European contact to Christianity, from economic and social depression to an era of urbanization and treaty grievance settlements, are part of the continuum of Maori tribal society. Although tribes have been irreversibly entangled with European culture, religions, and values since the mid–nineteenth century, the *marae* has endured and is still the quintessential focus of Maori tribal identity. Ameliorating crises is part and parcel of each generation's responsibility for maintaining their kin group's long-term identity in relation to particular lands and the *marae.* Successful amelioration has assisted tribes over the generations to survive, recover, and prosper from one crisis to the next, ranging from climate changes, volcanism, and land contestation through to introduced diseases, firearms, Christian doctrine, and the imposition of foreign laws (as by the Crown). The secret to this survival seems to lie in each tribe's ability, first, to ensure that the lore of their ancestors persists in such a way that descendants can adapt to their changing social, political, and economic circumstances and, second, to prosper. This genealogical ability

of descendants to synthesize outside belief systems to complement their *marae*-associated core values appears to be at the heart of successful kin group crisis negotiation.

The challenge of living within an all-pervasive Western modernity is today's crisis for tribal identity and the *marae.* Core *marae* values of *whakapapa* and *tikanga,* carefully maintained for countless generations, have allowed descendants—the seed of Rangiatea—to maintain their kin relationship to their ancestors *(mana),* to the land *(whenua),* and to each other *(whanaungatanga).* The weakening of any one of these three essential customary relationships in the movement from one generation to the next represents a crisis to which kin group leaders must respond or risk the extinction of their *marae* and associated tribal identity. In the later part of the twentieth century, the weakening of all three of these kin relationships occurred as the result of urban resettlement, thereby disintegrating communities and presenting a threat to tribal identity. This crisis has been manifest on both an individual and a group level over the past five decades not only for those tribes being depopulated (rural-based communities), but also for the *tangata whenua* of metropolitan areas. It is the task of today's Maori leaders to respond creatively to this latest crisis, as their predecessors have done time and again over the generations, and to find new ways of allowing the *marae* values of *whakapapa* and *tikanga* to reinforce once again the group's kin identity to a community philosophically grounded in ancestral land.

The *marae* is a tried and tested institution designed to negotiate crises. But unlike in the past, today's *marae* is itself being directly contested. In 1951 the Crown confiscated Ngati Whatua O Orakei's *marae.* The repercussions of this action not only affected the *tangata whenua* but also the many Maori from tribes throughout Aotearoa/New Zealand who resettled in Auckland. For those resettling or born in the Auckland region between the years 1951 and 1991, Ngati Whatua were an invisible people. During that time, because there was no *marae* symbol upon the landscape proclaiming the tribe's presence, there was no statement of *tangata whenua* status. Consequently, the tens of thousands of Maori migrants entering the Auckland region were not provided the opportunity of customary recognition upon another tribe's ancestral domain. While the first generation of migrants maintained close contact with their home *marae* and kin groups (Metge 1964), this was not always the case for their children. The next generation grew up more familiar with their surrounding urban environment than with their parents' home *marae,* perhaps hundreds of kilometers distant. This generation was mostly unaware of Ngati Whatua's presence as *tangata whenua.* They began to form their own understanding of Maoriness, which had little to do with *whakapapa* and *tikanga,* but was instead ethnically molded in a Pakeha-dominated urban context. The result is a kinlike but nontribal structure—Maori kinifi-

cation (Rosenblatt 1997:18)—in which the customary *marae* concept has been revolutionarily adapted to represent a Maori identity devoid of genealogical connection to ancestral lands and the universe. In other words, as long as one is Maori, identity to nontribal *marae,* like Waititi, relies solely on residing in a particular region. These *marae* not only provide their members with a validation of their Maoriness, but give them a Maori-like platform to define themselves as *iwi* and even as *tangata whenua.*[6]

On one level, it could be argued that this nontribal urban *marae* phenomenon represents the successful indigenization of modernity (Sahlins, in Rosenblatt 1997:18), where urban leadership has apparently reconciled the crisis of metropolitan resettlement by providing descendants with a home *marae* in the city. From a tribal perspective, however, this attempt at ameliorating urban dislocation and Maori identity appears to have been counterproductive. Instead of harnessing customary values, which might continue to provide descendants with ancestral pride and identity in new circumstances (the urban milieu), *marae* like Waititi have discarded them in favor of a short-term solution. Urban Maori kinification obviates both *mana o te whenua* and *whakapapa.* Aside from the difficulties kinification ideology represents to the *tangata whenua,* it also prevents urban-born descendants from learning about their ancestral *marae* heritage of *mana, whenua,* and *whanaungatanga,* not to mention *taonga.* Denied this heritage, on death they are prevented from spiritually finding their genealogical pathway home to Rangiatea/Hawaiki.

Not all urban-dwelling Maori have chosen the nontribal route to maintain their sense of Maori identity. Many have continued to keep contact with their ancestral homelands either individually or as a group, via intermediary immigrant-tribal *marae,* even though they were born and raised in cities. During the years when Waititi was created, Ngati Whatua may have been *marae*-less, but this did not stop outside tribal groups from approaching the still distinct *tangata whenua* community of Auckland to seek their permission and guidance regarding the construction of an immigrant-tribal *marae.* The same also occurred in Rotorua when Tuhoe approached Ngati Whakaue. Such groups realized that lands on which cities have been built still have *tangata whenua,* whether or not their presence was obvious. Thereafter, customary understandings of *whakapapa* and *tikanga* have continued to guide these immigrant-tribal communities while they have dwelled on another kin group's city-covered *whenua.* Instead of an either/or situation, immigrant-tribal *marae* have become examples of urban adaptation without severing ancestral continuity. They successfully demonstrate that modern Maori aspirations can be achieved without having to sacrifice kin group identity.

In Auckland, Ngati Whatua's cultural slide into oblivion was finally reversed

when the Crown returned Orakei Marae in 1991. With their symbol of *mana* over the land restored, Ngati Whatua's presence in Auckland is slowly returning to full strength. A new generation of leaders have taken over the role of providing their descendants and all other Maori who choose to live under their *mana* with ancestral protection *(hunga tiaki).* This protection, however, is for the time being not accepted by nontribal *marae,* like Waititi, who continue to live and operate outside the lore of *whakapapa* and *tikanga.* Instead they are molding their Maori identity as an ethnic reaction to Pakeha values as dictated by the Crown rather than according to ancestral precedents as prescribed by *tangata whenua.* In the late 1990s these *marae,* represented by urban Maori authorities (UMA) like Te Whanau O Waipareira, engaged in a divisive public campaign against tribalism. One urban leader strongly and very publicly denigrated the maintenance of tribal identity as "a backward step [that] belonged in the dark ages" (Tamihere, in *New Zealand Herald* 1998:A5). However, in the same article a renowned tribal leader simply questioned: "If they don't have a whakapapa, how do they know they are Maori?" (O'Regan, in ibid.).

The late 1990s urban Maori campaign appears to have been the result of growing competition among tribal organizations for Crown-controlled assets and resources that have been promised to *"iwi."* Underlying motivations at an individual as well as a group level are undoubtedly complex. Closer inspection, however, reveals that the recent reinterpretations of nontribal *marae* as *"iwi"* bases are the latest urban counteraction to the Crown's ongoing divide and rule policies, which have been pitting Maori against Maori since the treaty was signed in 1840. More recently, the same urban-educated, legally trained Maori have shifted the battle for Crown resources back to the regions, especially those traditionally controlled by Tuhoe and Te Arawa *hapu.* The new prize is the capture and control of the Crown's multi-billion-dollar forestry assets that grow on the exclusive ancestral estates of distinct *hapu*—subtribes (WAI 791). Once again the Crown appears quite willing to enter into agreements with a non–tribally organized global settlement group (Judicial Conference File 2000), at the expense of the rightful descendants, who have remained relatively impoverished since original alienation in the late 1800s.

In the meantime, nontribal organizations like Waititi's Whanau O Waipareira have begun seeking investment opportunities outside normal Maori spheres in an effort to create a sound capital base from which a community can develop a long-term sustainable future. The most recent chief executive officer acknowledged that, as Ngati Whatua O Orakei continues to grow in power, it is imperative that a mutually sustainable partnership is forged (Te Rongomaiwhiti Mackintosh, personal communication, 2000). Such a part-

nership would provide benefit for both parties. *Tangata whenua* would finally be able to fulfill their obligations of *manaakitanga*—care and hospitality—to outsider Maori living on their lands, while nontribal urban authorities could provide the organizational mechanisms for the distribution of both Crown-controlled and tribal-originating health, education, housing, and employment resources to urban descendants. It remains to be seen how John Waititi Memorial Marae may respond to any such corporate initiative.

In the future I expect the customary precedent already set by urban immigrant-tribal *marae,* like Mataatua, coupled with responsible tribal and urban Maori leadership may well provide a positive path of development acceptable to both tribal and nontribal Maori organizations. One day this kind of development could deliver to all descendants, wherever they live on our planet, equal opportunities and benefits, while at the same time reinforcing their genealogical relationship with their home community of *marae,* elders, ancestral estates, and *taonga.*

NOTES

1. See Tapsell 1997 for a more comprehensive understanding of these central Maori concepts from the perspective of a *taonga*/kin group relationship.

2. In reference to Weiner's (1992) use of this concept as discussed in Tapsell 1997.

3. Following Kawharu 1989 I have decided to pluralize references to Maori kin groups within this essay so they might closer reflect the community reality that all tribes invariably represent collective ancestral and living identities.

4. The industries included forestry, dairy factories, and meat works.

5. This name has since been placed on the *wharekai,* and sometime in the future a special unveiling of the name is expected to take place, to which Tuhoe intend to invite Ngati Whakaue as guests of honor (John Tahuri, personal communication, 1998).

6. *Iwi* has until recently been translated to mean "tribe." But around the time I wrote the first draft of this essay (1998), urban Maori authorities, of which Waititi's incorporated trust (Whanau O Waipareira) is one, unsuccessfully tried to argue in the High Court that this concept is not necessarily based on kinship, only on residency (*New Zealand Herald* 1998:A5).

GLOSSARY

Aotearoa	accepted indigenous name for New Zealand
atua	ancient protecting ancestors, gods
hapu	subtribal group tracing descent from a common ancestor, which traditionally consisted of approximately three hundred members. How-

	ever, as the result of the 1840 treaty and the introduction of individual land title implemented by the Native Land Court, boundaries and kin group affiliation have become fixed. Consequently, *hapu* membership today can be on the order of thousands and may even be referred to as *iwi* (also see Firth, in Kawharu 1975:21); pregnant
Hawaiki	the ancestral homeland of the Arawa descendants: Rangiatea
hongi	ritual greeting by pressing noses
hui	kin group gathering on a *marae*
hunga tiaki	Te Arawa dialect term for *kaitiaki,* meaning guardian, manager, trustee
iwi	tribe: a large social grouping of related *hapu* connected by a distant common ancestor that temporarily came together in times of crisis or for political expediency (as in war). In more recent times *iwi* has also been used to define any group of Maori not necessarily connected genealogically; bones
kaumatua	male elders who are the kin group's orators on *marae*
kaupapa	charter, plan of procedure, business
kawa	protocol on the *marae*, rules
mana	authority, prestige
manuhiri	visitors to a *marae* not of *tangata whenua* descent
marae	ceremonial courtyard in front of meeting house
mauri	spiritual essence, life force
mihi	to give a public speech: *mihimihi*
Mokoia	island in center of Lake Rotorua, also called Te Motutapu a Tinirau
Ngati . . .	tribal *(hapu* or *iwi)* prefix meaning "the people of . . ." (followed by kin group's eponymous ancestor)
pa	village, fortified hilltops: *papakainga*
Papa	Papatuanuku—Earth Mother from whom all things descend: *marae*
papakainga	village community surrounding the *marae*
poupou	carved ancestral slab of wood inside a meeting house
rangatira	tribal leader, usually a male elder
Ranginui	Sky Father
Rotorua	one of nineteen lakes, inland Bay of Plenty; main township in region
taiaha	long hardwood fighting staff depicting an ancestor
Tainui	confederation of Waikato tribes named after their ancestral *waka*
takawaenga	intermediary, go-between, mediator
tangata whenua	kin group that holds *mana* over their customary-ancestral estates
tangihanga	death-mourning ritual on *marae*, which can continue for several days

taonga	any tangible or intangible item, object, or thing that represents a kin group's genealogical identity in relation to its estates and resources and that is passed down through generations
tapu	restricted, set apart; space/place associated with ancestors (c.f. *noa:* profane, common; space/place associated with everyday activities)
taurahere	immigrant Maori, non–*tangata whenua* Maori living in a town or city
Te Arawa	descendants of this ancient Hawaiki-originating *waka;* a mythical shark
Te Papa-i-Ouru	the ancient *marae* of Ngati Whakaue and all of Te Arawa
tohunga	spiritual leader, controller of *tapu* knowledge who supports the *rangatira*
totara	native tree used particularly for carving
Tuhoe	major tribal group of the Urewera region, Bay of Plenty
tuku rangatira	right of access to land and associated resources granted by home tribal group to an outside group
tupuna	ancestor
turangawaewae	a place to stand, home *marae*, ancestral land
utu	reciprocal payment, balance, revenge
wairua	ancestral spirit, soul
waka	general term for canoe, can be up to thirty meters long
wero	challenge
whakapapa	genealogy, philosophy of ordering the universe, weaving term: to layer
whanau	extended family, to give birth
whanaungatanga	interconnecting of kin during times of crisis, kinship
wharekai	dining hall on a *marae* complex; accompanies the meeting house and is usually named after a female ancestor
whare tupuna	meeting house named after kin group's eponymous ancestor
whenua	land; afterbirth, placenta

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ABUSE AND DISCIPLINE: THE CREATION OF MORAL COMMUNITY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE GROUPS ON THE WAIʻANAE COAST (HAWAIʻI)

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This article discusses the creation of moral community in two self-help groups on the Waiʻanae Coast of Oʻahu in the state of Hawaiʻi. One is a women's domestic violence group and the other a men's anger management group. Both groups use freely constructed narratives from the participants as the foundation for establishing rules of conduct and standards of the "good person." In each case, facilitators bring the lessons and the doctrine of a state agency to informal proceedings. The article argues that out of the intersection of participant interpretations of experiences and state-sanctioned forms of discipline come the lineaments of a moral community. In self-help groups, residents of the predominantly Hawaiian Waiʻanae Coast confront a discourse whose references to "wrong" do not accord with customary discourse about making things right. The development of "moral community," then, involves a continual negotiation between apparently distant representations of proper conduct, ethical behavior, and the virtuous self.

