OF EXTERNAL HABITS AND MATERNAL ATTITUDES: MARGARET MEAD, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE REPRODUCTION OF CHARACTER

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Some critics have thought of Margaret Mead's research in culture and personality as a mechanical reduction of character types to child-rearing techniques. However, a closer reading of her work reveals that, by 1938, Mead understood character to arise in the social and communicative interactions between caregivers and their charges. For Mead, techniques such as swaddling were powerful means by which caregivers communicated attitudes to children, but those same techniques were not sufficient to either form a child's character or produce an attitude within a caregiver. This article takes up the examination of this more psychologically dynamic Mead. It attends to her rare but express statement of the influence by the gestalt psychologist, Kurt Koffka, as well as to the similarities between Mead's thought and that of Kurt Lewin, another important gestalt psychologist.

A Beginning, of Sorts

During his mid- to late 1930s course of lectures on "the psychology of culture" at Yale, Edward Sapir (1994, 181) contended that such a psychology "only arises in the relations of individuals." For Sapir (1994, 183), "In itself, culture ha[d] no psychology. It [was] just a low-tone series of rituals, a rubber stamping waiting to be given meaning by" individuals in their relations with and to one another. "[C]ulture [meant] nothing until the individual, with his personality configuration, [gave] it meaning" (Sapir 1994, 183). The analyst needed to understand culture in order "to know

how to gauge the individual's ... expressions of his reactions," but "the psychology of *a* culture [meant] nothing at all" (Sapir 1994, 181, emphasis in original).

Sapir's concern with the consequences of what might be called "the reification of culture" (cf. Darnell 1986, 158; Handler 1986, 136) can easily be traced back to Sapir's (1917) innovative response to Alfred Kroeber's (1917) contention that culture is somehow superorganic. During this course of lectures, Sapir (1994, 181) brought his concern to bear on the work of both Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict. He contended that "the implication of . . ." their work, or what he called "much of the social psychological literature [then] being produced," [was] "a bit mischievous" (Sapir 1994, 181). A single mention of Mead aside, Sapir's discussion, as re-created by Judith T. Irvine, attended to Benedict and her 1934 book *Patterns of Culture*.[1] Sapir's criticism of Mead, at least on the grounds that he advanced during his Yale course, was misplaced, however; in that it has been repeated, Sapir was himself mischievous at best. This point shall become clearer over the course of this article.

Here, I continue a body of work dedicated to exploring Mead's scientific project and that project's multiple contexts (see Sullivan 1997, 1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2005b). Further, I have noted elsewhere Mead's long attention to the individual in culture, a notion traceable to Sapir (Sullivan 2005a). In this article, I focus on the dynamic relations of individuals—notably caregivers and young children—in Mead's thought. As in my previous work, I draw from Mead's unpublished papers—in particular a memorandum Mead wrote in 1938 while working with Gregory Bateson among the Iatmul at Tambunam, New Guinea. For Mead, the dynamic relations between persons not only gave rise to the variable psychologies of cultures and also did so in ways central to the possibility of the reproduction of character from generation to generation.

Introducing Portions of a Memorandum

On March 21, 1938, Mead wrote a letter to Nolan Lewis, director of the New York Psychiatric Institute and Hospital and coordinator of field research for the Committee for Research in Dementia Praecox (hereafter CRDP). Mead's letter informed Lewis that she and Bateson were returning to New Guinea in order to gather ethnographic information of sufficient complexity that it could be compared with the materials they had already gathered in Bali.

The CRDP was by far the largest source of funds for Mead and Bateson's joint Balinese and subsequent Iatmul researches. A coalition of psychiatrists funded by the Masons, the CRDP's members were interested

in all matters having any bearing on dementia praecox, a set of psychoses better known today as schizophrenia (see Sullivan 1998, 72ff).

Lewis responded to Mead on June 23, 1938, indicating that "if . . . possible" the CRDP would "aid [Mead and Bateson] in obtaining material that may have a bearing on the subject of schizophrenia" (Library of Congress: Margaret Mead Papers [LOC: MMP], box N5, file 1).[2] Lewis also passed on a series of questions brought to his attention by Dr. Margaret A. Ribble, whom Lewis described as "a combination of psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and obstetrician . . . [and] who does a great deal of work with children."[3]

Dr. Ribble's questions would not likely strike current anthropologists as being ethnographically sophisticated; however, these same anthropologists may take these questions as revealing a particular local form of sophistication about rearing children.

Mead was "not quite sure whether [Lewis] meant these questions as suggestions [about what she] should keep an eye out [for], or as points upon which Dr. Ribble want[ed] immediate comparative comment" (LOC: MMP, box N5, file 1; hereafter Mead 1938). Mead may well have found certain questions pertinent to her own line of study. For example, "5. What swaddling is done and when? Is there actual limitation of movement and what is the immediate reaction?," and "6. How much physical contact with the mother takes place in the first months?" She may also have wished to keep in Lewis's good graces. Whatever her reasons, Mead composed a five-page, single-spaced, undated document (ca. August 29, 1938) that she titled "Memorandum in answer to Dr. Ribble's questions" (Mead 1938).

Mead (1938) answered these questions, referring in particular to "the range of [her] experience among Oceanic peoples: Samoa, Manus, Arapesh, Mundugumor, Tchambuli, Bali, Iatmul," as well as in passing to the Omaha, the subjects of Mead's only Amerindian study (Mead 1932; see Molloy 2008), and the Lepchas of Nepal, among whom Geoffrey Gorer had worked in 1936 (on the Lepchas, see Gorer 1938). Mead then added a postscript of sorts that includes the following passage:

> In primitive societies there is a greater congruence between external habits of caring for a child and the attributes developed in members of the society than there is among ourselves and this congruence is revealing, but should not I think be taken to mean that a *method* of suckling, for instance, is *ipso facto* capable of producing a definitive type of character formation. A good deal stronger case can be made out for the determinative nature of the condition of the child at birth. (Mead 1938, emphasis in original)

First Excursus, or Concerning Swaddling

Mead wrote that she had not found swaddling among the peoples of the Pacific she had studied.[4] She made reference, however, to two potentially relevant cases:

> Balinese babies [were] carried in the sling which is bound around the babies' hips and which constrains the lower parts of the body. Balinese children seem[ed] to concentrate all their activity in their arms and walk later and show[ed] less kicking activity than [did] New Guinea babies. (Mead 1938)

This way of carrying a baby was similar to swaddling, as the baby's lower body was constrained, but as the infant's body was not fully wrapped, the child was left free both to reach and to grasp. Mead made no further comment in the memorandum connecting this technique for transporting young children to any further development of their character.

