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PACIFIC STUDIES

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GLOBALIZATION, STATELESS CAPITALISM, AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TONGA'S SATELLITE VENTURE

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Globalization has led some Pacific Islands countries into ventures that use their sovereignty to advance private interests against regulation by metropolitan states. Tongasat, Tonga's innovative satellite enterprise, is one such recent initiative in "stateless" capitalism that has deep structural similarities with flags of convenience and offshore tax havens. The microstate has claimed a disproportionate percentage of geostationary slots and succeeded in filling a number of them. Tongasat's emergence is analyzed in terms of the contemporary world-system, declining U.S. hegemony over the global satellite regime (creating opportunities for independent entrepreneurs), and the end of the cold war (making inexpensive Russian satellites available for commercial uses in Tonga's slots). Tonga's satellite venture has benefited members of the ruling elite but made few contributions to the country's internal development. Tongasat has been at the vanguard of moves toward privatization, deregulation, congestion, and conflictual competition in outer space.

The current period of globalization is not simply a continuation of the expansion of capitalism and the West. If one wanted to fix its specific point of origin, it would be the first successful broadcast transmission made by satellite.

—Anthony Giddens (1994:80)

> *I see myself in the tradition of merchant princes. Tongans are pragmatists, some might say opportunists. . . . The essence of all this is that Tonga doesn't have a foreign policy. . . . I don't believe in policies.*
> —His Royal Highness Crown Prince Tupouto'a,
> then Tonga's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence
> (quoted in Bain 1993:101, 107)

THE CURRENT PHASE OF GLOBALIZATION has led some Pacific Islands countries into ventures where their sovereignty is used as a resource to advance private interests against regulatory attempts by metropolitan states.[1] Tonga's innovative satellite enterprise is one of the most recent initiatives in stateless capitalism:[2] the small nation claimed a disproportionate number of geostationary slots and succeeded in filling a number of them. This venture has deep structural similarities with flags of convenience and other offshore services provided by other Pacific Islands jurisdictions.

The present article offers the most complete account of Tonga's satellite enterprise so far and is the first to examine it from the standpoint of international political economy. Law review articles have recognized the great significance of the "Tonga issue" for the future of global telecommunications. They emphasize the implications of a country with no satellite capability of its own being able to secure slots for the purpose of warehousing, leasing, or even auctioning them (Delzeit and Beal 1996; Ezor 1993; Riddick 1994; Thompson 1996; Wong 1998). However, these law review articles treat the issue formally and legalistically, with no more than thin or superficial descriptions of the actual details of Tonga's satellite venture.

Origins: Tongasat and the Global Satellite Regime

On 23 March 1990 the government of Tonga registered its claims on sixteen of the most valuable unoccupied orbital parking places for geostationary satellites.[3] Such space vessels can link Asia, the Pacific, and the United States —a range stretching from Saudi Arabia to Hawai'i and from north of Russia to south of Australia—encompassing over sixty countries, most of Asia, and at least two-thirds of the world's population. The traffic between the United States and Asia alone generated about US$3 billion a year in revenue at the time and was growing rapidly. Tonga claimed almost 9 percent of the world's total of 180 slots.

Three years before, in 1987, Dr. Mats C. Nilson, a forty-eight-year-old American from San Diego who had looked into the possibility of retiring to Tonga after the death of his wife, had begun lobbying King Taufa'ahau

Tupou IV to file for the orbital slots. Friendly Islands Satellite Communications Limited, a company more commonly known as Tongasat, was registered on 16 February 1989 to be Tonga's exclusive agent in satellite matters for fifty years. Leasing each slot to television, telephone, and communications companies was to bring an annual rent of about US$2 million apiece (or US$32 million for all sixteen). According to the income-splitting formula Nilson and the king discussed, the venture would increase government revenue by about 25 percent. Nilson, Tongasat's managing director, and his compatriot Jerry Fletcher, a former beer distributor in Nuku'alofa,[4] who (like Nilson) had moved back to the United States, each owned 20 percent of the company, with Tongans holding the remaining 60 percent. The king did not want to be directly involved in owning or managing the company and recommended his daughter as a shareholder to Nilson. Her Royal Highness Princess Salote Mafile'o Pilolevu Tuita became chairman of the board and 40 percent shareholder, while Kelepi Tupou, a Nuku'alofa accountant and distant relative of the king's, was the other founding shareholder, with 20 percent. Tupou died soon after, leaving his shares to the princess, who would later emphasize that her investment had been intended to avoid the government's exposure to risk and to produce profits that she could give to the Red Cross, the hospital, and Vava'u's water system in Tonga (*Australian,* 7 March 1995).

Nilson had temporarily retired to Tonga for two years after making enemies in the United States. In the early 1980s he had obtained a U.S. license for two Ku-band slots for Advanced Business Communications Inc. (ABC) and enlisted a Hughes Aircraft Company subsidiary to build and operate satellites to rival Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT).[5] The U.S. Congress had created COMSAT in 1962 to control certain satellite services and dissuade Third World states from relying on the Soviet Union for them. Hughes withdrew from the deal with Nilson before any satellite was launched, however, because on 31 January 1985 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), faced with an increasing number of applicants for fewer available slots, withdrew the permission it had given to ABC. The FCC contended that ABC did not have committed capital sufficient to make use of the license, as satellites might cost upwards of US$100 million each. Two years later Nilson retired to Tonga, where he developed his new entrepreneurial scheme.

Nilson identified aspects of international laws that give disproportionate powers to sovereign microstates. The number of satellite slots is limited by international law to prevent interference between satellites, but the slots can be reserved at no cost by nearly any sovereign nation on an essentially first-come, first-served or squatter basis. Control over orbital slots determines who has the right to launch satellites serving a particular region. Under interna-

tional law, satellites using the same spectrum of frequencies can be no closer than two degrees in longitude apart (1,488 km or 916 miles) to prevent radio interference and collisions, thus limiting the number of slots to 180.[6]

International law also provides that any government has the right to reserve any unused slot simply by registering its intention with the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). The IFRB is a quasi-judicial division of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations agency that (under different organizational names) coordinates the orbital positioning and radio frequencies used by satellites to avoid physical or electromagnetic clashes. Tonga has been an ITU member since 1972. Orbital slots are allocated on request either to individual sovereign governments or to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) on behalf of more than 125 sovereign governments that are members. Tonga is not a member of INTELSAT, but as a sovereign state it can make claims directly to the IFRB—at no cost and without having to demonstrate any financial resources.

Nilson had worked at INTELSAT as its chief strategic planner until 1979. He had noted a major flaw in the organization's strategy: it was not claiming slots in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region (*Forbes,* 12 September 1994; Reuters, 29 August 1990). INTELSAT apparently had not thought it had competition for, and consequently neglected to reserve, the sixteen orbital slots subsequently claimed by Tonga. Five INTELSAT member countries protested to the IFRB that Tonga was breaking customary law and subverting the IFRB's goals of maximizing global communications by the island nation's desire to warehouse slots until they could be leased for speculative profits.

Geostationary satellite orbits and associated radio frequencies are seen by most observers as becoming ever more scarce, despite technical advances that temporarily increased supply (Straubel 1992:206; Thompson 1996:284). Satellite slots are allocated by a global regime that claims to consider them resources owned by all but in reality has given the overwhelming majority to highly regulatory core governments on the premise that these can arrange for the slots to be used most readily and effectively. Almost half of geostationary slots are occupied by U.S.-owned satellites.

The Third World has been relatively unified and effective in gradually changing the rules of the global satellite regime since the early 1980s. There is increasingly favorable treatment of claims to slots by less-developed countries, even though they may lack internal funds to launch satellites and thus need to locate external finance. Inadvertently, this change favored Tonga and strengthened its position in relation to INTELSAT, whose rhetoric of public service must be viewed in light of its goal of producing at least a 14-percent annual profit for holders of its shares, most of which are owned by

core countries. Tongasat emphasized from the outset that its telephone, radio, television, fax, and data transmission services were to be complementary (not in competition with) INTELSAT's (*South Sea Digest,* 13 April 1990), but on 28 August 1990 INTELSAT petitioned the ITU to change communications law to thwart Tongasat (*Matangi Tonga,* August 1990).

Washington, D.C.–based INTELSAT, created in 1965 out of the same American anticommunist agenda as COMSAT (which has effectively controlled it), continues to see Tonga's claims as a dangerous challenge to the world regime in telecommunications. This regime has been effectively controlled by the governments of core countries (particularly the United States) through "gentlemen's agreements." From the standpoint of INTELSAT, Tongasat is a subversive intruder, unleashing forces that threaten to convert outer space from a realm of governmental (particularly American) hegemony into a relatively stateless market where orbital slots are leased to the highest bidders.

Tongasat has become a top-level concern of INTELSAT. Tongasat has contributed more to polemic in Pacific satellite circles than any other regional system in recent history because it represents a formal and substantive challenge to an important aspect of the contemporary world order. Another of Tongasat's antagonists, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (through which INTELSAT transmitted its protests to the ITU), estimated that the market value for telecommunications traffic—including telephone, data, and television signals—between the United States and Asia totaled US$2.5 billion in 1989 and was growing at nearly 40 percent a year (*New York Times,* 28 August 1990). Even in the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s the ITU estimated that Asian telecommunications traffic would grow more than 20 percent a year during the five years up to 2002 (*Asian Business Review,* August 1997). Total global revenues from space were US$85 billion in 1997 and are expected to grow rapidly to US$121 billion by 2000. Satellite revenues are predicted to explode—from US$9 billion in 1996 to US$31 billion by 2002 (*Economist,* 3 May, 24 November 1997).

One of the spheres in which the United States still has supremacy is the one surrounding the earth, where its military and commercial powers have not yet been challenged seriously. Partly as a result of effective control over international space organizations such as INTELSAT, the U.S. government has been able to subject transnational corporations using outer space to a variety of licensing requirements, fees, and regulations, since each satellite has been under the sovereignty of a nation-state and, until recently, all but a few operating satellites were heavily regulated by governments. Somewhat paradoxically, in an attempt to reassert American hegemony, two new U.S.-based companies attempting to take advantage of a more deregulated and

privatized satellite market quickly appealed to the FCC to stifle Tongasat. Columbia Communications (which is closely tied to NASA) requested that the FCC deny approval for earth stations that would use satellites in Tonga's orbital positions. PanAmSat proposed that the United States deny landing rights to airplanes communicating through Tonga's slots (*Islands Business,* February 1994; *Telecommunications,* August 1994).

A Flag of Convenience in Outer Space

Despite well-publicized rumors that the ITU would grant Tonga at most a handful of slots and possibly none (*Times* [London], 13 March 1991), in June 1991 the IFRB and Tonga agreed that the kingdom could retain six slots if it renounced its claims to the others. Tonga would retain rights to the six until 1999. Tonga soon added three more slots, for a total of nine—14.0 degrees East, 70.0 degrees East, 83.3 degrees East, 130.0 degrees East, 134.0 degrees East, 138.0 degrees East, 142.5 degrees East, 170.75 degrees East, and 257.0 degrees East. Two of the slots were still not entered on the ITU's Master Registry by 1998—as they represent first claim on slots not yet available (*Matangi Tonga,* April 1998; *South China Morning Post,* 17 June 1991; *Via Satellite,* February 1998). The footprints span from Europe in the west to the western coasts of the United States, Canada, and Mexico in the east, and cover Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Tonga became the world's sixth largest ITU-approved claimant on geostationary orbital slots, after the United States, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union, China, and Japan (*Matangi Tonga,* August 1994). Tonga also applied for twelve lower-earth-orbit slots (*Matangi Tonga,* May 1993, April 1998).

With a staff of six people and little capital, Tongasat is in effect proposing a flag of convenience for satellites.[7] This allows capitalists to escape or minimize heavy regulation and the direct and indirect taxation by the core governments that have hitherto controlled outer space. Like all flag-of-convenience registers, Tonga's fees are extremely low in comparison to the costs of doing business with the traditional powers that have dominated satellite communications. As in the tax havens providing maritime flags of convenience (mostly small Third World states), such fees may produce a substantial proportion of the revenues received by their governments and the urban elites that control them. As already mentioned, Nilson said Tonga's governmental revenues would increase by around 25 percent if Tongasat leased each slot for a mere US$2 million apiece per year. The venture might also considerably enrich members of the indigenous aristocracy who control Tongasat and the Tongan state. In 1990 the Tongan parliament approved a new tax rate of 10 percent for company headquarters (*South Sea Digest,* 20 July 1990); this reduced rate of taxation would appear to apply to Tongasat.

Many microstates provide havens from taxation, regulation, and disclosure and are important weapons in the arsenal of transnational corporations. Space remains one of the last bastions of American state hegemony, which created an ordered postwar realm of global governance under U.S. direction. American hegemony in most areas of international commerce, however, has been increasingly superseded since the early 1970s by a multipolar world in which transnational corporations play states off against each other to reduce taxation, regulation, and governmental control and where (since the end of the cold war) states act more like business firms (Tang 1995:574). Tongasat represents the first significant initiative to create stateless capitalism in outer space, presaging a realm increasingly controlled by powerful private interests with little or no allegiance to any constraining state or society.

Tonga's efforts to convert geostationary satellite slots into objects of financial speculation are more consistent with the New Right's notions of economic efficiency and reliance on markets than are the older standards of regulation and authoritative management by governmental agencies. Nilson had already identified what he regarded as an inevitable tendency toward deregulation, privatization, and multipolarity while working for INTELSAT during the 1970s.

The End of the Cold War

The disintegration of the Second World brought great transformations. Just as *glasnost* and *perestroika* encouraged a rapid transfer of Eastern Europe's maritime fleets from state socialist registers to flags of convenience offered by tax havens, so the cash-strapped Informcosmos, a commercial space-related organization in Moscow, reached an agreement with Tongasat on 20 July 1993. In August 1993 one of Russia's older Gorizont ("Horizon") satellites was renamed *Tonga Star 1* and moved into Tonga's orbital slot at 134.0 degrees East, where it began commercial operations in the following month. The economic crisis in post–cold war Russia meant little government money for even civilian telecommunications—and desperation among Russian satellite technologists to accept virtually any deal to keep the industry afloat. Since the former USSR possessed 1,198 of the world's 1,989 operating satellites (as of 31 June 1991), a considerable extension of such adventures in stateless capitalism could seriously undermine the entire regulatory structure of outer space.

Tongasat had already leased slots to Rimsat, a Fort Wayne, Indiana, satellite purchasing company incorporated in the Caribbean tax haven of Nevis. Rimsat was formed in April 1992 by three Americans: Michael A. Sternberg (a telecommunications consultant), James A. Simon (a wireless cable television operator in Indiana), and a leading communications attorney, Dr. Carl

B. Hilliard. The company was formed specifically to take advantage of Tonga's orbital slots and the sudden availability of relatively inexpensive Russian launches and satellites. Nilson initially acquired 11.25 percent of Rimsat to complement his 20 percent of Tongasat.

On 3 November 1992 the Russian Republic government approved the US$130-million agreement that Rimsat had signed with Informcosmos. The plan involved moving or launching seven satellites (three Gorizonts and four new-generation Express spacecraft) into Tonga's slots. All seven satellites have small capacities but cost less than one-third of their Western counterparts. Each Gorizont has seven transponders and a minimum guaranteed working life of four years, although it can possibly operate more than twice that long. Each Express satellite has twelve transponders and a minimum lifespan of seven years. Each transponder rents for an average of about US$1 million a year. Rimsat claimed that the Paine Webber stock brokerage, the First Chicago Bank, and about sixty private investors had already provided enough capital to finance four launches. Rimsat also had a ten-year option to lease another ten Express satellites from Informcosmos for about US$250 million.

The problem for Nilson had always been finance. In March 1993 Rimsat faced collapse, as it could not meet impending obligations to Tongasat and the Russians. Fortunately, Nilson had met a wealthy Malaysian who had acted interested in his project at a 1991 satellite conference in Hawai'i. Rimsat executives rushed to Kuala Lumpur to meet Dato Tajudin bin Ramli, who has close ties to the Malay political elite and whose Technology Resources Industries was a diversified investment holding company that had expanded into telecommunications in 1989 by buying a majority of the shares of Celcom, Malaysia's very successful second cellular-telephone network, from Telekom Malaysia (*Asia Business,* November 1992; *Matangi Tonga,* May 1993). Rimsat (through its Tongasat slots), Nilson claimed, could offer Celcom rates more than 25 percent cheaper than INTELSAT's charges, despite the Asia-Pacific being a seller's market for satellite services (*Fiji Times,* 7 July 1993).

Ramli bought 45 percent of Rimsat for US$38 million and planned, through it, to have as many as ten satellites in orbit as a result of its innovative pact with the highly price-competitive Russian space agency (*Far Eastern Economic Review,* 13 January 1994; *Forbes,* 12 September 1994). Ramli, described as "intensely ambitious, totally self-confident, and very aggressive" (*Airline Business,* December 1994:32), was extremely optimistic in 1993, when the stock market valuation of his Technology Resources Industries soared 1,300 percent—making this entrepreneur a paper billionaire by giving his 38-percent shareholding a value of US$1.2 billion (*Forbes,* 18 July 1994).

Ramli proposed listing Rimsat on the New York Stock Exchange (*Business Times* [Malaysia], 7 September 1993); soon his 45 percent of Rimsat was

said to be worth US$150 million (*Business Times* [Singapore], 24 November 1993). This extraordinary appreciation in the valuation of his Rimsat shares was based on enthusiasm over Rimsat's unique synergy between Asian telecommunications growth, Tonga's easily available slots, and cheap Russian satellites. The entry of the post–cold war entrepreneurial Russians into the global satellite market began to erode a regime that had been oriented around a few large satellite manufacturing or operating companies—most owned or tightly regulated by core governments.

Rates for telecommunications and broadcasting through Tongasat have in fact proved to be considerably cheaper than those available in the heavily regulated system, leading to a counterattack on Tongasat. Australia has been leading the (largely unsuccessful) opposition of some metropolitan governments to Tongasat (*Asia Pulse,* 17 July 1998; Thompson 1996:282–283). Although Australia's anti-Tongasat proposals have been explicitly meant to discourage overfiling for satellite slots by introducing much higher financial requirements for filers (*Communications Daily,* 24 November 1997), most countries' antagonism toward Tongasat seems primarily related to the cut-rate prices available in Tonga's slots. The Tongan price is as little as US$700,000 a year per transponder, considerably less than half the normal price and a substantial discount on the US$4.3–5 million that Australia's Optus has been charging (*Cable and Satellite Asia,* March 1996).[8]

The first Rimsat satellite was a Gorizont 17 *(Tonga Star 1),* which, as we have seen, was moved into a Tongan slot at 134.0 degrees East in August 1993. On 18 November 1993 a Gorizont named *Rimsat 1* was launched from the Balikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan into a second Tongan geostationary slot over the Pacific Ocean (*Flight International,* 1 December 1993, 31 May 1995; *Jane's Intelligence Weekly,* March 1994). On 20 May 1994 a Gorizont-42 named *Rimsat 2* was launched from Kazakhstan into a third Tongan slot —the 142.5-degree-East orbital position over Papua New Guinea. This satellite's capacity had been fully leased (particularly to companies associated with Ramli), except for one transponder set aside for Tonga's use. The three satellites in Tonga's slots had a footprint extending from Iran to Hawai'i, covering 3.5 billion people. Rimsat claimed annualized revenues of US$12 million and a US$4 million cash flow. In September 1994 Tongasat's share capital was valued at US$41.7 million and Rimsat's equity was calculated to be worth approximately US$88 million[9]—meaning that Nilson's 11.25 percent of Rimsat and 20 percent of Tongasat were valued at US$18 million and Princess Pilolevu's 60 percent of Tongasat was estimated to be worth US$25 million (*Flight International,* 25 November 1992; *Forbes,* 12 September 1994; *Matangi Tonga,* May 1993; Rimsat media release, 17 November 1992; *Tonga Chronicle,* 8 July 1993).

Space Jam

The scarcity of slots is now becoming more acute, and conflicts among businesses and governments are becoming more frequent. Tonga's claims have conflicted with those of other sovereign nations in the past. Other satellites operated in three of the sixteen slots initially claimed by Tonga, leading Nilson to protest to the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that the United States was encroaching on Tonga's territory and later suggesting that some compensation would be in order. Tonga and the United Kingdom also had competing claims to two slots (*New York Times,* 28 August 1990). In 1990 a third party, Hong Kong–based Asiasat, had the temerity to launch a satellite into the slot above 105.5 degrees East longitude claimed by both the United Kingdom and Tonga. Several delegations to Nuku'alofa from Asiasat, the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, the ITU, and others failed to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on an Asia-Pacific regional satellite communication system (*Pacific Magazine,* November 1990; *South Sea Digest,* 13 April 1990). These disputes all transpired in 1990—at which time none of these conflicts concerned the six (and then nine) slots the ITU would subsequently grant to Tonga.

The first significant problem in Tonga's relationship with Rimsat came when Indonesia moved a satellite into one of the kingdom's ITU-approved slots in July 1992 (*Matangi Tonga,* May 1993). A private Indonesian operator, PT Pacifik Satelit Nusantara, purchased an eight-year-old Palapa B-1 satellite, renamed it *Palapa Pacific 1,* and moved it into the slot at 134.0 degrees East, north of the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya. After three months of unsatisfactory diplomacy with the Jakarta government, Tonga retaliated by threatening to move a satellite into an Indonesian slot and saying that it would jam many of the country's telecommunications links (*Daily Post* [Suva], 12 July 1993). Indonesia responded by seeking a meeting in Jakarta, but Tonga appealed to the ITU. In October 1993 representatives from the Tongan and Indonesian governments met at the ITU's headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland (*Tonga Chronicle,* 2 October 1993). For both countries it was not only a matter of economic competition; each felt its sense of nationhood was at stake. Indonesia is a 4,800-kilometers-long (3,000 miles) archipelago of 17,508 islands, and its government considers satellites as vehicles for creating national unity (*Los Angeles Times,* 20 September 1993).[10] Tonga issued a T$2 stamp commemorating its first satellite as a significant national achievement. National prestige and the quest for a vague sense of national greatness have generally been fundamental motives for space development. In authoritarian regimes such as Tonga and Indonesia, successful space exploration can be useful in diverting people's attention toward the

skies, away from the immediate terrestrial problems around them (Marshall 1995:45, 48).

It was finally agreed that Tonga and Indonesia would share the slot for the life of *Palapa Pacific* 1, which was estimated to be only five or six months (*Tonga Chronicle,* 25 November 1993). The two nations agreed to consider joint procurement of satellites and co-registration of future satellites in slots currently allocated to Tonga, including those at 130.0 and 138.0 degrees East (*Telecommunications,* August 1994). This truce was short-lived. Tonga claimed that the agreement to share the 134.0-degrees-East slot was of limited duration (ending in October 1995), but Indonesia asserted that the two countries had agreed to share the slot into the indefinite future. Indonesia persisted with its original claim that there were no technological reasons that two satellites could not operate in the same slot (Reuters, 10 December 1993). Tonga launched new satellites into the slot, but Indonesia protested. In 1996 Tonga complained that Indonesia was jamming the slot from a transmitter on Sumatra, disrupting television and telecommunications reception. Four days of negotiations between the countries in Sydney in February 1997 broke up in acrimony, with Indonesia apparently insisting that Tonga make room for a new Indonesian satellite in the slot (*Islands Business,* May 1997; *Satellite News,* March 1997; *Tonga Chronicle,* 27 February 1997). Extensive litigation in Geneva led to the dispute's temporary resolution, with the satellites of both countries being adjusted so that both could occupy the slot (*Islands Business,* February 1998).

Similar problems are even more likely to recur if Tongasat does not maintain an active launching program, as the Gorizont (although quite reliable) has an average in-orbit life expectancy of only five years and seven months. Although the Russians have placed a high priority on extending the lives of their satellites (*Satellite Communications,* October 1993), their current rapid obsolescence makes Tonga's slots vulnerable to incursions that have been justified (in the Indonesian case) on the grounds that they are not being used. The entry of private operators into a realm previously dominated by governments and a new aggressiveness on the part of certain governments that are ignoring international conventions have led some commentators to predict "orbital anarchy." This situation might leave extremely expensive satellites orbiting uselessly—unable to operate effectively because of interference problems with other satellites that are too close.

Tonga's problems with Indonesia in June 1992 were a first sign of this breakdown of the world satellite regime. Even more serious, though, was China's insistence on launching a satellite (without collaborating with the ITU, of which it is not a member) into a slot already occupied by a Tonga-registered and ITU-approved satellite (*Australian Financial Review,* 16

November 1993). Tonga's second satellite, a second Gorizont named *Rimsat 1,* which had been launched in November 1993 to cater exactly to Rimsat's requirements, was operating at 130.0 degrees East longitude and fully leased to Sun TV and Asia Net of Madras, India, and to Intersputnik of Moscow. Nevertheless, China insisted on placing the US$130-million Hughes HS-376 spacecraft named *Apstar 1* in orbit at 131.0 degrees East longitude on 21 July 1994, creating the possibility of interference (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* 30 May, 8 August 1994).

Rimsat had already filed its intention to launch a larger, Russian-made Express satellite into the slot in 1996. Tongan and Japanese officials as well as Michael Sternberg of Rimsat rushed to Beijing to protest. The Japanese government complained that China had not notified it of its plans and that the twenty-four transponders of *Apstar 1* would create serious interference for its *Sakura 3a,* launched twenty days earlier into the slot at 132.0 degrees East to provide telecommunications services for Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation. In September 1994 it was agreed that China's *Apstar 1* would move to 138.0 degrees East, which had been allocated to Tonga by the ITU and leased to Unicom, which had not used it.[11] Not all *Apstar 1* customers were happy. These included Turner Broadcasting System's CNN, MTV, HBO Asia, Discovery, Viacom, Time Warner Entertainment, ESPN, China Telecommunications, and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. At least one complained that the move would weaken its signal over the lucrative Indian subcontinent, although clients focused on the East Asia market would not be affected. Tonga started collecting fees from the Chinese owners of *Apstar 1* (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* 8 August 1994; *China Daily,* 15 September 1994; Lee and Wang 1995:136; *Telecommunications,* August 1994; *Tonga Chronicle,* 25 August, 15 September 1994).

Crisis

But all was not well between Rimsat and Tongasat or between Nilson and the princess. In March 1994 she had replaced Nilson as managing director of Tongasat with Dr. Wilbur Pritchard, a satellite engineer based in Bethesda, Maryland. She contended that Tongasat should be more independent of Rimsat and that Nilson's shareholdings in both created a conflict of interest. The second problem for Rimsat was the developing prospect of excess capacity over Asia as many new satellites were scheduled to be launched. This compounded the global regime's problems of poaching, congestion, and coordination. In 1994 two or more satellites had been proposed for more than twenty of the slots in the Asia-Pacific region. Some suggested that severe price competition would enter this market, as supply increased so rapidly

that it would exceed demand, even though demand was growing at very high rates. Nilson and Rimsat predicted that few of the scheduled launches would actually take place. Rimsat continued to contend that its smaller, cheaper satellites would put it into a good position to compete, even if prices decreased (*Satellite Communications,* July 1994; *Telecommunications,* August 1994; Tongasat media release, 7 March 1994).

Rimsat's confidence was unfounded. A very high level of launchings did occur in a short period and soon serious problems arose. In December 1994 Carl Hilliard, Rimsat's sacked attorney (whom Rimsat was suing for US$300 million as compensation for alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and malpractice), and Nilson filed for the receivership of Rimsat in the Caribbean tax haven of Nevis, where the company had been incorporated two and a half years earlier. The High Court of Nevis appointed Hilliard the receiver of Rimsat, which the Fort Wayne faction saw as his device to escape the US$300-million Rimsat lawsuit against him and gain control over Rimsat's assets. In February 1995 the Fort Wayne officials of Rimsat filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in an Indiana court, which issued a judgment that refused to recognize the effective validity of the Nevis court's bankruptcy judgment.

Rimsat lost US$10 million in 1994 and owed Tongasat US$2.5 million in license fees, but the company was still making some partial lease payments for the two orbital slots that its satellites were filling. Informcosmos had moved one of its Gorizonts from a Tongan slot because Rimsat had not met its payment schedule.

In September 1995 the Russians acted far more dramatically: they simply appropriated the two remaining satellites (at 130.0 and 142.0 degrees East). Without consulting any court, the Russians transferred the satellites from Informcosmos to another organization (Intersputnik)[12] and told Rimsat's Asian clients to negotiate new deals with Moscow or face termination of service. Some clients were blacked out, but their signals were restored when payments to the Russians were made. Robert Underwood, the trustee appointed for Rimsat by an Indiana bankruptcy court, maintained that the Russians had unfairly confiscated Rimsat's two satellites (for which Rimsat had paid the full price of US$20 million) and appropriated the satellites' annual revenues of about US$12 million. According to Underwood, the Russians had failed to account for the US$6.7 million that Rimsat had advanced for the construction of its first Express satellite or to give any adequate idea of when it would be built or launched. This situation had led Rimsat to stop making its monthly payments to Informcosmos in April 1994.

The Russians countered that they were perfectly justified in taking over the satellites, controlled from their earth station at Duna: Rimsat was fifteen months in arrears—US$780,000—on its transponder lease payments. Fur-

ther, Rimsat never came close to having the funding required to meet its obligations to the Russians of US$130 million, paying only about 20 percent of the agreed total and frustrating the Express development program, which was largely dependent on funding from Rimsat. The Russians claimed that Rimsat's US$6.7 million for development of the Express was accounted for, and they ignored a 30 August 1995 U.S. Federal Court judgment to block their appropriation of the satellites (saying no American court had jurisdiction over them). Protests by the U.S. State Department, Commerce Department, and prominent U.S. congressmen (especially from Indiana) had no effect, despite the legislators' threats to end or sharply reduce U.S. funding for any joint Russian-American space endeavors as retaliation for the Russians' "piracy." Attempts at arbitration and mediation (for example, by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, as specified in the contract between Rimsat and Informcosmos, and by 1990 Goodwill Games organizer Bob Walsh) came to nothing, despite diplomatic attempts by the U.S. government to persuade Informcosmos to compromise.

The Russians favored the reorganization of Rimsat in the tax haven of Nevis, as proposed by Hilliard and Nilson, and concentrated their aggression on the Fort Wayne faction (particularly former Rimsat executives James Simon and Michael Sternberg, trustee Underwood, and U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Robert Grant). The Fort Wayne faction claimed that the Russians embraced the Nevis receivership as an opportunity to form a new company with Hilliard and to evade their obligations to Rimsat—particularly their failure to build Rimsat's new Express satellite and their responsibility to account for millions of dollars that were missing.

In mid-October 1995 Intersputnik signed an agreement with Tongasat for mutual cooperation and joint operation of satellites serving Asia-Pacific clients. Fort Wayne shareholders in Rimsat soon started litigation against both the Russians and Tongasat (*Aerospace Daily,* 6 and 7 September 1995; *Broadcast,* 22 September 1995; *Cable and Satellite Europe,* December 1995; *Communications Daily,* 26 October 1995; *Flight International,* 20 September 1995; *Multichannel News,* 25 September 1995; Rimsat media releases, 30 June, 31 August, 7 September 1995; *Satellite News,* 9 and 30 October, 18 December 1995, 8 January 1996; *Satellite Week,* 18 September, 23 October 1995).

Tongasat canceled Rimsat's remaining leases and proceeded to "Tonganize" its own board of directors—encouraging Jerry Fletcher to resign as a director in July 1995 and requesting that Dr. Wilbur Pritchard quit as managing director in September 1995, although Pritchard remained as a consulting engineer. By 1996 all of its staff and management were Tongans, with the indigenous aristocracy strongly represented on the board: Princess Pilolevu as chairperson; her brother, Prince Lavaka ʻAta ʻUlukalala, as deputy

chairman; her San Francisco–based personal secretary, Meleane Ti'o, as corporate secretary; Lucy Anna Tupou, a Nuku'alofa businesswoman, as interim managing director; and Sione Kite, the former Tongan high commissioner to London, who had conducted many negotiations with the ITU and foreign governments, as a board member and (eventually) managing director. The reorganization was seen as further distancing Tongasat from Rimsat or any American connection. All operations were moved to the kingdom in mid-1996. In 1998 all full-time staff were Tongans and the princess was in the process of acquiring Fletcher's shares in Tongasat—raising her interest to 80 percent, leaving only Nilson's 20 percent in foreign hands (*Daily Commercial News* [Sydney], 6 April 1995; *Islands Business,* November 1995; *Matangi Tonga,* October 1995, April 1998; *Wall Street Journal,* September 1995).

There were many reasons for Tongasat to cut links with Rimsat and the United States. On 10 March 1995 Ramli's private family company, Kauthar Sendirian Berhad, filed suit in the United States suing investors in Rimsat and Tongasat (including Princess Pilolevu) for US$130 million, claiming that Ramli had been deceived. This was many months before the Russians seized Rimsat's satellites, but a few months after Rimsat was placed in bankruptcy. The lawsuit alleged that Rimsat directors had used part of the company's investment to pay secret, multimillion-dollar commissions to the people who had introduced Ramli to Rimsat and who had misrepresented Rimsat's prospects, including Princess Pilolevu. At the time that Ramli filed his suit, Tongasat had an office in the United States. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Princess Pilolevu spent most of the year in San Francisco, where her husband, Siosaia Ma'ulupekotofa Tuita, was Tonga's consul general. The princess announced the couple's intention to leave the United States to resume their residence in Tonga (*Islands Business,* November 1995; *Satellite Week,* 3 August 1995).

Pilolevu established Pacific Asia Global Holdings in the tax haven of Hong Kong. She emphasized that this company, in which she was the major shareholder, was designed to reduce or eliminate liability caused by Tongasat's problems with Rimsat and the Malaysians, who conducted extensive litigation over the years (*Pacific Islands Monthly,* June 1998). The princess, who began living in Hong Kong part-time, developed a strong relationship with the Chinese government in Beijing as part of her negotiations with it in regards to Tongasat. The Tongan government switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to mainland China on 2 November 1998, accompanied by a ceremony in Nuku'alofa in which the Chinese satellite company that is now Tongasat's leading client presented the king with a larger-than-life bronze statue of himself. A major factor in the diplomatic shift from Taiwan was the Chinese

promise to help in developing important income streams from Tonga's satellite slots. China is interested in many of Tonga's nine slots, but it is not next in line to claim any of them—thereby giving Beijing an incentive to cooperate with Nuku'alofa in filling Tongan slots with Chinese satellites. It is not in the interest of either country for the slots to be unoccupied or for Tonga's claims to lapse.

The pact with Beijing was the first significant action of Tonga's new foreign minister, Prince Lavaka Ata 'Ulukalala, the youngest of the king's four children and former chairman of Tongasat. The prince took over the post in mid-October 1998, after his brother, Crown Prince Tupouto'a, resigned from the position on 5 May 1998 to devote himself to his business interests—among which was Shoreline Property, proprietor of an expensive building that had been built to be occupied by Taiwan's embassy. The People's Republic of China will apparently build a new embassy in Nuku'alofa rather than occupy the new T$2.5-million Taiwan embassy complex for which the crown prince had provided the architectural concept and land and which had been officially opened less than ten months before (*Islands Business,* November 1998; *Matangi Tonga,* April, December 1998; *Pacific Islands Monthly,* February 1999; Reuters, 12 April, 18 October, 2 November 1998; *South China Morning Post,* 2 and 3 November 1998; *Tonga Chronicle,* 5 February, 5 November 1998).

