NOMINATION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

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Descriptions of Pacific Island social systems typically attend to the function of kinship and descent in the constitution of enduring, corporate groups. Standard overviews of kinship, such as that of Fox (1967), have noted that "no society so far has managed to dispense with an irreducible minimum of kinship-based social relationships" (16) and that "one of the commonest uses of 'kinship' ties is in recruitment. Thus, social groups are recruited on the bases of blood ties (assumed, putative or fictive) or affinal ties" (36). Keesing (1975), drawing on research experience in the Solomon Islands, concluded that "descent corporations, or 'corporate descent groups,' were a crucial development in the evolution of tribal societies. They provided an adaptive solution, in different ecological settings, to the problems of maintaining political order and defining rights over land and other resources across generations" (18).

But descent—understood as filiation and symbolized by shared body substances (see Schneider 1980: 23–25)—is not the only mechanism for corporate group recruitment, even in so-called tribal societies (Monnerie 2012a, 34). Groups acquire members with a variety of strategies, as studies of voluntary and common interest associations, age grades, churches, businesses, clubs, and other organizations have documented. Adoption is one such nondescent recruitment device, although one that serves to repopulate kin-based corporate groups lacking children. Nomination is another strategy that does not necessarily laminate upon descent. Anyone can be called by name into a group (or an office). Nomination can recruit new members into local

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corporations with land and other rights. Such groups resemble joint stock companies wherein people become corporate members through acquisition of shares. Shares, here, are personal names. Current group members recruit new members by naming them. Nomination passes along a limited and fixed set of personal names from generation to generation, as new recruits replace their namesakes.

Nomination does overlap descent where namers bestow available names mostly on their own children. This is the case on Tanna, Vanuatu. Men, however, may choose to name others from outside their own families—sometimes these are infants, sometimes youth or grown men, who then slough off previous names and take up the new one. Although relations between namer and named may be seen as parental, kinship does not limit who can be named into a group. As such, I have referred to Tanna's land-owning corporations as "name-sets," and not lineages or clans, insofar as these latter kin terms presume descent as the dominant corporate group recruitment mechanism. In nomination systems, children (and occasional others) become members of local groups by being named into these. Moreover, each male name entitles a person to plots of land, to other miscellaneous rights including "chiefly," to other political roles, to wear distinctive decorations, to eat turtles, and so forth (see below). Lévi-Strauss (1987) earlier proposed the term "house" to describe non–kinship-based social units "which cannot be defined either as families or as clans or lineages" (151; see Godelier 2011: 92–96). Although house membership trumped kinship connection, according to González-Ruibal (2006), Lévi-Strauss "always considered house societies as another kinship type" (144).

House metaphors, and also models of the canoe and its crew (a vessel of personages), certainly resonate on Tanna as group idioms (see Iati 2012; Wood, this collection). I use the term name-set to describe that island's local corporate groups in that this directs focus to the archives of named personalities that compose such groups, and because, although name-set property is localized, group estates do not center on actual houses, as they sometimes do elsewhere in the Austronesian world and beyond (see Ku, this collection). Pursuing island logic, I suggest that naming can indeed govern local group reproduction and that descent considerations, here, are secondary and ancillary.

For name-sets, naming functions as a corporate group recruitment device; elsewhere, names signal one's membership in local groups, otherwise constituted. In regions where descent determines corporate group recruitment, names may comprise part of the heritage of descent groups, be these personal names of humans and spirits; place names on land, reef, and sea; or even pig names. Personal knowledge of such names, moreover, may demonstrate

legitimate membership in a descent group or, more particularly, rights to specific lands and other entitlements. Names, here, are part of a descent corporation's estate. I offer examples below of both sorts of system—naming as a corporate group recruitment mechanism, and names as group property—and briefly note the implications of these systems for cross-cultural understandings of personhood, descent, and adoption, and also stereotypic social reproduction.