"The most significant material on swaddling" that Mead (1938) knew of "among primitive people" concerned the cradleboard, used among some Amerindian groups, including the Omaha. To Mead (1938), there seemed "reason to believe that part of the exceedingly self-constrained American Indian personality can be attributed to the cradleboard." She limited the significance of her comments about the use of cradleboards in two ways. First, "there [were] many other cultural agencies forming this character" (Mead 1938). Second, "some tribes," did "not have the cradle board," yet presumably many persons would still manifest "the exceedingly self-constrained American Indian personality" to which Mead (1938) referred. Hence, according to Mead, the technique in isolation was not determinative; a given personality type could derived from different, possibly multiple, sources.

Mead had expressed the view that specific techniques were not sufficient to generate a "definitive type of character development," with its corresponding pattern of habits, to her sister, Priscilla Rosten, in a letter written shortly before the 1938 memorandum to Dr. Ribble. Rosten had written Mead asking advice about raising her recently born son, Phillip. Mead replied, "It's important to remember that no single item of education has much effect in itself, unless it is backed up by attitudes, tones of voice, etc" (LOC: MMP, box R7, file 7, letter from Mead to Priscilla Rosten, dated July 15, 1938).[5]

Further, Mead contended that any particular technique or apparatus "is a mechanical device whereby an emotional attitude *can* be put over"; that

is, any particular technique or apparatus (e.g., a sling or using a cradle-board) was a means of communicating about the tenor of relations between caregiver and child (LOC: MMP, box R7, file 7, letter from Mead to Priscilla Rosen, dated July 15, 1938, emphasis in original). Mead's sister was to understand that any particular technique or apparatus may "have some effect on character structure" but only insofar as that particular technique or apparatus was "correlated with other parts of the educational system, and [was] congruent with them" (LOC: MMP, box R7, file 7, letter from Mead to Priscilla Rosten, dated July 15, 1938). Thus, for example "nursing babies standing, will reinforce the hostility of a hostile mother, but it does not make a mother hostile or a child undernourished, *in itself*" (LOC: MMP Box R7, file 7, letter from Mead to Priscilla Rosten, dated July 15, 1938, emphasis in original). Similarly, "any child that [was] swaddled" or like a "Balinese baby, carried in a cloth sling," would "probably show some effect in its gesture, but whether" any particular way of handling infants would "also effect it [the child] emotionally [would] be due to whether the swaddling [or using the sling was] congruent with parental attitudes" (LOC: MMP, Box R7, file 7, letter from Mead to Priscilla Rosten, dated July 15, 1938).

There is no evidence that I have found in Mead's corpus, published or unpublished, that Mead ever changed her mind on this point. Even Geoffrey Gorer would note more than once that swaddling was but one of the important "clues" to understanding Great Russians (Gorer and Rickman 1949, 129, 198, 216). According to Gorer, "It is *not* the argument of this study that the Russian manner of swaddling their children produces the Russian character" (Gorer and Rickman 1949: 128–29, emphasis in original). "[T]echniques of education," swaddling being an example, were not "the cause of [subsequent] adult behavior" (Gorer and Rickman 1949, 128), nor should Gorer's argument "be interpreted to mean that" these techniques were such causes (Gorer and Rickman 1949, 128). Rather, "[s]waddling" was a "device employed by adults to communicate with the child in its first year of life, to lay the foundation for those habits and attitudes which will be developed and strengthened by all the major institutions in Great Russian society" (Gorer and Rickman 1949, 129).

Mead, in her 1954 essay "The Swaddling Hypothesis: Its Reception," concurred, asserting that Gorer's argument had been misunderstood. Among such misunderstandings was

> an assertion that when a student of national character attempts to delineate the way in which swaddling by Russians communicates to an infant in specific ways which become part of his culturally

regular character, this description is equivalent to saying that swaddling *per se* by members of any culture will have definitive predictable effects of the same sort on all infants, regardless of culture. (Mead 1954, 398, emphasis in original)

In making this argument, Mead (1954, 398) attempted to distance herself from notions she attributed to Abram Kardiner, in which the projection of "individual fears and hopes which themselves originate[d] in childhood experience" became manifest in "cultural forms."[6] Equally, Mead (1954, 398) tried to separate herself from suggestions she attributed to Kenneth Little, who in her opinion held "that the way to find out whether swaddling was an important element in Great Russian character [was] to trace swaddling as a single trait through a variety of cultures to see if it always has the same effect."[7]

For Mead, Gorer's argument had not reduced institutions to individual psychology in Kardiner's manner.[8] Nor had Mead (1954, 400) taken Gorer's essay to be a study of swaddling, as Little (1950) suggested, primarily on methodological grounds, it should be. Mead's version of Gorer's argument —presented in her 1954 essay and also in her article on national character studies (Mead 1953) published in Alfred Kroeber's (1953) volume *Anthropology Today*—stressed neither Russian civilization nor swaddling. Rather, Mead's discussion emphasized Russians as people who came to embody a disposition that took its significance within particularly Russian contexts. Gorer's argument, paraphrasing Mead's own description of *Balinese Character*, was "not about [Russian] custom, but about the [Russians]—about the way in which they, as living persons, . . . embody that abstraction which (after we have abstracted it) we technically call culture"(Bateson and Mead 1942, xii).

For Mead (1954, 399), Gorer, like others involved in national character studies, had attempted "to understand the complex process by which a child with an innate biologically given potential, exposed to a certain very complex cultural configuration, develops a character structure with observable regularities which can be referred to the experience of being reared in that culture. . . . [T]he forms of acceptance" that Russians display towards "a strong leader whether called Czar or Stalin" would be grounded "in the way children [were] reared to be members of Russian culture," but "the Russian institution of such strong leader[s] . . . [was] not to be attributed to swaddling" (Mead 1954, 398). Concomitantly, Russian emotional life had not taken the form of the "the exceedingly self-constrained American Indian personality" that Mead (1932) had observed among the Omaha.

By 1954, Mead had been consistent on this point, beginning with her memorandum for Dr. Ribble and her letter to her sister, for at least sixteen

years, if not longer. A technique, by itself, whatever its capacities to influence the development of an individual's character, was insufficient, by itself, to effect such a patterned development of habits.