A more significant problem for Princess Pilolevu emerged in 1998, when her brother Crown Prince Tupouto'a asked Tonga's cabinet and Privy Council to end Tongasat's exclusive rights. There were complaints circulating around Nuku'alofa that Tongasat had not paid the government all the royalties it was owed and was paying excessive salaries to the princess and her staff. In 1998 the princess refused to explain how the revenues of Tonga's satellite venture are divided with the government and Tongasat could not provide any specific information about how much the government had received from the enterprise. Tongasat requested a Supreme Court injunction against the kind of government action proposed by the prince, but the documentation relating to the case has been kept secret. The court date was canceled after the parties agreed to arbitration. Meanwhile, Crown Prince Tupouto'a and three American partners were organizing a rival to Tongasat called Diligence. This was to complement the most recent of the crown prince's ventures in stateless capitalism (also in collaboration with Americans): the successful Internet-registration site called Tonic, or the Tongan Network Information Center (*Matangi Tonga,* April 1998; *Pacific Islands Monthly,* April 1998).

In April 1997 Tonic Corporation, mostly owned by Crown Prince Tupouto'a (the Oxford-educated then-minister of foreign affairs and self-confessed "computer geek"), began successfully pioneering the creation of an interna-

tional market in Internet domain names. The company sought to capitalize on the severe shortage of names in the .com, .org, and .net domains. Tonic offers .to names that become immediately operational on the same day as purchase through an automated Tongan registry. Moreover, Tonic charges half or less of the price demanded by the considerably slower conventional name supplier, InterNIC or Network Solutions, which has a cooperative agreement with the National Science Foundation of the U.S. government.

Washington has never renounced its claim to own all the name space for Internet addresses. Tonic's strategy, then, implies that the Internet's domain name space is international property and that a sovereign state such as Tonga (which has an exclusivity agreement with Tonic) should be entitled to part of it. Like the oceans, the sky, and outer space, cyberspace may be claimed by sovereign states—no matter how small.

Tonic's fee of US$100 per name for the first two years and US$50 for each additional year is extremely competitive, particularly when one considers the recent bidding war for the "Business.com" site, which Network Solutions sold for US$150,000. In its first full month of operation Tonic registered about five hundred names, and subsequently received about fifty applications a day registering government, commercial, and personal sites. In November 1997 Tonic agreed that TABNet, the world's largest Internet domain-registration company (headquartered in Napa, California, but with offices on four continents) would resell .to domain names through its large marketing channels and unique domain-name registration system (*Australian,* 12 July 1997; *EDGE: Work-Group Computing Report,* 23 June, 14 July 1997; Gigante 1997; *IT Daily,* 16 June 1996; *Network Week,* 2 July 1997; TABNet marketing release, 24 November 1997; Tonic Corporation marketing release, 11 November 1997). The crown prince has shown considerable ability to form a successful venture in stateless capitalism and telecommunications, without the sorts of problems Princess Pilolevu and Tongasat had encountered with Ramli and Rimsat. However, King Tupou, chairman of the Privy Council, is still said to be divided in his loyalties—hoping that the disputes between his son and daughter will disappear and be hidden from the public.

Internal Development

One of the principal claims of Tongasat's promoters is that it assists Tonga's internal development. Crown Prince Tupouto'a, viewing the launching on 22 May 1994 in Balikonur, Kazakhstan, of the third satellite (one of whose seven transponders was dedicated to use by the kingdom),[13] called for the formation of a new company that would be a joint venture between Tonga-

sat, Cable and Wireless, Tonga Telecom, and the public to improve Tonga's telecommunications. The prince argued that separation of the organizations involved was impractical and would not take advantage of Tonga's satellite slots for Tonga's interests. He complained that Tonga's only earth station facilities have been operated by INTELSAT (since 18 June 1978) at the expense of the more remote islands of the archipelago.

Tongasat claims that the twelve lower-earth-orbit station slots, for which it had applied, would be useful for small dishes providing cheap communications for island nations. Tonga's fleet of high-powered and relatively inexpensive satellites in its proposed lower-earth-orbit slots would supposedly be capable of sending signals strong enough to be received by small antenna dishes in remote villages and isolated islands. Such satellite-based communication would improve education, general access, and weather forecasting (*Matangi Tonga,* May 1993) and help to reverse the relentless migration from rural areas to overcrowded towns—a trend of much concern to the king and the aristocrats. In short, Tongasat claims that the international space regime represented by its greatest enemy, INTELSAT, has stifled Tonga's and the Pacific region's development because it does not sufficiently promote deregulation, private enterprise, and the interests of a multitude of nation-states.

Nevertheless, neither Tonga Telecom (which provides domestic service) nor Cable and Wireless (which conducts the kingdom's international telecommunications) has been favorably inclined toward Tongasat, regarding it as unproven or even embarrassing for them at international telecommunications conferences (*Matangi Tonga,* July 1993). On 6 June 1994 Cable and Wireless signed an agreement whereby the government gave the large multinational a franchise for international telecommunications until the year 2000 (*Matangi Tonga,* June 1994). Tonga Telecom's independence from the Tongasat project was further revealed when it signed an A$4-million contract with NEC Australia on 12 December 1996 to install an INTELSAT F-3 standard earth station on each of the five main islands of the kingdom: Tongatapu, Haʻano, Vavaʻu, Niuatoputapu, and Niuafoʻou (*Matangi Tonga,* January 1997). No links have yet been established between Tongasat and the two providers of telecommunications in Tonga.

More substantial benefits for Tonga have come from leasing fees. Rimsat had initially leased two of Tonga's orbital positions for a period of ten years. It agreed to pay US$1.2 million up-front and US$1.5 million for each satellite, plus US$100,000 a month for both satellites' broadcast bands. Half of the lease money was to go to the Tongan government, with the other 50 percent a commission for Tongasat. Tongasat presented the prime minister, Baron Vaea of Houma, US$600,000 as a "gift" to the government to com-

memorate the king's birthday and anniversary in July 1993, just before the first satellite entered into Tonga's slot (*Business Times* [Malaysia], 13 May 1994; *Business Week*, 7 December 1992; *Flight International*, 25 November 1992; *Forbes,* 12 September 1994; *Islands Business,* November 1995; *Matangi Tonga,* May 1993; *Novecon Sevodnya,* 7 June 1994; Rimsat media release, 17 November 1992, 20 May 1994; *Tonga Chronicle,* 8 July 1993).

Despite this "gift," dissatisfaction surfaced over the fact that Tongasat is mostly owned by Princess Pilolevu. A commoners' representative in the Legislative Assembly, Viliami Fukofuka, attempted to place pressure on the minister of justice, Attorney General David Tupou, to renegotiate the agreement with Tongasat that gives the government only 50 percent of the net profits from the country's orbital slots until the year 2003 (*Tonga Chronicle,* 30 September 1993). On 20 June 1994 Tongasat and the government signed a fifty-year formal agreement that increased the government's share to 50 percent of gross, rather than net, profits. Yet Tongasat paid the Tonga Trust Fund only T$812,788 (US$636,494) in 1994 and T$625,078 (US$492,106) in 1995 (*Tonga Government Gazette,* 24 February 1996)—less than 5 percent of Nilson's early optimistic projections. Moreover, the money went not to the government directly but to the Tonga Trust Fund.[14]

Large contributions have been promised to the government's development budget from the Tonga Trust Fund, which has been accumulating in overseas accounts, principally from selling Tongan passports and, to a much lesser extent, from Tongasat fees. The *promised* contributions amounted to about 10 percent of total governmental expenditure during the early 1990s (Fairbairn 1992:6, 9). As discussed below, the Tonga Trust Fund has the resources to fulfill these promises. It is highly significant that little of this money was actually delivered (National Reserve Bank of Tonga 1995:S29, S44) and that by 1994 the National Reserve Bank of Tonga decided to omit the promised Tonga Trust Fund transfer from its budget forecasts. The bank stated that in the past the transfers had either not occurred or been far lower than predicted. There were even cryptic comments that the government's budget document failed to establish "entitlement" to the Tonga Trust Fund and that such "offshore" funds (money expended outside the kingdom) "represent . . . funds which are not accounted for by the government of Tonga" (Sturton 1994:13).

The kingdom's Ministry of Finance presented the assets of the Tonga Trust Fund as being T$37.8 million (US$27.8 million) as of 31 March 1994, almost T$1 million more than a year earlier on 31 March 1993, when the assets were T$36.9 million (US$26.5 million). Yet the fund made relatively stingy contributions to the government's budget. Despite the Ministry of Finance's repeatedly making grandiose promises of money from the Tonga

Trust Fund for the coming year, even the Reserve Bank of Tonga concluded that they could not be taken seriously as these promises had never been fulfilled. For 1993–1994, for example, the ministry had predicted T$11.4 million would be entering the government's development revenues from the Tonga Trust Fund. In fact, only T$45,708 was actually delivered, despite the increase in the fund's assets. The Tonga Trust Fund contributed less than 0.1 percent of the government's current revenues of T$54.7 million (US$40.3 million).

Tongan commoner politicians and central bank economists questioned how entitlement to these sums was actually being defined, how accountability was being established, and why T$28.5 million of the assets of the Tonga Trust Fund should be held offshore in fixed deposits at the Bank of America in San Francisco (where Princess Piliolevu had lived for many years with her husband) outside public scrutiny, Tonga's foreign exchange laws, and parliament's budgetary processes and control (Minister of Finance 1995:17, 35; National Reserve Bank of Tonga 1995; Sturton 1994:13). It is a measure of the monarchy's attachment to San Francisco that in 1997 the king proclaimed Tau'akipalu, a palatial private residence on two and a half acres in the affluent suburb of Hillsborough, to be a royal residence as well as a facility for Tongan government ministers and officials (*Tonga Chronicle,* 21 August 1997). In summary, the promised benefits of Tonga's satellite venture in assisting internal development have not eventuated. On the other hand, a small Tongan elite has been substantially enriched.

Stateless Capitalism in Outer Space

Tongasat represents the purest form of contemporary stateless capitalism in satellite communications, without the industrial, commercial, and firm-specific entailments of other ventures. Tongasat is primarily an opportunistic intermediary, a lessor of sovereign airspace and a registry for satellites. With the disintegration of the Second World (which controls a high proportion of orbiting satellites) and its jettisoning of central planning for a commitment to the free market, new possibilities exist for the allocation of satellite services on the basis of price—increasingly outside the control of governments.

Satellites, by their very nature, operate beyond a country's territory and serve as instruments to bypass the effective sovereignty and jurisdiction of most of the states of the world. They are increasingly owned or controlled by private capitalists rather than governments. The recent trend toward mobile cellular networks and small satellites has offered much greater opportunities for participation and even control by the private sector. It has made governmental regulators and national post and telecommunications monopolies

and oligopolies ever more apprehensive. This defensiveness has been expressed particularly by INTELSAT, which is financed by a consortium of national telephone companies and acts to limit competition with and between them. INTELSAT supports a system where satellites have genuine nationality. Tongasat points the way toward a "nationality of convenience," where a jurisdiction may register satellites and enact laws for them that favor the interests of capital. States such as Tonga have little actual supervisory power.

The tax havens of Mauritius and Singapore followed Tonga's lead by filing for a disproportionate number of satellite slots—apparently intending to offer them to foreign companies for a fee (*Business Times* [Singapore], 22 September 1994). Located in the tax haven of Luxembourg, Société Européene des Satellites (the platform of choice for Rupert Murdoch, Canal Plus, Leo Kirch, and other major media organizations) has become the third largest satellite operator in the world (*Australian Financial Review,* 30 March 1995; *Financial Times,* 10 May 1998). In a move seen as having "echoes of Tongasat," GE Americom (the company that has controlled the largest number of orbital slots over the United States and that has the largest satellite capacity in the world) abandoned the U.S. regulatory process administered by the FCC and turned to the government in the tax haven of Gibraltar for assistance in obtaining rights to twelve international satellite slots (*Satellite Week,* 15 January 1996; *Via Satellite,* 1 July 1997). Orion Asia Pacific also decided to avoid American regulations, including foreign ownership limits, by operating from the Pacific Islands tax haven of the Marshall Islands, whose government arranged access to a slot at 139.0 degrees East so Orion can provide services from India to Hawai'i (*Bernama,* 2 October 1997; *Cable and Satellite Asia,* March 1997). Tax haven promoters in Pacific Islands microstates would appear to be likely beneficiaries of the ITU's increasing reluctance to grant valuable slots to countries that already have a large number of satellites in orbit (*Newsbytes News Network,* 28 March 1996).

If American hegemony continues to weaken, it appears likely that current or aspiring offshore financial centers may become increasingly involved in passing satellite legislation that allows owners and lessors to avoid a welter of competing laws, regulations, and taxes that mainland states attempt to enforce. According to international law, positions in geostationary orbit cannot be maintained for longer than thirty years; hence an allocation amounts to usufruct and not permanent appropriation. Thus, over time, users of slots given to traditional powers may gravitate toward new space-age flag-of-convenience jurisdictions in a manner similar to the major post–World War II movement of ships to maritime open registers in tax havens.

Since it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to appropriate or own

outer space (which is like the open seas), jurisdiction and regulation become largely a matter of regulation of the vessel, represented by its flag (Weaver 1992). Although a maritime flag of convenience does not give a ship exclusive access to any section of the global waters, a satellite flag of convenience currently is supposed to confer use of an orbital slot from which other satellites are excluded. But there is increasing recognition (even within the ITU) that space may be even more like the open seas than once thought and that the value of exclusion has been overly emphasized. At 94.5 degrees East four satellites operate harmoniously in the same slot because there are no conflicts between their frequencies and antennas (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* 8 August 1994). Flags of convenience in outer space are likely to increase as the number of satellites grows. Some writers claim technical advances will allow four thousand satellites to operate in geostationary orbit without interference (Riddick 1994).

A Possible Future

As the world's global satellite regime continues to evolve, spacefaring companies ultimately owned in core countries may find it increasingly necessary to pay fees to microstates such as Tonga to gain access to orbital slots. Core countries (and particularly the United States) no longer have virtually unlimited use of the orbital spectrum. This evolving space satellite regime increasingly favors the claims of less-developed sovereign states. Even the United States will probably have to learn to cooperate with small, less-developed countries such as Tonga (Ezor 1993). Pacific Islands states would appear to be primary candidates for the further development of flags of convenience in space.

Like the shipping business over the past twenty-five years, the satellite business has been risky and unpredictable. High rates of failure have meant that not a single American satellite carrier from the early 1980s was still operating ten years later (*Australian Financial Review,* 16 November 1993). Tongasat's situation has also been extremely volatile. In May 1997 Tongasat had four satellites in different orbital slots, with a fifth just launched into the 170.75-degrees-East slot (*Islands Business,* May 1997). Less than a year later only two of its slots were still filled by satellites paying fees to Tonga—at 134.0 and 138.0 degrees East, which connect Asia and North America (*Via Satellite,* February 1998). Continuing deregulation of telecommunications would only further accentuate the satellite industry's instability, unpredictability, and riskiness (Giget 1994:478). The cycles of the world satellite industry increasingly resemble the boom and bust of the oil-tanker business, a great user of maritime flags of convenience. In both the shipping and satellite industries

there is a long delay between the ordering and the launching of vessels (*Economist,* 3 May 1997), with consequent cycles of great scarcity and oversupply.

If both the maritime and satellite businesses continue to become more entrepreneurial, more globalized, and less tied to subsidies and protection from states, the appeal of flags of convenience will grow. Flags of convenience are means of minimizing state regulation, taxation, national rules of procurement and service, and so forth.[15] The increasing deregulation of outer space reflects conditions on earth, where property is increasingly allowed to be relocated to jurisdictions that make the fewest claims on it. This is often justified by the doctrine of the equality of sovereign states. Tonga's satellite venture has departed radically from the social democratic conception of outer space as the common heritage of humanity. It has accelerated the globalization of stateless capitalism into ethereal realms. One day the advent of Tongasat may even be regarded as marking a significant new phase in world historical change.

NOTES

An earlier version of this article was presented in the Globalization and Pacific Politics section of the Sixth Pacific Islands Political Studies Association conference at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, December 1998.

1. Globalization is a process of growing linkage between social groups so that occurrences in one part of the earth increasingly affect people who are distant.

2. The term "stateless" indicates lack of a genuine link to the nationality of the capitalist and freedom from meaningful state regulation rather than the absence of any state. "Stateless" points to an extreme limit, in the same way "countless" in ordinary language means very numerous, as in a "countless fortune." In the case of Tongasat, the capitalism is stateless since Tonga exercises no effective control over the satellites in its slots or the companies that own or operate them. I thank Michael Goldsmith for questioning my use of the term.

3. The "geostationary orbit" is 35,786 kilometers (about 22,300 miles) above the equator, where more than one hundred spy satellites, some early-warning satellites, and a few weather satellites orbit in tandem with the earth's rotation (*Economist,* 15 June 1991). It is also known as a "Clarke orbit" after Arthur C. Clarke, the science-fiction writer. Clarke brought the concept to a popular audience in his 1945 article "Extraterrestrial Relays," in which he speculated (correctly) that satellites positioned above the equator at this height and traveling at the same speed as the earth's rotation would appear to hover over one location, a condition he labeled "geostationary" (Clarke 1945).

4. In the 1980s Fletcher had also promoted a controversial proposal to dump toxic waste from the United States in Tonga (*South China Morning Post,* 22 July 1993).

5. Most satellite systems operate in C-band (6/4 GHz); the future may bring further development of the more expensive Ku-band (14/12 GHz) and Ka-band (30/20 GHz) as

well as the LaGrange L-5 orbital positions. Extension of transoceanic fiber-optic cable systems may limit, although not eliminate, the predicted scarcity but is a less attractive option in the vast Asia-Pacific region than in relatively compact markets such as Europe. Most Tongan satellites have been Gorizonts—each with one L-band, one Ku-band, and six C-band transponders (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* 30 May 1994). The transponders on the satellites that have filled Tonga's slots, then, are mostly C-band, but this is not perceived as much of a weakness since Tongasat's primary market has been Asia, where the terrain presents severe problems for Ku-band (*Satellite Communications,* July 1994).

6. Some contend that technological advances have substantially lowered the necessary distance between satellites, to only about eighteen kilometers (twelve miles), although they still see future saturation of the orbits as an important problem (Thompson 1996:284).

7. A flag of convenience is a legal identity for a vessel registered easily for a fee in a jurisdiction where it is not ultimately owned, for the purpose of commercial or tax advantages (van Fossen 1992).

8. Important clients for transponders on satellites in Tonga's geostationary slots have included Australia's most popular television network, Kerry Packer's Channel Nine (*Cable and Satellite Asia,* March 1997); Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation (*Broadcast,* 24 May 1996); and even Australia's government-owned ABC (Lee and Wang 1995:136).

9. Another, earlier estimate valued Rimsat at US$333 million (*Business Times* [Singapore], 24 November 1993).

10. Indonesia has a history of frustrated ambitions in relation to the geostationary orbit. Indonesia was one of the eight equatorial countries that signed the Bogota Declaration of 1976. Their claims to the parts of the geostationary orbit over their territories were strongly rejected by both core powers and nonequatorial developing countries (Thompson 1996: 306–308).

11. Unicom (a Delaware-registered company headquartered in Aspen, Colorado) had concluded an agreement with Tongasat back in November 1991 to lease two of the kingdom's slots, with an option on a third (*South Sea Digest,* 6 December 1991). Unicom has not been able to place any satellites in these orbital positions, which the kingdom has reclaimed.

12. Intersputnik would soon spin off a private company, Intersputnik Special Project Company, headed by former Rimsat Vice-President Tim Brewer, registered in the tax haven of Gibraltar, and aimed at establishing a global satellite system (*Space Business News,* 26 June 1996). Lockheed Martin later formed a joint venture with Intersputnik and agreed with Tongasat to place Gorizonts in each of two of Tonga's orbital slots—at 130.0 and 142.5 degrees East—in 1999 (*Interspace,* 10 February 1999; *Space News,* 2 November 1998).

13. The statelessness of Tongasat's venture is highlighted by the fact that three of the four transponders that were leased were used for video transmission by Asian Broadcasting Company, headquartered in the tax haven of Jersey in the Channel Islands (Rimsat media release, 8 June 1994).

14. There was a report that Tongasat had presented a check for T$3,167,361.45 (US$1.89 million) to the Tonga "government" on 29 September 1998 (*Islands Business,* November

1998; *South Sea Digest,* 23 October 1998; *Tonga Chronicle,* 8 October 1998), but the details of this are still unclear.

15. Wong's (1998:875–879) contention that the problem of "paper" satellites will be minimized if banks, insurance companies, and other financial capitalists are given greater power by being included in the International Telecommunications Union is contrary to experience in maritime commerce. In the shipping industry, these financiers frequently encourage or even require ships to fly flags of convenience to avoid taxes, regulations, or other expensive requirements (van Fossen 1992).

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ETHNIC INTERCESSION: LEADERSHIP AT KALAUPAPA LEPROSY COLONY, 1871–1887

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Western notions of leadership can obscure the complexity of colonial history. This article examines ethnic relations in Hawai'i via its Hansen's disease colony during the years immediately preceding the overthrow of the monarchy. Popular accounts of Kalaupapa portray a nineteenth-century prison of iniquity where native Hawaiians, sequestered from the controls of civilization, degenerated to a state of "savagery" until a European priest saved them. This image is challenged by letters and reports to the Board of Health, which invoke an alternative history focused on the dialogue between native patients and foreign advisors in government. It is argued here that the settlement functioned with mitigated autonomy until shifts in power induced tighter control. The goal is not to replace the white heroic myth with a brown one; rather, the data introduced invoke an interpretation politicized by tension between native Hawaiian and foreign interests. Kalaupapa was a Hawaiian community with permeable boundaries and indigenous leadership. Successful resident managers were not rebels or crusaders; they were mediators between white administrators and native patients.

Hansen's disease, which had been known in Hawai'i since around 1830, did not become a medical concern until population decline became a concern of the sugar industry, and King Kamehameha V signed the "Act to Prevent the Spread of Leprosy" on 3 January 1865.[1] The members of the Board of Health opened two hospitals: one near Honolulu for light or doubtful cases and another for those in an advanced state of illness. The Kalawao *ahupua'a* (land division) at Kalaupapa—a peninsula on the north side of Moloka'i Island that had hundreds of acres of cultivable land, an abundance of water, and was separated from the rest of the island by steep cliffs—seemed ideal

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for the severe cases. While the hospital at Honolulu was strictly managed, Kalaupapa remained preinstitutional, that is, it lacked the restricted administration of life from above, as described by Goffman (1961). Although the Board of Health was regulated by whites, Kalaupapa came under the management of Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian patients. The native superintendent was in charge of daily affairs, but Rudolph Meyer, a German resident at the top of the Molokaʻi cliffs, controlled the purse strings. The Board of Health was responsible for the settlement but relied on Hawaiian legislators for funds. The politicians, in turn, owed their position to Hawaiian voters, many of whom were patients or relatives of patients.

Life at Kalaupapa

Nearly all of the leprosy patients sent to Kalaupapa in the first two decades were native Hawaiians (see Table 1) who possessed subsistence skills that could prevent dependency. Although they raised taro and sweet potatoes, poultry, hogs, and various other foods, the patients never achieved the envisioned self-sufficiency. Goods the patients could not produce themselves were acquired from kin or the Board of Health. The patients also received assistance from the *kamaʻāina* (native residents) of Kalaupapa *ahupuaʻa,* who had been farming there for generations. The government provided housing, but many people chose to build their own homes: wood or traditional grass houses, depending on their family resources. They also formed congregations that worshiped with circuit riders. Although the board tried to keep the patients isolated, it was virtually impossible to prevent them from communicating with the *kamaʻāina* and with friends and relatives. Many of the early arrivals were allowed to take family members with them as *mea kōkua* (helpers) to nurse them and to assist with domestic chores. This action was not as rash as may be presumed; fewer than 5 percent of patient spouses who lived at the settlement contracted the disease (McCoy and Goodhue 1913; McCoy 1914).

When the leprosy settlement at Kalawao, Kalaupapa, received its first inmates in 1866, it was administered by white nonpatient managers. After five years of rebellion, a more normal village environment was realized under the leadership of part-Hawaiian patient resident-superintendents—or undersuperintendents, as they were called (to emphasize their subordinate position to Meyer, who handled government appropriations because natives were not trusted with financial affairs [Hillebrand 1870]). Meyer's large family, management of the Molokaʻi Ranch, entrepreneurial ventures, and numerous government appointments left him little time to intervene in the day-to-day affairs of the colony. He rode his horse down the rugged trail to the settle-

TABLE 1. **Nationality, Number, and Sex of Lepers Received Annually from the Foundation of the Settlement**

	Hawaiian		Mixed Hawaiian		White		Chinese		Other		
Year	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	Total
1866	101	38					2				141
1867	56	12			1					1[a]	70
1868	72	37	2	2	1		1				115
1869	73	53									126
1870	31	26									57
1871	125	55	3								183
1872	69	36									105
1873	289	191	2	1			3		1[b]		487
1874	51	37	1	1	1						91
1875	121	82	2	2	3		1		1[c]		212
1876	55	39	1		1						96
1877	107	53	2				1				163
1878	134	101	1	2	1						239
1879	79	42	1	1	1		1				125
1880	31	17	2		1						51
1881	151	76	2		2		1				232
1882	49	18	1		1		2				71
1883	181	116	3				1				301
1884	60	37	3		2		6		1[d]		108 [*sic*]
1885	68	28	2		1		3				103 [*sic*]
Total	1,903	1,094	28	9	16		22		3	1	3,076

Source: Mouritz 1886.

[a] Lascar [b] Rarotonga [c] Mauritius [d] Manila

ment when necessary and corresponded regularly with the succession of assistants who ran the community, by messenger until the installation of a telephone line connected them directly. The normalization of leprosy was ended in 1887 by the "Bayonet constitution" that triggered the loss of native autonomy finalized with the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893.

Kahoʻohuli

On 12 April 1871 Kahoʻohuli, formerly captain of the Hawaiian Guards, arrived at Kalaupapa to assume office as the first peer superintendent. He was to survive there just a year, not long enough to leave a strong impression, but when Meyer descended the *pali* (cliffs) at the end of May, he found

the community happy and everything in excellent order under the captain's direction. The people seemed pleased with their new *luna* (manager), and Meyer heard no complaints from them.

The Board of Health instructed the captain to inform the patients that they must relinquish privately owned cattle; they were given three months to get rid of their livestock, which the board offered to buy if they thought the price reasonable. Every inmate was allowed to keep one horse, and those willing to give the board two extra days' labor a month for each additional animal were allowed to keep up to four; to prevent breeding, no stallions were allowed. Limiting the number of horses conserved pasture for Board of Health cattle and curtailed unauthorized transport of persons and goods to and from the settlement. The original plan for a self-sufficient colony had already been undermined by the leasing of Waikolu Valley, which was initially part of the settlement, to King Kamehameha V and would be further compromised by the aspirations of persons who were in a position to profit from government contracts.[2] Disallowing personal livestock would not only reduce the problem of overgrazing, it would make patients dependent on the Molokaʻi Ranch, of which the king was the owner and Meyer, who encouraged the action, was manager. The agreement between the Board of Health and the Molokaʻi Ranch was one of many lucrative arrangements made at the patients' and taxpayers' expense.

In June, William Humphreys, a patient who had been jailed on Oʻahu for his leadership in an insurrection against past-superintendent Caroline Walsh, took advantage of the changed management to file an admission of guilt, plead for clemency, and request a return to Kalaupapa. Humphreys' protégé, Kaʻaumoana, signed as well. Humphreys' rivals had petitioned against allowing the men to return, and because the Board of Health had its own reservations about the dissidents, Humphreys was still writing from the Oʻahu jail in August to repent for his impropriety and to beg to be permitted to return to Molokaʻi. After consulting some of the inmates, Kahoʻohuli initially barred the return, fearing that it would disturb the peace, but by December Humphreys' apologies had been accepted, and he returned to find his former residence and position as assistant to the superintendent occupied by W. N. Pualewa. He sought reimbursement for improvements he had made on the house and settled quietly into village life.

The farmers of nearby Pelekunu Valley had been providing taro for patient rations, but when their contract expired, the king successfully tendered his bid to furnish *paʻi ʻai* (hard poi) to the colony. Kahoʻohuli was optimistic about the arrangement he made with Kupihea, the king's land agent who oversaw *kamaʻāina* cultivation at Waikolu Valley; there would be suffi-

cient taro to last the winter months without sending to Hālawa, Wailau, and Pelekunu (Kahoʻohuli 1871).

Kahoʻohuli's management of the community was not without incident. Minor complaints were made against him with regard to the supply of taro, and he was accused of feeding milk to his pigs. He assured the board that the taro supply was sufficient and that milk was available for hospital patients and any others who were willing to milk cows. He gave one of his accusers a cow with the stipulation that she deliver a quarter of the milk produced to the hospital patients. When she refused to share, he took the animal away from her. He raised pigs, he said, because Meyer objected to his keeping cattle, and he fed them on the residue from butter making. He admitted that he imposed a four-dollar court fee to cover the cost of a summons and to pay witnesses; to other complaints he replied that there was insufficient tallow for everyone, so the most needy received what he had, and that he imposed labor only on the able-bodied.

Kahoʻohuli became ill in January 1872 and turned management over to Pualewa, his assistant. Within a month, a rash of runaway inmates prompted Meyer to request new handcuffs and foot irons for the punishment and "safekeeping" of escapees; the cuffs he had were so large that they easily slipped off (Meyer 1872a). One man crossed the nine-mile-wide Pailolo Channel to the island of Maui, and another was caught at Kaunakakai but escaped. Later, unable to get off the island, the fugitive was compelled by hunger to return to Kalawao.

A few months later, Meyer investigated irregularities in the *paʻi ʻai* bills; although the board had been charged for enough poi to feed the entire community, the amount received was inadequate for their rations. When it was discovered that Pualewa had come to a furtive agreement with Kupihea, Kahoʻohuli asked Meyer to dismiss Pualewa and appoint William Humphreys in his place. Meyer, however, was reluctant to make any changes considering Kahoʻohuli's poor health and Humphreys' reputation as a rebel. Patient complaints about the quantity and quality of *paʻi ʻai* continued until Pualewa was superseded by Humphreys.

William Uweleʻaleʻa Humphreys

When Kahoʻohuli died on 4 June 1872, Meyer appointed Louis Lepart and William Humphreys to fill the position of superintendent jointly until the board could make other arrangements; Pualewa became head constable.[3] Meyer defended his choices by stating that Humphreys was more competent than Pualewa and that he was the only man appropriate for the job;

moreover, his influence was so great that Meyer feared what would happen if he named anyone else. Lepart would look after the interests of the board. Administrators in Honolulu were not pleased with either selection, notwithstanding Meyer's assurance that he had made it clear to the men that their appointments were temporary. Meyer underscored Humphreys' talent for inspiring people and said it was the downfall of Superintendent Walsh that she had made an enemy of him. On his return from jail, Humphreys had done so well assisting Kahoʻohuli that the captain requested he be named his successor. Yet Meyer distrusted Humphreys, and, for that reason, he had asked Lepart, who was incompetent but honest, to assist. A trustworthy man with the ability to govern was essential, explained Meyer, and he had done the best he could at the time by employing two men.

> Native luna, (Leper if not too far gone or non-leper) are the best, being watched, well-treated and strictly drawn to account will give the board . . . far less trouble than any one foreigner that you can get, and all I would ask of you is to appoint men soon, because I told the two present ones, it would only be for a short time. Humphries [*sic*] is ambitious and undoubtedly hopes in his heart that he may be appointed. Lepart is without ambition in the fullest sense and rather lives like a native than to do anything and would not accept the place even if offered, and is not fit either. (Meyer 1872b)

In spite of the board's disapproval, Meyer's choice seemed to have been a fair one. In August he found everything in the best of order; the *paʻi ʻai* was good and in adequate supply. In addition to the usual requests for salt, blankets, rice, plates, pots, rope, soap, and cotton, the patients asked for books, slates, and pencils so that the school could reopen with Pualewa as schoolmaster.

As the number of inmates rose to more than four hundred, the allocated funds would only provide clothing for those who lacked the means to obtain their own. Meyer justified the reduction by pointing out that when everybody received blankets and clothing, many who did not need them gave them away or used the blankets as saddle cloths. In order that they might better appreciate what they did get, Meyer delayed dispersal until the advent of cold weather. In September 1872 two petitions were sent to the board objecting to the scant distribution of supplies, but Meyer reported that everyone was satisfied after rations were given out the following month. In October Humphreys was made *luna.*

The death of King Kamehameha V in December of 1872 was followed by the succession of Lunalilo, who intended to enforce the laws of segregation

passed nearly a decade earlier; 487 people with leprosy were sent to Kalaupapa in 1873, nearly doubling the population. One of Humphreys' first assignments was to expel ten *mea kōkua* to make room for the new arrivals, and additional evictions followed as the settlement became more crowded and rations had to be stretched further.[4]

People with leprosy suffered most during stormy winters, and mortality rose to seventeen during the chilly January of 1873. In March, Humphreys became severely afflicted with dropsy and requested that medicine be sent to him by Board of Health physician George Trousseau. After taking a single dose, he felt so much better that the following day he told his assistants that he no longer needed them. He repeated the treatment that day and felt quite well until late in the afternoon, but he died that evening. According to patient Peter Young Kaeo, a cousin of Queen Emma, many natives thereafter refused to take Trousseau's tablets, which, they asserted, had killed their superintendent. When the doctor next visited, a patient fired on him; the doctor was unharmed but remained unpopular (Meyer 1873b, 1873c; Korn 1976:54). The death of Humphreys increased the suspicion common among Hawaiians that the *haole* (white people) were trying to kill them off, and, growing impatient with the failure of doctors to cure leprosy, they petitioned that non-Western remedies be tried.[5]

The original legislation for the segregation of persons with leprosy had been extended in 1870 in a futile attempt to stem the flow of relatives traveling back and forth to visit inmates and to restrict communication between classified lepers and the *kama'āina* of Kalaupapa. On 1 March 1873 it was further revised so that any person free of leprosy found on Board of Health property without a permit could be fined ten to one hundred dollars. It gave the board the power to make and promulgate any rules it deemed essential in controlling persons in its custody. Near the end of March, Meyer explained to the *kama'āina* of Kalaupapa the board's desire that they vacate their homes "for the common good, as well as their own" so that the colony could be expanded (Meyer 1873a). The property consisted of twenty-four *kuleana* (lots), eighty acres in all; the soil, although rich, was very stony and of little commercial value. The people were asking fifty dollars per acre, but the figure had dropped to ten dollars per acre in 1865, when the board made its first purchases at Kalawao, and Meyer knew prices would become more favorable to the government with time. The Board of Health already possessed housing for a hundred new patients, and, when it bought the homes at Kalaupapa Village, it would have enough for an additional hundred.