Name-Sets: Tanna

On Tanna, local group recruitment relies on nomination, or the bestowal of one of the group's male personal names on an incoming member (Lindstrom 1985, 2011). Land and other rights follow the name, and thus persons—not groups—control these assets until they pass along to namesakes. Men usually, but not necessarily, bestow names on their own children or on children of other group members. Although men each gain primary rights to land and other entitlements with their name, these names group into larger sets of a dozen or more. Related names anchored in neighboring lands constitute the membership of small, localized groups. Such groups resemble and operate much like typical Pacific lineages. However, because these groups recruit replacement members by means of nomination, not descent, I call these groups name-sets rather than employing a descent-associated term like lineage or clan. Men bearing names from the same set have secondary rights to all related names, and they step in to bestow these in cases where available names are empty and unused if a fellow member has died young, has no children of his own, or has otherwise failed to pass along his name or names to others. If a person has more children than available names, other members of his name-set typically are the most likely to bestow a set name on these excess children. However, many men have received names from name-sets other than their fathers'—perhaps by receiving a name from a mother's father or from someone in another local name-set who finds himself with more unused names than available living children to be named. Nomination, here, resembles adoption insofar as the named child becomes a member of his namer's name-set, although he lives and grows up in the household of his father and mother.

Most Tanna name-sets themselves are named, often taking the form "the grandchildren of X," e.g., *Nɨmipwi Iarasoa* (grandchildren of Iarasoa) or *Nɨmwipwi Noka* (grandchildren of Noka). People also sometimes call them *kwanokus* (rope or vine). Related name-sets join together into larger groupings, also typically named, that comprise the "sides" of a hamlet or a kava-drinking ground. These places commonly split into two sides, although

some have three, four, or more component facets. All name-sets in an area clump together into regional unities, which Guiart (1956, 11) termed *groupes tribaux*. In 1951, Guiart counted 115 of these around the island. Each of these "tribes," or perhaps better termed named territories, centers around one or more focal and secondary kava-drinking grounds, all surrounded by named hamlets that may or may not be currently occupied. These regional groupings are also named after founding ancestors, geographic features, or the like. For example, *Nasipmene* (Nasip + plural-marker [and people]), or alternatively *Imwai Nasipmene* (The place of Nasip and [people]) is a grouping of several name-sets united by ancestral connection to Nasip. *Nɨpikinɨmumene* (Tail of the fish + plural-marker [and people]) is a territorial grouping named after the peninsula east of Port Resolution that resembles a fishtail. Like some name-set names, ancestor-focused group names like Nasipmene suggest people do have in mind notions of shared blood and descent; but they also otherwise refer to local group like Nasipmene as "Imwai (house of/place of) Nasipmene," and these instead highlight conceptions of the shared house, land, and place that people occupy through nomination.

Tanna male names, once, were mononyms. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, however, almost all have become associated with an attached name derived from the Christian Bible, from experience abroad, or from other European sources. Both parts of today's binyms typically pass down together to new namesakes. Female names, without land entailments, are more commonly still mononymic. Nominal relationships can trump genealogy, notably in people's choice of kin term. Rapi, for example, called his son Soarum *kaha* (grandfather) because Soarum was the namesake of Rapi's father's father. Similarly, men use the so-called "heroic I" first-person pronoun when narrating stories of some ancestral namesake. I listened to one in the 1970s who remembered "when I met Captain Cook" in 1774. The heroic I is widespread in Pacific cultures; see Bateson (1936, 35) and Silverman (2001, 28) for similar pronoun use among the Iatmul; and Turner (1991, 21) for Fiji.

Male names give title to land plots (often scattered) and also confer rights to build houses in particular hamlets and to drink kava at particular kava-drinking grounds. Actually, many people garden, establish plantations, and build houses on lands attached to others' names, sometimes invited recently to do so, and sometimes exercising long-standing claims to use although not own these places. Nonetheless, people strictly differentiate name-based tenure and usufruct. Land users are land owners only if they possess pertinent personal names. Name-set members also inherit and recycle archives of names for women and for prized pigs. Names, furthermore, endow a series of other rights, including the entitlement to manage power stones that control

crop fertility, the winds, volcanic activity, earthquakes, and also more nefarious ones that cause disease and death; although few, today, presume to use these latter. Some names endow their bearers with one or the other of two chiefly statuses on the island: *ierumanu* (ruler), or *iani inteta* (spokesman of the canoe). These come with secondary rights to wear two or more feather plumes in one's hair, to sport certain decorations on tapa belts, and so forth. The named also inherit rights to tell publicly various traditional origin myths and narratives of ancestral namesakes.

