PACIFIC STUDIES

A multidisciplinary journal devoted to the study of the peoples of the Pacific Islands

MARCH 1999

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PUBLISHED BY

THE INSTITUTE FOR POLYNESIAN STUDIES
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY–HAWAI'I

IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE POLYNESIAN CULTURAL CENTER

Articles and reviews in *Pacific Studies* are abstracted or indexed in *Sociological Abstracts, Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts, America: History and Life, Historical Abstracts, Abstracts in Anthropology, Anthropological Literature, PAIS Bulletin, International Political Science Abstracts, International Bibliography of Periodical Literature, International Bibliography of Book Reviews,* and *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences.*

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Editorial Policy: *Pacific Studies* is published quarterly by The Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young University–Hawai'i, Lā'ie, Hawai'i 96762–1294, http://academics.byuh.edu/divisions/ips/, but responsibility for opinions expressed in the articles rests with the authors alone.

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This publication is printed on acid-free paper and meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources.

ISSN 0275–3596

Volume 22 March 1999 Number 1

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Vol. 22, No. 1 March 1999

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND EMIGRATION IN TUVALU

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Growing consensus on the accelerated greenhouse effect indicates that potential increases in both sea levels and tropical storms will pose problems for atoll states, especially Tuvalu. Land areas and water supplies may be threatened by coastal erosion, depleting agricultural and fisheries potential. Tuvalu's economy is limited and partly reliant on aid and remittances whose sustainability is uncertain. More than a third of the population now lives in overcrowded conditions in the urban center of Funafuti. Population growth has accelerated since independence, despite attempts to implement a population policy, while opportunities for temporary or permanent emigration have not increased. If environmental changes exacerbate domestic development strategies, Tuvaluans are more likely to become "environmental refugees," creating new human-rights issues.

IN THE PAST DECADE concern has increased over the possible impact of the accelerated greenhouse effect on sea-level rise and thus over the implications of that sea-level rise for countries with substantial areas of land at or close to sea level. Many island states fall into this category, none more so than those where coral atolls predominate, since atolls rarely rise even three meters above sea level. For most coastal dwellers one response to rising sea levels is moving inland to higher ground. For residents on atolls, such a choice is not possible, as high land does not exist. Though all island states face new environmental problems, as many people, all urban centers, and much infrastructure related to tourism, trade, and economic development are concentrated on the coast, the five world states composed solely of atolls—Tuvalu, Tokelau, Kiribati, the Maldives, and the Marshall Islands—are most at risk. It is in these atoll states that the challenges posed by global warming are most severe and where the necessity to respond to the threat of the greenhouse effect is most apparent (Connell and Lea 1992). Small

island states also face difficult economic circumstances; they are remote, with economies that are dependent on primary commodity production and increasingly on aid, but the potential "aid fatigue" of metropolitan nations coupled with increasing expectations over standards of living pose new challenges for future socioeconomic development. This article examines the recent development trajectory in the very small island state of Tuvalu, the extent to which contemporary problems may be exacerbated by the greenhouse effect, and the possible outcomes.

Tuvalu is one of the smallest independent nations in the world in its population size, land mass, and national economy. In the nineteenth century the island group, then called the Ellice Islands, along with its northern neighbors the Gilbert Islands became separate British protectorates jointly governed in the interest of administrative convenience. This arrangement was formalized in 1915, when the two protectorates merged into the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. In 1975 the Ellice Islands voted to secede (Macdonald 1975), and Tuvalu became an independent state in 1978 (Connell 1980). It is an archipelago consisting of three small reef islands and six coral atolls located on the western margin of Polynesia and some one thousand kilometers north of Fiji. A total land area of only 24.4 square kilometers is spread over 750,000 square kilometers of the central Pacific; the largest island, Vaitupu, has just 4.9 square kilometers. The highest point in the country is no more than five meters above sea level, and most areas are well below that; hence Tuvalu is highly vulnerable to natural hazards. Over a third of the population of ten thousand is concentrated on the main island of Funafuti, which has an area of just 2.4 square kilometers. Tuvalu suffers from most of the conventional disadvantages of small island states, further accentuated by very small size, extreme isolation and fragmentation, and thin and porous coral soils lacking in nutrients, thus making agricultural and most other forms of development exceptionally difficult. There are also severe problems related to administration, transportation and communications, an inadequate social and economic infrastructure, a small entrepreneurial base, limited skilled human resources, and few development projects that can attract external financial support.

Population growth has been rapid in the postwar years and has not been relieved by the safety valve of outmigration as has occurred in most other parts of Polynesia (especially in New Zealand dependencies). Agricultural and fisheries production has not grown as rapidly as population, and a transition to imported food, especially rice, has followed changing tastes, preferences, and convenience. This transition has been so substantial that in Tuvalu, as in other atoll states, imported foods and drinks now constitute about a third of all imports by value, a substantial

drain on domestic resources. The combination of high postwar rates of population increase, a growing desire for consumer goods, the location of the hospital in the single urban center, and the concentration of formal-sector employment there has resulted in urban migration from the islands of the periphery. Rapid urbanization even in a very small state has posed a range of social problems, all of which are complicated by the threat of climatic change.

The Greenhouse Effect

Scientific studies have drawn increasingly consistent conclusions regarding future climatic trends. Although enormous uncertainty remains, especially over chronology, some indication of the impact is possible. That impact is likely to involve rising sea levels, with some low-lying lands inundated and coasts eroded. Erosion is not unusual and was evident in Nanumea and Nukufetau even before recent concerns over accelerated sea-level rise. A gradual rise of mean sea level will progressively lift the zone of flooding and increase the impact of storm waves, eroding areas hitherto considered safe. Human responses will vary depending on the value of the coastal land under attack and the resources available to provide protective measures. In states where resources are very limited and small populations thinly spread, the provision of expensive engineering works will not be a commonly available option.

Coastal erosion will increase as the rise of sea levels accelerates, perhaps beyond the upward growth of corals, and this erosion will probably be accentuated by the greater frequency of storms. Increased temperatures will decrease human comfort in the tropics and may worsen human health. The intertropical convergence zone is likely to shift northwards, changing the distribution of zones of upwelling, hence altering the distribution of fish stocks and thus affecting fisheries. Such major climatic changes as the frequency and severity of cyclones and tropical storms may also increase as temperatures increase.

Island ecology, in terms of the capacity to support human habitation, is closely tied to the existence of a permanent groundwater system. Islands above a certain size, about 1.5 hectares, contain a permanent lens of fresh water surrounded by salt water. The volume of the lens is roughly proportional to the surface area of the atoll. Hence a decline in the area of an atoll would have a disproportionate impact on the volume of the lens. During droughts water-table levels fall and the groundwater may become brackish. Environmental stress is manifested by trees losing leaves, not fruiting, and even dying. Yet the most severe threat to permanent water supplies is not

from climatic factors directly, but rather from marine processes that cause coastal erosion and increase the frequency of storm overwash.

Increased groundwater salinity will reduce its potability, which for most atolls is currently of considerable significance. It will also reduce the productivity of agriculture, since no plant species will gain from increased salinity. In drought conditions access to groundwater on atolls is crucial, although on some atolls with reasonably high rainfall construction of better cisterns may enable the use of groundwater to be minimized or even ended. If increased salinity is combined with any long-term decline in rainfall, as is possible in some areas, the results will be even more serious, since the cost of water purification and desalination is extremely high. If groundwater becomes no longer potable, human habitation will be effectively impossible. Fresh water is most scarce after cyclones or tidal waves have swept over an atoll, salting soils and wells, a situation likely to increase under greenhouse conditions (Roy and Connell 1991). Tropical storms are of present concern in Tuvalu. The national submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997 stated:

> We are already experiencing increased frequency of cyclones, tornadoes, flooding and tide surges, many of which hit us outside the usual climatic seasons. This year alone, in 1997, Tuvalu was devastated by three tropical cyclones: the first two in March—Gavin and Hina—and more recently Keli. The costs of these effects to us in Tuvalu is enormous. Not only were houses and whole villages damaged, but also vegetation and food crops were completely destroyed. In one recent incident, an entire island community was left homeless and its vegetation damaged so much so that the island is uninhabitable right now. In another incident, one whole islet completely disappeared into thin air. Erosion to coastal areas of our already scarce land is further worsened, and the increased salinity in underground water is seriously affecting not only vegetation and traditional food crops but also the health and lives of the people. (Quoted in *Pacific News Bulletin,* December 1997, 7)

Erosion reduces land area, and, where there is minimal elevation, such losses may become severe and increase the swampiness and salinity of areas that remain above sea level. Areas immediately at risk will be those that have previously been reclaimed from the sea, including parts of Funafuti, the main island and urban center, now used for agriculture and roads. Land

losses will lead to a decline in agricultural production, increased competition for scarce land, and a related decline in handicraft materials (such as wood and pandanus) and firewood, which is already in extremely short supply in the urban area. Such changes will further threaten the already limited subsistence base and introduce new environmental problems. Erosion of fringing reefs may disturb and reduce the distinctiveness of lagoon ecology as lagoons increasingly become indistinguishable in content from the surrounding ocean. Mangrove habitats may also be damaged. This damage would reduce the artisanal fishing potential of many areas, especially where lagoons currently provide fisheries diversity.

The greenhouse effect is likely therefore to lead to reduced agricultural production, a possible decline in fisheries production, and a loss of vital water, timber, and firewood resources, thus reducing the potential of the few areas in which island states currently demonstrate a degree of self-reliance. These effects will occur alongside continued population growth. An increase in population pressure on diminishing resources will further encourage rural-urban migration from the outer islands in search of wages and salaries, rather than the increasingly unpredictable agricultural and fisheries income.

Much of what is currently known about the impact of the greenhouse effect is derived from conjecture and speculation, since the order of magnitude of future physical events cannot be determined, and there is no real precedent for what is likely to follow. Though the postglacial marine transgression that ended around six thousand years ago must have had a similar effect, it occurred in a vastly different social and economic context, leaving few records of its human impact (and none in then uninhabited Polynesia). With complex and interrelated causes and with consequences involving changing natural processes and a variety of human adaptations to those changes, the greenhouse effect is effectively an uncontrolled experiment on a global scale. Whatever the outcome, it is apparent that the greenhouse effect offers nothing positive to tropical island states. In atoll states like Tuvalu where all the land is low-lying, problems will be more apparent and quicker to occur.

Island states have consequently sought to discourage greenhouse-gas production, most of which occurs in the north, individually and through the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) in international and regional forums. Island states themselves have done little or nothing to cause changes in atmospheric composition and thus in global climate change, nor can they directly influence mitigation. As the prime minister of Tuvalu, Bikenibeu Paeniu, has said: "We strongly believe that we have done the least to cause this hazardous problem, although we are now faced with the highest possibility of losing the most" (*Pacific Report,* 10 July 1997, 5). Collectively the

island states have had some success, notably in negotiations leading to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1992), but subsequent achievements have been fewer. In the Pacific region this downturn was most apparent at the South Pacific Forum meeting in September 1997, when island states were unable to reach a consensus on binding targets for greenhouse-gas reductions that would include Australia, a situation that was maintained at the UNFCCC meeting in Japan later in that year. Paeniu led the move by Pacific islands to insist that greenhouse-gas emissions be reduced to a lower level than Australia was prepared to contemplate. Though it has become widely recognized that global warming constitutes a new and significant problem for small island states (Commonwealth Advisory Group 1997), and a considerable threat to security, the impact of small states on international policy changes on global warming has been slight (Shibuya 1997). Even if an international agreement were reached to stabilize global greenhouse-gas production levels, a notion that appears unlikely, there would still be considerable future impact from present greenhouse-gas levels. Adaptation to climate change is therefore essential.

Opportunities for adaptation (and for socioeconomic development) are naturally constrained by limited land areas and the simplicity of atoll environments (where natural ecosystems may easily be disrupted). Moreover, uncertainty over the outcome of the greenhouse effect has restricted the ability and willingness, nationally and internationally, to respond to potential problems through policy formation. Indeed, response is least likely in small island states where information is inadequate, planning offices are small and fully stretched to cope with standard recurrent activities, and options are few. Environmental planning remains in its infancy, and the five-year plans that presently exist are usually the extreme limit of long-term planning. Many conventional measures to reduce vulnerability, such as transferring populations, infrastructure, and economic activities to higher land, are impossible in atoll situations. Other conventional measures, such as the construction of dykes, sea walls, and pumping stations are extremely expensive (especially in developing states, where small populations are spread over a large number of islands). Even defending the urban area would be a complex and costly operation, and would itself be a pointless exercise. Financing for such projects is absent in all small states, and no donor would contemplate aid on the appropriate scale.

However, island states can develop programs to improve environmental conservation and management. Opportunities exist for the increased use of solar energy (rather than expensive, imported greenhouse gas from fossil fuels or local firewood), afforestation (in order both to guard against erosion and storm damage, and to produce new and old species of social and eco-

nomic value), and improved water supplies (especially the construction of rainwater catchments to improve water quality and reduce dependence on underground lenses). Because of increased pressure on resources, especially coastal resources, stemming from rising population and solid-waste disposal problems, the necessity for improved coastal-zone management is paramount. Although none of these policies will significantly reduce the impact of the greenhouse effect, and atoll states cannot develop such policies themselves, still, they would stimulate wise resource use, improve the physical quality of life, and lead to more sustainable development.

An Atoll Economy

In spite of basic difficulties in stimulating development, Tuvalu has experienced limited economic growth in recent years after stagnating in the first half of the 1980s. The GDP per capita has steadily increased to around A$1,500, representing growth in several sectors including agriculture (especially the subsistence component), manufacturing, and trade. The small and open economy and absence of a national currency restrict the ability of government to manage comprehensive macroeconomic policies. The economy is particularly vulnerable to external influences, including fluctuating aid flows and commodity prices. Tuvalu is heavily dependent on aid for development capital and technical assistance, with most of the budget receiving overseas support. Aid is supported through the now sizable Tuvalu Trust Fund, established in 1987 with substantial contributions from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia, which provides almost a quarter of total recurrent revenue. Remittances contribute more than 10 percent of national income (substantially more than export earnings) and are mainly derived from nationals working in the phosphate mines on nearby Nauru or on overseas shipping lines. Economic activity is almost entirely dominated by the public sector, which is responsible for most nonsubsistence activities.

In contrast to many other Pacific island states, agriculture is of limited importance, contributing less than 20 percent of GDP, primarily because of the low potential of coral soils. It is still an important activity, primarily because, outside Funafuti, most of the population is at least partly dependent on it. Commercial production was dominated by copra exports, but they ended in 1993 because of low world prices. There is some limited potential for encouraging the production and local marketing of other crops, but distance from markets and intervening opportunities are major constraints to most commercial production. In view of substantial stocks of tuna, the potential for a larger fishing industry is considerable and offers the

best possibilities for future sustainable growth. The industry is currently dominated by small-scale subsistence activities. Fish exports, which were substantial during the 1982–1984 period, ceased in 1985, when the government-owned pole-and-line fishing vessel ended its local operations because of a lack of bait-fish (Fairbairn 1993). Tuvalu benefits from licensing fees gained from its share of the multilateral fisheries treaty with the United States, and some infrastructure and other support services have been developed for future fisheries expansion.

Manufacturing contributes less than 10 percent of GDP and is unlikely to develop much further. Other than handicrafts the sole export-oriented activity is a garments venture sending shirts to Australia. A small number of processing activities—mainly in Funafuti—produce import substitutes for items such as soap and biscuits. Intentions to establish a "mini-industrial zone" on Funafuti have not eventuated. Tourism is similarly of very limited significance because of high transport costs and limited facilities of all kinds. Most visits are related to government activities, and tourism development prospects are poor, though in the 1990s a number of guest houses have complemented the one small hotel on Funafuti.

Most of the workforce in Tuvalu is dependent on rural-based subsistence activities. Formal employment in the wage and salary sector accounted for the small total of just under fourteen hundred people in 1991 and highlights the importance to the country of overseas employment and remittances. Two-thirds of all employment (just over one thousand persons at that time) was in the government sector. Cooperative societies and nongovernment organizations accounted for a further 17 percent of employment, while only 14 percent of all workers, just 130 persons, were employed in the private sector. Working for the government is therefore more dominant in Tuvalu than in almost any other Pacific island state and has grown steadily since independence.

Formal-sector employment is concentrated in Funafuti. In 1991 no fewer than 936 people (68 percent) out of the total wage and salary workforce were located there. This proportion has remained much the same since 1979 despite rapid population growth on the island over that time period. Unemployment on Funafuti has grown during the same period and has become a particular problem because of the limited opportunities for some migrants to gain access to subsistence resources. "Anecdotal evidence suggests that only one in four of all school leavers can now find employment and that the subsistence sector is, in fact, becoming less receptive to the unemployed" (Forsyth and Plange 1992:45). The growth of the formal-sector workforce has been twice that of employment opportunities since the 1980s.

Achieving economic development in Tuvalu has always been difficult. Future expansion of productive activities depends on developments in agriculture and fisheries, and the prospects for Tuvaluans of employment overseas. External employment currently accounts for as much as 18 percent of the total labor force. Shifting the balance in national development from Funafuti to the outer islands is also crucial to the structure of economic change, as the population has become extremely concentrated on one island, putting enormous pressure on services and land areas with consequent problems of urban environmental management. Because of difficulties in expanding agriculture and fisheries and the numerous obstacles to economic growth in such a small island state, Tuvalu is likely to continue to face adverse economic conditions in the foreseeable future.

Population Growth

Documentary evidence on the population of Tuvalu before 1865 is sketchy, but subsequent data are more readily available. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the population increased from under twenty-five hundred in 1876 to just over thirty-five hundred at the end of the century. Population growth was then so marked that, as early as the 1890s, resettlement was being suggested as a solution to what was perceived as an impending overpopulation problem. Nineteenth-century evidence suggests that there was a fine balance between population and resources, and extensive controls included both abortion and infanticide. As early as 1865 it was suggested that the islanders were "genuine Malthusians": "They feared that unless the population was kept down they would not have sufficient food" (cited by Munro and Bedford 1980:3), and the people of Vaitupu were reported to have such a fear of starvation that "there was a rule that only two children should be reared in a family" (ibid.). While infanticide was common, it was counterbalanced by extensive adoption. However, such traditional forms of population control were effectively abolished by missionaries, leading to more rapid growth of the population in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Between 1901 and 1911 there was a sharp decline in the resident population of Tuvalu, a result of both rising mortality levels and migration to Ocean Island (Banaba), then a phosphate mine (Munro 1990). Concern for the demographic future of Tuvalu became grounds for considerable pessimism. But the period of decline was brief, and from 1910 onwards the population of Tuvalu has grown steadily (Table 1). Growth became more rapid after the Second World War, primarily because of the more effective extension of modern medical services to the country, which was still a remote archi-

TABLE 1. **Population of Tuvalu**

Year	National Population	Year	National Population
1876	2,497	1963	5,444
1887	2,902	1968	5,782
1901	3,543	1973	5,887
1911	3,080	1979	7,349
1921	3,429	1991	9,043
1931	3,994	1997 (estimate)	10,900
1947	4,487		

pelago in a remote British colony. Growth was fastest during the 1970s (averaging 4.3 percent per annum between 1973 and 1979), as a result of return migration from the new state of Kiribati, but slowed to 1.7 percent between 1979 and 1991. The slower rate of growth was a result of substantial migration away from Tuvalu. Excluding permanent emigrants but including those temporarily overseas (mainly seamen, workers in the Nauru phosphate-mining industry, or students), the de jure population of Tuvalu would have been 8,730 in 1979 and 10,114 in 1991. The de jure population is regarded in Tuvalu as the more appropriate total for planning purposes on the assumption that almost all those away from the country will return permanently at some point in the future.

The fertility rate in Tuvalu declined steadily between 1965 and 1979, producing, in 1979, a crude birth rate of 23.7 per thousand. Since independence the fertility rate has risen, but it may have stabilized at around the 1991 level of 29.4. The total fertility rate was then estimated at 3.4 but had declined to 3.1 in 1994. A family-planning program began in 1968 and had considerable success until 1973, when there was an apparent decline in the proportion of acceptors, at least until 1979, when the proportion of eligible women practicing family planning was 21.4 percent. The proportion of acceptors has long been twice as high on Funafuti as on the other islands, with an acceptance rate of about 54 percent (in 1990) there and 31 percent on the outer islands. The low acceptance rate and regional variations have been a consequence of cultural inhibitions, the reluctance of men to participate or allow their wives to participate, lack of knowledge and contraceptive availability, and the desire of households to have substantial numbers of children so that at least one might, through migration, become a successful wage or salary earner and provider of remittances (Chambers 1986). Increasing the extent of contraceptive use on the outer islands will prove difficult.

The fall in the fertility rate in the 1960s and 1970s paralleled a fall in the

mortality rate, especially after 1976, when the establishment of an administrative center at Funafuti enabled improved service to the outer islands, and medical services, water supplies, and sanitation were also improved. The crude death rate in 1979 was 15 per thousand, and the infant mortality rate was 42 per thousand; the crude death rate has continued to fall, reaching 8.8 in 1991, but the infant mortality rate in 1991 was 56 per thousand (Rakaseta et al. 1998:20). The Tuvalu population is youthful, with 35 percent under age fifteen, and has an unbalanced sex structure. There are slightly more females than males because of selective emigration of men as mine workers and seamen; this imbalance is most pronounced in the age group from fifteen to twenty-nine.

If current fertility and mortality rates remain constant, the population of Tuvalu will continue to grow steadily past the end of the century; unlike in other parts of Polynesia, the actual extent of population growth depends more on natural increase than on migration. Tuvalu already experiences considerable threats to national development because of its small area relative to population size (and the distribution of that population over nine small atolls at some distance from other countries). National development plans have recognized these basic constraints and have increasingly acknowledged that both a reduced rate of population growth and greater regional balance in population distribution are necessary in order to avoid a reduction in what is increasingly perceived to be an austere quality of life. A growing consensus has emerged that the rate of population growth must slow if Tuvalu is to achieve a pattern of sustainable development.

Tuvalu has sought to develop a comprehensive population policy, aimed at both fertility reduction and the slowing of rural-urban immigration to Funafuti. The need for such a policy has been expressed by former prime minister Kamuta Latasi:

> Tuvalu's population growth rate of 2.5 per cent is "very alarming for us" Latasi said, and a committee has been established to conduct education tours of the country's eight [*sic*] islands. "The only way to be successful with family planning is to make people understand. If they don't understand they won't care. It's not a matter of getting on the radio and saying 'if you have five children this is what will happen!' You have to physically visit the island, get the blackboard and illustrate that if you have two metres of cloth it will cover two kids but if you have seven kids it won't." Previous opposition of church groups to family planning has changed, Latasi said, with the realisation of how serious the problem is. (*Pacific Report,* 4 April 1994, 7)

A new Population Policy Coordination Committee was established in 1993 to formulate a comprehensive national policy for outer-island development programs, population redistribution, and a means of implementing slower rates of population growth. Implementation is crucial because of the anticipated return migration of workers from Nauru when the phosphate deposits are depleted around the turn of the century, but the task is considerable:

> Although a level of optional population growth is not specified, clearly a rate near replacement level would be in the national interest. This would amount to an average of less than three children per couple. . . . Two children per couple may well be in the national interest, but few couples would find it personally advantageous to have such a small family. The vast majority specifically want two children of each sex not only to give parents support in their old age, but to provide sibling support for the children themselves. (Chambers 1986:324)

There are many other reasons, including the need for strong families and some chance of access to education and employment, for having families with more than two children. Economic conditions at the village level in the outer islands favor larger families because of shared responsibilities. Establishing new directions for population change in Tuvalu will be difficult, and future population growth is likely to be considerable.

Urbanization and Migration

No country in the Pacific region has experienced more recent or more rapid internal migration and urbanization than Tuvalu. Between 1973 and 1979, the period during which Tuvalu seceded from Kiribati to become an independent state, the population of Funafuti grew from 871 to 2,120 as a result of the closure of the Banaba mine, return migration from Kiribati, and movements from the outer islands. In 1973 three other atolls had populations larger than Funafuti, but by 1979 it was unchallenged as the most important island in the new nation. Only the atoll of Vaitupu had achieved relatively rapid growth in the same time period. During the 1980s that supremacy increased, as Funafuti took on more of the trappings of a national capital and its population grew to 3,839 in 1991. It has now passed 4,000. Its proportion of the national population increased from 29 percent in 1979 to nearly half of the national total by the mid-1990s. Moreover, the population of Funafuti has increasingly become concentrated on just one island, as natural hazards have intensified urbanization. Before 1972 there were about one hundred

people living on Fongafala, the southernmost islet of Funafuti, but after Hurricane Bebe struck, most people moved to the center of Funafuti, and by 1976 Fongafala was completely uninhabited, though there has been limited subsequent return migration. Whether on Funafuti or throughout the country, decentralization is a crucial issue in national development.

The urban situation is very different from that of most other Pacific states because of the high proportion of Tuvaluans living in a single place, the very high urban population density, and the consequential difficulties in achieving adequate service provision (especially fresh water) and providing formal employment (Connell and Lea 1995). These problems have long contributed to some tension between the long-established "true owners" of Funafuti atoll and migrants from other atolls. As early as the mid-1970s, "[d]emands for restriction of entry to the capital were being expressed by women's committees and island councils in Tuvalu: the outer islands seeking to retain active young people; Funafuti seeking to retain its separate identity" (Howard 1976:25). Since then these issues and resentments have smoldered on but have not resulted in related policy formation. Migration into Funafuti had also begun to create an "urban elite" of those who have wage jobs and government housing and are unwilling to return to their home islands, and this elite may be self-perpetuating to the detriment of the development of those remaining on the outer islands (Tuvalu 1980:35). Further migration has accentuated those problems, produced more substantial problems of overcrowding, and reduced the possibilities for developing appropriate urban-management policies.

Because it has been both recent and rapid, this urban concentration has created problems. Many of these problems are no different from those of much larger urban centers in other developing countries: overcrowding in poor housing conditions with attendant health risks, pollution from inadequate sewerage and garbage disposal, unemployment (even if disguised by sharing in extended families), the growth of uncontrolled settlements, worsened nutrition (as cash incomes are often inadequate to purchase diets based on imported foods), and some increase in crime and social disorganization. Since migrants are not always successful, they may be unable or unwilling to contribute significantly to the needs of their rural kin. These urban problems are not unique to Tuvalu or to atoll states, but the small size of the land and lagoon areas and the problems of achieving economic growth and hence generating employment or financing service provision accentuate the basic difficulties.

Emigration has long been a way of life in Tuvalu, though the first experience of migration in the mid–nineteenth century was of "blackbirding"—forced labor migration—to South America (Maude 1981). Blackbirding gave

way to more controlled movements to the plantations of Tahiti, Fiji, Hawai'i, Samoa, and Queensland. In 1900 migration to the phosphate mines at Banaba began, and there was such enthusiasm for overseas employment that British colonial authorities had to restrict the number of migrants to safeguard population numbers. Subsequently migration diversified to Nauru and elsewhere, and the number of emigrants remained high. Their remittances enabled superior house construction (at least in terms of imported "modern" materials) and changing patterns of food consumption.

By the time of the Second World War, population growth in Tuvalu had already indicated to colonial authorities that resettlement might be necessary. Two proposals to resettle Tuvaluans in the unpopulated Line Islands, two thousand kilometers to the east, and in Tonga were never implemented, the latter because of fears that the Tongan islands might eventually be needed for Tongan resettlement. However, between 1947 and 1963, a substantial number of Vaitupu islanders were resettled on Kioa, a small Fijian island (Koch 1978). Subsequently, as most Pacific island states achieved independence, the prospects for resettlement faded, and migration generally became possible only on a temporary basis.

The extent of emigration further increased after the war, particularly through continued circular labor migration to Nauru and Banaba, to the extent that in the early 1970s more than a third of all Tuvaluans were overseas. However, that proportion had fallen by the 1980s, with both the closure of the Banaba mine and the independence of Kiribati in 1979, resulting in return migration (Connell 1983:22–24). In the 1980s population pressure on resources became critical. By the end of that decade the number of migrants apparently permanently overseas was less than 5 percent of the total population. Nonetheless, in 1991 there were more than twelve hundred Tuvaluans overseas, rather more than 10 percent of the de jure population. The largest number of these, 735, were working on Nauru, where the phosphate mine was slowly contracting, necessitating that almost all those contract workers would ultimately have to return to Tuvalu, perhaps before the end of the century. The future of other overseas Tuvaluans—as seamen, students, or contract workers in New Zealand—is scarcely more secure. Tuvalu therefore faces the likely and perhaps imminent return of a significant proportion of its population (though short-term migration overseas will continue). Just as in the larger Polynesian countries, that return is likely to place particular pressure on the urban center, where population density and its impact on limited resources is already considerable. Since the skills learned overseas (on ships and in a mine) are of limited local value, especially in the rural sector, return migration often intensifies despondency rather than contributing to development.

Because of limited national development opportunities, those countries where international migration is now extremely important and where dependency on migration has become considerable are not only reluctant to control overseas migration but have become anxious to seek new and better opportunities. Tuvalu as well as Kiribati have not only specifically trained seamen for work overseas (alongside exporting workers to Nauru) but have requested many countries inside the Pacific and beyond to provide new opportunities for migrant labor. Such pressures have continued, despite the increased difficulties of access to metropolitan states, as the prospects for economic development have failed to improve, population density has increased, and environmental problems have become more apparent.

In parallel with Tuvalu's increased interest in international migration, there has long been a growing recognition of the relevance of migration as one solution to development problems. In a paper produced by the South Pacific Commission, an organization for technical cooperation covering all Pacific island states, it was argued, in the case of Kiribati and Tuvalu, that for both temporary and permanent migration, "with the relatively small numbers that will be involved and with the severity of their plight, assistance from other Pacific countries and from Australia and New Zealand may be considered more favourably than is generally thought" (South Pacific Commission 1982:14). Little subsequently changed, though Tuvalu gained access to the New Zealand guestworker scheme, allowing a small number of migrants access to employment in New Zealand for periods of less than a year. A subsequent review of Australian aid, which attached concern to the impending closure of the Nauru mine, gave particular emphasis to the special needs of the small states in the South Pacific. The executive summary assigned sufficient importance to the problems of Kiribati and Tuvalu to recommend measures denied to all other states except Papua New Guinea:

> Kiribati with a population of 60,000 and Tuvalu with a population of 8,000 have special problems. Their remote and minute land areas are heavily populated. They depend very much on remittances from their emigrants and on foreign aid. Their long-term development prospects are discouraging. In view of structural problems which are beyond their control and beyond the reach of aid, Australia should make available limited opportunities for immigration from Kiribati and Tuvalu. (Australia 1984:8)

The review argued that Australia should "go beyond traditional ideas of aid" to provide a special immigration quota for the two countries, with which Australia hitherto had few ties (ibid.: 181). As in the case of an Asian Devel-

opment Bank survey that made similar suggestions involving a range of metropolitan states (Castle 1980:136), external perceptions increasingly recognized the potential role of international migration, from at least the smallest countries in the South Pacific, in contributing to development.

Other than marginally improved access to New Zealand, little changed. Metropolitan states feared that concessional migration access to one or more small states would stimulate pressures from larger states and that international migration would reduce the likelihood of successful self-reliant development initiatives. Island states, except Tuvalu, were reluctant to press for improved access, fearing that other forms of aid might then decline. In 1994 Tuvalu's prime minister stressed that his country was continuing to seek employment opportunities in Australia and that Tuvalu "would not take no for an answer" on the provision of either employment or education opportunities. Regarding those Tuvaluans who have been educated overseas: "We want them to come back, but certainly [we] cannot have everybody, even if they are graduates. There will come a time when we can only take back a portion of our population. The rest—we will have to assist them in obtaining employment overseas and we need to prepare people for when that time comes" (quoted in *Pacific Report,* 4 April 1994, 4). Despite being rebuffed, two years later the prime minister was again requesting that Australia accept a small number of Tuvaluans each year as guestworkers to relieve existing overcrowding and enable the country to cope with the return of Nauru migrant workers: "We haven't even got homes for them. These people have been there for 20 years with the Nauru Phosphate Corporation. They have no experience working in the gardens, growing taro, cutting toddy, fishing or building houses. I am sure some of them are really good tradesmen and I am sure that they can be absorbed by companies in Australia" (quoted in *Pacific Report,* 5 August 1996, 2). Once again the request was ignored. Since the early 1980s the notion of providing new international migration opportunities for small Pacific island states has been absent from external reviews, primarily a result of the recognition that there was virtually no prospect of any positive response from metropolitan states. Island states were increasingly directed to resolve their own population and development issues.