The death of Humphreys left the colony without leadership, and Lepart was once again installed as temporary (Meyer underlined the word) *luna* until a proper replacement could be found. The poi dealers had taken ad-

vantage of Humphreys' illness by making bundles four pounds shy of the standard twenty-one pounds. Meyer asked the board to withhold payment to Himeni, one of the culpable taro growers, but the following week Himeni delivered less *pa'i 'ai* than was needed to feed half the people, and many went hungry.

Within two weeks of his taking charge as superintendent, Lepart asked to be released from the disagreeable post. A controversy had erupted over Makaieana, a patient native to Moloka'i, who had tried to kill his wife. The culprit was briefly imprisoned at Honolulu, and on his return to Kalawao, he ran away for several days—presumably to his home. When he returned to the settlement, apparently of his own volition, Meyer insisted that he be put in jail as a lesson to all that running away would not be tolerated. Six patients, most of them newcomers, demanded the prisoner's release and threatened Lepart with violence.

Jonathan Napela

It was painfully clear to managers Lepart and Meyer that the laws governing the colony could not be enforced. Meyer warned the president of the board that if violators were not penalized, they would run away all the time. He wanted to punish the ringleaders but did not have the means to do so; neither he nor Deputy Sheriff Rogers possessed a single iron.[6] The people were armed, because they had never been prevented from arming themselves, and there was no way to make them stay put. Meyer suggested that people who harbored escapees should be subjected to punishment. He knew the inmates were unfortunate beings and not criminals, but the "common good" required their isolation from society, and the means had to be found to enforce segregation and to keep order among them. As a final request, he added, "I furthermore beg to provide a good *native* [emphasis his] Superintendent . . . as Mr. Lepart desires to be released as soon as possible" (Meyer 1873c). In May 1873 Jonathan H. Napela, who was moving to the settlement to serve as *kōkua* to his wife, was appointed undersuperintendent. Lepart sold his property at Makanalua to a patient and moved to 'Ōhi'a, in southeast Moloka'i, where he was safe from further requests that he act as interim manager.

Jonathan Napela and his wife, Kiti Richardson Napela, were of chiefly rank. Napela was an early convert to the Mormon faith and helped translate the Book of Mormon into the Hawaiian language. He was about sixty years of age, educated, Hawaiian, and with his high status, he seemed an apt candidate for resident superintendent. But when Meyer made his trek down the cliffs to Kalaupapa in June, he found more than a hundred illicit visitors

there from Maui (the isle from which the new *luna* hailed). Both Isaac Previer, the head constable, and Napela had unauthorized guests in their homes, a situation Meyer condemned as encouragement for contact between inmates and those from whom they were supposed to have been sequestered. Meyer discharged Previer on the spot and gave Napela a "little blowing up" (Meyer 1873d; Board of Health 1868–1881:75).

The board could no longer get *pa'i 'ai* at the rate of twenty-five cents per bundle, and although the growers at Hālawa Valley on the east end of Moloka'i were willing to provide three hundred bundles a week, they wanted the price they received at Lahaina: thirty-seven cents per bundle. Ever conscious of economizing, Meyer suggested that rice be distributed instead. Although Meyer attempted to convince the board that patients preferred rice to poi, when taro was in short supply, the patients threatened to rebel.

As the community in exile grew, so did its churches. Father Damien arrived on 10 May 1873 as the first resident clergyman to St. Philomena Catholic Church, which had previously been served by priests visiting from other parishes. The Protestant congregation welcomed a Hawaiian preacher with leprosy named Holokahiki at Siloama Church, and Napela conducted Mormon services in a wooded section of Kauhakō Crater at the center of the peninsula. The presence of the *haole* priest irritated the *kama'āina,* because, while the government denied them free access to their ancestral land, Damien insisted on coming and going as he pleased. Former residents, who had unwillingly sold their homes for settlement expansion, complained to Sheriff Rogers that, like them, Damien should be made to comply with the law. When the board insisted Damien conform to regulations requiring that he obtain permission before leaving or entering the settlement, they were accused of interference with his religious duties and heard not only from the bishop but from the French consul. The diplomat insisted the priest be given the same rights as other *haole* clergymen, and even though the Protestant ministers had no special privilege to visit freely, the incident has been interpreted by Catholic historians as sectarian jealousy (Stoddard [1885] 1908; Farrow 1954; Englebert 1954; Bunson 1989).

The homes of most of the Kalaupapa *kama'āina* had been purchased, and the eighty-one people who had occupied them were ready to leave by the end of June. The owners had come down from their fifty dollars-per-acre asking price to half that amount. The purchases—which included seven wood houses, twenty grass houses, and forty-five head of cattle—had cost the board just $2,612. Some people sold their dwellings to relatives of the patients instead of to the Board of Health. Twenty-six people refused to sell and stayed on their *kuleana,* but Meyer was sure they would leave once they found themselves isolated by stricter segregation laws. Having gained full control of the

harbors at Kalaupapa and Waikolu, the board expected to be able to curb illicit traffic to and from the settlement. In addition, the board placed restrictions on the road by which visitors had been descending the cliffs almost daily.

William Ragsdale

William Ragsdale—a part-Hawaiian legislative translator who possessed, as Mark Twain observed (1934:85), "a readiness and felicity of language" that was remarkable—arrived at Kalaupapa on 14 June 1873. With heroic gestures to serve the lepers masking his own affliction, Ragsdale made a dramatic exit from Honolulu. In exile he turned his rhetorical talents to writing obliging letters to the members of the Board of Health he had known in Honolulu and remained more popular with them than he was at Moloka'i. Within two weeks of his arrival, Ragsdale was in pursuit of the head position. As tenacious a writer as he was a translator, Ragsdale's lengthy letters constantly reassured daunted board members, while making assaults on Napela's management. On his arrival he wrote:

> I will carefully post you on everything that occurs here, either to yourself or through Mr. Meyer. . . . There seems to be no head or tail to the institution just now because the luna does not preserve his dignity, or at least the dignities of his office. To make all those who are under his charge respect him, he can be kind and keep his dignity at the same time, there must be some system, or else the Institution can never be carried on with economy. Cleanliness ought to be observed around the hospital. . . . We are killing say 8 or 10 . . . cattle per week. . . . If [the heads were] cooked under ground, it would go first rate. The brains could be [converted] to some other use than eating, . . . all the marrow . . . could make a lot of candles. . . . There is a thousand of other things that could be used to advantage which is at present thrown away. (Ragsdale 1873b)

Ragsdale cleverly played on the two dominant concerns of the government: discipline and economy. He planned to put the patients to work building stone walls that would not only keep cattle out of the gardens, but provide people with useful occupation. He assured the minister of the interior that their lepers were better fed than plantation laborers.

Ragsdale declared the effort to carry out isolation was "cheering" to him, and he was sure a strict policy would retard the spread of leprosy. He planned to arrest any untainted person caught mixing with the lepers and would visit every house to ascertain how the people were doing and how

they had contracted the disease. In addition, he intended to write to the Hawaiian newspapers instructing anyone afflicted with leprosy to do his or her duty to family and country by committing himself or herself to the leprosarium.

Like other inmates who could afford to do so, Ragsdale established himself as a landholder. He purchased nine taro patches, twenty-six chickens, a sow, a pig, and a pumpkin patch—vowing to promote industry among his neighbors. He eagerly rendered his services to encourage husbandry among the people able to do manual labor (although he insisted precarious health prevented his doing so himself) and was ever ready to defend board members from discontented native patients. He claimed to have pacified dissidents roused by accusations that the Board of Health sent the patients of a certain Chinese herbalist to Moloka'i when they discovered he could cure leprosy. The inmates insisted that the board did not want them cured and was trying to kill them off to save money. Ragsdale had reprimanded the accuser, who was an officer, and told him that the board was only doing what had to be done for their national salvation, "otherwise the whole people would become lepers and in a few months or years at most there would not be one Hawaiian living in the whole Kingdom of Hawaii" (Ragsdale 1873a). He told the inmates that the board was trying everything in its power to bring them comfort. Ragsdale called attention to a malcontent named Kao, who had grown stouter in the two years since his arrival, and asked, "Does this look as if the [board] wishes to kill us off?" (ibid.). The entire assembly then agreed that the board members were very kind and that they were all satisfied, or so Ragsdale claimed. With an ever-present potential for mutiny, it was easy for Ragsdale to sell himself as the ideal broker between the board and the disgruntled inmates. He assured the Honolulu administrators that they had no reason to fear violence from the lepers after his meetings with them.

With growing hostility at Kalawao against the Board of Health, Trousseau began to fear for his life. He had again been shot at, this time by a leprosy "suspect" detained at the Kalihi hospital for observation. Although the gunman was found innocent by reason of "temporary insanity" induced by the drinking of *'awa* (kava), the doctor was distrusted by many patients (Korn 1976:128). The shooting provided Ragsdale the opportunity to offer further assistance: he would do everything in his power to prevent feelings of animosity toward the board and its officers, Trousseau would be safe, and all reports or threats from patients ought to be ignored.

Peter Young Kaeo, who arrived at about the same time as Ragsdale, also used his wealth to establish a small, but comfortable, estate for himself. Kaeo was of the Hawaiian *ali'i* (chief, royal) class, the great-grandson of Keli'imaika'i, a half-brother of King Kamehameha I. Unlike those of Bill Ragsdale,

Kaeo's letters reflected the views of the patients rather than what the board wanted to hear. The people looked to Kaeo, a member of the House of Nobles, to offset Ragsdale's fervor. He suggested that the *kamaʻāina* should be allowed to remain at Kalaupapa, because they had already mixed with the patients and if the disease was contagious, they would carry it to the general public when they were evicted. He also asked that greater assistance be given the infirm during the cold spells that were so hard on them.

Near the end of October 1873, Napela was discharged from his office at the recommendation of board member Samuel G. Wilder, and Ragsdale assumed the position of resident superintendent. The reason given for Napela's dismissal was "corruption" in allowing food rations to be issued to persons not on the list of lepers. Although the recipients were elderly *kōkua,* unable to work in the taro fields, the government could not afford Napela's benevolence. As the settlement population swelled, cost was a major concern. Where Napela had done little to appease the board, Ragsdale made a concerted effort to win their confidence.

The year 1873 was one of the most difficult at Kalaupapa: more than three hundred people were sent there between March and September, and the population reached 806 in October, causing a great strain on resources. Although houses had been purchased from the *kamaʻāina,* accommodations as well as food and clothing were inadequate; Kaeo claimed some newcomers had resorted to living in caves (Korn 1976:80). Many of the *kōkua*—who had helped provide staple crops and other assistance—had been removed, which reduced food production.

In December, Protestant patients accused Father Damien of converting one of their members on her death bed and proceeding to bury her a Catholic. The Reverend Holokahiki (1873) suggested that a priest be sent who also had leprosy or, better still, that a native Hawaiian be ordained to minister to the Catholics.[7] The *haole* missed the cultural basis of Holokahiki's objections: Damien believed he was being persecuted by sectarian jealousies, and Meyer assumed Holokahiki felt slighted that he always stopped for coffee with the priest and never with the Protestant clergyman. The white population saw Damien as a man of courageous compassion—the humanitarian side of Western expansion—but the native patients knew him as an associate of the Board of Health.[8]

When Meyer made his inspection at the beginning of November, it looked as though things were going well for Ragsdale, who was "in his element" (Meyer 1873e). By the end of the month, however, there were signs of trouble. People complained that food prices in the government store were higher than elsewhere, and they wanted more rice than Ragsdale allotted them. When men threatened to break into the store to help themselves to provi-

sions, Ragsdale had the leaders jailed. The disgruntled inmates occupied themselves in brewing *ʻōkolehao* (distilled ti-root liquor) and with disruptive drunkenness. In December, Peter Kaeo wrote to his cousin, the queen, that Ragsdale had become abusive, swearing at the natives and giving his three "kept" women food that should have gone to inmates who were starving. Kaeo speculated that "since he has been Luna he has made more Enemyes and less friends" (Korn 1976:156). Ragsdale claimed that the Mormons made trouble for him because they no longer lived like princes, as they had when Napela was the superintendent (Ragsdale 1873c).

When the taro supply on Molokaʻi fell short and poi dealers were unable to fill their contracts, there was difficulty in finding food for Kalaupapa. About two hundred taro patches were put into cultivation at Waikolu Valley, but there was no relief for the immediate shortage. Ragsdale estimated that, although the valley had around seven hundred terraces, it would take sixteen to eighteen months to put them into production, and there would be no taro ready to cook within the year. To ease its burden, the board requested that all but the "real lepers" be taken off the ration books. *Kōkua* who had become too old to work in the gardens or for some other reason needed support were removed from the list; only six or seven infants of leprous parents were to receive food from the government (Ragsdale 1874). Ragsdale's self-proclaimed "study of economy" on the board's behalf increased the patients' disdain for him.

The Reign of Kalākaua

Lunalilo's reign was ended, after less than a year, by his death in February 1874 of tuberculosis. He was succeeded by David Kalākaua, whose pro-Hawaiian stance and frequent cabinet changes impeded the administration of Kalaupapa. Laws passed between 1874 and 1887 reflected a lenient attitude toward Hansen's disease, starting with the repeal of section 6 of "An Act to Prevent the Spread of Leprosy," passed a decade earlier, which had made all property of persons committed to the care of the Board of Health liable for expenses incurred in attending to their confinement. In 1876 Hawaiians were exempted from medical licensing when they treated leprosy, and in 1886 inmates were excused from paying personal taxes. The only act that might be seen as stringent was the 1884 decision to buy the remaining private lands at Kalaupapa for the expansion of the colony.

The segregation of people with leprosy was one of an aggregate of factors that had signaled to the natives that they were losing control of their islands. In an attempt to regain authority, Hawaiians petitioned the legislature with demands that Hawaiian be the official government language; that foreigners

be barred from buying land; and that schools, prisons, medicine, and leprosy hospitals be under local jurisdiction.[9] Where there had been only four letters to the 1872 legislature regarding the disease, seventeen were sent to the 1874 session following the exile of three hundred people the previous year. Seven petitions called for the return of patients to their homes, where family members could care for them. The ten from Kalaupapa complained about Ragsdale's management, made objections to treatment by *haole* doctors, requested that spouses be permitted to remain as *mea kōkua,* and asked that *mea kōkua* be allowed to leave the colony for employment or to obtain food.[10]

In April 1874 Kalākaua visited Kalaupapa accompanied by Queen Kapi'olani, members of the Board of Health, and a variety of distinguished guests, including the French commissioner and the writer David Malo II, son of the Hawaiian historian. They were greeted by a band of disfigured boys playing a drum, a fife, and two flutes, and by nearly half of the 697 inmates—all of them dressed in their Sunday best. Their cheerful greeting gave way to tears when the king addressed them in a short but moving speech, and it was an equally emotional event for the visitors, who were overwhelmed by the grotesque faces of the severely ill they saw in the hospitals. At Kalawao, they found Peter Kaeo and Kiti Napela well situated in neatly fenced and whitewashed houses, "as suited to persons of their means and connections in life and reasonably cheerful under their sad conditions of exile" (*Pacific Commercial Advertiser* 1874). The king and the members of his entourage encountered other familiar faces among the inmates, including that of former legislator John 'Ūpā, who was managing the settlement store. Following the visit, the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* reported that the community was doing well under the care of the ten patient constables who distributed food, looked after the property of the board, and protected the patients' gardens. Residents were growing a variety of fruits and vegetables as well as tobacco. With three places of worship to choose from, their religious aspirations were well provided for, and there were two schools for the children.

The Board of Health had become increasingly annoyed by the presence of the 184 residents who were not inmates and used the publicity of the visit to announce its intention to expel them.

> These are known as "kokua," or assistants, but their principal occupation appears to consist in assisting the lepers to consume their rations. They do little or no work, will not improve the opportunity afforded to raise taro to sell to the board; pasture their animals *ad libitum* on the government land; live on the lepers; are the authors of evil reports, and are a bad lot generally. They own kuleanas in the neighborhood, and so cannot be forced to leave the district without

> a special act of Parliament, which is to be hoped will be passed for their benefit during the coming session. (*Pacific Commercial Advertiser* 1874)

Ragsdale, by contrast, was portrayed favorably by the press:

> Necessarily, his authority among his fellow exiles—removed as the community is from the range of courts and . . . beyond the operation of law—is almost autocratic, but so far as we could learn from the lepers themselves, he uses that power discreetly and with moderation. He is however assisted in the discharge of his governmental duties by a committee of twenty, chosen by the lepers from among their own body, by whom ordinary controversies and disagreements are settled. But the superior mind of Ragsdale guides and regulates his little principality in most matters of government, quite as absolutely and undisputedly as the captain of a ship whose word is law. (Ibid.)

No doubt the flattery pleased Ragsdale, but his authority was hardly undisputed: the other patients complained bitterly about his autocratic style of governing.

Tension between Ragsdale and the other patients climaxed on 23 June 1874, when people asked Peter Kaeo to intervene on their behalf because Ragsdale intended to squander $243.62 that the king had sent for them on a feast. When Kaeo, accompanied by a few patients, called on the superintendent, they found him defiant, armed with a pistol and a knife, and bolstered by *kama'āina* from Kalaupapa Village brandishing axes, knives, and pickaxes. Kaeo and Alapai, a teacher, called Meyer's attention to the situation, and although Meyer would not respond to Alapai—who had shown an unwillingness to conform to the rules of the board—he did write to both Ragsdale and Kaeo. Of the former he asked that he learn to control his temper: he was to give the people what the board agreed to furnish and to ignore uncomplimentary remarks, he was to let them meet in the schoolhouse as long as they did so in an orderly and peaceable manner, and he was to make no threats he could not carry out. Meyer appealed to Kaeo to use his influence over the people to avoid further disturbances. A successful reconciliation was reached at a meeting when Ragsdale and Kaeo publicly apologized to one another, and Kaeo announced he would remain Ragsdale's friend and assist him. Since the people did not want the proposed feast, it was suggested that a large fishnet be purchased with the disputed funds. Ragsdale was thereafter more congenial and, even after Kaeo's return to Honolulu in

June of 1876,[11] affairs went smoothly aside from the occasional petition from a disgruntled inmate asking that Ragsdale be dismissed.

The winter of 1874 brought a late storm that damaged houses and left the inmates, whose disease made them acutely sensitive to cold, subject to damp weather. Those who could afford them bought shingles with which to repair their homes, and the Board of Health supplied scantlings—upright beams—for framing houses. The owners held a life interest in their residences, and, if they maintained them, they could bequeath or sell them to other inmates. Property, except for animals, was not to leave the colony; when a patient died without specifying an heir, his or her effects were sold at auctions, and any money left after paying debts was delivered to the deceased's family. By the end of 1875, the community was more comfortable; many of the new patients had built homes, and some of the wealthy among them had more than one. Peter Kaeo had a beach cottage as well as his estate at Makanalua, and Napela had houses to rent. J. ʻŪpā, the store manager, ordered a stove so that he could bake bread, and Keʻeaumoku (W. C. Crowningburg) asked S. G. Wilder to send him a bat and ball so that they could play baseball during their leisure time. Seventeen people were on the payroll, including constables, a milkman, a *paniolo* (cowboy), a butcher, a steward, a washer and a cook for the hospital, and a jailor who also assisted at the hospital. William Williamson, an English brick mason, was in charge of the hospital from 1873 until his death in 1875.

In 1876 a smallpox epidemic diverted the board's energies away from affairs at Kalaupapa, and the patients' relatives flocked to the settlement, often under suspicious circumstances. A Honolulu resident by the name of Pahunui would, for a price, simulate the symptoms of leprosy by shaving off eyebrows and treating his clients with *ʻilieʻe,* an herb that blemished the skin. The pseudo-victims would then report to the Board of Health as suspects and allow themselves to be sent to Molokaʻi to join their loved ones.

William Keolaloa Sumner

When Ragsdale's health began to fail in 1877, Meyer suggested that he appoint an assistant so there would be someone trained to take his place should the "unhappy accident" of his death occur. The only man they deemed capable was William Sumner, an elderly half-Hawaiian patient recently arrived from Honolulu who was honest and well liked, who understood the needs of and knew how to work with other inmates, and who could speak and write both English and Hawaiian. In October a bout of poor health prevented Meyer from visiting Kalaupapa, and he tendered his resignation as agent to

the board. Ragsdale, however, was on the verge of death, and Meyer's familiarity with the settlement was critically needed.

Although Sumner was respected by the residents, it was felt he lacked the necessary business sense to run Kalaupapa economically, and Meyer suggested that Father André Burgerman be assigned to assist him in administration. Burgerman, who had come to Hawai'i for the purpose of living among the victims of leprosy, had been disappointed to find the position of priest to the lepers already taken by Damien. Because he had studied a little medicine, he remained at the settlement to dispense drugs. Although he was liked and trusted by the sick, Burgerman did not get along with Damien, who became indignant when he found out his rival was under consideration for an administrative position. When Ragsdale died, it was Damien who was asked to manage the settlement temporarily until a permanent superintendent could be found. Legislative Representative Thomas Birch was rumored to have contracted leprosy, and it was hoped that he might take the position, but Birch denied his illness and turned down the offer.

For the first time since 1871, the community was under the direct authority of a nonpatient *haole.* Within a week of Damien's assuming control, inmates complained about the lack of care given at the hospital; two weeks later a petition signed by a committee of patients was submitted to the Board of Health asking that he be discharged and that Sumner be appointed *luna.* Although he had promised not to show sectarian discrimination, Damien had Protestant minister J. K. Kahuila, a patient, put in irons and removed to the O'ahu prison. According to Damien, the reverend's language was infamous and rebellious against the Board of Health and its regulations, and Kahuila, if he were not removed, would make trouble for the board during the following legislative session (De Veuster 1878).

Kahuila's wife, Miliama, secured the services of Honolulu lawyer W. R. Castle, who charged that his client had been the victim of the unnecessary and arbitrary use of power. The confrontation had taken place after Kahuila's wife, who had been allowed to accompany her husband to the settlement on condition that she leave on the same boat to Lahaina and from there home to Ka'ū, did not board because the schooner was returning to Honolulu instead of going on to Maui. Damien insisted that the wife go anyway. When Kahuila objected and others supported him, he was charged with undermining Damien's discipline and with telling people they were not obligated to work because they were legally considered dead.

Kahuila denied the accusation, called for an investigation of Damien's "overbearing manner," and insisted he would rather stay in the O'ahu jail than to return to Kalawao under Damien's control (Board of Health 1868–

1881:172). Kahuila was assured that Damien's position was temporary, and board member S. G. Wilder traveled to Kalaupapa to find a replacement. After the visit, the board secretary notified Damien that the duties of the superintendent were to be turned over to Sumner (Board of Health 1881–1888:174).

Although the community again had a manager who was part-Hawaiian and a patient, 1878 would be a year of turmoil for the settlement and for the kingdom. The sugar industry was booming, and the amount of land put into the crop rose from 12,225 acres in 1874 to 22,455 acres in 1879 (Kuykendall 1967:62, 197). The resulting rise in prices of beef, poi, rice, and other foods made it difficult to keep expenses within the Board of Health appropriation (Smith 1878:3). *Haole* citizens and the Hawaiian legislature became polarized over the reciprocity treaty, which offered duty-free export of sugar to the United States for white businessmen and increased the importation of labor that reduced Hawaiian wages.

The increased number of people sent to Moloka'i caused, as it had in 1873, overcrowding and hardship. Sumner was well liked but considered too old and weak to maintain strong leadership, and Meyer continued to control colony finances. Complaints about Sumner came from patients Clayton Strawn, William Crowningburg (Ke'eaumoku), and David Ostrom with their bids to assume his position; Strawn was an ambitious American, Crowningburg was a part-Hawaiian *ali'i,*[12] and Ostrom was an American who had lived in Hawai'i off and on for thirty years and had been working in the settlement dispensary since 1875.

Toward the middle of 1878, the distilling of *'ōkolehao* reappeared briefly but was quickly stopped by jailing the drunkards. The binge was blamed on Sumner by his critics; Damien, Sumner, and Meyer each took credit for ending it. Among the frequent offenders was the head constable, William Crowningburg, whose ties to royalty ensured him a paid position despite petitions from other patients to have him removed from office. When he arrived at the settlement in 1874, Crowningburg had been employed at the Moloka'i store, but he was reassigned after he was caught stealing money. As constable, he was charged with excessive force and abuse of power, especially in his treatment of Kahuila, the Protestant minister Damien had imprisoned during the brief interval of his superintendency. Crowningburg threatened other inmates and fought with fellow police officers, usually after drinking *'ōkolehao,* until Sumner was forced to dismiss him.

Samuel G. Wilder, a prominent Honolulu merchant and entrepreneur, became the minister of the interior and president of the Board of Health in July of 1878. Hawai'i's reputation in the United States of having lepers at large was bad for international business, and Wilder gave the issue imme-

diate attention (Board of Health 1868–1881:181). He proposed sending a large number of people to Kalaupapa, but it was full; more cottages had to be built to accommodate new inmates. Some authorities optimistically believed the islanders were becoming more willing to send their "unfortunate ones" to Molokaʻi, but this was not so; most Hawaiians still hoped to establish sanctuaries on all the islands so that families could look after the welfare of their sick members (Parke 1878). Nine petitions sent to the Hawaiian legislature in 1878 called for an end to exile at Molokaʻi and the establishment of branch hospitals on other islands.[13] Illicit communities of victims had been established in remote valleys throughout the islands, where they were sequestered yet their families could still assist them.[14]

Hawaiians showed few signs of having developed a fear of the affliction and continued to appear at Kalaupapa hoping to serve as *kōkua.* Some were successful, like the wife of a forty-year-old patient named J. W. Nakuina, who hiked down the cliffs with a *kamaʻāina* at midnight without permission from the Board of Health. Friends in Honolulu had failed to dissuade her from going to Molokaʻi or persuade her to marry someone else. Her husband tried to convince her to leave when she arrived at the settlement, and Sumner, who was her uncle, told her to consult Meyer; she refused. Because she was a talented seamstress, she was allowed to stay, and the couple opened a coffee shop.

From the time of Sumner's installation as *luna,* Meyer had encouraged the board to find an assistant to handle financial matters. Like other *haole,* Meyer believed that Hawaiians should not keep accounts or distribute rations, because they tended to be more generous than the Board of Health could afford. The position was filled by Clayton Strawn, an American patient who had arrived in 1878 (Meyer 1878). Strawn quickly busied himself with getting houses built for the new patients the board was sending, starting with one for himself. Since labor was in short supply, he suggested that *kōkua* be allowed to enter, and to ensure they would have to work, he established a system of distributing rations with zinc tags, which made it difficult for patients to obtain more than their individual shares of food.

In 1879 Doctor Nathaniel Emerson (son of an American missionary) took charge of Kalaupapa, although Sumner and Strawn retained their offices. The doctor left the settlement in March for Maui and Oʻahu, and returned near the end of May. In July he was on Maui again and in September, on Kauaʻi. He returned to Kalaupapa in mid-October but left a month later, stating that everything seemed to be going fine and he saw no reason to stay (Emerson 1879g).

The board wanted Sumner to retire, but Emerson advised that there would be trouble if they tried to get rid of the part-Hawaiian leader. Emerson

did not consider Sumner's judgment very good, but the old man was well liked, and although Strawn was extremely cooperative, he lacked "a conciliatory way" with the Hawaiians (Emerson 1879a). Emerson got along well with the American Strawn, to whom he entrusted business when he was away. He suggested that Strawn's position be made equal to Sumner's, because Strawn was improving his manner toward the Hawaiians.

Nineteenth-century beliefs in Western supremacy made it difficult for white patients to accept the superintendency of native Hawaiians.[15] Although Strawn assumed a patronizing attitude, he was tolerated because of a favorable working relationship with Sumner. He felt he should be the superintendent instead of Sumner but wisely accepted a lesser position. Joseph Pickford was different. Pickford, an Englishman, was diagnosed with leprosy in 1876, and, denying that he had the disease, he had gone to Victoria, British Columbia, to seek treatment. When he returned to Honolulu, he asked to be allowed to remain free, taking medicines prescribed in Canada. He was sent to the settlement anyway; there he sought the company of other foreigners and wrote to the board on behalf of David Ostrom and Father Damien. The British government supplied him with an allowance of one dollar a month until the beginning of 1879, when the consul general informed the Hawaiian government that Queen Victoria's treasury would no longer provide for him. The British contended that since he had been confined for the safety of the community, he was Hawai'i's responsibility. Pickford was given a job as butcher, but he did not get along with the Hawaiian men working under him or with his half-Hawaiian superintendent. When Sumner became ill and requested some meat, Pickford impertinently replied that, although an animal had been killed and dressed, it was not time to serve out rations. Meyer gave Sumner permission to dismiss Pickford, but the Englishman saved face by resigning.

The settlement population had swollen to more than eight hundred by the end of 1878, and it was difficult to procure enough *pa'i 'ai* to feed everyone. Emerson was alarmed that the captain of the steamship *Warwick* lingered at Pūko'o, on the southeast coast of Moloka'i, instead of bringing supplies to Kalaupapa as had been arranged. Delays were excusable when rough seas made landing difficult, but the water was so calm "a man might have gone ashore in a tub" (Meyer 1879). Food was insufficient for weekly rations, taro at Waikolu was scarce, and even sweet potatoes were running short; the settlement seemed near famine. For Emerson, who was not yet accustomed to hardship, the situation seemed urgent, but Meyer reassured him that it was, although serious, a common plight. The people would understand, he said; they knew the supplies would arrive. A few days later they did.

The local farmers had tried to take advantage of Emerson's inexperience

by selling him sweet potatoes at $1.00 a bag, twice the usual price. To the enraged physician, this action constituted nothing short of manslaughter, and he threatened to send any *kōkua* up the *pali* who would not sell him at least half his sweet potatoes at $0.50 a bag. Emerson did not expect to have any further trouble with the *kōkua,* who seemed to have had the idea that his superintendency "was to consist 1st of aloha, 2nd of aloha and 3rd of aloha—without reference at all to strictures" (Emerson 1879b). Having dealt with them harshly, he believed that he had won their respect.

Food became increasingly difficult to obtain. In 1868 the price of *pa'i 'ai* was $0.25 a bundle, but by 1871 the board was paying $0.37 to $0.50 per bundle, and in 1878, $0.50 to $0.60 per bundle. In mid-1879, the price jumped to $1.25 to $1.50 per bundle in Honolulu, and the local growers were unwilling to sell it to the Board of Health for less. Although Meyer hoped the Moloka'i growers would find it just as profitable to sell it locally at $0.50 a bundle as to ship it to Honolulu for more, he was unsure of future supplies and ordered rice. The following year the price went back down to $0.50 per bundle, but the supply was unsteady.

By August 1879 there were again signs of tension between Emerson and the patients. Kahuila, who had been Damien's nemesis, and others were calling for Strawn to be removed. Emerson saw no reason for doing so; to him the Hawaiian leaders were evil, cowardly liars who threatened Strawn in his absence (Emerson 1879e). In mid-October the Hawaiians again petitioned for Strawn's removal, presenting grievances claiming inadequate rations and against Strawn's character. Emerson defended Strawn, who was one of the few people at the settlement he seems to have gotten along with, and countered the charges against him.

Emerson had much to learn about economic efficiency. When the constant flow of cattle down the trail from Moloka'i Ranch rendered the road in such bad condition that twenty head purchased by the board were lost during one drive, he requested that laborers be sent to repair it. Meyer's solution was less expensive: he paid the cowboys only for cattle that arrived at the bottom of the *pali* alive. In the following cattle drive, thirty head made it to the peninsula, and although one animal had to be butchered on the trail, its meat and hide were saved.[16]

The doctor believed it was in the best interest of the Board of Health to increase its control at the settlement. The board already supplied food, and Emerson set about monopolizing the remaining two sources of influence: medical care and housing. He insisted that Fathers Damien and André should not be dispensing medicines, many of which contained dangerous ingredients such as arsenic and mercury. When Damien received "hoang-nan" pills for the treatment of leprosy from a missionary in China, Emerson was

skeptical. After five months, however, many people showed positive effects from their use, and they became more popular than the doctor's prescriptions (which were, he insisted, every bit as effective) (Emerson 1879d). Emerson found Damien eager to trade the medicines for a wagon, horse, and harness to be used as a hearse, thereby restoring the doctor's function and freeing the board from its apparent obligation to the Catholic mission for providing medical services.

Emerson was particularly displeased with André Burgerman for undermining his authority as medical superintendent. When Father André allegedly told some of Emerson's patients his remedies were poisonous or unsuitable to their cases, Emerson responded by calling Burgerman a "pestilent fellow," an "ignorant charlatan," and accusing him of solacing himself with leper women and of being a hypocrite. The priest, he claimed, had prejudiced his patients against him, criticized his medicines, and advised the sick to change doses or not take the medication at all. Since Burgerman also clashed with Damien, he was transferred to Maui.

To increase government control over housing, Emerson encouraged the board to purchase the pleasant home left by the Napelas.[17] "I should dislike very much to have this fall into the hands of the Catholic priests. They are always trying to buy; it gives them power. In my opinion they have quite enough already" (Emerson 1879f). Emerson's attitude toward Catholics was inconsistent with the cooperative arrangement between the Board of Health and the bishop. Emerson's misgivings about the priests, whose utility was more tangible than was his own, had little influence on the board.

Taro production at Waikolu dwindled to almost nothing. In 1866 the patients had been allowed to live in the valleys with their families, but concern with control over them had prompted the board to move people to the villages of Kalawao and Kalaupapa. The patients were deterred from maintaining gardens, and the *kōkua* lost interest in cultivating large tracts, because the government did not compensate them adequately for their labor. The board took a portion of their crop in exchange for the privilege of nursing their sick spouses. The abandoned terraces at Waikolu were consequently damaged by wild hogs.

While Kalaupapa was neglected by administrators in Honolulu, the segregation laws were fervently challenged. A dozen patients resisted board control by building homes on private land within the bounds of the settlement; Strawn was instructed to order them to live in Board of Health houses, but he could not make them comply. The *kama'āina* of Kalaupapa freely associated with inmates, and people from nearby Pelekunu Valley visited when they landed freight. When Strawn asked to see their permits, he was

confronted with threats and insulting language. One group was so brazen as to go to a coffee shop kept by an inmate, and when Strawn attempted to detain them in order to send them to Meyer for punishment, they resisted, making scurrilous taunts as they got away. Himeni, who frequently traded with the residents of Kalawao, made so light of regulations—and was so bold, openly defiant, and insulting to Strawn—that Emerson feared that if Himeni were not punished, the law would be ignored and the superintendent would find it impossible to prevent incursions from becoming a common occurrence (Emerson 1880a). The board, able to ignore such annoyances from a safe distance across the Moloka'i channel, did nothing.

Emerson was unsympathetic toward the patients and did not get along with them any better than he did with Catholic priests. When men grew frustrated that water was not reaching their homes and chopped the pipes with an ax, Emerson marched them off to jail. His Protestant work ethic is evident in his assertion that the dissenters were lazy: although able to plant and thus make money, they did nothing. "They waste their rations and with their *kokua* wives, who do not draw any rations, eat themselves out before the end of the week and then complain. It is of no use to increase their rations, for they have enough for themselves now, though not enough for themselves and wives" (Emerson 1880b).