After a century of epidemics, Tanna's population began to rebound in the 1920s. By the 1980s, some name-sets had run short of male names to bestow upon name-set children. They deployed various strategies, including name splitting and name sharing, to find names for their children (Lindstrom 1985). Adoption—acquiring a name from another set with more empty titles and fewer live humans—was the most common of strategies. This was no new tactic, however. More than 40% of the generation of men who had been born in the 1940s, when many names were "empty" and temporarily unused, had been named into different name-sets than their fathers.

Since Vanuatu's independence in 1980, several thousand Tannese have migrated up to Port Vila and today live in periurban squatter settlements (Lindstrom 2012). Despite in some cases three decades' distance from the island, people remain deeply and politically concerned with naming. Names, after all, provide titles to land and other rights. In July 2012, Joel bestowed his own (and his father's) name Joel Iau on his son's son in Blacksands, a Vila settlement. He prepared a slightly urbanized feast (kava, pig, tuber puddings, and cloth, but fewer of the baskets, mats, and kava roots that mark such exchanges on Tanna) and presented this to one of his wife's brothers. After kava was prepared in a settlement kava clearing, that brother-in-law drank first and introduced the infant's new name to ancestors and guests, despite the fact that island ancestors more properly haunt homelands down on Tanna, not urban settlements. The Tannese strategy is that public pronouncement and acknowledgment of a name (notably by affines) reduces possible future conflict over name and land claims.

Similarly, in 2011, Joel's brother Iapwatu insisted that his new granddaughter (his son's daughter) *not* be named up in Vila but, rather, that her naming should be delayed until she could be brought back down to Tanna where the girl eventually received a European name. Iapwatu argued that her home-based naming would anchor her more firmly to island family and name-set.

Nineteenth century feuding and its refugees, subsequent population rebound, and today's urban migration all have unsettled Tanna's titular links between name and place. A Tannese friend, living in a Port Vila settlement,

in 2013 named his unmarried daughter's son Soma—a creative combination of the names of the boy's uncles Sola and Mark. Ordinarily, Soma's father should have bestowed a traditional title, but the boy, alas, was a *pikinini blong rod* (bastard), as one says in Vanuatu. My guess is that his namer hopes that uncles will look after their seminamesake nephew because his invented name bestows no land rights back home on Tanna (see Bacalzo, this collection). Soma's grandfather's brother added that the "chiefs" (in command of name-set titles themselves) always need landless helpers, guards, and soldiers like the hapless Soma. According to Godelier (2011), children without titles in European feudal houses similarly became "virtual servants to the brother or sister who had inherited the name and the property" (95). Naming systems, however, allow the possibility of eventually redeeming and absorbing extraneous persons like Soma, either by renaming him with some name-set title when one of these comes available (thus incorporating him fully within the name-set, despite particulars of his descent) or by bestowing name-set names on his children to come.

Name-Sets Elsewhere

Name-set systems operate, or once operated, elsewhere in southern Vanuatu, including on Aneityum and Erromango islands, as well as in New Caledonia farther south. On Aneityum, located 55 miles south of Tanna, Wood (this collection) notes that "each totemic group has a finite set of names" and that "all cognatic descendants of a totemic ancestor may potentially receive a totemic name, as totemic names are typically given to blood descendants, but this is not always the case." Further, as on Tanna, Aneityum names give land rights, although collectively: "All members of a totemic group share the ownership of the totemic district and all totemic entitlement." Although Aneityum also suffered massive depopulation beginning in the 1830s, people today are engaged in renewing selected aspects of tradition and—as on Tanna—names, if remembered, are easily revived simply by bestowing these on newborn children.

Further to the South, on New Caledonia, ethnographers have likewise remarked name and land connections. Guiart (2003) described personal Kanak names as land titles bestowed on children at gatherings of paternal and maternal relatives "qui décide, à la naisaance, de l'attribution du nom vernaculaire au nouveau-né" (31). But another "lignée" might instead bestow one of its own names—and that name determines "le status social et le statut foncier de l'enfant devenu adulte" (32). Kanak personal names, thus "détermine le status social de l'individu et ses droits fonciers" (54, see 57–58). Guiart's mentor, Maurice Leenhardt (1979), had also observed that

> In each clan, there are a given number of ancestral or mythic personalities, made present by the use of their names, which serve as essential supports for the social edifice of the clans. The names return periodically, marking a rhythm of original personalities which are the group's strengths, somewhat in the manner of authorized names in our saints' calendar (158).