In this essay, I discuss the creation of moral community in self-help groups on the Waiʻanae Coast of Oʻahu in the state of Hawaiʻi.[1] The groups are part of a state system for dealing with victims and perpetrators of domestic violence. One is a women's group for victims of abuse and the other a men's group for those accused of committing domestic violence. The women's group used consciousness-raising techniques to persuade participants to change their circumstances. The men's group borrowed more explicitly pedagogical methods to teach men new ways of interacting in their relationships.

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Both groups encouraged the exchange of freely constructed narratives from participants.

Participation in each group was partly a matter of choice and partly a matter of coercion. The men's case is clear. Brought before Family Court, they were offered the choice of a jail term or attending an anger management group. Behind the choice lay the power of the court to restrain or incarcerate a man. The women's case is a bit different. The women chose to come to the group, using it as a resource against the abuse they were experiencing in a relationship. Behind their choice, however, lay the threat that the state, through Child Protective Services, would remove any children they had; the state argued that violence against a mother threatened the children in her household. Voluntary self-discipline took place in the context of state punishment.

As my remarks imply, group discussions focused on modes of discipline and punishment. Participants responded to the subject in narratives and in nonverbal performances, manipulating the official messages in creative and playful ways. Out of the intersection of participant interpretations and state-mandated forms of discipline came the lineaments of a moral community.

I will show that that community is grounded in shared ideas about the person and that these ideas evolve from a consideration of the meaning of self, autonomy, responsibility, and relationship. In self-help groups, residents of the predominantly Hawaiian Waiʻanae Coast confronted a discourse whose references to "wrong" did not accord with the local discourse about making things right. I develop the point that for participants an emphasis on self, extracted from group, is wrong.

My essay measures the distance between urban and local in terms of the means of instituting right behavior—in other words, discipline. Urban notions of discipline appear in doctrines diffused from an American legal, judicial, and therapeutic system. These doctrines are effectively represented in the "self-help" principles presented at the women's and the men's groups. The local notion of discipline appears in the narratives, in the gestures and behaviors of the participants, and in the expressed interpretations of self-help messages. Each time a group meets, participants and audience compose a "master" story that contains the lineaments of a moral community. The community is moral not only in the sense of judging, sanctioning, and approving behavior, but also in the "shared faith" confirmed at each morning's end. The form and content of the meetings serve as a "collective representation," a symbol of solidarity in the Durkheimian sense. As I show, the representation joins the urban and the local.

My essay is organized in the following way. First, I explain the relevance

of my site and my argument to a volume that focuses on processes of accommodating to a complex modern world. Next I outline the theoretical framework for my analysis of the discourses of discipline evident in the meetings I attended. The bulk of the essay concentrates on those meetings, showing how a juxtaposition of traditional forms of Hawaiian conflict resolution with modern programs of personal transformation embody collective representations of community in domestic violence groups.[2]

In the conclusion, I explore the significance of ongoing constructions of moral communities—for the process occurs weekly and varies with the vagaries of attendance, court interventions, and the presence of outsiders. Little is given in the situation: The participants at, the content of, and the personal and social impact of the gatherings shift and change, even within the three-hour period of a meeting. More than those who sit around a *marae* or attend church in Enid, Oklahoma, or quarrel over space in Honiara, the individuals who go to self-help groups follow their own devices. At the same time, no one removes herself or himself from the competing pressures writ large in a domestic violence group: the metropolitan emphasis on the individual as agent of her and his own acts, the local emphasis on the individual embedded, often entangled, in a nest of other individuals.

Why Urban?

Anyone who has seen the Waiʻanae Coast might consider it odd to include the area in a volume that uses "urbanism" as the primary setting for the activities and experiences of individuals. The dry leeward side of Oʻahu, the Waiʻanae Coast looks like a sequence of rural towns, wandering between mountainsides and beaches. The impression is somewhat belied by the heavy traffic on Farrington Highway, the main route along that coast. For my purposes, what lies behind the visual landscape scene is what urbanizes the residents of this part of Hawaiʻi. The towns of the Waiʻanae Coast are fully encircled by the political, structural, and cultural institutions of a metropolitan world.

Residents of these towns daily confront the administrative bureaucracies characteristic of a city and prominent in Honolulu. "Urban social relations are conducted within and contextualized by state and state-regulated institutions concerned with education, communication, transportation, production, commerce, welfare, worship, civic order, housing, and land use" (Sanjek 1990: 154). The relevant bureaucratic institutions for my research project include social service agencies, Child Protective Services, Family Court, and the Department of Health. These institutions perform functions that, as I learned,

Waiʻanae Coast residents both appreciate and resent. Manifestations of state authority, such institutions perpetuate a history of colonialism; they are also resources for individuals who experience dire poverty and discrimination. Individuals turn to agencies of the state for help in emergencies, like uncontrollable abuse or violence in a household, while simultaneously resisting the premises of that help. Each encounter with an agency exposes a resident to the diversity of ideologies and practices typical of an urbanized environment, casting into sharp light his or her own understandings of crisis and solution. Each encounter demonstrates the swing between "metropolitan" and "local" described in other essays in this volume.

The domestic violence groups I attended were sponsored by a downtown Honolulu agency. Policies established in the central office were translated into practices in towns radiating out from the city through the county of Honolulu.[3] The practices had an efficient, impersonal quality, evidently constructed in order to accomplish a goal systematically and predictably (in this particular case, to discipline the men into controlling anger and the women into resisting abuse). What actually happened in the groups shows the vitality of a local discourse of discipline constantly confronting a mandated, state-authorized, and urbanized discourse—either of which any person might voice. To anticipate my fuller discussion, the local evoked notions of generosity, harmony, and affiliation—*moral* to the urban environment's *technocratic* order.[4]

In modern cities, of which Honolulu is exemplary, "prevailing understandings and relationships would have to do with the technical rather than the moral order, which is to say that administrative regulation, business, and technical convenience would be dominant; and the cities in question were populated by inhabitants of diverse cultural origins, removed from the indigenous loci of their cultures" (Hannerz 1990:1). Honolulu is a typical modern city, and the institutions that implement state law develop strategies to deal efficiently with diversity, disorder, and disjunctive cultural systems. Through social service agencies, the arm of the central city extends to "peripheral" spaces like the towns on the Waiʻanae Coast. I put peripheral in quotation marks, since one of the points of my essay is that such designations are constructed, circumstantial, and contested by individuals and by institutions.

It follows that the local is neither opposite to nor replaced by the urban. At times denizens of a city are removed from the "indigenous loci of their cultures," at times they are not. Sometimes they distance themselves by choice—flying toward the glow on the horizon—and sometimes they have no choice but to leave home and resettle.

I want to add another characteristic of urbanism, or "the social and cultural characteristics that are the result of the urban" (Mayo 1987:100).[5] A city is characterized by the availability of spaces in which heterogeneity and

its counterpart homogeneity can be negotiated. "And, as in the well-ordered home, the spatial distribution of activities and persons in the city is more complex than might first appear," a sociologist of the city writes, and different spaces serve different functions depending on the moment of use and the intentions of the people who are using the space (Lofland [1973] 1985:67). The same space may be the site for different kinds of activities and discourses.

In the instance I am describing, significant spaces included the downtown agency, where, in stiff and formal offices, group facilitators were trained for their job; the small community building on the Waiʻanae Coast in which the groups gathered for weekly meetings; and an open and beautiful beach, across Farrington Highway from the community building. Symbolically if not geographically, the community building lay between the downtown offices and the beach, and inside its spaces activities were up for grabs.[6] Regimented at the agency and playful on the beach, the facilitators constantly renegotiated organization and roles in the small building mountainside of Farrington Highway.

By definition, a city offers multiple sites for activities, celebrations, and performances (Mayo 1987:101). Among those activities are historically constituted and contested means of maintaining order. The instance I observed can be described in terms of concentric circles: The outer ring is constituted by social service agencies whose practices implement state policy; the next ring consists of facilitators or "messengers" of the state to individuals; the inner ring is composed of the women and men who participated in domestic violence groups.[7] My story is not one of rigid (or unidirectional) encompassment but of flow from circumference to center and back, a version of the "cultural flows in space" Hannerz attributes to an urbanizing world (1990:1).

Disciplining and Disentangling

I was teaching Greg Dening's *Mr Bligh's Bad Language* when I began drafting this essay. The book is about many things, but one of its main themes is the nature of discipline on a British naval ship and the alternation between hierarchy and egalitarianism, rule and riot under a good commander (which Bligh was not). Dening's analysis of discipline on the *Bounty* modifies the classic account in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish,* and Dening's version shapes what I say below. I link the theoretical position set forth in *Bligh* to the specifics of Hawaiian modes of disciplining or "setting things right" (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1979:17).

In the introduction to a volume on conflict resolution in Pacific Island societies, White and Watson-Gegeo call the process "disentangling." "Disen-

tangling refers to cultural activities in which people attempt to 'straighten out' their 'tangled' relations" (White and Watson-Gegeo 1990:3). The customary mode of disentangling in Hawai'i is *ho'oponopono,* a group meeting within the *'ohana,* or extended family household. *Ho'oponopono* is structured, with a leader, who facilitates the movement of the discussions, guiding individual narratives to a final resolution. Individuals give their accounts to bring into the open a conflict or disagreement to be arbitrated through the wisdom of the leader (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972:61).

The structure of *ho'oponopono* contrasts with the loose conversational style known as "talk-story" (Ito 1985). In gatherings, participants often sit around telling stories in an easygoing, undirected manner. These stories tend to be anecdotal, digressive, and meandering. In my experience, frequently one story piles on another so that a kind of composite script appears at the end, not a summary but an accumulation of viewpoints and interpretations. Talk-story is egalitarian compared with *ho'oponopono,* but, as my observations indicate, the two forms are not always distinct. A major problem for the three facilitators I knew on the Wai'anae Coast was to balance their appreciation of talk-story with an obligation to lead the group.

Ho'oponopono and talk-story represent complementary styles of effecting a discipline of behavior. Each style differs from the self-help programs through which the downtown agency imposes discipline on participants in domestic violence groups. As local forms, *ho'oponopono* and talk-story share an emphasis on the group rather than the individual, on community harmony rather than personal transformation. "People talk about their troubles, and in seeking solutions through talk, they create valued images of self and community," White and Watson-Gegeo write about Pacific Island styles of disentangling (1990:3). The value of these images propels the movement toward setting things right. I claim that disentangling represents a moral order of discipline compared with the technocratic order agencies espouse. I argue, too, that a moral order has a playful structure—it is a kind of theater that gives actors a chance to show off. In theater, as Dening writes, lies the opportunity for an active engagement with rather than a passive acceptance of state authority.

Foucault argues that with modernization, state forms of punishment infiltrate all aspects of individual lives. Dening qualifies this view with his complex and playful account of Captain Bligh's ambiguous authority over the *Bounty* crew. If the ship is taken as an analog for an urban setting, Captain Bligh's story reveals the limits on a state's infiltration. "The Ship," Dening writes, "in all its spaces, in all its relationships, in all its theatre—was always being re-made, was always in process" (Dening 1992:27). There was much theater in the women's and men's groups I attended and a constant staging of interpretation in stories, gestures, and, in one wonderful instance, charades

on the beach. I will discuss the impact of these local performances on the discipline officially expected of participants at the end of the sessions.

As the *Bounty* sailed into the Pacific, distance from the urban sources of authority (the British Admiralty) increased. The "space" of the ship attained an autonomy of its own, into which Bligh came with his clumsiness and uncertainties. The domestic violence groups on the coast were similarly a distance from the downtown agency. Like Bligh, facilitators of the groups at once represented an urban institution and constructed their own discourse of discipline out there on the coast. As representatives of the agency, facilitators were supposed to impose a technocratic order, but there were many a slip between official strictures of command and actual events in the groups.[8] The performance of the three facilitators I knew best reveals how tangled their task was—in history, culture, and personality.

Participants in domestic violence groups are not as captive as a ship's crew or a prison population. The groups met in a community building that was across the highway from the open beach; a quick walk—or, more likely, a dash—brought us to the shores of the Pacific. In addition, there was a yard around the little building into which women and men wandered during breaks and before and after the formal meetings. These spaces became alternatives to the "public space" designated for meetings, providing the opportunity for individuals to transform practices and subvert rules of order (Lofland [1973] 1985:ix).

If the spaces I observed were not as fortified as the *Bounty* or a prison, the central site was equally institutionalized—locked in by the premises of an American social service system. Alternative spaces do not provide immunity from "the authority that sentences" (Foucault 1979:303), but the availability of such spaces modifies the absolute infiltration on which a state depends.