Although he rejected government physician George Fitch's conviction that leprosy was the fourth stage of syphilis, Emerson believed sexual activity, especially with promiscuous women, had something to do with spreading it —a notion he shared with many Victorian doctors. Since leprosy afflicted men twice as frequently as it did women, they assumed women were carriers, yet, paradoxically, when the Board of Health limited the number of *kōkua* allowed to stay at the settlement, most of those expelled were female. Men —who could farm, fish, and otherwise contribute to the material welfare of the patients and reduce the cost of running the colony—were encouraged to stay; whereas women, seen as both economically less valuable and a greater source of contagion, were undesirable attendants. The resulting imbalance in the sex ratio increased discontent among the patients.

About six months after his arrival, Emerson asked a portly, good-looking woman, who had come as her father's *kōkua,* to leave. She was, he claimed, "causing jealousies and heart burnings among the leper women married and unmarried," and her "influence on the manners and morals of the unpledged male lepers" was especially fateful (Emerson 1879c). Although her father benefited greatly from her presence, Emerson could not tolerate her and asked that she be denied reentry—for the good of the whole—unless, of course, she contracted the affliction. (And that, with all her "carry-

ing-on," he thought was quite likely.) Two weeks later he detained a woman who had accompanied her husband, who had tubercular leprosy, to Kalaupapa. She was, Emerson insisted, tainted with both leprosy and syphilis and had infected four previous husbands, all of whom died. He was determined to make the fifth spouse her final victim by keeping her there permanently.

Political Polarization on Leprosy

On 14 August 1880 the cabinet ministers were asked to hand in their resignations, and the body was reconstituted. Emerson was removed from his position as resident physician by Walter Murray Gibson (Emerson 1880c; Meyer 1880). Although they had shown little interest in Emerson's medicines, 291 patients signed a petition asking that the services of a doctor be retained, and Charles Neilson was assigned to take Emerson's place.

When Neilson arrived, he found the supply of Chinese (hoang-nan) and "Japanese" pills nearly exhausted, but the patients did not seem to have benefited from them and were willing to try Gurjun oil from India. British doctors reported a number of cases cured by Gurjun, but strict dietary restrictions made the treatment controversial. Neilson also received six cases of Masanao Goto's medicine from Japan for trial use. In response to a request from the board that he perform postmortems on people at the settlement, however, he declined, stating that the natives were so against the idea that he was afraid they might murder him if he tried and that the study could be carried out more successfully at Honolulu. The board ordered a microscope so that the organism that caused the disease might be identified and patients more accurately diagnosed. However, the instrument they selected was too limited to be used to this effect, and leprosy continued to be identified by a consensus of government-appointed physicians (Board of Health 1868–1881: 214; Neilson 1881).

The *haole* cabinet installed in September of 1880 brought increased polarization on the leprosy issue. The Honolulu businessmen and members of the House of Nobles who joined the Board of Health discussed whether they should keep a physician at Moloka'i. Although they had decided that removing lepers from society was all that they could do to stem the disease, they had not convinced the Hawaiians that it was incurable, and, as a "concession to the feelings of the natives," Neilson was instructed to remain at the settlement (Board of Health 1868–1881:208).

The Hawaiians petitioned the legislature of 1882 for an end to segregation. They saw a connection between diseased Hawaiians and white prosperity, and their concerns reached the board in threatening notices:

A Punishment to the Evil: for evil deeds!!

> With heaviness of heart and for the love of kindred who are cast away to Kalawao, taken there not for any good but are thrown away like pigs in consequence of evil law. From the time of the ministerial administration of E. O. Hall [minister of the interior under Lunalilo, 1873], the native Hawaiians have ever since been compared as like dogs thrown to the sea. And therefore warning is hereby given to the Min. of Int. H. A. P. Carter and Mem[bers] of the Bd. of H. to immediately stay any further carriage of lepers to Kalawao after the issuing of this notice. If this is not heeded, then the plantations from Hawaii to Kauai will be burned down at an unknown moment until this warning is taken notice of. The government had better consider.
>
> P.S. There should be a leper asylum in Honolulu, or else asylums built on each of the several islands. (Native Free Mason 1881)

Events at the leprosy settlement in 1881 were eclipsed by a virulent epidemic: between 1 December 1880 and 2 April 1881 more than 4,400 Chinese laborers were brought into the kingdom, and with them came smallpox (Board of Health 1868–1881:218–280). Quarantine prevented the spread to other islands, but the result was devastating at Honolulu and on Kauaʻi: 797 cases, 287 deaths.

News from Kalaupapa became scarce. Neilson was gone from the community more than he was there and seemed to take little interest in his work. Mail was sent through Meyer, and little seems to have reached the board. Sheep were substituted for cattle, although, according to Meyer, the patients disliked mutton.[18] Kahuila and Kanakaʻole continued to complain about Strawn, but Meyer denied the situation was as oppressive as portrayed. Meyer grew annoyed with native patient managers—whom he deemed unreliable in running Kalaupapa as an efficient enterprise—yet he had no time to do it himself (Meyer 1881).[19]

A site was chosen for a girls' home to be directed by Father Damien as a step in controlling the promiscuity he perceived around him. Damien asserted that "many an unfortunate woman had to become a prostitute to obtain friends who would take care of her and [her] children" and that "children, when well and strong, were used as servants" (De Veuster 1886). As the Catholic-run homes were established, distant relatives or friends were not recognized as legitimate guardians.[20] Adulterous relations certainly occurred

between married men and women segregated from their mates, and there were small-town scandals; but it is unclear exactly what Damien considered to be prostitution. Because women received rations from the Board of Health they did not need to procure food with sexual favors. Native girls were, by European definition, promiscuous and therefore needed moral supervision.

Kalawao became increasingly perceived as punishment. In December of 1881 Kaka'ako Hospital opened at Honolulu for the treatment of mild leprosy cases with experimental cures. Strict regulations were imposed at the new facility to maintain discipline: (1) loud noises, fighting, and drunkenness were forbidden; (2) patients were to obey all directions given by the doctor or steward in charge; (3) they were not to assemble on the verandas; (4) they were forbidden to eat salt fish or out of common calabashes, although the eating of poi with the fingers from individual bowls would be allowed; and (5) all persons were to work in the gardens if so instructed. Regulation number six was intended to see that the first five were obeyed; it stipulated that persons violating the other rules would be punished by immediate dismissal to Kalawao (Board of Health 1881).

After Gibson became premier in 1882, most of the country's resources were directed to strengthening the monarchy, which was increasingly threatened by foreign interests. The issues of leprosy and Kalaupapa were pushed to the periphery of government attention, and, since Gibson assimilated the president's chair, Board of Health meetings became irregular. Neilson was replaced by Fitch, who, functioning as visiting physician, commuted from Honolulu. Damien accepted assignment as the doctor's assistant, although he felt it outside his general vocation as priest. Damien adhered to Fitch's assertion that leprosy represented a stage of syphilis; even after he had been diagnosed with the malady himself, he maintained that 90 percent of its incidence was connected with venereal disease (De Veuster 1886:37).

Damien asked that his appointment be put down in black and white so that he "would be able to act for the welfare of all concerned without being molested by unprincipled men" who were jealous of him (De Veuster 1882). He was undoubtedly referring to Kahuila and other Hawaiians who had tormented him during his brief superintendency. The post under Fitch may have been consolation for the priest, who, having been in Honolulu a few months earlier when Meyer informed the board of Sumner's failing health, had promptly volunteered to reassume the office of assistant superintendent (Board of Health 1881–1888:15; De Veuster 1882). The board had declined the proposition. Damien exaggerated his new position in a letter to his brother, claiming he had been commissioned to build a hospital large enough for several hundred patients to be treated entirely under his direction. "So I have

to work," he boasted, "not only as priest, but as doctor and architect" (De Veuster 1889:138–139).

The Politics of Contagion

Few records survive of the settlement between 1882 and 1886. Whether this paucity was due to a lack of concern with leprosy during the period, whether it reflected patient distrust of the board, or whether documents were intercepted by Meyer, misplaced, or discarded is unclear. The few incoming letters in the Board of Health files were from Damien and leprologist Edward Arning. The patient voice was expressed in petitions to the legislature demanding that patients be released because Fitch had assured them that leprosy was noninfectious. There was a public outcry in 1883, when a large number of people were sent to Kalaupapa following the publication of a threat to boycott Hawai'i's products if the government did not curb leprosy (*San Francisco Chronicle* 1883).

The contradictory descriptions of Moloka'i in the board report to the Legislative Assembly of 1884 divulge the vested interests of their writers. Fitch used his account to laud conditions at Kaka'ako Hospital in Honolulu, where he acted as physician and surgeon, by comparing it favorably to Kalawao. He described Moloka'i patients lying in pus-soaked overalls, receiving spoiled or soured food, and going for days without provisions; parents were told that daughters sent there were destined to "serve the purposes of God knows how many loathsome rakes" (Fitch 1884:vi). Such occurrences were "part of the history of the place from its inception," and the transfer of "the most unfortunate of earth's suffering mortals" to Kalawao was, in his view, unchristian (ibid.:iii–vi).

English physician J. H. Stallard, who had accompanied Fitch on a tour of the settlement, wrote a highly critical and inconsistent report on his observations of both the branch hospital at Kaka'ako and Kalawao. Although segregation was pretense at Kaka'ako, he found the people well treated and able to partake of good food, abundant exercise, and "occupation" (work was considered therapeutic in preventing the natives from becoming lazy). He found it an outrage that patients were not segregated: new cases mixed with old, the young with the aged, men with women.

In Stallard's description of Moloka'i, he characterized the patients as cheerful, clean, and contented people living without complaint in tidy dwellings surrounded by plots of onions, sweet potatoes, tobacco, and flowers. They possessed luxury items of personal adornment and horses, giving the appearance of happiness and freedom. The scenery was beautiful, the vege-

tation was luxuriant, the soil was rich, and every necessity was provided. He praised the government for replacing "wretched grass huts" with wooden dwellings, bringing piped water from the streams, building hospitals, and providing for the segregation of men from women. This initial challenge to Fitch's description was followed by accusations that the natural advantages of Moloka'i had been destroyed by defective administration; excessive mortality was not the result of leprosy, but rather of dysentery brought on by neglect. Stallard claimed that the patients were being starved to death, their diet was inappropriate, and that there were no doctors or medicines available. In the eyes of the paternal Englishman, patients were being dumped on the shore and left to fend for themselves, which amounted to murder. "The natives, and especially the lepers, cannot be relied on for rendering much assistance, for it is well known that leprosy blunts the sympathies and weakens the energies of its victims" (Stallard 1884:xliii). He was appalled that if a native chose not to go to the hospital, he was allowed to die at home. Stallard agreed that the care at Kaka'ako was superior to that at Kalawao, but he believed the solution was to take the care provided at Kaka'ako to Kalawao, where segregation could be maintained. He was confident that leprosy, like plague and other diseases, could be eliminated under "good sanitary organization and better sanitary administration" (ibid.:xlvii).

Rudolph Meyer, who had overseen matters for twenty years, vigorously denied that patients perished of starvation, dysentery, or neglect. Even inmates who had the means of providing themselves with comfortable homes —Williamson, Pickford, Ostrom, Ragsdale, Humphreys, the Crowningburgs, and the Napelas—eventually died. Inmates were supplied with beef, salmon, and mutton, and only rarely did these supplies not arrive weekly. Although Stallard considered salt salmon inappropriate to a patient's diet, people bought it themselves and would be eating it whether the board supplied it or not. In reply to accusations that spoiled rations were distributed, Meyer responded that Hawaiians preferred their poi aged. As for the lack of care, he thought that, although hospitals were provided for persons who had no *kōkua* to tend them, medical conditions could be improved by obtaining foreign-trained nurses. He disliked doctors, saw no need for a resident physician, and believed those who had stayed at the settlement (Emerson and Neilson) had been of little benefit. Other settlement workers agreed with Meyer that nurses would be of more value to the patients than doctors.

Fitch and Stallard both had reason to emphasize stark conditions at Kalaupapa: it was Fitch's intention to have a new hospital put under his control at Honolulu, and Stallard's report accompanied his proposal for the appointment of a chief medical officer and a letter stating his own qualifica-

tions for the position. Stallard's self-serving advertisement for a "sanitary administration" in Hawai'i failed to impress the Board of Health, as did the inference that they were murdering their patients.

John H. van Giesen (1884), steward at the branch hospital, provided a more neutral account of what the group saw at Kalawao based on his talks with the patients. He described a panorama—sweet potato patches, bananas, sugarcane, cabbage, and onions cultivated by patients—that extended the length of the settlement at the foot of the cliffs and gave the impression of a prosperous village. Waikolu had enough water, he claimed, to supply all of Honolulu, and about forty acres could easily be cultivated. The only land in the valley in which taro was being grown was three acres tended by a *kama'āina,* because Meyer refused to let inmates live there. During Ragsdale's time, the area had been extensively planted, with a third of the harvest going to the board for rations; but under the administrations of Father Damien, William Sumner, and Clayton Strawn, the *kōkua* who cared for the crops became demoralized—especially when Strawn made them work in his private garden. Eventually, *kōkua* were allowed to pay fifty cents instead of doing their obligatory time in the fields, and taro ceased to be planted. When van Giesen saw the plots, they were covered by guava and weeds; he estimated it would take at least two years to get another harvest. Although they continued to provide *pa'i 'ai* of good quality, the taro growers in the neighboring valleys were dissatisfied, because they had to climb the cliffs to Meyer's home to cash in the receipts they received from the superintendent, and they often went months without payment.

The patients complained that sometimes the twenty-one-pound bundles of *pa'i 'ai* were largely leaves, with only fourteen to eighteen pounds of poi. In addition, the water system needed upgrading, and the hospital could stand being whitewashed more often as a disinfectant and to eliminate the peculiar smell attending leprosy. Van Giesen found the invalids well cared for by native stewards and thought that the gardens around the hospital gave it a homey quality. The inmates had given him a list of requests to be taken to the legislature: they wanted their *pa'i 'ai* allowance to be raised from twenty-one to thirty-three pounds per week, the meat ration increased to eight pounds, and the yearly clothing allowance to be doubled. Entire families were trying to survive on the rations for one person, and some patients wanted to adopt children to fetch and pound their *pa'i 'ai.* Good *kōkua* were essential, but there had been abuses by both patients and their helpers: *kōkua* who did not earn their keep and patients who exploited them. Overall, van Giesen found the people better off than they had been on his visit a year earlier. He believed Meyer to be a conscientious man but noted that his infrequent visits

to the settlement left him oblivious to patient needs. Meyer admitted that he did not have charge of the community, which had suffered administratively since Ragsdale's death.

Arning was the first leprologist to conduct scientific investigations in the islands. He was new in the kingdom (he arrived in November 1883) when he toured the colony with Fitch, Stallard, and van Giesen, and had nothing to say about it. He was more concerned with the archaic attitude he saw toward leprosy, especially the notion espoused by Fitch that it represented a stage of syphilis. If this were true, he remarked, it would overturn everything known about both diseases, and he felt obligated to refute it. "The theory is, perhaps, not quite as harmless as many would believe, as it has led . . . the public to consider leprosy as an outcome of licentiousness, which term certain classes of society unhappily seem to use as a synonym of syphilis, and to look upon the unfortunate lepers as the victims of their own or their parents' transgressions" (Arning 1884:liv).

Arning had struck out at the feature that made the syphilis theory attractive: it was congruous with the belief that the Hawaiians were responsible for their own demise. Arning believed in segregation (every leper was a potential "hotbed" of disease), but to consider the disease incurable and conceal the afflicted was a medieval barbarism that every professional man ought to oppose. He intended to treat the disease with the techniques available to him: by surgical interference and experimental applications of electricity. Bacterial disease was most easily combated in its early stages, and he proposed that children and young people be accommodated at a group home, where they would receive special attention and regular schooling.

William Hillebrand stressed to the board the importance of Arning's work, recalling Koch's discovery in Berlin of the bacteria that caused tuberculosis and the French government's support of Louis Pasteur. Arning represented the optimism of science and Hawai'i's chance at becoming a part of medical history. The vision of great scientific discoveries in the islands was not shared by everyone, and in 1885 Arning was dismissed by Gibson, then president of the Board of Health, because he would not release research notes, specimens, and photographs related to his work.[21]

Gibson issued a special report on leprosy in 1886 that espoused his views: a selectively homogenized version of nineteenth-century thought condensed from answers to his queries by foreign governments. He refuted claims that leprosy arrived with Chinese immigrants and insisted that it was a natural phenomenon that had been lying dormant among the native population. Citing Fornander's theory of Polynesian migration, he tied leprosy in Hawai'i to its prevalence in the "cradle of . . . the great and ancient races from whose loins were derived the Hawaiians" (Gibson 1886:24). The dormant germ

had been activated by a demoralization of the system through uncleanliness, he alleged; the blood was poisoned "by a degraded condition of living or by excessive indulgences of the animal nature in a tropical climate" (ibid.:29). The latent flame of disease was ignited by the coming of Captain Cook's ships and the subsequent impregnation of the "poor, ignorant, simple and innocent minded natives" (ibid.:32). Gibson's belief that syphilitic blood poisoning activated a dormant leprosy is similar to the indigenous concept of *'ea,* the genetically passed disposition for illness that resulted in the eruption of infections later in life, which made it comprehensible to the Hawaiians (Kamakau 1964:103–104).

To those who cited Father Damien's having the disease as proof it was contracted by other means, Gibson argued that the priest became ill only after inhaling fetid breaths, cleaning ulcers, watching over the dying, and handling cadavers—living, eating, sleeping, and sharing with the infirm. There was no reason for people to be alarmed or to treat the leper as an outcast. They should show charity to the victims, especially since the disease seemed to be incurable. He saw the Hawaiians as mentally depressed as well as physically ill and stated that it was moral encouragement that they needed. With regard to the necessity of segregation, he was vague. He believed that it was wise to keep the diseased from the healthy but that herding them to a single location was unnecessary and that places of seclusion should be maintained on each island. Gibson's proposals were politically agreeable. The importation of labor was not the source of disease; it was the well-known animal nature and sexual appetites of the naive primitive aroused by European debauchery. His suggestion that places of isolation be maintained on every island was seized with hope by the families of the infirm.

The controversy over contagion was politically well defined. The *Saturday Press,* a newspaper started by a committee of merchants opposed to the Gibson-Kalākaua policies, was adamant in its call for compulsory segregation. Their condemnation of leprosy was a denunciation of government policy and of Hawaiian culture: "We know the loose habits of the Hawaiian people, the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, and thinking people are not alarmists because they call public attention to the rapid spread of leprosy in these islands on account of such national customs and the do-nothing policy of the Hawaiian government whether King or Cabinet" (*Saturday Press* 1883). These accusations were picked up by the *San Francisco Chronicle,* motivating the threatened boycott of Hawaiian goods at American ports.

Expressing the opposite viewpoint was the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser,* owned by Gibson, which, in an 1885 article, lauded the government's humane treatment of the victims of leprosy. "The Hawaiian Government is deserving

of all praise. But the leper is the stock-in-trade of the Opposition. Without this festering sore there would be no excuse for its existence; wherefore everything pertaining to the management and care of these unfortunates is distorted to serve the narrow and selfish purpose of local politicians" (*Pacific Commercial Advertiser* 1885). Instead of talking about contagion and dirty habits, this article discusses possible cures, including Chaulmoogra oil, which would later become a common treatment (Mouritz 1916:186–187, 1943:130–131; Daws 1973:238).

Ambrose Kanoeali'i Hutchison

While the debate over contagion and the need to segregate continued in Honolulu, propitious changes were made at Kalaupapa. Arthur Mouritz was appointed physician in 1884, and a young part-Hawaiian patient by the name of Ambrose Hutchison became the superintendent. Hutchison was born at Honomā'ele, Hāna, on the island of Maui, and spent his boyhood at boarding school in Honolulu under the tuition of Archdeacon George Mason. He had noticed the loss of feeling that indicated he had leprosy when he was about twelve years of age. The disease advanced slowly, and he was twenty-three before he was taken by policemen from his home and locked in a prison cell, without food or drink, before being sent to Honolulu for cursory examination by government physician Robert McKibbin. He arrived at Kalaupapa on 5 January 1879 with Board of Health president S. G. Wilder and Emerson, who had just been appointed resident physician. He stayed with a patient kinsman of his mother while he built himself a residence, and he proved to be a valuable employee of the Board of Health—starting in 1881 as chief butcher and beef dispenser.

The following year Hutchison was promoted to head storekeeper of the Kalawao store, and on 8 March 1884, at about the age of twenty-eight, he took charge as resident superintendent. William Sumner and Clayton Strawn were sent to Kaka'ako branch hospital in Honolulu.[22] Like Sumner and Ragsdale, Hutchison was Caucasian and Hawaiian, but unlike his predecessors, he seems to have won admiration in both cultures. Napela, Sumner, and Humphreys had the respect of the native patient community but did not fare very well with the Board of Health authorities; Ragsdale was very popular in Honolulu but lacked support at Kalaupapa. Hutchison developed the lifelong trust and friendship of both Mouritz and Meyer, the men with whom he shared administrative duties; the deep regard Mouritz felt for him was reflected in the biographies that appear in his books about leprosy in Hawai'i. Hutchison "displayed marked ability and highly creditable administrative powers for a man so young"; not only did he act as superintendent, sheriff,

surveyor, and supervisor, he had to write policies and enforce them (Mouritz 1943:77).

The young manager found himself with his greatest challenge in the 1885 removal of nonleper girls of leper parentage to Kapiʻolani Home, carrying out Queen Kapiʻolani's response to some parents' requests, when she visited with King Kalākaua in 1884, that children be taken away from Kalaupapa to prevent their contracting the disease. Built at the Kakaʻako branch hospital at Honolulu, the home was to be under the supervision of the Franciscan Sisters. On October 27, Hutchison received notice from Fred Hayselden, Gibson's son-in-law and secretary to the Board of Health, that girls between the ages of four and twelve years who had been examined and found clean of leprosy were to be sent to the home. A steamer was chartered to deliver a load of cattle from the Molokaʻi Ranch and to take the girls to Honolulu. Two days before its arrival, the parents were told to have their daughters, dressed in their best clothes, waiting when the boat came; the superintendent would issue free passes to relatives who wanted to accompany the girls to Honolulu and return.

When the ship arrived, two patients armed with knives attacked *kōkua* employed in loading hides, seriously injuring three men. While John Gaiser, the butcher, went for Mouritz, Hutchison assumed responsibility as sheriff in controlling the crowd. Two of the victims suffered fatal wounds, but Hutchison and Damien saved the third man. The motive for the stabbing appears to have been the mandatory removal of children from their parents (Hutchison n.d.; Kamae 1886).

By the middle of 1886, the patients complained of government neglect and drafted a petition to the Hawaiʻi legislature asking that a committee be sent to inspect the settlement.[23] Representative Lorrin A. Thurston, eager at the chance to discredit Kalākaua, suggested that the matter be looked into immediately, and on July 16 a party of notables—cabinet ministers, diplomats, legislators, clergymen, and reporters—went to Molokaʻi, where they were politely greeted by Ambrose Hutchison and a band of boys playing two drums, three tin flutes, and a triangle. About two hundred patients appeared at a meeting to express their concerns, but when a man named Kahului complained about the weekly rations, Gibson responded by telling the people how much the government was doing for them. He said that difficulties had been exaggerated, and now the members of the legislature could see for themselves the comfortable houses and scenic beauty of Kalaupapa. When he finished, Polish patient John Liefanesky explained the plight of foreigners with regard to getting food that was palatable to them. Kamae of Hāmākua insisted that the Board of Health members should be replaced, because the president had visited only once since 1879. The colony desper-

ately needed regular steamer service, and the patients were angry at Rudolph Meyer for implementing the policy of forcibly taking away their children. Meyer's dual role as agent of the board and manager of the Moloka'i Ranch had allegedly resulted in his sending them inferior cattle and profiting at the expense of the patients, and his refusal to reinstate the policy allowing patients to receive cash in lieu of rations made them entirely dependent on Board of Health provisions. The patients requested larger poi rations, soap, and a steady source of water.

The inmates felt the board was not doing enough for them. None of the complaints was aimed at Hutchison but, rather, at Meyer's vested interests and at the Honolulu administrators. Since Meyer no longer visited the settlement and did not know what was happening there, they were receiving taro flour without the fuel with which to prepare it and substandard rice. The inmates had built 227 houses at their own expense compared to 110 by the board (only 80 of which were for patients, with the remainder for employees). Since the settlement had expanded across the peninsula, it needed a second butcher shop and a post office more accessible to the disabled. A number of patients complained about the quality, quantity, and lack of choice in the food received. They were no longer allowed to raise chickens, apparently because Meyer claimed they wasted their rations on fowl, and without the right to grow pigs and chickens, they were restricted to what the board supplied: low-quality beef and salt salmon.

Damien maintained that the patients were well cared for but that the doctor was seldom available, and when he was gone, the drugs were locked up; the only way to get them was to break into the cabinet. Hutchison added that Hawaiians often cast aside prescribed treatments to use medicines of their own, and Doctor Mouritz would not see anyone he knew to be under the treatment of a *kahuna lapa'au* (native medical practitioner). When asked whether there were any *kahuna* there, Hutchison exclaimed: "Kahunas! Yes; nearly everybody is a kahuna" (Hawaiian Legislative Assembly 1886:375).

Because an improved water system was the most pressing and rectifiable condition, discussion on the topic continued even as the gathering broke up. The reforms addressed in the meeting had to wait for a change of government; during the latter half of 1886 and into 1887, the Kalākaua-Gibson regime was on the defensive and unable to act.

Conclusions

The period from 1870 to 1890 was one of rapid change in Hawai'i: as the sugar industry expanded, there were adjustments in land distribution and population composition. With increased international trade came epidemics

—and with new wealth, a shift in power favoring the nonnative population. As authority fluctuated, the factions governing leprosy grated against one another.

On 6 July 1887 a group of businessmen succeeded in taking power away from Kalākaua and forced him to accept the "Bayonet constitution," which, among other repressive features, imposed property qualifications for voters that excluded many native Hawaiians. The government replaced Hutchison with nonpatient superintendents in 1889, but the change brought such a lapse in order that Hutchison was reinstated in 1892 and remained in the position until his friend and supporter Rudolph Meyer died in 1897.

Board of Health documents from Kalaupapa during the period from 1871 to 1887 divulge changes taking place in Hawai'i during the two decades of relative calm before the squall that swept power from native Hawaiians. Leadership did not come in the form of the white-savior missionary-frontiersman of the Damien myth (Moblo 1997). Local authority was a matter of negotiation rather than overt force and was manifest in individuals of mixed parentage who could function efficiently in both native and foreign cultures. A prime example is Ambrose Hutchison; he was friends with Mouritz, Damien, André Burgerman, and other foreigners in service to the board, but his devotion to Hawaiians was explicitly couched in his will:

> For the love and affection I hold for my mother, Maria Mo-a, and Maria Kaiakonui, my wife (deceased), who were of the pure Hawaiian aboriginal ancestry, from whom sprung from and hold dear and my heart longing desire to perpetuate their race from extinction which forecasting shadow of time forbode their doom, which only the power of a mercifull and all loving God can stay, from the evident fate which await them and leaving firm faith in the love and mercy of God, who alone can save and perpetuate and multiply from being effaced from the land, which, by His grace he gave to their forefathers and foremothers and their descendants as a heritage forever and to this end and purpose, I consecrate my worldly estate both real, personal or mixed. (Hutchison n.d.)

Hutchison lived until 1932, by which time Hawai'i was firmly established as a territory of the United States, and Kalaupapa was strictly segregated by law, by fences, and by stigma. The leprosy settlement, as a symbol of Hawaiian impotence (Moblo 1997:700–702), evolved into an institution of what Foucault calls "social protection" (1994:82), where the poor were protected by the rich and the rich, against the poor.

APPENDIX

Kalaupapa Resident Superintendents, 1865–1902

1865	Louis Lepart	Former French missionary employed by December 1865 to prepare for the first exiles; agreed to stay until a permanent superintendent was found
1867	David Walsh	Englishman initially employed as the schoolteacher; took over as superintendent in November
1869	Caroline Walsh	David's wife; took over after his death with assistance from a Mr. Welsh; when unseated by patient insurrection, rancher Rudolph Meyer agreed to oversee employment of a native Hawaiian
1871	Kahoʻohuli, assisted by Pualewa (dismissed) and W. Uweleʻaleʻa Humphreys	Arrived March 1871; died 1872
1872	Lepart with Humphreys	Assigned temporarily after the death of Kahoʻohuli
1872	Humphreys	Until his death in October 1873
1873	Lepart	March–April, temporary
	Jonathan Napela	April–October, dismissed
	William Ragsdale	Replaced Napela; died February 1877
1877	Father Damien W. Keolaloa Sumner	Patients petitioned that Damien be removed and part-Hawaiian Sumner be installed
1878	Sumner with Clayton Strawn	To serve jointly: Sumner satisfied the patients' demands, American Strawn was the administration's choice
1879	Nathaniel Emerson, M.D. Sumner and Strawn	Emerson took over administration as resident physician; Sumner and Strawn were in charge during his frequent absences

1880	Clayton Strawn	With resident physician Neilson
1881	Rudolph Meyer with Strawn	Meyer appointed superintendent, November 19
1884	A. Kanoeali'i Hutchison	Under Meyer's supervision
1890	Thomas Evans with Hutchison	Maui sheriff put in charge; resigned in March
1891	William Tell with Hutchison	Former head of Honolulu police
1892	Hutchison	Acting superintendent
1898	C. B. Reynolds, assisted by William Feary	Board of Health agent since 1885
1902	Jack McVeigh	Reynolds forced to resign by Hutchison and others

NOTES

1. Although leprosy is now officially known as Hansen's disease, the politically correct form is generally ignored here in favor of the historical "leprosy" and "lepers" used in the nineteenth century, usually without moral connotation.

2. The productive taro fields of Waikolu were leased out in 1867 to compensate for the Board of Health having overspent its budget in building the settlement.

3. William Uwele'ale'a Humphreys was the son of William Humphreys, a native of New Hampshire who settled on Maui. Although he is listed as American in Board of Health records, it appears that William Jr. had a Hawaiian mother; he spoke English but wrote in Hawaiian to the Board of Health and used his Hawaiian name as a member of the 1864 legislature. Lepart went to Hawai'i as a French missionary and left the priesthood to farm at Kalaupapa. When it was decided to put a leprosarium there, he was asked to served as interim superintendent.

4. There had been 115 attendants living at Kalawao: sixty-four spouses, twenty-six parents, four grandparents, fourteen children, and a sister-in-law of patients—plus Kaho'ohuli's cook and nine members of his or his assistants' families.

5. The following are examples of requests to treat leprosy in 1873: Kaiwi'okalani, Hawaiian *kahuna,* to the Board of Health, May 8, Board of Health Letters (hereafter BHL), box 5, Archives of Hawai'i, Honolulu; Board of Health 1868–1881:74–77; P. W. Waha acceptance of board offer to let him treat lepers, May 18, BHL box 5; Board of Health 1868–1881:74; a patient claims "Kā'ana'ana" (Akana, Sing Kee) can cure leprosy and the Chinese doctor is granted permission to treat patients at Kalawao, Ragsdale, July 1, BHL box 5; Board of Health 1868–1881:79.

6. Meyer writes, "Mr. Rogers, the Deputy Sheriff—he has not a single iron in his possession nor have I." It is unclear whether he means iron shackles or a shooting iron (Meyer 1873c).

7. The suggestion was futile, since the Catholic church did not have a seminary in Hawai'i until World War II prevented bringing missionaries from Europe.

8. Although Damien was under the supervision of the board, they communicated through the bishop. None of Damien's letters appears in the Board of Health records from 1874 to 1877; thereafter, Damien wrote occasionally requesting supplies for the boys' home he managed.

9. Petitions, Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Archives of Hawai'i (hereafter AH), series 222.

10. Petitions (1872, 1874), Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, AH, series 222.

11. Peter Kaeo was pronounced "not a leper" by the legislative Committee of Thirteen (Korn 1976:xii, 282–283). An average of eight people were released each year from Kalaupapa.

12. William Charles Crowningburg was also called Ke'eaumoku IV after a chief who had supported Kamehameha I in his conquest of Hawai'i. He was the son of a German-American settler and a Hawaiian woman descended from Kala'imamahū, a half-brother to King Kamehameha I (Korn 1976:231; Kame'eleihiwa 1992:117, 121–122).

13. Petitions 1878, Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, AH, series 222.

14. Sheriffs' and doctors' reports show that refuge was taken in Hāmākua on the island of Hawai'i, at Kula on Maui, and at Kalalau on Kaua'i (the site of Jack London's short story "Ko'olau the Leper").

15. Nine white patients, all male, were admitted between 1867 and 1879; five had died, leaving four: John Kack, David Ostrom, J. Pickford, and C. Strawn.

16. The hides of cattle butchered for rations were sold to offset the cost of running the settlement.

17. According to a family Bible cited by genealogist James "Sonny" Gay, Jonathan died at Moloka'i on August 6, and Kiti died 23 August 1879. Korn gives Jonathan's date of death as 1888 (1976:16).

18. For Meyer, manager of the Moloka'i Ranch, which had furnished cattle to the asylum, it meant diminished profits, since the sheep were coming from Walter Murray Gibson's ranch. Gibson joined the Board of Health on 7 September 1880. On September 14 he signed a contract to provide sheep for the settlement, and on October 2 he resigned; the animals proved to be difficult to transport and to tend (Board of Health 1868–1881:199, 216; Meyer's letters to the Board of Health, 10–17 November 1880, BHL).

19. In addition to his duties managing the Moloka'i Ranch and starting his own sugar plantation, Meyer served as a road supervisor, an agent to grant marriage licenses, an election inspector, and an agent to review labor contracts. He also helped plan lighthouses for Moloka'i.

20. This perception may reflect a failure to comprehend the complex of relationships by which native Hawaiians claim affinity by adoption or fostering; administrators often complained that the "parents" a child was living with were not "real."

21. Fitch's unauthorized publication of Arning's research in support of unproven assertions regarding leprosy prompted the caution. Although Arning's dismissal was opposed by colleagues in the medical profession, he had decided that Hawai'i was not suitable for scientific research (Arning 1886).

22. Sumner died at the hospital in 1885; Strawn returned to Kalaupapa in 1888.

23. Petition number 457 (n.d.) 1886, submitted by W. H. K. Kekalohe to the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, AH, series 222.

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CHANGING CONTOURS OF KINSHIP: THE IMPACTS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON KINSHIP ORGANIZATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

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The incorporation of microstates into the capitalist world-system sets the stage for profound transformations of kinship organization. This article argues that, while ideologies of kinship may remain largely intact, the actual organization of kinship is changing. It explores the roles of social, demographic, political, and economic factors in the transformation of the structure of kinship and family in the South Pacific in the period since continuous contact with the West commenced some 170 years ago. The case of Western Samoa is offered as an example of the process of change that is occurring at varying rates throughout Pacific Island societies.

Samoan culture and social organization have been extensively described, analyzed and debated by scholars since the mid-1800s, and, as a consequence, Samoa is one of the most extensively documented societies in the southwest Pacific region (Taylor 1965; Caton 1994).[1] Academic and popular interest in Samoan society has ensured that there are accounts, albeit of varying quality, of changes in social organization since the onset of European contact.[2] This article draws on that literature to outline one aspect of that change, the impact of incorporation into the capitalist world-system (Wallerstein 1974, 1983) on the structure and organization of Samoan kinship. Its central argument is that while, after 170 years of contact with the European world, an ideology of kinship remains a central element of Samoan culture, incorporation into the capitalist world-system has produced significant shifts in the way in which kinship is organized.