Returning to the Memorandum

As we have seen, Mead's (1938) memorandum for Dr. Ribble contended that "[a] good deal stronger case [could] be made out for the determinative nature of condition of the child at birth" than for any particular child-rearing technique. In doing so, Mead drew attention to the issue of whether a given child was either healthy or ill through early childhood and hence, by extension, whether the child's experiences of interacting with others were largely similar to or rather different from the experience of other children reared in accordance with the local pattern of the "external habits of caring for a child" (Mead 1938).

For Mead (1938), these "external habits" were "mere physical detail[s] such as holding the child a certain way, or putting it on a cradle board, or feeding it hard or pre-masticated food." Any set of such habits required support "by a great number of other details of cultural behaviour"— especially but presumably not only "the basic emotional set of the mother"— if those external habits were to "shape the child's personality importantly" (Mead 1938). This was true even in societies where "there [was] a greater congruence between external habits of caring for a child and the attributes developed in members of the society" than in ours (Mead 1938). "No mere physical detail" of suckling, of holding children was *ipso facto* capable of producing a definitive type of character formation" (Mead 1938, emphasis in original).

But where such external habits were congruent with "the attributes developed in members of the society," such habits were, according to Mead (1938), "perhaps one of the most potent ways in which a culture shapes the growing personality of the child to the cultural emphasis." Congruence could breed a continuity of coherence, in no small part, because what Mead (1938) called "the basic emotional set of the mother" would derive to a degree from her own earlier experiences of those same external habits.

Caveats

Although Mead did not mention such matters directly in her memorandum for Dr. Ribble, at least two caveats apply here. We may trace the first concern in Mead's unpublished papers to the spring of 1933 (Sullivan 2004b; for the original, see LOC: MMP, box S11, file 8). For Mead, the combination of external and internal forces and stresses acting on a given society

could change the social order in ways rendering "the basic emotional set of the mother" (Mead 1938) at odds with either the predispositions of the child, the world in which the child grew, or both.

By external forces, Mead indicated the presence of larger, politically, economically, or militarily more powerful societies. Such forces would certainly have included defeat in expansive colonial wars and its correlates, "pacification" and the effective ending of local warfare, as well as new forms of labor relations, which perhaps called some part of the population away to distant plantations. In one way or another, such forces had already begun to affect all the peoples among whom Mead had already worked; this point was not absent from her thought, though it was also not as well developed as some would like, except perhaps in her Omaha study (Mead 1932; see also Molloy 2008).

By internal stresses, Mead referred to the manifest emergence of significant recessive genetic forms within the breeding population as well as changes in local incentives toward endogamy. She not only explicitly mentioned the effects of the cumulative growth of available knowledge but also implied stresses deriving from what we would now call ecological, epidemiological, or dietary changes.

If these cumulative forces and stresses were sufficiently strong, then a society could cease to be integrated. In *Patterns of Culture*, Benedict (1934, 46) wrote of the tendency of cultures toward integration. Perhaps anthropologists have made too little of this notion of "tendency," for it implies, as Benedict (1934, 223ff) knew, that at times—under some circumstances— cultures, like persons, would not be terribly consistent in the patterns of their thought and actions. In 1935, Mead dedicated the final two lectures of her Columbia University seminar on the study of the individual in culture to such relatively dis-integrated societies and the circumstances of persons living therein (LOC: MMP, box J8, file 11; cf. box O40, file 7; on this seminar, see Sullivan 2005a; for a more recent discussion of ethics and life after cultural devastation, see Lear 2006). Much later, Mead (1959, 206), contrasted Benedict with W. H. R. Rivers, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Claude Lévi-Strauss—all of whom had worked, if only briefly, among a "living people." Mead contended that Benedict

> never saw a whole primitive culture that was untroubled by boarding schools for the children, by missions and public health nurses, by Indian Service agents, traders, and sentimental or exiled white people. No living flesh-and-blood member of a coherent culture was present to obscure her vision or to make it too concrete, when, in the summer of 1927, she saw with a sense of revelation that it would be possible to explain the differences

among the tribes of the Southwest or the Plains—both in what
they had taken from one another and in what they had resisted—as
one might explain the choices of an individual who, true to his own
temperament, organized his life out of the myriad and often con-
flicting choices presented to him by a rich historical tradition.
(Mead 1959, 206)

Mead and Benedict, both good Boasians versed in the literature of
so-called salvage anthropology, were well aware that this tendency toward
cultural integration was but a tendency.

A second caveat: Under some circumstances, a caregiver and a child
would not have had the same experiences of "the external habits of caring
for a child" (Mead 1938). For example, when and where (1) boys and girls
are raised differently, when (2) caregivers are predominantly or exclusively
female, and when (3) the child is male, a female caregiver and a male child
would not have the same early-life experiences of the pattern of these
external habits. The same could be said of male caregivers and their female
charges. Mead (2001) later discussed these issues in *Male and Female*,
contending that, under such conditions, relations between caregiver and
child would be more complementary than symmetrical.

According to Mead's (2001, 59) later formulation, "each of the pair
[in complementary relations was] seen as playing a different rôle, and the
two rôles [were] conceived as complementing each other." Symmetrical
relations, by contrast, required that "the mother behave[d] as if the child
were essentially similar to herself, and as if she were responding to behav-
iour of the same type as her own" (Mead 2001, 59). Mead (2001, 361 n. 2)
acknowledged Bateson's discussions of schismogenesis as the source of her
terminology (e.g., Bateson 1936, passim).

For Bateson (1936), whether complementary or symmetrical, schismo-
genic interactions tended toward characteristically cumulative, intensifying,
and eventually climactic, even socially destructive encounters, unless some-
one introduced a contrasting and emotionally defusing form of behavior.[9]
By 1938, when she responded to Dr. Ribble's questions, Mead would have
been well aware of Bateson's terms and their pertinence for describing a
"psychology of culture" arising "in the relations of [and between] individu-
als" (Sapir 1994, 181). Either complementary or symmetrical interactions
would have given the relations between caregivers and young children their
characteristic trajectory and emotional tenor.

Mead's 1938 memorandum did not directly refer to her theory of the
squares. Most discussions of the squares have noted that, while in New
Guinea in 1933, Mead, Bateson, and Reo Fortune read and discussed a

draft of Benedict's (1934) *Patterns of Culture*. Encouraged by Mead's (1972, 217) own account, these discussions have tended to see the squares hypothesis as a continuation of Benedict's analyses and, to a lesser extent, of Carl Jung's theory of psychological types.[10] Less widely noted is the point that Bateson (1979, 192) later viewed these same discussions and his subsequent "descriptions of Iatmul men and women" as leading "away from typology and into questions of process." Mead's discussions in *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (1935) and *Balinese Character* (Bateson and Mead 1942) were crucially organized not only around matters of temperamental types but also around questions of process and development. This is apparent in the very order and architecture of her analyses.