These ancestral names, according to Leenhardt (1979) "periodically restored over the generations" (156), invest newborn persons with ancestral personalities, the namesakes being "replicas" rather than "reincarnations."

Monnerie (2003, 2012b) provided more detail on New Caledonian naming systems, describing Arama "Great House" collectives within which male personal names recycle across at least three generations. Arama children today receive recycled ancestral along with "fabricated" names, with firstborn sons (or those adopted into these positions) receiving the ancestral titles. These names, owned by local groups, endow their bearers with land rights, with defined social roles including political and ritual leadership positions, and with connections to namesake ancestors, many of which are mythically celebrated (Monnerie 2012b). Each local group, according to Monnerie (2012b) "possesses an ensemble of such names which define it and constitute for it the central dimension of transmission of roles, rights and specializations which are at once personal and social. In effect, in the composition of persons, ancestral names determine personal relations and masculine destinies reflected directly from those of their ancestral namesakes" (163 [my translation]). Monnerie concluded that local groups are "not patrilineal lineages in the strict sense" and, to translate the Arama term for such groups, preferred "the more subtle term 'subclan' which allows not to unduly privilege unifiliation in describing relational groups" (165 [my translation]). Arama subclans in many ways resemble Tannese name-sets insofar as, according to Monnerie (2012b), "the subclans firstly define themselves by *the collection of their ancestral names* and the necessity to ensure these are carried by living persons" (165 [my translation, emphasis in the original]). Finally, Leblic (this collection) reports that Paicî (of Ponérihouen) clan patronyms are also toponyms and thus also connected to land and territory.

Melanesian ethnographers have reported that people elsewhere also constitute local groups through nomination, alongside or in addition to descent. In parts of Fiji, for example, according to Turner (1991), each *mataqali* (patrilineal clan) possesses a pool of names that "represents a set of positions that a succession of individuals occupy" (12). Turner suggested that descent constrains nomination insofar as most men receive names from paternal relatives. Even so, he noted that fathers may name a child with a name belonging

to another clan if they "first approach the would-be namesake or his representative, present *yaqona* [kava] and formally ask permission to use the name" (12–13; see Chave-Dartoen 2006, 208 for similarly restricted name borrowings on Wallis). Although name, here, does not exclusively determine the membership of local descent groups, Turner reported that children do occasionally join nonnatal local groups by receiving names from these.

Nominated local groups exist as well on Wogeo island, north of Papua New Guinea's Sepik River mouth, where a person's membership in a group, according to Anderson (2011) "is partly attained by naming" (186). Urat people, who live in the Torricelli foothills north of the river, also bestow names that determine a person's place of residence (Eyre 1992, 278). These personal names mostly pass from father to son, although people also use "name-bestowal to recruit nondescendants to take up residence in their hamlets" (278). Every name gives rights to live in a hamlet, to name-linked garden plots, rights to hunt on name-set lands, and rights to engage in established exchange relationships with men from other name-sets. Those who do not receive a name from a father's name-set may nonetheless remain living in his village; but they only have rights to use their own name-associated garden plots elsewhere (Eyre 1992, 279). The Urat system differs from that on Tanna insofar as men who receive a name from a group other than their father's name-set may not pass that name along to one of their sons. Instead, they either name children with names from their father's name-set or they request men from their adoptive name-set to name these children. (Eyre does not record whether these second-generation name-set members acquire full rights to pass along set names to their own sons.) Nonetheless, Eyre (1992) concludes that "although conceptualized in an idiom of descent, hamlet affiliations are not based upon descent claims" (288). Although the Urat certainly entertain notions of shared blood and descent, they use personal names to sort children into local groups.

Farther afield, beyond Melanesia, naming reproduces local groups among the Tsimshian of northwest coast America. Local groups possess fixed sets of recycled personal names—available personhood slots they fill by nomination (of newborns or of adults who take on and "wear" the name of someone recently departed). According to Roth (2008):

> Names link members of a Tsimshian lineage to the past and to the territory on which that past unfolded. A Tsimshian name holder shares his or her name with a succession of matrilineally related predecessors stretching back to the ancient historical events that describe the origins of the name, of the house lineage, and of the lineage's rights to territories and resources (30).