Toward the Future

The modern era has increasingly demonstrated the tyrannies of distance that have restricted contemporary development in small island states. Atolls are tiny, resource-poor, often distant from each other, and remote from substantial land masses. Atoll states consequently face a host of development

problems, often in a more accentuated form than in other island microstates. Problems include limited skills, a small domestic market size, the high cost of imports and exports, the restricted diversity of exports, and substantial administrative costs. These disadvantages have usually led to large trade deficits, balance of payments problems, and considerable dependence on foreign aid and technical assistance. Only in the Maldives has there been any industrialization or tourism. In the South Pacific, especially in Tuvalu, both types of development are absent. Atoll states have moved rapidly into situations of extreme dependence on the outside world, primarily for aid, concessional trade, and migration opportunities. The absence of international migration opportunities comparable to those in many other island microstates, in turn, has necessitated domestic responses to the problems of achieving economic development, but with few human or natural resources the problems have been increasingly difficult to address.

Concessional trade schemes are of diminished importance in an era of increasingly free world trade, and aid from most donor nations is currently declining; in both spheres greater self-reliance and increased privatization are being thrust upon less-developed states by reluctant donors and international organizations. Where island states, like Tuvalu, are disadvantaged in their geographical location and physical characteristics and further have little trade and no strategic location to provide bargaining status, these trends are of concern. There are few prospects for significant economic growth in Tuvalu and none that are likely to be possible without some degree of external support.

Because of limited economic and social development, migration has become a way of life. The government of Tuvalu has encouraged international migration and intermittently sought improved temporary and permanent migration opportunities in metropolitan states. Elsewhere in the Pacific migration has been a common response to difficult economic circumstances, and, where political ties permit migration, flows have been substantial and the populations of some dependent territories have declined (Connell 1987; Aldrich and Connell 1998). Although this migration does constitute a brain and skill drain, the investment in human capital that it constitutes has been an essential element in household survival strategies in the absence of attractive domestic investment opportunities, and Polynesian migrants continue to remit at high levels for periods of more than twenty-five years (Connell and Brown 1995). The provision of migration opportunities thus results in significant income flows to small island states, constituting a valid form of aid in a context where conventional forms of aid have been of minimal value in stimulating economic development. However, most metropolitan states have increasingly restricted migration opportunities, while focus-

ing on skill requirements that are rarely evident in the atoll states. Indeed, the former Australian minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs stressed in 1993 that "it should . . . be remembered that the migration safety valve may no longer be an option in a future, more crowded world" (Gordon Bilney, quoted in Moore and Smith 1995:110). That is also the position in New Zealand and North America.

Environmental change is likely to exacerbate domestic development problems in Tuvalu, and in other atoll states, and increase the demand for emigration. In the coral atolls that constitute the Carteret Islands (Papua New Guinea), where there has been a regional sea-level rise, resettlement has transferred people onto the large island of Bougainville (Connell 1990). In other world regions, environmental problems, whether natural (including drought and volcanic eruption) or anthropogenic, have stimulated emigration (Hugo 1996; Swain 1996), and a worsened environment in Tuvalu is likely to add to existing pressures for new emigration opportunities. More adequate coastal-zone management, sustainable development, and a slowing of population growth will delay but not avert this situation. Yet the resettlement of the national population would pose ethical issues, as Tuvalu has enunciated: "there is nowhere else that can substitute for our God-given homeland of Tuvalu. The option of relocation as mooted by some countries therefore is utterly insensitive and irresponsible. . . . Ignoring our pleas will amount to nothing less than denial of our rights to exist as part of the global society and of the human race" (quoted in *Pacific News Bulletin,* December 1997, 7).

In the 1890s, when population densities were much lower than they are now, labor migration was perceived to be "the only alternative to starvation" (Macdonald 1982:53). A century later there is a growing possibility that at least some of Tuvalu's population will become environmental refugees at some time in the next century and that metropolitan states on the fringes of the South Pacific will thus have to respond eventually to one of the most profound impacts of the accelerated greenhouse effect: the challenge to human rights.

NOTE

I am indebted to Dr. Doug Munro and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version of this article.

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CHIEFS FOR THE NATION: CONTAINING ETHNONATIONALISM AND BRIDGING THE ETHNIC DIVIDE IN FIJI

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Chiefship, a central element of indigenous Fijian society valorized and transformed under colonial rule, is becoming a crucial part of a national political culture for multiethnic Fiji. The collective status and authority of chiefs in Fiji's political life is grounded not simply in the part they have played in expressing opposition between indigenous Fijians and the descendants of the immigrant Indians, but also in a paradoxical function they have acquired in bridging ethnic conflict. This dual ethnic and national identity was affirmed and reinforced by their endorsement of the recent constitutional reform. This article suggests that in its capacity to contain and dampen the powerful potential for an antagonistic and excluding Fijian ethnonationalism, chiefship may function to help preserve a viable democratic political system for this deeply divided society. Thus it contributes to contemporary debate about the potential for reconciliation between cultural difference and the need for social and political cohesion.

> Just as the "chief" once occupied a strategic position in colonial systems of indirect rule, so today he finds himself mediating local realities and larger spheres of national and transnational interaction. Far from premodern relics, the chiefs of modern Pacific states increasingly figure in the rhetoric and reality of national political development.
>
> —Lindstrom and White 1997b

THIS ARTICLE SEEKS to illuminate the enigma of the continuing importance of chiefship in some of the rapidly changing societies of Oceania (Feinberg

Pacific Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1—March 1999

and Watson-Gegeo 1996; Lindstrom and White 1997a) with an analysis of the national significance of chiefship in the most complex and modernized of these societies: multiethnic Fiji.

I argue that Fijian chiefship has a regulatory function. In doing this I seek to redress an imbalance in a postcoup literature that has predominantly viewed the leading chiefs as an aristocratic elite who have promoted ethnic division and conflict to secure power and privilege for themselves and their commoner allies (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988; Howard 1991; Lawson 1991, 1996, 1997; Lal 1988, 1992; Sutherland 1992).

Leaders of both chiefly and nonchiefly rank have sometimes exploited ethnic tensions for political advantage, but the force of ethnicity in political life has been only partly a function of elite interests and strategies. Fijian ethnonationalism has its roots in long-standing ethnic differences and inequalities in popular life, and chiefly leadership has been more significant in containing the ethnonationalist disposition than in fomenting it. For this reason, my focus is less on elite interests and manipulations (elite agency) and more on the *forms* of Fijian ethnic identity and leadership, and on how these forms have influenced the political process.

My argument thus dwells on a paradox in the development of the national polity and public culture of Fiji—the dual significance of leading Fijian chiefs and chiefly councils as the strongest embodiment of indigenous identity, particularly in opposition to the other major ethnic group, the Indians, yet also as a form of leadership that has facilitated interethnic accommodation. Under colonial rule the chiefs in administration and political leadership became rallying points of Fijian ethnic solidarity and the most powerful symbolic markers of cultural boundaries. But from this secure position as ethnic leaders, they were encouraged also to assume a function as conciliators across the ethnic divide.

The Fijian chiefs' role in both affirming and reconciling ethnic difference has roots in the cultural meaning of chiefship in most Fijian communities and in legacies of colonial rule. The colonial legacy is the unification of chiefly identity and authority in the Council of Chiefs and its privileged consultative relationship with the state. This relationship became an important factor in the management not only of Fijian affairs but also of the national political economy, particularly the allocation of much of the best Fijian-owned agricultural land to Indian tenant farmers.

Although elected Fijian political leadership is now dominated by commoners or people of relatively modest traditional rank, the chiefs, collectively as the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (Great Council of Chiefs), retain prerogatives in the state: they control the appointment of the president and vice-president of the republic, and they hold fourteen of the thirty-two seats

and a veto power in the upper house. These entitlements accord with a widely held view that in representing indigenous sovereignty the chiefs are an essential source of legitimacy for a national government, a function conceived in terms of their predecessors' act of trust in their cession of the islands to the British Crown in 1874. The continued privileging of the chiefs signifies not merely the appeasement of a powerful traditional "vested" interest group, but the preservation of a mechanism that has helped to constrain the potential for antagonistic Fijian ethnicity and to support the system of land sharing.

Chiefs in the Postcoup Literature

Much of the postcoup literature to date has valuably emphasized cross-ethnic interests and intraethnic differences in the modern economy that create a potential for broad-based political parties or coalitions. This focus has countered a commonly held misconception, encouraged by certain writers (e.g., Scarr 1988), that the ethnic divide is the only significant social and political reality in Fiji. But in their mission to affirm the political potential in shared interests, the majority of writers have underestimated the weight of ethnic differences in popular life, conveying an abstracted idea of the people of Fiji as simply citizens of the nation who carry ethnic identities provisionally, like clothing styles that might readily be changed were it not for the "traditionalist" demagoguery of elites (e.g., Lawson 1996:43).

The political expression of general interests has been blocked by the more powerful force of indigenous Fijian concerns with cultural identity and political power. These concerns cannot be accounted for in terms of the manipulative strategies of "traditionalist" elites; rather, they are rooted in popular experience and outlooks, conditioned in interethnic relations by profound cultural differences, economic inequalities, and the continuing rarity of intermarriage. The crucial analytical and political question is not how general interests might submerge or marginalize particularistic interests and identities but by what kind of institutional system and public ideology they might be reconciled.

Before examining the chiefs' role in such reconciliation, I must explain in more detail my criticisms of the literature cited (Robertson and Tamanisau, Howard, Lawson, Lal, Sutherland). First, its focus on the vested interests and manipulations of a chiefly elite has disregarded or understated the fact that the Fijians who benefited from the coups were mostly commoners who gained places in state organizations and enjoyed easy loans from financial institutions.[1] Commoners have also predominated in all governing councils and cabinets since May 1987. There has been an expansion of an

affluent Fijian middle class in which people of chiefly rank are a small minority.

Second, there is often an assumption that commoners are less disposed than are chiefs to promote antagonistic communalism. Throughout colonial and postcolonial history aggressive ethnicist sentiments have actually been associated more with nonchiefly leadership (from the millenarian leader Apolosi Nawai to the Fijian National Party). Mainly commoners led the Taukei Movement, which influenced Rabuka's first coup and later induced him to reject an agreement between the deposed prime minister Timoci Bavadra and the paramount chiefs Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau. After briefly ruling with Taukei leaders, Rabuka returned authority to Ganilau and Mara, who further weakened the Taukei Movement by encouraging a split in its leadership. It is true that Mara had not initially condemned the Taukeists and later admitted his sympathetic understanding of their aggressive demands (Mara 1996:203–204). But he rejected pressure from army officers led by Rabuka, all commoners, to impose a highly repressive rule to secure Fijian economic power.[2] Whether Mara and Ganilau might together have overturned Rabuka's coup is a moot point. In that unprecedented moment of ethnic militancy, their resistance might well have been swept aside, preventing their subsequent moderating influence and strengthening Taukei control over the political process. It is clear that the two leading chiefs and the Council of Chiefs countered the Taukeist push for a more extreme ethnic dominance than that consolidated by the 1990 constitution.

In its focus on the interests of elites, the literature has, third, underestimated popular Fijian endorsement of the coups and its influence on the chiefs' support for Rabuka. A strongly chauvinist mood persisted for several years, not just in a hard core of Taukei extremists but widely in popular consciousness, and to some extent it remains. Much postcoup writing has overstated the influence of elite rhetoric, depicting the political force of the ethnic divide as being mainly an artifact of leadership and underestimating the influence of popular attitudes and expectations on elite behavior.

Finally, the characterization of the chiefs simply as a colonially constructed power elite fails to take account of the cultural and social bonds that chiefs in national-level leadership, including the Council of Chiefs, have with their local communities. They have a continuing significance in the life of local Fijian groupings as well as in symbolizing the encompassing ethnic identity. I do not ignore the failure of individual chiefs to live up to popular expectations for caring and protective behavior, and the consequent ambivalence toward them. Rather, I am referring to an ideology of chiefship in popular consciousness that is strongly grounded in routine Fijian cultural

practices and social relations (Norton 1993a:745–749). The image of an invidious inequality of privilege and power dividing chiefs and commoners has long been a misleading one for Fiji, where chiefs have not enjoyed a constitutionally backed dominance in popular life since the 1960s. Although chiefs have a privileged share of land rents, very few prosper from these, and fewer still are in a position to dictate the lives of ordinary people. To focus attention on their privileges, as most postcoup writers have, illuminates neither the chiefs' significance for Fijian group and ethnic identities nor their role in interethnic accommodation.

Several anthropologists have discussed the coups and their aftermath in relation to Fijian cultural meanings (most notably Kaplan 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Rutz 1995). These writers give more recognition to the popular roots of ethnonationalism, but their central theme is the tension between the actions of colonially reconstructed chiefs in the national political arena and their failure to meet popular Fijian expectations. There is no recognition of their accommodative function in the multiethnic polity. Kaplan's interesting discussion of the potential for cross-cultural discursive "articulations" in support of a nation-making project does not consider the possible role of the chiefs (Kaplan 1995b:chap. 7). Indeed, she sees "chiefs-centered" narratives about Fiji as being antithetical to nation making (1995a:116).

The present article, building on an earlier analysis (Norton 1986), examines a process of linkage between disjunctive systems, but it is not of the syncretizing cultural form on which Kaplan speculates. I show how Fijian chiefship, by facilitating the sharing of land and acquiring a distinctive role in a public culture of interethnic relations, has contributed to a discourse about the nation that suggests a concord between the Indians' strengths in the capitalist economic system and a valorized indigenous cultural identity and political prerogative.

Modalities of Ethnic Identity: Accommodative Chiefship and Militant Taukeism

The fundamental question for nation making in Fiji is how indigenous identity and demands can be reconciled with the cultural and economic realities and democratic political needs of the multiethnic society. The importance of the chiefs in this process is highlighted by contrasting two forms in which Fijian identity and demands have been expressed.

The lesser form is antagonistic and excluding, involving protest marches and rallies with anti-Indian rhetoric and flaring especially in an atmosphere of tension generated by election campaigning and its outcome. Examples include the Fijian National Party from the early 1970s, the Taukei Move-

ment launched after the election of the Bavadra government, and, on occasion, the Methodist Church. While this militantly antagonistic leadership has come mainly from commoners (including trade unionists, church ministers, and politicians), individuals of chiefly rank have sometimes taken part, and the Council of Chiefs itself has voiced ethnonationalist demands.

But militant protest is not what distinguishes chiefship as the other, and dominant, modality of ethnic identity and leadership. As an institution, chiefship is a powerful but restrained affirmation of Fijian group identities, from local village and *vanua* (district) to the encompassing ethnic collectivity represented by the Council of Chiefs. The stress is on ceremonial order, restrained and conciliatory speech, and the achievement of consensus (Nation 1978).

Leaders of chiefly rank can more easily accommodate ethnic and national concerns because their legitimacy resides in secure authority within Fijian groups, not in aggressive rhetoric at the interface of ethnic relations. Moreover, the reconciling of group conflict is traditionally part of the chiefly role: conciliation from a position of sanctified strength. For these reasons chiefs are at less risk than commoner leaders from extremist challengers and so are less disposed to engage in ethnicist rhetoric.

The precedence of chiefly leadership over confrontational expressions of ethnic identity rests on the chiefs' control of the most potent cultural resources of Fijian collective life: the hierarchies of rank and authority that continue to define the identities and interrelations of groups. A chief traditionally has the dual roles of representing group identity in opposition to other groups and mediating communication and accommodation between them. Through chiefly alliances groups were linked, often with complementary responsibilities and rights. Other writers have suggested, without developing the point, that this principle of complementary mutuality across difference in group relations among Fijians also influences Fijian dispositions in interethnic relations (Nation 1978:xviii; Hooper 1996:264).

Chiefly leadership in the national political arena was patterned through a melding of this cultural form, expressed most strongly in the hierarchies of eastern Fiji, with the policies and bureaucratic practices of the colonial state (Norton 1990:63–64). From the late colonial period, the syncretized form of chiefly leadership assumed an important place in the promotion of interethnic accommodation. Of critical importance in this process has been the Great Council of Chiefs, Bose Levu Vakaturaga.

The Council of Chiefs

The Council of Chiefs is the strongest embodiment of Fijian identity and power as a central presence in the nation. Originating in the assembly of

chiefs who, by the Deed of Cession, gave their islands to the British Crown, it was formalized by the early governors to facilitate indirect rule and to nominate Fijians for the colonial parliament. It is the classic "neotraditional" institution, established through a blending of traditional forms of rank with colonial law and its administrative and consultative requirements. The meaning of the council meetings as ritual reaffirmations of the special trust and shared authority binding chiefs with the Crown disposed participants to assume a responsibility not only to protect ethnic interests, but also to accommodate needs of the wider society. Membership was eventually broadened to include commoner leaders, many of them parliamentarians. But, after the first army coup, it was remade as almost exclusively a forum of chiefs, and so it remains. Under present rules each of the fourteen provincial councils chooses three members. The five ex officio members are the president and the two vice-presidents of Fiji, the prime minister, and the minister for Fijian affairs, who nominates an additional six chiefs. The Council of Rotuma has two representatives.

The assemblies are publicized to the nation as affirmations of the strength of indigenous tradition. Yet there is also a modern "corporate" tone: grave-faced men in suits gathering at Suva's convention center with briefcases and conference folders. The chiefs form a wide spectrum of experience and outlook. A few have tertiary education, careers as bureaucrats and politicians, and are widely traveled. But most have had little formal education and live mainly in their home villages. While some, including several of the highest rank, have progressive views on the sharing of power and resources, the majority have ethnocentric outlooks. There are several women, all of high rank. The most influential members have historically been leading paramount chiefs of southeastern Viti Levu and the eastern islands who have since late colonial times held high office in the state (Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau, and Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, of whom only Mara survives today as president of the republic).

At moments of heightened conflict the council has shared in the affirmation of ethnic chauvinism, as when it ratified Rabuka's coup and approved the consolidation of Fijian dominance through a new constitution. Yet earlier ethnicist demands had been little more than rhetoric. Following the exceptionally acrimonious 1982 elections, many members called for constitutional change to secure Fijian political dominance (Lal 1992:249–250). The demand was not maintained. At a more serious crisis point in ethnic relations near the end of colonial rule, the council had called for the repeal of legislation it had earlier approved for the benefit of Indian tenants. The chiefs did not force their threat, however, and several years later, in spite of the emergence of the anti-Indian commoner-led Fijian National Party, they

agreed to further reforms advantaging the tenants (Lasaqa 1984:163–164). Furthermore, it has not only been chiefs who have voiced ethnic antagonism in the council. From the 1950s until 1987, commoners representing wage workers, town dwellers, and the church comprised up to 50 percent of the members. The most notorious outburst of anti-Indian sentiment came after the 1982 elections from a commoner trade unionist.[3]

While ethnicist opinions are voiced and politicians are sternly questioned when seen to be compromising Fijian interests in their dialogue with Indian and other leaders, the Council of Chiefs also provides experiences, direct and vicarious, that enhance Fijian convictions of political and cultural strength in relations with other ethnic groups and thus have encouraged acceptance of concessions to them. In particular, the ethnic identity and political privilege embodied in the council has been a symbolic counterweight to the economic power of non-Fijians.

Most postcoup writers have not appreciated the extent to which, in the context of interethnic politics, cultural and political uniformities among Fijians have overlaid regional and provincial differences. That these uniformities have been produced by a blending of aspects of tradition, particularly eastern variants, with colonial law, does not lessen their contemporary significance for Fijians. The image of the strong chief, derived particularly from eastern *vanua* (tribal communities), was reinforced by colonial practices and was long associated with the dominance of eastern chiefs in political leadership, but it became a central element of a pan-ethnic Fijian identity (Norton 1993a; Tanner 1990).

With its members drawn from leading *vanua* in all fourteen provinces, the council continues to be a unifying counterweight to the local allegiances and jealousies among the Fijians. The well-documented differences and inequalities between "eastern" and "western" Fiji have not disturbed its cohesion. Students of Fijian politics have often stressed westerner resentment of the eastern chiefs' dominance of political leadership (e.g., Norton 1977, 1990; Lawson 1991; Howard 1991; Lal 1992). While the political potential in regional sentiment remains important, there have been counterforces. Since the early 1970s politicians from eastern provinces have drawn western chiefs into the establishment, and westerners have not been underrepresented in government since then. In fact, for several years the most prominent western-districts chief, Tui Vuda, has been a vice-president of the republic. Demands for an independent western political confederacy to complement the three based in the east have been restrained by old ties with eastern chiefs and *vanua.* Rivalries in eastern Fiji, expressed in the formation of the Fijian Association Party, have not fractured the Council of Chiefs, and in the Fijian submissions to the 1995 Constitutional Review Commission, provincial dif-

ferences were outweighed by the general demand for the preservation of Fijian political control (Norton 2000).[4]

What is most significant about the place of the Council of Chiefs in national political life is precisely the unity it has sustained on ethnic concerns, especially land and political prerogatives. The continued presence of this culturally well-grounded unitary indigenous authority for approving changes on such matters has helped to inhibit the emergence of a power struggle on ethnic issues that could be destructive to the security of other groups (Norton 1990:chap. 1, 1993b).

Chiefs in Their Fijian Context

The hierarchical values reinforced by the political prominence of eastern chiefs have usually been reconcilable with the local ranking systems, especially as symbols of Fijian cultural strength. In fact, the social and political significance of distinctive values and institutions in terms of which people of all localities can identify with one another as Fijians has been greatly underestimated by writers stressing the themes of colonial "invention" of tradition and a "myth of cultural homogeneity" (Lawson 1991, 1997; Sutherland 1992). As White observes for the Solomon Islands, overemphasis on the idea of cultural invention "draws attention away from the substantial cultural and historical continuities that give so-called invented forms much of their emotional and political power" (1997:232; also Norton 1993a).

The contemporary value of chiefship has been reinforced by its potency in symbolizing in popular Fijian discourse the contrast between an idealized "traditional" way of life of reciprocal kinship and *vanua* relationships in communal attachment to the land, and the often denigrated "modern" lifestyles of the individual and household pursuit of money to which people are increasingly drawn. Chiefly ceremonies are everywhere significant for the affirmation of Fijian identities in the context of the ambivalence and anxiety associated with economic and cultural modernization, a feature often noted of contemporary chiefship in Oceania (Firth 1979; Marcus 1989; James 1997; Howard and Rensel 1997; White 1997).

The symbolic importance of the chiefs is further enhanced by the ethnic divide. The Indians' superiority in commercial farming, business, and the professions has created economic opportunities for Fijians but also provokes their resentment and suspicion. Ethnic disparities gave chiefs and the state institutions empowering them significance as ultimate guardians of cultural identity and political strength, enabling them to hold their preeminence as ethnic leaders after Fijians were given the vote and emancipated from coercive village administration. The 1960s marked a shift in the identity of the

leading chiefs from paternalistic and often resented authorities overseeing Fijian local government to defenders of the Fijian ethnic collectivity in opposition to Indians. The chiefs' symbolic importance strengthened as political party rivalry aggravated ethnic conflict in the move to self-government. As ethnic leaders the chiefs were able to co-opt trade unionists and other potential challengers emerging with economic and social change (Norton 1990: 79–80).

For all Fiji's economic modernity and the predominance of commoners in leadership and administration today, the chiefs remain the most powerful legitimators of political leadership and decision making where matters of ethnic interest are seen to be at stake. This significance of the leading chiefs has generally submerged the tension some scholars have stressed between them and their traditional local communities, the "people of the land" (Kaplan 1995b; Rutz 1995).

Chiefs in the National Context

Paradoxically, the very fact that chiefship continues to be the strongest expression of Fijian ethnic identity has supported its accommodative function in interethnic relations. Many Indians, at both national and local levels, view chiefship favorably, for Indians have needed chiefs to help contain ethnic tensions and to facilitate reforms no less than chiefs have needed Indians to shore up their popular relevance as the symbolic anchor of Fijian ethnic identity.

This mutual dependence was highlighted by an unprecedented event in the last phase of negotiations to reform the discriminatory postcoup constitution. The principal Indian leader, Jai Ram Reddy, was invited to speak to the Council of Chiefs. His address helped win the chiefs' assent to proposals agreed between Fijian and Indian politicians.[5]

Reddy began with a declaration of respect and unity: "The grandson of an indentured labourer answers the call of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga . . . and together we keep an appointment with history . . . to put the final seal on a troubled era and to open a new chapter of hope." He addressed his hosts as "the chiefs not just of the indigenous Fijians, but of all the people of Fiji," and reminded them of how their forebears had overcome mutual animosities to lay the foundations for the modern nation in the Deed of Cession. "This great council," Reddy urged, "is called upon again . . . to be a foundation of unity for the islands your ancestors set on the road to nationhood." In proposing a "partnership" between Indian and Fijian, he assured the chiefs that "we honour your place, and the place of your people, as the first inhabitants of Fiji. . . . We seek not to threaten your security but to protect it. . . . For in your security lies the basis for our own."[6]

The chiefs had not in fact "called" Reddy. The visit was arranged by the prime minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, and the president, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, and some chiefs were offended that the council had not been first consulted. But most agreed that the speech was gallant and persuasive, and the few who had been vociferously opposing reform now acquiesced. The upper house of parliament, which the chiefs dominated, soon unanimously endorsed the reforms. A colleague of Reddy recounted how after the debate some of the chiefs walked across to the offices of the Indian political parties and "hugged us." The only member of the reform committee who did not sign its report, a commoner lawyer with Taukei Movement links, eventually endorsed the reforms—in deference, he declared, to the chiefs.

Reddy's speech was a defining event in the quest for a political community reconciling the principle of indigenous primacy with multiethnic government, for never before had an Indian leader appealed directly to this bastion of Fijian ethnic identity and solidarity. Encouraged in his view that "the Indians can best advance their interests by working with the chiefs,"[7] Reddy later began to talk with local chiefs about the future of the farmers' leases, and several responded by declaring their concern for Indians in their districts.[8]

Chiefship and the Control of Militant Ethnicity

The chiefs' decision subdued the voice of ethnic chauvinism. There were protest rallies by the "Viti National Union of Taukei Workers" and the "Indigenous Rights Movement," one speaker warning that "the *lewe ni vanua* [people of the land] will now turn against their chiefs, because they have betrayed the indigenous peoples' trust."[9] A copy of the reform proposal was publicly burned. But the most significant feature of the protests was that very few people took part.

Nonetheless, the protests echoed the rhetoric of betrayal with which the Fijian National Party had pressured the Fijian leaders who controlled the precoup Alliance Party government (Rutz 1995; Kaplan 1995a). Like that earlier chauvinism, the Taukei Movement voiced widely held sentiments. Rabuka's coups had encouraged the mood, and fear of a reproving chauvinist challenge to his leadership inhibited him during most of the constitutional reform process, causing him to swing between ethnic and national visions, at one moment declaring his goal was power sharing, at another insisting that Fijian power must be further strengthened.

The charismatic persona of the heroic warrior defending the *vanua* and its chiefs against the threat of domination by the *vulagi* (foreigners) had become an obstacle to the compromises Rabuka and some of his colleagues now conceded must be made. They were beset by the contradiction between

their ethnic political base and the pressing task of nurturing a stagnating economy dependent on the resources of nonindigenous people and foreign investors. Since the coups, one in seven Indians have emigrated with their skills and capital, ironically contributing to Rabuka's failure to fulfill Fijian expectations.[10] Yet the exodus also gave Fijians a demographic edge (51 percent to the Indians' 44 percent) that encouraged their leaders to agree to changes allowing Indians to share in government. Another major inducement to the accord was steady pressure on human-rights issues from aid givers and trade partners (especially Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand).

In his efforts to remake himself as a national leader, Rabuka has needed the chiefs, because as a commoner he has no basis of legitimacy for interethnic "bridging" actions. He relied on the Council of Chiefs to validate his compromising with Indian leaders just as he depended on them to ratify his coup and secure his first regime, to constrain the chauvinism inflamed by that crisis, to endorse the 1990 constitution, and to authorize the political party through which he has ruled. These episodes all highlighted the chiefs' control of cultural and social capital with which affirmations of ethnic identity can be most strongly made.

Chauvinist discourses rivaling chiefship in the expression of ethnic demands have usually remained weaker political voices, despite stressful economic and social changes evidenced in urbanization, rising unemployment, and growing land shortages. The significance of chiefship in the context of ethnic concerns is reinforced by its continuing place in popular life. Rapid growth of the urban population, now 40 percent of Fijians,[11] has not eroded the weight of customary values of rank and authority in social organization for life-crisis celebrations and other activities. The social and cultural realities of clan, village, and *vanua* persist in the lives of most urban Fijians (Griffin and Monsell-Davis 1989; Overton 1989; Rutz 1987).

The most progressive Fijian challenger to Rabuka, the Fijian Association Party (FAP), launched by politicians from southeastern Viti Levu and the eastern islands as a breakaway from the governing Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) Party, has been favored by many in the growing stratum of Fijian executives, professionals, and business people, most of whom are commoners. But the FAP is careful to show respect to chiefs and has prominent chiefs among its principals. Its commoner leaders are quick to reprove Rabuka for not consulting the Council of Chiefs,[12] which they have defended as the "highest authority in the land" for Fijian issues,[13] and they opposed a proposal for a countervailing "Council of Commoners."[14] In an ironic by-election outcome, the FAP's chiefly candidate, a young member of the Cakobau clan, failed because more senior members of this preeminent

chiefly family backed Rabuka's commoner contestant.[15] Although initially promoted as the party for educated commoners on issues linking them with non-Fijians, the FAP relies on traditional relationships and provincial loyalties. While its followers are mostly in the villages, even its urban support, campaigners have told me, has reflected these ties more strongly than interests of social class and urban life.

What seems most remarkable about Fiji is less that urban interests have yet to be given an effective political voice, with the potential for some interethnic solidarity, than that ethnic chauvinism has not been more strongly sustained. The predominant pattern in the public expression of ethnic difference has been an asymmetric complementarity and accommodation rather than antagonistic schism.

I have discussed aspects of the institutional form of chiefly leadership that contribute to this pattern. In the next three sections I consider how historical shifts in the development of political economy and public culture created three contexts that have encouraged the accommodative disposition of chiefly leadership: (1) the origins of the chiefs' interethnic role in their agreement to a state-controlled system for managing the leasing of land to Indian farmers; (2) the subsequent strengthening of the chiefly political and bureaucratic elite, partly to secure the chiefs' solidarity with the colonial state as their cooperation became crucial for economic development; and (3) the engagement of this elite in interethnic relations during a new nation-making phase in the last two decades of colonial rule.

Chiefs in the Political Economy of Colonial Fiji

Most academic writers on Fiji have depicted the strengthened chiefly elite of the late colonial period as continuing an unbroken line of authorities inaugurated by the first governors and concerned simply with Fijian affairs. This view ignores events from the mid-1930s that reshaped the chiefs as an elite of national as well as ethnic significance. During the colony's first fifty years, many chiefs exercised power in a system of indirect rule designed to supervise Fijians in their villages. By the 1930s this system had been relaxed, and the chiefs were marginalized by British district administrators (Macnaught 1982:115–117). Yet it was at this time that chiefs began, under pressure from the colonial government, to assume a crucial role in the management of the economy by facilitating the provision of Fijian lands for the sugar industry.

As the Australian-owned CSR Company that controlled the industry remade its plantation laborers into peasant farmers (Moynagh 1981:chap. 6), it relied increasingly on Indians obtaining secure leases from Fijians.

This trend clashed with a growing Fijian interest in cash cropping as the government encouraged individualism "to fit the Fijian for competition with his Indian neighbour."[16] Although by 1933 nearly 10 percent of cane farmers were Fijians, they were proving less efficient than the heavily cash-dependent Indians. When Fijians began to exploit the tenants' vulnerability by inducing bribes and threatening not to renew leases, the company pressured the governor to take charge, warning of "calamity for all . . . [if] the land situation . . . were to fall into the hands of the original owners,"[17] and insisting that Fijians must not be encouraged to take up cane farming at the expense of the Indian farmers. Official concern was reinforced by the English crusader for overseas Indian welfare and friend of Gandhi and Nehru, Charles Andrews, who concluded after his 1936 visit that farmers who had easily obtained land when it was "almost useless to the Fijian" now faced dispossession and that the sugar industry was "in danger of collapsing."[18]

Wishing to avoid "an imposed solution,"[19] the governor relied on the most influential chief, Ratu Sukuna, to persuade the Council of Chiefs and the provincial councils to allow the state to control the leasing out of lands not required for clan members' use. Sukuna preached about the wisdom of sharing land with the Indians, from whose labor "much of our prosperity is derived": "Bear in mind the biblical story of the talents: Whoever utilises what is given him will be given more. He who fails to use what he has, will lose all. . . . It is therefore the bounden duty of landowners to utilise what they possess for the benefit of all." Ratu Sukuna continued: "The land can only be fairly leased if this is regulated by the government. . . . We shall receive more rents for there will be no waste land. Bribery, fraud, and lies will be suppressed. We will live peacefully with our neighbours . . . and we shall have dissipated causes of evils that are now giving us a disreputable name."[20] He urged the chiefs to accept his proposal lest "our house be forcibly put in order from without." Colonial officials hailed his achievement as a breakthrough for economic development and praised the chiefs for their "statesmanlike attitude towards the general affairs of the colony."[21] Sukuna was soon conceding that in the cane areas Indian interests should be "paramount,"[22] although a few years before the governor had urged the chiefs "to do everything in your power to encourage your people to undertake the cultivation of sugar cane."[23] Sukuna himself had then insisted that "the Indian community, having shown us the way, can hardly expect to continue to hold all the agricultural land in the sugar districts where the plough mints money."[24] Nearly seventy years later, only 25 percent of the cane farmers are Fijians.