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In one sense the impact of incorporation on the organization of kinship in Samoa is unique, and this account should be regarded as the study of a particular case. However, Samoan society shares sociocultural and economic features with and is exposed to the same or very similar economic and political forces as other small, island Polynesian societies within the region. Processes that have occurred in Samoa, outlined below, can be seen to varying degrees elsewhere in the southwest Pacific. This account, then, with appropriate caution, can be read as an illustration of the processes by which Pacific Island societies have been incorporated into the capitalist world-system and of the consequences of those processes for the social organization of small island Pacific societies.

Samoa: A Brief History

The Samoan archipelago was settled around thirty-five hundred years ago by the Polynesian descendants of voyagers who had moved from Southeast Asia into the Pacific some five thousand years ago (Meleisea and Schoeffel-Meleisea 1987). Apart from occasional contact with Tongans and Fijians (Tuimaleali'ifano 1990), the Samoan population lived in relative isolation until the eighteenth century, when Europeans began to visit the archipelago. Until that time Samoa was a single-language-and-culture region within which regular visiting and trade occurred.[3]

Samoa's contact with the world-system commenced when explorers started to visit the Pacific. The Dutch navigator Roggeveen sighted the archipelago in 1722 but did not land or trade with the Samoans.[4] He was followed by two French navigators: Bougainville, who visited the Samoas in 1768 and named them the Isles of Navigators, and La Pérouse, who called in Tutuila in 1787. An early misunderstanding between Samoans in Tutuila and La Pérouse's crew, which resulted in the death of a scientist and eleven marines, won Samoa a reputation among mariners as an inhospitable port. Apart from the HMS *Pandora,* which visited the islands in 1791 in search of the *Bounty* mutineers, few Europeans visited the group until early in the nineteenth century.

European settlement in Samoa commenced on a small scale when beachcombers, deserters, and even fugitives from justice started to arrive in the early 1800s, and on a larger scale with missionary activity in 1830 and commercial activity shortly thereafter. In 1899, as part of a rationalization of European interests in the Pacific, the Samoas were divided into an eastern and a western group. The former became, and remains, an unincorporated territory of the United States. The latter became a German possession between 1900 and 1914, a League of Nations mandate between the world wars, and a United Nations Trust Territory between World War II and the assump-

tion of independence in 1962.[5] Throughout recent history, Samoans have always been the largest ethnic group in Samoa, and today over 95 percent of the population of 170,000 is of Samoan descent.

Kinship in Pre-European Society

Until European contact, kinship was the central principle of Samoan social organization; economic, political, and religious life was organized around an elaborate system of kinship (Gilson 1970:29–64; Turner 1983:172–183).

The basic kin groups, or *aiga,* were nonlocalized cognatic corporations (Gilson 1970:29); for Samoans these groups consisted of all people who were bound by kinship to the land and the chiefly title *o e uma e tau ile suafa ma le fanua.* The title was a chiefly name associated with a particular village and held for life by a male. The holder of the title was chosen by the incumbent holder in consultation with senior members of the *aiga* before his death. Its significance derived from the relationship between a family's title and its resources. As O'Meara has noted, "Corporate extended families, called *'aiga,* owned nearly all residential and agricultural land, as well as houses, canoes and other resources. . . . Authority, or *pule,* over the use of the corporate family's lands and other resources . . . was vested in a particular *matai* name, or title, which was an office specific to that family" (1995:110).

The nucleus of a kin group comprised a series of related *pui aiga,* or domestic units, numbering ten to twelve persons, which resided in a village and worked nearby agricultural land vested in the *matai,*[6] or chief, under whose authority members resided.[7] The *matai* was bound to protect the autonomy of the *aiga* that he headed, to advance its interests, and to extend its prestige and influence by investing its human and physical capital in sociopolitical activity. His performance in each of these areas was monitored by members. Some members of the *aiga* resided outside of the village with their affines' *aiga* but retained the right to return, to exercise land rights, and to be consulted on certain central matters such as title succession—hence the term for the maximal kin grouping, *aiga potopoto,* which means "the family assembled."

Kinship was central to social organization because it was the basis of access to land and other resources and of the social relations of production (Meleisea 1987). Individuals derived their rights to a house site, agricultural land, and marine resources through establishing membership in kin groups.[8] Individuals derived their right to call on the labor of others for certain types of economic and ceremonial activity through kinship. Individuals also derived social identity, social location, the right to protection by the group, and eligibility to succeed to chiefly titles from membership in the *aiga.*

In return for these rights, individuals were bound to serve, or *tautua,* their *matai* and the *aiga.* Service generally entailed placing some part of their primary production and labor at the disposal of the family's *matai,* who was free to distribute it within or use it on behalf of the *aiga.* This labor and production was generally used in activities designed to maintain the integrity of the *aiga,* such as warfare, or to increase its sociopolitical status, such as gift giving, strategic marriages (Moyle 1984:254–255), and the hosting of visits, *malaga,* by other families or villages (ibid.:251–254).

All Samoans inherited membership rights in their mothers' parents' and fathers' parents' *aiga* at birth and were free to exercise these rights throughout their lives. At various times individuals could, and did, move from one of these *aiga* to another as their needs changed and opportunities arose. Choices were usually the consequence of decisions about resources and leadership available in and the benefits of association with various *aiga* with whom an individual had connections.

Where an *aiga* had access to plentiful or fertile land, its numbers usually grew, as people with rights to reside on its land exercised these rights. Conversely, those families with limited or poor land were unable to support large populations, and their numbers fell as individuals were forced to exercise rights to reside with *aiga* possessing more resources. As a consequence, *aiga* were routinely in a state of flux as individuals exercised their rights in different *aiga* over time (Gilson 1970:31). While resources were clearly significant, they were not the sole determinant of a group's size or influence.

Effective leadership could also result in the growth in size and influence of an *aiga* and its *matai.* Those who were entitled to claim membership chose to attach themselves to effectively led groups and benefited by association with them. As incoming members took up residence and developed plantations, they contributed to growth of resources at the disposal of the group and indirectly to its influence. Conversely, ineffective leadership could result in declines in size and influence of an *aiga. Matai* typically nominated their successors, in addresses known as *mavaega,* shortly before death and in the presence of their families. *Aiga* were bound by these directives but were, technically at least, free to dismiss *matai* and elect new ones when poor performance resulted in loss of prestige or jeopardized a group's autonomy.[9]

Villages, or *nu'u,* comprised a series of often related *aiga.* They resided under the authority of a *fono matai,* or council of chiefs, comprising the *matai* of all of the families in the village. The *fono* exercised eminent domain over village lands, which generally consisted of territory running from mountain peaks in the interior through forest land, agricultural land, and

villages, to the fringing reefs. Families cultivated designated areas of the village land, and *matai* assigned rights to use a family's agricultural land and house sites to members of the family and their spouses who agreed to reside in the village and to serve the *matai* and the village. The use rights assigned in this process to individuals lapsed at death, and control of the land was returned to and reassigned by the *matai.*

The *fono* managed the social, political, and economic affairs of the village and acted where necessary to resolve disputes within village boundaries and with neighboring villages. Disputes typically involved village boundaries, boundaries between families, and theft from plantations. The relative importance and influence of various *aiga* within the village varied over time with size, quality of leadership, and the use made of productive resources. At any given time families' relative importance was indicated in the ceremonial order of precedence or *fa'alupega* (Krämer 1994:660).

Districts, or *itu malo,* consisted in turn of groups of eight to ten villages that would occasionally agree to unite, under the high chief of a district, usually in defense of the district's or a member village's territory or honor when threatened by another village or district (Turner 1983). A district's cooperation and authority was confined to these occasions; at other times villages were autonomous social and political entities.[10]

Until evangelization and colonization commenced, kinship was the foundation of all social, political, and economic organization. It lay at the base of the economic, political, and religious spheres of life and defined the rights and obligations of all individuals and the groups in which these rights were exercised. The Samoan historian Meleisea has explained the relationship as follows: "The foundation of the Samoan economy and the *fa'a Samoa* [Samoan worldview and social organization] was subsistence agriculture based on descent group tenure and ownership of land, and for social and political institutions to have changed, the system of tenure would have had to change. The Samoan system made economic individualism impossible" (1987:18). Any activity that disturbed economic, political, or religious organization was bound to have an impact on the organization of kinship. European contact was to influence all three areas of Samoan life.

European Contact

The Runaways

Samoa's incorporation into the world-system commenced toward the end of the eighteenth century with the settlement of small numbers of beach-

combers, runaway sailors, and escaped convicts.[11] These people were, however, largely dependent on the Samoans for protection and survival and, as a consequence, had limited impact on Samoan social organization. In fact, their reception and the probability of their finding protection were influenced by their value to the Samoans. Thus boat builders and those with a knowledge of trade, firearms, and military strategy were often pressed into the service of chiefs who sought to extend their political and military influence within Samoa.

The Missions

Missionary activity commenced in earnest in 1830 with the arrival of the Reverend John Williams and eight Tahitian teachers of the London Missionary Society.[12] Conversion of the Samoan population to Christianity followed relatively quickly and smoothly.[13] The promotion of Christian doctrine and practices constituted a watershed in Samoan cultural history. The idea that the adoption of the new religion signified a break with the "times of darkness," *aso o le pouliuli,* and the commencement of the time of enlightenment, *aso o le malamalama,* was promoted initially by missionaries to establish the importance of conversion but was increasingly accepted by the Samoans themselves. Although the missions initially promoted religious doctrines and practices, they soon began to promote a series of secular ideas and practices such as the sanctity of private property and the value of "industry." These secular ideas gained varying degrees of acceptance from Samoans because of their association with the mission.

Missionaries had mixed feelings about the chieftaincy and the nature and extent of its authority over the people (Gilson 1970:75). Despite their reservations they chose not to interfere with the organization or leadership of Samoan kin groups for reasons of expediency. Indeed, the success of their mission was dependent on the continued authority of *matai* who heard the mission teachings and promoted conversion to the new religion among their followers. Gilson notes: "Williams was probably guided more by considerations of expediency than was any other London Missionary Society missionary of his time. Certainly, no one placed a higher value on the patronage of chiefs . . . nor did any display greater confidence in being able to gain it and use it to advantage. . . . In the vanguard of the mission, he sought to make the most spectacular first impression, that mass conversion might occur in the shortest possible time" (1970:75).

This strategy led to conversions of entire families or *aiga* and produced large numbers of converts in the Samoas in a relatively short time. The process meant also that families were not usually split by conversion, since all

were converted on the instructions of recognized leaders at once and to a single religion. The fragmentation of *aiga* and the disruption of their social organization, which had followed conversion elsewhere in the Pacific, did not occur to the same extent in the Samoas.

Missionaries did, however, challenge those Samoan religious beliefs that connected families' fates with the activities of a number of "village and household gods" (Turner 1983:23–77; Stair 1983:210–241).[14] These gods, usually embodied in animals, were supposed to guide and protect families from their enemies. Missionaries required Samoan converts to renounce their family gods, but even in this area their efforts were not as heavy-handed as was the case in Tahiti earlier. John Williams reported in his journal that he had been advised by a Samoan chief, Faueā, who accompanied him to Samoa on his first visit, to avoid "precipitate actions" that might alienate the Samoans, and the missionaries did not see the Samoans' religion to represent as serious a challenge to Christianity as had the religions of eastern Polynesia (Gilson 1970:73–74).

Indeed, as Turner noted, "At one time it was supposed that Samoa was destitute of any kind of religion and . . . the people were called 'the *godless* Samoans' " (1983:16–17). Though the gods that dominated Samoan life were not considered threatening, because, as Stair noted, "they have no idols or teraphim, neither were they accustomed to offer human sacrifices to their idols," the Samoans "were burdened with superstitions which were most oppressive and exacting" (1983:210), and they had to be "freed" from these beliefs. The remedy involved persuading Samoans to the belief that one god rather than many gods controlled their families' destinies (Gilson 1970:73–74). While the new belief transformed the exact nature of the connection between families and the supernatural, it left intact a relationship between families and the supernatural realm that could be invoked to guide and protect them. Thus, over time, families abandoned the protection of a Samoan god in favor of that of the omnipresent and omniscient god of the missionaries.

Missionaries, from John Williams on, also sought, for various reasons, to reduce the level of hostility between villages and districts.[15] Williams, for instance, was concerned not solely with the biblical injunction to peace, love, and forgiveness, but also with the need to protect "his people" and their property. He sought to have the energy Samoans devoted to war diverted into religious activity. The effort was partly successful early on, but later civil war broke out again among various chiefly families and continued until the late nineteenth century (Gilson 1970; Meleisea and Schoeffel-Meleisea 1987).[16] Renewed attempts by missionaries and civil authorities to promote peace and a growing disillusion with war among Samoans led to the creation

of new mechanisms for resolution of disputes and of venues for competition within and between chiefly families.

In one important respect missionary activity was to have an impact on the rationale that underpinned traditional economic organization. The various mission societies sought to take their message to the islands that lay to the west of Samoa as part of a longer-term evangelism project. This extension of missionary activity stretched the resources available from traditional supporters in Britain, and the mission looked for contributions from those who had benefited from the missionary presence. These contributions took the form of personnel and financial support. From 1846 on Samoan teachers and pastors played a significant role in the evangelization of the western Pacific, but it is the financial contribution to the missions' activity that is of interest in this context.

Missionaries encouraged Samoans to raise contributions for the advancement of the mission by creating surpluses of crops that could be sold to finance missionary activity. These collections were organized by Samoan laity according to Samoan custom, and they pitted family against family and village against village in a competition to donate the most to the mission and, by implication, to demonstrate the greatest commitment to the faith (Gilson 1970:100, 130–135). Families competed within the villages to outgive one another. Villages then competed to become the most generous village in mission meetings that were held in each district in May of each year and that became known as the *me.*

In one respect the mission meetings, or *me,* can be seen simply as a revival of intervillage competition organized by Samoans in support of Christian missionary activity, continuing a tradition of intervillage and interdistrict rivalry that had been suppressed to some degree by the missions' discouragement of warfare. These mission meetings were, however, the first occasion on which Samoans had been encouraged to produce significant surpluses of crops for sale for cash in a world commodity market and for reasons unconnected with traditional interests and practices. Although the *me* were the most obvious examples of mission-induced production of surpluses, the more general requirements of participation in religious activity and a desire to demonstrate families' commitment to their faith through gifts to their pastors meant that the routine production of agricultural surpluses for sale in a market became a more general practice.

In these respects then, missionary activity had an early impact on the Samoan worldview and on the organization of families. This impact was, however, less profound than the effects that followed the onset of commercial activity and that posed challenges to central tenets of kinship ideology.

Commerce and Kinship

The commercial activities that became established in Samoa were, ironically, a by-product of missionary activity. Missions still had to raise funds in Britain, and to do so they had to return periodically and appeal for funds. Support was sought from both congregations and corporate "sponsors" by appealing to somewhat different motives in each case.

In the case of corporate sponsors, the missions had to argue that missionary activity indirectly served the longer-term interests of commerce. Gilson, for instance, has described how John Williams obtained funds from the City Corporation of London:

> His "prospectus" had only recently appeared as the final chapter of his book, *Missionary Enterprises,* in which he had confidently asserted that the evangelist, by taming and sophisticating the savage, was creating the conditions most essential to commercial progress in the Pacific. Indeed, the commercial interests of mankind had *never* been served more effectively, he had written, than by the introduction of the Christianity among the heathen. Surely, then, the merchant and the shipowner would want to embrace the mission cause. (1970:138)

In this case the aldermen gave Williams £500 and expressed confidence in receiving "an ample return," but a more general consequence of these periodic assurances of the safety of Samoa, and the Pacific more generally, was to alert European capitalists to the possibilities of extending commerce into the Pacific and exploiting opportunities there.

In the Samoan case commercial interests sought to establish plantations initially to grow copra in the 1840s and later to grow cotton as the Civil War disrupted American cotton production and drove prices up. Settlers, hoping to acquire cheap land and labor, flocked to Samoa to establish commercial plantations (O'Meara 1995). A formal colonial presence commenced in the 1850s with the appointment of consuls to represent the interests of settlers from Britain, Germany, and the United States (Gilson 1970). These forces were to have a significant influence on the organization of kinship, because they introduced alternative ways of organizing social, political, and economic relations. Not all such relations were embraced, but all challenged the kinship ideology that underpinned social relations in precontact Samoa.

The linkages between kinship and land tenure were challenged early, as settlers arrived to establish plantations. Nervous of leasing land in the absence

of a system of land title registration, settlers sought to persuade Samoans to sell them land with freehold title. By the mid-1860s a few thousand acres, mainly on the north side of Upolu, had been sold to Europeans for residential and agricultural purposes (Gilson 1970:271–290), and pressure was building for more alienation to take advantage of the high demand and prices for cotton. By 1889, when land sales were banned by a tripartite commission, land speculation had resulted in claims that covered twice the land area of the entire archipelago (O'Meara 1995:115). These sales and other alienations had resulted in the commodification of a resource that formerly had only use value and had created a market in land. This commodification in turn raised fundamental questions about kinship and, more specifically, about the relations among a *matai,* an *aiga,* and the lands to which they were bound.

First, were there limits to chiefs' powers to assign land use rights? Samoans had acknowledged a chief's power to assign rights, but these rights were generally conferred for an individual's lifetime or until such time as an individual committed an offense that entitled the *aiga* to expel the individual and to revoke his or her land rights and reassign them. All rights to use land lapsed at death, when the land was returned to the *aiga* and the *matai,* who could then reassign them. Did chiefs have the power to assign anyone rights permanently?

Second, to whom was a *matai* entitled to sell or otherwise alienate land? While most Samoans acknowledged a chief's right, or *pule,* to assign rights of usufruct to members of the *aiga,* and indeed to non-kin who had served the *aiga,* could such rights be extended to assign rights to non-kin who had not served and were unlikely ever to serve the family? In rare cases, alienations of land occurred within Samoan contexts such as payments for the right to live (O'Meara 1995:113), but here too these exceptional events occurred with relations explained and sanctioned in Samoan terms. This new situation raised the question of whether a *matai* was in fact a manager or an owner of kin-group land. If alienation was possible, which chiefs needed to be consulted or to agree to alienation in any given case?

Finally, and perhaps most significant, the alienation of small amounts of land to settlers and the creation of freehold title opened the possibility of another category of rights and relationships that derived not from kinship, but from ownership and control of private property.

The existence of commercial plantations gave rise to a second set of challenges to the kinship ideology. Settlers, unable to provide all of the labor required to work their plantations, sought to hire Samoans as wageworkers. Samoans were generally reluctant to work for wages and did so only when they needed cash for specific purposes, but the existence of a labor market transformed for all time the traditional bases of authority and rights to ser-

vice. Samoans' own limited experience of wage labor and contact with indentured Melanesian and Chinese plantation workers raised another set of issues about the nature and bases of authority and power that previously had been embedded in kinship and explained by an ideology of kinship.

Kinship was clearly not the only basis for authority and power. The possession of private capital created another basis for authority and for demanding and receiving compliance from other people. Nor, it became clear, was kinship the only basis for service, or *tautua.* The contrasts in production and the use of labor within Samoan villages and on plantations were stark. The possession of land and cash with which to purchase labor permitted one to purchase service and obedience from unrelated persons and to use it in the pursuit of individual rather than group ends. Access to capital, furthermore, permitted individuals to expropriate all produce and to retain any profits from its sale without any obligation to redistribute either among those who had contributed to their creation. Both of these discoveries raised fundamental questions about the centrality of kinship.

The recruitment of Samoans to the crews of whaling and trading ships and the creation of labor barracks on commercial plantations, in which unrelated people lived together under the authority of unrelated people and without chiefs, presented alternative models of coresidence and coexistence, and another challenge to the assumption that kinship was the only basis for the organization of human social activity. Specifically, it demonstrated alternative bases of hierarchy and raised questions about the inevitability of a connection among kinship, social status, and control.

Early in the twentieth century more pressure was placed on the Samoan kinship ideology by the creation of both missionary and state formal-education systems. Both drew heavily on curricula and teaching materials created in metropolitan nations. Samoans valued success in formal education and embraced and promoted it. As a consequence, significant parts of the population were exposed to teaching material that contained alternative discourses and images of kinship organization. In these images, families were typically small and often apparently isolated; kinship was less significant in social organization, and constellations of values were both implicitly and explicitly individualistic rather than communitarian. Possibly because these images were most apparent to children, who in a gerontocracy have little power, their immediate impact on the organization of Samoan society was limited.

Later in the century other phenomena, including the presence of U.S. troops during World War II, travel, and mass media, were to give these alternative images much wider currency. The introduction of a private press,[17] the growth and popularity of cinema, U.S. television broadcasts from American Samoa,[18] videotapes, and most recently the television broadcasts from

New Zealand on the state's television system, Televise Samoa, have all contributed to a much wider awareness by adults of a European, or *palagi,* lifestyle and worldview in which kinship is much less significant and very different in character.

The Transformation of Kinship in Independent Samoa

Despite exposure to these alternatives, kinship remained, for most Samoans in Samoa at least, the preferred basis of social organization when, after 120 years of contact with the West, independence was first formally discussed. When Western Samoa prepared for constitutional independence in the late 1950s, representatives of the Constitutional Commission visited every village in Samoa to establish what people wanted embodied in the constitution (Davidson 1967). There was significant support for the retention of Samoan custom and tradition. More specifically, people voiced support for a system of land tenure based on kinship, a system of local government based on the village and run by the *fono matai,* the creation of a system of national government based on the election of *matai* representatives by *matai,* and the appointment as head of state of the holders of two nationally significant titles.

These wishes, along with the desire for a national court, the Lands and Titles Court, charged with resolving customary land and titles disputes according to Samoan custom and tradition, were embodied in the constitution (USP 1988:502–503). Some have argued that the embodiment of these principles in the constitution enshrined the importance of kinship and ensured the smooth transition and relative political stability that has followed independence.[19] They do not suggest that changes in the significance and organization of kinship had not occurred, but rather that these were relatively minor compared with those that would follow independence.

What followed independence was a consequence of both internal and external forces all of which, one might argue, necessarily followed a new relationship with the world-system. Four factors—a new electoral system, the growth of a wage economy in Samoa, changes in land tenure, and labor migration—have produced significant changes in the nature of both relationships between branches within *aiga* and between individuals and their *aiga* in the period since independence. The following sections deal with each of these factors and the changes that each has caused.

The Electoral System and Kinship

Samoa's full incorporation into the modern world-system required the formal adoption of the political symbols and practices of a "modern state" as

defined by the United Nations. It also required the modification of the Samoan form and style of governance, which, in the opinion of those charged with overseeing the transition to independence, lacked certain types of institutions and was insufficiently democratic. A transformation of the chieftaincy and, by extension, the basis of power and authority within families followed independence in 1962.

This change was an unanticipated consequence of the electoral provisions of the constitution. The charter provided for *matai* suffrage to elect forty-five *matai* members of parliament.[20] It quickly became apparent that members of parliament, and more especially cabinet ministers, were able to assist their supporters in various ways (Meleisea and Schoeffel 1983). Competition developed within electorates between aspiring candidates and *matai* who supported them and stood to benefit from their election.

One means of ensuring that candidates won power was to create more *matai* to increase their electoral power base. This end was achieved in some cases by creating new and spurious titles, *matai palota*,[21] and in others by creating multiple titleholders where before there had been one. As rival groups in many electorates became involved in these practices, the number of *matai* increased rapidly.

In an attempt to limit the dilution of the status of *matai* titles, parliament banned the creation of new titles and annulled those that had not existed on the eve of independence. To ensure that titles registered were legitimate, parliament further required claimants to demonstrate that defined procedures, which ensured that titles were bestowed by those entitled to bestow them on those whom they had chosen, had been followed before titles were registered in the Lands and Titles Court and their holders were entitled to vote.[22]

This ban did not, however, prevent the "splitting" of titles by families or rival factions within families,which has generated another set of problems that have generated tension within kin groups. As Meleisea and Schoeffel have noted, while "this solution [splitting] may be successful in the short term, in the long term the proliferation of title splitting may generate widespread dissension within families, regarding authority over family lands and subsequent issues over succession" (1983:105). This has proved to be the case, with an increasing number of apparently intractable cases being passed up to the Lands and Titles Court for settlement. Such settlements, in turn, may generate still further problems, because they are imposed by the court, albeit at the request of claimant groups. In the past such disputes were resolved within the *aiga,* and, as a consequence, the solutions were "owned" by its members.

Another factor in the transformation of chieftaincy has been the difficulty in agreeing on a single candidate to succeed to a title. In the past the suc-

cessor was chosen by incumbents on the basis of descent, service to the *matai,* and demonstrated competence in skills that could be placed at the disposal of the *aiga.* With an increasing number of family members involved in the nomination process and a growing number demonstrating service and an extended range of valued skills, it has become increasingly difficult for *aiga* to agree on a single candidate. This predicament has placed more pressure on families to split *matai* titles among rival claimants to obtain immediate solutions—solutions that may create greater difficulties and tensions within *aiga* in the longer term.

In an attempt to resolve a steadily worsening problem, the government amended the Electoral Act to permit universal adult suffrage in 1990. This move effectively transferred power that had formerly resided with *matai* to untitled adult members of the *aiga.* Furthermore, the amendment meant that aspiring politicians were forced to distribute preelection "gifts" and postelection favors more widely (So'o 1996). The net effect of these changes was to reduce *matai* influence and to increase that of untitled members of the *aiga.*

Wage and Salaried Labor and Kinship

A second factor that has opened the way for the transformation of kinship has been the emergence of a wage economy alongside the subsistence and cash-cropping economy. Although there has been waged labor in Samoa since the establishment of plantations in the middle of the nineteenth century, the proportion of the Samoan population involved in the sector has increased rapidly since independence as a consequence of the withdrawal of expatriate labor, increased government activity, and the growth of the manufacturing and service sectors.

The waged workforce is made up of a public sector, which as of 1991 employed some 4,339 persons, or approximately 5 percent of the adult population (AIDAB 1994:76), and a private sector, which employed approximately 13,500 persons, or 17 percent of the adult population (ibid.:9).[23] A significant part of the workforce is employed in the capital, Apia, and resides in or near the urban area. While salaries and wages are not high,[24] the availability of wage labor means that a significant group of people are no longer solely dependent on kinship ties for access to a livelihood.

Wage earners no longer need either house sites or agricultural land, which they would normally obtain from their *aiga* in return for service to it. This fact has the potential to transform the relationship between individuals and their *aiga* and *matai.* There is evidence that some wage earners who are free to do so are choosing to limit their ties and commitments to their *matai* and

their extended family. Where they choose to maintain their contributions to the family, these contributions are frequently qualitatively different. Many opt to substitute cash contributions for labor. Over time, Samoans argue, this practice leads to a loss of contact and the attenuation of bonds that were formerly based on cooperation. That many wage earners choose to place their income at the disposal of their *aiga* and *matai* and regard this contribution as another form of service, or *tautua,* to their family is an indication of the power of kinship ideology. It cannot, however, disguise the fact that these acts are now matters of choice for kin whose relationship with the *aiga* has been transformed by the changing social relations of production.

Wage or salaried labor has another consequence for kinship. It divides individuals' loyalties between two competing sources of authority, the first derived from kin relations and the second from employment relations. While the first form of authority recognized by employed individuals derives from complex historical and social sequences, the second derives from a simple exchange of wages for service. Faced with competing claims for one's time, energy, and support, a person must decide between competing authorities. In times past the kin authority would have had prior claim over an individual's time and energy. With the increasing monetization of Samoan society and the increased demand for cash, however, the authority of the manager, which would seem far less socially compelling, assumes increasing importance and does so at the expense of the authority of the chief.

Indeed, this change derives support from the highest levels of Samoan government. In 1997 the prime minister and the minister of labor drew attention to the high absenteeism rates at the Japanese-owned Yazaki assembly plant near Apia and urged Samoans to realize that these plants could leave Samoa and would do so if Samoan employees continued to take time off to attend to family business whenever they chose. They urged parents of employees to send their children to work and to encourage them to adopt better work practices.

Land Tenure and Kinship

A third factor that has opened the way for changes in kinship has been the creation of new forms of land tenure. There has, since European settlement, been a small freehold land market, and this market has provided opportunities for people to live away from family land and beyond the effective control of *matai* and *aiga* (O'Meara 1987, 1995). In the recent past the government has subdivided and sold freehold lots and increased the amount of freehold land available for settlement by people who wish to live in new forms of kinship units and more individualistic lifestyles. The growth of suburban

settlements around the capital Apia, in which smaller families live privatized lives based on incomes from wage earning, is a relatively new phenomenon in Samoa.[25] Rapidly rising demand and increasing prices for this land suggest a growing demand for this type of lifestyle. Perhaps the exact number of people living in this way is less important than the existence of a readily observable alternative family lifestyle.

This phenomenon is not, however, confined to the urban and peri-urban areas. Since the 1950s development economists and advisors have argued that customary land tenure has limited agricultural production (Stace 1956, 1963; Lauterbach 1963; AIDAB 1994:3, 4, 28–29). These advisors asserted that insecurity of tenure, the requirement that a certain proportion of production be assigned to the *matai* as a form of rent,[26] and the difficulties of obtaining credit for developments on customary land constituted disincentives to potentially productive farmers and discouraged more effective forms of land use. External and internal pressure to increase production, specifically export production, led the government to create the Samoa Land Corporation as part of its recent organizational restructuring program to oversee the subdivision and leasing of significant areas of Crown land to individual farmers for longer terms.[27]

This policy, shaped by advisors from international agencies concerned with strengthening the national economy, has created another group of people who are no longer dependent on their *aiga* and their *matai* for access to resources and are free to limit their commitment to and connections with family. It also provides experience in farming under more easily managed conditions. Unlike customary land, which may be subject to periodic challenges to tenure and variations in rents, leasehold tenure is effectively guaranteed for the life of the lease, and annual rents are fixed. Ironically, some of those who hold these leases say that they are more kindly disposed to their kin group now, as they no longer feel that kin are constantly frustrating their activities. The existence of this type of alternative arrangement offers an example of a greater degree of personal freedom and places pressure for change on traditional forms of land tenure and kin relations. This development is, however, limited by the amount of government land available for settlement and farming (Pitt 1970:94).

Changing land tenure and, by implication, kinship relations are not confined to freehold and leasehold land. Preliminary work by O'Meara (1987) revealed a move to a system of de facto freehold land tenure on customary land. Customary land, while nominally under the control of *matai* and *aiga,* in fact passed from parent to child at death. More recent work by the same author showed that this form of tenure is becoming more widespread (O'Meara 1995). Land rights no longer lapse at death but are in practice, if not in law, controlled and transmitted by individuals to their chosen heirs.

With this shift in tenure comes a change in the pattern of family relations that arises from a greater degree of independence from *matai* control and greater economic freedom. O'Meara (1987) has noted an increasing tendency to regard customary agricultural land as individual property and to resist the notion that a *matai* may demand, on behalf of the family, all or any part of the production from that land. It may be that, like the leaseholders, those who experience greater security of tenure and greater control over the distribution of the profits from their activities will feel more committed to their *aiga* than they did with less security and freedom. This possibility should not obscure the fact that those who continue to support their kin group do so voluntarily and that the fundamental basis of their connection with their kin group has changed.

Migration, Remittances, and Kinship

The final and most significant shifts in the organization of Samoan kinship are a consequence of emigration from Western Samoa since the 1950s. Uneven development in the Pacific generated a demand for labor in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States. An extended period of emigration from Western Samoa led to the formation of significant migrant enclaves in New Zealand (Pitt and Macpherson 1974; Krishnan et al. 1994; Statistics New Zealand 1995), Australia (Va'a 1995), and the United States (Franco 1987, 1990; Rolff 1978; Kotchek 1975). By 1989 some 76,200 Western Samoans were estimated to be living overseas (Ahlburg 1991:16).[28] The existence of these migrant populations has had a huge impact on the organization of kinship in Western Samoa in two areas: redistribution of resources and the demonstration of alternative forms of kinship organization.

Migrants have remitted significant amounts of both cash and goods to Samoa. Western Samoans were remitting WST$86.6 million annually. This sum is almost three times the value of Western Samoan exports (Ahlburg 1991:18), and it is economically extremely significant (Ahlburg 1995; Connell and Brown 1995; Brown 1995; Foster 1995; Walker and Brown 1995). It has also had a marked impact on the organization of kinship. As early as 1976, Paul Shankman noted: "As a new form of income remittances are not subject to the same kinds of redistributive pressures within the *aiga* as other forms of income, for in remittance redistribution, the title-holder can be bypassed as the redistributive agent" (1976:66).

Unlike the revenues from the use of customary land, which were traditionally channeled through the *matai* and returned to the members of the *aiga* as the *matai* deemed appropriate, remittances from migrants are frequently sent to individual members of families. Thus, no longer do *matai* alone control resource flows within the family, and individual households

with generous remitters abroad enjoy greater degrees of economic and social independence than was once possible. Furthermore: "Both remitters and recipients tend to regard remittances as personal property rather than as *aiga* property and, despite sanctions for wider redistribution, the sharing of remittances has become more confined to the immediate family" (Shankman 1976:66). Where individuals are determined to resist the pressure to redistribute remittances that they receive, they may retain, accumulate, and convert funds for private use in such areas as small business. Such practice may result in untitled people who are significantly better off and control greater resources than their *matai* (Macpherson 1988). Wider access to alternative sources of income has political and economic consequences. As early as 1976 it was apparent, as Shankman noted, that remittances "have substantially weakened the economic and political solidarity of the *aiga*" (1976:66).

Migrants have sponsored relatives' formal education both within Samoa and overseas. Such remittances have produced a pool of people who have acquired valuable skills and who may aspire to *matai* titles and a more effective role in leadership within an *aiga.* Remittances have also meant that more people within an *aiga* have access to income and are in position to use it to advance and promote their own candidates for leadership roles in the family. This practice may in turn increase the competition within the *aiga* for titles and compound the attendant tensions.

Thus, a number of branches or sections, *itu aiga,* of an *aiga* may have both credible candidates and the resources necessary to promote these candidates for leadership. The competition between *itu aiga* may produce considerable tension within the *aiga* and thus reduce political solidarity. The popular, short-term solution in many cases, conferring the title on several contenders, may simply postpone tension between *itu aiga.* Internal division may prevent an *aiga* from mobilizing its resources as effectively as it might have earlier when such internal political division was less common.

Furthermore, remittances have meant that families no longer need to work together for extended periods of time to produce corporate resources that were formerly used on their behalf by their *matai.* With alternative sources of income available from migrants at relatively short notice, it is no longer as necessary for a family to work its land together under the direction of a *matai* and to engage in the sort of collective activity that formerly generated a sense of family unity and common purpose. I am not suggesting that families do not continue to cooperate in corporate activities in which their family's honor and prestige is at stake. They do. It is simply the character, frequency, and amount of this cooperation that has changed.