Roth reports that personal names belong to Tsimshian "houses," although he also uses descent terms including "lineage" for these local groups. The Tsimshian themselves refer to these houses as "boxes" or "baskets" of names (Roth 2008, 36). Again, although descent limits nomination in that most people receive names from kin, the Tsimshian may also bring nonkin into local groups by naming them (Roth 2008, 58). If a house is out of people to wear its available names, it can name persons from other houses who at least temporarily personify and occupy that named slot (Roth 2008, 60). Moreover, should most persons belonging to a box or basket inopportunely die, related houses (like Tannese name-sets) have the right to repeople the depopulated house by bestowing its empty names on available persons: Roth (2008) records cases "of supposedly genealogically extinct lineages returning from obscurity, either because a forgotten branch of the lineage steps forward to claim the prerogatives or because a member of another lineage turned out to have been quietly holding key names in trust all along" (72).

Nomination substitutes for descent and ensures social reproduction when ordinary genealogical propagation fails. As on Tanna, the Tsimshian restore their house personalities by adopting others (who may be from related or unrelated houses) into the group through name bestowal (Roth 2008, 78). Adoption, according to Roth (2008), "provides a crucial hedge against the vicissitudes of fertility and mortality" (80). In Brazil, Fisher (2003) also borrowed the use of "house" originated by Lévi-Strauss (1987) to label Kayapo local groups which "comprise corporations holding an estate composed of a distinctive stock of names, ornaments, and ritual and non-ritual prerogative" (118). Kayapo house members may name someone from outside their house (house membership rights do not follow name) although, conversely, other adoptees *do* receive a house-owned name that, according to Fisher (2003) "facilitates integration into a network of kin" (119; see Maybury-Lewis 1984 for a brief introduction to name-sets in other Brazilian societies). Here, too, nomination that replaces or overlaps adoptive or fictive descent can serve to reproduce local groups when procreation fails.

Personal Names as Group Property

Other local groups, here and there around Melanesia, which do use ordinary descent rules instead of nomination to recruit their memberships, also possess archives of names for persons, for animals, for spirits, and so forth. Possession of these names often signals title claims to land and other resources. The Iatmul, Chambri, and Manambu of the mid-Sepik river, for example, pass down numerous names from ancestor to descendent. Every Iatmul individual, according to Bateson (1932), "bears names of totemic ancestors—spirits, birds, stars, animals, pots, adzes, etc.—of his or her clan,

and one individual may have thirty or more such names. A man takes his father's names and applies them to his own sons. Similarly he takes his father's sister's names and applies them to his daughters" (409). Also according to Bateson (1936), "Every clan has hundreds of these polysyllabic ancestral names which refer in their etymology to secret myths" (127). Iatmul boys also receive (or at least used to receive) names from their mother's side (Bateson 1936, 42; 1932: 273, 403) that denominate rights and access to maternal as well as paternal estates. Bateson (1936) reports, moreover, that descent alone does not always govern name-giving. If a woman is the only survivor of a (patrilineal) clan, for example, "all the names of that clan become vested in her and her bride price becomes correspondingly great since the right to give the names will fall to her husband or her children" (51).

Iatmul names, as more recent ethnography has clarified, derive from totemic ancestral beings. According to Silverman (2001), descendants who hold these may "weep in public" during their ceremonial recitation (27), and patronyms are the "roots" of each descent group, "its totemic and cosmological foundation" (54), and grandfathers and grandsons should be namesakes. Although particular Iatmul names, unlike Tanna, do not serve as titles to specific water areas or land plots, a person's possession of a given name assemblage asserts his rights in general to occupy territory, narrate associated sacred stories, deploy magical recipes, and so on.

This is the case also among the neighboring Chambri Lake people, where, according to Gewertz (1977), "The ownership of the land and water rights is inextricably bound to the ownership of the names which designate them. When an expanding patrilineage can secure possession of relevant totemic names, its ownership of homonymous land and water is secured as well" (341; see Forge 1972; Allen 2009: 427–428; Bacalzo, this collection). The Manambu of Avatip, too, inherit fixed and finite sets of totemic names (Harrison 1990, 55) with which they also name themselves, although here some such personal names are indeed connected with "bounded tracks of land" (52). Manambu subclans own, on average, between one and two thousand ancestral names (Harrison 1990, 59). These charter their "ritual prerogatives" (56) as well as subclan members' more materialist claims to local territory.