Group Meetings: Disentangling Discourses

Data come from three summers of fieldwork, in 1989, 1990, and 1991. In addition to participating in several women's and men's groups sponsored by a downtown Honolulu agency, I interviewed participants and facilitators outside the group setting. Furthermore, in 1991 I became a member of the women's group run by Gloria and Karen, attending all sessions and graduating with the women at the end. That summer as well, I attended anger management group meetings held by Paul for men under court order to attend.

I also spent time hanging out with the women in my group, sitting around their houses, going to the beach, and eating at the local McDonald's. In all

the groups I attended, the facilitators were local—born and brought up in the islands—though not necessarily Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian. A majority of participants in the domestic violence groups were Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian.[9]

I will briefly describe what happens at weekly meetings of the groups, with the women's group run by Gloria and Karen my main source of data. The form and content of meetings reflected a combination of pressures: the principles imposed by the sponsoring agency, social and economic conditions along the Wai'anae Coast, and some degree of self-consciousness about "traditional" Hawaiian culture.[10]

Group meetings began with a round of narratives, stories about the past week's occurrences. "Understanding," Greg Dening writes in *Bligh,* "comes from narrative, from sailors' yarns, if you will" (1992:124). Essentially, everyone's understanding comes from yarns: mine, the facilitators', and that of the women themselves. Loosely constructed, digressive, and anecdotal, these narratives exemplified the Hawaiian talk-story mode of discourse; the initially unimpeded exchange of narratives among the women established an egalitarian format. Like sailors' yarns, the narratives demanded audience response, and those who were listening later offered a chorus of comment and confirmation through their own stories.

The beginning of a meeting, then, was casual and undirected. Story piled upon story, as the women summarized their weeks in narratives full of joking, banter, anecdotes, innuendoes, and laughter.[11] The stories were not independent of one another, exactly, but an accumulation of shared experiences that implied shared values—and reactions. At this point in the meeting, Karen and Gloria were exclusively listeners, not directors of the script as it unfolded from woman to woman. The hierarchical direction characteristic of *ho'oponopono* gatherings did not appear, though the sense of entanglements and "knots" was certainly evident in the women's presentations. Yet in their official roles, Karen and Gloria were charged with "untangling" the knots in the women's lives. Had they accepted the *ho'oponopono* model (as other group facilitators did), they would have directed the meetings with strength, insight, and expressed knowledge (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972: 61). In their urban personae, Gloria and Karen were supposed to be leaders; they had been trained by the agency to alter the women's behaviors and not just hear them out.[12]

But Karen and Gloria were caught by two strands of local discourse, *ho'oponopono* and talk-story. In addition, they were responsible for implementing the goals of an American self-help group, in which change comes from a personal transformation on one's own. Such a concept of self-improvement contradicts both modes of local discourse. In these, the individual is thoroughly embedded in and never alienated from social networks. Karen and

Gloria could not direct *hoʻoponopono* style and still be faithful to the self-help agenda of domestic violence groups sponsored by a modern agency. For personal and professional reasons, they also could not let the group drift through the casual course of talk-story exchanges.

How these tensions played themselves out in the sessions I attended can best be illustrated through one character. I have chosen Lindsay to highlight the issues and frame my analysis of urban and local discourses, technocratic and moral practices. Lindsay was a center of attention in the group as well, since the imminent birth of her baby inspired a good deal of talk and ultimately a shower at the end of our season together. I supplement her story with those of others I heard in men's and women's groups on the Waiʻanae Coast.

Every Friday morning during check-in, the initial exchange of stories, Lindsay described her interactions with Clarence. She reported both her entrancement with him and the beatings he subjected her to for one reason or another.[13] She also talked a lot about her pregnancy and the baby she was about to have.

Clarence was the father. In Lindsay's accounts, Clarence wanted the baby and wanted to be a father. She also reported his rejection of her four other children, telling an anecdote to show how she resolved the problem. One morning, she said, she was standing at a bus stop with the four children when her former boyfriend drove by. He stopped and offered her a ride wherever she was going. She packed the children into the back seat and climbed in next to him. He looked over at the children and abruptly announced that he would like to "keep them." And, as Lindsay put it: "I just gave them to him." According to Lindsay, the gesture, an idiosyncratic version of *hānai,* the Hawaiian custom of informal adoption, also appeased Clarence.[14] Significantly, too, the gesture was Lindsay's own; no social worker or Child Protective Services official had forced her to give up her children. Her autonomy is underlined by the space in which the transaction took place, the privacy of a car. Or I might say, adapting Lofland's point, the car distanced Lindsay from a "city" setting. The anecdote conveyed her devotion to Clarence, the usefulness of Hawaiian custom in times of crisis, and the independent spirit Lindsay brought to the travails she faced.

She returned persistently to the heart of her story: She wanted desperately to have and keep Clarence's baby. Adopting language the facilitators brought to the meetings, Lindsay said a baby would give her "a sense of self-worth" and would "make" Clarence treat her "with respect." Lindsay assured the group: "This one [baby] I am going to keep. So I can have something of my own, something worthwhile."

The other women in the group showed their appreciation of Lindsay's

presentation both in direct responses and in the stories they subsequently told. Their tales, alternating with hers from week to week (depending on who sat where on the two large couches in the room), played through their behavior as mothers, their interactions with a sexual partner, and their roles in an *'ohana.* The stories contained a cast of characters, and in none that I heard did the narrator appear as sole actor—sometimes, in my experience, hardly appearing at all, so "tangled" were the incidents being reported.

From one week to the next, the gathering of stories integrated children, men, sex, working, and partying. From one week to the next, too, alternatives appeared in anecdotal references to better relationships than the one Clarence offered Lindsay. One morning, for example, with tears in her eyes, Janie described a man "with a good heart," who "took care of me and my boys." "He never hits." She contrasted Melvin with the other men in her life, especially other sexual partners she had had. Although all the women who attended the meetings gave a meaning to the concept of abuse—experience of abuse was why they came—each interpreted its presence in her own life differently. Reminiscences, reconstructions, and reviews of a past week introduced an elaborate array of relationships, personal interactions, and styles of intimacy.

Those in attendance also took turns commenting on everyone else's story. The flow of anecdotes, commentary, analysis, and silent signs of sympathy constituted a wave of feelings, opinions, and judgments that created a basis for community. The facilitators were not as free as the women to enter the process, holding themselves back in an obligation to agency principles. Karen and Gloria checked in narratively, too, but their accounts of the week differed from those the women provided in content and, more significantly, in style. Less the meandering, anecdotal talk-story style, their check-ins incorporated through metaphor and structure a more individualized (self-help) approach to the problems at hand. But their stories did not range far from the other women's in content, ultimately establishing an unmistakable identification with local values. Gloria and Karen spoke pidgin when they referred to men and sex, they did not hesitate to tell "dirty" jokes, and they freely described their own desires to the gathered group.

For Gloria and Karen, as I observed, the consequence was a deadlock, a betwixt and between where they never quite entered the city and never quite left behind the "atoll" of the local. This deadlock showed up in a couple of ways. First, the facilitators did not orchestrate the storytelling or correct anyone's mode of presentation. A woman could, for instance, joke her way through the check-in—though I rarely saw anyone do that in Karen and Gloria's group. Second, Karen and Gloria did not (in my time with them) ever succumb completely to the talk-story style the participants created; they drew

lines at entering a complete free-for-all of narrative presentations, and they did not make direct commentary on someone's report of the week. During the time I attended, I expected that the official role they held would compel one or the other to intervene in Lindsay's understanding of her life with Clarence. The conviction Lindsay voiced, that having a baby would "please" Clarence enough to make him stop beating her, seemed to violate agency scripture on abuse. Lindsay herself had cited enough evidence of Clarence's violent temper to tempt even the most neutral observer (which I wasn't) to advise her to leave. Gloria and Karen did not offer the advice. Instead, they dwelt on the attachment between the two, on the impact of Lindsay's generosity *(aloha)* on Clarence, and on the loving ties potentially activated by the birth of a baby. In other words, they summoned local values.

Not naive, Karen and Gloria also clearly considered the consequences if Lindsay stayed and Clarence kept beating her. Here the weight of the "metropolitan" made itself felt, in their reminders of the official punishment waiting for a woman who tolerated abuse. They did not harp on what women in domestic violence groups knew all too well: If a woman stayed with an abusive partner, Child Protective Services took her children away.[15] From the point of view of professional social workers in an American state, such action is reasonable. According to the "best interests of the child" dictum, children are in danger in a household where violence occurs, especially if the child's mother is the primary victim.[16]

Karen and Gloria did not use the threat posed by Child Protective Services policy to discipline Lindsay, partly because the institution had already made an impact in the group. As I observed at meetings, the three initials "CPS" worked talismanically to evoke a foreign social order—and one that easily intruded into local lives. Partly, Karen and Gloria accepted Lindsay's own view, in which affiliative attachments effectively disciplined the individual.

Like Karen and Gloria, in his group Paul negotiated the distance between urban and local discourses. He, too, expressed his identification with local values, occasionally bringing up his own experiences of having battered a partner. During group discussions, he was loose and easygoing, rarely criticizing a man's report of the week's events. But Paul, more than Gloria and Karen, intervened in the men's voiced interpretations of their behaviors. To return to Captain Bligh for a moment: Paul had the confidence that the unfortunate Bligh lacked, that he could play with the men and still command. Paul realized that joining the "crew" increased his ability to direct their actions. As Dening writes about a good captain: "There was mutual engagement of commander and men in the discipline. There was a sense of sporting realism and gamesmanship" (1992:127).

I am not sure why there was a difference between Paul and the two

women facilitators in the form of their engagement. In a Hawaiian context, gender is not the explanation, since women have as strong a role as men in both *ho'oponopono* and talk-story-style discipline (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1972:61). Possibly Paul's training and ambition encouraged him to exert leadership more definitively. The nature of his personality, too, made a difference in events, as did the personalities of Karen and of Gloria. In the end, Paul was disciplining men who abused their partners, and Karen and Gloria were working with women who had been (and still were being) abused. The "subjects" called for different methods. But like a good captain, Paul never forgot to be playful, at once eroding and reinforcing his position by expressing his equality with the men in the group. The style and content of his check-in stories attached him closely to the participants, a boundary blurring that was more evident to me than the one in the women's group. In the end, Paul's playfulness lost him his position, and the agency removed him from the Wai'anae Coast groups.

The next step in my analysis concerns the impact of differing styles of discipline in the two self-help groups I attended. Were the techniques used by Paul more effective—were the men more thoroughly disciplined than the women? In posing the question, I take note of the reciprocal nature of a discipline/punish technique: Those who receive the commands, the insults, and the lashes (borrowing again from Dening) are not passive. Neither the women in the "victims" group nor the men in the "abusers" group received the word of the agency, its nonlocal vocabulary of redressing wrong, without restructuring, revising, and resisting the messages. To return to language I used earlier, in both groups a constantly created moral order limited the effectiveness of a rigid technocratic order.

I explore this segment of my argument by turning to the lavish shower the women made for Lindsay just before our sessions ended. From that account, I move directly to a concluding section in which I broaden the discussion of discipline, self-help groups, and moral communities.

On the Beach

The shower was held on the beach, across Farrington Highway from where we usually met. It was a surprise party; we all arrived early in the morning to set things up, hanging gifts on a nearby tree and setting the table with huge amounts of food.

Sandy had been designated to bring Lindsay to the shower, and when they drove up, Lindsay expressed perfect surprise and pleasure. We bustled around, planning an agenda: when the gifts would be opened, when the food would be served, when the games would start. At that moment Karen,

Gloria, and I were given no more attention than anyone else, and the decision about the morning's activities was entirely consensual. After several distractions, like sexual banter with two young soldiers who wandered by and a check of the beach for boyfriends, we sat down for the opening of presents. The gifts were interesting to me, half for the baby and half for Lindsay, including perfumes, powders, soaps, and jewelry. As a disciplined anthropologist might say: the shower prestations acknowledged Lindsay's sexuality along with her imminent motherhood. Gift opening was followed by a feast, after which we organized for charades.

Before the games began, I noticed several women disappearing one after another into Sandy's car, each coming back exuding the smell of marijuana. Eight months pregnant, Lindsay did not hesitate to take her turn along with everyone else. This event ended, the woman arranged themselves into two teams, leaving the facilitators and me out of the selection. Forcefully and unmistakably, we were turned into an audience, spectators for the play they were about to perform. We sat on the sand, not three feet away from the women, but there was no confusion of boundaries or collapse of the (figurative) proscenium. The actors took over, and we waited for the show.

It was a carefully orchestrated work, in which titles of films and names of television stars were offered to us full of sexual innuendo and reference: a finger pushed into the palm of a hand, gestures of mock striptease dancing, and the like. The performance wrapped us in its illusions: Once we caught on, the actors did not have to play very hard to make the point. There was no director; in an important sense, the common purpose of those performing the charades unified the action. The competition between teams was visibly less present than an ebullient showing off of talents and preoccupations. Karen, Gloria, and I laughed and applauded, thoroughly caught by the entertainment and disciplined in the right ways of responding.[17]

Charades was the last event of the shower, and gradually the women drifted away from the beach, alone or in pairs. The charades were not the end of group sessions, however, and they were the beginning of my insight into discourses of discipline on the Waiʻanae Coast.