But the most significant changes may be yet to come. As migrants who

have lived and worked overseas have moved back to Samoa, some have begun to mount challenges to the authority of *matai* and *aiga.* There have been cases of individuals claiming that individual rights embodied in the Western Samoan constitution take precedence over rights conferred on *matai* by tradition and legislation. Thus, individuals have claimed, for instance, that the right to freedom of religion takes precedence over the traditional practice of a family worshiping where its *matai* choose. Such views allow individual members to worship where they choose and without concern for the appearance of their family's solidarity and respect for the authority of its *matai.* While this may seem relatively insignificant, each successful challenge erodes the unity of the group and the authority of traditional leadership.

There have been further challenges from returnees who have chosen to maintain distance from their families and to live relatively affluent, individualistic lifestyles, often in urban areas. While the numbers of such people are small, in a society in which the young are increasingly exposed to and aspire to more materially affluent lives, this group's actions may send signals that materially successful people live away from the family and limit their contact with kin.

Conclusion

Samoa has maintained both an ideology and a system of extended kinship despite 170 years of contact with the West. Today, 82 percent of Samoa's land remains in customary ownership, or *fanua tau Samoa;* some 80 percent of the population lives in villages; and approximately 90 percent of the Western Samoan population claims, in the census, to live under the authority of a *matai.* Villages are run by councils comprising the heads, *matai,* of village families, and *matai* continue to govern the country. On the surface at least, kinship remains a central feature of Samoan social organizations and, in popular discourse, the ideology that legitimates kinship seems as robust and as popular as it ever was for many Samoans. But there have been significant changes in the organization of kinship since independence.

The connections between kinship and land tenure that lie at the heart of the traditional political economy have, as O'Meara has shown, been transformed in fundamental ways as a consequence of the commodification of land as its production value is rethought in the light of changing economic realities. The status of the *matai* and the limits to their authority over their families and over landholdings are also changing. The numbers, status, and bases of appointment of the *matai* and the bases and extent of their authority have been similarly changed as a consequence of the electoral provisions of the constitution adopted at independence. Since the family has been defined

as "all who were connected with the land and the title," fundamental changes in the nature of landholding and the office of the *matai* signal fundamental changes in the organization of kinship.

It is likely that these changes and others that will occur in the near future will create further and even more significant shifts in the structure and organization of Samoan kinship. But as experience has shown, these real changes may not be reflected in the ideology of kinship, which, like bamboo in a hurricane, may continue to bend with the wind and withstand the stresses to which it is subject.

NOTES

1. The Samoas are an archipelago in the southwest Pacific Ocean that once comprised a single political economy. In 1900, after an agreement by colonial powers, the Samoas were partitioned. The eastern islands have been administered by the United States as an unincorporated territory since that time. The western islands were administered first by Germany, then by New Zealand under a League of Nations mandate and later United Nations trusteeship until 1962, when Western Samoa became an independent state. In 1997 its parliament changed its name to Samoa.

2. Among these is the classic 1902 work by the German physician-ethnographer Augustin Krämer (Krämer 1994), Felix Keesing's 1934 study, and studies by a Commission of Enquiry into Lands and Titles in the early 1950s. A concise sociohistorical overview of the changes can be found in Meleisea's 1992 work.

3. Bougainville was so impressed with the construction of Samoan canoes and the speed and ease with which Samoans moved around within the island group that, in 1768, he named the group the Archipelago of Navigators.

4. The archipelago lies between 171 and 176 degrees West longitude and 13 and 15 degrees South latitude, and consists of two groups of high volcanic islands: in the west Upolu (1,114 sq km), Savaiʻi (1,820 sq km), Apolima, Manono, Fanuatapu, Namua, Nuʻutele, Nuʻulua, and Nuʻusafeʻe; and in the east Tutuila (137 sq km), Taʻu (45 sq km), Aunuʻu (1.4 sq km), Olosega, Ofu, and the atolls Rose and Swains Islands.

5. Detailed accounts of the earlier period can be found in Gilson 1970 and Meleisea 1987, and of the later period, during which New Zealand assumed responsibility for the administration of Samoa, in Davidson 1967 and Boyd 1969.

6. There are two classes of *matai: aliʻi,* or high chiefs, and *tulafale,* or talking chiefs. The latter usually served and acted for the former in a range of sociopolitical activity.

7. An extended discussion of kinship can be found in Gilson 1970:29–64.

8. A discussion of the bases of these rights is contained in Pitt 1970.

9. The term *fa'asavali le matai* meant, literally, "to cause the chief to walk" and was invoked where incompetence or conduct brought the group into danger.

10. The names and histories of these districts are outlined in Turner 1983:232–266.

11. Williams's 1830 and 1832 journals suggest that he met or was told about some ten people throughout the group (Moyle 1984).

12. A detailed commentary on missionary activity in the Pacific can be found in Gunson's *Messengers of Grace* (1978).

13. This process is thought to have occurred quickly because of the decision by a key chief, Malietoa Vai'inupo, to embrace the new religion and because of the approach of the missions (Gilson 1970:97). In 1839 twelve Samoans were chosen to accompany Williams as missionaries in Melanesia, and by 1846 Samoan graduates of the Malua Theological Seminary were serving as pastors both in Samoa and farther afield.

14. A series of "household gods" provided omens that were used by families to determine propitious times and courses of social and political action.

15. Williams was concerned about the level of intervillage warfare. On his second visit he promised further missionaries only if Malietoa would put an end to war and persuade his followers to invest their energy in religious activity (Moyle 1984:122–123).

16. These wars were probably prolonged by European-settler factions that backed various families in an attempt to advance their own interests.

17. The government-controlled newspaper *O le Savali* and the London Missionary Society's *O Le Sulu Samoa* were essentially conservative media that reflected the interests of the government and the church, respectively. The arrival of privately owned newspapers opened the possibility of independent news.

18. For some thirty years television broadcasts, complete with commercials, from KRON San Francisco were rebroadcast and received in both American and Western Samoa. In the 1990s Western Samoa established a television service that rebroadcast a mix of New Zealand and local programs.

19. It can also be argued that the stability was a product of the fact that those who were dissatisfied with the system were able to migrate and did so.

20. Out of a total of forty-seven. The remaining two were elected by individual voters.

21. Literally, "voting chiefs."

22. Thus, in the thirteen years after independence, the number of *matai* increased from some 4,500, or 4.1 percent of the population, to an estimated 11,000, or 7.3 percent of the population (Meleisea and Schoeffel 1983:98–105); by 1989 it had reached 20,000 (Browne 1989:181).

23. This figure is likely to have increased significantly since 1991 as a consequence of the formation of new businesses, including the Yazaki Company, which alone employs over 3,200 employees.

24. Average salaries in 1991 ranged from WST$16,271 in the attorney general's office to WST$6,885 in Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries; the public-sector average was WST$7,398 (AIDAB 1994:76). The minimum wage was WST$1.10 per hour, and the average wage rates for unskilled labor was WST$1.35 (ibid.:20).

25. These people are different from the members of families who have always lived in town but remained involved in the affairs of their *aiga* and served their family by providing a home in town for visiting kin.

26. The problem was not the rental per se but the fact that it varied and discouraged "rational" economic planning. Furthermore, it was argued that more successful producers were more heavily "taxed" by *matai* and would withdraw from production.

27. Sixteen percent of Samoan land is owned by the government. This land was confiscated from German residents in 1914, administered as the Reparation Estates and later as the Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation (WSTEC) during the New Zealand administration, and transferred to the Western Samoan Crown at independence. As AIDAB notes, the release of these lands so far has been slow because of the absence of divestment policies and operational procedures.

28. If the children of migrants are added to this total, the number of persons of Western Samoan descent residing overseas is probably closer to 240,000 compared with the 170,000 presently in Samoa.

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EDITOR'S FORUM

COSMOLOGIES, CITIES, AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF SPACE: OCEANIC ENLARGEMENTS OF THE WORLD

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This is a commentary on Epeli Hau'ofa's vision of an extended Oceania. By contrasting a widening "sea of islands" with the current discourse of an ever-shrinking world, I draw attention to a heterotopic terrain of incompatible spaces. I intend to show that the widely accepted narratives and maps of a shrinking world encompass and assure the image of an ever-extending Western sphere. This rhetoric of global shrinkage as a result of an expanding West is denying others the capability to create their own enlarged world. Hau'ofa's critique of a reductionist and diminutive view of Oceania can be seen as a counterversion to presumed neutral and fixed spatial orders. I would like to contribute to Hau'ofa's project of enlarging Oceania by illustrating the connection of cosmologies and cities through examples from the northeastern part of Papua New Guinea, with an emphasis on space as a cultural construction bound to specific forms of power and knowledge.

Juxtapositions

THE PRESENT TEXT should be viewed in the context of the ever-widening "sea of commentaries" that has dissolved the encrusted image of the island world of the Pacific since the appearance of Epeli Hau'ofa's "Our Sea of Islands" (1993b and 1994; see also Waddell, Naidu, and Hau'ofa 1993). When I came across Hau'ofa's 1994 article, I was immediately fascinated by the idea of an extended Oceania.[1] Teresia Teaiwa is certainly right when she

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traces the present, trans-Pacific interest in Hau'ofa's thesis to, among other things, his extravagant and sensitive intermediate position as author/scholar, but also to the current trend of displacement, diaspora, and postcoloniality in the academic world (Teaiwa 1996:214). As I recall, it was most of all the poetic power of inversion, the subversive extension of a world made small by highly paid "experts of hopelessness," that triggered in me a stream of associations and stories. I was astonished by the unexpected direction that my thoughts took, by maps that showed me the way, and by the discoveries that became possible through this navigation of chance.

Here, then, is my understanding of "Our Sea of Islands." Hau'ofa objected to the neocolonial discourses of denigration and reduction with which the West constitutes and routinizes the island world of the Pacific. His criticism is directed against the hegemonic dominance of a deterministic perspective based on economy and geography that places in the foreground the isolation, diminutiveness, paucity of resources, and fragmentation of the contemporary island nations of Oceania. For Hau'ofa a trip from Kona to Hilo on Hawai'i Island was a decisive experience, one that allowed him to express a view opposite to the discourses of minimizing that he himself had advocated for quite some time:

> I saw such scenes of grandeur as I had not seen before: the eerie blackness of regions covered by recent volcanic eruptions; the remote majesty of Maunaloa, long and smooth, the world's largest volcano; the awesome craters of Kilauea threatening to erupt at any moment; and the lava flow on the coast not far away. Under the aegis of Pele, and before my very eyes, the Big Island was growing, rising from the depths of a mighty sea. The world of Oceania is not small; it is huge and growing bigger every day. (Hau'ofa 1994:151)[2]

Hau'ofa refers to the cultural history of Oceania, which provides various models of the expanse and size of the previously existing universe of discourse. Moreover, he calls attention to the mobility and border-crossing of today's Pacific Islanders. According to Hau'ofa this mobility, with its disregard for national borders, brings with it an immeasurable expansion of the Oceanic world. He demystifies the reductionist and one-sided view that characterizes parcels of land in the Pacific as single, small, and isolated instead of as a "sea of islands" with the assessment that "smallness is a state of mind" (Hau'ofa 1994:152). His criticism of the Western hegemonic constructions of insular diminutiveness attempts to highlight the fact that such a discourse denies the people of Oceania the ability to create their own spatial reality (see also Hau'ofa 1993a:127).

I wish to take up Hau'ofa's optimistic narrative of Oceania's expansion and, in the first place, juxtapose it with the metanarrative prevalent in the West of an ever-shrinking world. While Hau'ofa did in fact restrict his presentation to Greater Oceania and did not consider the entire world, his premise of the enlargement of Oceania does inevitably lead to the question of how this expanding space fits into the terrain created by Western discourse of a continuously shrinking world concomitant with increasing globalization. It is this diminution as a natural process, as an irrefutable and self-evident fact resulting from the global spread of the economy of late capitalism, political forms of organization, latest information technologies, and newer modes of transportation that is now being brought to the fore. It is this particular teleology, with its authoritative claim to universal truth, that will be exposed and queried by way of contrasting reduction and enlargement. Hau'ofa's Oceanic vision has, in my view, a decentering and undermining effect that reveals presumed neutral spatial orders as being discursive formations, which are constructed under specific conditions of power and knowledge.

Marshall McLuhan's "Global Village"

I shall concentrate on two examples of Western discourse on the shrinking world. My first example is Marshall McLuhan's version of a world getting smaller. The continuous and uncritical usage of the slogan "global village" persuaded me to do a short retrospective of McLuhan's essential ideas. I would like to demonstrate that his theoretical positions, which are the basis of his handy catchword of a shrinking world, are far more questionable than generally acknowledged.

McLuhan's influential idea of an electronic utopia evokes the dramatic scenario of the world imploding into a "global village" with the image of the technological extension of the human organism (1969; 1994). It may be remembered that McLuhan's structural approach led him to make a distinction between a literate, visually oriented society centered on the individual on the one hand and a traditional, nonliterate, oral and collectively organized tribal culture on the other. This media expert was convinced that the emergence of the electronic age and its accompanying ever-increasing compression of the world requires those auditory skills requisite to an oral society, skills that have been virtually lost by the literate—and consequently visually oriented—"civilization." Life within this electronically condensed and increasingly interdependent world in which radio serves as a "tribal drum" will, according to McLuhan, become re-tribalized, that is, placed upon the foundation of a new, post-alphabetical tribal culture. He writes: "But cer-

tainly the electro-magnetic discoveries have recreated the simultaneous 'field' in all human affairs so that the human family now exists under conditions of a 'global village.' We live in a single constricted space resonant with tribal drums" (McLuhan 1969:43).

According to McLuhan the electronic acceleration and its resultant flood of information caught the Western, literate culture unawares. The resulting disorientation is, in his view, comparable to the destabilizing effects of writing on tribal cultures. McLuhan's Anglocentric orientalism becomes particularly clear precisely through the differences in reactions and resistance to the new electronic world that he himself presents. The contrast that McLuhan constructs between visually and individualistically oriented societies as opposed to oral-auditory and total tribal societies pervades a differentiated ranking of cultures by conceptualization. According to McLuhan's typology, England and America belong to those industrialized societies that are most thoroughly anchored in the visually oriented literate culture, having long ago left tribal integration behind them. The introduction of radio, therefore, was of little consequence: only through the introduction of television could signs of change be detected. In fact, an increase in sensitivity to radio as well can be attributed to these changes.

According to McLuhan, Germany and Japan in large measure have retained their collective and tribal consciousness and, like other tribal cultures, react to the rapid expansion of the "electric field" with confusion and uncertainty, in spite of being alphabetized and technically advanced. The demand for *Lebensraum* in former Nazi Germany, for example, was in McLuhan's eyes a consequence of the spatial compression caused by radio and electricity, which led to the revitalization of the archaic-tribal powers permeating the German psyche (McLuhan 1994:301). Russia also tends toward an oral-auditory total society, which McLuhan sees in China and India as well, but most particularly in the tribal societies of (black) Africa.

McLuhan cautions that the implosion due to electricity and temporal acceleration should not be mistaken for a unifying, leveling power. The shrinking of the planet involves the tendency toward decentralization and pluralization and thus represents a countermovement to the centralizing tendencies of an alphabetized culture. I will spare the reader a comprehensive criticism of the continual essentialization of the tribal and the occasionally alarming ideas concerning Fascism in Germany in the thirties and forties. Nevertheless, I consider it important that, in McLuhan's binarily organized textual universe, Western literate "civilization" tends to be associated with individualism, explosion, expansion, and growth, whereas the oral-auditory oriented tribal cultures represent collectivism, implosion, reduction, and the intimacy of village life. The electrified vision of the "global village" designed

in the sixties by McLuhan is a neocolonial theoretical construct that confines indigenous societies to their sites of reduction and smallness.

Global Compression and Postmodernity

The second important example of Western discourse on the shrinking world is David Harvey's recent analysis of the transition from modernity to postmodernity (1989). In his knowledgeable and comprehensive presentation, Harvey argues for a necessary correlation between the appearance of postmodernist forms of cultural expression, the transition from stable Fordism into a system of flexible capital accumulation, and a new phase of time-space compression. His narrative phases out the postwar economic boom by the seventies and envisages an ensuing post-Fordism era of rapid change. A feature that distinguishes the recent form of maximization of profits is a new flexibility in the production process, labor markets, and consumer behavior that is closely linked with technological innovations in transportation and communication. According to Harvey, the decisive factor in the increasing global compression is the acceleration that reduces the time required for capital outlays to yield profits to the investor (1989:182). This acceleration in turnover time enables capital to seize global space, which causes a dramatic change in our perception of time and space. Harvey is convinced that the present economic transformations represent the material basis for postmodern forms of representation. He regards postmodern thought—with its stress on ephemerality, uncertainty, fragmentation, decentralization, and eclecticism—as a response to the advanced global spread of capitalism.

Harvey holds the view that "postmodernity" is characterized by a new phase of time-space compression. He emphasizes the socioeconomic processes that, through their speed, make it possible to overcome the separation of space and time. Harvey illustrates the time-space compression with a specific depiction (1989:241, plate 3.1) that shows a succession of consecutively smaller globes visually representing the shrinking world (see also plate 3.2). He explicitly refers to the popular images of the "global village" and "spaceship earth" that entered common speech after McLuhan and Buckminster Fuller introduced them (Harvey 1989:240). The figurative portrayal of a continually shrinking world can be traced back to the sixties. Harvey himself indicates that he borrowed this depiction from Peter Dicken's *Global Shift* (1986: fig. 4.6). Dicken in turn quotes John McHale's *The Future of the Future* as his source (McHale 1969:58, fig. 1), which in turn relied on various sources from the sixties. McHale's model is based, for example, on the Eurocentric idea of the continuous progress of humanity to ever-higher stages of technical development: from locomotion by foot to jet planes, high-

speed trains, and so forth; from the transmission of oral messages through drums, smoke, and relay runners to radio and transcontinental television; from a world of ruralness and regional limitedness to one of megalopolises and a global society. This technology-centered myth of progress, based on Western rationality, ascribes to the Euro-American vision of history a sense of objectivity: a single, true measure of world events that denies the legitimacy of other historical and spatial versions, or even fails to recognize their existence. The basis here is a hierarchically organized system that gives precedence to unity, homogeneity, continuity, and closedness over heterogeneity, discontinuity, chance, and openness.

The intertextual world maps of Harvey, Dicken, and McHale share the important aspect of the continual contraction of the globe occurring in ever-shorter intervals. This compression shows the global spread of the West as a consequence of technological evolution and increasing acceleration in the various areas of life. It is this practice of a cartography of compression, with its claim to the historical reality of a natural and linear development, that assumes a privileged, objective view of world affairs. The aura of factuality is supported by a positivist halo of modern cartography (see Harley 1992:234–235). The world map is an exemplary product of the objectification that started with the Enlightenment—a process that homogenized and abstracted various spatial practices and narratives into a singular representation of geographic knowledge. Harvey refers to this totalizing claim of cartography with respect to De Certau and Bourdieu (1989:252–254), but fails to recognize its applicability to his own practice of mapping time-space compression. The point being neglected is that the various related world maps of the above-mentioned authors and the associated teleology are culturally bound representations; that they are part of a normalizing and disciplining exercise of power, which creates and routinizes a specific knowledge of the historical and spatial order of the world (see Harley 1992). The representation of the time-space compression, the cartography of a succession of shrinking globes, is a Euro-American form of power/knowledge that carries out the reduction of the world as a consequence of the expansion of the West.

Harvey explains that the universal dominance of capital and the concomitant reduction of spatial separation lead to closer scrutiny of local variation in capitalistic projects, thereby producing greater fragmentation (1989:293–296). In a capitalist world, where the destruction of space through time is a central feature of profit maximization, oppositional movements can control their own place for a limited time at best. It is Harvey's view that, as a consequence of their identity being tied to place and tradition, workers' movements, ethnic minorities, women, or colonized peoples are entangled in the process of fragmentation by the power of capital, without being able to counter-

balance this global power. Even beyond this point, Harvey asserts that the various phenomena such as instability, mutability, and transitoriness that accompany flexible capital accumulation bring into question historical continuities and, in the end, relegate tradition to being a commodity or a part of museum culture (1989:302–303). However, with this analytical assessment, Harvey remains committed to a theoretical position that primarily associates the expansion of the West with the worldwide erosion of cultural differences. This cultural pessimism occurs at the cost of the essentialization of Others. The great narrative of cultural decline and loss (Clifford 1988:14) is an effect of the isolation, fixation, and incarceration of authentic identities within clearly delimited locales.

Harvey's narrative reduces the potential for countermovements to locally restricted fields of action in which genuine traditions have no future. He introduces a theoretical perspective that, by means of the analysis of the flow of capital within our new post-Fordist universe, transports and establishes spatial constructions of reduction and of fragmentation. It is this discursive isolation in the space dominated and compressed by capitalism that denies the Other the capability to create his or her own, enlarged world. Harvey has described globally active capital as the motor of the time-space compression and explicitly stresses that historical materialism still provides the means to analyze these global processes. With this, Harvey turns against postmodern skepticism toward the great narratives and their totalizing claims. According to his view, the relinquishing of historical materialism would lead to the abandonment of an analytical tool that was—and remains—relevant for the present. And he is not alone in this view. Thus, for example, both Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, who have brilliantly reconceptualized the relationship between space and cultural difference in ethnology, believe that the abandonment of the metanarrative of late capitalism would crucially diminish our potential to investigate the Western global hegemony's political dimension (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:19).

In contrast to this, I would like to use Harvey's study as an example to demonstrate that such theoretical models, through their authoritative claim of being *the* sole representation of global reality, are fundamentally involved in the very spread of Western hegemony. Harvey's capital-oriented examination of the time-space compression diverts attention from the fact that it is precisely this analytical approach that is part of the Western "reduction-machine."

Incompatible Spaces

With McLuhan and Harvey on one side and Hau'ofa on the other, we enter a paradoxical terrain, in which reduction and expansion are juxtaposed. How

does the compression of the world through electricity and the extension of the central nervous system or through the power of capital to annihilate space through time—how does this global implosion fit together with a simultaneous enlargement of Oceania? Not at all—and the incompatibility of reduction and extension is precisely what makes this perspective so remarkable. I am interested in this global heterotopia of discordant geographical spaces most of all because, through it, the idea of a fixed, stable space is being challenged. Hau'ofa's questioning of the claim to universality of the Western, economic-deterministic concepts, his well-considered resistance to geographical disciplining by an international jet set of development experts —these challenges expose the construction of spatial reality and make it clear that the order of the world is bound up in a discursive field of knowledge and power. The result of this Oceania-based contestation is a heterotopia of plural world-sizes. According to Foucault, heterotopias are pluralist and historically variable countersites that simultaneously represent, contest, and reverse existent sites (Foucault 1970:xviii, 1986:24). Heterotopian spaces are capable of placing different, mutually incompatible sites next to each other at a single location. Further, they can suspend existing temporalities. Such heterotopias "are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality" (Foucault 1986:24). They are "zones" (McHale 1989:44) that indicate the boundaries of existing spatial systems and that focus attention on the instability, discontinuity, and ambiguity of spatial orders. In the foreground, moreover, is not exclusively the question of an *epistemology* of space; foremost in this perspective are rather the *ontological* questions and the concomitant systematic deconstruction of one *singular,* objective reality (McHale 1989:9–11, 221).

Skepticism thus seems appropriate when currently everywhere—including in ethnology—the image of a shrinking world is an integral part of the debate about globalization. Ethnology runs the risk of thereby creating tiny ethnotopes of authenticity and small reservations of traditionality. The ethnological exotic-machine can no longer function without friction within the globalization debate and so will become bound to a reduction-machine that maintains the old ethnological dream of refuges for "the traditional/authentic." One should, in my opinion, assess the scholarly discourses on globalization individually and with caution. The narrative of the global spread of the West is joined to a reduction-machine that, with its artful rhetoric of neutrality, evokes a diminution of distances as a natural consequence of technological innovation and worldwide processes of acceleration (see, for example, Friedman 1994:196). The logocentric conceptions of a "global village" and the increasing compression of the world are coupled with the localization, fixing, and confinement of the Other on fixed, tradition-bound sites, according to

McLuhan and Harvey. Alternative versions of enlargement or contrary conceptualizations of space are not even brought into consideration. Paradoxically, the spread of the West proceeds with the essentialization, separation, and exclusion of the Other. The extension of the West, its dynamism, and global mobility remain enmeshed within the stasis and rootedness of the non-Western societies.

Cosmologies and Cities

Epeli Hau'ofa, with his narrative on the extension of the Oceanic world, has created an important alternative to the Western perspective.[3] He supports his idea of the enlargement of Oceania primarily with two lines of argument, which I mentioned briefly at the beginning of this commentary. Thus, for example, he draws attention to the dimension of cultural history and points out that the Oceanic world of precolonial times was in no way as small, circumscribed, and limited as pictured in Western discourse that exclusively centered on is/land surfaces. His presentation makes clear that the narrative traditions and cosmologies of the ancestors of today's Oceania residents contained spatial dimensions that spread far beyond the currently dominant reductionist view. The previous universe encompassed the experience of the tremendous expanse of the ocean as well as the fire-giving and earth-moving powers of the underworld and the heavens with their gods, celestial bodies, and stellar constellations figuring as signposts. Hau'ofa evokes an earlier Oceanic world of connections and contact, an economically, socially, and culturally interwoven sea of islands, the formidable vastness of which was rent asunder, restricted and compressed by the colonial expansion of the West. And he stresses that this colonial expansion was crucial to the rise of today's discourse on the diminution of the Pacific island states.

Just how biased the recent postcolonial reductionism is—with its one-sided view of national boundaries and with its elite perspectives of international and national advisors, bureaucrats, experts, and diplomats that ignore the day-to-day reality of a considerable portion of Oceania's people—is made clear by Hau'ofa's depiction of a further indisputable extension. Thus, in Hau'ofa's view, the expanding world economy after World War II not only created dependencies and needs but also a transnational mobility of Oceania's populations, which allowed for far-reaching economic and social relationships across national boundaries. Under the established hegemonic view of reduction and narrowing, the enlargement of the world is carried out anew by means of labor migration and informal transfer of goods, translocality and interregional networking of kinship. For Hau'ofa it is primarily these multiple processes, sustained by a significant number of the common people of the

various Pacific Islands nations, that are presently involved in the enlargement of the Oceanic world. As he writes: "The world of Oceania may no longer include the heavens and the underworld, but it certainly encompasses the great cities of Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada. It is within this expanded world that the extent of the people's resources must be measured" (Hau'ofa 1994:157).

I would like to extend Hau'ofa's exposition of the enlargement of the Oceanic world by advocating a further optimistic turn and connection. To start with I will use the passage just quoted, which I consider remarkable for two reasons. For one, there appears in a passing moment an apparently insignificant, associative field, one that brings together local versions of the heavens and underworld with Western cities. On the other hand, the separation and contrast of past cosmological models and the present metropolises of Western industrial states in the Pacific region is suggested, albeit in a cautious formulation. In Hau'ofa's guarded estimation, concepts of the heavens and the underworld no longer play a part in the expansion of the Oceanic world.[4] As I see it, however, cosmological horizons in Oceania and urban landscapes in Western countries are not necessarily mutually exclusive.[5] And it is precisely this interweaving that I wish to introduce into the realm of the conceivable in the following discussion. I am concerned with an ontological formation that in my eyes can be read as a local example of the enlargement of the Oceanic world.

In parts of northeastern Papua New Guinea, a whole range of circulating rumors, guesses, and opinions—but also confidentially expressed convictions and narratives—maintain that the land of the whites is in fact the place of the dead. During my 1988–1990 fieldwork in the hinterland of the Rai Coast as well as in 1996, I was repeatedly confronted with various expressions of this idea. For example, occasioned by the death of a youth some months earlier, I came to learn of the ambivalence toward Christian grave crosses. The elder adoptive brother of the deceased told me of his campaign opposing the erection of a wooden cross over his sibling's grave. To the indignation of the village church leaders, he had held out for months against the erection of the cross because, according to his interpretation, with such an act the spirit of the departed would disappear from the nearby world. The mourning adoptive brother wanted to preserve the nearness of the deceased—a nearness that expressed itself in various signs such as birds' voices and nocturnal sounds as well as in other ways. When the grave finally did receive a cross, the adoptive brother claimed that the intense contact between him and the spirit of the departed broke off. The man explained: "When people die they don't go to heaven or hell. I think that they go to the land of the whites. . . . I am convinced of it. And precisely at this point, when we erect the cross, they go

there. . . . They go away from us" (Field notes, Jethro, 29 December 1988, no. 7:10). Christian grave crosses were occasionally designated as "passports to the world of the whites."

John Kikang, who was active in the spread of cash cropping and Catholicism throughout the region after World War II and who died in February 1997 at a ripe old age in his home village in the hinterland of the Rai Coast, had expanded this conception of life after death through his experiences in trances and dreams. "Hell is here, where we now live," he once said with respect to human life full of privations, hard work, and human offenses. His model of the stages of afterlife had "remaining-here," the "dwelling-nearby," as a sign of sin and guilt and as damnation to hell. To have to stay after death in the nearby rural environment of the village: that was hell. There were places in the otherworld that promised a better existence. Depending on the extent of one's guilt, which could be reduced by prayer performed over decades, a stay in one of the three different, hierarchically arranged purgatories was possible. The first was called *klinpaia,* a place of minor hardships, a moderately urban world that was represented as being equivalent to the provincial capital, Madang. After this came *limbo,* a large city with many tall buildings, comparable to and even designated by Kikang as "Port Moresby." The third stage he called *pulgatori,* a "holy place," to which he added, "that is very close to heaven. . . . That is Australia, you know. There only machines work, [there are] department stores, tool markets. The people are happy. No hard work. Everything is good. So the dead told me. They told me and therefore I know what these places look like." And as a deceased individual once told him that he, the deceased, had just left "Port Moresby" and was in "Australia," Kikang knew that "he has arrived in the city" (Field notes, Kikang, 18 February 1989, no. 35:102–118).

The joining of the otherworld/underworld and Western countries/cities has also found a place in elaborate narratives that can be encountered in different versions along the Rai Coast. Here is one story that a man of about thirty-five told me in 1989:

> I have only heard this story. It was just told this way. It seems that a young man was involved in a dispute over a woman and therefore ran off. It is said that he got a passport from a missionary in order to go overseas. Apparently he traveled with two whites. He left Saidor [the district administrative station], went to Madang [the provincial capital] and beyond. They went directly abroad, somewhere to America. Anyway that's what I heard. They apparently traveled by boat overseas. There they came to a large city and the two whites accompanying him came with. On a particular street . . . the two

simply left him standing there. [They] took a speedboat and rode out to an island. The young man was at a loss. How was he supposed to get on now? He thereupon also took a speedboat and went after the other two. [He] arrived on the island and stood on the street. He looked around. He looked for the two men, who were supposed to help him. But the two of them had disappeared. So he stood on the street, till it became late afternoon. Then a white man came up to him. And in the story it is said that it was his [deceased] grandfather. The grandfather questioned him and the young man said: "I came with two men, but they both left me alone. And now I'm looking for the way." Then the white man said: "Okay, come, we'll go to my place." So he took him home with him. They went into the house and greeted the white man's wife. . . . They sat down, spoke with one another for some time and finally the two whites asked: "Where do you come from?" He said: "I have come from PNG. I came with two whites. It went well at first, but when we got here, the two of them left me all alone." The two said nothing. There was supper. After supper [the grandparents] identified themselves. But they did not directly say their names. . . . That the two concealed. But they kept looking at the young man. And the young man did all he could to learn their names. Finally, they gave him a piece of paper. On it he was supposed to write his name. And he wrote his name on this piece of paper. Then both grandparents wrote their names. In reverse. They wrote their names in reverse. The last letters as the first letters. And they said to him that he should find it out. He tried to and finally he succeeded. He found it out, and the two said to him: "The two of us are your [deceased] grandparents." They embraced and wept. They talked about all the[ir] relatives. He stayed at first with them [in the land of the whites]. The next day they said to him: "There is a room there that you may not open." They gave him all the housekeys and went off to work. The young man stayed home and thought: "Why did the two of them tell me that I shouldn't open the door to this room?" He thought hard about it—and while the two were not yet there he opened the door. He opened the door to the room and looked in—but couldn't recognize anything. It was dark inside. In the afternoon the two grandparents came back home. As they were sitting down together to eat they both asked him, "Did you in fact open the door?" They already knew. But it was hard at first for the young man to admit to it. Then he said, "Yes, I opened it." And the two said, "What did you see in there?" And he said, "I didn't see anything at all." They stayed together for some

> weeks and finally the two [grandparents] said that now he had to return. They gave him a passport and all that stuff. Then they said: "Get ready, tomorrow you will depart." They sent him back to Papua New Guinea, directly to Saidor. There he underwent a circumcision ritual. Then he came back [to the land of the whites]. When he got there, they let him into the room again. They said to him: "Open the door to this room." And as he opened the door, they asked him, "What do you see?" And he said: "I can see the village, I see my village [on the Rai Coast]." He saw his parents, his relatives, who lived there. Today it is said that he stayed there. In the land of the whites.[6] (Field notes, Peter, 17 July 1989, no. 122:15–18)

A similar narrative can be found in the more-easterly Sepik region. There, at the beginning of the sixties, the German professor of ethnology Eike Haberland met with an approximately twenty-five-year-old Catholic sailor named Noah (Haberland 1964). The young man told of a trip to Sydney, where he had met deceased relatives. Haberland summarized the story of this young man from the lower Sepik:

> As I came on land in Sydney, an acquaintance from my village came up to me and asked if I didn't want to visit my ancestors who lived not far from the city. We took a truck and drove there, which we were only able to do with great difficulty because the Australians had stationed police everywhere on the city limits to prevent Kanakas from visiting their dead relatives. We went on foot into the realm of the dead. It was dark there, but my friend had brought his flashlight along, so that we found the path. The dead relatives, who lived in attractive houses made of cement with roofs of corrugated iron and had everything that one could want, greeted me very cordially. They asked: "Has the Cargo finally arrived?" They were very sad when I said that we still hadn't gotten anything and that the whites and Chinese always take everything away. . . . As I left, the ancestors stuffed my pockets full of pound notes. At the exit of the realm of the dead there stood a policeman; he took the money from me and sent me on board the ship. (Haberland 1964:38–39)[7]

Haberland derogated this narrative as the "autosuggestion" of a "unimaginative and truthful youth" (1964:39).[8] His attribution of irrationality corresponds to a static conceptualization of cultural difference—a conceptualization that gives priority to the rootedness of people and cultures in fixed, demarcated territories. This "incarceration" of cultures in fixed places (Appa-

durai 1988) clearly draws the line between the "West" and "Papua New Guinea," between "cities" and "rural regions," between "center" and "periphery." Thus it is that Haberland also interprets the young man's narrative as a tradition-bound attempt of a "native" to come to terms with the presence and (spatial) challenges of a dynamic West. According to the implicit logic of Haberland's interpretation, this indigenous attempt at an explanation remains in the final analysis nothing more than a transitional phenomenon on the way toward the acceptance of Western rationality.