Second Excursus, or Initial Comments on Mead, Benedict, and Gestalt Psychology

I have discussed elsewhere Mead's and Bateson's knowledge of Erik Erikson's (1937) zonal-modal theory with its notion of progressively differential patterns of human development (Sullivan 2004b). I understood Mead as addressing questions of the production and reproduction of particular embodied personality forms deriving from (1) heritable psychological dispositions of the sort Mead called temperament; (2) temperament's cultural correlative, that is, ethos; and (3) patterns of psychological habit, or what Mead termed character. Character, in this sense, developed over the course of a people's lives from the conjoined interaction of their temperament, the accidents of their life, and the local patterns of culture within and against which they lived those lives. Unlike in xerography, the production and reproduction in these processes from which character derives do not necessarily, perhaps cannot, yield perfect copies.

I suggest that a fuller exposition of these matters would require looking back to Kurt Koffka's book *The Growth of the Mind* (1927). In *An Anthropologist at Work* and later in *Blackberry Winter*, Mead (1959, 207; 1972, 125) wrote that she had read Koffka. She lent her copy of Koffka's book to Edward Sapir and discussed the book with both Sapir and Benedict before she left for Samoa in 1925. Mead's comments are unusual not so much because she refers to Sapir and Benedict or their developing interest in "pattern" or even their shared interest in gestalt psychology. Rather, Mead's references to Koffka are unusual because they were among the very few instances in her (auto)biographical and historiographic writing in which Mead mentioned reading a book—any book—much less that "echoes" of a book "came" "into [the] discussions" she had with Bateson, which led to

the formulation of the theory of the squares (Mead 1959, 207). By contrast, Mead (1972, 124, 217) only implied that she had read Jung's (1921) *Psychological Types*. Nor did she provide a source for the terms "temperament" and "character," though she adapted these terms to her purposes from the work of William McDougall (Sullivan 2004b).[11] Mead provided no reference that I have been able to find for the source of the concept of "psychological load," of which she was so fond. That source was June Etta Downey's (1924) psychological work.[12] We are, therefore, not at liberty to dismiss Mead's debts to the gestalt psychologists too quickly or easily.

In *The Growth of the Mind*, Koffka (1927) introduced a child psychology organized around the concept of *struktur*. For Koffka, such structures initially arose as the infant's nervous system adapted itself to the wider world and that world's shifting stimuli through the infant's active perceiving of and responding to that world. The structures themselves were organizations of apperception, including both the perceiving individual and the stimulative world in a single whole not reducible to its parts. Both the infant's shifting capacities and the perceptible characteristics of the stimulus crucially influenced the processes of the infant's ongoing development, a point that I shall return to below. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that for the gestalt psychologists, such structures were, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964, 117) noted, "those wholes articulated by certain lines of force and giving every phenomenon its local value" within "the configurations of the perceptual field." Put another way, such structures were the world rendered psychologically real for any individual or group of persons living that world.

Koffka (1927, ix) and his translator, Robert M. Ogden, together agreed to translate *struktur* as "configuration." They hoped thereby to avoid problems posed by the "very definite and quite different meaning in English and American psychology" that using the term "structure" would have occasioned, given the "controversy between *structuralism* and *functionalism*" in American and British psychology of the era (Koffka 1927: xv–xvi, emphasis in original).[13]

Benedict had also read *The Growth of the Mind*. She owed a general debt to Koffka and the gestalt psychologists (Caffrey 1989: 151–52, 154). Benedict began using the term *configuration* in much the gestalt psychologist's manner by the early 1930s.

In *Patterns of Culture*, Benedict argued that cultures may exhibit a tendency toward integration through processes of both selection and adaptation of available or borrowed "traits" to their diverse, respective purposes. Mead (1935: v–xiv) reprised Benedict's argument concerning integration in the introduction to *Sex and Temperament*.

As part of her argument, Benedict wrote of the gestalt psychologists, albeit not of Koffka by name:

> The *Gestalt* (configuration) psychology has done some of the most striking work in justifying the importance of this point of departure from the whole rather than from its parts. *Gestalt* psychologists have shown that in the simplest sense-perception no analysis of the separate precepts can account for the total experience. It is not enough to divide perceptions up into objective fragments. The subjective framework, the forms provided by past experience, are crucial and cannot be omitted. The "wholeness-properties" and the "wholeness-tendencies" must be studied in addition to the simple association mechanisms with which psychology has been satisfied since the time of Locke. The whole determines its parts, not only their relation but their very nature. Between two wholes there is a discontinuity in kind, and any understanding must take account of their different natures, over and above a recognition of the similar elements that have entered into the two. The work in *Gestalt* psychology has been chiefly in those fields where evidence can be experimentally arrived at in the laboratory, but its implications reach far beyond the simple demonstrations which are associated with its work. (Benedict 1934: 51–52)

Benedict's view was psychological insofar as it implied a human interiority complimentary to, if not exactly of the same order as, the surrounding lived world. For her, personalities and cultures bore metaphorical similarities without being of the same order. Yet Benedict's version of human, as opposed to cultural, psychology was neither particularly nor necessarily dynamic.

Writing to Mead on August 3, 1938, Benedict showed interest in a possible book project for Mead concerning the differences between the sexes:

> The way to approach it may be very well be through the phraseology of the zones, and it would be worth trying, but the zones have never really clicked for me. I suppose it's because the zonal discussions are all mixed up with a series of stages through which the human life cycles progress, and it seems harder to me to disentangle the salient points than to begin over and stick just to the conditioning without any particular use of what's been said about zones. (LOC: MMP, box 5, file 9, Benedict to Mead, letter dated August 3, 1938)[14]

In this context, "zones" must be understood to have referred to theories of the sort developed by Erikson (1937) and specifically to those parts of the body—classically oral, anal and genital—through which the child's capacity to exert control of his or her body and, to some extent, the broader world moves as the child's mind, in Koffka's sense, and body develop. By sticking with "conditioning" and by suggesting that "the character of [Iatmul] *tamberan*[15] organization works itself out in their character formation exactly as one would expect," Benedict (LOC: MMP, box 5, file 9, Benedict to Mead, letter dated August 3, 1938) had aligned herself with the behaviorists in psychology on the one hand and with the emerging culturalists in anthropology on the other. Benedict chose to explain mind from the vantage of the stimulus or, put another way, by reference to external habits alone.