The strongest expression of indigenous identity—chiefly leadership—had been made a support for the economic security of the Indian settlers. Central to this paradoxical link was the bond the Deed of Cession had

created between the chiefs and the British Crown, a mutual commitment that both established their collective authority in indigenous leadership and, by binding them in a privileged consultative relationship with the colonial state in which the chiefs' rank and prerogative were regularly honored, helped to secure the Indians' and the company's economic position. Indian leaders recognized this link in their concurrence with legislation that strengthened the chiefs' position in the state soon after the land reform (discussed below). When, in parliament, a European leader denounced the political change as a barrier to Fijian progress, the senior Indian leader, Vishnu Deo, responded that he did not wish to be associated with "a direct challenge to the chiefs" and that the Indian leaders would "cooperate with the chiefs and the Fijian people in furthering the welfare of their race."[25] On Sukuna's death Deo lamented that "the Indian community had lost a very good friend." Ratu Sukuna, he declared, "was not only a leader of the Fijian people, but the leader of all races."[26]

However, the potential for popular Fijian opposition to the chiefs' land decision was reflected in protests by the exiled millenarian leader Apolosi Nawai, who had tried to organize villagers to compete in the market economy and whose most ardent admirers were now the new Fijian sugarcane farmers (Macnaught 1978; Kaplan 1995b:133–139). He complained that "the chiefs have . . . given away many leases to Indians against the wishes of the people."[27] With his release impending, he sent to his expectant followers a "Proclamation of the New Era" announcing momentous events to come, including "the destruction of the haughty chief."[28] Apolosi was the nascent voice of militant ethnonationalism. But after returning to Fiji, he was briefly confined to Suva and then shipped back into exile.

A Strengthened Chiefly Elite

The leading chiefs themselves were briefly seen to pose the threat of disaffection. Their cooperation with government had become crucial just as their status had been diminished, with some *roko tui* (provincial governors) enduring a humiliating subordination to young British officers. The chiefs' grievance was redressed by the new wartime governor, Sir Phillip Mitchell, who worked with Sukuna to elevate their position in a revitalized system of indirect rule. In justifying this move to the Colonial Office, Mitchell explained that it was "urgently necessary to broaden the base of Native collaboration," warning that "Fijians have political representation . . . but no direct responsibility or authority" and that "if this does not produce irresponsible nationalism or racialism it will be surprising."[29] Mitchell's reliance on the chiefs in preparing Fiji for war was doubtless a consideration in his reform.

From 1945 leading eastern chiefs enjoyed a stronger position in the colonial state than ever before. Indeed, Sukuna, as head of the new Fijian Administration, became the first non-European to join the colonial cabinet. The Council of Chiefs controlled appointments to the Fijian Affairs Board, which formulated regulations for "communal" village life and chose officials to administer them (Roth 1953; Nayacakalou 1975). The liberal philosophy of the 1930s had been reversed. Colonial officials had once hoped that Sukuna would help guide the Fijians in "their transition to individualism."[30] He now governed them with the conviction that they were "still at heart subsistence villagers" (Norton 1990:46).

The new paternalism had contradictory meanings for the Fijians. Many referred to it as "the bond" (Nayacakalou 1975:132), and the constables appointed to retrieve runaways from village duties faced a daunting task. The British colonial officials themselves soon regarded it as an obstacle to economic and social progress, and they arranged the study by the geographer Spate that encouraged further criticism of the system (Spate 1959). In the 1960s, as the government began again to emphasize the necessity of individual initiatives for indigenous Fijian advancement,[31] they abolished the coercive sanctions that had bound most people to village life.

But as the Indian population grew and as self-government loomed, the strength of the paternalistic institutions and the chiefs in the state gave them a reassuring symbolic importance. It is one of the ironic twists of Fiji's history that the obstacles Sukuna's administration placed in the way of Fijian economic development intensified anxieties that reinforced its value as framework and symbol of ethnic solidarity and political power.

For most Fijians, the last two decades of British rule were marked by a protective fusion of bureaucratized chiefship, the colonial state, and a strengthening consciousness of ethnic identity. Though also in this period new "class" interests drew many together with Indians and others in workers' and farmers' unions, the nexus of chiefly leadership and ethnicity continued to dominate political consciousness.

Yet in the context of interethnic relations the chiefly elite also began, not always wittingly and willingly, to acquire an identity as mediators and conciliators no less than as rallying points for ethnic solidarity. This dual identity was encouraged by a new colonial ideology and the new roles it supported for leading chiefs.

Chiefs in Interethnic Relations

The empowering of chiefs as a "corporate" ethnic elite paradoxically occurred just as the postwar British government proclaimed a new mission to encour-

age among its colonial subjects everywhere a sense of national identity in preparation for self-government. In the Fiji of the 1950s there was an unprecedented emphasis on interethnic ties and nation building after a period of tension aggravated in part by the Indians' actions in wartime, the revelation that they had become a demographic majority, and fears of local political repercussions from India's independence.[32]

An annual holiday was inaugurated for the anniversary of the chiefs' gift of their islands to the British Crown. The occasion hitherto modestly celebrated mainly between government and the Fijians was now to be commemorated "not as a Fijian day, but as Fiji's day," "a focal point for the spirit of unity."[33] The Deed of Cession, in Fijian eyes symbolizing their special status and protection under colonial rule, was sacralized as having secured peace and civilization, marking the ancestral chiefs' commitment to the development of a modern nation in which all could prosper. Radio programs were introduced to help "the whole community to develop a national consciousness."[34] An administrators' conference discussed "how to make the Fiji-born Indian feel that Fiji is his home and make out of him a contented constructive citizen."[35] Multiethnic social clubs were formed in the provincial towns, modeled on an organization established in Suva in 1945. Although members were predominantly Indians, partly reflecting town demography, leading office bearers were often prominent Fijians holding government posts (Norton 1990:53–58).

Thus, just as Fijian ethnic identity was being strengthened within reconstructed institutions of separate rule, the Fijian leaders were drawn into a process of interethnic bridging. Chiefs in the new Fijian Administration or as district officers in mainly Indian areas assumed roles in public celebrations and joined Indians as members of community boards, patrons or office bearers in social and sports clubs, and sometimes even chairmen of Indian advisory committees and town councils (Norton 1990:53–58).

A pattern of public sociality began to form, paradoxically on the very basis of an ethnic difference accentuated by the presence of the chiefs. There was in the new ties a sense of conciliation between the "foreign" agents of economic modernity and the elite custodians of an indigenous culture and political strength on whose goodwill harmony and prosperity were seen to depend. The identity of chiefs in these relationships has paralleled their role as what Nation terms the "focal points" in the structure of relations between groups within Fijian society, articulating a unity across difference (Nation 1978:42, 148; also Nayacakalou 1975:chap. 3; Walter 1978:10–13). The willingness of Fijian leaders to engage in this interethnic bridging was enhanced precisely by their privileged position in the colonial state.

The senior Indian political leaders acknowledged that Fijian interests

should be paramount in government,[36] and the chiefs' new position in the colonial state strengthened the force of rhetoric invoking the Deed of Cession in support of this principle. From this vantage point Sukuna continued to be a voice of conciliation. In the early 1950s a young commoner's plan to provoke a debate on the threat posed by Indian population growth was foiled by Sukuna's persuading his fellow high chiefs not to support the proposal.[37] A decade later Sukuna's political protégé Ratu Mara dissuaded a group of young commoners and minor chiefs against starting a political party on the platform "Fiji for the Fijians" (Norton 1990:79–82).

The pattern of interethnic relations emerging in the town middle class helped to define an ideal of complementarity and partnership that encouraged alliances or agreements in the national political arena. All four leading chiefs in the Alliance Party had been drawn into relations with Indians while serving as district officers or as governors of Fijian provinces whose geographic boundaries included areas of non-Fijian settlement. It is true that the most popular Indian political leaders in the last years of colonial rule generally had few ties with Fijian leaders. In their election campaigning they initially condemned chiefly privilege and sought legitimacy as champions of universalist egalitarian ideals. But after a crisis in ethnic relations on the eve of independence, precipitated by their demand for a common-roll electoral system, they moderated their rhetoric with a conciliatory affirmation of the importance of the chiefs (Norton 1990:100–103).

The changing ethnic relations in the late colonial period highlight another of Fiji's historical ironies. Most Indian settlers, having left the ancient caste system and developed an egalitarian society among themselves (Mayer 1973; Jayawardena 1972, 1975; Kelly 1991), were compelled by economic interests to come to terms with a new order of ascriptive difference and inequality—in the popular Fijian expression, as "*vulagi*" (foreigners and guests) dependent on their "*taukei*" (indigenous landowner) hosts and patrons. The inequality in control of the means of production and in associated forms of occasional social deference was balanced by the tenants' greater economic gains (sometimes even employing members of the landowning group as labor) and by a quiet conviction of their cultural superiority and their role in transforming Fiji from "bush and barbarity."

A contradiction emerged between the progressive universalist ideals adopted from Gandhi's movement and the benefits Indians actually gained from the preservation of Fijian village "communalism" within the framework of chiefly authority. Land leases were available and cheap for farmers and business people to the extent that the owners remained subsistence villagers only marginally reliant on money incomes, as most did until the 1970s.[38] From the late colonial period until well after independence, the

Indians of Fiji were one of the best-off economically of all the populations descended from emigrant indentured workers; a survey of the diaspora, published in 1951 by India's governing Congress Party, declared Fiji to be "a bright spot in an otherwise black picture."[39] Although in the 1950s and 1960s Indian leaders protested against the reclamation of certain lands into Fijian reserves, the displaced tenants could usually be relocated as the sugar industry expanded (Moynagh 1980:188, 195). In fact, material conditions have generally favored the management of ethnic conflict. The archipelago has a population just below eight hundred thousand, abundant natural resources, and the most advanced capitalist economy in the Pacific (excepting New Zealand and Hawai'i). Only in the last two decades has competition for jobs and land become a major problem. A continued relative affluence, until the coups, is a theme in recent writing by a leading Fiji Indian author (Subramani 1995:167, 174, 204).

Ethnic tension was aggravated when the British preparations for self-government signaled the prospect of a power struggle. Fijian anxieties were deepened by the Indian demand for political equality under common-roll elections when Indians were 51 percent of the population. Indian fears were aroused by short-lived rhetoric about a "Fiji for the Fijians." The militant campaign for a common electoral roll eventually provoked Fijian protest marches and rallies. However, these protests were followed by a rapprochement in which Indian leaders moderated their demand and proposed special powers for the Council of Chiefs in an upper house of parliament. Transcripts of the confidential talks in 1969 that led to a united call for full independence from British rule reveal a remarkable spirit of mutual understanding and trust after a dangerous phase of acrimony and suspicion (Norton 1990:104–107).

The accord was eventually broken by the emergence of the Fijian National Party and the reluctance of Ratu Mara's government to condemn it strongly. Fijian ethnonationalism was a central force in the two major political crises in postcolonial Fiji, both arising after electoral wins by groups based largely in Indian constituencies. The first of these victories, in 1977, was enabled by the Fijian National Party splitting the Fijian vote. The governor-general, the highest ranking chief, reinstated Ratu Mara as prime minister after the victorious, mostly Indian, National Federation Party leaders procrastinated in their efforts to form a government. Although their protest forced fresh elections, they then split into factional rivalry rather than try to repeat their victory. A decade later, Timoci Bavadra's new Labour Party and National Federation Party coalition government was ousted by a military coup influenced by an intimidating ethnicist protest movement.

Events from the late colonial period, however, suggest a pattern of recur-

ring phases in national politics: crises that accentuate conflict yet also create new contexts for dialogue and accommodation through a reformulation of shared values and principles (Norton 1994).[40] The recent constitutional reform is a striking echo of the rapprochement that preceded the achievement of independence. Indeed, the main historical significance of the coups may well prove to be the impetus they eventually gave to a nation-making project more surely based than that inaugurated by independence in 1970. In this project the place of the Council of Chiefs in facilitating and legitimating change has been more strongly affirmed than it was at the end of colonial rule.

Chiefship in a National Political Culture

Postcoup debate on how to make the nation has revolved around three "discourses" reflecting contrasting modalities of interethnic relations (Norton 2000). At one extreme is the schismatic ethnonationalist vision: an antagonistic and excluding ethnicity asserted by some Fijian individuals and groups, particularly the Suva-based Taukei Movement. The proponents have typically been commoners. The most ominous assertion of their vision was a proposal for authoritarian rule unsuccessfully urged on the highest chiefs by senior army officers two years after the coups.

At the other extreme, a "universalist" vision of equivalence among the citizens is held by many leaders (mainly Indians) in the multiethnic labor movement, most Indian religious and political groups, some Christian churches, and some individual Fijians as well as Indians and others in the urban middle class. Proclaimed in the face of deep difference in culture, social relations, and economic interests, this vision has yet to acquire an effective political voice.

The model of the nation that prevailed in the recent constitutional reform is the one that developed as I have described, affirming an asymmetric complementarity linked with the role of chiefship in the management of ethnic conflict. Most Fijian petitions to the Constitutional Review Commission in 1995 did not voice an antagonistic and excluding ethnicity, but rather a theme of accommodation and inclusion, stressing the idea of a partnership based on preserving indigenous political preeminence in some form.[41] Although the petition of Rabuka's own party initially insisted on preserving a heavy Fijian dominance, with little change from the 1990 constitution, the Council of Chiefs declined to endorse it.

The place of chiefs in the public imagining of the nation is highlighted annually on "Ratu Sukuna Day," instigated by the Council of Chiefs several years after the army coups. The most renowned chief of the colonial era is

exalted as a model of Fijian leadership for the multiethnic society, symbolizing a way in which chiefship, still the core element of Fijian political culture, might also become a central element of a national political culture. The iconic Ratu Sukuna potently melds the ethnic and national meanings of chiefship.

Since the 1930s he has been the ideal exemplar of high chiefs as figures of unassailable strength and dignity representing and protecting Fijians, their land, and their culture in the modern world. This image has sometimes been invoked by ethnic extremists—as when, soon after the first army coup, some members of the Taukei Movement gathered in "warrior" dress beneath Sukuna's bronze statue in Suva and threatened to roast in an oven freshly dug beside them any supporter of the ousted government who tried to initiate legal action against their high chief, then the governor-general, for dissolving parliament.

Many Fijians denounced that use of Sukuna's image, and now he is being configured to symbolize the role a chiefly leader should play in bridging the ethnic divide: "Ratu Sukuna, the man who graced a nation. This man of noble birth carried out deeds with even greater nobility, without motive against any race."[42] On Sukuna Day in May 1995, as public hearings for the constitutional review began, Rabuka's press statement intoned: "The unity and sanctity of traditional Fijian society was always his foremost interest. . . . But at the same time it was clear to him that Fijians would have to adjust to coexistence with other communities. . . . All share a wish to live peacefully . . . and contribute to the development of Fiji."[43] In the late 1990s Sukuna's "national" outlook is officially invoked as inspiration for an equitable resolution of a new uncertainty about the future of Indian leases: "Ratu Sukuna laid the foundation for modern Fiji by guiding the Fijian people towards an acceptance of others as partners in the development of their land as a national asset."[44]

Conclusion

The colonial legacy for ethnic relations in postcolonial Fiji has two dimensions. Most obvious is the reinforcement of the ethnic divide marked by persisting differences in economy, culture, and social relations. In political life these differences, long emphasized by a communal electoral system, have outweighed the shared interests of workers, farmers, and consumers. The other colonial legacy, less recognized, is the one with which the postcolonial political process has now strongly reconnected and is reinforcing: cultural codes and institutions that facilitate mediation and accommodation across difference. In considering this articulation between indigenous identity and

power, on the one hand, and the multiethnic economy and polity, on the other, I have examined the intersection of aspects of Fijian culture, colonial institutions, and the development of political economy in which non-Fijians, primarily Fiji Indians, gained lease access to much of the best agricultural land.

The colonial rulers encouraged the development of a chiefly elite holding a privileged position in the state and symbolizing indigenous Fijian culture and political strength. Yet chiefly privilege has not inevitably been equated with Fijian ethnonationalism. On the contrary, the formation of this elite facilitated the growth of a national political economy and has constrained antagonistic ethnicity. The significance of the chiefs in the political process has been their paradoxically dual position, on the one hand, as the most powerful ethnic boundary markers and rallying figures in the occasional affirmation of indigenous Fijian solidarity in opposition to Indians and, on the other hand, as mediators of that division, reconcilers of the conflicting demands of ethnic and national domains.

This accommodative function was not necessarily a matter of considered personal commitment on the part of chiefs. Rather it was favored precisely by the manner in which Fijian ethnic identity and leadership were so strongly constituted from the late colonial period. Especially important has been the privileged consultative relation between chiefs and the state, which from the 1930s was turned toward national as well as ethnic goals.

I have not denied that chauvinist opinions are often voiced in the Council of Chiefs. The chiefs endorsed the coup d'état and its promise of ethnic political rule with chiefs at the forefront, a regime that was to prevail for several years. However, I would argue that the ethnicist governments and constitution following the coups are more accurately to be understood as a constrained expression of a potential for a more oppressive ethnonationalism rather than as the unbridled triumph of that potential. The ethnicist phase began in the context of a perceived loss of Fijian preeminence in the state, a groundswell of popular Fijian support for the coup, and the coup maker's quick convening of a meeting of the Council of Chiefs where he sat, one participant told me, "like a messiah" whom no one dared challenge.

Initially, like the millenarian leader Apolosi, Rabuka promised a redemptive "new era" of Fijian power and prosperity, repudiating the economic dominance of non-Fijians. The ironic spectacle a decade later of Rabuka, like Apolosi's nemesis Ratu Sukuna, urging the chiefs to approve reforms in support of interethnic partnership and national prosperity reflected a perennial dialectic in national politics in which the chiefs mediate conflict between needs of the multiethnic economy and society, and the persisting strength of indigenous cultural identity and demands.

It is true that a major outcome of the coups has been the much strengthened prominence of commoners in political leadership. The principals in government have been mostly commoners, and Rabuka himself as chairman of the Council of Chiefs has demonstrated charisma and skill in influencing the chiefs' decisions. Yet it is also clear that since the coups the chiefs have become more significant in the national domain, less by their constitutional prerogatives than in their place in a nascent public imagining of the nation. The important part played by the council in the final phase of the constitutional reform and the reconstructed iconic Ratu Sukuna affirm this significance. The attitude of commoner leaders such as Rabuka toward the persisting weight of chiefship in both ethnic and interethnic politics is ambivalent because the chiefs, as ultimate arbiters of the legitimacy of ethnic leadership, are potentially independent adjudicators of the political process.

The circumstances of ethnic relations are now different from those in which the forms of Fijian leadership and ethnic identity I have been describing were shaped. The inception of the chiefs' function in interethnic accommodation was linked with a pattern of complementarity supported in large part by a substantial ethnic separation in economy. This structure is weakening. For some time, an increasing convergence of Fijians and Indians as wage employees, commercial farmers, and consumers has been generating some shared interests and values, as reflected in the scale and strength of the trade-union movement. But there is also an increasing competition for jobs, land, and other economic resources, and a rising incidence of militant landowner protests in disputes with non-Fijian leaseholders and government authorities. Strengthening common interests might encourage intensified ethnic rivalry and antagonism no less than a disposition to unite politically across the ethnic divide.

New Fijian ethnonationalist political groups were formed in preparation for the first elections under the new constitution. A critical question for Fiji's future is whether chiefs will continue to contribute to accommodation, to a political and cultural articulation across the ethnic divide, or whether they might tend to align more strongly with the chauvinist style of leadership they have in the past helped to restrain.

NOTES

This article draws on thirty-two years of study, but particularly on twenty-one months in Fiji between 1993 and 1998. I have benefited from discussions with informants too numerous to name and from the friendly and efficient assistance of Margaret Patel and her staff at the Fiji National Archives. I especially thank Kerry James and Tony Hooper for their suggestions and encouragement, and acknowledge the invaluable comments by three anonymous *Pacific Studies* readers. An earlier and much shorter version is to be

published in *Culture and Development in the Pacific,* edited by Antony Hooper (UNESCO, 1999).

In these notes "CSO" refers to Colonial Secretary's Office files held in the Fiji National Archives. Fiji Archives rules do not permit reference to specific confidential files. "CO" refers to Colonial Office files, Public Record Office, London; those not identified as AJCP microfilm copies were studied in London.

1. Fifty-nine percent of 1,011 civil-service appointments in 1991 were Fijians, 33 percent Indians; 62 percent of the 702 promotions were Fijians, 34 percent Indians (Public Service Commission report for 1991). For several years after the coups, many Fijians readily obtained poorly secured loans from the National Bank of Fiji (*Fiji Review,* July and November 1995, August 1996).

2. *Australian Financial Review,* 25 September 1989, 1; and the original forty-four-page document.

3. Joveci Gavoka, former president of the Fiji Trades Union Congress, *Fiji Times,* 6 and 10 November 1982.

4. The most ethnicist petitions were from provincial councils and other groups in southeast Viti Levu near or in the capital city.

5. The most controversial proposals, endorsed by parliament soon after Reddy's speech to the chiefs, were for political representation in proportion to ethnic demography, a bipartisan cabinet, and special appointive and veto powers for the Council of Chiefs. The Constitution Review Commission was headed by Sir Paul Reeves, a former governor-general of New Zealand. The reforms rejected the commission's recommendations for full common roll but introduced some common seats, complementing a majority of communal seats, as well as allocating the latter in proportion to ethnic demography. The offices of president, vice-president, and prime minister are no longer reserved for Fijians (*Report of the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee on the Report of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission,* Parliamentary Paper No. 17 of 1997). The commission's report was published as *The Fiji Islands—Towards a United Future,* Parliamentary Paper No. 34 of 1996. See also Lal 1997 and (Fiji) *Review,* November 1996 and July 1997.

6. The speech is reported in full in *Fiji Times,* 7 July 1997. It was arranged after Reddy complained that the chiefs' opposition to some of the agreements being negotiated among political leaders on constitutional reform was encouraging resistance from some Fijian participants in the talks. Before presenting Reddy, Rabuka urged the chiefs "to think of the other communities": "International law has given us the right to self-determination. . . . But equally under international law . . . we have an obligation to look after the minority communities" (*Daily Post,* 7 July 1997).

7. Interview with Mr. Reddy, 27 January 1998.

8. *Fiji Times,* 11, 16, 30 January 1998. While the renewal of numerous Indian farm leases is currently in doubt, many Fijian clans and political leaders agree that the sugar industry will be best served by the continuation of most of them.

9. *Fiji Times,* 9 June 1997, 3. See also *Fiji Times,* 6 June 1997; *Daily Post,* 6 and 9 June 1997.

10. Chandra and Mason 1998:70–73; World Bank, "Fiji: Restoring Growth in a Changing Global Environment," 22–23, Report No. 13862-FIJ, 1995.

11. Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical News*, no. 8, 21 February 1997.

12. *Fiji Times,* 10 February 1995; *Daily Post,* 13 and 25 February 1995.

13. F. Dewa, in House of Representatives, *Daily Hansard,* 9 December 1994, 2580.

14. *Fiji Times,* 10 January 1995.

15. *Fiji Times,* 24 June 1996; *Review* (Fiji), July 1996, 28.

16. Fletcher to Secretary of State for Colonies, 26/1/1932, CO83 196/7, PRO, London.

17. C.S.R. Co., Sydney, to Governor of Fiji, 23/2/34, CO83/207/9. By 1934, 4,600 farmers leased Fijian land, and 4,100 were company tenants (Lal 1992:100).

18. Andrews to Government of Fiji, May 1936, CO83/215/85038/36, AJCP, reels 4168, 4169.

19. Richards to Secretary of State for Colonies, 30/12/1937, CO83 222/8.

20. CO83 215/15.

21. Barton to Secretary of State for Colonies, 31/10/1936, CO83 215/15. The Native Lands Trust Board was chaired by the governor and initially comprised two Fijian and two European members but toward the end of the colonial period had a Fijian majority. It supervises relations between landowners and tenants by arranging leases and collecting and distributing rents within landowning clans.

22. 1944 Administrative Officers' Conference, CSO F50/104.

23. Fiji Legislative Council Paper No. 3, 1931, 3.

24. *Fiji Legislative Council Debates* 1933:301.

25. *Fiji Legislative Council Debates* 1947:112.

26. *Fiji Times,* 31 May 1958, 1; *Fiji Legislative Council Debates* 1958:469.

27. Nawai to Governor Luke, 16/9/1937, CSO confidential files.

28. "The Order of the New Era for the Year 1938," distributed in Fiji from Rotuma, CSO confidential files.

29. Mitchell to Secretary of State, Colonies, 15/4/1943 and 16/7/1943, CO83 236/15. Sukuna's ambivalence toward Europeans began with his rejection on racial grounds when as a young Oxford student he tried to enlist in the British army for World War I. He later united with Indian leaders against color discrimination in the civil service, formed a close friendship with a leading Indian critic of colonial rule, and sympathized with striking Indian sugarcane farmers in the midst of the Pacific War; for more information on Sukuna's life, see Scarr's evocative biography (Scarr 1980). Continuing official anxiety about Fijian loyalty is indicated in Governor Freeston's urgent request to London for funds to rebuild Queen Victoria School, where Fijian youths were prepared for government service. Insisting that this project "should have complete priority over all development projects," he warned that "dissatisfaction was reaching such a pitch as to threaten the longstanding Fijian loyalty. . . . I cannot overemphasise the political aspect. . . . Further procrastination will have disturbing and far reaching political consequences" (Freeston to Secretary of State for Colonies, 12/1/1949, CSO F28/224, part 2).

30. Secretary Native Affairs to Colonial Secretary, 5/7/1932, CSO confidential files.

31. Governor Maddocks's Cession Day speech in 1961, CSO F9/21–2.

32. On these sources of ethnic tension in the early postwar years, see Lal 1992.

33. *Fiji Times,* 29 September 1955, 4–5; 6 November 1953, 4; *Legislative Council* 1953: 204; CSO F50/115/1–6, F9/21–2.

34. CSO confidential file.

35. CSO F4/3/7–5.

36. *Fiji Legislative Council Debates* 1944:44, 1946:211, 1947:112, 1948:219.

37. CSO confidential file.

38. The 1940 legislation set rents for twenty-five years. Although since 1967 rents have been allowed to reach 6 percent of the unimproved capital value of the land, they were usually much lower until quite recently. For the vast majority of Fijians, including most people of chiefly rank, rents have been a minor source of income (Overton 1989:44, 110).

39. "Indians outside India," by N. V. Rajkumar, CSO confidential file.

40. The earliest expression of this cyclical trend was the famous "Deed of Cession debate" in 1946 on the question of "safeguarding the Fijian race," which took place in the colonial parliament during a phase of heightened ethnic tension and culminated in an agreement among political leaders on the principle of paramountcy of Fijian interests (Norton 1977:39–40).

41. Records of the Constitutional Review Commission, Fiji National Archives.

42. *Fiji Times,* 29 May 1995, 1.

43. Ibid.

44. *Daily Post,* 30 May 1997.

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INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE AND STATUS EXCHANGE: A STUDY OF PACIFIC ISLANDERS IN HAWAIʻI FROM 1983 TO 1994

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Intermarriage is one of the most salient demographic features of Hawaiʻi. Between 1983 and 1994, 46 percent of all marriages contracted in Hawaiʻi were racially exogamous. This article examines socioeconomic status exchange in outgroup marriage and explores the impact this status change has had on the social well-being of four ethnic groups of Pacific Islanders (Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Samoans, and other Pacific Islanders). Status homogamy emerges as the most important pattern of mate selection. In a broad sense, people choose their mates on the basis of equal socioeconomic status, either within or across boundaries of race and ethnicity. Gender differences are very small, indicating that status is equally important for both men and women in choosing a marital partner. These general patterns, however, suggest that groups of very high and very low status have a restricted marriage market, and high-status individuals from the Pacific Islander groups tend to marry out, leaving future generations in a comparatively unfavorable family socioeconomic environment.

High rates of intermarriage are a unique demographic characteristic of the people of Hawaiʻi. Historically intermarriage has been common in Hawaiʻi, and the outmarriage rate during the last decade was around 46 percent in the state (HSMDH 1995). Many factors have contributed to the high rate of exogamy, among which the most important are ethnic heterogeneity and the relatively small size of the ethnic groups. These demographic structures set constraints on rates of endogamy and have created an island culture of intermarriage. Pacific Islanders are especially vulnerable to intermarriage because of their relatively small group size and their tradition of accepting people of all origins. This article examines patterns of status

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exchange in marriage for four Pacific Islander groups from 1983 to 1994 and discusses the possible consequences for future-generation Pacific Islanders in Hawai'i. Based on the assumption of equal-status matching in mate selection, it is anticipated that Pacific Islanders will be negatively affected by intermarriage, because they currently have a low group socioeconomic status, which makes it more likely for their high-status members to outmarry. In the long run, this trend will reduce the socioeconomic resources of their future generations and isolate them in a restricted marriage market.

Hawai'i's Demographic Profile

The history of Hawai'i can be traced back at least fifteen hundred years, to the time when Polynesians from the Marquesas Islands and Tahiti came to live in the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaiians had an estimated population of 300,000 at their first encounter with Europeans in 1778 (Howard 1980).[1] Within the next fifty years, the native population decreased by 40 to 65 percent as a result of diseases such as syphilis, gonorrhea, smallpox, measles, cholera, and respiratory illnesses brought to the islands by foreign sailors. The indigenous population gradually became a small fraction among Hawai'i's ethnic stocks after the need for workhands on the sugar plantation fields brought in large numbers of foreign laborers. The first credible missionary count in 1832 reported only 130,000 Hawaiians living in the islands. The first official census in 1853 tallied 73,000 Hawaiians, and in 1878 the Hawai'i Kingdom counted fewer than 58,000. The number of full-blooded Hawaiians was reduced to 30,000 by 1900 and to 8,711 in 1990 (Buck 1993; Lind 1980; Schmitt 1968, 1973; Kitano 1991; Nordyke 1989; Hawai'i State Data Book 1993–1994). Since the late nineteenth century, however, the most important reason for the decline of the full-blooded Hawaiian population has been intermarriage (Fu and Heaton 1997). Today, native Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians have relatively low group socioeconomic status among the island populations (Nordyke 1989; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989; Kitano 1991; Buck 1993).

In the nineteenth century sugar production was the most important industry in Hawai'i. Because of a shortage of laborers, many immigrants from Asia, Europe, and America came to the islands to work on sugar plantations, and Hawai'i quickly became ethnically diverse. Owing to the high sex ratio within immigrant populations, many foreign male laborers married local women, initiating a tradition of intermarriage in the islands. Stigma against outgroup marriage has been historically weak in Hawai'i, especially after World War II, when minority groups gradually gained social and economic parity with the dominant group (Labov and Jacobs 1986). Table 1 reports

the ethnic distribution of Hawai'i's population in 1990 by the state government and by the U.S. Census Bureau. The state still collects data on native Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians separately, while the U.S. Census Bureau combined the categories of native Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians in 1960 (U.S. Census 1961) and has since reported part-Hawaiians as either Hawaiians or non-Hawaiians. The 1990 U.S. census counted 138,742 Hawaiians, about 12.5 percent of the state population (U.S. Census 1991, 1994). For the same year, however, the Hawai'i State Department of Health reported 8,711 native Hawaiians and 196,367 part-Hawaiians, totaling nearly 19 percent of the state population. The drastically different counts from the two agencies were due largely to the situational definition of self-reported racial identity, a result of many generations of intermarriage.

Intermarriage rates in Hawai'i have gradually increased ever since data on marriage were collected in the late nineteenth century (Schmitt and Strombel 1966; Nordyke 1989; Fu and Heaton 1997). Table 2 reports the outmarriage rates for the major ethnic groups in the state from 1920 to 1994. The different outmarriage rates across ethnic groups are mainly a function of their relative size, and those between genders are mainly a function of their unbalanced sex ratio. However, part-Hawaiians have comparatively higher rates of outmarriage than ethnic groups of similar size, indicating a closer link between them and other groups. The difference occurs in part because part-Hawaiians, by definition, have a family history of intermarriage and more easily accept people of other racial origins.