On Normandy Island, off the eastern point of PNG, Auhelawa lineages also possess sets of personal names that recycle among matrikin. According to Schram (unpubl. data):

> Every member of a lineage is named in honor of a deceased matrilineal ancestor . . . This group of names is supposedly unique to the lineage, having been passed on in perpetuity. A mother who wants to give a certain name to her child must ask the "owner of the

> name" to confer the name. The owner and the recipient become related as *'aivelahe* (namesake), which is a lifelong relationship in which the elder gives support to the junior. Such namesake relationships are thought to be part of a cycle of reciprocity in that a mother who names her child after a relative will usually be the namesake for that relative's child (10–11)

Although these names are not explicit titles to land, they do sustain interlineage relations from generation to generation, as namesakes shoulder obligations to support one another.

Nomination and Corporate Groups

Nomination, depending on the details of local systems, functions to (1) recruit new members into local groups; (2) staff ancestral personality slots with fresh players; (3) entitle the named with specific or general estate/house property rights and resources, including land plots, waterways, myth and songs, chiefly or other status positions, magical practices, adornments, styles, emblems, and insignia, and more; and (4) ensure stereotypic reproduction of social structure no matter the vicissitudes of history and demography. Nomination can substitute for descent rules of local group recruitment and also simultaneously for inheritance and succession insofar as a personal name entitles a person to designated lands and other rights and resources, and insofar as a personal name/title may also appoint him to the office of chief, magician, warrior, or otherwise. On Yap, according to Labby (1976),

> People were not only named for their predecessors on the estate, however. More important, they were also seen to represent them socially . . . A man was chief because he spoke for land which had a chief's voice; a magician, because he spoke for land with a magician's voice (18).

Persons inherited land *and* succeeded to office by receiving a personal name.

I discuss, briefly and in conclusion, some of the implications of nomination including its correlation with descent and adoption, implications for personhood, and its capacity for stereotypic reproduction of social structure.

Beyond Blood?

Nomination is one of several nondescent mechanisms that recruit new members into Melanesian local groups and other organizations. Men in cen-

tral and northern Vanuatu, for example, once purchased memberships in grade-societies with pigs and other goods presented to a sitting member—a society sponsor who need not be a close relative. And one thinks of a range of other non–kin-based groups and associations, reported in the ethnographic literature, that people might join if they have the right dream, are successfully cured of a disease, or because of shared residence.

At the local group level, nomination substitutes for descent, although descent ideology nonetheless often persists alongside naming. Argument about the universality of biological or genealogical constructions of human kinship and descent has once again flared. Schneider (1984), drawing on evidence from Yap, questioned whether humans everywhere appreciate their kin (including descent) connections in the same biogenetic manner. Warren Shapiro has pushed an essentialist, "birthist" reading of classificatory kinship systems in a series of articles and comments (e.g., Shapiro 2012, 2014), sparking response from Marshall Sahlins. Sahlins (2012a) defends "nonprocreative" cultural understandings of kinship as a "socially constituted network of relationships between persons and among groups" (673; see 2012b). However, Shapiro and the essentialists and Sahlins and the culturalists both presume that descent works everywhere to constitute local human groups be this by extension of primary and universal natal facts or by some internal cultural logic. Ethnographies of nomination systems, too, have subsumed these within a more general concern with descent practice and its resultant lineages, clans, or other kin-based groups despite contrary evidence that nomination, not descent, may sometimes ultimately constitute local groups.

This is fair enough given that people everywhere do indeed acknowledge kinship even if, sometimes, they turn to nomination instead of or alongside descent to populate their local groups. The Tannese, for example, do entertain ideas of shared substances, notably *neta* (blood). They juggle divergent terms for their name-sets, sometimes speaking of these as *kwanokus* (vine, rope)—a metaphor that may infer descent connection but may also imply any chain of persons who take up name-set membership—and sometimes imagining local groups as "canoes" or "places/houses," less serial tropes. Others in the Pacific also refer to local groups as "houses"—a term that also may or may not evoke descent relationships among group members. In a sample of four Tanna name-sets, 59% of men did indeed receive names from their fathers, and people can find themselves in shared substance vs. nomination quandaries (Lindstrom 1985). Name-set members occasionally have tried, although not succeeded in the cases I have monitored, to "de-name" a fellow with whom they had fallen into dispute, attempting to grab back someone's name on the grounds

that others have better rights to this through closer patrilineal connection to whomever bestowed the name. People's nominated claims, however, generally prevail over such counterarguments that evoke substance and descent connection.