For this reason, Mead (1946, 428) would later describe "Benedict's theory" as "the most culturally based theory of personality" from among those scholars now loosely and somewhat erroneously grouped together as "the culture and personality school" (cf. Sullivan 2005a). Benedict did "not rely upon any assumption of systematic differences in temperament or constitution, nor upon any theory of limited possibilities." (Mead 1959: 546–47 n. 21).

According to Mead (1946, 481), Benedict treated "culture over time as analogous to personality." Culture, through the "selection of certain types of behavior and the rejection of others" over long periods of time, could but need not necessarily obtain a greater consistency or integration than would necessarily be found "in the life history of a single individual" (Mead 1946, 481).

Benedict's patterns arose "not so much in the interpersonal relations of individuals as in the formal elements of culture," such as "religion, myths, formal speeches, [and] magic" (Mead 1946, 481). Thus, Benedict's thought referred neither to bodily processes as such nor to the behavioral interaction of people with one another but rather to understandings of the external world as both imagined and therefore lived.

In her letter to Mead of August 3, 1938, Benedict (LOC: MMP box 5 file 9) described her own attitude toward such a dynamic psychology as potentially "very wasteful." In the next passage, she also wrote,

> As soon as [Mead could, she] must write a book on childhood conditioning. People don't understand and there's no one but you to write it. When I want points I have to go back to my notes on the course you gave at Columbia. It's a book that would just roll off your pen and you probably won't believe until you get back to civilization how much it's needed. (LOC: MMP, box 5, file 9, Benedict to Mead, letter dated August 3, 1938)

Third Excursus, or Further Comments on Mead and Gestalt Psychology

It is not entirely clear that Mead ever wrote the book on "childhood conditioning" that Benedict had hoped for, though that book-in-the-mind may have been *Male and Female* (Mead 2001). Mead's understanding of this subject at the time of Benedict's letter would have informed the memorandum she wrote that same month, August 1938, in response to Dr. Ribble's questions. Mead later listed the gestalt psychologists, notably Koffka and Kurt Lewin, as among the psychological influences on national character studies. If influence by or, more likely, a confluence of interest and opinion with the gestalt psychologists is to be found, in Mead's thought of the 1930s the memorandum would be a likely place.

Mead maintained contacts with leading gestalt psychologists over the years, including both Koffka and Lewin. Further, she attended the gestalt psychologists' Christmas conferences in 1935 and 1940, and Bateson joined her at the latter conference (see Gilkeson 2009).

On January 3, 1936, Mead wrote to Bateson concerning primarily her happiness with the world and about her plans for her impending ship journey to Batavia (now Jakarta, Indonesia), where they would meet prior to going on to Bali.[16] In this letter, she described having lunch with Koffka at a conference of gestalt psychologists:

> I got quite a little about the Gestalt point of view, especially about the Lewin approach which they call topology. I think I can use it to show the relationship between personality and social structure, [Radcliffe-]Brown's kind of social structure I mean, not yours. (LOC: MMP, box S1, file 6, Mead to Bateson, letter dated January 3, 1936)

Bateson described Radcliffe-Brown's notion of structure as referring to "*society*," where the "units" of study were "human individuals . . . linked together in groups," a description that accords well with Radcliffe-Brown's own subsequent description of his position (Bateson 1936: 25–26, emphasis in original; cf. Radcliffe-Brown 1940: 190–91). Bateson (1936: 25–26) also developed an idea of what he called cultural structure, wherein "details of [human] behavior" were "linked into a 'logical' scheme." Bateson (1936, 26) conceived of these two sorts of structure as the same sorts of "phenomena," albeit studied "from two different points of view."

Mead published *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* in 1937 but had effectively completed the manuscript before she sailed for

the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia) in 1936. She explained to Bateson that in this book she had "still used [Radcliffe-]Brown's definitions" in that book because she wrote "if I try to use yours [Bateson's], I come to points we haven't discussed, and then I don't know how to say it" (LOC: MMP box S1, file 6, Mead to Bateson, letter dated January 3, 1936). While she clearly looked forward to working on their shared vocabulary, Mead also implicitly suggested that one of the subjects that she and Bateson would have to address was "the relationship between personality and social structure" (LOC: MMP box S1, file 6, Mead to Bateson, letter dated January 3, 1936).

Mead and Bateson's proposals of 1935 and 1936 for their Balinese researches built on the theory of the squares and, ultimately, on their earlier discussions with Reo Fortune while the three were among the Tchambuli during 1933.[17] These proposals held that personality arises in the conjunction of (1) the person's constitution or temperament, meaning his or her inherited, innate disposition; (2) the conditioning or training which the person experienced, organized in accordance with the specific culture's regularities; (3) those accidents peculiar or particular to his or her life; and (4), in Bateson's addition, the person's reaction to this conditioning and those accidents of experience. The terms of these 1935–1936 proposals clearly prefigure Mead's (1954, 399) subsequent description of what the national character studies would later attempt to understand.

Such a conjunction of temperament, culture, character, accident, and reaction would likely have left, as Mead phrased it in 1935, "the factors with which the student has to deal are too complex and too incapable of control," rendering "[a]ll attempts to study the individual within society, in regard to his good or poor functioning, . . . nugatory (LOC: MMP, box N5, file 1, "A Plan for the Study of the Origins of Mental Disorders with a View to Isolating the Cultural and the Biological Factors," Mead's research proposal submitted to CRDM, September 12, 1935).

Lewin, like Koffka before him, went a step further in the ongoing discussion of the relationship between biology and psychology, especially social psychology:

> The sterility, for example, of the always circular discussion of heredity and environment and the impossibility of carrying through the division . . . of the characteristics of the individual begin to show that there is something radically wrong with their [both hereditarian and environmentalist] fundamental assumptions. (Lewin 1935a, 40; cf. Koffka 1927)

For Lewin (1935a, 41), psychology, like other disciplines studying such matters, was in a transition away from Aristotelian views concerned with the internal teleologies of "single isolated objects." For that earlier psychology, such "single isolated objects" would have been individual human beings considered without reference to their environment, no matter how dynamic their development (Lewin 1935a, 41).