Theoretical Perspectives of Intermarriage

There are a rich variety of theories that explain why people marry out of their racial and ethnic groups and whom they marry. These theories can be roughly divided into two groups: availability and choice. Availability is constrained by structures of the marriage market, including ethnic heterogeneity, relative group size, and the sex ratio of the marriageable population, all of which affect chances of outmarriage. With this given availability, the choice of a spouse often reflects racial or ethnic proximity, cultural preference, and exchange of socioeconomic status.

Availability

For someone to marry out of his or her group, there must be potential mates available from a different group. Thus demographic structures of the marriage market, including the relative size of ethnic/racial groups, ethnic heterogeneity, and the sex ratio of marriageable populations, set constraints on

TABLE 1. **Racial and Ethnic Distribution in Hawai'i, 1990**

Ethnic Group	Counts from State of Hawai'i	
	State Total	% of State Total
All groups	1,089,572	100.00
Unmixed	(702,416)	(64.47)
Caucasian	262,604	24.10
Japanese	222,014	20.38
Chinese	51,293	4.71
Filipino	123,642	11.35
Hawaiian	8,711	0.80
Korean	11,597	1.06
Black	16,180	1.48
Puerto Rican	3,140	0.29
Samoan	3,235	0.30
Mixed	(387,156)	(35.53)
Part-Hawaiian	196,367	18.02
Non-Hawaiian	190,789	17.51

Race or Hispanic Origin	Counts from U.S. Census	
	State Total	% of State Total
All races	1,108,229	100.00
White	369,616	33.35
Black	27,195	2.45
American Indian/Eskimo/Aleut	5,099	0.46
Asian or Pacific Islander	(685,236)	(61.83)
Chinese	68,804	6.21
Filipino	168,682	15.22
Japanese	247,486	22.33
Korean	24,454	2.21
Vietnamese	5,468	0.49
Hawaiian	138,742	12.52
Samoan	15,034	1.36
Other Asian/Pacific Islander	16,566	1.49
Other race	21,083	1.90
Hispanic origin	(81,390)	(7.34)[a]

Sources: Hawai'i State Department of Health, Hawai'i Health Surveillance Program, special tabulation; Hawai'i State Data Book 1993–1994, Table 1.25; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Release CB91–42 (Feb. 1991) and Summary Tape File 1A.

[a] Persons of Hispanic origin can be of any race.

TABLE 2. **Interracial Marriage as a Percentage of All Marriages by Sex and Ethnic Populations in Hawai'i, 1920 to 1994**

	1920s	1930s	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980–1985	1994
Native Hawaiian								
Grooms	33.3	55.2	66.3	78.9	85.8	87.1	89.2	78.9
Brides	52.1	62.7	77.2	81.5	90.1	85.9	84.5	72.7
Part-Hawaiian								
Grooms	38.8	41.0	36.9	41.3	61.3	57.2	55.8	54.3
Brides	57.7	57.9	64.2	58.4	56.7	57.9	59.1	58.8
White								
Grooms	24.3	22.4	33.8	37.4	28.2	26.1	21.9	38.9
Brides	13.8	10.7	10.2	16.4	19.8	20.8	15.8	25.9
Chinese								
Grooms	24.8	28.0	31.2	43.6	58.2	60.2	60.1	57.6
Brides	15.7	28.5	38.0	45.2	61.5	65.2	63.9	66.2
Japanese								
Grooms	2.7	4.3	4.3	8.7	19.6	33.1	40.5	45.3
Brides	3.1	6.3	16.9	19.1	28.1	40.3	47.4	54.3
Filipino								
Grooms	25.6	37.5	42.0	44.5	50.6	47.0	44.3	43.0
Brides	1.0	4.0	21.0	35.8	47.9	50.9	54.6	56.6
Korean								
Grooms	17.6	23.5	49.0	70.3	75.1	62.0	47.3	34.9
Brides	4.9	39.0	66.7	74.5	82.1	82.4	77.2	63.8
Black								
Grooms					45.9	60.2	52.7	57.5
Brides					13.2	16.1	17.2	21.4
Samoan								
Grooms					39.2	41.0	44.0	47.8
Brides					50.7	40.3	39.9	38.1
Total	19.2	22.8	28.6	32.8	36.0	38.4	35.5	46.9

Sources: Lind 1980:114; Department of Health, State of Hawai'i, Annual Report, Statistical Supplement, 1971–1985; Vital Statistics Supplement, 1991–1992, Table 92–86 (A–144), Aug. 1994; marriage certificate data, 1994.

rates of exogamy (Blau and Schwartz 1984). The percentage of outgroup marriage increases as the proportion of the group in the marriage market decreases (Adams 1937; Fishbein 1971; Blau 1977; Blau, Blum, and Schwartz 1982; Blau and Schwartz 1984; Blau, Beeker, and Fitzpatrick 1984; Schoen 1986; Fu and Heaton 1997). This inverse relationship between group size and outmarriage has been repeatedly observed in empirical research, and virtually all ethnic minorities in the United States have interracial marriage rates considerably higher than that of whites (Hollingshead 1950; Barnett 1962; Heer 1962, 1966; Thomas 1972; Blau, Blum, and Schwartz 1982; Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982; Labov and Jacobs 1986; Heaton 1990; Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1990; Kalmijn 1993; Fu and Heaton 1997).

At the same time, ethnic heterogeneity is positively associated with the likelihood of interracial marriage. The presence of multiple groups increases the probability of intergroup interactions, and a higher intermarriage rate is often expected where there are multiple racial groups than where there are only two. Not only does the existence of several groups reduce the feeling of "them versus us" that exists when there are two groups, having a variety of groups from which to choose also decreases the perceived undesirability of outmarrying (Spickard 1989; Jacobson and Heaton 1995; Fu and Heaton 1997). Related to the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on interracial marriage is residential concentration. Ingroup solidarity is stronger when there is a high ethnic residential concentration, which provides social networks among group members and exerts a strong cultural pressure against outgroup relationships (Boissevain 1974; Jackson, Fischer, and Jones 1977; Ridley and Avery 1979; Spickard 1989; Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1990). Empirical research has confirmed the negative association between residential concentration and outmarriage among several ethnic minorities in the United States (Fitzpatrick and Gurak 1979; Kitano, Yeung, Chai, and Hatanaka 1984).

The sex ratio of the marriageable population is another structural constraint on endogamy (Blau, Blum, and Schwartz 1982). If there is a shortage of one gender, the surplus members of the opposite gender will have to find marital partners outside their group if they want to marry at all (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982). Intermarriage patterns of minority groups in the United States provide strong support for the sex ratio theorem (Spickard 1989:345). In Hawai'i the Chinese and Japanese who composed about half of Hawai'i's population in 1900 had a sex ratio of four to one (Parkman and Sawyer 1967), and when the Koreans first immigrated to Hawai'i in 1910, their sex ratio was six and a half to one (Nordyke 1989). All these immigrant groups at that time had a higher outmarriage rate for males than for females, but the rates gradually evened off when they later balanced their sex ratio through a large inflow of female immigrants (Fu and Heaton 1997).

In brief, availability of potential mates can significantly affect outgroup marriage, independent of social and cultural forces. For intermarriage to take place certain structures of the marriage market are thus necessary, but they are not sufficient to determine the scope and depth of such marriages. With the given availability of mates from different groups, whom to choose as a marital partner is an individual decision, influenced primarily by cultural preference, economic considerations, and matching of personal attributes.

Choice

Most people choose to marry within their ethnic groups not only because mates are generally more available within one's group, but also because members of the same group do not have cultural conflicts. Even when marrying out of one's group, individuals tend to choose mates based on cultural proximity (Parkman and Sawyer 1967; Kitano et al. 1984; Kalmijn 1993). Cultural preference is built on the basis of factors such as ethnic origin, national origin, religious beliefs, languages, and dietary habits. When there are more than two groups to choose from, there tends to be a gradient of perceived closeness among the diverse groups. The closer any two groups perceive each other to be culturally, the more likely intermarriage will occur between them. For example, Hispanics of different nationalities tend to intermarry more often than they marry non-Hispanics (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982), and Asian Americans have a higher rate of intermarriage among themselves than with non-Asians (Parkman and Sawyer 1967; Kitano et al. 1984; Kalmijn 1993). Preference in an outmarriage is based on many factors, ranging from skin color to cultural compatibility, but similar criteria tend to be emphasized by all ethnic groups (Spickard 1989).

Exchange theory has frequently been used to account for both endogamy and exogamy (Edwards 1969; Blau, Beeker, and Fitzpatrick 1984; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989). The greater the demand for a social attribute, the higher its price will be in a social exchange setting, including marriage formation (Wallace and Wolf 1991). Most marriages are homogamous, because persons with equivalent resources are most likely to maximize each other's rewards (Campbell 1971; Schoen 1986). However, those who lack a highly desirable social attribute or ability will be willing to give up much in an exchange for this attribute or ability when selecting a mate.

Expectations of exchange theory in mate selection can thus be summarized in terms of two tendencies. First, couples tend to be alike in most aspects of their demographic and social characteristics, including race, ethnicity, age, religious beliefs, political views, socioeconomic status, and

physical attractiveness. Second, if some of the couple's characteristics are dissimilar, exchange in others tends to make up for the imbalance. To be specific, the theory implies a hierarchy of status among ethnic groups that needs to be matched by a compensatory system of intermarriage. People of different ethnic groups may perceive themselves as possessing different ascribed status and believe that they have an unbalanced set of resources, other things being equal (Spickard 1989). Minority men who are upwardly mobile are assumed to have an incentive to marry white women because such a marriage signals greater prestige, whereas white women of low achievements are willing to accept as husbands minority men of high achievements (Schoen and Wooldredge 1989; Kalmijn 1993). Statistically significant interactions have been found between a black husband's higher education and a white wife's younger age and low socioeconomic status on the U.S. mainland (Heer 1974; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989; Heaton 1990; Heaton and Albrecht 1996).

In sum, both availability of potential mates and choices made by individuals based on cultural and economic considerations will affect outgroup marriage. Hawai'i's unique ethnic diversity and history of interracial marriage make it one of the best places in the world to study marriages across groups.

Data and Method

Analysis in this article is based on marriages registered in the state of Hawai'i from 1983 to 1994. Marriage certificate data were obtained from the Office of Health Status Monitoring, Department of Health, State of Hawai'i (HSMDH 1995). From 1983 to 1994 there were 117,428 resident marriages registered in the state of Hawai'i (a resident marriage has at least one spouse who is a Hawai'i resident). Grooms and brides are classified by the state into fourteen ethnic groups based on their self-reported entries on marriage certificates,[2] as shown in Table 3. Because some groups are very small, statistical analysis of the unions between them and Pacific Islander groups will not be reliable (such unions may be fewer than ten). A few groups are thus combined. Groups 7 to 10 (Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and other Asian) are combined into an Asian group, and groups 11 to 14 (Black, Hispanic, Native American, and Portuguese) are combined into an "other" group. Analysis in this article will be conducted on patterns of intermarriage using these combined groups.

Demographic characteristics provided in the marriage certificate data include brides' and grooms' age, education, occupation, and number of prior marriages. My analysis will focus on how mate selection is affected by

TABLE 3. **Grooms and Brides by Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status in Hawai'i, 1983 to 1994**

	Groom			Bride		
	Count	%	Average SES[a]	Count	%	Average SES[a]
1. Hawaiian	974	0.8	6.12	706	0.6	5.75
2. Part-Hawaiian	17,746	15.1	6.46	19,179	16.3	6.16
3. Samoan	2,324	2.0	6.31	2,092	1.8	5.99
4. Other Pac. Islander	1,614	1.4	6.34	1,268	1.1	6.33
5. Caucasian	46,400	39.5	7.22	39,984	34.0	7.10
6. Filipino	13,816	11.8	6.47	17,666	15.0	6.44
7. Chinese	4,640	4.0	7.93	5,195	4.4	7.81
8. Japanese	16,628	14.2	7.79	19,324	16.5	7.78
9. Korean	1,868	1.6	7.27	3,817	3.3	6.84
10. Other Asian	984	0.8	6.83	1,613	1.4	6.48
(Asian)[b]	(24,120)	(20.5)	(7.74)	(29,949)	(25.5)	(7.59)
11. Black	6,116	5.2	6.58	3,329	2.8	6.78
12. Hispanics	2,037	1.7	6.24	1,299	1.1	6.16
13. Native American	907	0.8	6.74	759	0.6	6.47
14. Portuguese	1,374	1.2	6.36	1,197	1.0	6.09
(Other)[b]	(10,434)	(8.9)	(6.50)	(6,584)	(5.6)	(6.50)
Total	117,428	100.0		117,428	100.0	

Source: Department of Health, State of Hawai'i, marriage certificate data, 1983–1994.

[a] SES (Socioeconomic Status) is a scale of educational attainment and occupational prestige. Job prestige scores are assigned as follows (see Treiman 1977): professional (5.9), farm owner/manager (5.0), clerical (4.0), craftsman (3.9), operative (3.0), private service (2.8), laborer (2.0), military (4.2), and no occupation (4.1). These scores are combined with the five categories of education, ranging from 1 to 5 respectively for below high school, high school, some college, college, and graduate degree. The scale has a range of 3.00 to 10.90, with a mean of 7.02 and 6.90, and a standard deviation of 1.59 and 1.67 for all grooms and all brides, respectively.

[b] Groups 7 to 10 are combined into "Asian," and groups 11 to 14 are combined into "other."

education and occupation, indicators of socioeconomic status. Education is recorded in a five-level ordinal scale, and occupation is grouped in nine categories. Table 4 lists percentages for level of education and occupation by groom and bride for the four Pacific Islander groups and the state total (grooms and brides of all groups combined).

Apparently there exists a gap in socioeconomic status across the ethnic groups, reflecting deep-rooted historical, social, and economic differences among them. Compared to the state total, the four Pacific Islander groups have much smaller proportions of grooms and brides who have a college or

TABLE 4. **Percentage Distribution of Education and Occupation for Grooms and Brides by Ethnicity in Hawai'i, 1983 to 1994**

	Hawaiian		Part-Hawaiian		Samoan		Other Pacific Islander		State Total	
	Groom	Bride	Groom	Bride	Groom	Bride	Groom	Bride	Groom	Bride
Education										
Below high school	19.1	18.1	10.4	10.0	12.1	13.6	17.5	12.6	6.7	7.9
High school	59.3	55.1	56.3	54.1	58.6	55.4	46.7	43.6	42.4	38.4
Some college	16.1	19.9	23.0	26.4	23.1	25.1	24.4	31.9	27.4	31.3
College	3.2	4.0	5.6	5.1	4.2	4.0	6.0	7.4	11.6	12.3
Graduate degree	2.3	2.8	4.7	4.5	2.1	1.9	5.3	4.5	11.9	10.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	974	706	17,746	19,179	2,324	2,092	1,614	1,268	117,428	117,428
Occupation										
Professional	4.6	6.0	6.6	7.0	5.4	4.1	4.5	4.3	12.9	13.7
Managerial	8.7	5.4	10.5	7.9	5.4	4.2	6.7	5.2	12.4	8.5
Clerical	6.3	21.2	8.4	33.5	5.0	25.2	4.3	24.4	8.3	28.8
Craftsman	19.7	1.0	21.8	1.1	12.4	1.3	19.0	0.7	15.3	1.2
Operative	19.0	2.7	15.2	1.7	14.9	1.7	5.3	1.0	7.2	1.1
Private service	16.6	20.5	16.5	12.5	17.5	10.4	14.8	13.0	10.7	12.0
Laborer	14.5	0.9	9.2	0.4	9.9	0.3	14.8	0.5	4.3	0.4
Military	2.5	0.4	3.5	0.5	7.9	1.1	8.3	1.7	22.6	6.5
No occupation	8.1	41.9	8.3	35.5	21.6	51.6	22.2	49.3	6.3	27.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	974	706	17,746	19,179	2,324	2,092	1,614	1,268	117,428	117,428

Note: Percentages may not sum to precisely 100.0 due to rounding.

graduate degree, or hold a job with high prestige. Filipinos and the "other" group (neither shown in the table) are similar to the Pacific Islander groups in this regard, while Asian grooms and brides have the highest education and job prestige, followed by Caucasians. Asians are about four times more likely to have a graduate degree or to hold a professional job than part-Hawaiians, who have the highest SES (socioeconomic status) among the four Islander groups. Within groups gender differences are very small in education and in professional jobs but noticeable in other types of occupation, reflecting a sexual division of labor in the workplace and a traditional gender role expectation that men are breadwinners.

To make standardized comparisons across groups, a scale of socioeconomic status was created by combining education and occupation. Treiman's international occupational prestige scale was used to assign occupational prestige scores to the job categories (1977),[3] and these scores were combined with levels of education to compose a scale of socioeconomic status (SES). The scale ranges from 3.00 to 10.90, with a mean of 7.02 and 6.90 and a standard deviation of 1.59 and 1.67 for all grooms and all brides, respectively (see details in Table 3). The average group SES by this scale is listed in Table 3 (the magnitude of the group difference will be discussed below), and the scale will be used to examine degrees of status exchange in outgroup marriage.

The analysis in this study comprises three steps. First, ratios of endogamy and exogamy are presented to detect the general patterns of mate selection across groups. Second, the average group socioeconomic status of grooms and brides by types of marriage is examined. Finally, a multivariate logistic regression model explores the effect of SES on odds of marriage after controlling for important demographic variables.

Findings

Ratios of Endogamy and Exogamy

Table 5 presents percentages of endogamy and exogamy for the four Pacific Islander groups in Hawai'i between 1983 and 1994. Each row of the table reports for a gender/ethnic category how many of its members chose their spouses from a particular ethnic group. For example, 18.8 percent of the Hawaiian grooms married endogamously, while 31.3 percent, 0.8 percent, 0.9 percent, 29.0 percent, 7.3 percent, 6.7 percent, and 5.2 percent married a wife from the groups of part-Hawaiians, Samoans, other Pacific Islanders, Caucasians, Filipinos, Asians, and other, respectively. Shown in parentheses following the percentages are ratios of endogamy or exogamy, given the

model of independence. These ratios report how far the observed counts in each type of marital union deviate from the expected counts if group size is the only factor that affects chances of mate selection. A ratio of one suggests no preference, while a ratio higher (or lower) than one indicates a greater (or smaller) likelihood of marriage than availability of potential mates can explain. For example, 18.8 percent of all Hawaiian grooms married within their group, while only 0.6 percent of all brides are Hawaiian (see Table 3), resulting in an endogamy ratio of 31.33 (18.8 divided by 0.6). In other words, a Hawaiian groom is thirty-one times more likely to marry a Hawaiian wife than expected by chance.

Several patterns can be detected from these percentages and ratios. First, ingroup marriage is the strongest tendency in mate selection. The endogamy ratios are all greater than one, indicating selective matching on the basis of ethnicity (endogamy ratios are comparable across groups of similar sizes). Second, in both endogamy and exogamy, gender differences are small. Grooms and brides tend to have a similar ratio of marrying into a particular group, with the only exception that Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian brides are more likely to marry into the Samoan or other Pacific Islander groups than their grooms would. Third, there is a slight tendency for the four groups to marry each other more frequently than they marry others. Samoans and other Pacific Islanders are about twice as likely to marry each other as would be predicted by chance, and similar trends are evident between the two Hawaiian groups. For the four Pacific Islander groups under study, intermarriage with other groups is not highly selective, as suggested by the similar exogamy ratios. The probability of marrying an Asian, however, seems to be the lowest.

These results confirm early research findings that there exist large racial/ethnic clusters in the islands: Pacific Islanders and Asians tend to marry within their racial groups more often than they would marry each other (Parkman and Sawyer 1967; Fu and Heaton 1997). The above analysis of selective mate selection focused on structures of the marriage market by taking into consideration two factors: group size and sex ratio. These two variables determine the structural availability of potential spouses, and high odds of ingroup marriages clearly indicates that race/ethnicity is an important consideration in mate selection.

Socioeconomic Status

Table 6 reports for grooms and brides their average SES scores by ethnicity. For example, the average group SES ("Total") is 6.12 and 5.75 for all

TABLE 5. **Patterns of Endogamy and Exogamy for Pacific Islanders in Hawai'i, 1983 to 1994**

Spouse's Ethnicity	Hawaiian		Part-Hawaiian		Samoans		Other Pacific Islanders	
	Groom % (Ratio)	Bride % (Ratio)	Groom % (Ratio)	Bride % (Ratio)	Groom % (Ratio)	Bride % (Ratio)	Groom % (Ratio)	Bride % (Ratio)
Hawaiian	18.8 (31.33)	25.9 (32.38)	0.9 (1.50)	1.6 (2.00)	0.9 (1.50)	0.4 (0.50)	1.9 (3.17)	0.7 (0.88)
Part-Hawaiian	31.3 (1.92)	21.4 (1.42)	45.8 (2.81)	42.4 (2.81)	24.3 (1.49)	8.9 (0.59)	20.3 (1.25)	6.9 (0.46)
Samoan	0.8 (0.44)	3.1 (1.55)	1.0 (0.56)	2.9 (1.45)	51.1 (28.39)	56.8 (28.40)	4.7 (2.61)	3.9 (1.95)
Other Pac. Islander	0.9 (0.82)	4.4 (3.14)	0.5 (0.45)	1.7 (1.21)	2.2 (2.00)	3.6 (2.57)	41.1 (37.36)	52.3 (37.36)
Caucasian	29.0 (0.85)	21.2 (0.54)	18.3 (0.54)	18.4 (0.47)	10.5 (0.31)	12.4 (0.31)	17.6 (0.52)	20.9 (0.53)
Filipino	7.3 (0.49)	8.1 (0.69)	12.8 (0.85)	11.0 (0.93)	4.3 (0.29)	2.2 (0.19)	5.6 (0.37)	2.9 (0.25)
Asian	6.7 (0.26)	7.5 (0.37)	16.7 (0.65)	12.3 (0.60)	4.2 (0.16)	2.9 (0.14)	4.9 (0.19)	4.4 (0.21)
Other	5.2 (0.93)	8.4 (0.94)	4.0 (0.71)	9.6 (1.08)	2.5 (0.45)	12.8 (1.44)	3.8 (0.68)	7.9 (0.89)

Note: The percentages in this table show proportionally how many grooms and brides in each of the four ethnic groups married spouses of a specific group. The ratio (endogamy or exogamy ratio) indicates the likelihood of the marriage when group size is the only consideration (see text for an explanation).

TABLE 6. **Average Socioeconomic Status for Couples by Ethnicity in Hawai'i, 1983 to 1994**[a]

Bride's Ethnicity	Groom's Ethnicity								
	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Samoan	Other Pacific Islander	Caucasian	Asian	Filipino	Other	Total
Hawaiian									
Husband	6.02	5.87	6.25	6.13	6.41	6.73	5.81	6.15	6.13
Wife	5.58	5.58	5.17	5.26	6.12	6.39	5.42	5.95	5.75
Part-Hawaiian									
Husband	5.96	6.27	6.25	6.27	6.91	7.07	6.28	6.20	6.48
Wife	5.65	5.89	5.86	5.96	6.76	6.75	5.86	6.01	6.16
Samoan									
Husband	6.53	6.29	6.21	6.10	6.76	6.77	6.12	6.27	6.30
Wife	5.68	5.93	5.83	5.65	6.71	6.15	5.41	6.23	5.99
Other Pacific Islander									
Husband	6.32	6.44	6.59	6.35	6.86	7.16	6.16	6.69	6.53
Wife	6.28	6.11	6.46	6.08	6.82	7.09	5.80	6.61	6.33
Caucasian									
Husband	6.30	6.70	6.85	6.44	7.22	7.75	6.83	6.73	7.16
Wife	6.20	6.51	6.57	6.33	7.22	7.44	6.51	6.67	7.10
Asian									
Husband	6.60	6.95	6.39	6.98	7.67	7.92	6.97	6.82	7.66
Wife	6.34	6.82	6.13	6.71	7.69	7.84	6.81	6.77	7.59
Filipino									
Husband	6.18	6.30	6.33	6.31	6.88	7.10	6.34	6.31	6.54
Wife	5.79	6.03	5.99	6.14	6.87	6.96	6.23	6.33	6.44
Other									
Husband	5.75	6.23	6.20	5.92	6.84	6.79	6.32	6.49	6.52
Wife	5.70	5.92	5.93	5.80	6.82	6.52	5.88	6.59	6.50
Total									
Husband	6.12	6.46	6.31	6.34	7.22	7.74	6.47	6.50	7.02
Wife	5.86	6.18	5.94	6.09	7.20	7.60	6.26	6.48	6.90

[a] Socioeconomic Status (SES) is a composite measure of education and occupational prestige, ranging from 3.00 to 10.90. See Table 3, note a.

Hawaiian grooms and brides, and 6.02 and 5.58 for inmarrying Hawaiian husbands and wives, respectively. Similarly, all husbands who married Hawaiian wives have an average SES of 6.13, and all wives who married Hawaiian husbands have an average SES of 5.86.

The magnitude of the average group difference in SES can be interpreted in comparison with the overall mean and standard deviation (see note to Table 3). Taking part-Hawaiians and Asians for examples, the difference in their group averages (7.74 – 6.46 = 1.28 for grooms and 7.59 – 6.16 = 1.43 for brides) in SES indicates that the percentile rank is 76.4 (75.8) for the average Asian groom (bride) but only 28.8 (23.6) for the average part-Hawaiian groom (bride). Stated differently, on a scale that combines educational achievement and occupational prestige for grooms and brides of all groups, Asians stand on average 47.6 percent (grooms) and 52.2 percent (brides) higher than part-Hawaiians. Average status varies considerably across racial combinations of husband and wife, and the pattern clearly demonstrates a tendency toward status homogamy in mate selection. Compared within their own groups, grooms and brides have higher status if they marry out of a low-status group into a high-status group, while the opposite is true if they marry out of a high-status group into one of low status. With few exceptions, grooms and brides from the four Pacific Islander groups who marry Caucasians or Asians have the highest average status in their

TABLE 7. **Correlations of SES between Couples by Ethnicity and Types of Marriage in Hawai'i, 1983 to 1994**[a]

	Ingroup Marriages	Outgroup Marriages		All Marriages	
		Groom	Bride	Groom	Bride
Hawaiian	0.517	0.430	0.495	0.477	0.500
Part-Hawaiian	0.484	0.573	0.588	0.550	0.559
Samoan	0.422	0.525	0.534	0.483	0.435
Other Pac. Islander	0.566	0.502	0.596	0.527	0.591
Caucasian	0.620	0.640	0.600	0.628	0.616
Asian	0.721	0.658	0.667	0.713	0.706
Filipino	0.599	0.567	0.567	0.585	0.591
Other	0.472	0.512	0.520	0.500	0.495
Total	0.684	0.624		0.662	

Source: Department of Health, State of Hawai'i, marriage certificate data, 1983–1994.

[a] *Outgroup marriages* are all types of outmarriages combined. For example, the SES correlation between all outmarrying Hawaiian grooms and their wives is 0.430 (these wives could come from any non-Hawaiian group). *All marriages* combine both ingroup and outgroup marriages.

groups, while Caucasians and Asians who marry Pacific Islanders have the lowest status within their groups. Marriage is still "traditional" in that husbands tend to have a slightly higher status than wives, regardless of ethnicity.

Status homogamy is also indicated by the similar SES scores between partners. Regardless of inmarrying or outmarrying, the difference in SES between couples is rather consistent across groups. Correlations of SES between husbands and wives are presented in Table 7. Although these correlations do not differ with a pattern between couples in endogamous and exogamous marriages, they are consistently higher in marriages involving a spouse from a high-status group (Caucasian or Asian). Evidently couples tend to match their socioeconomic status more closely if at least one spouse is from a high-status group, as compared to couples who both come from groups of comparatively low status. Intermarriage in Hawai'i is thus marked by equal status between couples across racial and ethnic groups, and status homogamy is especially important if the marriage involves a spouse from a high-status group.

Multivariate Analysis

The above analysis only focuses on the effect of SES and does not take other factors into consideration. Age at marriage, for example, can influence SES, since a group with a larger proportion of young grooms and brides will tend to have a lower status. Young people may yet complete more schooling or move into better jobs after they get married. In this section the effect of socioeconomic status on mate selection is further tested in logistic regression models controlling for age at marriage and number of marriages. Group size and sex ratio cannot be included in this analysis, because they are constants in any specific ethnic group.

Logistic regression analysis is appropriate for dependent variables with only two outcomes (outmarrying or inmarrying in this case). Coefficients in the logistic regression analysis describe the log odds of outmarrying. Although in everyday language "odds" is often used interchangeably with "probability," mathematically the two are different quantities and can be expressed as below (when there are only two outcomes):

$$\text{Odds } A = \text{Probability } A \,/\, \text{Probability } B$$

The odds of outmarrying is therefore defined as the probability of outmarrying divided by the probability of inmarrying, or more simply as the ratio of

outmarriages to inmarriages. The regression equation expressing the log odds is

$$\text{Ln (odds of outmarrying)} = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 \ldots + B_pX_p$$

where B_0 is the constant and B_1 is the estimated coefficient for the independent variable X_1. The hypothesis that a coefficient is not different from zero is usually tested with a Wald statistic (a chi-square-type statistic), based on degrees of freedom for that variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). The logistic regression coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the log odds for the dependent variable associated with one unit change in the independent variable. The results of the logistic regression analysis are reported in Table 8, and they reflect the effect of socioeconomic status on selective outmarriage after controlling for age at marriage and number of marriages.

To make comparisons easier to read, odds ratios instead of log odds are reported in the table (coefficients are not estimated where cases are fewer than fifty). The statistical significance of the coefficients is also given as an indicator of their strength, although the data are not considered as a sample. Endogamous marriage is the implicit comparison group in all models, indicated by 1.00 in the table. In other words, deviation from 1.00 shows the percentage difference in SES for those who outmarry as compared to those who inmarry. The table should be read only along the rows, not down the columns. For example, Hawaiian grooms and brides who married Asians have an average SES respectively 48 percent and 40 percent higher than Hawaiians who married endogamously. Hawaiians who married part-Hawaiians, in contrast, have a slightly lower SES than those who inmarried (6 percent and 1 percent lower, respectively, for Hawaiian grooms and brides).

Consistent with the findings in Tables 6 and 7, status emerges as a salient factor in mate selection among the ethnic groups, even after controlling for important demographic characteristics. To marry a Caucasian or an Asian, Pacific Islanders need to have higher status than those who inmarry, while Asians and Caucasians who marry Pacific Islanders are of lower status in their own groups. With one unit increase on the socioeconomic status scale (ranging from 3.0 to 10.9; see Table 3), the probability that a Hawaiian groom will marry an Asian wife increases by a factor of almost 1.5, compared to marrying endogamously. Mate selection seems to be guided by a hierarchy of status compensation. Stated differently, the lower one's group status, the more important one's own status will have to be in marrying into a high-

TABLE 8. **Logistic Regression Coefficients (Odds Ratios) Showing Effects of Socioeconomic Status on Selective Marriage**

Group of Origination	Group of Destination							
	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Samoan	Other Pacific Islander	Caucasian	Asian	Filipino	Other
Hawaiian								
Groom	1.00	0.94			1.18*	1.48**	1.07	0.76
Bride	1.00	0.99			1.27**	1.40**	0.94	1.19
Part-Hawaiian								
Groom	0.73**	1.00	1.02	1.12	1.25***	1.44***	1.03	0.96
Bride	0.84**	1.00	1.00	1.04	1.45***	1.42***	0.99	1.06**
Samoan								
Groom		1.04	1.00	1.39	1.64***	1.18		0.98
Bride		1.07	1.00	0.89	1.65***	1.21		1.37***
Other Pacific Islander								
Groom		0.95	0.83	1.00	1.06	1.45***		0.74***
Bride		1.03	1.24*	1.00	1.42***	1.52***		1.33***
Caucasian								
Groom	0.62***	0.86***	0.83***	0.85***	1.00	1.13***	0.85***	0.87***
Bride	0.54***	0.67***	0.72***	0.60***	1.00	1.04**	0.70***	0.77***
Asian								
Groom	0.66***	0.74***	0.65***	0.79**	0.96***	1.00	0.75***	0.67***
Bride	0.65***	0.75***	0.60***	0.76***	0.99	1.00	0.74***	0.74***
Filipino								
Groom	0.77*	0.97	0.90	0.91	1.25***	1.32***	1.00	1.00
Bride	0.85*	0.95***	0.95	0.99	1.32***	1.32***	1.00	1.07**
Other								
Groom	0.77*	0.74***	0.79**	1.17	1.16***	1.22***	0.83***	1.00
Bride	0.51***	0.58***	0.55***	0.59***	1.13***	0.91*	0.55***	1.00

Note: Endogamous marriage is the comparison group for estimation of coefficients. Age at marriage and number of marriages are controlled in the model, and their coefficients are not reported in this table. Where cases are fewer than fifty, coefficients are not estimated.

*$p < 0.05$ **$p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$

status group. Conversely, the closer the average status between two groups, the easier it will be for their members to intermarry because of their comparable socioeconomic status.