Dening emphasizes the significance of the spaces used for discipline on the bounded area of a ship. Locating Lindsay's shower across Farrington Highway and on the beach may have seemed natural; after all, what better place for a party than a beach? But choice of space has profound social and cultural implications, particularly in a dense urban setting where every inch of space is contested. Setting the party on the beach rather than at the community building (or someone's house), the women also made a decision about the form and content of activities. A beach epitomizes free play, and the women emphasized that with the decorations and the catcalls to soldiers

through which they framed the party. At the shower, participants modified the structure of official meetings while reiterating in gestures and symbols the gist of the stories they told over there.

Gloria and Karen were rarely directive, not even in the official space for agency-sponsored activities. On the beach, they were even more completely spectators, expected to suspend disbelief when an invisible but evident curtain rose on the charades. Holding the stage, the women displayed values that had been implicit in their check-ins—in Dening's words, "the presentation of self in louder and slower charade, the reduction of the other to some nuance in voice and gesture" (1992:288). As Dening suggests, charades are revisionary, not oppositional; neither, in my as-yet-unfinished argument, are urban and local oppositional.

The shower was not a rite of reversal. On the beach, the participants presented an alternative discourse of discipline in which they did not reject but played with the idea of discipline presented to them on the other side of the highway. Like a carnival almost anywhere in the world, the charades, gift giving, and feasting on the beach absorbed, satirized, and (stage-) managed the views associated with the sponsoring agency and carried in by Gloria and Karen in their professional capacity.

Details of the shower, supplemented by observations at weekly meetings, expose the lineaments of a moral community. The riotous celebration contained a "yarn" about right action or, in the context of my essay, about disciplining wrong action. In the women's performance on the beach, discipline focused on social interaction rather than on the self-improvement prescribed by state programs. The exchange of gifts and the mixture of sex, parenthood, maleness, femaleness, order, and disorder in the charades suggest a complex conjoining of bodies and a complex integration of the body missing from the principles the agency conveyed in its practices.

The Implications of Self-Help

"Moral" refers to acting in a proper and approved manner. Prescriptions for acting properly entwine with notions of the person, though no one I met would have used such pompous language. What became clear to me on the beach was the distance between a state view of self and the women's view of themselves—a difference that provides an elaboration of the distinction between urban and local, "metropolis" and "atoll" that runs through all the essays in this volume.

Every gesture and every joke at the beach linked sexuality with motherhood and pleasure in one's body with responsible parenthood. Explicit at the shower and implicit at weekly meetings, such links revised the official dis-

course of discipline. For the state's purposes, components of the individual body are broken down in order to be efficiently disciplined (Foucault 1979). In an American state, sexual activity is one measure of disorder—and the legacy is long in Hawaiʻi, where colonialists early on saw sex as a sign of recalcitrance.[18] To control "sex" is to produce order and, as well, to separate sexual activity from other behaviors. The women I knew constructed another discipline, premised on the integrity of the body. In their discourse, woman as sexual partner was inseparable from woman as mother.

At first glance, this also appears to be true of the state's discourse. After all, the punishment for a woman who tolerates abuse from a sexual partner is removal of her child; the practice seems to link sexuality to motherhood. But that is only a superficial reading. In actuality, state practices separate the child's well-being from the social-sexual universe of the woman, subjecting the child to special rules and reasons for intervention. I do not doubt that a child may be at risk when adults are abusive. I am arguing that the state interpretation of the situation breaks down the woman's body, using one aspect to control another. If a woman is deprived of her child, then she will manage her sexual relationships. Alternatively, if a woman does not control her sexuality, then she will be punished by losing her child. The logic can only exist if the elements are distinct. To the women I met on the Waiʻanae Coast, this was absurd.

Their casual conversations and check-in stories proclaimed the integrity of the body and denied the state interpretation of body-in-parts. I was initially puzzled when the women in my group brought their children to meetings; I knew they had kin and friends who would happily take the children. After a while, I realized that the inclusion of children in a domestic violence group was a version of the local discourse. Bringing a child announced an aspect of themselves the women considered inseparable from the sexual sides of who they were. This was not the discourse of the downtown agency —or, at least, it had a different grammar. In local discourse, the intersection of roles of mother, partner, nurturer, and lover embed a person in a community. Furthermore, I would argue, the intersection embodies symbols of solidarity, not only establishing but also activating the "common faith" that, according to Durkheim, constitutes a moral community. The apparent naïveté of Lindsay's confidence that being a father would "make Clarence act right" vanishes when put in the context of local understandings of discipline. By contrast, in the downtown grammar Clarence's fatherhood bore no meaningful or structural connection to his abusive behavior.

The attitude toward drug use in the women's and men's groups provides another perspective on the distance between state and local disciplines. At the shower, Gloria and Karen said nothing about Lindsay's smoking pot. In a

private conversation with me, they admitted they were worried about her baby's health and about the possible perception by a Child Protective Services worker that Lindsay's child was threatened with imminent harm, grounds for removal. But they said this to me and not to Lindsay. Resisting state mechanisms themselves, Karen and Gloria refused to intrude onto Lindsay's body through a proscription of pot smoking. Although the purpose of the women's group was to provide Lindsay with the resources to resist abuse, for the facilitators this purpose did not justify subjecting her body to their surveillance and control.

It was even more surprising to me, at first, that Paul did not mention drug use at the meetings he ran. A number of men came to those meetings quite visibly high—a fact Paul and I discussed later on. Paul, however, refused to intrude on this behavior as staunchly as Karen and Gloria turned the other cheek to the trips to Sandy's car during the shower. Unlike Karen and Gloria, Paul had the backing of both metropolitan and local discourses of discipline in ignoring the evident lack of sobriety in his group.

Mainland self-help groups established to help individuals manage anger often leave the treatment of alcohol and drug abuse to other groups. The intention is to treat one, presumably separable, problem at a time.[19] Characteristic of a modern political and economic order, the technique reiterates the divisibility of the subject: The "self" who abuses a partner is separated from the "self" who uses drugs. For Paul, then, the "foreign" and the "familiar" discourses came together. He did not transgress the downtown agency agenda by ignoring the "problem" occurring right before his eyes, nor did he violate the (self) integrity of the men who sat with him week after week. From one point of view, Paul respected the rules of classic self-help groups; from another point of view, like Karen and Gloria he resisted turning the "body" into a site of instrumentalized discipline.

The model for the women's group and the men's group was the same: self-help groups developed in mainland American society. And the principles of such groups certainly influenced the content and method evident in the Wai'anae Coast groups, through an emphasis on outlining, discussing, describing, and confronting troublesome issues. Paul accommodated to the model in one way, Gloria and Karen in another. But neither group embraced the American cultural concepts of the "self" that guide classic self-help programs. I saw no signs, for instance, of an extraction of "self" from networks and no indication of a view of self as divisible into parts. Instead, a local conceptualization of self reigned at the weekly meetings, embedded in social context and integral, not instrumental, in nature.

Gloria, Karen, and Paul carried the language of self-help to the Wai'anae Coast, but there they transformed its meanings by using local dialect. On

the one hand, haole style, the three facilitators insisted that a person could manage the circumstances of her or his life. On the other hand, Hawaiian style, they encouraged management, or resolution, to emerge from a conglomeration of stories that reimmersed the narrator into a community. Responses to Lindsay's weekly, often painful, tales and her joyful participation in the shower for her baby illustrate the manifold maneuvering of a local discipline into the heart of an urban agency's well-constructed program.

Sam's performance in the men's group offers another variation on the negotiation of discourses in a self-help group. He challenged Paul more directly than Lindsay challenged Gloria and Karen; Sam challenged us all with his wise, witty, and wicked "play" with agency prescripts, the lessons transmitted by Paul, and his own finely honed ethnography of Hawaiian "custom." Sam did a lot of work to bridge the distance between urban and local traditions, technocratic and moral orders, and he left us somewhat breathless at the brilliance of the show.

During check-in, Sam enticed his audience into the "conspiracy" he created.[20] He cunningly exploited Paul's sympathy for local conditions and cultural values by constantly portraying himself as "one hundred percent Hawaiian" and the descendant of a royal lineage. Supporting these identifications, Sam displayed a vast knowledge of Hawaiian history and legend. In his check-in stories, he professed contrition for his outbursts of uncontrolled anger while remarking on the legacy of male aggressiveness in his family and his *ʻohana.* "What else can I do?" he would ask Paul. "That's all I learned at home." This was subtle teasing, on several levels. Sam teased about the cultural reason for his actions, about the significance of role models (a sly stab at professional discourse), and about the difficulties of altering his personal behavior when he was "loyal" to "old ways." His grins, jokes, and verbal punches indicate he knew he was teasing. But the self-consciousness does not minimize the significance of his intentions, any more than the carefully constructed charade on the beach detracts from the "resistance" in that play.

Sam's performance entertained his audience and placed Paul in a dilemma similar to the one faced by Karen and Gloria on the beach. In his local persona, Paul agreed that culture and circumstances contributed to a man's actions in his household and with his partner; in his urban persona, Paul had to teach Sam (and the others) that violence was absolutely bad—that there were no justificatory circumstances. Sam exploited Paul's efforts to be egalitarian and embrace local values; this appeared most obviously in his use of talk-story strategies to explain his actions, for example, drawing on Hawaiian "custom" and "legend" to elaborate an incident in his week. The other men followed Sam's lead as best they could, until a cacophony of (presumably genuine) Hawaiian customs filled the air during check-in. Like me, Paul was

spectator to the performance, enticed and amused, yet always off the stage, deciding whether to applaud or to criticize.

In all the weeks I attended the men's group, however, I never heard Paul completely pan a performance. Or, to put it more precisely, I never saw him intrude in a heavy-handed way to correct the story a man was telling. He did not bring state authority to bear any more adamantly than Gloria and Karen did in the women's group. Paul could have: He had a powerful weapon for disciplining the men had he chosen to use it. His reports on their performances determined the court's decision about whether a participant had successfully completed his anger management training. His comments could cause the court to lift or reimpose a restraining order, to forgive a jail sentence or not. Paul, then, had the leverage to discipline a man into complete obedience, into toeing the line, and into being faithful to the nonlocal prescriptions he carried from downtown. He resisted the temptation to fall into such "bad language" and to risk the mutiny of his men. Comparable "bad language" for Gloria and Karen would have been mention of Child Protective Services and its right to remove children. But, in my weeks with them, I never saw either one use that strategy to bring state authority to bear on a woman's actions.[21]

At the same time, Paul did direct the men's group more forcefully than Gloria and Karen directed the women's group. His own check-in stories were less anecdotal, loosely constructed, and humorous than instructive and pointed.[22] He often read passages from standard psychological studies of anger, and he occasionally showed films about abuse prepared by mainland anger management groups. Watching these, I wondered whether images of blonde, blue-eyed middle-class couples—in films from, for instance, Duluth, Minnesota—made a dent on the largely Hawaiian audience. Paul showed the films in order to demonstrate that violence was not attached to culture or class: Anyone anywhere might batter a spouse or a partner.[23] Like other aspects of conventional self-help discourse, the films attributed a person's violent expression of anger to a lack of self-control, not to his (or her) social, cultural, or economic conditions. By portraying violence as an individual phenomenon, extracted from historical and political contexts, the films participate in the technocratic, instrumentalized discipline of an urban/metropolitan world. Paul showed the films, but he encouraged yarning among his men—and the import of the yarns subverted the message of the films. "Yarning exchanged the politics of experience. It enlarged the boundaries of interpretation by giving a measure of what was exceptional and what was usual. Yarning was a very political thing. It educated participants in the language and the signs of institutions" (Dening 1992:73).

The women's charades and the men's flamboyant talk-stories were all

"yarns" in this sense. Through yarns, the women and men in the Waiʻanae Coast domestic violence groups constructed a commentary on the institutions of the state and on the conditions of their own "ships." Through yarns, the women and men I met established a world of right and wrong that differed from the discipline officially mandated by the downtown agency.

Elements of local discipline are the basis for a moral community. On the Waiʻanae Coast, these elements appeared in the yarns told by men and by women. Like the women, the men did not portray their own behaviors apart from or outside of a changing network of social relationships and affiliative attachments. The men did link the quality of their social and affiliative attachments to a political and economic order more than the women did. The men in Paul's group talked about being "marginalized" by a modern capitalist system. They talked about their distinctive situation: They were not, the stories claimed, just like men "anywhere" who battered their wives. From the men's (seemingly shared) perspective, acts of violence were not transcultural and the routes to altering violent behavior were not neutral, value-free, and nonhistorical. They were local.

By localizing the sources and the solutions to abusive behavior, the men and women in the Waiʻanae Coast groups were not excusing anything. They were not condoning violence or lack of self-control. They were creating a moral community in which the methods for restraining battering drew on a concept of the self whose premises stretched far from the self a self-help program offered. They replaced an atomistic, instrumental view with a holistic view in which act and actor are "one" and are one with others.

This kind of integrative and integrating view challenges the terms of a modern discipline. Its very language contradicts the discourse of a technocratic order in which acts can be categorized as absolutely wrong and individuals as unambiguously self-determined. Paul, Karen, and Gloria negotiated the challenge at every meeting they ran, the more skillfully the more they joined the "crew."

My analysis of Waiʻanae Coast domestic violence groups leaves two major questions for a conclusion: (1) Can local discourse prevail against an urban discourse backed by the careening forces of modernization and globalization? (2) Does the discipline of a localized moral community effectively address the substantial (and growing) dangers of battering and being battered?