Lewin (1935a, 41) called the emerging understanding within the human sciences "a Galilean view of dynamics," using an analogy with the physics of motion. Such a transition, he hoped, would lead the human sciences to understand that "[t]*he dynamics of the processes* [were] *always to be derived from the relation of the concrete individual to the concrete situation* (Lewin 1935a, 41, emphasis in original). In this view, understanding the "momentary condition of the individual" required attention to "the mutual relations of the various functional systems that make up the individual" (Lewin 1935a, 41). At another level, when concerned with "the psychological structure of the situation," Lewin's view established the possibility of a multiperson or properly social psychology (Lewin 1935a, 41). While Mead would have thought Lewin's ideas about "the momentary condition of the individual" similar to her own notions of temperament and character, Mead also suggested to Bateson that Lewin's approach to "the psychological structure of the situation" was comparable to Radcliffe-Brown's concern with "*society*," where the "units" of study were "human individuals . . . linked together in groups" (Lewin 1935a, 41; LOC: MMP box S1 file 6, Mead to Bateson, letter dated January 3, 1936; Bateson 1936: 25–26, emphasis in original; cf. Radcliffe-Brown (1940: 190–91). For his part, Bateson (1936: 175–76, emphasis in original) was "inclined to regard the study of *the reactions of individuals to the reactions of other individuals* as a useful definition of the whole discipline which is vaguely referred to as Social Psychology."

In Lewin's (1935b, 43, italics in original) view, any stimulus would possess "*an adhesion with certain reactions*." That is, not only would the stimulus, whatever it might be, and the stimulated living being become conjoined in these processes, but also the processes would lead on toward further reactions. Such stimuli would have included, for example, what Mead (1935) called "the external habits of caring for a child" and "the basic emotional set of the mother."

According to Lewin (1935b, 48), "[i]n every process *the forces in the inner and outer environment are changed by the process itself*." Lewin (1935b, 48) continued, contending that "the totality of the forces present in the psychical field" controlled any interactive process. Lewin's "attractive object"—that is, the stimulus whatever it might be—controlled "the

direction of the [interactive] process" only insofar as this object remained part of "the totality of the forces present in the psychical field" (Lewin 1935b, 48). The same caveat implicitly applied to the person or persons being stimulated:

> This change of the forces controlling the processes may, however, be of very different degrees in different processes, so that in many processes this change [was] not essential to the course of the process itself, while in others the course of the process [was] fundamentally influenced thereby. (Lewin 1935b, 48)

Lewin's thought, then, is not far removed from Bateson's idea of schismo-genesis, save that in Lewin's version, unlike Bateson's, there is no sense that such encounters must culminate in some emotive, violent, or orgasmic climax (see Sullivan 2004c; cf. Bateson 1936, 175ff). In Lewin's version, the course of any particular interactive processes would depend on the specific qualities of all the entities—persons or any other forces—within the psychical field or, put another way, all those forces and entities considered together.

To the extent that no two persons are exactly alike, if only because they are not the same person, any developmental process they underwent, while perhaps quite similar, would differ from person to person, if only in some small detail. But we may also infer from this, as Mead and Bateson would most probably have done, that, to the extent that two persons grew up responding to the same general set of culturally organized stimuli, their personalities would likely become similar, albeit not absolutely or even necessarily obviously so.

Breast-Feeding, as an Example

As Mead well knew, Erikson's zonal-modal psychology described a series of divergent developmental sequences "of a large variety of different types of character structure," which, for Bateson were "as met with in different cultures" (Bateson 1949, 38, n. 2; cf. Erikson 1937). The first of Erikson's zones was the mouth because this was the first of several portions of the growing infant's body over which the infant could exert control of itself and, thereby, control over some small portion of its environment. The modes of an infant's possible engagement with some object could differ. The infant could hold something in his or her mouth, refusing to let it go; could allow objects or substances to pass into and out of his or her mouth; or could refuse access thereto. Erikson (1937) was not overly concerned with the

qualities of these objects or substances as such. In this respect, Erikson's psychology differed from that of Koffka and Lewin.

Koffka's psychology, like Lewin's, eschewed explanations couched solely in terms of nurture, or the only apparently more adequate but equally flawed terms of nature alone. Rather, Koffka preferred to remind us that reference solely to either nurture or nature was insufficient, as both nurture and nature were operationally intertwined and, therefore, necessary. Thus, in discussing why suckling is a complicated, instinctive act and not a reflex, he contended, in part,

> The movement [i.e., suckling] depend[ed] upon the stimulus in the sense of being adapted to it . . . because the act of suckling [was] regulated directly by the formal characteristics of the stimulating object. Thus the position of the lips in suckling must be different according as it [was] the breast nipple, a rubber nipple, an adult's finger, or the child's own finger which [was] being sucked. (Koffka 1927, 87).

Even as suckling was one of those "modes of behaviour . . . which originate neither in experience or in deliberation," its movements depend "upon the stimulus" to which the movements and the infant, considered as a whole, adapt (Koffka 1927, 87). Adaptation, here as elsewhere in Koffka's work, must be understood as an activity undertaken by the adapting entity. Koffka's discussion addressed processes by which the nervous system assumes the shape we would now want to call something like the embodied mind, the mindful body, or, with Gerald Edelman, "higher order consciousness" (Edelman 2004, 97ff).

We must note that neither Lewin nor Koffka, in this specific context, discussed suckling as a social interaction occurring in culturally variable and culturally specific contexts. From Mead's developing point of view, the specific qualities of breast-feeding—considered as a social interaction occurring in culturally variable and culturally specific contexts—necessarily involved a further dimension, for Mead a child adapted not just to the qualities of the nipple but also to those of the enculturated woman or women (or even men) whose nipple(s) the child suckled. Suckling would be like any other technique or apparatus, a means or "devise whereby an emotional attitude can be put over" or communicated between caregiver and child, as Mead would explain to her sister and as Gorer would subsequently note (LOC: MMP, box R7, file 7, letter from Mead to Priscilla Rosten, dated July 15, 1938; Gorer and Rickman 1949, 129). By extension, therefore, the child would also have begun to adapt him- or herself to the

local cultural structure, in Bateson's (1936: 25–26) sense, wherein "details of [human] behavior" were "linked into a 'logical' scheme" by which and through which these persons lived.