Conclusion

In this study status exchange between couples is examined for four Pacific Islander ethnic groups, and findings lend strong support to the expectations of exchange theory. There are several important patterns of mate selection in Hawai'i. First, ingroup marriage is the strongest norm, despite a long tradition of interracial marriage in the islands. For the four groups under study, grooms and brides are 2.8 to 37 times more likely to marry within their own groups than chance would predict. This tendency, however, is weaker for part-Hawaiians than for other groups (even compared to groups of similar size), probably because part-Hawaiians have a family history of intermarriage, and the racial and ethnic background of a potential spouse is not as important a consideration as it might be for other groups.

Second, intermarriage among the four groups is slightly more frequent than among non–Pacific Islander groups, and the bond seems especially close between the two Hawaiian groups. This finding indicates the existence of a large racial/ethnic cluster that includes all Pacific Islanders. However, ratios of exogamy are basically proportional to group sizes across all groups, indicating that no group is particularly favored in outmarriage, nor is any undesirable. Since marriage is the most intimate relationship between two individuals, similar rates of intermarriage across groups suggest that groups accept each other equally. The only exception is a comparatively low rate of intermarriage between Pacific Islanders and Asians, probably due to cultural dissimilarity and status gaps.

Third, if mate selection at the aggregate group level is not very selective, at the individual level it certainly is. In endogamy as in exogamy, mate selection is, in part, an issue of status matching, with little difference between genders. Grooms and brides have basically the same probability of marrying into a certain ethnic group, and status is thus equally important for both men and women. In a broad sense, those who marry exogamously are more likely to choose a mate on the basis of equal socioeconomic status than on the basis of racial or ethnic background. The Asians have the highest socioeconomic status among the groups, and to have a high status is thus essential in marrying an Asian spouse, regardless of one's racial and ethnic origin. In other words, failure to marry into a certain ethnic group could be a result of status incompatibility rather than preference among ethnic groups. Status matching also explains why, apart from cultural reasons, part-Hawaiians are

less selective in outmarriage: They have the highest SES among the four Pacific Islander groups, and this status makes it easier for them to marry into all groups, as far as status compatibility is concerned.

These patterns of selective outmarriage, however, suggest that groups of very high and very low status could face a restricted marriage market and are somewhat isolated within their own groups. Along the SES continuum, those at the higher end of a low-status group and those at the lower end of a high-status group are more likely to intermarry, while those with low status in low-SES groups and those with high status in high-SES groups tend to marry within their own groups. This status matching at the individual level may help perpetuate socioeconomic gaps along racial lines. For example, the comparatively low status of the Pacific Islander groups could have been, in part, a result of many generations of intermarriage in which they have lost high-status individuals to other groups. If the pattern persists, high-status Pacific Islanders would be more likely to outmarry and have children with multiple ethnic identity, while low-status Islanders would be more likely to inmarry and have children who keep their Islander ethnic identity, resulting in an unfavorable family SES environment for future-generation Pacific Islanders. This tendency would in turn enlarge group difference in SES and strengthen the tendency toward ingroup marriage. The island culture of intermarriage thus to some extent works to the disadvantage of low-status groups when status exchange is considered. The pattern especially affects native Hawaiians, because they have no ethnic reserves outside the islands. If higher-status native Hawaiians tend to marry out and have children who are no longer native Hawaiians, it will be difficult to raise the group status for future-generation Hawaiians. The data under study have clearly indicated that part-Hawaiians have higher status than native Hawaiians, and this trend is expected to continue if the current pattern of intermarriage persists.

Sustained high frequency of intermarriage also raises questions about how to measure race and ethnicity. Generations of intermarriage have made it very difficult for many in Hawai'i to classify themselves into only one racial category. The ethnicity classification in the data set is self-reported, and for many who have a multiethnic background, it may reflect only their perception of which racial/ethnic identity is the most important. The racial categories in this article may therefore overstate the amount of homogamy but at the same time overstate the degree of ethnic differences in intermarried couples. Despite this inaccuracy of categorizing ethnicity, it is important to recognize that racial identity, even when it is a self-reported choice, is a very important factor in mate selection.

NOTES

1. Howard estimated a population of 300,000 for native Hawaiians when they had their first contact with Europeans. This figure is probably based on Schmitt and Zane's hypothesized calculation (1977). Stannard argues that the Hawaiian population at the time of Cook's arrival in 1778 was 800,000 to over one million (1989). Dudley and Agard claim that a number of scholars in Hawaiian Studies adopt the higher number (1990).

2. On the marriage license application form, grooms and brides are given a variety of racial and ethnic categories to choose from, and they are free to select multiple entries. When marriage certificate data are compiled by the Department of Health, only one ethnic identity is finally chosen for statistical reporting purposes. If more than one ethnicity is checked on the marriage certificate, the following rules apply to code multiethnicity into one category.

1) If Hawaiian is one of the multiple ethnicities listed, Part-Hawaiian is coded.
2) If a non-Caucasian ethnicity is listed with a Caucasian ethnicity, the non-Caucasian ethnicity is coded.
3) If there is more than one non-Caucasian ethnicity listed, the first one is coded.
4) If there is more than one Caucasian ethnicity listed, the first one is coded.

(Vital Statistics Supplement 1996)

Once the data are compiled, it is not possible to recode the ethnic categories back to their original entries. Thus, compilation may pose potential inaccuracies in measuring ethnic identity of the grooms and brides.

3. Occupational prestige has been studied for decades, and its measurement has been stable across nations. See Stark 1998:440–442 for a detailed discussion.

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KENNETH P. EMORY AND "HERBERT C. SHIPMAN CAVE": A LONG-STANDING PUZZLE SOLVED

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Hawaii Speleological Survey

On 13 and 14 September 1945, Kenneth P. Emory of the Bishop Museum investigated what he later termed "Herbert C. Shipman Cave," twelve miles from Hilo in the northern Puna District of Hawai'i Island. His typescript of this investigation is frequently cited, but the cave remained unidentified until recently. In 1996 a Hawaii Speleological Survey team located a signature of Emory in the upper part of Keala Cave, at the site of a 1945 newspaper fragment previously found by another Hawaii Speleological Survey team. Other pukas explored and described by Emory as part of "Herbert C. Shipman Cave" unmistakably are entrances of Kazumura Cave, a different cave in a separate flow unit of the Aila'au Flow Field of Kilauea Volcano. While he considered the possibility that he might be wrong, Emory mistakenly thought all his exploration to be part of a single "Herbert C. Shipman Cave," which never existed per se. Use of this name should be replaced by proper designation of Kazumura and Keala Caves, depending on the context. Radiocarbon dating of charcoal in the section of Keala Cave visited by Emory strongly suggests but does not prove that the entire cave was explored by early Hawaiians.

Kenneth Emory (1897–1992) dominated Hawaiian archaeology throughout most of the twentieth century (Takeuchi 1992). With little interest in Hawaiian cave archaeology before 1950, Emory's 1950 unexpected findings in Oahu's Kuliouou Cave caused a major shift in emphasis from large, impressive ancient structures to detailed studies of stratigraphy and small-scale phenomena. It may be of special interest to present readers that he contributed an article to the first issue of this journal (Emory 1977).

While preparing an initial bibliography of Hawai'i speleology, one of us

Pacific Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1—March 1999

(W.R.H.) noted repeated references to a puzzling "Herbert C. Shipman Cave" (sometimes shortened to "Shipman Cave") reported by Emory (1945). The name appears especially in reports of archaeologists in environmental impact statements. In all such reports reviewed to date, it is clear that the writers had not relocated this cave in their own field studies or in other literature. In its own systematic fieldwork in Puna District and an additional bibliographic search, the Hawaii Speleological Survey initially fared no better. Descriptions of certain features suggested that Emory visited part of Kazumura Cave and part of Keala Cave (Figure 1), two caves located in separate flows of the Ailaʻau Flow Field of Kilauea Volcano (Holcomb 1987:27; Oberwinder 1995). However, conclusive confirmation was lacking. Through artifacts left by the 1945 Emory party and by systematic comparison of Emory's narrative with existing cave features in this area, we subsequently were able to solve the puzzle conclusively.

Particular problems in the identification of "Herbert C. Shipman Cave" were as follows. (1) Today's names for the major caves of this area did not exist in 1945. (2) Hawaiian names for two of the pukas (entrance sinkholes) Emory cited had faded from local memory, and the name he gave a third puka seems never to have been used by anyone else. While the name and approximate location of one of the pukas appeared in handwritten testimony of the 1873 Boundary Commission (Puaa 1873; Uma 1873), this information was so little known or so closely held that it did not come to our attention until December 1996. (3) The only other landmark mentioned by Emory (a corral along what now is Highway 13) disappeared long ago, and its location seems to have been forgotten or confused with another closer to Keaʻau.

Emory's Narrative

In deciphering this puzzle, we followed Emory's footsteps as described in his own words and compared his descriptions with present-day field findings. On Thursday, 13 September 1945, Emory drove from the seaside Keaʻau Ranch house of Herbert C. Shipman to a corral "approximately 12 miles from Hilo" on the Keaʻau-Pahoa road (now Highway 13). Herbert C. Shipman was a wealthy part-Hawaiian landowner and manager of the extensive Shipman family holdings, noted for expansive hospitality and breadth of interests (Cahill 1996). He clearly organized and probably financed at least the on-island part of Emory's reconnaissance. At the corral Emory joined a small group including Henry Haa, Shipman's chief of staff and confidant (Cahill 1996). (Emory misspelled the name as Ha.) All went by horse to a puka he recorded as "Oleoleana," "a circular pit with overhanging edges, 30 feet across and some 20 feet deep." His team included three Hawaiians, who



FIGURE 1. **Location of Kazumura Cave and Keala Cave, south of Hilo, Hawai'i.** (Map compiled by C. Allred)

guided him to pukas on both sides of the highway (Emory called them *kipukas*), and Emory believed that all were parts of a single cave, which he named "Herbert C. Shipman Cave"—a misapprehension that was to cause confusion for more than half a century.

At least two of the party were natives of the area. Either they did not know or did not tell Emory that in 1873 the name of the pit had been recorded with a slightly different spelling—"Olioliana"—and that it was a common point of Kea'au, Waikahekahe, and Waikahekaheiki *ahupua'a,* native Hawaiian land divisions (Puaa 1873). "Olioli" is translated by Pukui and Elbert as "delight, enjoyment" or "chanter" (1992). *Ana* means "cave."

Circular pits with overhanging edges twenty feet deep and thirty feet wide are so common in Puna as to be unremarkable. Emory estimated the distance to this one from the highway as about two miles. This estimate did not greatly reduce the number of Puna pukas that might have been Oleoleana or Olioliana Puka. However, Keala Pit, a well-known feature about thirty feet deep and twenty feet wide—the reverse of Emory's estimates—is about two and three-quarters miles upslope from the highway, in an area now undergoing rapid urbanization. In retrospect, even without knowing that Olioliana was somewhere near the present-day common point of the three *ahupua'a,* members of the Hawaii Speleological Survey should have been quicker to recognize that Emory was describing Keala Pit.

As did Puaa and Uma seventy-two years earlier, two brothers in Emory's team (Henry and Eddie Haa) knew the cave below as an ancient refuge in time of war. Further, the Haa brothers had been told that it "ran all the way to the sea" (apparently they had never been in it). Today, local residents still talk of Keala Cave "running all the way to the sea," and few of them have entered it. Rock fortifications and slingstones reported by Emory are still in place, and other cultural material is undisturbed by the urbanization overhead.

Emory descended this overhanging pit and initially looked into the upslope mouth of the cave below. Then he proceeded downslope with some of his team, traveling an estimated one-half mile to another puka known to the Haa brothers as Keakiu Puka. During Hawaii Speleological Survey mapping of Keala Cave, the actual distance to the next puka was found to be 0.496 miles, straight-line distance. This remarkable accuracy was typical of Emory's estimates during this reconnaissance. Beyond Keakiu Puka, Emory's team continued underground for an estimated additional one-quarter mile (actually 0.257 miles when mapped) to a point where the cave has an unmistakable upper level recorded by Emory. Here they scratched names on the walls, then returned to Olioliana for lunch. Our teams did not find any such scratched inscriptions. We did find a scratched "TW" and a "45" seventy

meters farther downslope at the top of a lavafall 3.5 meters high; their significance is unclear at this time. Either Emory described the site of the "scratched names" inaccurately, some scratches were too superficial to persist for fifty years, or our teams simply missed the inscription.

After lunch, Emory and the others turned to the cave section upslope from Olioliana Puka. At 175 and 325 yards they observed daylight entering from above. Later they determined that the first daylight site actually was another entrance to the cave, with ti plants growing in it (as they do today in the next entrance upslope from Keala Pit). The Haa brothers knew no name for this puka (even today it is much less known than Keala Pit), and Emory dubbed it "Poi Pounder Cave." Later in his report he shortened this name to "Pounder Cave." We have been unable to find anyone else who has identified it by either name, and it is now known as "Ladder Puka" because of an old ladder lying on its floor.

From "Poi Pounder Cave" the group continued another 2,450 paces without finding "a single shell or any sign of human occupation." This statement is curious because Hawaii Speleological Survey members found scattered fragments of *kukui* nut and wood charcoal along what appeared to be this portion of Emory's route and beyond—all the way to the upper end of the cave. As discussed below, special consideration was given to this additional puzzle.

Emory recorded that his team marked their farthest point by "setting up a candle," then returned to the ranch house for the night. On 23 July 1993 a Hawaii Speleological Survey team (Stephan Kempe, Dave Hubbart, and Susan Dotson) found a candle in Keala Cave, 7,297 feet (2.22 km) upslope from the "Poi Pounder Puka" entrance, the equivalent of 2,450 paces at 2.98 feet per pace, an acceptable average-pace length. With the candle were two "D" size flashlight batteries with expiration dates of 1946 and a scrap of newspaper published 31 August 1945 announcing the forthcoming V-J Day parade (Kempe 1993). In view of Emory's statements about the lack of signs of previous non-Hawaiian visitation, it seemed likely that these artifacts were left by his party, but proof was lacking until 14 December 1996. On that date another Hawaii Speleological Survey team (Kevin Allred and Mike Shambaugh) wiped slime off the candle and found an entire inscription: "K P Emory 1945" (Figure 2). It now was indisputable that the upper section of Keala Cave is the upper part of "Herbert C. Shipman Cave" and, through the artifacts left in 1945, the archaeologist himself had become the object of archaeological investigation.

The lower end of Keala Cave is upslope from Highway 13, but "Herbert C. Shipman Cave" was said to extend far downslope beyond the highway. Close field attention to Emory's text revealed the explanation. On 14

FIGURE 2. **Candle showing Emory's name, battery with expiration date of 1946, and fragment of *Honolulu Advertiser* dated 31 August 1945, all found in upper Keala Cave.** (Photo by K. Allred)

September 1945 the Emory group went to a puka in a different area, this one estimated to be one-quarter mile upslope from the highway and in line with Olioliana and the pukas they had visited on the previous day. It also led into a lava tube cave, "in all probability the same as the one we had explored on the previous day." In this area, three small pukas are known today. Emory was not specific enough to permit conclusive identification of the puka he entered here, but all three of these pukas open into Kazumura Cave rather than Keala Cave, sealed by the younger Kazumura lava almost three-quarters of a mile farther upslope. One of these three pukas is precisely one-quarter mile (400 m) from the highway; another is about eighty meters closer (the third is a small vertical shaft, clearly not the puka in question).

After a quick trip back to the "Poi Pounder Puka" entrance, Emory rode downslope with Henry Haa and an unnamed Filipino helper. At a point an estimated one mile downslope from Highway 13 and supposedly "300 yards" upslope from the old cane railroad, they entered still another cavernous puka (this one without any name known to Henry Haa). Emory refrained from naming this cave or puka, noting that Eddy Haa "felt certain it was a continuation of the (cave) at Oleoleana." Even though it was about five hun-

dred yards from the old railroad grade rather than three hundred, from his further description we suspected that it was another part of Kazumura Cave. He recorded a massive lava column dividing the passage, such as exists today in this part of Kazumura Cave, and still another unnamed puka "in which was growing an avocado tree." On 29 December 1996 Hawaii Speleological Survey members rechecked the puka in the appropriate part of Kazumura Cave and indeed found a very old avocado tree in it. In our opinion, the evidence now was conclusive. "Henry C. Shipman Cave" never existed. Instead, Emory had found and studied parts of both Keala and Kazumura Caves.

Now that the sites of these 1945 investigations are clear, Emory's report appears as a fascinating revelation of strengths and weaknesses of Hawaiian reconnaissance archaeology in the period before the breakthrough at Kuliouou Cave. Despite undeniable flaws, his typescript is a major contribution to both speleology and archaeology. Much of it is as relevant today as when he wrote it, and it truly is remarkable for the length of cave he covered in a very limited time. He described his findings with notable clarity and accuracy, identifying sections of the caves used for wartime refuge, for occasional overnight visitation, and for other cultural purposes. Evidently he took compass bearings, and his estimates of underground distances were remarkably accurate. The skeleton of a small pig, for example, can be observed today, precisely where he noted it.

As for Emory's failure to recognize Keala and Kazumura Caves as separate caves, it is understandable considering the limited time at his disposal and the lack of organized speleology in Hawai'i at the time. Confusing was his terming "Poi Pounder" as a specific cave within "Herbert C. Shipman Cave." This nomenclature, however, was in accord with native Hawaiian traditions giving a different cave name to many different entrances to a single cave (even today this tradition persists among some well-known archaeologists). It should be noted that Emory's usage of the word *kipuka* is in the traditional Hawaiian sense (Pukui and Elbert 1992), not current geological usage (Jackson 1997). In this part of Puna District, high vegetation is found in many cave entrances, making "pukas" (depressions or collapse holes) look like *kipuka*s (localized elevations above the surface of lava flows).

We are unaware of any studies by other archaeologists in any section of Keala Cave or Kazumura Cave discussed by Emory. The confusion caused by his error may have obstructed studies that should have been conducted long ago. Fortunately, the cultural content of these sections of the caves is largely intact, despite the accelerating urbanization of the area. State-of-the-art professional studies following up on Emory's observations should not be further delayed.

In some ways, it seems almost regrettable that the cave Emory attempted to name for Shipman never existed as such. In any event, further use of the name "Herbert C. Shipman Cave" or "Shipman Cave" would be misleading and is inappropriate. Future references to features and content of the caves described by Emory should be attributed either to Keala Cave or to Kazumura Cave, whichever is correct.

The Puzzle of the Charcoal

When mapping the 2,953-meter upslope section of Keala Cave in 1993 (July 21, participants: Stephan Kempe, Stephen Smith, Steve Kadel, Scott Harris; July 23, participants: Stephan Kempe, David Hubbart, Sue Dotson; and July 31, participants: Stephan Kempe, Ole Fulks, Thomas Hargrave), small bits of charcoal were noticed on the floor. Although not mentioned by Emory, they were found all the way to the turnaround point of the Emory party between stations 96 and 97, 2,343 meters upslope from the entrance and even beyond, to the very end of the cave at station 119 (see Figure 3). Was this charcoal overlooked by Emory and of ancient origin, was it left by members of his party and/or immediate follow-up investigations by Eddie Haa or others, or was it comparatively recent?

The upslope end of Keala Cave is caused by an intrusion of black lava that can be followed for 196 meters on the cave floor before it plugs the upslope continuation of the cave passage. Neither this prominent feature of the cave nor a spectacular four-meter-high lavafall 250 meters upslope from the turnaround point was noted in Emory's report, suggesting that Emory did not go to them. Before reaching the lower end of this intrusion, the downhill end of a secondary ceiling is encountered at survey station 109. The secondary ceiling divides the passage into an upper and a lower level, creating a sort of balcony across the passage. When we first reached this place, we noticed a few stones piled up below the balcony to facilitate climbing up onto the secondary ceiling, indicating that someone had already scouted the upper level.

In 1995 a survey team (participants: Stephan Kempe, Jan Strassenburg, Jens Hartmann, Ole Fulks) revisited this site in order to explore and map the upper level in the hope of continuing above and beyond the intrusion that plugs the lower passage. This upper passage starts with the "Red Room," a small breakdown cupola obstructed by red lava breakdown. One has to scramble up this breakdown and can, after a few meters, climb down again to the floor of the secondary ceiling. From here a very small opening continues (about 30 cm high). Only one of us (S. Kempe) pushed this lead; it gives access to a series of small, glazed, flat-bottomed cupolas no longer

than ten meters and just high enough to sit up in. The upper passage ends here with no hope of continuation.

Unexpectedly, charcoal was found even in this remote section of the cave. Our first thought was that it might have been washed in through cracks, but the ceiling does not have wide enough joints to allow passage of sizable chunks of charcoal. This discovery indicates that explorers had not only gone to the very end of Keala Cave, negotiating several vertical lavafalls, but also had climbed up the secondary ceiling and squeezed into this terminal room on their bellies (see Figure 3). The end of Keala Cave is almost three kilometers (2,953 m) from Ladder Puka. Even with modern equipment (shoes, helmets, gloves, head lamps), it takes about one hour for each trip. With *kukui* nut torches and bare heads and hands, the time necessary for ancient Hawaiians probably would have been multiplied tremendously.

After the 1996 determination of the source of the 1945 artifacts, we decided to date the charcoal from the upper end of Keala to determine if it was left by early explorers or by someone in Emory's party (or by someone entering the cave after 1945). K. Allred therefore collected three samples in December 1996: Keala 1 (0.2 g), burnt *kukui* nut, collected ten meters upslope from station 109 in the upper passage; Keala 2 (0.2 g), burnt *kukui* nut fragments, collected near station 119 at the end of the cave, on the black lava intrusion; and Keala 3 (0.4 g), wood charcoal from a large chunk, collected seven meters upslope from station 109 in the upper passage near sample Keala 1.

Because of the small sizes of the samples, they had to be dated by carbon 14 accelerator mass spectrometry (^{14}C-AMS). We submitted the three samples to Dr. J. van der Plicht of the Center for Isotope Research of the University of Groningen, Netherlands, at the beginning of February 1997 and received the results in June 1997: Keala 1 (GrA-6989), 250 ± 50 B.P.; Keala 2 (GrA-6990), 200 ± 50 B.P.; and Keala 3 (GrA-6991), 150 ± 40 B.P. "B.P." denotes years before present—before A.D. 1950—that is, before widespread atomic-bomb testing was conducted.

At first glance these results indeed suggest pre-Emory dates for the charcoal. Yet they seem to be relatively far apart. Unfortunately, the carbon 14 inventory of the atmosphere shows large wiggles in the last three hundred years, making exact correlation of carbon 14 dates with calendar years difficult for this period. Employing cellulose from tree ring–dated wood from Germany, Ireland, and western America, Stuiver and Pearson (1993) have published the best current calibration dates. This curve (Figure 4) is believed to be representative for the northern hemisphere, since carbon reservoir modeling showed that differences in carbon 14 "ages" should not exceed twenty years (Braziunas, Fung, and Stuiver 1991).


KEALA CAVE
MAUKA SECTION
0 5 10 15 20 25 m
map
0 2 4 6 8 10 m
cross - sections
true
mag
11°
N
I
II
III
FALL HALL
MEANDER HALL
PAINTED PASSAGE
STALACTITE PASSAGE
MAIN STREET
LADDER ENTRANCE
(Poi Pounder Puka)
light hole
raft plug to upper passage
sagged ceiling
upper passage
squeeze - out on preterminal flow breakdown faces
collapse to upper passage
stalactites
low crawl
upper passage discontinued
3 m crawl
ledge
cairn
crawl
collapsed low upper passage
charcoal
drained lava pond
1,2 m lavafall
longitudinal section
lavafalls entrance
- 3 stone settings wall
climb
goat bones
sling stones
shells, charcoal
upper passage
2-4 climb
strata
lower passage
upper passage breakdown
lavafall 3,2 m
blister
hand prints
deposits
crawl 1,0 m high
crawl 1,2 m high
cave cricket
low passage
Roots
stalagmites
stalactites
three plastic jars
rafts
waterfall
crack with waterfall
grotto
roots
drained section
too low
1 m low angle lavafall
lavafall 1m
lavafall 0,6 m
rat skeleton
waterfalls
stalactites (2-3 1,5cm long)
alcove
passage 1,8m high



FIGURE 3. **Map of the upper part of Keala Cave between the Ladder Puka (Emory's Poi Pounder Puka) and the black lava plug at station 119. Note the area with handprints at station 32, the turnaround of the Emory party at station 97, a four-meter-high lavafall at station 105/106, which can be free-climbed, the beginning of a secondary ceiling upslope from station 109 (Red Room), and the tongue of intruded black lava 196 meters long. Samples Keala 1 and 3 were collected at the upslope side of the Red Room, and sample Keala 2 was collected at the end of the cave at station 119.** (Map by S. Kempe)



FIGURE 4. **Calibration curve (heavy line) between carbon 14 dates (y-axis) and calendar years (x-axis) for the period A.D. 1450 to 1950 (after Stuiver and Pearson 1993). The bell-shaped curve on the y-axis gives the statistical probability of the carbon 14 date for sample Keala 1. The spiky curve on the x-axis depicts the probability distribution that sample Keala 1 dates fall into certain calendar years. The total area under this curve represents a probability of one and is equal to the area of the bell-shaped curve. The horizontal lines mark the intercepts for all three Keala samples with the calibration line. Vertical lines show the most probable period for all three samples.** (Graph courtesy Dr. J. van der Plicht, Groningen)

When plotting the three Keala carbon 14 ages onto the Stuiver and Pearson graph, the difficulties in interpreting the dates become readily apparent (Figure 4). Even though the age of Keala 1 corresponds to only one calibration curve point (i.e., A.D. 1660), one has to take the statistical measuring error (1 sigma = 50 years) into account as well. It is shown by the bell-shaped curve on the y-axis. The possible dates for sample Keala 1 range from A.D. 1470 to A.D. 1940, as suggested by the lower curve on the x-axis,

the area of which is equivalent to a probability of one and is the same as below the bell-shaped curve. The most probable dates are centered at around A.D. 1660 and 1790.

Keala 2 is best correlated with three calendar dates, A.D. 1670, 1790–1800, and 1940; Keala 3 to A.D. 1680, 1730, 1810, and 1930 with statistically possible dates covering the last four centuries.

Taken individually, these dates do not tell when the charcoal was deposited. However, if one makes the likely assumption (based on the scarcity of the charcoal) that only one group of explorers visited the remote parts of the cave, then the periods A.D. 1660–1680 and (less probably) 1750–1800 are favored. In these periods the sum of the probabilities of the three ages would be largest. Furthermore, in this period the large difference in the three carbon 14 ages is minimized, because the later part of the seventeenth century is the steepest part of the calibration curve (Figure 4, left).

The statistically favored time of the visit, the years A.D. 1660 to 1680, would be in accordance with Hawaiian history. A population peak occurred around this time, inducing widespread tribal warfare (Kirch 1985). During this time especially, many people would have taken refuge in caves. Keala Pit was an underground fortress, and Ladder Puka (Emory's Poi Pounder Puka) was used as an underground living area. The motives for explorers to push themselves to the cave's limits may have been multiple: First, they could simply have looked for an underground escape route. They could have been searching for hidden enemies or hidden enemy bones (to destroy or use their mana). Possibly they also scouted the cave for resources like obsidian (even though we did not notice the removal of glassy parts from the intruded black lava).

The second time period when the three samples converge is the late eighteenth century. This period marks the war of unification of the islands under King Kamehameha I, when cave use and cave exploration might have peaked again.

It should be kept in mind that interpreting the carbon 14 dates in this manner is speculative, and the possibility that the charcoal was left by the Emory party or shortly thereafter cannot be completely excluded. The charcoal certainly is not more recent than 1950 (it is not bomb carbon 14–contaminated). Nevertheless, it is not likely that the charcoal derived from the time of Emory's visit or later. First, we know that at least one person in the Emory party used a flashlight (plus candles). Second, charcoal is found in almost all parts of Keala, even in those parts that clearly were not visited by Emory. Further, Keala Pit and the Ladder Puka served as living areas during times of war, making it likely that other parts of the cave were explored

simultaneously by Hawaiians. Further, two of the samples are burned *kukui* nuts, traditionally used for lighting by early Hawaiians. Although *kukui* nuts still are in limited use as a lighting source in rural Puna District (O. Fulks, pers. com., 1997), they were largely replaced by kerosene torches early in this century (Brigham 1902). Although petroleum products may have been in short supply early in World War II, kerosene for torches should have been available in Puna by the time of Emory's visit. In fact, burned remnants of such torches have been found in Kazumura Cave.

Other Artifacts

Apart from the artifacts of Emory's party, the charcoal, and some stones piled up as a climbing aid, another interesting set of artifacts was found on 21 July 1993 in the upper part of Keala: handprints (Kempe and Ketz-Kempe 1997). A set of prints of approximately five hands was noted on the wall upslope from station 32, 720 meters upslope from the entrance. This section of the cave was consequently called "Painted Passage." These positive handprints were made by "inking" the flattened palm with light brown mud that occurs copiously on the walls of the lower part of this section and then pressing the hand onto the dark brown walls of the upper part of the cave wall. It is not astonishing that the resulting prints look similar to the handprints in some of the paleolithic picture caves of France and Spain, where about twenty positive and five hundred negative handprints occur (Lorblanchet 1997). Currently there is no way of telling if the Keala Cave prints were made by prehistoric Hawaiians or by someone in Emory's party, possibly even himself, illustrating "European cave art" to his guides. Since these prints are near to Ladder Puka, it is also possible that they are very recent. K. Allred noticed some burnt *kukui* nuts next to the prints, which could be a hint that the prints are of old age. Emory did not mention these prints in his report, just as he does not mention the charcoal in the upslope section of Keala Cave. He could have simply overlooked them.

NOTE

We are grateful to Bobby Camara for typed transcripts of the Boundary Commission testimony and for bringing that testimony to our attention. Further, we are deeply grateful to all the members and cooperators of the Hawaii Speleological Survey who made possible the field studies and maps described here. Dr. J. van der Plicht is thanked for the ^{14}C-AMS age determinations on the charcoal, and Thomas Hargrave helped in pinpointing the exact date of the *Honolulu Advertiser* page found in the cave.

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EDITOR'S FORUM

TOWARD HISTORICIZING GENDER IN POLYNESIA: ON VILSONI HERENIKO'S *WOVEN GODS* AND REGIONAL PATTERNS

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This article considers possible parallels between Rotuman and Samoan gender history through Vilsoni Hereniko's book *Woven Gods.* Hereniko draws upon the work of Victor Turner to analyze his Rotuman data, arguing that wedding clowns reverse normative social structures. Wedding clowns are expert female practitioners of Rotuman joking discourse. This discourse is not only ritualized on special occasions but is also an everyday informal discourse and, I argue, is in this sense normative; it counterbalances respect discourse, which is likewise practiced in ritual (ceremonial) contexts but also in everyday polite contexts. In the Samoan precolonial sex-gender system, males and females had different discursive specialties—males in politesse, females in joking. Joking was often sexual in nature and indexed practices at odds with contemporary virginal ideals for girls. Rotuman wedding clowns may represent traces of precolonial feminine gender practices that resemble precolonial Samoan practices. Further, they offer a running commentary on sex-gender colonialism.

Vilsoni Hereniko takes the license to be a scholar-trickster—to document custom or to write myth as his thought processes and creativity demand. To take is also to give: Hereniko gives his readers a kind of permission that I intend to take. In this essay, written in response to his work, I will be my own kind of trickster—the woman clowning at the wedding, so to speak—taking the opportunity to ask questions that Hereniko's *Woven Gods*

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(1995) raises for me, rather than trying to answer them. I also exploit a possibility offered in "The Death of the Author" by Barthes (1977), who sees the text as an open field for play rather than a closed object; every reading, in Barthes's view, goes on writing the text. Let me begin as Rotumans do when clowning around (Howard 1990:269), saying *"se fek,"* "don't be angry" with me for taking *Woven Gods* as a venue in which to explore, comparatively, my interest in discourses on self and Polynesian sex-gender history.

Turner and Rotuman Clowns as Queens-for-a-Day

Through much of his book, Hereniko expands on Victor Turner's seminal work on carnival (1977). Turner believes that there is social structure and that in carnival there is, temporarily, antistructure. Carnival-type occasions (1) represent a return to a purer form of collectivity than one usually finds in social life—communitas—and (2) evacuate collective frustration with normative structures. The communitas and release offered by carnival renew and reinvigorate social structure even while they deconstruct it.