Discipline, Person, and Moral Community

In this essay I measure the distance between urban and local in terms of discipline, not space or time. I have indicated how in domestic violence groups the distance is mediated by facilitators whose role is to implement state poli-

cies by imposing agency practices. I have also shown that participants in the groups constructed a local discourse of discipline through stories, gestures, and performances. Finally, I have suggested that local discourses establish a notion of self distinctly different from the "self" presented in self-help programs. In this last section I want to move back a step from the descriptive account to consider modes of discipline as a way of refining the links between urban and local as well as between (the not necessarily isomorphic) "technocratic" and "moral."

I have treated self-help groups as a site for strategies of discipline that can be called urban, in the sense of being efficient, subjectivizing, and noncontextualized. Alcoholics Anonymous is the classic model of a self-help group, and its principles influence programs established by social service agencies throughout Hawai'i. A discussion of a collapse of the model in the groups run by Gloria, Karen, and Paul extends my argument that urban and local, metropolitan and "atoll" (borrowing the metaphor of the introductory essay) are distinguished by the interpretation and implementation of discipline. A self-help agenda hinges on the conviction that an individual is responsible for his or her own acts and that alteration in behavior comes about through transformation of the self. Embraced by state institutions in Hawai'i, such an agenda represents a primary (technocratic) means of enforcing discipline.

Gloria, Karen, and Paul could not stick with the agenda and also present themselves to participants as having local values and affiliations. In the training sessions I attended, I never saw a facilitator encourage the scrutiny of self that is part of Alcoholics Anonymous or introduce a hint of a twelve-step program, or put pressure on members to confess their flaws. They did encourage contrition for bad behavior—the men's abuse, the women's tolerance of abuse—without accusing anyone of being a weak or incompetent person. In his work on alcohol problems, the sociologist Joseph Gusfield distinguishes between the delinquent, whose act is punished, and the deviant, whose character is stigmatized. In a classic self-help program like Alcoholics Anonymous, the individual has to erase the stigma and reconstitute his or her character. The self is transformed. In adapting the Alcoholics Anonymous model, the two Wai'anae Coast domestic violence groups I observed came closer to the other option, designating the abuser and the abused as delinquent. The goal was not transformation of self but rejection of a behavior. As Gusfield puts it, with penance the individual is redeemed and restored to life (1996:206–207).

Yet "delinquency" does not fully reflect the local discourse created at the meetings I attended. The way the term is used in classic self-help groups, "delinquency" refers to an autonomous self. The American-based canon

considers the individual, whether delinquent or deviant, as the focus of discipline. Transformation and redemption are equally self-oriented. By contrast, customary Hawaiian modes of discipline are directed toward restoring harmony, not recomposing the self, on creating community rather than constituting a "right" person. The question for outside observers, including Paul, Karen, Gloria, and me, is whether local discipline works well enough to deal with battering and being battered. That is, can a local discourse of discipline serve to prevent problems of abuse that intertwine so closely with nonlocal economic and political conditions? The answer depends on whether Hawaiian-style disentangling can prevail against the forces of modernization loosed upon residents of the Waiʻanae Coast by an (Americanized) global political economy.

Hoʻoponopono, a traditional method for resolving conflict and calming anger, has evolved to meet the conditions Hawaiians face in an American state. In both the customary and the revised forms of *hoʻoponopono,* setting things right begins with exposing the sources of conflict—bringing distress into the open (Pukui, Haertig, and Lee 1979; Ito 1985; Boggs and Chun 1990). In the process, the statements made by participants are juxtaposed to a narrative of ideal social relationships. Such juxtaposition resolves the conflict: "Talk in *hoʻoponopono* reinstates by reenactment the social relationships that are to be maintained ideally in the culture" (Boggs and Chun 1990:131). At the end of *hoʻoponopono,* disturbances are smoothed over and order is restored to the group. *Hoʻoponopono* can only work if participants acknowledge the importance of acting with *aloha* and affection. Success depends on loyalty to shared values: "The goal [of disentangling] inevitably involves the reconstruction of a collective vision of social reality through the mutual involvement of community members" (White and Watson-Gegeo 1990:8). In a word, the success of *hoʻoponopono* depends on the ongoing creation of moral communities.

Can domestic violence groups discipline abuse, the abuser and the abused, by reconstructing a collective vision of social reality—by creating a moral community? Several features of *hoʻoponopono* are missing from domestic violence groups, primarily a leader who deliberately moves the discussion toward a goal and the presence of all those involved in the conflict: Abusers do not meet with the abused. Moreover, one could argue that the methods of *hoʻoponopono* are not discipline so much as persuasion and that persuasion is never adequate when the health and well-being of a person are at risk.

The point is that in the Waiʻanae Coast self-help groups I observed the local and urban work together. Hawaiian modes of discipline, exerted either through a formalized *hoʻoponopono* or a less formalized talk-story inter-

change, feed on the proffered urban discourse. The energy of building up a local discourse in the context of the metropolitan leads to a situation in which discipline has a chance of success. To clarify the point further, I return to the inspiration I find in *Mr Bligh's Bad Language.* Dening's account of misbehavior and its (mis)handling on the *Bounty* provides a paradigm for occurrences far away in twentieth-century Hawai'i. Bligh's mistaken way of attending to sailors' yarns and sailors' mischief resulted in the complete undoing of discipline. Paul, Karen, and Gloria did better than Bligh.

Dening writes of the gap between stern British naval rules and the sassy trivia retailed in the stories, dances, and "duckings" (dunkings) of the *Bounty* crew. The account modifies Foucault's thesis in *Discipline and Punish* in the direction of the "subject" response to an imposed authority. The concocted sociability on the *Bounty* denies the absolute power of state authority and distresses Bligh no end. If the state possesses powerful mechanisms of discipline, the *Bounty* shows there are many ways of scoffing at the state.

I am taking the *Bounty* and its story as a parable for the relations between urban and local, the strange and the familiar, the faraway and home. Dening thickly describes the "culture" of the ship, delineating its faithfulness to Admiralty regulations and its simultaneous fostering of locally created moral communities. In a space that was urban in its density and heterogeneity, the residents yarned and performed a distinctive social solidarity. Packed into floating confinement, the officers and the crew of the *Bounty* captured and redid elements that were pliable, like rituals, watches, and their own bodies. Nor does Dening forget the private ticks and idiosyncrasies that emerge whenever there is space and scope for play. Those, too, are part of the social solidarity.

His word "play" insists on the creativity and the subversiveness possible in —indeed, endemic to—settings encircled by the state. Like the *Bounty,* the groups I studied demonstrate that one mark of an urbanized, or metropolitan, context are the chinks that let in and the circumstances that nurture the local.

Poor Mr. Bligh was not able to play between the urban and the local. For personal and professional reasons (the ship was not easy to captain), he repressed the flow of creativity and cultural construction going on endlessly on the *Bounty.* His discipline had no flexibility or nuance—the "bad language" of the title—the very qualities that would have ensured effectiveness. "Bligh spoke badly to them [sailors] in not allowing them to find their own levels of authority independent of his" (Dening 1992:73). On board ship, as elsewhere, discipline is most successful when it emerges from a consensus between those who impose and those who submit. This is not to say that the sailors cooperate in their own subjugation but rather to claim they have an impact on the "community" of rules—on the collective vision of

social reality, as it were. On good ships, according to Dening, things did not work in a totalitarian fashion. "For commanders, discipline could be improved if they played it as a game won and lost. Bligh did not play it as a game" (ibid.:119). Other captains did. "There was a mutual engagement of commander and men in the discipline. There was a sense of sporting realism and gamesmanship" (ibid.:127).

Karen, Gloria, and Paul knew how to play it as a game—too well for their own good, as it turned out. In the end, domestic violence groups do not have the leeway of a *Bounty* far from home in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Closely anchored to an urban agency, the self-help groups were themselves subjected to an order of discipline—the efficient, nonplayful legislation of social service institutions in a large American city. Karen, Gloria, Paul, and the participants in their groups struggled against this order, rejecting the inappropriate, foreign-dialect message of self-determination and subverting the chain of command from state to agency to individual.

Gloria, Karen, and Paul were more playful than Bligh was, and while his performance resulted in the mutiny of a crew, their performances brought the disapproval of the state. Karen and Gloria were fired at the end of the sessions I attended, and I later learned that Paul had been pressured into leaving his position at the agency.[24] Stepping in, the downtown agency inserted a trained social worker into the women's group—"an uptight haole lady," my friends reported. Through the agency, the state had asserted its power to classify and control, efficiently.

Meanwhile, however, something had been created during the meetings, and its value should be noted in an otherwise not entirely cheerful tale. A community emerged in the space and time of the training sessions, definably a moral community inasmuch as it was characterized by modes of "setting things right." The modes were local, drawing on a (perceived) tradition of Hawaiian conflict resolution in *hoʻoponopono* counsel and talk-story style. And they are "moral" in that they persuade a person to proper conduct, in this case proper conduct vis-à-vis others. This is not discipline in Foucault's sense of the state's authoritarian intrusion into a subject's interests. It is disciplining, in Dening's sense of controlling conduct by playing (in all seriousness) with the rules of sociability.

Within a moral community, disciplining depends on a shared notion of the "self." I have made the point that the "self" in the self-help groups I attended had a local interpretation, set against the autonomous individual the agency's prescriptions presented. The local self, I suggested, is integral and integrated; the idea of a separate self and separable aspects of the self was missing from the discourse I heard at the women's and the men's groups on the Waiʻanae Coast. From this perspective, the body is a crucial element

of self. In groups designed to prevent abuse and battering, the body is an especially important site of meanings.[25] As the stories I heard and the many performances at which I was spectator showed, the body gained meaning from its "wholeness," so that sexuality, sustenance, and attachment were considered inseparable.

By contrast, state authority divides the body and the bodies of its citizens into manageable segments. Foucault writes of the modern state: "The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A 'political anatomy', which was also a 'mechanics of power', was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines" (1979:138). Is the end of my story of self-help on the Wai'anae Coast fated to be a victory of the state over the local, the technocratic over the moral?

The three facilitators eventually lost their jobs. Charades and comedies on the beach were intolerable and the yarns of inebriated men not easy to wink at. The women and men I knew had a hard time escaping the strong arm of state institutions, including Family Court, Child Protective Services, and still other self-help groups. Community on the Wai'anae Coast was to be organized efficiently, it seemed.

The end of the groups as I knew them does not mean the silencing of the discourse created in those groups. The situation I observed ended in a draw, a victory for neither the downtown agency nor the local groups. Fortified by the community they had constructed, the women of Karen and Gloria's group continued their stories outside the space now supervised by a new haole facilitator. The outcome, however, was tragic for Lindsay: She had her baby and stayed with Clarence, who continued to beat her badly. One evening he shoved her head in the toilet and flushed. The last news I heard was that Child Protective Services had removed the child from Lindsay's care, and, though no one talked about Clarence, I assume he was hauled into Family Court.

Yet an analysis of process—of the circulation between urban and local—cannot end with one individual, and Lindsay's failure does not doom the process I observed in the self-help groups. On the one hand, she had the opportunity to play her own game and run her own risks. On the other hand, she was hurt both by her loyalty to local ways and by her immersion in a state system of family supervision. Recalling the two questions I posed several pages ago: Lindsay's case suggests that the local discourse did not prevent battering, but this must be qualified by the abundance of state pressure in the situation she shared with Clarence. Discrimination and poverty are

part of the picture on the Waiʻanae Coast. At the same time, Lindsay's case also demonstrates that a local discourse has vitality and maintains a community at a distance from the encircling metropolitan world.

The example can be turned in another direction as well. I have described a situation of "movement," as it were, between urban and local. Following the remarks of students of the city, like Simmel and Lofland, I see "freedom" in moving away from the ties that bind—just as the sailors on the *Bounty* did and redid their worlds as they sailed from island to island. But the ties that bind are not broken either, as Bligh reminded his crew and as Lindsay and the other women reminded the messengers of the state-sponsored program. A vigorous moral community comes not from maintaining ties to the local (or to home) but from the adaptation of old ties to new spaces and structures.

At the moment, women and men on the Waiʻanae Coast are in a vulnerable position, economically and politically. The very site of the moral communities I have described underlines the restrictive conditions for solidarity and the assertion of values: Self-help groups are founded on problems and response to crises. Moreover, self-help groups fit into a pattern; they are only one example of ongoing struggles to create community within an encircling state. The groups were interesting to me because of the particular toughness of the issue: Battering and being battered are life-threatening.

Let me try out a paradox. Lindsay was beaten but not subjugated. That is, while Clarence hit her and hurt her, Lindsay did not succumb to an authority that was "foreign" and that violated the integrity of her self. She clung to the affiliative relations that, the language at the women's group made clear, defined without rigidifying a moral community. That Clarence did not improve his behavior does not render community creation futile. Rather, Clarence's failure to manage his anger indicates that some persons always escape the discipline of any community.

I reach my concluding points by once again borrowing from Dening. One of the primary lessons of the mutiny on the *Bounty* is that authority cannot be absolute as long as there is "play." The sailors on the *Bounty* were good at playing, but the captain unfortunately was not. The sailors were "institutional men," Dening tells his readers, alienated "by their sense of powerlessness over the structures they know they create by their own deferences." Then he adds the crucial sentence: "But their alienation can be their defence. The institution does not touch them in their souls" (Dening 1992:28). The freedom to yarn and duck saves a crew from total subjugation; granting that freedom saves a captain from the threat of a mutiny. The line between cutting absolute authority and mutinous resistance with "play" and developing techniques of co-optation is fine. It is not therefore nonexistent.

The process of creating moral communities in urban settings, in other

words, partakes of the dangers of succumbing too thoroughly and, as well, the dangers of resisting too hard. The self-help groups I observed show that residents pulled into a metropolitan world can walk a tightrope line.