I, on the other hand, consider the narratives given above to be allegories for the expansion of the world. In extending Hau'ofa's cautious appraisal, I have used examples from northeastern New Guinea in an attempt to show that the conceptions of heaven and the underworld are also essentially involved in the expansion of the world today. Hau'ofa has primarily given prominence for the present to the recent phenomenon of immigration into the large cities of the Pacific states and concentrated his view on economic activities. I think it is equally important to consider present-oriented versions of heaven and the underworld in order to avoid the cultural pessimism that associates the colonial and missionary pervasion of Oceania primarily with cultural decline. Without denying the disappearance of many former beliefs and practices, I would like to direct attention to the continuing emergence of new discursive universes. Hau'ofa refers to this processual aspect in another place when he notes: "By deliberately omitting our changing traditions from serious discourses . . . , we tend to overlook the fact that most people are still using and adapting them as tools for survival" (1993a:129). Precisely the special combination of heaven and the underworld with the land of the whites and its urban centers appears to me in this context to be particularly instructive. Cultural difference turns out to be not one of an essence that is based on spatial separation and discontinuity, but rather as a product of historical processes and hegemonic influences in a world of connections and contacts (see Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Lavie and Swedenburg 1996). Cosmological considerations can play an important role in the expansion of the Oceanic world and, in my opinion, cannot be separated from economic and political, developmental, and ecological questions.

The amalgamation of spaces, the transgressing of colonial and postcolonial localizations and confinements, as they are formulated in the narratives discussed above, refer to a plurality of spatial constructions. The contrasting of Western narratives of expansion and reduction with the subversive ordering of space by the peoples of Oceania, who have developed their own versions of spatial continuity and discontinuity, points out the constructed character and the politics of Western delimitations. Space thus becomes a flexible event, a negotiable entity within the context of power and knowledge. I believe

that Hau'ofa's counterdiscourse to the Western reduction of the world of Oceania is best seen against this background. I consider his ideas also to be eminently important, because with this counterversion he places the relativity and cultural embedding of the constructions of space directly before our eyes. With this he opens a discursive field and launches a game of spatial truths that initiates a critical reflection about the universality of claims for the Western concept of globalization. His criticism of the logocentric view of the reduction, or shrinking, of the Oceanic space makes clear that space and the exercise of power are closely bound together.

NOTES

An earlier version of this essay with the title "Cosmologies, Cities, and the Enlargement of the World" was presented at a seminar organized by the Institute of Ethnology, University of Heidelberg, in June 1997. I am indebted to students and colleagues for useful comments and questions, in particular to Shahnaz Nadjmabadi and Thomas Reuter. My sincere thanks also go to Epeli Hau'ofa for his encouraging comments and good humor. The usual disclaimers apply. Priscilla Herrmann and Jennifer Sloot did an excellent job of translating and improving the English text. Steffen Herrmann prepared the manuscript for publication. Many thanks to them all. And finally, especially heartfelt thanks is due to Elfriede Hermann for providing support and valuable criticism.

1. The plenary paper of the Third Conference of the European Society for Oceanists in Copenhagen in which Epeli Hau'ofa further developed these ideas with respect to an Oceanic identity stimulated me to join the discussion on his dynamic picture of Oceania (see Hau'ofa 1996).

2. In this context, it should be mentioned that the current, trans-Pacific interest in Hau'ofa's Oceanic visions does have its problematic side. Thus, in 1995, a German church-oriented popular information brochure was published under the heading "Meer der Inseln. Berichte aus der Suedsee" ("Sea of Islands: Reports from the South Sea"). It contains a substantially truncated version of Hau'ofa's article. The German version of the passage cited above, for example, reads:

> Mir boten sich Anblicke von einer Erhabenheit, wie ich sie nie zuvor gesehen hatte: das unheimliche Schwarz von Landstrichen, die erst vor kurzem ein Vulkan mit Lava bedeckt hatte; die unnahbare Majestaet des Mauna Loa, des groessten Vulkans der Welt; die ehrfurchterregenden Krater des Kilauea, die jeden Moment erneut auszubrechen drohten; und der Lavastrom an der nahen Kueste—vor meinen eigenen Augen wuchs die Insel aus den Tiefen des Meeres. Die Welt von Ozeanien ist nicht klein—und sie wird jeden Tag groesser. (Pazifik Informationsstelle und Missionswerk der Evang.-Luth. Kirche in Bayern 1995:56)

Those parts of Hau'ofa's text omitted in the German translation are shown below.

> I saw such scenes of grandeur as I had not seen before: the eerie blackness of regions covered by recent volcanic eruptions; the remote majesty of Maunaloa, ~~long and smooth~~, the world's largest volcano; the awesome craters of Kilauea threatening to erupt

> at any moment; and the lava flow on the coast not far away. ~~Under the aegis of Pele, and~~ before my very eyes, the ~~Big~~ Island was growing, ~~rising~~ from the depths of a ~~mighty~~ sea. The world of Oceania is not small; it is ~~huge and~~ growing bigger every day. (Hau'ofa 1994:151)

In my view these exclusions are grave not only because of their ideological implications, such as the omission of the Hawaiian volcano goddess Pele makes clear, but also because no reference at all is made of the fact that considerable changes were introduced into Hau'ofa's text. Hau'ofa himself commented that this kind of editorial proceeding is just another example of diminution and belittlement.

3. Many ethnographies of changing cultures in Melanesia reveal an extension of the Oceanic world. Navosavakadua's ritual politics in nineteenth-century colonial Fiji, for example, included the renaming of the local landscape according to biblical sites such as "Rome," "Egypt," and many more (Worsley 1968:22; Kaplan 1995:110–111). Kenelm Burridge depicts a sand drawing from Manam as disclosing a complex world of landscapes and seascapes beyond the local sphere, and he gives an account of Mambu's mythical travels to Australia (1960: 10, 188–189). Similarly, Peter Lawrence describes various beliefs and movements in the Madang area that show a wide range of attempts to expand horizons toward heaven and the land of the whites (1964). It should also be noted that the prominent role of ships and airplanes within these movements could be seen as a means of linking other worlds in the effort to enlarge the local universe.

4. See also John O'Caroll's reference to the absence of the sky in Hau'ofa's Oceanic vision (O'Caroll 1993:25).

5. This connection between cities and heaven/underworlds can be found in depictions of cultural change in Papua New Guinea. Albert Maori Kiki, for example, writes in his autobiography: "Some of our people back home refer to Sydney as heaven. It is not a real place to them, but the mysterious city from which the dead send us the 'cargo' which inevitably gets diverted into the hands of the white man" (1968:72). Peter Lawrence, in his *Road Belong Cargo* (1964), deals in detail with the enlargement of the local cosmos in northeastern Papua New Guinea. In particular, Sydney is described in this context as heaven, home of ancestors and white men (Lawrence 1964:77, 191–192, 237, 242, 251).

6. I have already published two further versions of this narrative in conjunction with a study of recent changes in the secret male initiation rites among the Ngaing living in the hinterland of the Rai Coast (see Kempf 1996).

7. Text translated here into English from the German.

8. The quotations have been translated into English from the German.

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REVIEWS

John Kneubuhl, *Think of a Garden and Other Plays.* Talanoa Series. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997. Pp. 220. US$39 cloth; $18.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Caroline Sinavaiana-Gabbard, University of Hawai'i

A FAIR AMOUNT HAS BEEN SAID about John Kneubuhl, the Samoan-American playwright, as a writer of singular talent, and less perhaps about the highly complex and sometimes volatile sensibility behind the work. During my long acquaintance with Kneubuhl—my father and he sang Rudy Vallee songs together as boys in the Samoa of the early 1930s—I found myself mostly keeping a safe distance from what seemed to be the kind of intellectual fire that can singe the unwary companion. Some kinds of mental brilliance give off warmth as well as light, and Kneubuhl's was the kind that could flame. Given the volcanic nature of South Pacific social history in the twentieth century—the profound ruptures and force-fed "gifts" of Western colonialism on Oceanic peoples and environments, it can certainly be said that John Kneubuhl was a man of his time.

In *Think of a Garden and Other Plays,* we are most fortunate to have in print this trilogy of Kneubuhl's mature dramatic work. Something striking about the writing here is a singular kind of synthesis between a suave, urbane, Noel Coward voice of 1940s Broadway, and that of the sly and raucous satirist of ancient Samoan theater. The hybrid voice—native son of Polynesia meets the eastern seaboard avant-garde, native sensibilities cross-pollinating with Western aesthetics of performance—Kneubuhl's is among the earliest Pacific literary voices in English to articulate the sheer distances

of culture and history being traced in his life path. But perhaps the most shining contribution of this collection is to showcase its fine storytelling, the craft of well-wrought narrative that underlies most literature of lasting value. And surely the finest thread that runs through the three plays is simply and delightfully their presentation of old-fashioned, crackling good stories.

Written between 1975 and 1991, each of the three plays explores themes of cultural identity, loss and redemption for Polynesians of mixed blood, and second thoughts. In a letter written the year before he died in 1992, Kneubuhl specifies that for purposes of thematic coherence, the three plays "despite their actual order of composition . . . must be presented, in print or on stage," in a particular order, with the last play, *Think of a Garden* (1991), going first in the trilogy; the first play, *Mele Kanikau* (1975), in the middle; and the second play written, *A Play, A Play* (1990), last. While the editors of this collection have dutifully honored the playwright's instructions in this regard, the writer of this review will honor another directive—that of the *fai fale aitu,* ancient Samoan comedian, a trickster or "contrary," and totally ignore the playwright's wishes, at least for the moment. For, by considering the plays in the order they were written, it is much more possible to trace a trajectory of development in Kneubuhl's poetics, as he worked through a number of aesthetic, thematic, and metaphysical questions in his writing over these culminating years of artistic fruition. When viewed chronologically, the plays take on a formal logic and evolution not readily apparent otherwise. Not only are they linked by similar themes—alienation and cultural loss among modern Polynesians—the plays also feature postmodern formal devices of parallel and intersecting story lines, as well as metaphysical reflections on the nature of theater itself and its play with reality.

In *Mele Kanikau* (anthem of lamentation, 1975), for example, we find at least three distinct layers of story, the first narrated by a character called "the author" who quickly co-opts the name John Kneubuhl for himself after a bit of fancy wordplay and metaphysical shtick. "Poets don't merely create; they, too, are created by their creations. They don't just write; they are themselves written. So, you see, I have as much right as he to say I am the . . . real author of this play. . . . Ladies and gentlemen, here and now I create him. And, in that creation, create myself. . . . Friends, dear friends, my name is John Kneubuhl. I am the author of the play. . . . As I've explained, I *am* the play." Following this self-reflexive introduction, we find that story line number 1 revolves around an actual woman the author character (Kneubuhl) knew as a child, a genteel daughter of the *haole* (foreign) elite who scandalously runs off to live with a Samoan man "of no education . . . an ignorant savage" in his "old tent in the foothills, away from everybody." Story line number 2

provides the actual plot of the play, in which Noa, a crusty, disheveled Hawaiian from the back country, rolls into town with Frances, his common-law wife, formerly of "a good *haole* family." This odd couple proceeds to stir up painful memories of lost love and betrayed friendship with their childhood friend Carl, a middle-class native who works as a travel agent and produces Hawaiiana "packages" for the tourist market. Story line number 3 features the performance of a supposedly legendary tale of a tragic love triangle in which the young chief/hero is jilted by his lover and his best friend, who run off together to a remote locale. In *Mele Kanikau,* these layers of story and theme continually speak to and across each other, weaving in and out of the text like the fibers of a pandanus mat.

Kneubuhl's recurring theme of cultural alienation and loss forms the knotted heart of the play. We follow the testy reunion of Noa, Frances, and Carl after all these years, to see what they will make of this second chance to make peace with their painful memories of youthful romance and betrayal. Noa and entourage have arrived at dress rehearsals for one of Carl's glossy tourist productions, a so-called Hawaiian pageant featuring ad copy "royalty" and fake flowers. Noa is a hard-drinking, acerbic *kumu hula* (hula teacher), imported from the sticks to save the day after the official pageant director unexpectedly decamps for the greener pastures of Las Vegas. Noa and his dance troupe are accomplished in all things Hawaiian, and their performance of traditional dance and chanting effectively unmasks the fake glitter and show biz emptiness of the original pageant and its urban, *haole*fied performers.

In the closing scene the author character (Kneubuhl) address us and reweaves the play's metaphysical threads in a haunting statement of his poetics: "listen . . . and remember. For it is only in our remembering that we can make our *mele,* like houses of words into which our dead can move and live again and speak to us. . . . I have made this *mele kanikau,* a tattered tent against the indifferent rain, so that Love might once again cry out its loss through me . . . listen to their voices. . . . It is in you they grieve; it is through you they speak."

Throughout the trilogy Kneubuhl echoes the call for Polynesians to reconnect with their cultural past in order to infuse a vacuous present with some sense of cultural lineage, meaning, and individual integrity. *Mele Kanikau* was his first published play after returning to the islands from his twenty-year stint in Hollywood, writing screenplays for television programs like *The Wild, Wild West, Mission Impossible,* and *Adventures in Paradise.* As Kneubuhl describes that transition from tinsel town to the islands, "I was successful, but nothing could compensate for the essential hollowness of the work. I ended up feeling more alienated than ever, I quit and came home to Samoa in 1968." In 1975, *Mele Kanikau* appeared on the scene as a script, although

it was not to be staged until 1998, in a very fine production by the Honolulu theater group Kumu Kahua.

In *A Play, A Play,* published fifteen years later, in 1990, Kneubuhl continues his thematic exploration of cultural loss, confusion, and mixed heritage, only here through the vehicle of comedy. Set on the slopes of Volcano, Hawai'i, this drawingroom farce introduces James, an upper-crust, part-Hawaiian playwright on the verge of liquidating the venerable family homestead and running off to sip his sherry in Europe. However, in a supernatural turn of events, he reawakens to his cultural heritage thanks to a mysterious, antic visitation from the legendary goddess Madame Pele and her lively entourage of differently-gendered alter egos of various ages and sexual preferences.

Here, again, we find the layering and play of story lines: real, imagined, and legendary. Here that play is explicitly drawn with characters cast in dual roles, both as "actors" performing roles and also as the fictional characters themselves. The actors/characters weave back and forth between realities of fact and fiction. For example, our hero James Alama has an alter ego, "James Actor," who is the first to confirm the alarming discovery that he and the other characters are mere creations of some offstage someone called the playwright. There is much ado about mistaken identity, sexual frolic between humans and spirits, and parallel narratives that question the "real" and "unreal" as actors step in and out of role to ponder the deeper meanings of their provisional existence as "creations" of the playwright, who could well be nothing more than "some jerk . . . shooting his mouth off."

The actors/characters' ultimate realization and fright about their tenuous existence mirrors Kneubuhl's "real" story, his own fears about Hawaiians losing their cultural identity and thus any meaningful sense of self. Much of the farce turns on the characters' failure to recognize the legendary goddess Pele in their midst, to admit the ineffability of a native spiritual presence in their human world. She is after all portrayed as an androgynous, shape-shifting, brandy-swilling sexual athlete with a sad story to tell. These lapsed Hawaiians have forgotten what deities are like, how their own deities routinely operated. Only our hero James realizes that "Pele has come to us for a reason so important that it challenges our very right to live . . . she has come here to us so that we might teach her how she might once again be . . . a goddess relevant to our people at this time. . . . Poor Pele, she no longer knows what she is, what to be! . . . Poor us! Poor Hawaiians, we no longer know who we were or who we are. . . . How then can we live into the future . . ."

A Play, A Play marks a watershed in the development of Kneubuhl's poetics. While the familiar themes and parallel story lines are here, in this play Kneubuhl's aesthetic form blossoms through the humor of *fale aitu*

(house of the spirits), traditional Samoan satirical theater. Many of the classic earmarks of *fale aitu* are here, all at the service of highlighting fundamental questions of human existence, identity, and folly: the "breaking frame" of characters who step in and out of role to comment self-reflexively and ironically on the ambiguous nature of their dual identities (fictional character or human actor?), the elaborate word play with double entendre and punning, the stock characters like the wily female impersonator played by a straight actor, the ribald sexual humor. The two decades Kneubuhl had now spent rerooting himself in his native Samoan soil are evident in the flowering of indigenous aesthetic form in this play. Early in Act 1, James comments on his recently completed play: "It is as if, with this one play, I've discharged all my debts. My debts to this house where I was born and raised. My debts to my father and mother . . . and to my ancestors. My debts to my people. All over and done with. All paid." Surely it is no coincidence that these lines were written in the last several years of Kneubuhl's life.

Some say that *Think of a Garden,* Kneubuhl's last work, is his most "Samoan" play, because of its explicit subject and setting in Samoa. I would argue, however, that the penultimate *A Play, A Play* is his most "Samoan" work, at least by formal standards, because its aesthetic configuration, conventions, and stage business are so distinctively patterned on *fale aitu.* In the final scenes, the actors/characters agonize over their questionable existence as mere "creations" of some offstage "jerk." "He's working himself out. To find himself. Create himself. And in that work, he needs us. He becomes himself, through us. . . . He needs us, desperately. . . . He has made some mistakes that have to be corrected, different new tacks to try . . . a new way of hoping." Mirroring *fale aitu*'s traditional cultural role as a site for the transformation of social tensions through satirical humor, Kneubuhl aptly concludes *A Play, A Play* with a typically intertextual flourish: characters articulating his poetic project.

In Kneubuhl's last play, *Think of a Garden* (1991), we find a Samoa of the late 1920s, in which parallel worlds of human and nonhuman beings again come into direct play, this time intersecting with the historical narrative of the Western colonial invasion. Here, the writer/narrator explains at the outset that the young David, another mixed-blood hero, is actually modeled on himself as a child. The only offspring of Luisa, his "high-born" Samoan mother, and an enterprising American father, the ten-year-old David finds himself largely isolated from village life, thanks to Luisa's superiority complex toward the "common" villagers and his father's reservations about his son growing up "half-savage." David's lot worsens when he is stoned by an angry villager who objects to his disturbing their dead by befriending the ghost of a long-dead child.

David's stoning coincides with the political assassination of Western Samoa's paramount chief and resistance leader, Tupua Tamasese, who also happens to be an esteemed relative of Luisa's. As her brittle composure shatters under the weight of shock and grief, David snaps in his own wrenching way under the combined pressures of his mother's hysterical grief as well as her chronic obsession with social status and light skin color. In the ensuing emotional crisis, the family splits up; David is sent abroad to school, while his father and beloved uncle go their separate ways, leaving behind the bewildered Luisa for good, with "her confusion and her heartbreak . . . fruitcake and nausea, in a world of goodbyes."

Near the end of the play, an adolescent David visits home from the big city and finds the vividly remembered world of his boyhood to be oddly shrunken. He realizes that the flowers in the precious garden of memory were, like his only friend, completely imaginary. Suddenly we too can perceive David's imagination as magical refuge from a world of wrenching alienation and inexplicable loss, that imagination itself as a space of resistance against the vagaries of tormented adulthood and history. We might then hear an echo of the grown-up David/writer/character's invitation at the play's opening, "to think of that garden now as if it existed in your minds as truly and as beautifully as it did for me."

In *Think of a Garden,* the parallel narrative to David's personal story is one of Samoa's struggle for political independence from colonialist rule by New Zealand. By linking the boy's coming of age narrative to that of Tupua Tamasese, Samoa's Martin Luther King, Kneubuhl gives us an exquisite analogy. David's imagination as a site of personal resistance against the internalized colonialism of his parents becomes a mirror to Tamasese's political resistance against the colonial oppression of the West. In both narratives, the consequence of that resistance is self-determination. David is emotionally freed to move toward manhood, and Samoa is politically freed to move toward independence.

In the closing lines of the play, in the closing days of his life, John Kneubuhl, the native son come home at last, makes his farewells along with the writer/character perhaps, "repeating my goodbyes to that little boy and to his garden. . . . Never be far from me, little one. Lodge yourself in me, somewhere in the words I will seek all my life, and there, cry out your hurt, and cry until the words become a brown and shining young man" (the pacifist Tamasese, just prior to being gunned down) "raising his hands high and calling above the clamoring pain around us, 'Peace! Peace!'"

With the publication of this trilogy, John Kneubuhl's endowed chair in Pacific theater should be permanently secure. We can retire his jersey. This

work wondrously manages to synthesize postmodern and ancient aesthetics of intertextuality, while engaging modernist themes of loss and alienation. While the plays occasionally lapse into maudlin pontificating (missionary genes acting up?) and romanticized breast-beating about a lost Golden Age of cultural "authenticity," these are surely minor blemishes on the otherwise luminous stage of Kneubuhl's consummate artistry.

The long-awaited publication of *Think of a Garden and Other Plays* in this well-designed format from University of Hawai'i Press makes a major contribution to the field of Pacific literatures in English. An afterword by Jackie Pulani Johnson, "Editor's Note" by Vilsoni Hereniko, glossary, and footnoted translations of Samoan and Hawaiian segments offer readers an accessible, well-rounded presentation of the plays. Their availability in print, thanks to this excellent volume, should go a long way toward ensuring the wide readership and careful study such important work deserves.

Richard Feinberg, ed., *Seafaring in the Contemporary Pacific Islands: Studies in Continuity and Change.* DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995. Pp. 245, illus. US$35 cloth.

Reviewed by Nicholas J. Goetzfridt, University of Guam

There has been an interesting as well as a tired dichotomy of thinking about "voyaging" in the Pacific. Interesting because of questions concerned with the ability of voyagers to control their efforts across vast areas of a watery space in order to reach land and, in the settlement eras, to successfully prosper and possibly engage in return voyages of communication. These speculations, attempts at documentation through the paucity of European references to these voyagers, and the practical experiments undertaken by David Lewis and Ben Finney are all concerned with what must be seen as incredible journeys, regardless of how they were actually achieved.

The thinking has been tired because of a habitual practice in all kinds of literature, both scholarly and popular, to assign an either/or identity to "voyaging." As we are occasionally told in comments usually tucked away in the bowels of some greater concern with modernity, this voyaging, for all its illustrious past, is now "dead." And as such, it wallows in the past. It is only the romantics, the individuals pricked by a yearning for the spectacular, who resist recognizing this foundational fact of Pacific life. Outboard motors and jet planes have nothing to do with this heritage. It is a loss basic to "contact"

and to degrees of acculturation that have transported much of the Pacific, including many of its most far-flung islands, into closer and closer contact with the "global community."

It is true that the literature on voyaging is filled with both fascinating and questionable conjectures on the capabilities of indigenous, noninstrumental voyagers of the past and, in the case at least of Polowat and Satawal, the present. Putting aside discussion and tests concerned with basic questions related to determining set and drift (which would include the pioneering computer simulations of drift and navigated voyages by Levison, Ward, and Webb [1973] and the voyaging experiments recorded by Lewis [1972] and Finney [1988]), expanding landfall targets by swells, bird observations, and stellar routes at sea, there is still plenty in the literature that provides a rich collection of issues and perspectives on the voyaging heritage of Oceania. These would include Tupaia's map dictated to Captain Cook in 1769 that speaks directly to the question of indigenous geographic knowledge of distant islands before contact, the map's translations and reversals of Tupaia's intents by Forster (1777) and Hale (1846), Lewthwaite's 1966 defense of his characterization of Tupaia as a "Polynesian geographer," Hornell's 1935 attempt to draw a parallel between Scandinavian and Oceanic boat construction as well as all the other attempts to make cultural and material diffusion connections across the Pacific. This material achieved its best and most elaborate expression in Haddon and Hornell's *Canoes of Oceania* (1975). On the borderline would be the early debates on the "sacred calabash" supposedly used on the Tahiti to Hawai'i leg and enabling one to make an accurate westward turn to landfall in Hawai'i by lining Polaris up at a 19-degree angle in one of the three-foot calabash's four holes drilled near its top (Rodman 1928), Sanchez y Zayas's 1866 reference to a cane filled with water used at night to determine latitude, traditional references to arrivals at the ice-chunked seas of the Antarctic (Best 1923), and references to a Fijian navigational string chart (Smith 1891). At the representative edge would probably be Jourdain's 1970 speculation that Tahitians may have used a land-finding technique consisting of a small pig that, after being tossed overboard, would have immediately turned toward the nearest island because of its strong sense of smell.

What this epistemology of "voyaging" undercuts in visions of a greater past are the complexities of social and cultural relations that allow for the importation of the human compulsion to move that is apparent in "voyaging," to its relevant function in symbolism, mythology, and identity. The death of "voyaging" in Peter H. Buck's images of Kupe (1926) do not (and actually could not) mean the death of its social and cultural heritage. To do so is to force a Eurocentric standard, a stubborn phenomenology, if you will, of the

kind of grandeur that washes over early texts on the noble savage. What has been needed is a new approach to voyaging that allows for the exploration of its human and cultural roots in contemporary Pacific societies.

Fortunately Richard Feinberg's edited collection of papers, *Seafaring in the Contemporary Pacific Islands: Studies in Continuity and Change,* finally offers this approach and serves to reflect what has always been a part of voyaging, its canoes and its subjects. Laurence M. Carucci's work, for example, on the "Symbolic Imagery of Enewetak Sailing Canoes" notes that "the Enewetak and Ujelang people, like the residents of Sikaiana [examined in this volume by William H. Donner], are unceasing sailors, whose love for the sea will long outlive the last canoe. The trope that equates life with canoe voyages dominates daily discussion now as in the past" (p. 19).

Sailing, regardless of its distance, involves the transformation of the "magical potency of the wind into directed activity," rendering power unto the otherwise socially restricted individual (p. 21). Carucci elaborates upon the semantics of the canoe and the terminological extension of its components to those of the vehicles of "contact," such as the automobile, and of the inheritance of power through sailing and by harnessing the supernatural dimensions in a distant sky and the sea. Canoes further reflect hierarchical relationships of Enewetak people through the responsibilities of individual crew members, whose cooperation, however, also provides a representation of "people's interdependence in the voyage through life" (p. 25). Canoes in fact transcend time, even in what Carucci suspects are the waning days of the Enewetak canoe. Although most individuals on Enewetak refer to canoes as still possessing a major part of everyday life, only the aged canoe builders, who regret the passing of an era, refer to these canoes in the past tense. This transcendency of time at the hands of a material object of the past also seems to be reflected in the Enewetak association of sailing skills with the fact that the Marshallese of the Ralik and Ratak chains have not been able to exercise control over the island.

Other papers in this timely collection include Maria Lepowsky's "Voyaging and Cultural Identity in the Louisiade Archipelago of Papua New Guinea," which ties a close analysis of canoes and sailing in with the ceremonial interisland exchanges and feasting Lepowsky depicted in her *Fruit of the Motherland* (1993). The cosmology of the sea and voyaging is laden with mythical figures and supernatural forces that do not need voyages of significant distance to materialize. The flying witches Malinowski recorded continue to threaten sailing canoes and have been blamed for the loss of three canoes, all originating from the witch-infested island of Motorina. Spirits also reside in more dangerous reef passages and whirlpools. But despite these dangers, interisland voyaging in the archipelago represents a defiance of outside

bureaucratic interferences that have attempted, in both political and religious formats, to discontinue this fundamental part of ceremonial practices. External attempts to suppress these traditional means of transporting significant cultural goods and the inherent motives and consequences of these attempts have only strengthened a sustained and determined sense of cultural and social autonomy.

Donner's "From Outrigger to Jet: Four Centuries of Sikaiana Voyaging" also complements Lepowsky's work by expanding upon a characteristic "voyaging ethic" of Sikaiana life (p. 144). In this ethic, there is the desire to voyage (to travel), to participate in the vibrant voyaging "metaphors of social life" (p. 150), and to engage in voyaging by either outrigger or plane. The act of voyaging is surrounded by a "system of symbols and meanings that organizes experience and behavior" (p. 144). Donner's discussion on these metaphors expands their foundational origins into the areas of song, courtship, and the identification of terms that commonly refer to any vehicle of transport. "Lulu" designates the steering of either a canoe or a car and "vaka" (boat) applies to all vehicles, regardless of their speed. As a metaphor, seafaring enables the equating of the danger of a secret love affair to a dangerous voyage. And without a wife, a man describes himself as "an outrigger without the parts that are essential for navigation" (p. 151).

Alan Howard examines indications of previous navigational knowledge among the people of Rotuma that are found in scattered sections of early logbooks, journals, and legends. They suggest previous voyages to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Tikopia, Kosrae, and even to Raiatea in the Society Islands. Large double canoes were found by Wood in 1875 to have fallen into disuse. Howard summarizes the basics of Rotuman canoe construction gleaned from sources of the late nineteenth century and from McGregor's 1932 field notes, which include a Rotuman canoe lexicon that Howard provides in a table encompassing McGregor's notes with those from Churchward's 1940 dictionary of the Rotuman language. A seafaring tradition transformed itself into the service of Rotuman men on European ships, providing them with not only extensive experience at sea (and providing Rotuman society with information sources on the outside world), but also with a relatively high level of income for an isolated island. Historical sources demonstrate that Rotuman men were habitually referred to as sought after, high quality sailors—characteristics that extend to their present-day employment as crewmen. And although there are no canoe journeys beyond Rotuma's own reef, "travel abroad, in general, is metaphorically a sailing experience, and at its core remains a canoe journey" (p. 134). Howard suggests that the distinction Rotuman sailors have earned for themselves may be a consequence of the strong "personal characteristics" (p. 138) of good seamen that they already possessed and that the

symbolic centrality of sailing and the canoe in Rotuman culture may be a reflection of this. Howard also underlines the fact that, although there may be a collective, emotional ambivalence to the sea, it nevertheless remains defined by its mystique, part of which provides for a cultural, idiomatic association of sea and sky.

Other papers in this collection include Susan Montague's focus on one of the few indigene-constructed boat harbors in the Pacific, at Kaduwaga in the northern Trobriand Islands, and the harbor's historical and contemporary role in establishing Kaduwaga's place as a commercial and communication center. It remains a center that is particularly significant for repairs and replenishing of canoes for return voyages to other points in the Trobriands. Harry Powell examines the political dynamics derived from seafaring on Kiriwina, the main island of the Trobriands, particularly the northeastern Kiriwinans' political motivations in maintaining a strong position in the *kula* competitive gift-exchange system that subsequently served to preserve the northeastern canoe construction and sailing traditions. Edvard Hviding argues that the people of the Marovo Lagoon in the Solomon Islands, while engaged in contemporary seamanship involving large canoes with outboard motors, maintain a linkage of cultural identity with a voyaging past. This linkage emphasizes the "symbolic significance of an intimately known and classified seascape" (p. 90) that provides a well-maintained understanding of the significance of stories and traditions that form the contextual value of place names. Feinberg continues with his work on Nukumanu in a paper that draws upon the "continuity and change" in Nukumanu seafaring evident in the cosmological adaptation of things European as well as in the beneficial force of this cosmology, reflected in the continuation of single outrigger canoes and numerous sailing techniques of their Nukumanu ancestors. Nukumanu's relative isolation, small population, and location relative to islands that provide reasonably good prospects for successful landfall (in Nukumanu's case, these voyages are often to Ontong Java) have all served to make it possible for Nukumanu to maintain comparatively more of its seafaring traditions. Although Howard, Powell, and Montague each provide single-page illustrations of some aspect of canoe construction, Feinberg's chapter offers several drawings on Nukumanu canoe structures and riggings as well as several Nukumanu identifications of constellations with approximate English translations and common Western identifications of these stars.

Finally, Gene Ammarell examines the continuity points of seafaring among the Bugis of South Sulawesi, Indonesia. These are most clearly manifested in navigational techniques involving star paths, swells, tides, wind patterns, and other aids in land finding. The process of dead reckoning increasingly involves the use of the magnetic compass, although there are clear indica-

tions from Ammarell's fieldwork that its use as a reference in numerous examples is secondary and that star courses can serve as a comparable substitute. Ammarell's narrative on this navigation among traders, whose voyages include the 212 nautical miles from Ujung Pandang to Bima, is supplemented by several illustrations of Bugis trading boats. Ammarell also includes illustrations of twelve- and sixteen-point variants of the wind compass, which indicate discrepancies between the wind compasses in both Polynesia (particularly Tikopia and Anuta) and in Micronesia. The illustration of the Micronesian version appears to generally correspond with points of the international compass. Ammarell also includes several interesting, illustrated perspectives on the Bugis stars and asterisms of the southern and northern skies and a few comparative Bugis and Western designations of constellations and asterisms that appear to provide for the use of guiding stars in voyages to the east and west. Bugis maritime technology and its retention and modification, like those of other islands and island groups examined in this collection, is affected by physical, social, and economic factors; these factors deserve additional study in the context of contemporary seafaring.

The book's epilog, written by Ward Goodenough and Feinberg, provides an effective tying together of the spiritual dimensions that have an impact across all these environments. Seafaring's functional role as a metaphor of life and indigenous identity is, overall, a common theme throughout these studies, which serves to distance the common requirement that voyaging and the sea be affiliated with the spectacular. With this book's overdue focus on the impact of a voyaging heritage and the living of lives in accordance with change and continuity, it is possible to talk genuinely about relevance, practice, and spirit in the same breath. For this reason alone, but also for the depth of fieldwork and the quality of its conveyance throughout these papers, it is difficult to find something to criticize about this book. It makes the bifurcation of thinking about voyaging a point at which the understanding of change is either to assume a process of perpetual loss or the creation of new ways to explore what has been a part of Pacific societies for so long.

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David Lipset, *Mangrove Man: Dialogics of Culture in the Sepik Estuary.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xviii, 335, illus., bib., index. US$59.95 cloth; $22.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern, University of Pittsburgh

David Lipset has given us a rich ethnographic account of the Murik people, who live between the ocean and the inland lagoon system of the Murik lakes in the Sepik area of Papua New Guinea. His account stems from his research in the area during the 1980s and 1990s and is enhanced by the work of Kathleen Barlow and supplemented by secondary sources and documentation dating back to 1913.

Mangrove Man's theoretical thread is an examination of the gendered dialogue that underlies the sociality of the Murik. Lipset develops the notion of "maternal schema" (a phrase that he says was first used by Barlow in 1985) to provide his exegesis of how Murik men contextualize their places within their lived experiences: "Actors may explicitly acknowledge being guided by the maternal schema in certain situations . . . while in others they presume it. . . . What is culturally distinctive about 'the mother' is that, while the exterior and visible conduct of her mothering offers to them a model for moral behavior and order, qualities and substances inside of her body, particularly her powers of sexuality and fertility, the men stigmatize" (p. 3). Lipset states that this is a "hidden dialogue" through which Murik men negotiate the maintenance of Murik culture in which "ideas of domination, autonomy and so forth fail to apprehend the complexity of their [Murik men's] engagement with and responsiveness to the 'maternal schema' " (p. 3). Lipset's aim is to "analyze the terms in which men think through, live, create, and negotiate culture, as if they were responding to a particular schema of the maternal body" (p. 6). This maternal schema provides a gendered framework through which to view Murik society—one that attempts to acknowledge the male/female symbolic, physical-biological, and psychological duality and, at one and the same time, the unity presented in his materials.

The canoe and its gendered symbolism are central to the Murik people and to the analytical overlay of the maternal schema. A pregnant woman is said to be the "canoe of the fetus" (p. 54); a husband is said to be a "canoe hull" and his wife, the "outrigger float." The heraldic titleholders are also described as being " 'canoes' for their heraldry . . . [who] ought to act 'like a mother,' through feast making and the bestowal of *sumon* upon children" (*sumon* being defined by Lipset as "sacred, heraldic ornaments that repre-

sent the corporation, authority, moral order and jural identity of a descent group") (pp. 129–130).