In weddings, according to Hereniko, the normative pattern of Rotuman social structure is reversed in a seemingly chaotic play (1995:127). Normally, chiefs and men rule. Normally, Rotuman females are subordinate, act shy, and must be careful to respect propriety. But the woman who rules the wedding jokes with men about sex, her banter bringing out the sexual/scatological undertones of every encounter (ibid.:51, 80, 130, 133). Brandishing her *poki,* a large stick that is self-consciously both scepter and phallus, the clown orders everyone about, playing a role that is recognizable throughout Polynesia (ibid.:93, 158, 129, 143–166). In Samoa, for example, the clown, *fa'aaluma,* is literally "one who humiliates," and that is what queen clown does at Rotuman weddings; chiefs kneel at her behest and men dance absurdly. "A Rotuman wedding," Hereniko says, "is an arena in which chiefs and men learn humility" (ibid.:78).

Drawing out the implications of this argument, one might speculate that as Rotuman chiefs are to commoners, so Rotuman men are to women. On wedding days the entire "chiefs are to commoners as men are to women" ensemble is reversed via women. For Turner and for Hereniko, carnival and clowning allow people to let off steam in reaction to the frustration exacted by everyday social rules. Naturally, these rules are least rewarding for those who are oppressed and marginalized—aptly represented by women.

This inversion idea has been used to explain more than clowning; it is perhaps the most honored explanation of spirit possession (Lewis 1971; Bourguignon 1969), which is seen as another occasion for reversing social structure. And these two types of events—carnival and spirit possession—

are connected, at least in the Pacific. Carnival events are often at least figuratively ruled by spirits. Like their Samoan comedic relatives who perform in the theater known as Spirit House, Hereniko's Rotuman clowns are kin to ghosts; the entertainment forms associated with them may be rooted in ritual dance aimed at spirit harnessing (Hereniko 1995:80, 134).[1]

Hereniko cites Bradd Shore frequently on these topics, because he believes there are many cultural patterns accurately depicted by Shore in Samoa that also prevail in Rotuma. Shore sees those Samoan high-spirited occasions that Turner would call carnival (e.g., dancing parties, comedy nights) and Samoan spirit possession as forms of "conflict management" (1977:307; 1978). Shore calls this type of management "homeostatic," meaning that periodically reversing normative structures allows a society to remain in a state of balance or homeostasis. Mead ([1928] 1961:110–121), before Turner or Shore, saw dance similarly, and dance was a part of Samoan carnivals long before missionaries tried (unsuccessfully) to ban it. Samoan social rules, in her view, demand the suppression of individuality. Samoan dance, which Mead sees as very individualistic, effects a normative reversal vis-à-vis individuality, making its everyday suppression tolerable.

This is good theory, but no theory tells the whole story. Rotuman weddings have further stories to tell. Like Hereniko, but from another direction, I too suspect that there are many parallels between Samoa and Rotuma; further, these parallels are suggestive of larger Polynesian patterns. Based on my Samoan work, therefore, I want to raise a series of questions about the Rotuman data, thereby offering an alternative view of Rotuman weddings.

Hereniko frequently suggests that the clown's power has contracted, indicating culture change in this institution, which he dates roughly to the 1960s and 1970s (1995:96). Inasmuch as Rotuman weddings do reverse normative structures, are these reversals of (1) traditional social structures or (2) of social structures that date to the colonial period, reversals that have paled in part because colonialism has? In other words, what if wedding clowns comprise a figure in which one might read a colonial history, rather than merely reflecting Rotuman culture in a synchronous sense? What if the spirits who figuratively rule at Rotuman weddings in the person of queen clown are also historical ghosts, the ghostly survivors of an earlier age, with something to say about precontact Rotuman culture?

Hereniko sees not only clowning but sex roles in Rotuma as very like sex roles in Samoa, as those roles have been analyzed by Shore (1977, 1981, 1982). Thus, following Shore on Samoan roles (1977:416), Hereniko says that "the male wanders farther afield into the wilder and more dangerous territories," while "the female is more concerned with maintaining received order, sanitation, and cleanliness" (1995:62, 76). Like Freeman (1983), Here-

niko sees these sex roles as traditional. But what if they are not? Might Rotuman wedding clowning be a shrunken version of a precolonial cultural world that was more gender-balanced, in which the clown's queen-for-a-day sovereignty was for more than a day? What if these gender roles—both celebrated and turned topsy-turvy at Rotuman weddings—have been subject to historical revision, and—more significant—what if they have been subject to a Victorian colonial revision that inscribed all too familiar gender biases and inequities upon these relationships? These kinds of revisions might well be cross-culturally recurrent in Polynesia: missionaries, from the seafaring John Williams onward, were oh so thorough in their labors there. Such revisions would resemble the variations on a theme that one finds in truly old elements of Polynesian cultures occurring in different Polynesian locales.

Joking Discourse and the Self

I want to offer a supplement to the now-classic Turnerian view of carnival, which structures much of Hereniko's study, and to the models of clowning, spirit possession, and gender developed in Shore's work on Samoa as applied by Hereniko to Rotuma. To do so, I must make a detour into my work on the self (Mageo 1995, 1998). I argue that there are universally recurrent discourses on self that are key to understanding the cultural construction of personhood and that implicate other areas of cultural life—comedy, spirit possession, and gender among them.

Cultures begin with a premise about what it means to be a person, which is inevitably contradicted by experience. A moral discourse therefore arises, preaching that, although people may not be as their culture construes them, it is good and virtuous to be so. This discourse, furthermore, condemns contradicting tendencies. Ultimately, however, moral discourse succeeds best at highlighting these contradictory tendencies rather than suppressing them. In response to contradiction, two further discourses arise, one of which I call formal and the other, informal. In formal discourse everyone is expected to enter into cultural performances, with both gestural and verbal aspects, which convey the values lauded in moral discourse. In informal discourse everyone enters into performances that express a rhetorical "as-if" version of those tendencies condemned in moral discourse. There is yet another discourse that develops out of this series, but its consideration is unnecessary for my purposes here.[2]

My idea is that what Turner would call "antistructure" is actually structured into everyday talk, being fundamental to a major cultural discourse—informal discourse. This discourse is not saved for special antistructural occasions but is part of culture's daily balancing act. Formal discourse is

regent on ceremonial occasions, just as informal discourse is regent on carnival occasions, but neither is reserved for these privileged arenas. In this sense what I call informal discourse is part of a homeostasis, but one that saturates quotidian existence. I argue that all discourses on self feature norms. Rather than being antinormative, informal discourse is only in a special, limited sense antimoral: I say "in a special sense" because the antimorality of informal discourse is not literally meant.[3] I turn to the Samoan example for further clarity.

Samoans see people as role players in hierarchically tiered groups. In Samoan moral discourse people say that everyone should "stand at their posts," meaning one should humbly play one's appointed role in the group, deferring to superiors—a sentiment that is often contradicted in practice. Accommodating a contradicting human nature, Samoans define two further discourses: (1) a formal discourse in which everyone talks as if others are his or her superiors and affects an as-if deference toward them and (2) an informal discourse in which people playfully put down one another in jest.

In precolonial Samoa these discourses were performed at rituals and carnivals but were also everyday forms of talk. At Samoan ceremonies people spoke with ostentatious deference toward those with whom, before and after the ceremony, they might war (Churchward 1887:99–101). These performances, however, had mundane correlatives. Thus, in the nineteenth century, Robert Louis Stevenson watched Samoan children on the streets of Apia "my-lord" one another when they played marbles. Frequently, Samoans greet and address one another with high-flown courtesy and ceremoniousness, although this ceremoniousness is rhetorical: it is not meant as an indicator of any thoroughgoing deference to others. The boys that Stevenson observed were, after all, trying to beat one another at marbles.

In what were the most important carnival occasions, Joking Nights (Pōula), people performatively put down others, albeit in hilarious jests that were both verbal and choreographic (Churchward 1887:229–30; Krämer [1902] 1995:366–381). But Joking Night jests were highly elaborated versions of an informal discourse that was and still is the salt and pepper of everyday Samoan conversation. Traditionally, this discourse turns on two jest genres called *faipona* and *ula* (as in Pōula, Joking Night), illustrated below in that order.

> If a person should jeer a young woman as she might be passing by remarking freely on her person saying she was diseased or ill formed she would instantly throw off her cloth & expose herself in every possible direction & pass on. A respectable young man who had been residing among them some time informed me that when

> he first went on shore among them the females in great numbers gathered round him & some took off their mats before him exposing their persons as much as possible to his view. Perceiving him bashful the whole of the women old & young did the same & began dancing in that state before him desiring him not to be bashful or angry as it was Faa Samoa . . . or the Samoan fashion. (Williams [1830–1832] 1984:232)

To *faipona* is to lampoon, usually by carping on salient and risible personal characteristics.[4] To *ula* is to tease, preferably about sexual or scatological subjects. In Samoa to *faipona* or to *ula* is to playfully attack another's dignity: they are "as-if" put-downs. At Joking Nights the first part of the program was decorative and orderly, but joking dominated the program's second part. Although the entertainment mode was at once theatrical and choreographic—there being no real dividing line between the two—in part two the emphasis fell initially on theatrical versions of *faipona,* moving on to choreographic versions of *ula.*[5]

Shore argues that in Samoan social structure there are two predominant contexts, one of which he calls complementary (in which people's statuses vary) and the other, symmetrical (in which people's statuses are approximate) (1977, 1978, 1982). These contexts are related to but not coincident with formal and informal discourses, respectively. The difference is that Shore means to—and in my view does—describe actual Samoan social structure; the formal and informal discourses I describe are rhetorical rather than reflective of real social structural variables like status, age, or gender. Thus Stevenson's marbles-playing boys who addressed one another so formally did not inhabit what Shore calls a "complementary" context, that is, a situation in which social status varies: these street urchins, as Stevenson calls them, shared a common social status. Conversely, on Joking Nights and at like events, authorities were a particular target of put-downs (Sloan 1941:68; Shore 1977:318–331; Kneubuhl 1987; Sinavaiana 1992a:214). In other words, people affected an informal discourse as if no significant status differences existed between them on occasions when in fact such differences did exist.

Formal and informal discourses are structured in the sense that they represent highly patterned language games, but, like Turner's carnival, they can also be seen as deconstructive of real social structural variables like status, age, or gender.[6] By bringing a rhetorical relation to bear upon these structures, formal and informal discourses show that people may act in line with them or in freedom from them, implying that institutionalized social structures are conventional and arbitrary rather than natural and necessary. Contra Turner, who sees deconstructive practices as the flag of carnival, I

see them as a normal part of how we talk to one another, although we may be only dimly aware of the far-reaching, culture-challenging implications of what we do.

As in my discourse model, clowning at Rotuman weddings is but a high example of an informal discourse that is structured into everyday life. Hereniko gives evidence of the day-to-day occurrence of the clown's wedding discourse at the opening of his book, which begins with a return to Rotuma. Sailing on a small ship, he loses his quarters to a high-status family. Bunked uncomfortably in a hallway, he ends up spending his time on deck, where an eccentrically dressed middle-aged woman begins and sustains joking repartee (1995:6). This is, Hereniko both realizes and remembers, the way Rotumans entertain one another, and it happens in countless venues. "Card games and other informal contexts are usually marked by a lot of teasing banter," he relates (ibid.:15). Cards, furthermore, "turn everyone into a clown" (ibid.:13). But this clowning talk is not confined to so common a pastime as games; it is also what makes routine work lighter when one is net fishing in the lagoon or farming in the taro plantation (ibid.:15). If old women are the ruling spirits of informal discourse both at carnivals and in daily life, what does this say about Rotuman sex roles? For clues let us turn to the Samoan case.

Discourse and Gender History

In precolonial Samoa, formal and informal discourses were gender-marked, men tending to specialize in formal discourse and women in informal discourse (Mageo 1998:119–140). Men held most important titles, and the central actors in ceremonies were the titled representatives of groups. Ceremonies, therefore, constituted a male-dominated province, and, from an early age, males practiced a ceremonial discourse of genealogy and esoteric allusions. Thus Mead says: "It is an exceptional girl who can give her great-grandfather's name, the exceptional boy who cannot give his genealogy in traditional form for several generations. While the boy of sixteen or seventeen is eagerly trying to master the esoteric allusiveness of the talking chief whose style he admires, the girl of the same age learns the minimum of etiquette" ([1928] 1961:82–83).

In old Samoa the village was the basic political unit, but villages were fractious (Davidson 1967; Gilson 1970). Visiting, feasting, celebrating, partying, and marrying between them forged larger political solidarities. These activities were hosted by the *aualuma,* the association of native-born village women (Moyle 1975:239; Shore 1977:318; Meleiseā 1987:28). Hosting entailed entertaining visitors, and in these entertainments women took the

leading role, as in the earliest description of such a night by the missionary Williams.[7]

> The performers are divided into companies. . . . The young virgin girls taking the lead . . . enter the house entirely naked & commence their dance. The fullgrown women then follow after. Then come the elderly women all of whom are entirely naked. During their dancing they throw themselves in all imaginable positions in order to make the most full exposure of their persons to the whole company. In addition to this there are several persons supplied with flambeaux which they hold as near to the dancers as possible. During the whole of the time of performing the females are using the most vile, taunting, bantering language to the men. . . . The men then enter and being rather more bashful than the fair sex they [bear] . . . a narrow leaf in their hands. . . . The ladies however will not . . . be content with this return for the full & free exhibition they have made & commence a furious attack on them in language suitable to the occasion. The men at length throw away their apology for a covering & make a full exposure of their persons using lights as the females had done before them. (Williams [1830–1832] 1984:247–248)

Joking Nights were held on the evening after major ceremonies but were not the only occasions for jesting performances: in welcoming and parting celebrations *(ʻaiavā),* entertainment was also of a jesting nature.[8]

In old Rotuma, too, there were once more occasions, such as weddings, on which informal discourse was grandly celebrated and that were, in this sense, operative equivalents to ceremonies. There were *saʻa,* fine white mat weaving bees in which a woman clowned and had authority over men who wandered nearby (Hereniko 1995:114, 116–118). There were Beach Picnics in which a clowning woman was a catalyst to games among young people that involved "touching, embracing, and teasing banter" (ibid.:19).[9] "The Rotumans have always been fond of games on . . . sandy beaches, especially on moonlight nights," Eason explains, when "they used the village playhouses for dancing." These houses "acquired a good deal of notoriety and were suppressed by the missions," but not very effectively until the late 1880s (Eason [1951]:23).

There were also *tautoga* (Hereniko 1995:16–17, 88), traditional mass dances that began in an orderly fashion but became increasingly free and in which a female clown broke away to prance about, playing "the bird" and inciting laughter.[10] Energetic dancing on these occasions was often a form of

choreographic jest (ibid.:14), just as it was on Samoan Joking Nights.[11] Thus, Hereniko says, at such a dance "exaggerated body movements, facial contortions, or suggestive sexual antics are the standard techniques" (ibid.:17). Compare Churchward's clearly biased nineteenth-century portrayal of Samoan girls performing at a Pōula:

> Any stranger to Samoa . . . on his first introduction to such a party of girls, seated in front of him so demurely and properly, would require but slight provocation to persuade himself that he saw an eightfold incarnation of all that is modest and good. Alas for such a man's feelings should he . . . witness the very extravagant performance of these same damsels, when fairly roused and hounded into delirium by the approving shouts of the audience! . . . These same quiet-looking . . . damsels are quite capable of becoming so excited . . . as really to lose all command of their actions, distorting their countenances in the most hideous manner, and performing such undesirable antics, that . . . they appear at last more like a lot of demons let loose from below, than the angels upon earth they at first appeared. (1887:229–230; cf. Williams [1830–1832] 1984: 247–248)

If Samoan informal discourse was the special province of women in which they took the lead, there must have existed a better balance between gender talk and gender power in old Samoa than was found in colonial Samoa. Eason says of old Rotuma, "Women seem always to have had power and influence, and very little work to do" ([1951]:12). In Samoa, Christianization and colonialization had an unbalancing gender effect, as I will describe below. Did Rotuma suffer similarly? Once again, I turn to the Samoan case and its grounding in the self, about which I can speak more knowledgeably; then I will return to further interrogate the Rotuman data.

Colonialism and Gender Clowning

Cross-culturally there are two common premises about what it means to be a self: an egocentric premise in which the self is defined in terms of the individual's inner experiences and a sociocentric premise in which the self is defined in terms of people's group roles.[12] Societies featuring different premises also define formal and informal contexts in diverse ways. In the egocentric case, contexts are defined by how intimate the individual is with others: when interpersonal relations are close, the context is private (informal); when they are not, the context is public (formal). In the sociocentric

case, contexts are defined by group types. Thus in Samoa, when groups are composed of people differing in status, they are formal; when groups are composed of people of approximate status, they are informal. Shore calls formal contexts complementary and informal contexts symmetrical (1977, 1978, 1982), and I have argued that people's talk may actually counterpoint these contexts rather than discursively replicating them. I have, however, a further difference from Shore here: he sees the binary social division of life into contexts as a distinguishing feature of Samoan culture; I see formal-informal context splits as a universally important feature of social structure, albeit differently defined (private-public, hierarchical-peer, and so forth) depending on the culture's fundamental premise about the self (egocentric, sociocentric, or other). I do not mean that there are only two important contexts in Samoa or elsewhere, but rather that people sort contexts (which are extremely various) into binary categories.

American culture tends to be egocentric, and our context split is between public and private, but this was not always the case in our English parent culture—English culture before the nineteenth century. It may seem that I stray here from the Rotuman and Samoan case, but it was nineteenth-century English culture from which the original missions to Samoa and to Rotuma came, and so some historical perspective on the English culture of contexts and genders is prerequisite to understanding contact and subsequent culture change in these places.[13]

Late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English culture was ensconced in a context revolution and a debate about gender and sexuality attendant upon this revolution. Levy argues that internalized values, as opposed to values located in a community's shared social space, are concomitant with capitalism; in a capitalist world communities break down and individuals circulate among locales in search of work (1973:347–354; 1974). I argue the same is true of the self (Mageo 1998:29–30, 144, 147). In mid-eighteenth-century English society, the Industrial Revolution effected a change from sociocentric values and a sociocentric self toward privately held values and an egocentric self.[14] During the same period a redefinition of social contexts was taking place along with a reorganization of gender roles that revolved around contexts (Davidoff and Hall 1987). A private domestic sphere was partitioned off from public life. Particularly in the middle classes (of which missionaries were members or fledgling members), women migrated into this domestic sphere, giving up former roles in the public realm.[15] Whereas the parlor had once served many purposes—for example, as an office for an adjacent factory in which a wife might work as an assistant manager—it was gradually purified, coming to represent a haven deeply tinged with personal sentiment and insulated, along with its female inhabitants, from the crasser, competitive world of men.

Missionaries to Samoa educated converts in Christian doctrine, with particular emphasis on sexual ethics and in an egocentric context split between public and domestic realms. Girls were trained not only to read but also in sewing and other domestic arts (Mills 1844). "Our energies need to be directed," says the Reverend Mills of the London Missionary Society, "as much in raising up pious and educated wives as in preparing Native Male Teachers for the Work" (ibid.). Seminaries in contemporary Western and American Samoa (Piaula School, Papauta School, Malua School, Mapusaga Fou School, the Catholic Catechist School, and others) still matriculate husbands and their wives, training wives in the domestic arts.

I have claimed that in old Samoa the self was sociocentric and the context split was between hierarchical groups, in which statuses differed (formal), and peer groups in which they did not (informal). This split inspired a formal and an informal discourse, even though, in these discourses, contexts lost their actual social structural mooring and turned rhetorical. I also described how the informal joking that women led at Joking Nights could be raucous and wild. As Samoa became increasingly Christian over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a belief in premarital chastity for all women along with the belief that women belonged in the domestic realm rather than on the public stage compromised their role as entertainers.[16]

This change in the gendering of Samoan discourses was unfortunate for gender balances: it meant that men came to dominate a context that had formerly been the most important feminine province and sphere of authority. Older women were and are exceptional in this regard. Even though they were no longer a part of institutionalized comedy, they remained notorious for their clowning.[17] A plenitude of examples crowd my mind, but one must suffice: "One elderly and dignified *tama'ita'i* [titled lady] is celebrated among the women of her village for a particular dance she does; completely silent and straight faced using eye movements to express passion, resignation, pain, strain, surprise, and release, she parodies a whole sequence of events in sexual intercourse, enacting both the husband and wife roles" (Schoeffel 1979:217).

Gradually boys took up the comedic banner in a new comedy theater called Spirit House. Thus male comics replaced females as leaders of informal discourse, but their signature joke was feigning femininity.[18] By acting in a transvestite style, they left bodily traces of abandoned practices. In Spirit House the actors were called spirits, *aitu,* possibly because spirits were conceived of as shape shifters, as actors also were.[19] But there is another sense in which these figures were spirit-affiliated. Samoan male transvestites and notorious jesting older women, I believe, are cultural memories—ghosts of a pre-Christian, precolonial age. Could it be that Rotuman female clowns, like their Samoan sisters, embody a cultural memory trace of

a time when being spirit-affiliated meant more than it means today? Spirits represented to Christian ministers all those aspects of Pacific cultures they would cast out—exorcise from cultural identity. Spirits are, therefore, special cultural markers of pre-Christian culture, although they also tend to be compounded symbolically with anticolonial commentaries, as I will later describe.

Gender Imports and Virgin Brides?

"Traditional Rotuman culture," Hereniko assures his readers, "has always had a strict code of conduct regarding premarital sex for girls, as reflected in its emphasis on virginity for the bride" (1995:65). He goes on to describe a number of traditional wedding customs that are reminiscent of high-status marriages in old Samoa, such as the display of fine mats (ibid.:120–126). In pre-Christian Samoa, however, there were actually two kinds of marriage, corresponding to the two contextual discourses.

High-status marriages took place in a formal discourse and required virgin brides, whose defloration was the supreme moment of the ceremony (Tuiteleleapaga 1980:69; Freeman 1983:231). Lower-status marriages were elopements that often began on Joking Nights and in which virginity was a "requirement" more honored in name and in the breech than in body (Krämer [1902] 1995:377; Stuebel 1976:30; Turner [1884] 1984:95–96; Pritchard 1866:134; Schultz [1911] n.d.:29–30; Tuiteleleapaga 1980:68–69). Christianization imported a new kind of marriage, church weddings, which became every girl's formal wedding. In church weddings common people appropriated the accoutrements of high-status marriages (as much as their means permitted them), mainly the display of wealth. There was also an insistence on the bride's virginity, but this virginity was taken on faith rather than tried by a defloration, because missionaries so thoroughly disapproved.

The two pre-Christian marriage forms made sense in the Samoan sex-gender system. Status and titles were life's aim in old Samoa, and this aim was pursued by extended family groups *('āiga).* One of the most important means by which *'āiga* progressed in status was through their daughters and, even more important, through their daughters' offspring, who were, ideally, *gafata i luma,* "genealogic steps forward" (Hjarnø 1979–1980:91–93). A high-status girl remained virginal until her family arranged a union with a titled partner. That way, the baby's genealogy and correlative status would be exalted. Because lineage was cognatically calculated, lower-status girls could not hope to bear truly exalted babies, but if a lower-status girl bore a high-status male's baby, its genealogy would be elevated at least through the paternal line. Such offspring opened not only genealogical avenues to status, but practical avenues to the resources and titles of the father's family.[20]

In the project of bearing high-status offspring, lower-status girls acted in a more entrepreneurial capacity than their high-status counterparts. On Joking Nights, flamboyant, bawdy banter that was both verbal and choreographic gave these girls license to flaunt their charms. Then a girl might meet a male of lineage accompanying a traveling party whose "duty" it was, the first German governor of Western Samoa says, "to contract as many marriages as possible for the good of his village" (Schultz [1911] n.d.:29–30; see also Pritchard 1866:134–135). After all, descendants forged alliances between villages, which decentralized and fractious Samoans needed.

Did Joking Nights have Rotuman analogs? If Rotumans have always insisted on virgin brides, why did they also hold those mass dances at which young people moved with energetic abandon and the Beach Picnics at which they touched, embraced each other, and bantered shamelessly?

In Rotuma too there seems to be a difference in the sexual practices of higher-status and lower-status girls. Higher-status girls were supposed to preserve their virginity before marriage and might be clubbed to death should they fail to do so; lower-status girls "usually had a screened off room in the father's house in which to receive night visitors, the idea being to attract men to the *hoag* (family) and to receive presents" (Eason [1951]:12). Children born as a result of visiting and gift giving between unmarried women and men, Eason adds, were "no disgrace." Indeed it was said that an early barrier to Christianization was that lower-status Rotuman girls visited foreign ships to receive gifts from sailors, as did their Hawaiian cousins; the many white vagabonds who were resident at the time told Rotumans that missionaries would make them give up this custom (Eason [1951]:49; Sahlins 1981). Even during the 1960s, Howard says, girls "experienced considerable pressure to sexually engage a boyfriend who regularly provided store-bought presents" (1998:160). Further, "women with no economically productive males in their households sometimes sought to alleviate material deprivation by forming sexual alliances with men of means" (ibid.:160).

The Samoan sexual system relied on a scant distinction between intercourse and marriage. The local word for marriage was *āvaga,* which signified a girl going off to stay with a boy. *Fa'aipoipoga*—the word used for formal marriages in Christian times—was originally a Rarotongan word imported by missionaries so as to distinguish what they considered proper marriages from what they considered mere intercourse, there being no local term that effectively differentiated the two (Schultz [1911] n.d.:22). Despite Christian disapproval, in Samoa *āvaga* remained the most common kind of marriage (Schultz [1911] n.d.:22; Keesing 1934:412; Schoeffel 1979:210), although it came to be called "the way of the night" *(fa'apōuliuli)*—benightedness being missionaries' favorite trope for local behaviors that were discordant with Christian teaching. Sometimes way-of-the-night marriages

would later be legitimized in church. Sometimes the girl was simply sent home to her family; then her subsequent offspring was a "baby of the night" and not an effective means to raise her family's status.

Reading a bit further in Hereniko, one discovers that only in a "proper" Rotuman wedding is the bride a virgin and that many weddings today are not "proper weddings," meaning that often brides are not virgins (1995:44). Indeed, when Hereniko actually sets out to categorize Rotuman weddings, he finds three kinds (ibid.:66, 99). (1) There are proper weddings. In proper Rotuman weddings the boy's family sends a representative to the girl's family to speak on his behalf (Howard 1998:164). This pattern held for formal weddings in old Samoa, the representative speaker being called a *soa,* "double." (2) There are also Rotuman marriages that amount to a man having gone to stay with the woman, which do not seem to be recent cultural inventions. In Samoa these marriages are simply called "staying together." (3) There are Rotuman marriages in which a woman merely runs off with the man, an *āvaga* in Samoan. In Christian Rotuma, as in Christian Samoa, these latter two marriage types may be legitimized later by a minister and a public wedding.

The real variety of marrying practices in Rotuma raises questions about the traditional nature of the sex roles that, following Shore, Hereniko delineates in Rotuma. Describing these sex roles in Samoa, one of Shore's informants says: "Boys . . . run around naked. The girl, however, should be covered up" (1982:228). Showing off one's beauty or one's body is in Samoan called *fā'alialia,* and it is true that today when girls *fā'alialia,* they are roundly condemned. In missionary reports of old Samoa, however, one finds a rather different attitude toward female flaunting. The missionary Williams, so busy bringing Christianity to one Pacific island after another, left Tahitian teachers in Samoa to spread the gospel. When he returned, these teachers complained of the Samoans, saying that the women were continually wishing their wives

> to lay aside their garments and "faasamoa" do as the Samoan ladies do, gird a shaggy mat round their loins as low down as they can tuck up the corner in order to expose the whole front side of their left thigh anoint themselves beautifully with scented oil, tinge themselves with turmeric put a string of blue beads round their neck & then faariaria [*fā'alialia*] walk about to shew themselves. You will have, say they, all the manaia [*mānaia*] the handsome young men of the town loving you then. (Williams [1830–1832] 1984:117)

"The handsome young men of the town" is actually a mistranslation: *mānaia* means "the sons of chiefs." *Fā'alialia,* then, was an everyday form of flaunt-

ing correlative to the bawdy choreographic jesting girls did at Joking Nights, and it served the same purpose: attracting high-status males who could sire babies of elevated genealogy.

Shore correlates the gender dichotomy he finds in contemporary Samoa (between females who cover up and males who do not) with other gender contrasts having to do with females remaining in and around the house, while males wander abroad (1977, 1981, 1982). Remember Hereniko's parallel gender distinction in Rotuma: "the male wanders farther afield into the wilder and more dangerous territories," while "the female is more concerned with maintaining received order, sanitation, and cleanliness" (1995: 62, 75–76). In Samoa, *fāʻalialia* and strolling about—going *taʻa* in Western Samoan or *eva* in American Samoan—are related activities. Girls who go *taʻa* at night *(taʻapō)* are thought to be *fāʻalialia,* flaunting themselves, and are suspected of trysting with boys. Today doing so will earn a girl sharp criticism and even a punitive haircut. But there were no such consequences for the Samoan girls described by Williams, who wished missionary wives to lay aside their straight-laced garments and who thought walking about to show oneself was so acceptable an activity.

The male-female role dichotomy that Hereniko finds in movements through social space he also finds in dance movements: women's dance is "restrained and circumscribed, the men's expansive and vigorous" (1995:61). One of the supreme regional examples of this choreographic gender dichotomy is the Samoan *taualuga* in which the *tāupōu,* "village princess," dances in a restrained manner—keeping her body poised and upright—while an orator, or alternatively any boy, man, or old woman present, dances a clowning part called *ʻaiʻaiuli.* One of Shore's informants describes this choreographic counterpoint: "The *taupou* dances slowly, sweetly, gracefully. She never tumbles about. But the orators, they roll all about there, jump about here" (1982:260).

Traditionally the *tāupōu* was the prototype of those high-status girls for whom formal marriages were arranged, the fruits of which *(tamaʻāiga)* would be confluences of two exalted genealogies (Hjarnø 1979–1980). She was a chief's virginal daughter, appointed temporarily as his village's "princess"—as the word was translated in colonial times—who this village carefully chaperoned and hoped to marry to a high title from elsewhere. The village princess was also, in my view, the prototype of the premarital virginity and the corollary sex role that missionaries proffered to Samoan girls. A symptom of Samoans' gradual acceptance of this idea was a change in the English/Samoan gloss for "virgin" between contact and the mid–twentieth century. The best gloss Samoans could find for their missionary friends up until Pratt published the last edition of his Samoan dictionary in 1911 was *"tāupōu"* ([1911] 1977:152). Her virginity then appears to have been a dis-

tinguishing feature—distinguishing her from common girls. By the 1950s, however, Samoans glossed "virgin" for Milner firstly as "girl," *teine,* and only secondarily as *tāupōu,* implying that virginity had become a universal standard for girls ([1966] 1979:458).

The first European missionary to Rotuma was the Wesleyan Reverend Fletcher. In the 1860s he compiled a word list (Fletcher 1870); there is no word for virgin on this list, even though the concept was of obvious import to missionaries. In Rotuma, the earliest dictionary was not published until 1940 and translates from Rotuman to English only (Churchward 1940). The English word "virgin" appears only as a gloss for *taupoʻou* and for *salmafua* (virgin forest). Howard says, "There is no role known as *taupoʻou* in Rotuma; it is an adjective used to describe nuns and the Virgin Mary, so may well have been borrowed from Samoan by the first Samoan Methodist missionaries" (pers. com., 1999). In contemporary Rotuma as in Samoa, people use euphemisms for virginity, the most common being "young girl" (Howard and Rensel, pers. com., 1999).

In Samoa the *tāupōu*'s evolving role in the dance illumines and illustrates colonial gender history: she moved from being a model for high-status girls in pre-Christian times to being a model for all Christian girls. On Joking Nights the *tāupōu* led a set of orderly, often energetic dances that opened the evening, while the highest-titled person present performed the graceful, controlled dance today called the *taualuga.* By the mid–twentieth century, the highest-status person still graced an occasion by condescending to dance, but the *taualuga* had come to be conceived of as the village princess's special dance (Milner [1966] 1979:248; Mageo 1996:38–40, 1998:193–202). Colonial choreography thus made bodily restraint emblematic of the village princess. This choreographic identity was congruent with the Christian-Samoan privileging of virginity and put the virginity ideal in an idiom that others could affect.

During colonial times, the village princess dance style came to be affected by girls generally (Mead [1928] 1961:118). Recall that joking choreography had been led by girls in Joking Nights, when, "roused and hounded into delirium by the approving shouts of the audience," they would "throw themselves in all imaginable positions." This variety of dancing had come to be called *ʻaiʻaiuli* and was judged inappropriate for Christian girls, but old women continued to dance the *ʻaiʻaiuli* role.[21] There is evidence that a gradual transit of wild and funny dancing from girls and women generally to old women only occurred during the period before female dances were thoroughly Christianized. In the 1890s Joking Nights still took place. Unlike Williams's early report, the German medic Krämer says that at that time only old women still danced naked; girls would "once in a while undo their

lavalava only to fold it back together very soon" ([1902] 1995:374), at least until the wee hours of the morning, when no one but the young people remained. Then the young men would "tear the lavalava off the girls amidst laughter and screeching" (ibid.:377). The starring role in jocular dancing also shifted genders, moving to orators and to boys. In Samoan folk theory the village princess was by then the dance's central figure, while the clown danced on the periphery of the dance floor (Shore 1982:257–261). In Samoan practice, he often hovered close about the village princess, proceeding to throw himself on the ground before her, inviting her to step on his back, so that the two coalesced into one figure at the heart of the dance. Did the dance role that shifted in Samoa from all females to old women and males—leading choreographic jesting—shift from all females to only older ones in Rotuma?