As students of the city maintain, its anonymous and chaotic quality offers residents the freedom to make their own communities. City-ness, diversely represented at the beginning of the twenty-first century, offers residents of a modern world a refuge from the increasingly mechanistic and technocratic state. Multiple spaces and loosely constructed ties mean the local can "play" with the urban, as I witnessed in the women's and men's groups. "And yet, residents of home territories and those of urban villages have much in common: they have both created personal worlds in the midst of urban anonymity" (Lofland [1973] 1985:32). But these worlds are more than personal, my example shows; based on the personal, they are moral—and moral, they are a ground for conduct, solidarity, and "common faith," as Durkheim put it.

From one perspective it is sad that self-help groups are the forums for community creation, inasmuch as these groups are stereotypically associated with vulnerability and dysfunction. From another perspective, however, the life-threatening bases for participation in these groups makes the task of "yarning" fraught with significance. The groups I joined were blessed with good captains, good for them though not for the state. Under playful leadership, the elements for constructing a moral community flourished in the women's group and the men's group. The elements I described are not limited to those groups but rather are something to be looked for in other domains and something to be noted as anthropologists continue their analyses of urbanization, globalization, and modernization. Those big words we use, our discourse, should not also deafen us to the importance of small talk —in stories, yarns, and conferences. Only by being playful with talk can we, like the members of Karen's, Gloria's, and Paul's groups, open up the possibility of new "takes" on seemingly unstoppable movements.

NOTES

1. "Self-help groups are voluntary, small group structures for mutual aid and the accomplishment of a special purpose. They are usually formed by peers who have come together for mutual assistance in satisfying a common need, overcoming a common handicap or life-disrupting problems, and bringing about desired social and/or personal change." In Lee and Swenson 1994:421.

2. I have been influenced by Abner Cohen's discussion: Community consists of a manipulation of symbols, a way of drawing boundaries to separate one entity from another (Cohen 1985:12–13).

3. The City and County of Honolulu is coterminous with the island of Oʻahu and includes many kinds of settlements, including suburbs that look like those in virtually any American state.

4. See Howard's fine discussion of affiliative values in *Ain't No Big Thing* (1974).

5. Mayo (1987) provides three useful differentiating terms: urban, urbanism, and urbanization.

6. Lofland provides an excellent account of the uses of space in a city, arguing that location and appearance (self-presentation) are keys to survival in an urban environment ([1973] 1985).

7. I use "domestic violence" to cover both the women's abuse group and the men's anger management group.

8. As far as I could tell, there was no way of ensuring regular attendance at meetings. Failure to attend had greater consequences for the men than for the women, but that did not seem to make the men more conscientious about attending—though it did make them more creative in their excuses. Only two or three of the women in the group in which I participated (a total of about twelve women) had perfect attendance.

9. The reasons are both geographical and socioeconomic. The groups were located in Hawaiian Homelands areas and thus tended to draw people of Hawaiian descent. In addition, the Waiʻanae Coast is plagued by unemployment, poverty, and drug use, all of which contributed to the situations the women and the men found themselves in.

10. Publicity about the Hawaiian sovereignty movement undoubtedly influenced groups like the ones I attended, but since no one specifically mentioned sovereignty, I will leave that complicated subject out of this essay.

11. Boggs and Chun write that talk-story "consists of narratives of personal experience, banter, joking, and word play of a friendly sort intended to suggest sentiments and feelings which can then be shared" (1990:142).

12. The ambiguity of Gloria and Karen's position appeared in their relationship with me. Sometimes they identified with me, taking on the role of outsiders to local culture, and sometimes they distanced themselves from me, considering me the outsider—too thin, too pale, and too stingy in my appetites. By the end of the sessions, we were close friends but only after a good amount of teasing, testing, and talking. Paul had an easier time with me, because, I think, he had an easier time in general with his role as mediator between local and urban cultures.

13. Clarence was in an anger management group, by complete coincidence the one I attended. In my experience, he was a charming and persuasive person.

14. *Hānai* refers to the practice of giving a child to the person who requests it to solidify bonds between adults. Retaining some of its historical connotations, as Lindsay's anecdote illustrates, it has also changed to meet modern conditions on the Waiʻanae Coast (Modell 1996).

15. According to Hawai'i state law, a child must be removed if he or she is at risk of *imminent* harm.

16. In every state of the union, the "best interests of the child" principle—vague as it is—sets the criteria for a child's well-being.

17. Dening's discussion of theater and the "pull" between performer and audience is elaborate, and I am making just a pass over it in my text.

18. See Merry, this volume.

19. The theoretical premise is clear in statements like the following, chosen from a manual on self-help groups. "That is why with many men [who batter women] it is important at the early stage to decrease guilt to some extent through inclusion in the group and increase acknowledgment through each man's description of what he did. It is very important this be done without editing or blaming the victim or other factors such as alcohol" (quoted in Trimble 1994:263).

20. The phrases are adapted from Dening 1992:3.

21. I do not mean to simplify either Family Court's decision-making process or the burdens Child Protective Services has to bear in protecting children. To discuss those at length would require another essay.

22. Once he came to the women's group, and there he did a wonderful talk-story performance, full of sexual innuendo and quite different from what he did at the men's group meetings. He could be very playful!

23. At the women's group, I also learned how many women battered their partners.

24. I read this in a newspaper article that implied Paul had transgressed agency rules.

25. All three facilitators also talked about mental and emotional abuse, but physical violence took primary place for them and for the participants.

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COMPARATIVE CRIMINALIZATION: CULTURAL MEANINGS OF ADULTERY AND GENDER VIOLENCE IN HAWAI'I IN 1850 AND 1990

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This essay analyzes the impact of court cases concerning sexuality and adultery on customary understandings of kinship and gender in Hilo, Hawai'i. During the periods covered the nature of the cases, the content of the law, and the implementation of punishment changed radically. Nevertheless, there are similarities in modes of criminalization during the 1840s and 1850s, on the one hand, and during the 1990s, on the other. Both used the authority and sanctioning power of the law to redefine marriage and gender relations. Both were implemented through local practices of police, courts, and corrections/treatment officials, which provided incentives for compliance as well as opportunities for resistance, evasion, and noncompliance from the general population. The periods are also substantially different. The first sought to place women under the control of husbands in a private sphere beyond the law, while the second invited the law into the family to protect the woman. A comparison provides insight into changes in the elements that focus the moral values of a community.

THE LOWER COURTS of the Kingdom of Hawai'i in the 1840s and 1850s were full of cases of adultery and fornication. The flood of cases about sexuality outside marriage reflected the New England Calvinist missionaries' harnessing of the legal system to the project of containing the Hawaiian body: swathing it in clothing, containing desire within the bonds of a lifelong marriage, restricting sexual behavior to private spaces. The New England missionaries subjected themselves to the same family form and sexual restraints, defined by a legal system already in force in New England in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Grimshaw 1989). In both instances, the com-

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munities imposed moral dicta through a definition of good conduct within the family.

In 1850, the Kingdom of Hawai'i adopted a penal code based on an 1844 proposed Massachusetts penal code. The missionaries had succeeded in imposing their viewpoints onto constables and magistrates in the kingdom and through these officials onto both commoners and kings. Customary Hawaiian kinship patterns were transmuted into the Victorian bourgeois family, its internal space subject only to the sovereignty of the husband, while its external shape came under the supervision of the state. Everyday forms of sexual interaction and marriage that had been approved or at least tolerated became the object of legal censure and surveillance; in effect the everyday practices of the Hawaiian people were criminalized (see Merry 2000). Another example of the criminalization of family and gender practices occurred in the 1990s, in the campaign against gender violence.[1] In Hawai'i, a series of legal and procedural reforms during the 1980s significantly increased the scope of punishment, the severity of the criminal justice response, and the availability of treatment programs for wife battering. The officials and the goals behind these programs differed from the movement a century earlier, but the clash of community morals has something in common.

I argue that there are fundamental similarities in the two waves of criminalization. Both use the authority and sanctioning power of the law to redefine gender and marriage relations. Both are dedicated to a new vision of family life and gender relationships framed in a larger social/religious theory brought by outsiders. Both are implemented through local practices of police, courts, and corrections/treatment officials that provide incentives for compliance as well as loopholes and opportunities for resistance, evasion, and noncompliance from the general population. Both are embedded in reform movements brought to Hawai'i from the U.S. mainland. And both are premised on the assumption that constructing a moral community requires a transformation of the gender order.

The two moments of criminalization had different goals. The first sought to place women more clearly under the control of husbands in a private sphere beyond the law, while the second invited the law into the family to protect the woman, even if this meant sacrificing her marriage. The first wave embodied the expansion of modernity, the second wave the twilight of modernity and its replacement by a globalizing postmodernity. In the mid–nineteenth century, Hawai'i experienced the transformation from mercantile capitalism to an industrial capitalism of sugar plantations. In the 1850s, defendants were mostly suppliers of food, sex, and other services for merchant exchanges with visiting ships or were self-sufficient farmers outside the global market. The 1990s criminalization took place after the residents

of Hilo were fully incorporated into the social and economic arrangements of modernity and the global economy. But like their predecessors, defendants in wife-battering cases were at the margins of the economic system, working in poorly paid and unstable jobs, if at all.

The two waves of criminalization also took place within different political situations. The first occurred in a sovereign Hawaiian nation struggling to retain its independence in the face of colonial takeovers elsewhere in the Pacific. During the 1840s, the government adopted the Anglo-American rule of law and constitutional government to acquire recognition in the global arena as "civilized" and sovereign in European terms. But disciplinary systems —such as police, prisons, and social services—necessary for successful social transformation through law were rudimentary. In contrast, 1990s criminalization takes place in a society with a complex system of interconnected social service agencies in which the boundaries between the law and services are blurred and often effaced.

The First Wave: Establishing the Bourgeois Family through Law

Establishing a new gender order was a fundamental part of the social transformation of Hawai‘i. Only after two decades of efforts to control sexuality, to establish the discipline of the body and contain its sensuality within the bonds of marriage, did Native Hawaiians become in any significant way a part of a capitalist labor force. The bourgeois family, with its contained sexuality and ideology of masculine self-governance, was a precondition to the creation of a capitalist economic order based on wage labor and individual responsibility for production. Policing of the family formed the core of missionary efforts to redesign Hawaiian conduct, and intrusion into the lives of Hawaiian women and men was thorough.

Men and women in 1840s Hilo were brought to court for behavior that had long been condoned by Native Hawaiians. Couples were caught by constables in situations defined as appropriate—relationships of cohabitation or of love. Some cases report that constables followed couples into coffee fields, others that they peered through the thatch or broke into a house in the middle of the night. In most instances, these couples were living together in a way their kin and community found acceptable.

According to virtually all sources, early Hawaiian marriage was not marked with much formality at its initiation and was easily broken (Linnekin 1990: 121; Ellis 1969; Handy and Pukui 1972:105–111). Sexuality was relatively unconstrained during certain periods of life, particularly for young people and for chiefly men and women after their first children were born. There was clearly a different economy of the body and desire among the Hawaiian

population than among the New England missionaries. Customs clashed as missionaries claimed the right to question applicants for marriage about their religious affiliations and to forbid non-Christians from marrying converts (Linnekin 1990). Marriages had to be registered and conform to the conditions established by the state. Divorce became very difficult, requiring lengthy and expensive legal proceedings.

When cases appeared in court of men beating their wives, if a weapon was involved or the beating severe, the witnesses unambiguous, and the injury significant, the man was usually fined. Under other circumstances, he was not. However, not infrequently a woman went to court several times about a man beating her, and then she finally deserted him. The court, under these conditions, usually returned the woman to the husband.

Acceptable reasons for divorce changed. Being battered did not justify a wife leaving her husband, but a man's absence of four years did. A person could also receive a divorce as a result of his or her partner's adultery. However, in the early years of Western influence, an adulterer was not permitted to remarry as long as the cuckolded person remained alive.

This family form was fundamental to the creation of modern society. The sovereign male subject was given dominion over female subjects, understood as less capable of self-governance. The public sphere was constituted by agreement among equals, and a private sphere, outside the law and different in kind, was the realm of emotions, desires, needs, and cultural traditions (Collier, Maurer, and Suarez-Navez 1995:8). In the private realm of the family, inequalities were understood as the result of naturalized differences and capacities such as those based on gender.

This family form is also fundamental to the rule of law in the modern liberal state. As legal scholars note, modern law claims universal applicability but marks out a free, private realm of the family within which the subject engages in self-governance subject to the forms of self-discipline and policing embodied in the microtechnologies of power of the modern period (Fitzpatrick 1992:180). The private space of the family is externally structured by law, which regulates marriage, divorce, property rights, and inheritance, but its internal governance is vested in the sovereignty of husband over wife and father over children. In other words, the state constitutes this private space but cedes authority inside the space to the father/husband.

Imposed by missionaries, the bourgeois form of family was very different from prevailing Native Hawaiian practices of the nineteenth century. The speed with which new social forms and practices penetrated Hawaiian society, however, was not the same for urban and rural areas. While Honolulu, Lahaina, and to a lesser extent Hilo were inundated with ships, foreigners, and new opportunities to marry and earn cash and goods for sexual work,

rural areas remained less changed. In addition to rural-urban differences, there was a major difference between the social lives of commoners and chiefs. The latter are far better described by visiting merchants, whalers, and missionaries than the former and are even more clearly presented in the accounts of missionized Hawaiians, such as John Papa ʻĪʻī and Samuel Kamakau in particular. Accounts of commoner practices, based on written sources and court documents, suggest a gradual change.