Nomination, not descent, elsewhere staffs and restaffs some local group memberships from one generation to another despite ethnography's language of lineages and clans. Bororo "clans," according to Maybury-Lewis (1984), "are more correctly thought of as name-based corporations than as matrilineal descent groups" (6). Along the Sepik River, people deploy nomination and descent simultaneously. Gewertz (1977), for example, concluded that "it is the inheritance of totemic names, not the transmission of blood, that links together Chambri patriclans" (341), but since descent is supposed to govern naming (children receive names only from father's and mother's people), nomination and descent overlap, and local groups are simultaneously name-sets and clans. Back to Brazil, Maybury-Lewis (1984) argued that

> The transmission of names is used by the Central Brazilians as an independent principle. Sometimes it reinforces descent, so much so that it is unclear whether it is naming or descent that is the constituent principle of certain groups within the society. Sometimes it replaces descent (8).

Some, like Lea (1995), have taken nomination to be "a vast genetic-like thread" (209), but naming is only metaphorically "genetic" in systems where people can name any available person into their local group. As Eyre (1992) observed, "Personhood is detached from substance" (288). Not every local group in the Pacific or beyond comes into and stays in being through "shared blood" descent relationships.

These issues also appear in cases of adoption. In some places, "naming is not adoption" as people distinguish between descent-like relationships and separate name-governed rights to land and house sites (Eyre 1992, 280; see also Anderson 2011, 187). Others have likened name recruitment into local groups as a sort of adoption. Presumption of adoption, however, may confuse descent with nomination, especially where systems overlap. According to Fisher (2003): "Conferral of a great name upon adoption into the group equally facilitates integration into a network of kin" (119; see Roth 2008, 77). Is adoption name conferral, is it integration into an alternative kin network, or both? On Tanna, when a man "adopts" a child by giving him the name of his father or grandfather, he in fact often calls this person "father" (*tata*) or "grandfather" (*kaha*), not "son." Relations of nomination, here, often eclipse those of fictive, adopted paternity.

When necessary, we should discriminate two forms of adoption—adoption into a local group through naming and adoption as fictive descent, although adoption through naming may in fact endow a person with kin-like characteristics. Insofar as adoption ordinarily supposes relations modeled on and substituting for descent, one might avoid the term as overly presumptive of kinship, along with replacing kin group labels like family, lineage, or clan with "house," "canoe," "basket," "box" or "name-set." On the other hand, although the original Latin word *adoptare* meant to "associate with oneself," including "to take a child," it also meant "to give one's name to" and to "name after oneself."

Personhood

Nomination invites questions of personhood. In most Austronesian languages, names are inalienably possessed, as linguists put this. On Tanna, *naghu-k* (my name) is like *regu-k* (my arm) or *nenime-k* (my eye; see Turner 1991, 12 for Fiji). But who am I? Ethnographers of nomination systems have often noted that the newly named assume both title and an ancestral personality—the most recent in a line of persons all of whom have also carried that name. Thus, the common occurrence of the "heroic I" pronoun, where people choose the first-person singular to talk about their historical antecedents, in these societies. The Tsimshian, Roth (2008, 62) reported, believe that a named person is in fact a reincarnation of his namesake ancestor. In the Pacific, however, people usually differentiate between the particular person bearing a name and the ancestral personality he personifies. Leenhardt (1979), for New Caledonia, wrote: "We say 'a replica'. They are socially the one whose name they bear, but they are not his 'reincarnation'" (156). Partly because of local, nonlineal concepts of time, "this moment of mythic communion implies identity and repetition but not succession" (157). According to Maybury-Lewis (1984), "physical" selves differ from "social" selves (5) and names bequeath "social personalities" (8) on humans; particular persons come and go, but their personalities endure. As on Wogeo, according to Anderson (2011), "the history of the person is included in the history of the name and vice versa" (234).

The opportunity for two or more persons to share the same social personality either simultaneously, as sometimes happens on Tanna, or repetitively recalls Marilyn Strathern's now celebrated analysis of Melanesian "dividuals" whose personhood is partible—each self sharing parts of himself with others, incorporating their substances, labor, and essences. Strathern (1988), in a well-known quote, defined the Melanesian dividual:

> Far from being regarded as unique entities, Melanesian persons are as dividually as they are individually conceived. They contain a generalized sociality within. Indeed, persons are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the relationships that produced them. The singular person can be imagined as a social microcosm (34).