Outrigger canoes are manufactured from canoe logs within a temporary structure (the *gai' suumon*) in a ritual atmosphere that excludes the physical presence of women. Here the men work (often naked) in the symbolic equivalent of the birth house, from which men are excluded. During the carving of the canoe, celibacy must be observed and if the taboo is broken, it is thought that the hull of the canoe will split open "like a woman's genitals" (p. 42, citing Barlow 1985). Murik women are seen to possess the powers to send out a canoe with its crew and to make it return again to the community. While a canoe is away with its crew the steersman's wife must adhere to a series of taboos: chopping firewood might cause the canoe to split open and sink, and having sexual intercourse with one of her husband's rivals may cause her husband's canoe to "mimic the undulations she makes," causing the boat to sink (p. 44).

Like Annette Weiner's work on gendered aspects of sociality among the Trobriand Islanders, *Mangrove Man* challenges the reader to think critically about gendered symbolism and identities.

Parts 2 and 3 of the book continue the analysis of the maternal schema. First Lipset contrasts it with the images of the masculine, agressive body in which "passions and fluids overflow" (p. 135) and of the female sexual body, represented by female spirits. The maternal moral order is satirized and mocked in *mwara* rituals—enacted by the classificatory mother's brothers and father's sisters of a given person—that openly refer to the polluting but vital inner fluids of the body and its sexuality. Other rituals enact the jealousy between elder and younger brothers (characteristic of systems of primogeniture), which Lipset interprets as local versions of the Oedipal struggle.

Depicting in detail two sequences of disputes in 1981–1982, emerging out of sexual transgressions and jealousies, he further argues that these sequences showed a transition from aggressive display to a restatement of the maternal schema (p. 251) in the first case and a failure to do so in the second, correlated with the general developing problems of social control in Papua New Guinea in the 1980s and 1990s. Whether the maternal schema can constrain and restrain the conflicts that emerge in today's multilayered and complex arenas, in Murik and elsewhere, seems to be uncertain. The Bakhtinian dialogues that Lipset identifies as at the heart of Murik sociality have grown less coherent, more cacophonous; talking at or past the other rather than with the other, as partner. But some of the roots of "breakdown" can be seen already in the indigenous dialogue itself, in which aggression and mockery are counterposed to peacefulness and praise.

This book is a well thought through, informative ethnography that should inspire students and stimulate further anthropological debate among scholars, particularly because of the originality of its approach and basic concepts. We add only one minor note of caution. On p. 10 the author refers to "non-Austronesian speaking inland New Guinea and its deeply misogynist male cults." Misogyny, however, is not necessarily at the heart of these cults, at least in the western part of the highlands of Papua New Guinea. Rather, they are founded on the same kind of model of collaborative tempering of qualities and fusion of gendered values that Lipset himself delineates for the Murik.

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VISUAL MEDIA REVIEWS

Act of War—The Overthrow of the Hawaiian Nation. 1993. Video, 58 min., color. *We Are Who We Were: From Resistance to Affirmation.* 1998. Video, 15 min., color. *The Tribunal.* 1994. Video, 84 min., color. *Mākua —To Heal the Nation.* [1996]. Video, 32 min., color. Directed by Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina; produced by Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina in association with various groups. Nāʻālehu: Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina (P.O. Box 29, Nāʻālehu, HI 96772–0029; fax 808–929–9679; <video@namaka.com>; http://www.namaka.com/). US$15 to $165.

E Ola ka ʻŌlelo Hawaiʻi (May the Hawaiian Language Live). 1997. Video, 28 min., color. Directed by Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina; produced and distributed by ʻAha Pūnana Leo (http://www.ahapunanaleo.org/). US$20.95.

Reviewed by J. Kehaulani Kauanui, Wesleyan University

Imaging Hawaiian Struggle and Self-Determination Through the Works of Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina

MUCH OF THE DISCOURSE on Pacific peoples' use of video production focuses on "preserving culture" through documenting oral histories, indigenous languages, and family genealogies. In Hawaiian contexts, most videos zoom in on resistance to the ongoing neocolonial threats to Hawaiian culture and the suppression of the exercise of Hawaiian sovereignty. Production company Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina is the most prominent force in Hawaiian video creations. Made up of an independent, two-person collaborative team of Puhipau and Joan Landers, Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina has produced more than

fifty videos that have screened around the world—primarily throughout Europe, Asia, and the Pacific. Its works document traditional and contemporary Hawaiian history, culture, and politics. Together the team has been—as the very name Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina suggests—"the eyes of the land": witnessing and documenting struggles on the land. Along with their trans-Pacific circulation, Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina videos have made their way among more Hawaiians than any other videos on Hawaiʻi. More importantly, they have furthered the cause of Hawaiian sovereignty and self-determination, exposing the plight of Hawaiians on-island, proving to be one of the most potent galvanizing forces for both educational and activist purposes.

Adapting technology for emancipatory purposes, these videos work to disrupt common notions that perpetuate myths of Hawaiʻi as a land of no trouble, marking the Islands as site of contestation, where multinational tourism and U.S. militarism perpetuate indigenous invisibility and dispossession. Nā Maka's videos powerfully represent the complexities of struggle: land occupations, arrests, police brutality, county-police destruction of homes, native protests, marches, legal interventions, testimonials, vigils, and public prayer. The relationship between indigenous Hawaiian media and political projects for self-determination grows stronger with the visibility that these videos help to enable. These videos engage the viable models of self-governance, working to highlight Hawaiian national identities, indigenous agency, visual culture, legacies of political activism and social history, self-representation, and historical reenactment. It is no wonder that the team has earned awards from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Hawaiʻi Filmmakers, Hawaiʻi International Film Festival, Columbus International Film Festival, and CINE.

This video review examines five works by Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina. The release of *Act of War—The Overthrow of the Hawaiian Nation* earned Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina broader visibility outside of Hawaiʻi. *Act of War* was funded in part by the Native American Public Broadcast Consortium and the Independent Television Service (I.T.V.S.), a nonprofit funded by the U.S. Congress. It has aired on the Public Broadcasting Service channels numerous times since its release in early 1993 and has been included in many film festivals internationally, winning awards around the globe. Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina created *Act of War* in association with the Center for Hawaiian Studies at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, with Professor Haunani-Kay Trask as executive producer, Professor Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa as the primary historian, and the late Hawaiian novelist John Dominis Holt as contributing writer.

Act of War is in documentary form, with a focus on the events that led to the U.S. overthrow of Queen Liliuʻokalani. With historical enactments using various forms of documentation, *Act of War* is also quite powerful in that its

history is narrated by four contemporary Hawaiian sovereignty activists, including Trask and Kameʻeleihiwa, along with Jon Kamakawiwoʻole Osorio (professor of Hawaiian studies at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa), a Hawaiian historian in his own right, and prominent leader Kekuni Blaisdell, M.D. This video offers a very detailed account of the actors involved in the overthrow situated within a broad account of U.S. imperialism.

Act of War clears a space for more radical voices that continue to develop models of self-governance. To understand this, it is crucial that the video's powerful catalyzing effect be situated in the pre-apology context in which it was released. On 23 November 1993, the United States offered an apology through a joint Senate resolution (Public Law 103–150) to the Hawaiian people for the armed and illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian nation. Before the U.S. apology, leaders within the many sovereignty groups were constantly asked to account for the details of the overthrow as there was little popular consensus expressed over the military conditions under which the United States overpowered the throne. Among many other admissions of U.S. governmental complicity and support of the overthrow, the apology law acknowledges that "the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through plebiscite or referendum." But the apology is only that, a sorry excuse that makes no promise to recognize expressions of Hawaiian sovereignty.

Act of War works to "set the record" in its revision of Hawaiian and U.S. history. It works as counternarrative to the notion that Hawaiian leaders were despotic monarchs who, in the end, were too weak to hold their position. It offers an alternative to the idea that the overthrow was a "revolution" and takes account of the troubling motives involved. But even before grappling with the overthrow, *Act of War* reckons with three main themes that assert new theses regarding discourses of native deviance, depopulation, and the breaking of the *kapu* (sacred) system. For example, *Act of War* uses the texts of foreign explorers, missionaries, and traders to describe the industrious and fine nature of Hawaiians. The video also asserts that the breaking of the *kapu* was part of an indigenous response to the painful loss of mass deaths of Hawaiians, due to foreign diseases, and that Christianity, as an offering of "everlasting life," made sense to people whose world was no longer *pono,* in perfect balance, through practices within the Hawaiian polytheistic belief system. Thus, *Act of War* recreates an indigenous genealogy—a refined claim to the land—and offers a new way to make sense of the losses.

By delineating the history of the overthrow and in speaking to the contemporary struggles for Hawaiian sovereignty, *Act of War* throws Hawaiian national identity into question. Through a "before and after" focus on Hawaiʻi

then and now," the video opens with Trask's forceful assertion, "We are not American." Its ending also resonates with this claim, asking rhetorically: "And what has been the result of becoming part of America?" Here, the video operates as a critical intervention in a pre-apology nationalist context, one that enables broader Hawaiian participation in the struggle for sovereignty by offering a genealogical connection among Hawaiians through recognition of far-reaching dispossession and a movement beyond that loss towards self-determination via a common claim. This emphasis is instrumental within off-island Hawaiian communities in linking them to the movement and the land-based struggles on-island. Considering that nearly half of the Hawaiian people reside on the U.S. continent, this is no small amount of potential impact. Hawaiians from all over are widely recognizing the stakes in supporting the restoration of Hawaiian sovereignty.

We Are Who We Were: From Resistance to Affirmation is a provocative retelling of the dubious way that the United States annexed Hawai'i. Using archival photographs, historical quotes, and film footage, it details the efforts of Hawaiian people to defeat a treaty of annexation in the U.S. Senate. This video—produced collaboratively with the Hawaiian Patriotic League—is based on "Ke Kū'ē Kūpa'a Loa Nei Mākou: Kanaka Maoli Resistance to Annexation," the vital new doctoral thesis of Noenoe Silva (assistant professor of Hawaiian language at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa) that details broad-based Hawaiian opposition to the annexation. This video offers a legal lineage of resistance that supports the contemporary Hawaiian case for independence. *We Are Who We Were* works to shine the "light of knowledge" on conditions previously unknown that are instrumental in Hawai'i's fate. The video begins by marking the date of the "annexation" with a careful rhetorical move that immediately highlights the legal problematic of the transfer of Hawaiian dominion: "or so it appeared"—hence, referring to it as "the annexation that never was." The video delineates a compelling argument, drawing on Kingdom of Hawai'i law, international law, and U.S. law to argue the illegality of the way that the United States incorporated Hawai'i.

Prior to the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i, the United States and the kingdom signed a treaty of friendship, trade, and navigation in 1849. Indeed, at that time, the Kingdom of Hawai'i entered into treaties with over twenty foreign powers. And although U.S. President Cleveland had declared the overthrow an "act of war" after reading an official report written by U.S. Minister Blount, McKinley was soon in office before the United States could move in to rectify the actions of Sanford Dole and his cohort who had formed the Republic of Hawaii on 4 July 1894. McKinley backed the treaty of annexation presented by the Republic of Hawai'i on 16 June 1897. However, the very next day, Queen Liliu'okalani submitted her protest

urging against ratification, noting its violation of international law. The treaty was withdrawn, spurred by this memorial that documented mass Hawaiian opposition.

Hawaiian resistance in the Islands was fierce. As the video shows, a Hawaiian patriotic league called Hui Aloha ʻĀina was central to organizing these efforts to stop annexation. In a rally at ʻIolani palace, James Kaulia, president of the Hui Aloha ʻĀina, said that agreeing to annexation was "like agreeing to be buried alive." Kaulia called for mass opposition that consisted of a two-month-long, full-scale petition drive. By boat, horse, and foot, the Hui Aloha ʻĀina gathered more than twenty-one thousand signatures by November 1897. Another pro-Hawaiian group, called Hui Kālaiʻāina, also circulated a petition. Its petition called for the restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy, signed by over seventeen thousand Hawaiians. It is for the finding of these petitions that Silva is credited, since their existence had faded from public memory. Both petitions were formally accepted in December 1897 when representatives from each group traveled together to Washington from Hawaiʻi. Thus, the treaty of annexation was dead.

For a short time, annexation was stalled. But American empire builders gained a stronghold after the United States declared war on Spain. As part of the U.S. military efforts in the Philippines, Congress passed a joint resolution in July 1898 "annexing" Hawaiʻi by a simple majority of each house. After gaining McKinley's signature the document was presented by U.S. Minister Sewall to Dole (of the Republic of Hawaiʻi), who then yielded his authority to the United States. The video underscores the illegality of the transfer by underscoring the point that the resolution was assumed to possess the power and effect of a treaty of annexation.

The problems in *We Are Who We Were* stem from its assertion in the title itself, including its subtitle, *From Resistance to Affirmation*. While the underpinning of Hawaiian sovereignty claims is the insistence that Hawaiian sovereignty is inherent and not extinguished merely because governing mechanisms suppress it, the video ends on a problematic note by claiming that "there was no annexation": "What took place was nothing more than an illusion." Although the legal argument advanced in the production is convincing, this conclusion oversimplifies the legacy of that illegality. Nonetheless, *We Are Who We Were* incites the viewer to seriously ponder the effects of that legacy, legal and otherwise.

The Tribunal is a powerful video that documents the Peoples' International Tribunal, Hawaiʻi, conducted throughout the Islands for twelve days during August 1993. The tribunal—known in Hawaiian as Ka Hoʻokolokolonui Kanaka Maoli—brought together a panel of independent judges consisting of international-law experts, human-rights activists, and indigenous-peoples'

advocates. These judges reviewed multiple charges brought against the United States by the Hawaiian people, represented collectively by more than thirty different Hawaiian pro-sovereignty groups. This video was produced by Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina in cooperation with the tribunal's convener, Kekuni Blaisdell, M.D., and offers a broad examination of contemporary Hawaiian political issues in their historical context. *The Tribunal* allows the viewer an opportunity to witness a variety of moving testimonials offered by Hawaiian people and historians of Hawaiʻi in response to the crimes allegedly committed by the United States: illegal appropriation of lands, waters, and natural resources; economic colonization and dispossession; cultural genocide and ethnocide; destruction of the environment; and violation of domestic trusts such as the Hawaiian Home Lands and so-called ceded lands trust. Perhaps needless to say, the United States did not send a representative to the site to respond to or defend the government against charges—reflected by an empty chair that was marked with a sign that read "U.S. Representative."

The Tribunal offers a rare glimpse of Hawaiians publicly testifying about their situations and desires for self-determination. Many draw from their own histories of dispossession such as family lands confiscated by the U.S. federal government, the missile test launched from sacred burial grounds on Kauaʻi, the ongoing problems with land evictions and ocean access for fishing and gathering, and the abrogation of water rights that affect food cultivation. The video sets the charges lodged against the United States within a serious legal and cultural history that moves through the complex shifts in Hawaiʻi's governance—from the time of the kingdom (1795) through the era of the overthrow (1893) and republic (1894–1898), to the time of annexation (1898) that paved the way for the territorial governance of Hawaiʻi as a U.S. colony (from 1900), to the time of the dubious statehood plebiscite (1959) that fell far short of meeting criteria of international law. Those familiar with the Hawaiian sovereignty struggle will recognize testifiers such as Mililani Trask, Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa, Jon Osorio, Puanani Rogers, Jeff Chandler, Henry Smith, Skippy Ione, Palikapu Dedman, Charles Maxwell, Larry Kimura, Emmett Aluli, and Colette Machado. The representation of the judges' participation also allows the viewer to locate Hawaiʻi's case within the context of global indigenous movements and its evaluation by important figures judging the case: Asthma Khader of Jordan, Hyung Kyung Chung of South Korea, Odo Makoto of Japan, Te Moana Nui a Kiwa Jackson of Aotearoa/New Zealand, Sharon Venne (Cree nation), Ward Churchill (Creek/Cherokee Metis), and prominent U.S. legal scholars Milner Ball and Lennox Hinds. The advocate prosecutors were well-known justice attorneys José Luis Morin, Maivan Clech Lam, and Glen Morris (Shawnee).

Like all of Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina's works, *The Tribunal* also includes a selection of Hawaiian songs and resistance music as well as scenic shots that under-

score the beauty of the land base under siege and the land battles that continue to rage. It is no surprise that this stunning tape won the Web of Time award and won at the Two Rivers Native Film Video Festival of Minneapolis. This video, while longer than the others, is well worth the time and is a number one choice for classroom teaching and community screening because it offers the most variety in screening the contemporary and historical—the documented and the determined.

Mākua—To Heal the Nation brings to the fore a specific case of land occupation and survival. Introduced to the site by Henry David Rosa, the viewer learns how the land at Mākua is being reclaimed for physical and spiritual sustenance. As the video piercingly shows, the people there occupied the land simply to survive. The video was produced and directed by Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina prior to the eviction by the state that took place in June 1996, after the Department of Land and Natural Resources had served the occupiers notice to vacate in March of that same year. Indeed, the work is explicitly an advocacy piece, televised on PBS throughout the United States.

Located at the western tip of the island of Oʻahu, Mākua is situated between beach and valley and has an ancient history of being a *puʻuhonua*, a place of refuge. The U.S. military utilizes the valley of Mākua as a range, just adjacent to the village of people who made Mākua their home. The video opens with Robi Kahakalau singing "Mākua"—a familiar *mele* to all in Hawaiʻi. *Mākua* acknowledges what Mākua means to the people who resides there, including some families who were based there for six years, such as the Kaimanas. We see in the video how people grow sweet potato, pumpkin, watermelon, and squash amidst the threat of the army installation, live ammunition firing, and explosives testing. *Mākua* raises important problems in the struggle to exercise self-determination and self-sufficiency. Aptly, *Mākua*'s subtitle is "to heal a nation." It makes the important linkage between Hawaiian homelessness and its impact on this particular community (which is one of many) to the larger move for Hawaiian recovery.

E Ola ka ʻŌlelo Hawaiʻi (May the Hawaiian Language Live) is an informative and moving video about a form of cultural imperialism exemplified by the legal and cultural suppression of Hawaiian language. This work documents the struggle to revive the Hawaiian language and the ongoing work that enables Hawaiian people to proudly declare that it is indeed alive. The video tells the story of how a steadfast group of scholars and native speakers worked together to bring back the Hawaiian language. This video won the Hawaiʻi Filmmaker's Award and the best documentary under thirty minutes award at the Dreamspeakers Festival.

The Hawaiian language provides a genealogy of the past as well as a source of indignities committed against the Hawaiian people. In the wake of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, the Republic of Hawaiʻi (created by

those who orchestrated that coup) outlawed Hawaiian-language instruction and shut down over one hundred Hawaiian-language newspapers. An 1896 law declared, "The English language shall be the medium and basis of instruction in all public and private schools." This enforced law, along with other forms of political suppression, worked to sever much (but not all) of *ʻōlelo Hawaiʻi* from the tongues of Hawaiian people at large as they suffered systematic punishment and humiliation for speaking the language. As a result, today only a slim minority of Hawaiian people speak Hawaiian fluently, while the vast majority retain a broad Hawaiian vocabulary through familiarity with Hawaiian songs, chants, place names on the land, and the persistence of Hawaiian Creole English, which utilizes Hawaiian words as well as Hawaiian-language sentence structures, albeit with the "pidgin" content.

The 1896 law remained on the books despite the fact that in 1978 the Hawaiʻi State Constitutional Convention determined that the Hawaiian language was to be an official state language, along with English. But it was not until 1987 that the Hawaiian language was finally being taught to children in public schools, beginning with the elementary schools. Before that time, Hawaiian culture keepers and strongholds in different Hawaiian communities gathered to discuss long-term ways to revive the use of the Hawaiian language. Inspired by the Maori preschool program called Kōhanga Reo, these Hawaiians helped to organize the Pūnana Leo (language nest) programs throughout Hawaiʻi beginning in 1984. The first school opened in the small town of Kekaha on Kauaʻi, with other preschools soon flourishing in Honolulu, Hilo, and other cities on neighboring islands. These began as family-based schooling and are an example of cultural autonomy that draws from Hawaiian sources. There are now more than twenty-one schools in the Islands with over a thousand children waiting to gain access to these language nests and the first intermediate and high schools to be run in Hawaiian in more than a hundred years! The newest development is a master's degree in Hawaiian language now offered at the University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo.

The video includes some of the well-known veterans in the movement for Hawaiian-language revival, including Ilei Beniamina and Larry Kimura. *E Ola ka ʻŌlelo Hawaiʻi* also gives the viewer a look at the various Hawaiian immersion schools; protests and rallies in communities and at the State Capitol against finance cutbacks that threatened the programs; the many children speaking Hawaiian with a new sense of self; and an intervention made in the U.S. Congress by two prominent Hawaiian-language teachers in the face of proposed legislation to establish English as the official language of the United States, obviously without any respect to the indigenous languages.

My only critique of this work is that the producers from ʻAha Pūnana Leo do not address the issues of decolonization as they relate to curriculum and pedagogical practices. As a result, one does not get a sense of the values being

taught in the revived language. The form may be Hawaiian, but what is the content?

Now that the revival of the Hawaiian language is at an all-time high, the collective struggle to recover the language is bound to the struggle for land and indigenous empowerment. The push to learn *ʻōlelo Hawaiʻi* signals the broader move to restore Hawaiian sovereignty and exercise self-determination, self-assertion, and self-possession. This revival helps to more fully embody Hawaiian presence on the land on the terms of the Hawaiian people, not, for example, on those of the Hawaiʻi Visitors' Bureau.

The intimate participation of the videomakers in the world of Hawaiian land, struggle, and people certainly makes all of the difference in the ways these videos convey the complexity of the issues at hand with stunning perception that is crucially moving, and sometimes beautiful. The videos also reveal the various types of access available to the videographers—to the contested land sites and the various people, from multiple fronts with (often) competing agendas. This same open access indeed works as a double bond, insuring accountability among those from the local communities. In the works of Nā Maka o ka ʻĀina the stories are whole, and so is the word; whether in the racist utterings of a colonial thief long gone, declarations of past U.S. presidents, the status quo assurance of a state representative, the plea of a Hawaiian child insisting that her tent on the beach is her only home, or in the legal testimonial of a *kupuna* (elder) waving long-held land deeds in hand —the words are represented with integrity. Without any demeaning sound bites or sensationalization, these works succeed in bringing to life, once again, the emotional and material import of the struggle. The viewing of the videos has operated to draw the viewers closer to Hawaiʻi, both literally and actively, in the way of furthering inquiry into the political questions at hand and in reclaiming cultural identities and histories.

Lieweila: A Micronesian Story. 1998. Video, 57 min., color. A film by Beret E. Strong and Cinta Matagolai Kaipat. New York: First Run/Icarus Films (32 Court Street, 21st Fl., Brooklyn, NY 11201; fax: 718–488–8642; <info@frif.com>; http://www.frif.com/). US$390; $75 rental.

Reviewed by Suzanne Falgout and James West Turner, University of Hawaiʻi-West Oʻahu

Micronesia's rich traditional cultures and long and complex histories of colonization and change have only rarely been the subject of ethnographic film. *Lieweila,* "listen to our story," very effectively tells a small part of that history.

The film focuses on the migration and adaptation of the Refalawash (people

of our homeland) to the Northern Mariana Islands. More widely known there as the Carolinians, these are the descendants of peoples from tiny atolls spread over a thousand miles of ocean between Chuuk and Yap. Regarded as some of Micronesia's most skilled seafarers, they had traveled throughout the region, and occasionally beyond, long before the arrival of the Europeans. Early sixteenth-century Spanish observers on Guam recorded visits by Carolinians who had traveled over the northern sea route, called Metawal, to trade with indigenous Chamorro peoples. The Carolinians came to fear the Spanish, and most stayed away from the Marianas for decades at a time. But following a devastating typhoon and earthquake in the early 1800s that flooded atolls in the area, some Carolinians sought refuge in the Marianas. They were welcomed by the Spanish as a potentially valuable source of trade, converts to Christianity, and as a medium for transport and communication to the farther-flung islands in the colony. They were invited to settle the Northern Marianas Islands, which had remained largely empty since the Spanish conquest and forced resettlement of the indigenous Chamorro people to Guam one hundred-fifty years earlier.

In narrating this history of Carolinians in the Northern Mariana Islands, the film effectively weaves together images from early lithographs and photos, information from archival sources, recent film footage of the islands in Chuuk and the Marianas, and interviews with contemporary Carolinians.

The story told is one of the immigrant Carolinian community's struggle to maintain their identity and values over two centuries of contact and change. For almost one hundred years, the Carolinians kept their distance from both the Spanish and Chamorros in Guam and thus were long able to maintain their own language and culture. But the turn of the century ushered in a series of rapid and dramatic changes that would test their cultural resilience: German colonization and privatization of land in 1899; Japanese colonization and large-scale plantation production in 1914; World War II in 1941, including the Battle of Saipan; American liberation and their internment of indigenous peoples in 1944; and the establishment of the United States Trust Territory government in 1947. By mid-century, the Carolinians had begun a process of acculturation and an erosion of their cultural esteem. Furthermore, they had become outnumbered and outcompeted by repatriated Chamorros. They had become the Northern Marianas' minority poor.

The voice that narrates this film—literally and figuratively—is that of one of the first Carolinian attorneys, a woman whose family has been at the center of political ferment in the past several decades. Her father served as the representative of the Marianas' northern islands to the Congress of Micronesia and was a community leader on the remote island of Pagan. He had been influential in introducing social services to this more traditional setting—

Peace Corps teachers, a dispensary, an airstrip, and an agricultural exchange program. With these came the monetization of the Pagan economy, seen as a source of greed and envy within the community. He was killed in 1972 while mediating a dispute. The family's move to Saipan, followed by the forced relocation of the entire community because of an eruption of Mount Pagan, landed them in the midst of rapid political and social transformations. The Northern Marianas had just elected to become a U.S. commonwealth, they had developed their first constitution, and the islands had begun a period of economic boom. Then, the Carolinians were faced with the very difficult task of trying to take the best of both worlds.

The film documents the Carolinians' efforts to maintain what now remains of their language and expressive culture and to renew that which has faded. Two centuries after their separation, they have reestablished ties with those who remained on the atolls of Chuuk and Yap. As elsewhere in the Pacific, canoes and voyaging have been vehicles for their reidentification with their past.

Viewers who are unfamiliar with the cultures of Micronesia and the history of the Northern Marianas may find the early minutes of the film a bit vague about the identity of the people portrayed. Those who are familiar may object to sometimes brief or spotty historical coverage. In addition, the film's fifty-eight minute length may make it a tight squeeze into some classroom periods. Given the filmmakers' ambitious agenda, the beautiful film sequences included, and the overall quality of the production, however, these faults are easily forgiven.

Lieweila fills a real void in the library of ethnographic film on the Pacific. The issues raised within it will resonate with the voices of other Pacific Islanders reasserting their identities in the postcolonial world. The film was recently screened at the Honolulu International Film Festival, where it was well received. It will undoubtedly be of continued value for courses in anthropology, cultural studies, and the Pacific Islands.

Advertising Missionaries. 1996. Video, 52 min., color. Directed by Chris Hilton and Gauthier Flauder. New York: First Run/Icarus Films (32 Court Street, 21st Fl., Brooklyn, NY 11201; fax 718–488–8642; <info@frif.com>; http://www.frif.com/). US$390; $75 rental.

Pacific Passages. 1998. Video, 30 min., color. Produced and directed by Caroline Yacoe, Wendy Arbeit, and G. B. Hajim. San Diego: Media Guild (11722 Sorrento Valley Rd., Ste. E, San Diego, CA 92121; fax 858–755–4931; http://www.mediaguild.com/). US$99.95.

Reviewed by Marta Rohatynskyj, University of Guelph

Although aimed at quite different audiences, both of these films address the relation between the "traditional past" and the "modern present" of Pacific peoples. They both locate the traditional past in the village and the present in urban centers. The bridging of the dichotomy becomes not just a question of geographical and historical relationship, but a moral one as well. In the opening sequence of *Pacific Passages*, set in a museum displaying Papua New Guinean artifacts, the young female narrator claims a maternal link with Papua New Guinea and declares with conviction that the artifacts surrounding her are not exotic but are "part of me, part of my past, they're alive." Toward the end of *Advertising Missionaries*, Aluago, the Huli villager who carries the burden of representing village life, worries about the effect that the coming road, linking his village with the larger centers of Papua New Guinea, will have on the lives of his children. In confronting differences on these many planes, both videos acknowledge the existence of more broadly based identities that have to do with national and regional commonalities. *Advertising Missionaries* points out the detrimental effects of an idealized national culture of consumption on the environment and on cohesive community life while *Pacific Passages* presents to young people a way of looking at themselves as members of a larger Pacific community.

Pacific Passages is aimed at intermediate grades in junior high and high schools. Its goal seems to be to present to students a way of looking at themselves and at their "traditional" past that will inspire an acceptance of a regional identity within the context of a hegemonic Western discourse. Material is presented in four sections: "Origins," "Childhood," "Adult Life," and "Elders." Each section contains a mini-lesson on the history, geography, or anthropology of Pacific peoples as warranted by the topic and makes extensive use of archival film clips from across the Pacific. The narrative lauds the uniqueness of "traditional" aspects of community life and, at times, oversimplifies the contrast between that life and "modern" urban life. We are told in the sequence on "Adult Life" that those living in the village are faced with a clear path: "In the village you don't find an apartment, you build a house." The narrator goes on to say that there is little need for money in the village as everything can be made or grown, and a later sequence points out the difficulties that some Pacific Islanders experience in the move to town. The cautionary tone becomes even more pronounced as high rates of diabetes, obesity, and high blood pressure are attributed to the change from the traditional staple diet to one high in sugar and processed foods. This section ends with a shot of the Bougainville open pit mine while the narrator concludes by saying, "Western culture has changed our relationship with nature. . . . We exchange nature for money."

Aside from what I see as an overstatement of the contrast between the modern and the traditional, village life and town life, exchange economies and commodity economies, the overall message of this film speaks to young people who will have to negotiate major decisions in their lives concerning the quality of their environment, the pitfalls of engaging in the dominant capitalist ethic, and the frustrations of a consumer ideology. It presents these issues in a manner sensitive to viewers immersed in a hegemonic popular culture that rudely devalues noncompliance and brings many to ruin in frustrated desire.

These themes play a major role in *Advertising Missionaries* as well. The style in which they are presented is evocative, however, and they are embedded in the convention of a road film or journey. The film follows a troupe of Papua New Guinean performers whose task is to introduce the relatively unsophisticated inhabitants of the interior of Papua New Guinea to new consumer products. The troupe, composed of Elijah, Tina, Peter, and Robert, assembles in Lae. Traveling in their truck labeled "Walkabout Marketing" they drive into the Highlands, stopping at town markets, encountering rascals on the road as well as tribal fights, and staying overnight in a mission guesthouse. Their journey and experiences are counterposed to those of Aluago, a Huli tribesman who lives a "traditional" life in the "remote" Yoluba Valley. I call attention to these terms because obviously there is a relative remoteness and traditionalism at issue here. The Yoluba Valley does have a road of sorts leading into it; it does have members of a local government council who are fluent in English. Nonetheless, the relative isolation of the valley and Aluago's concern with traditional Huli wig making are used to underscore the very real contrast between his way of life and that of the urban sophisticates who make up the acting troupe.

It is explained by the European director of the advertising agency in downtown Port Moresby that his firm has fielded such a troupe for ten years and that this, itself, testifies to the effectiveness of the technique. Its function is to "follow development" and to be the first to introduce Western commercial goods to remote rural populations. His tone is matter of fact, concerned with increases in product sales. It is Elijah, the leader of the acting troupe, who provides the rhetorical embellishment and makes his quest heroic. In reflecting on his work he claims, "We are missionaries of lifestyle, we are pioneers." Further drawing on the metaphor of missionization into a consumer lifestyle, the narrator declares that the troupe spreads the "gospel of a new way of life."

The tension in the production depends on the counterpoint of Elijah and his troupe, on the road, and Aluago, going about subsistence concerns in his peaceful valley. The opening sequence sets up this opposition by showing the troupe on their makeshift stage before an appreciative market audience,

maniacally brushing their teeth while singing a silly ditty about Colgate toothpaste. There is a cut to Aluago carefully cleaning his perfect, white teeth with only water. The regular cutting back and forth between the two protagonists and their settings sets up a tension of expectation: What will happen when they meet? How will the issues deployed in the subtext be resolved?

The viewer can appreciate the irony in the presentation of Elijah's home and family in Lae as the troupe gathers to start their journey into the Highlands. Elijah is sitting in an easy chair on the veranda of a standard-looking town home. Several small children and other family members are sitting on the floor watching television while eating fast food consisting of french fries, fried chicken, and soft drinks. The camera focuses on the screen, which is showing an advertisement for Tru Kai Rice with the figure of a powerful male flexing his overmuscled arms. One of the small boys mimics the movement with his arms. Later, while explaining the purpose of his work, Elijah posits that his task is to acquaint his less-fortunate fellow citizens with the contents of the "luxury life," referring to the amenities he enjoys in town. As Elijah and his troupe enact ecstasy at the drinking of Coca Cola, as Tina shows village women how to use the detergent OMO in a clear mountain stream, the moral weight of the impending encounter looms.

The strength of this production lies in its ability to raise in the minds of viewers critical issues having to do with the encounter of subsistence village life with the complexities of a hegemonic consumer ethos. It does so subtly and with good humor, pointing out along its picaresque way the present social consequences of that encounter and concerns for the future. It presents no resolution save personal responsibility.

Once Aluago finds his way into the audience of one of the troupe's performances and good humoredly eats a cracker with peanut butter from Tina's hands, he reflects on how both the mission and the theater troupe give instruction on correct lifestyle. He recognizes the challenge to the authority of the elders in that message of the "luxury life." He comments, "When the road comes through, one of the things that will happen is that those kids that don't listen will be killed like frogs. So I will have to shout instructions into their ears, as if I am teaching some wild pigs." A further layer of responsibility is addressed by Elijah in a poignant concluding scene, showing members of the troupe and Aluago's villagers crossing a cane bridge in the primeval mountain forest. Elijah's voice is heard over the background of an indigenous lament, almost in debate with himself, asking who is responsible when the message of the good life results in the frustration of unattainability. He concludes that he can't be assigned the blame, it belongs to those he represents.

Nominated for several awards and shown at international film festivals in recent years, *Advertising Missionaries* will take its place as a classic among

ethnographic films that attempt to portray the encounter between "some of us" and "some of them" distinguished differently on a number of available axes. In such efforts categories become blurred, blame is not easily fixed, and questions of personal moral choice are naggingly exposed. It is a film that has much to say to a wide audience of scholars, students, and the general public.

BOOKS NOTED

RECENT PACIFIC ISLANDS PUBLICATIONS: SELECTED ACQUISITIONS, FEBRUARY–MAY 1999

THIS LIST of significant new publications relating to the Pacific Islands was selected from new acquisitions lists received from Brigham Young University –Hawai'i, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Bernice P. Bishop Museum, University of Auckland, East-West Center, University of the South Pacific, National Library of Australia, Melanesian Studies Resource Center of the University of California–San Diego, Secretariat of the Pacific Community Library, and the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau's Centre for Pacific Development and Training. Other libraries are invited to send contributions to the Books Noted Editor for future issues. Listings reflect the extent of information provided by each institution.

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