Shore relates that the *ʻaiʻaiuli* clown is a foil to the village princess, his jocular indignities highlighting her dignified movements (1982:258–262), and his is a typical Samoan explanation. It is precisely this foil relationship that Hereniko believes pertains between the virginal bride and the clown at Rotuman weddings (1995:81). Let me suggest an additional way of understanding this virgin-clown juxtaposition. I have argued that in the colonial *taualuga* featuring a virgin while prescribing her a clowning accompaniment was a way to smuggle in those ribald Joking Night dances of which Christian ministers disapproved (Mageo 1996a:38–40, 1998:197–198). Might contemporary wedding fanfare serve the same purpose in Rotuma, highlighting that part of the affair that Christianity most privileges—virgin brides—while preserving what Rotumans most enjoy—carnivalesque, Rabelaisian joking?

Spirits of Cultural Memory

In Samoa, changed sexual ethics for girls were not without psychological consequences, the most dramatic of which was a spirit-possession epidemic. Girls were the most frequent victims of this epidemic, which I date to circa the late 1950s through the 1970s (Mageo 1994, 1996a, 1996c). One typical pretext spirits took for possessing a girl was that she went strolling about *(taʻa),* particularly at night or with her hair down, all of which were seen as flaunting *(fāʻalialia)* and as indicative of trysting. Another spirit pretext for attacking a girl was vanity (Cain 1971:178), which happens to be one of the possible translations of *fāʻalialia* (Milner [1966] 1979:457). Yet another spirit pretext was that the girl had worn red clothes or red flowers in her hair. Spirit girls, often the agents of possession, wore red flowers in their own hair and were particularly likely to possess girls who wore such flowers in or around the spirit's home village or in the spirit's *"taʻa,"* the place where she

strolls (her haunt). Spirit girls, furthermore, were rubicund beings who would glow red like someone who had spent the day at sea; girls they possessed or boys they seduced would be flushed with this same telltale glow.

Similar interdictions against wearing red seem to prevail in contemporary Rotuma. Hereniko says that "at Losa, if there are visitors and it's early evening, you can't wear red clothes and stroll around" (1995:48), meaning the spirits will attack you if you do. But why? Are red body decorations regarded as flaunting in Rotuma as they are for Samoan girls? Are some people more likely than others to be attacked for wearing red on an evening stroll, girls, for example? And what does the proviso "if there are visitors" indicate? Does it refer obliquely to a now-forbidden cultural memory of Beach Picnics? Samoan Joking Nights took place when a traveling party from one village visited another. Did Beach Picnics or *tautoga* require a similar excuse? Were they a particular occasion for girls' strolling/flaunting that they might attract the sons of chiefs?

Whatever these interdictions on wearing red and strolling signify, the wedding clown often wears a bright red dress (Hereniko 1995:73). Red flowers, moreover, adorn her hair (ibid.), just as they do that of Samoan spirit girls. Indeed, Hereniko says that red feathers are "symbolic of the spirit world" and that the wedding clown is "a modern version of a Rotuman ghost" (ibid.:93, 119). In Samoa, birds' feathers are an analog of hair. Spirit girls are typically reputed to have red hair: One of the most famous (Letelesā) may take the form of a parakeet identifiable by its red-feathered head; from this parakeet came the feathers that typically decorated mana-imbued objects in old Samoa. I have argued elsewhere that Samoan spirit girls are cultural memories of pre-Christian girls and that their sex-gender practices are practices that could be submerged but not entirely forgotten by Christian Samoans (Mageo 1996a, 1996c, 1998:164–190). Could it be that red-bedecked Rotuman wedding clowns, like Samoan spirit girls, embody a memory of bygone practices, memories that are now threatened with extinction?

Hereniko believes that historically the Rotuman clown is a mere ghost of her former self (1995:116–117, 166). In folk theory she is still the supreme ruler of the wedding: "The female clown . . . behaves like a chief," ordering everyone about and punishing those who fail to obey (ibid.:77, 79). In fact, nowadays she constantly frets about exerting her authority. If she pushes chiefs too far, she will be punished by spirits (ibid.:25, 49, 51, 131, 151). But in the old Rotuman world the clown was a "spirit" (ibid.:108, chap. 6). Today the clown's spirits have deserted her in more ways than one. She worries she will offend the couple's relatives. She worries that the visiting Fijian govern-

ment official will not understand her jests and will be offended (ibid.:24). On top of all these worries, her children worry she might open her dress in public, flaunting herself (ibid.:42). With all these causes for worry, she must be extraordinarily sensitive (ibid.:135), a sure mark of disempowerment, as women in many cultures can attest.

Clowns were not always so beleaguered by cultural double messages about asserting their authority. Past clowns consistently "forced all the chiefs to kneel" (Hereniko 1995:95). Their sticks, emblemizing their authority, were "longer than the clown herself" (ibid.:102). Hereniko feels that clowning women can no longer adequately fill their role and that this role is too important to abandon. No present performer he could find seemed to him a very good example of what he felt Rotuman female clowns were meant to be. So, in chapter 3 he imagines himself into the female persona of the clown and plays the part in fantasy. I have argued that the Samoan boys who played the role of transvestites in that colonial theater genre called Spirit House acted on the same impulse, although this was not their only motive (Mageo 1992, 1996b).

Hereniko notes transvestite elements in the wedding clown's behavior. She is "dressed as a female" but behaves "like a male" (1995:92, 128). Her phallic stick is called a *poki* (ibid.:93, 129), a word meaning "penis" in Samoan. I have shown that in Samoa spirited cross-dressing or cross-acting was a vernacular gender commentary, well adapted to carry on a critique of colonial gender roles (Mageo 1992:452–453, 1996b:592–604, 1998:202–216). Often these commentaries revolved around the figure of the village princess: a male comic might wear the village princess's ceremonial outfit but, so arrayed, would mimic a transvestite. The result was a mockery of Samoan-Christian feminine gender ideals.[22] Could comedic gender crossing also be an evolving vernacular commentary on Christianity's sex-gender system in Rotuma?

Colonialism Commentaries

Colonial imports seem to be one of Rotuman clowns' favorite subjects—speaking English, for example (Hereniko 1995:39, 90). Fanon thinks language one of the most important vehicles and emblems of colonialism (1968:17–40). "Every colonial people," he says, "every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created . . . finds itself face to face with the language of . . . the mother country" (Fanon 1968:18). In Samoa problems with speaking English are a metaphor for inferiority feelings and fears of cultural distortion. There are many jokes about people speaking English stupidly and about foreigners' ensuing misunderstandings of local meanings. In one joke, for example, a women is selling fish. Her friend wildly mistranslates

her words in such a way that the tourist-buyer thinks she is trying to sell herself. Nineteenth-century visitors tended to see the indigenous sex-gender system—both its flaunting girls and its politic matings—in just these terms (Williams [1830–1832] 1984:77–79, 84, 130; Wilkes 1845:148–149), but from the Samoan viewpoint it was all a mistranslation.

A recurrent figure in Rotuman wedding clowning is the prostitute (Hereniko 1995:23, 93). Is she a joke about such mistranslations and the sexual conservatism that resulted from them? A standard joke for the wedding clown is to act like she is "in love with the white man" (ibid.:43, 48). One clown forces Hereniko's friend, an Australian video man, to dance, rolling her eyes and falling on the ground in a mock faint, indicating she would like to make love (ibid.:83–84). Do these jokes represent historical sentiments about Rotuman overassessments of colonial others (particularly by women) and mock these sentiments as well?[23]

Historicizing Gender and Clowning in Polynesia

In Samoan and Rotuman clowning, one finds that reversals, such as those described by Turner in carnival, are continuous with everyday forms of talk. Further, these comedic reversals are not only of normative social structures in the synchronous sense. They are also reversals of diachronic elements of social structure, for example, colonial elements; further, comedic reversals are a particularly handy medium for commenting on and thinking about historical conditions such as colonialism.[24]

I would further venture that reversals in everyday talk and in carnivals are related not only to institutional structures but also to their internalized versions, that is, to structures of self. Moral discourses and the norms they feature structure the self, as Freud showed long ago (1961), initiating a psychic economy that privileges certain parts of us, while disenfranchising and cloaking others.[25] Fanon could be read as arguing that in colonized cultures the extent of this disenfranchisement and self-rejection expands (1968). These disenfranchised parts of us, I suggest, are banished from the highlighted territories of cultural worlds by historically changing discourses of morality but continue to haunt the half-lit territories. If Rotuman moral discourse, influenced as it must be by colonial experience, to some degree alienates girls from their sexuality, their freedom of movement, their pleasure in power, and their expressiveness, these lost parts of girls continue to haunt the Rotuman world in the form of old women's joking—whether it is undertaken to pass time on the deck of a small ship bound for Rotuma or to honor a bride at a wedding.

In this essay I promised nothing more than questions, and I shall end

with them as well. Could there be so strong a parallel between contemporary sex roles in Samoa and in Rotuma—as I believe Hereniko rightly argues—without there having also been a strong parallel in pre-Christian times? Would it follow that in Rotuma, as in Samoa, there was once an informal discourse of jest equal in import and social place to chiefly discourse—a discourse that was, furthermore, a female specialty? Did girls too take a leading role in informal venues, as old women and wedding clowns still do? Are contemporary church weddings a revised version of high-status weddings in old Rotuma and are they markedly more formal than the ways of marrying practiced by most people in pre-Christian times?

If there was a pre-Christian parallel between clowning and gender in Rotuma and in Samoa, and if there is a contemporary parallel, then it seems likely that there are also commonalities in the intervening history of both places. In Rotuma, as in Samoa, has girls' sex-gender identity become more emphatically virginal and demure under Christian influence? If so, what was this identity like before having been stamped with the Christian imprimatur? Have Rotuman girls to a degree lost their voices through a Christian disinheritance of informal jesting discourse, failing to be given a speaking part in chiefly discourse in exchange? Is the wedding clown the patron saint of girls' forgotten ancestresses, who, en masse at *tautoga,* threw themselves into gymnastic antics as Samoan girls did? Is there a relation between the form of alienation that Fanon (1968) attributes to the colonial experience—in which inferiority feelings inspired by colonialization inspire a rejection of indigenous lifeways—and cultural memory loss?

If historical parallels might be drawn between Rotuma and Samoa in regard to clowning and gender, there must also be differences. Samoa was a larger and more stratified social world than was Rotuma. What differences did these factors make between Rotuman and Samoan versions of (1) informal discourse, in everyday talk and in institutionalized clowning, (2) informal marrying, and (3) feminine sex roles? How did variant Christianizations play upon and amplify these preexisting differences?

What about other Polynesian locales? Ortner argues that a sexual system kindred to that I have outlined here was once pan-Polynesian (1981). Surely, then, the questions I have raised about Rotuman clowning and gender could be raised profitably in nearby places such as Tonga or Tokelau. In locations like Hawai'i and the Marquesas, where precontact cultures were so seriously eroded, mixtures of the past and the present in current constructions of gender and context would be far different, although no less intriguing. Are gender-crossing clowning styles vernacular commentaries on colonial forms of gender and sexuality there too? Transvestite elements are shared by clowns throughout the region (Hereniko 1995:appendix). What about places

like Tahiti, where Christianity seems to have had a more moderate effect on gender and sexuality? There would be mixtures of local and colonial attitudes toward sex and gender there nonetheless, and perhaps even concomitant clowning commentaries. Would the combinations of indigenous and foreign elements be weighted differently? In twentieth-century Tokelau and Tahiti, women have been the particular victims of spirit attacks (Huntsman and Hooper 1975:420; Levy 1973:196); is their victimization symptomatic of gender confusions as it is in Samoa?

If all these questions seem a less than satisfying conclusion, it is because I mean to open a conversation rather than to close one; this essay can only really be concluded by the responses of others.

NOTES

I thank Alan Howard for sharing his work on Rotuman gender with me and for his generous help with sources on Rotuman history.

1. On the connection between comedy and spirit possession in Samoa, see further Shore 1977, 1978; Mageo 1996a, 1996b, 1998:164–217; and Sinavaiana 1992a and 1992b. Hereniko argues in his appendix that this theater-spirit connection pertained in other Pacific places as well, for example, in Fiji (1995:154).

2. For a fuller and more adequate presentation of this theory than is possible here and for an explanation of this last discourse type, see Mageo 1995, 1998.

3. On formal and informal discourses, see further Mageo 1992:444–449, 1995:287–228, 1998:81–101, 191–217.

4. Alternatively, one can *faipona* about another's ancestry (Mageo 1991:20, 1992:445). This jest genre seems related to one outlined by Hereniko in Rotuma: there *te samuga* is an indigenous form of teasing others about one's ancestors that was adapted to comment on contact with Europeans during the early colonial period (1995:62–63). *Faipona* is often practiced by making up funny nicknames for people or their families. Howard describes a similar joking style at Rotuman Beach Parties in the 1960s (1998:157).

5. On the Joking Night program, see Mageo 1996a:34–38 and 1998:193–197. Mimetic choreography was also referred to as *ula* (Moyle 1988:201), implying that *ula* may have been a summary term for joking performances.

6. On contextual discourses as deconstructive, see further Mageo 1995:288–289, 1998: 81–101.

7. On women's leading role at Joking Nights, see further Mageo 1992:446–447, 1996b: 593.

8. On Joking Nights as the concomitant of ceremonies, see Stair 1897:235; Turner [1884] 1984:90; Churchward 1887:141; Tuiteleleapaga 1980:70, 102. On other joking occasions, see Moyle 1975, 1988:99, 103–142, 144–146, 205–222; and Mageo 1998:131–132.

9. On Beach Picnics, see also Howard 1998:157–158. Howard describes Beach Party courting games that still existed in the 1960s (1998:169).

10. On *tautoga,* see also Howard 1998:169.

11. Hereniko says these occasions also involved exchanges of mock insults, *te samuga* (1995:17, 43, 51); so did the Pōula (Krämer [1902] 1995:361–62; Kneubuhl 1987).

12. On sociocentric and egocentric cultures of self, see Mauss [1938] 1985; Read 1955; Dumont 1966; Fogelson 1982; Levy 1983; Rosaldo 1984; Shweder and Bourne 1984; White and Kirkpatrick 1985; Sampson 1988; Harris 1989; Kondo 1990; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Hollan 1992; and Murray 1993.

13. The first Christian mission to Rotuma was the London Missionary Society, arriving in 1839, followed by the Wesleyans in 1845 and later by the Roman Catholic Mission in 1847. Conversion was at first slow, gaining momentum in the late 1880s. See further Eason [1951]:43–59. Foucault's work on nineteenth-century European sexuality and the self (1988, 1990) implies that the self-context-gender transition I trace in English society was broadly European and would have been shared even by the French Catholic mission—although no doubt with significant differences.

14. On the Industrial Revolution in England, see further Ashton 1947.

15. On missionaries and middle-class status, see Gunson 1978:34–35, 38, 86.

16. On this role change, see further Mageo 1992:447–449, 1996a:38–40, 1996b:592–594, 1998:191–217.

17. On old women clowning in Samoa, see further Churchward 1887:230; Krämer [1902] 1995:374; Schoeffel 1979:215–221; and Sinavaiana 1992a:213.

18. On transvestism in Spirit House, see Shore 1978; Mageo 1992, 1996b; and Sinavaiana 1992a, 1992b. On the continuity between precontact female comedic dancing and colonial male comedic theater, see Mageo 1992, 1996b.

19. On actors as *aitu* and on *aitu*'s shape-shifting nature, see Williams [1830–1832] 1984: 265; Stair 1897:216; Keesing 1934:399; Holmes 1974:64; Shore 1977:308; Schoeffel 1979: 405, 407; Kneubuhl 1987:173; and Mageo 1996a.

20. On genealogical steps forward, see further Hjarnø 1979–1980 and Mageo 1996c: 123–140, 1998:133–138.

21. On colonial changes in choreography, see Stevenson 1925:218, quoted in Moyle 1988: 206; Moyle 1988:passim; and Mageo 1998:197–202.

22. On the *tāupōu* as symbolic of the Christian sex-gender system, see further Mageo 1998:141–217.

23. The Rotuman clown's antics seem to implicate not only chief-to-commoner and male-to-female relations but local-foreign power relationships as well. One of Hereniko's wedding clowns tells him that her antics are "even funnier because the man is a foreigner and he has to copy you" (1995:43).

24. Sinavaiana also argues that Samoan comedy comments on colonialism (1992a, 1992b). Her work in this area has focused largely on local-foreign power relations, while mine has focused more on gender relations (Mageo 1992, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1998).

25. As to how moral discourse structures the self, see further Mageo 1998:52–80.

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REVIEWS

David Hanlon, *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944–1982.* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998. Pp. xv, 305, illus., bib., index. US$50 cloth; $34.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Lin Poyer, University of Wyoming

Understanding modern Micronesia entails understanding American intentions and actions in the islands since they came under American rule. David Hanlon, a respected historian of Micronesia, turns his attention to the intersection of American desires to shape the islands and islanders in the path of "progress" and Micronesians' desires to determine their own futures.

The rich scholarly potential of the postwar era in Micronesian history has hardly been touched. This volume presents an important early study of the significance of the economic programs designed for the islands, from the perspective of cultural history and critical analysis. Readers should be warned that this is not an economic history: Hanlon's goal is not to explain the failure of various development schemes, although he does some of this. Rather, his goal is a culture history of the "discourse over development"—that is, how the ideas and intentions surrounding the culturally weighted notion of "economic development" guided American-Micronesian interactions. The period he addresses dates from 1944, when occupying American troops lavished supplies on hard-pressed islanders emerging from years of war, to the negotiations heralding the end of U.N. trusteeship in the early 1980s.

Hanlon sets out explicitly to explore "economic development" as "a strategy of domination" (p. 3). The first chapter outlines the four themes of

the book: "American Ideology in the Postwar Period" (how the American cultural linkage of political and economic desiderata, and conviction that the American way is best for all, came ashore with the U.S. troops and stayed); "Economics as Culture" (how American ideas of productive work contrasted with Micronesian notions of work as embedded in social relations, and how Americans misjudged Micronesians as a result); "Development as a Discourse of Domination" (using Esteva and Escobar, how the global discourse of development fostered by the West was "employed to rationalize American domination" [pp. 10–11]); and "The Counterhegemonic Dimensions of Underdevelopment" (how Micronesians, both ordinary people and well-educated political leaders, responded to the program of domination by development).

The body of the book is broadly chronological, beginning with how Americans perceived their responsibilities to the islands taken from Japan. Ignoring the fact that war had devastated the colonial economy built by the Japanese, the first U.S. occupying forces began the soon-familiar habit of using poor economic conditions as "justifying preface for the efforts at social reconstruction that would follow" (p. 23). The later naval administration under U.N. trusteeship used agricultural, fishing, and other projects—all counted as failures—to further the "paternal and self-serving strategic politics of economic development" (p. 54) by concluding that Micronesians were culturally unable to manage productive labor. When the Department of the Interior took over, efforts immediately began to compensate (as critics saw it) for the U.S. Navy's failure to develop successful local economies. Thus began, in the 1960s, the golden era of planners and consultants.

Although the U.S. Commercial Company had produced the first American economic plan for Micronesia immediately after the war, the navy had shelved most of its recommendations. Of course, the same fate awaited the plethora of expensive reports commissioned during the next two decades. Hanlon reviews the Solomon and Nathan Reports, envisioning massive alteration of Micronesian societies, and the numerous other plans that followed through the 1970s. Efforts to remake Micronesia soon engaged the emerging discourse of modernization, and Hanlon effectively links development efforts of this era with global trends. Enter the Peace Corps, which attempted to connect local communities with the grandiose cultural makeover plans of the development experts. It is at this point in the book (chapter 4) that Hanlon turns to Micronesian responses to these plans, describing how what development planners saw as commercial fishing, retail transactions, and tourism opportunities were viewed in completely different ways by Micronesians. These examples reveal the classic distinction between production in a nonindustrial society—embedded in kinship and

social relations—contrasted with the reification of the economic in industrial societies.

In the second half of the book, Hanlon explores the Micronesian perspective in more depth, following the Congress of Micronesia as it discussed the same issues of development that preoccupied American administrators. Using Gramsci, Hanlon looks for "counterhegemonic discourse" from the congressmen, and he finds it. Though, to be sure, they consistently argued for increased development (complaining repeatedly, for example, that there were too many plans and not enough action), they also recognized and spoke against the wholesale importation of American culture. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the topic of "dependency" was on everyone's lips, as U.S. federal welfare programs came to the islands (Hanlon includes an interesting selection of Micronesian responses, pro and con, to bringing the "War on Poverty" to their shores). Micronesians who had been blamed for not being interested in development because of their commitment to local culture (in the 1940s) were now blamed for not being interested in development because of their lack of commitment to local culture (by accepting the "welfare programs" of the 1970s).

Indeed, the most haunting residue of Hanlon's book is the clear sense that Micronesians were damned if they did (buy into the program) and damned if they didn't. In a sense—because of overwhelming American might—their choices were irrelevant, because the steamroller of American strategic interests was going to overwhelm any efforts at local control. What is interesting to the historian, then, is how American interests deployed the strategy of development discourse and blame and how that discourse preserved for those in power the greatest freedom of action. The countervailing responses of Micronesians—how they have used the "weapons of the weak"—form the second strand of the discussion. Hanlon shows this process in detail in an entire chapter devoted to the "problem" of Ebeye, the crowded and impoverished labor-reserve adjunct to the well-appointed U.S. Army base at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. And, in his concluding discussion of the Compact of Free Association (and recent journalistic descriptions of Micronesia, reminiscent of those of thirty years ago), he reveals the current very active status of islanders' "struggle to persevere against those powers that have sought to dominate them" (p. 240). Everyone who has worked with Micronesians knows the strength of local cultural visions and will appreciate Hanlon's efforts to place the political efforts fostered by those visions into the context of current scholarly work on discourse and political economy.

Hanlon's emphasis on analysis of discourse—rather than empirical process—will please those who are eager to see Pacific studies come more fully into the mainstream of current academic work, but will disappoint those

who want a technical answer to "Why have efforts at economic development in Micronesia been so disappointing for all concerned?" There is neither enough economics nor anthropology to satisfy those who want to understand specific processes of local culture change. Another caution: this is not a "balanced" view of American intentions in the islands. A reader who does not agree that American interests in Micronesia have been predominantly selfish, strategic, and aimed at remaking the region in the U.S. image will not find Hanlon's approach congenial. Although he states, "I do not mean to portray American colonialism as a monolithic force," (p. 237), there is some of that here. American administrators who saw more clearly or sympathetically the Micronesian perspective are given rather short shrift. In fact, Hanlon's opinions are so clear that at times one wishes he had gone further and explored in more detail his view of "alternative futures" that might more fully accord with his analysis of Micronesian counterhegemonic visions.

Those who are not familiar with Micronesia's recent history, but would like to become so, will find this a valuable critical supplement to Fran Hezel's *Strangers in Their Own Land* (Honolulu, 1995). Those who already know the outline of the events Hanlon discusses will find valuable depth in his coverage of documentary sources for this era and thought-provoking interpretations of what Americans and Micronesians thought they, and each other, were up to. Hanlon's book is also a significant step in the effort to bring Pacific scholarship into closer dialogue with current humanities and social science theory and an exciting glimpse of the wealth of material that awaits scholars who look to recent history to illumine Pacific lives.

D. C. Lewis, *The Plantation Dream: Developing British New Guinea and Papua, 1884–1942.* Canberra: Journal of Pacific History, 1996. Pp. xvi, 347, illus., bib., index.

Reviewed by Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern, University of Pittsburgh

In the wake of a new millennium reflection on historical achievements and mistakes are inevitable. When one muses on the scope and impact of change in Papua New Guinea over the last hundred years it is little wonder that the country, which only became independent from Australian rule in 1975, finds itself confronted with difficult decisions about which path to take in the hopes of finding a more stable existence for itself in the twenty-first century.

D. C. Lewis provides a look into the period of Papua New Guinea history between 1884 and 1942 when British New Guinea and Papua were a labora-

tory for expatriate plantation agricultural experimentation. His account brings into focus various processes and procedures that allow the reader to put into context some of the historical pieces that were pivotal in building the picture of Papua New Guinea that we see today. He focuses on the experiences of the early settlers who came to set up the plantation industry, pulling together published and unpublished source materials that he supplements with oral history narratives he collected firsthand. His text moves from a discussion of the attempts to bring white settlers in to establish plantations prior to 1907, the subsequent influx of approximately one hundred settlers, the conflicts and crises that followed and forced settlers to reevaluate their positions in relation to the Papuan government, a discussion of the plantation industry itself, and the relations between Papuan workers and white management.

Lewis's historical presentation provides thought-provoking materials such as the details of the Native Labour Ordinance of 1906, which permitted indentureship of native laborers for up to three years with twelve-month interludes before reengagement could take place (p. 49). This same ordinance allowed for ninety-nine-year leases that could be obtained for as little as £10 per thousand acres, a set of terms that "were bound to encourage many an incautious application for land once a boom had begun" (p. 74).

The juxtapositioning of global events with those taking place on the plantations of New Guinea and Papua facilitates the reader's understanding of how external pressures molded the development of the plantation industries. For example, when Henry Ford in 1907 introduced assembly-line production into his factories, the global demand for rubber increased dramatically. But by the 1920s rubber tapping in Papua became uneconomical due to the impact of the international recession at that time (pp. 72–73, 205). In addition to the copra and rubber plantations, brief sketches of the ups and downs of other colonial plantations such as those for tobacco, sisal hemp, cotton, tea, sugar, coffee, and cocoa are given (chapter 17).

The Plantation Dream presents the experiences of the white pioneers in New Guinea and Papua. Although it does not discuss the experiences of the indigenous pioneers who followed in the footsteps of the white pioneers, the book provides materials that could be used to make such a comparison, such as with the well-documented case of the trials and tribulations of Joe Leahy's coffee plantations (see the film *Black Harvest*). It would also be of interest to use Lewis's presentation of the white experience in New Guinea and Papua to make a direct comparison with the narratives of the indigenous workers who could explain how they experienced the "plantation dream." In this regard, perusal of the historian Clive Moore's work *Kanaka: A History of Melanesian Mackay* (Port Moresby, 1985) on Melanesian indentured

laborers in Queensland from 1871 to 1904 could provide some interesting comparisons with Lewis's work.

Lewis also provides a thoughtful introduction to his theme, noting that today's Melanesian nationalists are unlikely to find a meeting of minds with the white planters of the early twentieth century. Yet, in an ironic way there is a situational convergence between these planters and the forerunners of the nationalists of today, the Melanesians who dreamed of riches and status to be obtained through "cargo cult" activity (a label for a multifarious set of movements of liberation, emulation, and protest). Lewis notes that "it can be said of the Europeans who made their home in Papua as planters in the period under review that they at least profited little from the opportunity, being themselves dupes of excessive expectations and delusions they shared with those who had encouraged them to settle there" (p. 3)—thus the "plantation dream."

Donald Tuzin, *The Cassowary's Revenge: The Life and Death of Masculinity in a New Guinea Society.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Pp. xiv, 256, illus. US$45 cloth; $18.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart, University of Pittsburgh

Donald Tuzin's latest book is based on his 1985–1986 return visit to Ilahita, an Arapesh-speaking village in the East Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. Tuzin had conducted his dissertation work in Ilahita from 1969 to 1972 and had not returned until this visit. His long absence had been interpreted to mean that he was dead and his reappearance was interpreted as his return from the dead as the "lost younger brother" in the Cassowary myth from the past. (We have experienced similar events in which people have seen us enter a field site that Andrew had visited long ago and ask if Andrew was returning from the dead with me [Pamela]. Tuzin discusses related issues [pp. 132 ff.].)

Tuzin's presentation encompasses three components: (1) the central event of the murder, by the man's own son, of a male villager, who had been a prime leader in the now-collapsed men's cult; (2) the local people's reflections upon their creation myth, whose central figure is a primal Female Cassowary–Human transformer figure who becomes involved with humans through trickery against her; and (3) Tuzin's reflections on his return to Ilahita and his perceived involvement in the historical changes that took place during the collapse of the men's cult practices known as the Tambaran.

The author deals with themes that are familiar from other areas of New Guinea, such as the role of transformer figures as presented in the Cassowary myth or the alterations in male cults that could be compared to or contrasted with similar situations like the last performance of the Female Spirit cult in Hagen in 1984–1985. His work is a valuable contribution to the literature on historical change in New Guinea. Especially interesting is the detailing of the interplay of Christianity and indigenous religious beliefs in his field area. During his return visit he says that "public life in Ilahita was ablaze with Christian fervor and expectancy" (p. 18). The 1980s in Papua New Guinea were a time in which dramatic shifts to Christianity were taking place and today many Christians there believe that in the year 2000 the world will end or some substantial change will occur, significantly altering their lives. His analysis of Christian movements, like that of others (e.g., Andrew Lattas), provides historical data that can be used to make comparisons with similar movements elsewhere in Papua New Guinea today.

The Cassowary origin myth that Tuzin collected has the element, reminiscent of and perhaps derived from the Kilibob-Manup stories from Madang, that the youngest of the Cassowary's sons went off to America "where he fathered the white race, and from whence he will someday return" (p. 71). Tuzin's return to Ilahita was interpreted to be the reappearance of this mythical figure and led to much discussion and expectation of a "cargoistic" kind that was itself destined to be disappointed, placing him in a difficult situation in his fieldwork, and his reflections on it (p. 198).

Although the subtitle of Tuzin's book refers to the "life and death of masculinity," it seems that what is described is actually a complex historical transformation encompassing both genders. Male cults are but one example of the "double-gendered" (to use Janet Hoskin's phrase) nature of sociality that Tuzin presents in his own ethnographical accounts (see, e.g., pp. 71, 115). We might juxtapose his example with the collapse of the men's cult practices in the Duna area where we work, which did not mean a collapse of "masculinity" or for that matter an increase or decrease in "femininity"—but an altered arena in which these aspects of social life both continued to be expressed. Origin figures such as the Female Cassowary in the Ilahita myth are not always females in other parts of New Guinea; they are male or "double-gendered," as indeed appears to be the case in Ilahita itself, since Tuzin speaks of her as "phallic." There is further the point that the Ilahita men decided to reveal the secrets of their cult presumably to secure for themselves the benefits of a new Christian order in which they would continue to play a part. This turn of events is again paralleled in other parts of New Guinea.

Tuzin has infused a great deal of thought and reflexivity into the ethno-

graphic materials for this book, writing in a vivid and involved way that brings Ilahita and its people's dilemmas and concerns sharply to life. At the book's end he seeks to make a bridge between gender issues in Ilahita and in American society, following in the footsteps of one of his original mentors, Margaret Mead, who earlier worked in the Arapesh area. Tuzin, however, presents the discussion in a latter-day context in which he is concerned with the supposed crisis in masculinity set in motion by the same feminist movement that Mead's own work made possible. This bridge-making exercise is admirable in itself, corresponding to Marcus and Fischer's injunction to make anthropology a source of "cultural critique." We may, however, wonder if the phenomena are in fact comparable, and we may want to think further about the perceived crisis in Ilahita. Tuzin's argument is that the loss of ritual power may have led to the exercise of physical violence among Ilahita men. If so, perhaps Ilahita women did not make indisputable gains, either, from the demise of the Tambaran cult; but there may be independent reasons also for an increase in male violence, connected to the tensions of economic and political change. In any case, the author's concern to make a bridge of this kind is interestingly paralleled by the Ilahita people's attempt to fit him into their mythical structures, including their interpretations of the illnesses experienced by himself and his friend Gidion (p. 15) as possibly brought on by the Tambaran.

This is a complex, densely woven book that readers will appreciate both for its substance and its arguments, while wishing perhaps also to enter into a creative dialogue with both.

Jan Rensel and Margaret Rodman, eds., *Home in the Islands: Housing and Social Change in the Pacific.* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997. Pp. 264, maps, figs., bib., index. US$39 cloth; $24.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Rebecca A. Stephenson, University of Guam

Home in the Islands is concerned not only with housing arrangements in the contemporary Pacific, but also and more importantly with the structure and content of people's daily lives. The reader encounters housing and social change in Rotuma (by Jan Rensel), among the Samo in Papua New Guinea (by R. Daniel Shaw), in Galilo, New Britain (by Ann Chowning), among long-time resident *pakeha*s in the highlands of New Zealand (by Michele D. Dominy), and among Pollapese in Weno, Chuuk (by Juliana Flinn). Additional chapters in the text discuss the urban housing situation of Samoans in New Zealand (by Cluny Macpherson), the experiences of urbanization for

Samoans in Hawai'i (by Robert Franco and Simeamativa Mageo Aga), and homelessness in Hawai'i (by Judith Modell).