Breast-Feeding Woman as Already Enculturated

In her memorandum for Dr. Ribble, Mead (1938) did not distinguish the types found in her squares hypothesis but rather what she called an "active, aggressive . . . type of personality" from, by implication, a form of passive personality typified by the Balinese. Mead (1938) was well aware of what she called the "gross differences" of culture and "the question of whether the child sle[pt] in its mother's arms, or in a separate cradle." Still, Mead was inclined "to think the most significant difference [between these two types of personality] is whether the child's body" was "held *off* from the mother's body, *out* in the hand, *up* on the shoulders"—as it was among what she called "[t]he active cultures"—or "whether the child's body is held against the mother's body, curved relaxed, adapted to the mother's postures," as among the Balinese (Mead 1938, emphasis in original).

How the child's body was held or carried had implications for the sorts of interactions that would become characteristic between the mother and child:

> [M]ethods of carrying in which the baby [was] hung from the mother's back in a bag or basket, or carried in the outstretched hand, or flung face down over the shoulder, or set on the shoulder, or carried on the back with the arms clasped around the neck or set on the shoulder round the neck, all mean[t] that the act of giving the child the breast [was] definite and ha[d] a beginning and an end, noted by the mother as well as the child. (Mead 1938)

Under these circumstances, when children wished to feed, they must, by some means or other, command the attention of their mothers, and, concomitantly, the "women tend[ed] to stop their work to suckle a child, wait[ed] impatiently until its hunger [was] assuaged, and then [went] back to work" (Mead 1938). Each partner in this relationship was deliberate in his or her actions, while the repeated interaction potentially paired upset against impatience, especially if the mother did not enjoy nursing.

As we have seen, Mead would explain to her sister, Priscilla Rosten, that "nursing babies standing, will reinforce the hostility of a hostile mother, but it does not make a mother hostile or a child undernourished, *in itself*" (LOC: MMP, box R7, file 7, Mead to Priscilla Rosten, letter dated July 15,

1938, emphasis in original). So, too, having to wait might upset a baby already prone to being upset or evoke impatience in an impatient mother, but it need not make the baby upset or the mother impatient in and of itself.

Not so with mountain Balinese "babies [who were] carried in a cloth sling from birth up to the age of two or so, with the breast always there . . ." (Mead 1938). "The sling . . . [was] bound around the babies' hips. This position "constrict[ed] movement in the lower part of their body" and pin-ioned the right hand against or behind the caregiver's body (Mead 1938). "The baby [hung] securely from the sling, the mother's hands [were] free and the baby [could] suckle as the mother pounds rice for instance" (Mead 1938). Such babies "habitually [fell] asleep still suckling gently" (Mead 1938)—upset rarely paired with impatience; indeed, neither partner needed to disturb, much less command, the other's attention at all.

These external habits of Balinese childcare were part of an analogic set in which "all through babyhood, the child is fitted into a frame of behavior, of imputed speech and imputed thought and complex gesture, far beyond his skill and maturity" in which "he [would] be echoing" words and gestures (Bateson and Mead 1942, 13). The words would have "already been said, on his behalf and in his hearing, hundreds of times" (Bateson and Mead 1942, 13). As the child assumed postures or made gestures, such as extend-ing a right yet pinioned hand to receive anything or learning a dance, the child's body was directly manipulated into position by others. These exter-nal habits, though powerful and suggestive of the forms of the resultant personalities, had been "supported by a great number of details of cultural behaviour, the most significant of which is the basic emotional set of the mother" (LOC: MMP, box R7, file 7, Mead to Priscilla Rosten, letter dated July 15, 1938). Thus, those habits could prove "capable of producing a definitive type of character formation" (Mead 1938).

This propensity toward mutual emotional unobtrusiveness became further complicated by "a series of broken sequences" initiated by the caregiver and a series "of unreached climaxes" experienced by the child (Bateson and Mead 1942, 32):

> The mother continually stimulate[d] the child to show emotion—love or desire, jealousy or anger—only to turn away, to break the thread, as the child, in rising passion, [made] a demand for some emotional response on her part. When the baby fail[ed] to nurse, the mother tickl[ed] his lips with her nipple, only to look away uninterested, no slightest nerve attending, as soon as the baby's lips close[d] firmly and it be[gan] to suck. (Bateson and Mead 1942, 32)

A Balinese caregiver may well have initiated interpersonal engagements, "stimulat[ing] her child to active response[s]" (Bateson and Mead 1942, 152), evoking thereby anger, fear, or flirtatious desire in the child—only to turn away once the child began to respond emotively to their caregiver's stimulating activity. In response, "the more directly assertive children of both sexes" tended towards tantrums; "the more passive of both sexes" were more likely to sulk in response to the failure of their "attempt[s] to introduce some sort of climax into the sequences of everyday inter-personal" engagements with their mothers or other caregivers (Bateson and Mead 1942: 155–56). Children of either sex might respond in either way, depending on their temperament.

According to Bateson and Mead (1942, 155), Balinese "[a]dults usually [did] not respond to either the sulks or the tantrums of their children." The adult had already learned "the Balinese habit[s] of feeling and titivating [tidying or stimulating] the skin, . . . introversion" of fantasizing that the "body as made of separable parts" and "avoidance of inter-personal climax," all of which, Bateson and Mead contended, could draw the adult's attention away from the child and back on the self (Bateson and Mead 1942, 151). It was "the child who has not yet learned the drawbacks of responsiveness and the satisfactions of Balinese gaiety" (Bateson and Mead 1942, 151).

First Coda: Narcissism

In the Balinese case, according to Mead, the mutual emotional unobstru-siveness that obtained between caregiver and child as described briefly just now was both supported by and congruent with a maternal attitude to which Bateson and Mead (1942, 152ff) accorded the rubric "narcissism."

Narcissism, understood as the turning of life energies turned back onto or into the self, was far from irrelevant to then current theories of dementia praecox. Eugen Bleuler (1911), a leading Swiss psychiatrist and for many years Jung's supervisor, had developed a theory of the group of schizophre-nias organized around a dissociation of the self from the surrounding world and, in some cases, from the self's emotional responses thereto. Among the mechanisms that Bleuler (1912) proposed were "ambivalence," a term he coined to designate the diffusion, even utter dissipation, rather than the unity, of emotion, and "negativism," that is, the refusal to engage emotionally.

Paul Federn (1928) had contended that some degree of narcissism was necessary.[18] But if engagement with the self came to exclude emotional engagement outside the self, narcissism could take on a pathological caste.

Federn's analysis of narcissism is not unlike Jung's commentary on introversion. For Jung, introversion was necessary if there was to be any integration of mental life, but excessive introversion led away from the world (Jung 1921; see also Sullivan 2004b). According to her squares hypothesis, Mead termed a generally narcissistic adaptation to life "fey" (Sullivan 2004a, 2004b).