Writing in the 1860s about commoners, Kamakau, a mission-educated Hawaiian, distinguishes between cohabitation, the most frequent type of attachment, and "the binding form of Hawaiian marriage," called *hoʻao paʻa* (1961:347; Handy and Pukui 1972:52; quoted in Linnekin 1990:123). The former involved many wives or many husbands. The latter could not be dissolved and involved ceremony and and reciprocal exchanges between the families, while children born to the couple sealed the relationship between the two families. *Hoʻao paʻa* was the custom of the chiefs, the firstborn children of prominent people, and children who were family pets, according to Kamakau. Among the commoners, firstborn children of prominent people and chosen favorites were also most likely to become family leaders. For the young, for junior siblings who could not move into leadership positions, and for most Hawaiian commoners, cohabitation was the norm. In this type of attachment, the pattern for the vast majority of the Hawaiian population, women were free to leave when they wished (Linnekin 1990:58).

Chiefly marriage, in contrast, was politically important, and the sexual behavior of *aliʻi* women was hedged with restrictions. Although chiefly women had liaisons and secondary unions, they could not do so with impunity, especially if they had high *kapu* rank or politically critical relatives (Linnekin 1990:60). Linnekin notes that although women flocked to the ships in large numbers to make alliances with the newcomers, chiefly women gave material gifts, while only the commoners provided sex (ibid.:156). Both commoner and chiefly women, however, lived in separate spheres from men and enjoyed considerable autonomy. Gender relations appear to have been fairly egalitarian (ibid.:114). Ties between brothers and sisters were stronger than those of marriage.

Transforming such family relationships into the model of the bourgeois family with enduring husband-wife bonds, female subordination to male sovereignty, and exclusive sexual relationships was not easy, at least for women. Although it is hard to recognize in the documents and court records that remain, there are hints of resistance. A moral discourse, bemoaning licentiousness and vice, suggests Hawaiians continued to behave in ways the missionaries disapproved of. For example, a missionary in Honolulu proclaims that Hawaiian women need to learn to "make their homes comfortable and

remove the temptation to wander about and commit crime in order to get money or fine dress." Men and women, he continues, need restraints when they travel to cities like Honolulu and Lahaina. "Much licentiousness too is practiced on small vessels going to and from these central towns" (Kingdom of Hawai'i 1846:32–33).

Another missionary adds that licentiousness is the prevailing vice of his district, as it is of the entire islands: "More married persons than unmarried are guilty of this sin, thus adding adultery to uncleanness. Of late, I have not heard of very many cases, still they occur often enough to cause me to tremble for the nation; for 'sin' and no sin more perhaps than this, 'is the reproach' and ruin 'of any people'" (E. Green, in Kingdom of Hawai'i 1846:31). Another missionary, Artemis Bishop, also says that the most prominent vice is licentiousness, although "much diminished from its former universal prevalence": "During the first years of my residence on these islands, it was shocking to witness the entire want of decency, both of feeling and action, among all classes." The problem, he adds, is idleness: Women and children have scarcely any employment, and women are "given to gossiping or absolute idleness, and the latter [children] of both sexes are left to grow up untaught in all kinds of work" (Kingdom of Hawai'i 1846:33–35).

At the same time, by 1848 the mission community was beginning to see signs of improvement. For example, in their general letter on the state of the mission to Rufus Anderson, assessing improvement since 1820, the missionary authors note that the people now wear clothes, whereas before even high chiefs would swim naked and walk from house to beach naked. Family and marriage, too, had improved.

> Now all the natural social and domestic relations are respected—the duties of each in some measure respected, and regulated by good and wholesome laws; and a neglect to perform the duties attached to these various relations is punishable by fine, imprisonment or other disabilities. Parents and children, husbands and wives, masters and servants, are recognized in laws and on any delinquency in the performance of the duties of their respective relations, they are answerable to the laws of the land. (Letter from Thurston, Hitchcock, Paris, and Comee dated 2 June 1848, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, vol. 13, nos. 10–12, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge)

By the end of the nineteenth century, when Hawai'i was annexed to the United States as a colony, the project of transforming the Hawaiian family had apparently succeeded. With American court systems and legal codes,

marriage was a more durable relationship, divorce virtually impossible. Yet the change increased women's vulnerability to violence, because violence and fear of violence were defined as irrelevant to ending the relationship. Women who deserted in fear were returned to their husbands, sometimes with penalties. Within the family, the sovereignty of the husband dominated all relationships. The woman was expected to remain in the house performing domestic tasks rather than wandering more broadly visiting, farming, and keeping ties with other kin (Grimshaw 1989). This cultural transformation subjected women to a kind of isolation and caught them in a nexus of power and control practices characteristic of battering families today. The transformation of older patterns into the circumscribed bourgeois family with a private core protected from the intervention of the state or public scrutiny of any kind made women far more vulnerable to gender violence than they had been before.

The Second Wave: Criminalizing Gender Violence in the 1990s

Since the late 1970s, an activist feminist movement in Hawai‘i has produced a gradual change in the law's stance toward domestic violence in Hawai‘i as it has nationwide. Laws have targeted wife battering, and penalties have become more stringent. A law passed in 1973 distinguished domestic violence from other assaults, but it did not immediately produce significant numbers of arrests and convictions. During the 1980s it was augmented by stronger sentences, longer cooling-off periods, more energetic police arrest policies, and more diligent prosecution. A 1985 addition to the statute required all convicted batterers to attend a treatment program for battering. In the town of Hilo, local feminists started a shelter in 1978 (Rodriguez 1988) and, in 1986, working with the activist local judiciary, developed a violence control program that offered violence control training for batterers and a women's support group.

These newly constituted communities gave women the moral support they needed to go to court for restraining orders and to prosecute their batterers.[2] During the twenty-year period from 1974 to 1994, the population of the County of Hawai‘i almost doubled, but the number of calls to the police for domestic trouble cases more than quadrupled (State of Hawai‘i 1994). The number of requests for civil protective orders, commonly called temporary restraining orders or TROs, has increased dramatically since the early 1970s. Between 1971 and 1978, seven temporary restraining orders were issued in Hilo for domestic violence situations. However, by 1985, the year the new spouse abuse law went into effect, the numbers were much larger. I could not find data for the period from 1979 to 1984, but in the ten years

from 1985 to 1995, the number almost doubled, increasing 182 percent. The most spectacular increase has been in criminal cases: During the sixteen years between 1979 and 1995, the number of criminal cases of wife battering increased twenty-five times from a very small initial number to almost 800 out of a population of 135,000. In 1993, there was one call to the police for every 58 residents and one charge of Abuse of a Household Member for every 183 residents in the county. In 1994, domestic violence cases made up 30 percent of the active probation caseload of the criminal court.

The increase in civil temporary restraining orders suggests that women have become more inclined to turn to the legal system for help. The even greater increase in criminal cases indicates that police are more energetic in making arrests and prosecutors in pressing charges. By 1995, the courts handled approximately the same number of civil as criminal cases. I interpret these statistics as indicating that wife battering has long existed as a social practice but that, as public consciousness increased during the 1980s, more women turned to the courts for help. As courts became more attuned to this problem, a higher proportion of cases were prosecuted. However, the fact that calls to the police for help have increased more slowly than criminal prosecutions suggests that the change is not the result of more wife battering but of victims' greater willingness to turn to the law for help and for police, prosecutors, and judges to take their complaints seriously.

The sharp increase in criminal cases is in part the result of a decision by the police to arrest all perpetrators of abuse in a household relationship—not just those who resist leaving, who come back before abuse has stopped, or who inflict serious injury. I was told by a public defender that this policy change occurred in 1989. There has also been an expansion of the victim/witness program that endeavors to encourage women to press charges, particularly in the last three years. At the same time, the victim/witness program has developed a more cooperative working relationship with the shelter, which facilitates prosecutions. These changes are even more marked in urban areas, such as Honolulu. A bill presented to the State House of Representatives for the Sixteenth Legislature (H.B. 364, S.D. 1) claims that on O'ahu, arrests for domestic violence increased from 128 in 1986 to 1,400 in 1988, while restraining orders issued by the family court on O'ahu increased from 164 in 1980 to 918 in 1988.

Over the last twenty years, there has been a sea change in the legal system as police, prosecutors, and judges have been willing to take domestic violence seriously and to prosecute the behavior. At the same time, women have become far more active in asking for the help of the legal system in situations of battering. I think that there has been a massive, one-time movement of wife battering cases into the courts. Most, but not all, of the defen-

dants are men, and the victims are women.[3] They are going to court for behavior that twenty years ago was taken for granted as a part of male authority.

These cases have long appeared in court in small numbers but rarely received severe penalties. An examination of the case records for the lower court of Hilo from 1853 to 1913 indicates that the courts heard 473 cases involving domestic violence over these sixty years, averaging about eight a year in a fairly stable pattern. Only eight had female defendants, and thirteen had male and female defendants. Ninety-six percent were male defendants. Of these defendants, 48 percent of those whose plea is recorded pleaded not guilty. The court convicted 76 percent of these, but of those convicted, 88 percent were given a fine under $100, generally $6. There was no further penalty or treatment for batterers during this period.

In the 1980s, batterers' treatment programs became the cornerstone of the local judiciary's increasingly assiduous attack on domestic violence.[4] All convicted batterers and many of those subject to restraining orders, particularly contact restraining orders,[5] were mandated by the court to attend a violence control program. Judges sometimes required women to attend a women's support group. Four hundred men were referred to this program over a three-year period from 1990 to 1993.

The batterers' treatment program teaches men to manage their anger and provides new perspectives on gender privilege. Leaders of the program say their main concern is with women's safety, but because the government is interested in rehabilitating men, they offer treatment for batterers. Program staff believe that batterers should be offered education and that they will respond when they are ready, although they have limited hopes for reforming men who batter. Education from the outside, in other words, may not alter self-images that are tied to older constructs of identity. Still, feminist advocates depend on this program and on the legal system to construct new gender identities. Women are told they do not deserve to be hit no matter what they do, and men are told that they can win love, trust, and affection through negotiation and collaboration instead of force. The men are taught how to control their violence and rethink their beliefs about male-female relationships, and the women are offered support in negotiating the legal system and provided with linkages to other women who have experienced violence. Communities of instruction and support emerge within the larger Hawaiian population, apart from and crucial to kinship and family.

Comparative Criminalization

How do the two instances of criminalization compare? The earlier is a product of advancing modernism, the later reflective of modernist collapse and the

postmodern era. Both expand state regulation of the family. Both seek to transform family and gender inequalities through enunciating a new moral order backed by relatively severe penalties, even though these penalties were probably as irregularly and uncertainly imposed in the nineteenth century as they are now. In both cases, the reformers came from outside, bringing a vision of rights and relationships to be imposed through law. In both, reforms were dedicated to the notion of a transformed family, although the notions differ significantly. The first is dedicated to protecting the woman morally and sexually within the family, the second to protecting her physically and emotionally from family relationships.

In the twentieth as in the nineteenth century, those whose behavior becomes the object of court surveillance are primarily the lower social classes. In both cases, the objective of the criminalization process is to construct an autonomous, choice-making rational subject within this class segment. In the nineteenth century, this was a male subject who was to take authority within the family. In the present period, it is women who are encouraged to leave partners who batter and to prosecute their batterers. If a woman fails to testify in support of prosecution, she may be seen as troublesome and difficult even though legal action subjects her to danger from an angry spouse and risks alienating relatives. Men are encouraged to take responsibility for their violence and to see it as a choice that harms their relationships with wives and children rather than an inner force they cannot control.

In the name of protecting women, both instances increase surveillance and control over men. In the first period women were to be protected from degradation, including their husbands' adultery; in the second, women were protected from violence. Yet it is unclear whether women's situations have been improved by either intervention. In both cases, changing the gender order required changing other aspects of social life. In the first case, locking women into permanent marriages under husbandly authority diminished their mobility and economic autonomy as well as reducing the importance of kinship linkages to members of the extended kin network or *'ohana.* In the second instance, women needed the financial and kinship resources to leave a man and set up a separate household, yet the legal system was unable to provide such resources.

In both cases, the law was limited in its effectiveness. Intervention evoked resistance, although the resistant practices are much easier to observe in contemporary ethnography than for the past (see Modell, this volume). Men argue with the judges who impose temporary restraining orders, pointing out that the problem is a woman's provocative behavior. They fail to come to the treatment program or come sporadically, offering excuses, evading requests to come again until their period of probation is over. They sit in treat-

ment programs and say nothing, apparently not becoming engaged in accepting the messages, or they joke about controlling women, thus undermining the message of the facilitators of the program (see Merry 1995).

In both cases, however, legal intervention produced new cultural meanings and new statements about the normativity of relationships. In the face of legal sanctions, good conduct acquired a heavy significance, and if the terms of conduct were unfamiliar (or disagreeable), the consequences of bad conduct were unmistakable. The clash of standards for behavior within a family had a profound impact on individual men and women in both periods.

There are numerous differences between the two moments of criminalization. Perhaps most important, the reforms were premised on different visions of marriage and gender inequality. The missionaries brought notions of a Christian family with a submissive wife busy in the domestic sphere; the feminists bring a secular vision of an egalitarian gender regime organized by mutual respect between autonomous individuals who can separate if there is abuse. The first vision privileges the maintenance of the nuclear family, the second the maintenance of the autonomous subject. Both promote the self-governing subject, but in the recent intervention women as well as men are considered candidates for this subjectivity. Remnants of the nineteenth-century image of the family persist in some of the counseling programs developed by evangelical Christian churches that expanded rapidly throughout the 1990s: Scriptural counseling promotes the continuity of the family while seeking reconciliation and forgiveness.