The difference between Western individuals and Melanesian dividuals can be overdrawn. An American mother, according to Schneider (1980), certainly evokes similar personal partibility when speaking "of a child as a 'part of me'" (25). Shared substance—"blood" in this case—diffuses personality between bodies. The same happens with shared name in nomination systems. Persons here likewise comprise bits and pieces of anyone who has nurtured them, but, more particularly, they share a joint personality with namesakes, dead or alive. If Melanesians are, or were once, "dividuals" who share semen, milk, blood, food, labor, and the like with others, names too are also a sort of shared substance. One can pull "dividualistic" descriptions from the nomination literature. Lea (1995), for example, argued that names and property are parts of the "essence of ancestors" (209). According to Godelier (2011), Baruya also share personhood with an ancestral namesake: "Something like part of this ancestor's spirit (in the sense of soul, *anima*, which is associated with the Sun) is transmitted along with the name" (62).

Named personalities are thus "partible," name and property shared among persons. When one is named, he absorbs bits and pieces of all his preceding (or repeating) namesakes. Contributors to Linnekin and Poyer (1990) similarly described "consocial personhood" (9) in Pacific societies where sharing food and labor makes people into kin just as shared substance (blood, semen, milk, bone) does. Where naming is consocial, names are partible as are personages.

In Melanesia, nomination and descent are thus often homologous. If ancestors and their descendants relate through shared substances of various sorts, consocial namesakes merge through their shared name. Personal name is another substance or an essence, perhaps, like blood, bone, food, sweat, semen, milk, or labor, which constitute dividuals. Names, too, are an aspect of partible personhood that creates consocial identity and structural repetition, as Leenhardt put this.

Structural Reproduction

Finally, nomination systems may be both more and less flexible than descent systems in adjusting population to land and other resources. Unlike descent,

which expands "naturally" given demographic growth, those who deploy nomination to reproduce persons and groups may dogmatically maintain that their existing sets of names/titles are fixed and permanent with no new and additional slots permitted. On the other hand, nomination permits the distribution of (in)dividuals from property-owning group to group more simply and quickly, through adoption/naming, than do kin systems that fix people into descent groups (even where these are cognatic and even where adoption is a common practice). Nomination is, according to Roth (2008), "designed to provide continuity in the face of stress and change—to maintain structure, one might say, in spite of history" (68). This produces, according to Fisher (2003), a "timeless social order" (132); "an eternal continuity of enduring form" (133; see Maybury-Lewis 1984, 8).

Nomination permits people easily to repair rips and gaps in their social fabric. When a name-set loses all living members, its personalities are only temporarily empty. Neighbors from related sets step in and nominate children to repopulate the group. Urat villages that were short of warriors, Eyre suggests (1992, 289), recruited replacement associates by naming men into open local personalities. Turner (1991:21) wondered if Pacific Islanders might first have turned to nomination during the nineteenth century, responding to an overload of deleterious historical events: epidemics, invasions, and massive population decline. Namers with no children might then have looked beyond the ordinary limits of descent. But small groups everywhere regularly encounter historical and demographic variability, even when times are good, and nomination to recruit group members (however names flowed) itself is a long-standing practice. Personal names and personalities that Cook recorded on Tanna in 1774 still circulate on the island today.

In the Pacific, we might instead follow Leenhardt to appreciate nomination as thoroughly embedded in island notions of time and personhood. Persons of the dividual sort, in the right context, inhabit multiple human bodies. We too often approach descent in overly Western cultural terms: We celebrate descent as progress through history, as growth, as development, and as natural. Where people expect identity and repetition and not developmental progress, however, nomination works more efficiently than does descent to ensure stereotypic reproduction of the social order. Accident, misfortune, and catastrophe are all forestalled and history denied. What disappears can always be remade through naming. Shapiro (2012) concluded his encomium to universal kinship with the charge, "We workers of the world are unimpressed by the visions of the anointed . . . We have the truth to win" (193). Sahlins (2012a) riffed on this: "Birth is the metaphor. (Kinship Workers of the World—Only Unite!") (676). I might

follow their lead: Name is the metonym. (Namesakes of the World—Wholly Unite!)

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