For Bateson and Mead, the characteristic encounters of Balinese life and custom gave rise to fey persons and to complementary ethos; in a Western context such an adaptation could, as the concerns of eminent psychiatrists reveal, yield persons at significant, even humanly destructive, odds with the tenor of their society. For present purposes, then, Mead's analysis of the development of Balinese character was at least as relevant to the study of dementia praecox as another study funded by Lewis and the CRDP that focused on shy children in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada.

Final Coda, or Back to Where We Started

Koffka died in 1941. During World War II, Bateson, Benedict, Lewin, and Mead all served the Allied efforts, with Lewin and Mead both joining the Committee on Food Habits (for Benedict's war effort, see Schachter 2009). Lewin died in 1948; Benedict followed in 1949. Mead and Bateson lived separately during much of the war before divorcing in 1950. Neither Bateson nor Mead obtained faculty positions with teaching responsibilities for a number of years.

The synthesis of anthropology and gestalt psychology that these scholars together might have generated—had they lived and prospered together—largely failed to gather adherents. Their joint interest in psychologies that "arise in the relations of [and between] individuals" (Sapir 1994, 181) has been too readily forgotten.

Sapir continued to criticize both Benedict's and Mead's work until his death in 1939. Regna Darnell (1990, 429 n. 7) holds that "Sapir's former students . . . did not see Mead as relevant to Sapir's work or as close to him personally." Mead played no part in the memorial volume for Sapir, edited by Leslie Spier, Irving Hallowell, and Stanley Newman (1941).

Unlike Mead and Bateson, many of Sapir's students and younger colleagues did obtain teaching positions; they furthered Sapir's legacy as well as his critiques of others' work. One might argue about whether Sapir's criticisms were apt when applied to Benedict; as we have seen, they had no reasonable application to Mead. Sapir's mischief has thus been compounded.

NOTES

1. Whether Sapir (1994, 181) was correct in his contention that Benedict conflated the configurations of culture with "the psychology of culture . . . [arising] in the relations of individuals" is well beyond the scope of this paper. So too is any question of whether or how Sapir's (1994, 183) contention that culture was "just a low-tone series of rituals, a rubber stamping waiting to be given meaning by" individuals can be squared with his nearly contemporaneous observation that

> [i]t is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to teach a native to take account of purely mechanical phonetic variations which have no phonemic reality for him. (Sapir 1994, 183; 1933, 48)

For the moment, one might wonder why, if phonemes have psychological reality for speakers, rituals and other social forms would not have such a reality for those who live them out.

2. As in all my previous work, I proceed as a prudent editor when quoting from work that Mead or her correspondents had not prepared for publication. I make modest corrections of spelling and grammar, but only where these do not change the plain meaning of the text. Mead's correspondence and unpublished materials used underlining to show emphasis, indicated in this paper as italics.

3. Margaret (or Margaretha) Antoinette Ribble (1890–1971) was a British pediatrician who pioneered working with children and their emotional problems before Melanie Klein and Anna Freud developed child analysis (Gail Donaldson, pers. comm., May 24, 2006). Dr. Ribble published two books, *The Rights of Infants* (1948) and *The Personality of the Young Child* (1955). I am also indebted to Michael Sokal for his assistance in researching Dr. Ribble's death date.

4. I am indebted to Ira Bashkow for his suggestion to include a discussion of the swaddling hypothesis; any errors in interpretation are perforce my own.

5. My thanks to Patricia A. Francis for bringing this letter to my attention.

6. Abram Kardiner (1891–1981) is perhaps best known for the seminar that he and Ralph Linton organized in New York City during the early 1940s to apply psychoanalytic

insights to ethnographic materials collected by Linton, Cora Du Bois, and Clyde Kluckhohn, among others. Kardiner's book, based on the seminar *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, appeared in 1945.

  7. Mead refers to Kenneth Linsay Little, an anthropologist who worked among the Mende of Sierra Leone and on issues relating to race in Great Britain. Little became professor of social anthropology at the University of Edinburgh in 1965.

  8. For an elaboration of Mead's argument concerning individuals in cultures, see Sullivan (2005b).

  9. On the dynamics of such encounters as a theme in Bateson's thought, see Sullivan (2004c).

10. On the squares, see Sullivan (2004b); see also Banner (2003, 238ff), Boon (1990, 186), Gewertz (1984), Lapsley (1999, 222ff), McDowell (1991, 293ff), and Molloy (2008). On Reo Fortune's response to the squares, see Thomas (2009).

11. William McDougall (1871–1938) was a member of the Torres Straights Expedition and later professor of psychology at Cambridge, Harvard, and Duke universities. He was one of the founders of social psychology, a term now more associated today with Kurt Lewin.

12. June Etta Downey (1875–1932) received her PhD at the University of Wyoming and later served there as professor of psychology. Downey's notion of load concerned psychological inertia: the ongoing preservation or attenuation of some previous mood, disturbance, or tension.

13. Histories of psychology have traced notions of structuralism to E. B. Titchener's (1908) work, for example, on the perception of phenomena prior to the interpretation of such phenomena and the so-called imageless thought controversy (see, for example, Kroker 2003). Accounts of the dispute between the structuralists and functionalists, including Mead's teacher, Robert Sessions Woodward, can be found in many of the standard histories of American psychology. On Mead's study with Woodward, among others, see Francis (2005).

14. I am indebted to Virginia Young for bringing this letter to my attention and for providing me with a copy. Patricia A. Francis found the Library of Congress box and file citation for me; any error of interpretation is perforce mine. I have deliberately left Benedict's phrase "human life cycles" in the plural. Changing this to the more conventional singular "cycle" would, in my view, alter the plain meaning of the text.

15. The *tamberan* is a men's cult practiced in parts of New Guinea. Mead (1935) referred to *tamberan* among both the Arapesh and the Tchambuli. Bateson's (1936) work concerned *naven* rather than *tamberan* ceremonial among the Iatmul.

16. I am indebted to Patricia A. Francis for bringing this letter to my attention.

17. For the originals, see LOC: MMP, box N5, file 1, and box N6, file 2.

18. Paul Federn (1871–1950) originally trained as a pediatrician before he met Sigmund Freud in 1902. Federn subsequently taught at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute.

Freud later appointed Federn as his personal deputy. Federn, like Freud, emigrated to avoid Nazi persecution but to the United States instead of Britain.

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