In contrast, the feminist-inspired batterers' treatment program and the courts see separation and prosecution as the only practical solution. Women are encouraged to look out for themselves and not take responsibility for the battering behavior of a man. The feminism of the treatment program asserts that women need protection, that they should be separated from battering men, and that battering behavior cannot be resolved with traditional methods of negotiation. While individuals are subjects of the programs, moral sanctions have been placed in the hands of outside institutions: Battering behavior within a family is tracked, reported, disciplined, and punished by external authorities. Sanctions are imposed by a community of experts, not through communal decisions made at family gatherings.

At the same time, there is not the large gap that there was in the nineteenth century between the social practices the law is encouraging and those of the community. In the 1850s, reformers gave rewards for catching offenses, thus encouraging spies within the community. Although victims did bring violence cases to the courts in small numbers, most of the adultery cases were uncovered by constables who spied on "known *moekolohes*," a term that appears in nineteenth-century court records, or by disgruntled dis-

placed partners who enlisted constables to help them spy on offenders. The second wave of criminalization is far more dependent on the initiative of the victims, who must call the police for help or go to family court requesting a temporary restraining order. That victims take advantage of external authorities in increasing numbers suggests that approved social practice coincides with the standards of good conduct in law.

There is a different cultural framing of identity in the two periods. The missionaries and court officials in the first wave (often members of the same social world and even families) held an infantilized view of the Hawaiians, designating Hawaiians as incapable of self-governance and in need of missionary intervention. The second wave has a tendency to see men as inherently violent and women as not violent, thus essentializing gender identities. But a critical difference is that the missionaries were not open to local meanings and understandings; they persisted in interpreting the world in a particular frame despite evidence to the contrary. Missionaries shared a self-preoccupation and cultural obliviousness that is not generally characteristic of the late twentieth century.

It seems likely that the missionaries were unintentionally collusive with capitalism in their effort to control sexuality, emotion, and expressiveness and encourage the turn toward rationality. The missionaries fought bitterly against the merchants of the early nineteenth century, but by 1850 they were beginning to forge a collaboration with the emerging industrial elite and to take on important roles in the Hawaiian government. Strategies for reform shifted from criminal law to the civil laws governing land and labor (such as the Mahele land division and the Masters and Servants Act of 1850). Missionary teachings of literacy, industry, and conserving resources within the nuclear family rather than sharing with the *ʻohana* plus restrictions on games and recreation, traveling, surfing, and the hula clearly predisposed Hawaiians to enter the capitalist labor market or to work as entrepreneurs. As Kameʻeleihiwa points out, commercial enterprise fit with Hawaiian cultural practices far better than ideas that were precursors of industrial capitalism (1992). There is no equivalent collusion between 1990s feminism and capitalism, except that the movement against gender violence has generated a new surveillance system for people who cannot fit into the new capitalist economy. Such people are taught to control impulses, a step toward gaining jobs in the tourist and service economies.

Another difference is the link between the courts and other disciplinary systems. In the first wave, the court worked alone, although its efforts were supported by churches. In the second wave, the court is connected to a disciplinary system of treatment programs, alcohol programs, and shelters that appear to be separate but in fact are intimately connected and share similar

views of the family and the necessity of breaking apart the family in order to protect the woman. Indeed, this intervention is part of a larger welfare-state system in which individuals are linked to institutions of the state in many ways, from welfare to child protective services to regulations of licensing and insuring cars to zoning regulations on housing. The blend of services and punishment that constitute the disciplinary matrix of the late twentieth century was clearly not present in the mid-nineteenth. The new initiative seems dedicated to dismantling the bourgeois family through the disciplinary mechanisms of the state and agents attached to it. In the present period, the opportunities for resistance to the disciplinary systems of the state, embedded as they are in other forms of regulation, are far less than they were in the 1850s at the dawn of the creation of the modern disciplinary society.

Another core difference is the relationship of the individual to the community. While the first wave of criminalization endeavored to subordinate the woman to her husband, this was in the interests of creating a Christian community. The second wave seeks autonomy at the price of community and, unlike other contemporary interventions in gender violence, argues that safety is more important than getting along and staying together.

Intervention and Cultural Imperialism

Are these instances of legal intervention to promote change examples of cultural imperialism? This comparison has proved very troubling for me. I have continually wanted to deny the obvious parallels between the missionary assault on sexuality and the feminist assault on gender violence. They reemerge, and I try again to find ways that they are different. My desire to find them different is moral and political: While I am offended at the way the missionaries thought about Hawaiians and their sexual mores that led them to attack this behavior, I support feminist efforts to reduce violence against women. The first seems deeply intrusive and disrespectful of Hawaiian culture, while the latter conforms to my commitment to gender equality. Are they really the same? What are the differences between them? And, perhaps more important, is the world in the 1990s like the world in the 1850s, or are there fundamental differences that change the meaning and implications of transferring ideas about family life through the law from one place to another? I think that there are.

The main form that the critique of both forms of intervention has taken, and continues to take today as human rights becomes a global language, is that intervention is ethnocentric. The critique holds that the spread of human rights is like imperialism: It is a Western concept that is being imposed on cultures that are quite different and do not share similar ideas about rights.

China made this argument forcefully in Vienna at the World Congress on Human Rights in 1993. Any claims to universal standards for moral behavior violate cultural differences and, like imperialism, represent acts by the West to reshape the rest in its own image. I think the analogy between nineteenth-century imperialism and late-twentieth-century human rights is fundamentally wrong. I will begin to explain why I think so by telling a story.

A few years ago a nagging back pain drove me to the office of a local chiropractor. He diagnosed my problem as a backbone out of line and recommended frequent visits over a period of months in which he would straighten my backbone and hold it in place. As he put it: "It is like orthodonture: You have to put the bones in the right place and hold them there until they stay there themselves." I dutifully submitted to a few weeks of unhelpful chiropractic visits, then turned to a physical therapist, who found a cure to what turned out to be a muscle problem. This experience led me to consider the power of the analogy that the chiropractor had offered me to think about my back. Are spines like teeth? Is the process of straightening a backbone in fact analogous to orthodonture? Is the relationship between the backbone and its surrounding tissue the same as that between teeth and the bone that holds them? It is clear that this analogy makes no sense. Yet the power of the analogy held me for several weeks.

This experience is relevant to the present comparison. There are clear analogies between the missionary efforts to control Hawaiian sexuality in the mid–nineteenth century and the introduction of mainland feminist efforts to reduce domestic violence in the late twentieth century. There are also substantial differences. One of the most important is that the world is not the same. In the nineteenth century, there were sharp cultural differences between the missionaries and the Hawaiians. Although the Hawaiians had experienced forty-two years of contact with Western traders before the missionaries arrived, they had not experienced a sustained effort to reshape their family and community life. Values generated in the family and community were nothing like the notions of law, government, religion, family, and sexuality that the missionaries brought.

In the late twentieth century, the globalization of culture means that the cultural world of Hilo is in some ways different but in other ways deeply similar to that of the rest of the United States. There are not separate and distinct cultures into which feminist ideas intrude. Instead, there are local communities with some variations in cultural traits, but they are not mapped out as distinct cultures with sharp boundaries. Each group has repertoires of cultural meanings and practices that overlap with those of other groups while being in some ways distinct. In this context, the concept of culture in the classic anthropological sense is misleading. There are not distinct, bounded

groups sharing integrated and cohesive sets of practices and worldviews. Instead, there are multiple, overlapping, communicating communities that share some ideas and contest others; within communities, different groups have different interpretations of the same symbols.

The situation was different in the contact zone of the mid–nineteenth century. The notion of a bounded, isolated, and static culture was still not accurate, since Hawaiian culture itself had changed and developed over the centuries of residence on the islands and had experienced massive transformations during the period of disease and death following contact. Nevertheless, the missionaries arrived in a complex, hierarchical, ancient cultural space armed with a clear agenda of cultural transformation accompanying religious conversion, a denigration of Hawaiian culture, and a desire to civilize the "savages." They helped the settlers create private landownership and wage labor with the belief that these moves toward capitalism would benefit the Hawaiian people. Missionaries even hoped to stem the dying by giving Hawaiians land of their own to work. This is the classic imperialist situation, replicated throughout Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.

Cultural relativism emerged in response to this kind of imperialism. An early proponent of relativism, Malinowski used the argument to challenge the cultural transformation project. He argued that cultures need to be understood in their own terms, that customs should be evaluated by internal standards of social functioning rather than by the norms of European civilization. Ironically, such a defense of local cultures against nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century imperialism produced the static, bounded, cohesive vision of culture that now burdens our efforts to understand the fluidity and globalization of culture in the current period.

Cultural relativism, in the form it took in the wars against imperialism in the early twentieth century, is no longer adequate as a moral position in the late twentieth century, nor is the concept of culture on which it is founded an accurate description of the world. Tolerance for difference is insufficient in a world in which the institutions of capitalism and Western culture have penetrated to virtually all segments of the globe and are being reappropriated and mobilized in various ways, in various communities, as forms of resistance. Cultural relativism grew out of an artificial imagining of cultural distinctiveness and boundedness, an imagining that provided useful fodder for resisting colonialism. But, just as the analogy of orthodonture is inaccurate and misleading for thinking about backbones, so is cultural relativism and the notion of separate and contained cultures inaccurate and misleading as a moral guide in the late twentieth century.

The communities now experiencing the influences of the West, such as the criminalization of gender violence or the dissemination of concepts of

human rights, are already participating in social worlds that have by and large been shaped by capitalism and by Western law and its concepts of rights. These ideas have been and are still being seized, appropriated, and redeployed in moments of resistance. A close analogy is the spread of the labor movement from Britain to the cities of Africa and from California to the docks and plantations of Hawai'i. This is not imperialism in the same way that the missionary introduction of Christianity to Hawaiians is. Instead, the spread of unions followed the spread of capitalism, and they emerged in Africa as they did in Europe in response to similar conditions of capitalist labor. This is different from imperialism, because the societies receiving the labor organizers already have a culture that includes capitalist labor relations. European nationalism, defined in linguistic and ethnic terms, has similarly been seized on in many parts of the formerly colonized world.

The Hawaiian sovereignty movement is another parallel process of introducing apparently "foreign" ideas into Hawai'i. Although many of the leaders are Hawaiian, they have typically been educated in Western conceptions of rights, sovereignty, and political struggles. Many are women (Trask 1993). While the men engage in electoral politics, the women pursue a more radical course, charting a demand for self-determination rather than simply participation in the electoral process. The form this self-determination took included the creation of a constitution, an electoral system, and a governing assembly. Is this an example of Hawaiians borrowing a Western form? I think not. The Western form of government was introduced to Hawai'i in the 1840s, under considerable duress. But, 150 years later, Hawaiian activists drawing on various facets of their culture in order to construct a new order find this form of government part of their own tradition, tailored in the constitution of Ka Lahui to a Hawaiian framework. In other aspects of its activity as well, the sovereignty movement has drawn on law to make demands for reparations, to try the U.S. government for its crimes against the Hawaiian people and their culture, to demand the right to sue over the misuse of Hawaiian homelands. This recourse to law is not to a "foreign" cultural repertoire; on the contrary, it is a turn to concepts of law and rights that have been part of Hawaiian social organization for over 150 years. As these concepts were absorbed, they were also adapted and appropriated to the Hawaiian context.

In the current movement, the concept of law itself is being redefined as both global and local rather than national. Areas of contest between cultural meanings cannot be thought of as occurring between distinct cultures; instead they occur among various groupings within cultures, such as those based on race, class, gender, region, and history. Moreover, meanings are constantly reformulated as these communities of common interest shift, succumbing to changing circumstances and changing populations. The moral

component of cultural meanings plays a crucial role, integrating competing interests and providing the wherewithal for local leverage in global movements. The moral component grants collective solidarity to communities engaged in a continual struggle for autonomy and participation.

The claim that the global spread of feminism or ideas of human or indigenous rights replicates nineteenth-century imperialism is wrong. Arguing cultural relativism as a barrier to global interventions in behavior viewed as offensive by some groups does not recognize the nature of globalization or the postmodern society. Nor does it recognize the fluidity and the overlapping nature of communities of "culture" throughout that global arena.

NOTES

1. The term "gender violence" emphasizes that the violence occurs in culturally defined gender relationships that privilege male authority and control and to some extent legitimate violence as discipline.

2. In Hilo, the number of requests for civil temporary restraining orders has increased dramatically since the early 1970s. Between 1971 and 1978, there were seven issued in Hilo for domestic violence situations. In 1985, there were 250; in 1991, 320; in 1992, 404; in 1993, 451; and by the middle of 1994, there were 252. The number of criminal cases of domestic violence has increased even more, from 31 in 1979 and 9 in 1980, to 291 in 1990 and 551 in 1991.

3. When the 151 calls for domestic trouble to the Hawai'i County police are broken down by gender, of the 130 for which information is available, 117 (90 percent) have female victims and male perpetrators, 10 (8 percent) have male victims and female perpetrators, and 3 (2 percent) have male victims and male perpetrators (Hawaii Spouse Abuse Task Force 1989:A-3).

4. A 1985 statute defining abuse of a family or household member as a misdemeanor adds the provision that a person convicted will serve a minimum jail sentence of forty-eight hours and "be required to undergo any available domestic violence treatment and counseling program as ordered by the court" (Hawaii Revised Statutes 709–906, section 5).

5. This is an order that allows the restrained person to see the other person but prohibits him from using violence against that person.

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