Co-editors Rensel and Rodman bring to their task considerable depth and breadth of field research in the Pacific. Rodman leads off in a well-written prologue, illustrated with maps of the "moving walls" of houses she and Bill Rodman encountered in Ambae, Vanuatu. Rensel, in a lengthy introduction, sets forth the theoretical points with verve. We are reminded that housing involves both product and process; that architecture styles in the Pacific include the vernacular as well as traditional and changing forms; that the modification of housing is occurring even in remote locations in the region; and that the urbanization process for some Pacific Islanders can present entirely new challenges to be met and overcome.

The case-study chapters then follow, as mentioned above, eight in number. Rodman contributes the conclusion, a fine synthesis. She reminds us once again that, like the social relations that produce them, houses are constantly in flux, being "containers not only of people but of changing cultural meanings" (p. 223). Housing is likewise linked to the collective experience of being human, in that "home is a place in a community" (ibid.). Accordingly, the experience of being homeless (e.g., in Hawai'i, chapter 9 by Modell) means a lack of both structure as well as connectedness for contemporary Pacific Islanders, a circumstance that can be fraught with new tensions and trauma.

I used *Home in the Islands* for the first time in my undergraduate course Anthropology 320: Peoples of the Pacific, at the University of Guam in spring 1998. Each student in the class selected a case study in the text to present. In May, the students were asked if they would be willing to help me evaluate *Home in the Islands* for this review. Their names and comments are included here with their express permission.

Jerleen Rokop of Chuuk stated in writing, "I like this book very much. I have many friends who see the cover of the book and wish they had taken our class because they would like to learn about different types of housing in the Pacific today. They ask if they can look through the book to see if their island is included! . . . One thing I find very common, and it applies to every culture, is that houses are built to show success. . . . When I went to high school on Weno [Chuuk], I had some Pollapese classmates. I never thought about their culture and how they had to change some of their ways of living because they moved to a different place [until I read this book]."

Charles Acosta of Guam offered: "This is a very appealing book. I enjoyed studying the relationships between modern day challenges of living and housing structures. It never crossed my mind before reading the text. I especially like the use of local language terms within many of the chapters

because it provides the reader with a sense of the cultural awareness that the authors command. . . . I feel that the book is an important tool for Pacific Islanders to read and understand because it provides important insights into social and housing changes that occur hand in hand in our precious islands. . . . I am a visual learner. More maps and photos would enhance this book."

According to Lindsay Quichocho of Guam, the book's greatest value is that it highlights ways in which Pacific Islanders come together as a community. "It [the book] is not about how people live together, but about how they share their common unity with each other regardless if they are weak or strong." He reflected on the fact that the physical labor of constructing homes in the Pacific emphasizes and enhances close bonds between people. But modern housing construction undermines this, and leaves some members of the community (e.g., women) with fewer opportunities to contribute (see chapter 2 concerning Rotuma). Lindsay feels that the book needs to be revised: "In Chapter 6 [concerning Chuuk], the information [refers to] 1980, but it is now 1998. A lot of changes have happened since 1980 in housing and in people's lives." Finally, Lindsay concludes: "This book is great in showing Westerners how close the relationships are among Pacific Islanders. No matter how many obstacles Pacific Islanders encounter and how they change their homes or lifestyles, they will always share their close kinship."

For Magdalena Mesngon of Rota, the book *Home in the Islands* is interesting because it sets forth problems and solutions for living in many different Pacific Islands settings. She was impressed by the great variety of housing styles that are found throughout the Pacific. "My favorite chapter is Chapter 9 [on homelessness in Hawai'i]. But when this book is rewritten, I wish someone would write about my island of Rota! . . . Also, additional maps, illustrations, and photographs are needed in this book to elaborate the points being made more fully."

Joseph N. San Nicolas of Guam wrote: "This book is very informative for someone like myself who is an islander from Guam but knows little about the rest of the Pacific, except for Rota and Saipan, Hawaii and the Philippines. . . . Many islands are still in the developing stages in housing; eventually technology will be brought to these places but hopefully not destroy the beauty of these islands that are still somewhat native and pure [*sic*]. . . . It's very creative that Samoan people who live in New Zealand [in chapter 7] use their garages to live in, play in, for storage, and basically to do whatever they want to within. . . . The most significant thing I learned was that the people are all becoming Westernized and that the daily ways of farming and fishing may soon be on the way out. . . . When the book is re-written, all the chapters should be kept in! But the book does need additional maps, illustrations and photographs. It is true that a picture can say a thousand words!"

According to Sheila Santiago of Guam, *Home in the Islands* is very informative and exhaustive in its presentations in the various chapters. The book offers detailed explanations of the many Pacific Islands cultures portrayed. "But please, more photos and maps! And where is the chapter about Guam?"

Katarina Rocky of Chuuk shared with the class her understanding of the complex situation of Pollapese migrants to Weno (see chapter 6). Pollapese habits, ideas, and values are quite different from those more commonly found on Weno. However, according to Kathy, some Pollapese migrants to Weno rather quickly accommodate, and this is reflected in their housing. The photo on page 142 depicts a certain style of Pollapese house on Weno. But now there are Pollapese people on Weno who have constructed very modern homes, says Kathy. She thinks it would be helpful if the chapter made further mention of this. Also, Pollapese people now reside in other geographic locations around the island of Weno. A rewriting of the chapter could add this new information.

For Ted Nededog of Guam, "*Home in the Islands* has given me new insights about life on the different islands. Customs and practices in other islands do bear some resemblances to the ways we live on Guam. . . . This book has given me a reason to look forward to visiting other islands in the Pacific!"

In addition to the comments of my students cited above, I'd also like to mention that we considered the colonial experience and its impact upon the lives of the Pacific Islanders that we encountered in this book. Alterations over time in the ways that islanders build their homes and formulate their sense of identity and community are inextricably linked to their lives in the colonial period.

Finally, my students and I have a question for R. Daniel Shaw concerning chapter 3, "Samo House Styles and Social Change," especially with reference to the diagram of the floor plan of a village house (p. 69). Our question is, Where do children sleep?

David Philip Miller and Peter Hanns Reill, eds., *Visions of Empire: Voyages, Botany, and Representations of Nature.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. 370, illus., index. US$64.95 cloth.

Reviewed by David Grandy, Brigham Young University

In one of the essays in this volume, Lisbet Koerner remarks that the mid-1700s constituted a "peculiar moment in the history of European imperialism" (p. 117). The momentous discoveries lay in the past but most of the great political empires were yet to be realized. En route to those empires, Euro-

peans sought to systematize nature. Among the more ambitious exponents of this project was Joseph Banks. His botanical activities—the discovery, collection, and transfer of exotic plant species to British soil—contributed much to Europe's expanding vision of the larger world.

Visions of Empire is a response to the recent publication of Banks's *Florilegium,* which documents and illustrates his Pacific voyages. The essayists recognize that those voyages, while ostensibly scientific in nature, were motivated by a rich panoply of interests and concerns. The approach, then, is interdisciplinary, and the scope of the inquiry is extensive, often ranging beyond Banks and his immediate affairs. If there is a leitmotif, it is that new botanical understandings reflect and inform shifting cultural practices and attitudes, and so this is not a book that portrays science as an unambiguous march toward truth.

For Banks and other participants of the era, however, science was generally regarded as an instrument of truth. This sets up an interesting tension in the book, with many of the contributors describing the era in terms different from those subscribed to at the time. Only Koerner, as she treats the aims of Carl Linnaeus, acknowledges the matter directly: "Positivist, structuralist, *and* feminist analyses . . . all focus on issues inaccessible to eighteenth-century people themselves" (p. 120). Her study, then, is a deliberate attempt to step away from such approaches in order to recapture the Linnaean frame of reference.

To get maximum benefit from the book, the reader must be able to recognize the overlay of modernist and postmodernist theory on historical detail. The general effect of that overlay is to complicate the narrative in ways that both enrich and obscure. All this is consonant with the idea that history is a study of the past informed and shaped by contemporary concerns and predilections. Still, there is something refreshing about sensing that one has put on a different, if now somewhat outdated, thinking cap, and, to be fair, the book offers ample opportunity for this sort of experience. Under Koerner's analysis, for instance, Linnaeus emerges as a somewhat quixotic figure wanting to promote Swedish autarky through the transplantation of tropical plant species to the northern climes of Scandinavia.

This sort of naiveté also shows up elsewhere, although not always in ways that seem so quaint. In Christopher Lawrence's study of the British attempt to control scurvy, we are reminded of the wide-angle ecological approach to disease once taken by Western medicine. Before scurvy was attributed to a lack of vitamin C, sea captains and ship physicians tended to assign its outbreak to moral and social factors that were felt to be entwined with physical circumstances regarding food, air, and cleanliness. It is interesting that even though physicians were unable for many years to effect a precise cure for

scurvy, they were yet able to enhance their professional status by learning to talk judiciously about the disease. This judicious discourse seems almost to have required the careful balancing of a variety of considerations, only one of which involved diet.

Other essays are also engaging. Janet Browne and Alan Bewell give us the Enlightenment fascination that attended the growing realization of the sexuality of plants, scandalous for some in its import. These essays dovetail nicely with Martin Kemp's, which offers insight into how the period's botanical representations encoded cultural concerns. Further, Barbara M. Stafford cogently describes the revelations ushered in by the microscope: worlds within worlds receding into ever smaller nooks and crannies. Here was a provocative counterbalance to the macroscopic discoveries of European explorers—one that stretched the mind in the opposite direction.

Stafford argues that the microscope enabled people to learn to think objectively. In terms of absolute distance, the small details of nature were close at hand, but when one peered into the microscope, things seemed remote, even otherworldly. It became easy, then, to feel oneself a spectator to nature's operation and assume an objective stance. At the same time, however, the marvelous images presented by the microscope tended to decenter humankind by shifting attention to new and startling life forms. Although Stafford does not say it, one senses here the stirrings of a biological replay of the cosmological reorientation ushered in earlier by Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. In view of nature's extraordinary fecundity and diversity, humans were beginning to question their distinctiveness as a species.

This is only part of the story, however. Scholars such as Owen Chadwick have long noted that Western intellectual thought proceeds by paradoxical leaps: the "outrages" or debasements of humankind suffered at the hands of philosophy and science ironically elevate those callings and, by implication, the human race. One can find in any era, then, scientists like Alexander von Humboldt who are not particularly bedeviled by the phenomena they study. According to Michael Dettelbach, Humboldt's scientific aims and methodology were very different from those of his British counterparts. Coming from central Europe, he lacked the firm sense of political empire possessed by Banks and Captain Cook, and consequently his voyages possessed a different scientific character. While they wished to collect species and artifacts that engaged the senses, particularly that of vision, Humboldt sought through measurement to secure a "physical portrait" of the earth. Most remarkably, he believed that his measuring instruments could reveal lines of commonality (isothermal and isodynamic lines, etc.) stretching across continents and bringing the planet into organic unity.

To an extent, Humboldt was a scientific romantic, and Dettelbach holds that his thinking was marked by Friedrich Schiller's notion of "aesthetic empire." This and the fact that Prussia, his homeland, was not scrambling to impose its might on the world, freed him from the commercial and political concerns that inevitably shaped the British expeditions. His ultimate goal was to view the entire planet synchronically, in a single moment of vision. By contrast, the British were content to work away at nature diachronically, perhaps because their imperialism had a more mundane emphasis that affirmed change and becoming.

In his generally favorable response to Kemp, Stafford, and Dettelbach, Peter Hanns Reill insists that much work needs to be done to bring the Enlightenment forward in its true complexity. In Reill's mind, this means, as a first step, developing more nuanced understandings of people like Humboldt who do not fit neatly into any of the categories traditionally invoked to explain Enlightenment impulses. To call Humboldt a romantic, for example, misleadingly identifies him with a crowd of thinkers who reacted against the mechanical excesses of Newtonian science. What Reill is recognizing, of course, is that archetypal personages exist only in the abstract and that no interesting historical figure stands still long enough for precise characterization. But he is also recognizing that nature does not respect our taxonomies of nature and so the ground constantly shifts beneath our feet as we peer into the past. Thus, Reill's insistence on greater complexity is fully justified, and Simon Schaffer, reasoning from similar principles, effectively declares the field of Enlightenment scholarship wide open. In my mind, Reill's and Schaffer's calls for new complexity are less interesting than, say, Koerner's descent into the thoughtworld of Linnaeus, but those calls are necessary reminders of the tentative and highly imaginative character of our engagement with the past.

VISUAL MEDIA REVIEWS

Mabo: Life of an Island Man. 1997. Video, 87 min., color. Co-produced by Trevor Graham and Denise Haslem, directed by Trevor Graham. New York: First Run/Icarus Films; distributed by West Glen Communications (1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018).

Reviewed by Deborah Bird Rose, Australian National University

The Australian High Court's "Mabo decision" of 1992 was a major blow to the foundational mythology of Australian nationhood. The nation had long been held in both popular imagination and political rhetoric to rest on completed conquest, a conception held stable by the *terra nullius* doctrine that at the time the British claimed the continent it was unowned (occupied, but without a system of land tenure). Eddie Koiki Mabo, of Mer Island in the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua New Guinea, initiated the court case that became the defining battle of his life: a challenge for recognition of ownership of land, sea, and resources. The High Court found in favor of Mabo, determining that at the time of conquest there had been a system of land tenure on Mer Island and that that system was still valid. Labeled the Mabo decision, it knocked away the founding myth. In principle, indigenous people continue to exercise rights of ownership—now labeled "Native Title"—except in areas where conquest and appropriation have formally extinguished those rights. The eloquent decision drew much of its moral force from the new wave of Aboriginal history (dubbed by conservatives the "black armband" school of history). In drawing on a narrative of history that challenged the complacency of imperialist narratives, it threw open all the big questions of nationhood. Where and what was the Austra-

lian nation if conquest was in some sense incomplete, and if the territory of the nation was subject to indigenous law?

Mabo: Life of an Island Man is a sympathetic portrait of Eddie Mabo made by a filmmaker, Trevor Graham, who became a friend of the family. It is neither judgmental nor overtly political. Graham's decision to tell the story in a straight biographical mode was, in my view, the crucial decision in this film. It was not only smart, but wise; the result is a superb documentary. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were until 1967 wards of the state (unless they were able to acquire an "exemption" from this status). Their civil liberties were almost nonexistent, and fundamental aspects of their lives were managed by government officials. For them, the personal was the public, and the public was the political. The telling of a personal story becomes the telling of a public and political story, and enables the story to be told for maximum political and personal impact, since it is precisely the invasion of the political into the personal that for indigenous peoples constituted a gross and enduring violation of their human rights.

The late Eddie Mabo was an extraordinary man. The film portrays him through his own accounts of himself (interviews and letters), through the eyes of his family and neighbors, through interviews with countrymen back on Mer Island, and through interviews with two influential "white" historians, Noel Loos and Henry Reynolds, each of whom was close to him. There is nothing one-sided in the portraits: his problems with his countrymen and his family are part of the story, as are his radical affiliations and his problems with Queensland's "special branch" (secret service). The film does not provide an external analytic frame, so certain issues remain unexamined. For example, the outrage that erupted across Australia in response to the High Court's Mabo decision is portrayed in this film as fragmented noise. Perhaps this is how the family heard the uproar; it sounded like that to me too, after a while. Australians know what is being said here, but non-Australian viewers are likely to want more information. As a teaching tool, *Mabo: Life of an Island Man* would work well with one of the excellent post-Mabo studies (for example, Rowse 1993, Sharp 1996, or Attwood 1996).

One of the questions the Mabo decision raised was whether the High Court's findings of a system of land tenure would be applicable to mainland Australian hunter-gatherers who differ greatly from Torres Strait Islanders. The Australian Parliament implemented the Native Title Act (1993) to provide a legislative framework within which the continuity of Native Title can be asserted. The first decision concerning a claim on the mainland was handed down in November 1998: Justice Lee of the Federal Court of Australia found in favor of the Miriuwung Gajerrong Aboriginal applicants. It

now seems clear that Eddie Mabo's challenge will reverberate to the benefit of indigenous peoples not only across the islands but across much of the mainland as well.

Mabo died in 1992, not long before the High Court handed down its decision. He was buried quietly and unostentatiously in Townsville, and three years later, as is Torres Strait Islander custom, a large public ceremony was held to unveil the tombstone, release the family from mourning, and celebrate the life of the deceased. I do not want to give away the closing scenes of this film, for they are immensely powerful. It is important to know, however, that in the end this film shows why indigenous people require land rights. We see how the culture of conquest, with its hatred of anything that disrupts white supremacy, is a significant part of contemporary Australia. We also see how alliances of family and friends withstand that brutality.

I recommend the film to all who are interested in contemporary Pacific history, in relations between indigenous and settler peoples, and in postcolonial possibilities for social justice.

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Not a Simple Story/Out in Silence. 1994. 2 video programs on 1 cassette, 37 min., color. Produced by Fear of Disclosure Project, directed by Christine Choy. Distributed by Filmakers Library (124 E. 40th St., New York, NY 10016; <http://www.filmakers.com>). US$150.00; $50.00 rental.

China Dolls. 1997. Video, 28 min., color. Produced and directed by Tony Ayres for Film Australia. Distributed by Filmakers Library. US$295; $55 rental.

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Breaching the Margins: Three Stories of AIDS and Sexuality in the Asian and Island Pacific

Film can be many things, perhaps too many things. It occupies our attention with multiple narratives. There are narratives of style and technique, of the story told and the story of the telling, and ultimately, narratives that step outside the frame of the film to other stories alluded to, explicitly engaged with, or just unavoidably intersected with the story the film accounts for. This is a necessary complication of film as an artifact of popular culture and historical imagination. Even the simplest telling on film reverberates outward and inward like straining breath in a windstorm. HIV/AIDS has, in some ways, the same inherent characteristic. The narrative of HIV/AIDS is shot through with its presence in popular culture, social theory, and lived experience of often great drama. HIV/AIDS is not so much a moving target as it is a flock of targets weaving patterns of interconnection and interpenetration with larger and smaller stories in the imaginary constitution of HIV/AIDS as a sociocultural and historical event or process.

Combining the two, that is, telling about HIV/AIDS on film, is daunting on so many levels that it is difficult to imagine a technique of telling that can handle the multiplicities HIV/AIDS engages. Some efforts at filming the HIV/AIDS story explicitly position themselves as singular tales, cautionary narratives that stand on their own, not so much denying the connections outward but choosing to leave the tracing of these connections to others. Others tell a singular story but through a wide-angle lens that implicates the connections beyond the frame of the specific story, making the position of individual stories part of the quilt of stories HIV/AIDS contains. A third possibility, of narrativizing HIV/AIDS as a heuristic device in which HIV/AIDS is simply the vehicle through which the larger network of stories is engaged, has to my knowledge never been attempted.

Two of the films considered here stand somewhere between the cautionary tales of individualized experience and the wider lens of stories about the multiple stories HIV/AIDS implicates. *Not a Simple Story* is a seven-minute character sketch of a woman in Hawai'i living with AIDS and with her guilt over the risk at which she has placed her daughter. The piece is powerful in its examination of the multiple levels of emotion this woman engages in her experience of HIV/AIDS but is ultimately bereft of any explicit exploration of why her story is not indeed a simple one. Locating the story inside the issue of local cultural experiences of HIV/AIDS, this vignette never directly examines what it is about the cultural milieu, in this case local Hawaiian, that may or does complicate the experience of HIV/AIDS for this woman or for Pacific Islanders in general. As such, it wants to be both a person-specific

cautionary tale—and succeeds insofar as it takes HIV/AIDS beyond the gay male convention—and a broader cultural critique of HIV/AIDS as a living process—and succeeds only insofar as it raises the question, almost in passing, though never returning to it.

This brief film's intention is never fully accomplished, and as such, the film should fail and yet it does not. But the onus is on the viewer to find the connections that take this short story outside the particular circumstances of this woman's experience. It is at this level that the film succeeds: it generates interest in looking beyond individual health to the larger question of encultured health and illness. Its power may lie in the simplicity with which the film straddles the private cautionary tale and the wider narrative of cultural implications and conditionings within which HIV/AIDS is enacted. By calling the question, like the chair at a debating society, it energizes discussion even though its sole contribution is to make the question explicit. The film leaves you hungry for discussion, and its real power may well be in pointing to the margin between individual experience and the cultured worlds in which that experience (especially of something as complex as HIV/AIDS as both a medical and sociopolitical phenomenon) is played out, directing us to explore that margin, to challenge seeing HIV/AIDS as nothing more than stories of victims suffering or fighting back.

The second AIDS-specific film, *Out in Silence,* however, is much more explicit about this intersection between individual experience and encultured condition. Although it takes longer to tell its story, and it tells its story with incredible power at times, this film finally fails because the filmmakers seem unable to make up their minds about what their objective is. The film begins with great promise, anonymous voices over a black screen talking about HIV/AIDS and giving voice to culturally specific misconceptions—that Asians and Pacific Islanders cannot get AIDS, for example. These lacunae in the state of knowledge about HIV/AIDS are terribly ironic when placed against changes in the shape of the pandemic in which South Asians now account for the majority of new infections each year (Jonathan Mann, per. com., 1997), and set the ensuing film up as an exploration of the multiple cultures of HIV/AIDS, explicitly and directly.[1] But this is a promise on which the film only peripherally delivers.

The film, taken as a complete tale, is a powerful exploration of one young Pacific Islander's experience with HIV/AIDS and with his growing commitment to cultural activism to combat the spread of the disease, particularly in Guam. This is potent and emotionally draining stuff, often casually staged though at other points set up in tableaux that are breathtaking and wrenching. One scene, in which Vince, the focus of the film, visits the grave of a partner who had died of HIV/AIDS, lingers on him for several minutes as

he weeps with increasing intensity, resting his hand lightly on his lover's gravestone; it made me stop the video for a moment, just to recover my critical and emotional distance. Perhaps that scene, staged as it is, speaks most eloquently to the complexity of issues researchers encounter in—and bring to—the study and understanding of HIV/AIDS, and perhaps just that intensity makes the filmmakers pull back from the cultural issues they seem to want to explore, into the relative safety of tears and anger.

But the very power of scenes such as this—there is another scene, both hilarious and deeply distraught, where a person living with HIV/AIDS talks about the problems of traveling on public transit with his portable oxygen supply—defeats the tossed-off comments made throughout the film that seek to site the film in a larger context of cultural critique. Twice Vince's father comments that one cannot say he is not gay, one can say only that "he is not gay, not yet"; and twice the process of this man's coming to accept his son's gayness and his illness are mentioned, flagged as issues related to the culture to which he belongs, but then left unexplored as the film jumps back to some other aspect of Vince's coming into awareness as an activist. Oddly, one of the most interesting contentions between competing cultural premises, still being debated in Hawai'i, involves the invocation of "tradition" by opposing camps in the legal arguments over same-sex marriage. This rich clash between one vision of Hawaiian tradition and another, two visions informed not only by a sexualized field of identity, but also by the long-standing contention between recollected Hawaiian tradition and Christianity, suggests a ground for exploration that this film only hints at, a flaw I found startling.

Both of these films are the product of the Fear of Disclosure Project, initiated in 1989 by the late Phil Zwickler and produced by Jonathan Lee. Over five years four videos exploring the topic of revealing HIV status in differing communities have been produced. The first, the video *Fear of Disclosure* (1989) by Phil Zwickler and David Wojnarowicz, explores the complex dangers and problems of revealing HIV status for gay men. *(In)Visible Women* (1991) by Ellen Spiro and Marina Alvarez examines HIV/AIDS issues for women in the Latino/Latina community by showing how three women with AIDS deal with silence, invisibility, and complacency, while *Non, Je Ne Regrette Rien (No Regret)* (1992) by Marlon T. Riggs focuses on HIV-related issues for gay African-American men. *Not a Simple Story* and *Out in Silence* are the most recent films to come from this project.[2]

Each of these two films, in their own way, succeed in the intention of showing how Asians and Pacific Islanders, at least in these two individual cases, have made their HIV status the center of political and community commitment and activism. In both cases, the strength with which the emer-

gence of ground-up activism is informing the continued maturation of the pandemic as a social and political phenomenon is clearly and cleverly presented and is a valuable corrective to the AIDS-victim trope that informs so much of the HIV/AIDS story. At this level, these films succeed powerfully and well, and in teaching about the social and political ecology of HIV/AIDS, they are valuable tools that I will include in the library of material I use to teach about anthropological approaches to HIV/AIDS.

But the window on cultural difference—on the dark areas of denial, the blind spots in knowledge and understanding—that is the anthropology in these films is only alluded to. And where the first short film, *Not a Simple Story,* by making these allusions manages to create an opportunity for this kind of exploration, the longer and more thorough film, *Out in Silence,* by dropping hints of cultural matters only to leave them like vague traces in the story the film ultimately tells, creates an illusion of cultural exploration and critique that vanishes as the credits roll. Viewers may think they have crossed into new cultural territory, only to find at the end of the exercise they can't remember what that territory looked like because it never rose above the position of being implied in the story the film ends up telling. To my knowledge these are the only films that set out to deal with the Pacific Islander's culture-driven experience of HIV/AIDS and of the sociopolitical ecology of sex and sexuality that this disease and syndrome have made so salient. The hints each of these films insinuates into its story might be taken as the first sketches of a map of this ecology, but as first steps they are tentative and incoherent rather than revealing or explanatory. But in different but comparable ways, each film breaches several margins. The first is, though only by implication, the margin that locates HIV/AIDS on one hand as a personal experience of devastating enormity and on the other as a wider cultural phenomenon with an ecology of connections with sex and gender, power and identity, ethnicity, difference, and marginality. On this count, the films succeed by allusion rather than revelation or critique, and thus succeed only insofar as the viewer interrogates the films' too often facile interpolations about wider issues. The other margin—between victim and a more proactive engagement with the political and community issues within which HIV/AIDS is deployed—is much more successfully breached, giving voice not so much to Asians or Pacific Islanders as to the growing body of work that relocates living with HIV/AIDS outside the conventions of victimology and directly and explicitly in the field of social action and political change.[3]

It is perhaps ironic, then, that the third film I want to talk about, *China Dolls,* though not taking as its focus the multiplicity of cultural conditionings through which HIV/AIDS is engaged, offers the more thoroughgoing and revealing insight into what the landscape of HIV/AIDS is for Asians and

Pacific Islanders. The film takes as its particular point of departure the specific and unpleasant truths about racism, both in Australian society in general and in the Australian gay community in particular, in order to explain the double and triple deviances of gay Asian Australian men, transvestites, and transsexuals. For those familiar with American trash television, such a topic sounds suspiciously like a description for a Jerry Springer episode, and it is to the filmmaker's credit that this complex and unpleasant story, a story replete with stereotypes and gender-bending multiple identities, does not descend into a screaming match between the multiple contending camps that occupy the fields of engagement between and around which flow the caustic discourses of race, appropriate maleness, and (perhaps surprising to some readers) appropriate gay maleness.

And it is this multiplying doubledness that opens up the margins of being Asian, Australian, gay, or transgendered. There is deep sophistication and historical depth in this film, subtlety of theory-bending explorations, and passionate humor. The film does not pretend to be a comprehensive exploration of the permutations that coincide with Asian or Pacific Islander identity in predominantly white discourse of sexualities, national identities, gender, and the political economies of disenfranchisement that are the overwhelming legacy of the White Pacific. Nevertheless, *China Dolls* challenges us with ethnographic richness to rethink and redouble our own ethnographic practices. Gayness, as it is emerging in the islands, is a traumatic and complicated discourse of identities, power and powerlessness, and competing marginalization; and HIV/AIDS hovers over this concatenated field like a spectral guest. *China Dolls* never once utters the "A" word but it does not need to. Instead, it explodes the conceptions of appropriate maleness in the white Australian gay scene, drawing wider linkages between race, heterosexual presumption, and the pervasive importance of power as a sign of proper maleness, a sign that excludes Asians and Pacific Islanders as soft, feminized objects. One of its more valuable observations involves a brief discussion of power in Australian gay male sexual imagery, an observation that proposes that Asians and Pacific Islanders are conceived as girlish, powerless, and desexualized. This kind of suggestion is particularly intriguing in light of my own experience in Western Samoa, where *palagi* (Europeans) are the ones thought of as soft, powerless, effeminate, and weak. The film drew me to rethink the sexuality of cultural identities in a way that makes the interconnections between identities, marginalization, and HIV/AIDS far more complex and complicating than they appear superficially to be.

And this is the film's compelling accomplishment, ironic in a film that does not take HIV/AIDS as its starting point, unlike the other two. Perhaps the lesson is simply this: Rather than reading HIV/AIDS into the discursive

space in which Asians and Pacific Islanders engage in their identity challenging and creating practices, a real and valuable insight into where HIV/AIDS connects within these relationships demands we first read outward from these identity practices to the point, as yet not fully mapped, where HIV/AIDS associates and insinuates itself. Where *Not a Simple Story* and *Out in Silence* begin with an unexplored presumption of HIV/AIDS as "the thing to be reacted to," *China Dolls* steps deeper into the interpolations of cultures and identities through which HIV/AIDS circulates. In doing so, the film issues a challenge to recuperate the story HIV/AIDS is generating as it matures and expands through the Pacific, from the minutiae of particular stories, and invigorate it with the larger stories of national ethoses, competing engagements with the fluid question of gender and sexualized being and presence, and the emergent history of sexualities in the Pacific, as these issues contend within a globalized field of consuming and consumable identities.

Conclusion

It is a truism today to say that HIV/AIDS matures in distinctive ways in each distinctive community it affects, that it is an interpenetrating collation of multiple and culturally driven subepidemics. These films could have explored that, exploding the marginalization of these multiple epidemics by expanding their vision into the lacunae of cultural knowledges in and around which HIV/AIDS circulates as a disease event. Instead, despite rhetoric to the contrary, what these films—and here I mean all three—accomplish is the generation of more and powerful character studies of people living with HIV/AIDS but character studies that, in the end, contribute little to locating these individual stories in the larger cultural stories that need to be brought in from outside the pale and made central to our understanding of what HIV/AIDS does not only to bodies but to the social imaginaries it implicates in its still emergent combining of the multiple discourses of sex, identity, health, blame, and good and proper social presence. These films contribute little to answers, but each in its way adds powerfully to the way we frame questions about HIV/AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, a challenging reminder to invigorate and expand our exploration of the "event horizon" that is AIDS in the Pacific, something that is only now taking shape as the pandemic enters its third decade, a decade that future history may well refer to as the Pacific AIDS decade.

However, telling marginalized stories within a medium that straddles margins is important and offers compelling opportunities for insight and new ways of knowing the experiences of the silenced or the silent. With all

the reservations I have about these three films, what remains is a deep respect for the tactic of breaching marginalities with which each of these filmmakers is engaged. Though our insight into Asian and Pacific Islander experiences of HIV/AIDS, of sexuality and sex, of the multiple and multiplying cultures of gender, of secrecy, of deviance and of political and social change may too often be an epiphenomenon of these films, small steps and tiny advances are nonetheless steps and advances that bring the margins closer to scrutiny, and in doing so enhance how we understand the network of margins within which, through which, and because of which Pacific Islanders engage their presence and their activism in the world.

NOTES

1. In 1995 Asia became the location for the largest single cluster of new HIV infections, surpassing sub-Saharan Africa for this dubious honor. The change is particularly striking given that at the beginning of the decade Asia accounted for something closer to 10 percent of all new HIV infections (Jonathan Mann, pers. com., 1997). This places HIV/AIDS squarely at the insular Pacific's doorstep, an issue that make these films, and more intensive study, all that much more important.

2. This information was taken from a Web site that contains information on community-based activist programs related to HIV/AIDS and other issues (Anonymous 1998).

3. Stoller's *Lessons from the Damned* (1998) is perhaps the best exploration of the question of living with HIV/AIDS and political engagement. Farmer's *AIDS and Accusation* (1992) is one of the finest attempts to link AIDS as a culturally specific disease event to the wider, even global, political ecology of health and, in particular, of blame.

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BOOKS NOTED

RECENT PACIFIC ISLANDS PUBLICATIONS: SELECTED ACQUISITIONS, SEPTEMBER 1998–JANUARY 1999

THIS LIST of significant new publications relating to the Pacific Islands was selected from new acquisitions lists received from Brigham Young University–Hawai'i, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Bernice P. Bishop Museum, University of Auckland, East-West Center, University of the South Pacific, National Library of Australia, Melanesian Studies Resource Center of the University of California–San Diego, Secretariat of the Pacific Community Library, and the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau's Centre for Pacific Development Training. Other libraries are invited to send contributions to the Books Noted Editor for future issues. Listings reflect the extent of information provided by each institution.

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